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Historical Review.
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SADAO ASADA
*I am grateful to the following friends and colleagues for their valuable sug-
gestions: Barton J. Bernstein, Milton L. Bierman, Roger Buckley,Robert Butow,
Wayne S. Cole, Roger Dingman, EdwardJ. Drea, Robert H. Ferrell, Richard B.
Frank,Hatano Sumio, Waldo H. Heinrichs, Hosoya Chihiro, Akira Iriye, Osamu
Ishii, Michael Schaller,Ronald H. Spector,J. Samuel Walker,D. C. Watt,and Rus-
sell Weigley.
Throughout this article I have adopted the normal Japanese practice of
giving family names first (with the exception of works that have appeared in
English).
1. EdwardJ. Drea, "Previewsof Hell: The End of the Warwith Japan,"Mili-
taryHistoryQuarterly, 7 (1995), 79.
Pacific Historical Review ?1998 by the Pacific Coast Branch American Historical Association 477
Manhattan Project and the decision to use the bomb, but, when
it comes to assessing the significance of the bomb, they base
their interpretation on Blackett.24Arai Shin'ichi has drawn on
American works and the unpublished Stimson diaries for Gem-
baku tokae no michi [The road leading to the use of the atomic
bomb] (1985), which leans toward the "atomic diplomacy" the-
sis and is the only scholarly monograph written by a Japanese
historian.25The eminent political scientist, Nagai Yonosuke, has
published a brilliant theoretical analysis of the American deci-
sion to drop the bomb (1978) that tends to support the "or-
thodox" American interpretation.26
One thing is clear: Like their American colleagues, Japan-
ese historians have not studied sufficiently the crucial period
from Hiroshima to the surrender.27 It may well be that while
the "atomic diplomacy" thesis heightens the Japanese sense of
victimization, it also accords with their general unwillingness to
come to grips with their responsibility for the Pacific War and
its consequences. Consciously or unconsciously, historians have
been affected by this climate of opinion-until recently. On
August 6, 1995, on the fiftieth anniversary of Hiroshima, the
New YorkTimesquoted-or actually misquoted-from the em-
bryonic version of this article, calling me, in an ironic twist of
logic, a "Japanese revisionist." It observed that such "revision-
ists" are still "a tiny minority" but "the taboos are breaking
down in Japan."28 The disappearance of the "taboos" coin-
cided, domestically, with Emperor Hirohito's death in 1989
and, externally, with the end of the Cold War.
Because of the nature of Japanese documentary source ma-
37. Togo,Jidai no ichimen, 342; Togo, The Cause ofJapan, 315; Togo Shigenori,
May 18, 1949, "Statements"; Gaimusho, ed., Shusen shiroku, 4: 58; Sakomizu Hisa-
tsune, April 21, 1949, "Interrogations."
38. Togo, Jidai no ichimen, 342; Gaimusho, ed., Shusen shiroku, 4: 57-58, 60;
Kurihara and Hatano, eds., Shusen kosaku, 2: 355-356.
39. Butow, Japan's Decision to Surrender,12.
40. Kido nikki, 2: 1222; Kido nikki: Tokyosaibanki, 421; Kido kankei bunsho, 84;
Okabe Nagaakira,Arujiju no kaisoroku[Memoirsof a chamberlain] (Tokyo,1990),
177-179.
41. Fujita Hisanori, Jijucho no kaiso [Memoirs of a grand chamberlain]
(Tokyo, 1987), 126.
42. Kido nikki: Tokyosaibanki, 421.
43. Yomiuri,ed., Showashino tenno,4: 310-311.
Togo said, "has not only revolutionized modern warfare but has
also brought about a great social upheaval and transformation
of the daily lives of ordinary individuals as well. This is to
be used as the turning point in bringing an end to the war"-
on condition, of course, that the emperor system be retained.
Emphasizing the urgency of the situation, Togo said that the
United States would continue to drop atomic bombs on Japan-
ese cities, as President Truman had warned, unless Japan
ended the war at once. As Togo recalled in his memoirs, Hiro-
hito emphatically concurred. "That is just so," he replied, and
went on to divulge his own firm determination:
Now that such a new weapon has appeared, it has become less and
less possible to continue the war.We must not miss a chance to ter-
minate the war by bargaining [with the Allied powers] for more fa-
vorable conditions now. Besides, however much we consult about
[surrender]termswe desire,we shallnot be able to come to an agree-
ment. So mywishis to make such arrangementsas will end the waras
soon as possible.44
46. Sakomizu Hisatsune, Dai Nippon teikokusaigo no 4-kagetsu [The last four
months of the Japanese empire] (Tokyo, 1973), 185.
47. Tominaga Kengo, ed., Gendaishi shiryo, 39, Taiheiyosenso (5) [Documents
on contemporary history:The Pacific War] (45 total vols., of which 5 are on the
PacificWar,Tokyo, 1975), 5: 756.
48. Sakomizu,May3, 1949, "Interrogations."
49. "Shusenno shosho: fu shusen hiwa"[Imperial rescripton the war'send
and the taped recording of Sakomizu'stalk] (n.p., 1970?).
50. Gaimusho, ed., Shusenshiroku,4: 100; SuzukiHajime, ed., SuzukiKantaro
jiden [Autobiographyof SuzukiKantaro] (Tokyo, 1985), 294-295.
60. Matsutani Makoto, Dai Toa Senso shushu no shinso [The truth about ter-
minating the Greater East Asian War] (Tokyo, 1980), 172-173; Kurihara and
Hatano, eds., Shusen kosaku, 2: 365.
61. Ibid.,2: 365; Toyoda, Saigo,207-209; Suzuki,ed.,Jiden, 295-296.
62. Gaimusho, ed., Shusen shiroku,4: 119-120, 122-123; Toyoda, Saigo,
207-209; ShigemitsuMamoru,Showano doran[Showa:Yearsof upheaval] (2 vols.,
Tokyo, 1952), 2: 285-286.
atomic bombs and the Soviet entry, would have rejected these
conditions. Insisting on them would have meant fighting to the
last.63The Supreme War Council failed to break the three-to-
three deadlock. Suzuki, Togo, and Yonai insisted on terminat-
ing the war on the sole condition concerning the emperor
system, while Anami, Umezu, and Toyoda called for a decisive
homeland battle unless the United States accepted the three
additional conditions as well.
The climax in the final act of the surrender drama came
in two emergency cabinet meetings, followed by an imperial
conference that lasted into the wee hours of the morning of
August 10. At 2:30 p.m., August 9, the first of the cabinet meet-
ings convened but reached an impasse, requiring a second
meeting at 6:00 p.m. Suzuki opened the first meeting, and
Togo spoke up: There was no hope of obtaining the "three ad-
ditional conditions." Anami fiercely opposed Togo and Suzuki.
In fact, Anami's utterances became almost irrational. As re-
called by those who attended the meetings, Anami declared:
"The appearance of the atomic bomb does not spell the end of
war....We are confident about a decisive homeland battle
against American forces." He admitted that "given the atomic
bomb and the Soviet entry, there is no chance of winning on
the basis of mathematical calculation," but he nevertheless de-
clared that "there will be some chance as long as we keep on
fighting for the honor of the Yamato race.... If we go on like
this and surrender, the Yamato race would be as good as dead
spiritually." Such was the mentality of the Japanese military.
Urged by middle-echelon and young officers who were "half
mad,"Anami would not retreat from making the last sacrificial
homeland battle.64
During the cabinet meeting in the evening of August 9,
Navy Minister Yonai bluntly stated that Japan had no chance
and urged a rational decision, pointing out that Japan had lost
the battles of Saipan, Luzon, Leyte, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa.
Anami retorted that, although Japan had lost battles, it had not
yet lost the war. Now on the defensive, Anami said that all he
could promise was one massive blow against the invading Amer-
ican forces; what he counted on was that American casualties
would be so heavy as to shake American morale and induce a
compromise peace. Again, the three-to-three stalemate totally
paralyzed the government's decision-making.65
As the last measure, Suzuki-in accordance with a scenario
that he had worked out between Kido, Hirohito, and himself-
requested shortly before midnight that an imperial conference
be convened in the underground air-raid shelter of the Imper-
ial Palace.66Suzuki and Togo, of course, knew where the impe-
rial wish lay. Attending the conference were the members of
the Supreme War Council and President of the Privy Council
Hiranuma Kiichiro, with Suzuki presiding. Dressed in full army
uniform and wearing white gloves, the emperor sat in front of a
table covered with a gold-colored tablecloth. In his presence,
Togo and Anami reenacted their confrontation. Hirohito pa-
tiently heard out the heated arguments for some two hours.
Once again, a three-to-three deadlock ensued.67
Then, in an act unprecedented in modern Japanese his-
tory, the prime minister stepped up to the emperor's seat,
bowed deeply, and submitted the matter for an imperial deci-
sion. Hirohito saw that only his direct intervention could save
the situation. Breaking his customary silence, he made the
"sacred decision." Speaking with emotion but in a quiet tone of
voice, Hirohito said he agreed with Togo, ruling that the Pots-
dam terms be accepted. "Especiallysince the appearance of the
atomic bomb," he said, continuation of war spelled needless
suffering for his subjects and Japan's ruin as a nation. He rep-
rimanded the army and pointed out the discrepancy between
its promise and performance, referring to the army's failure to
complete defense preparations for the Kujukuri coastal plain,
a key point to repel an American invasion of the Kanto (Tokyo)
Plain. Thus at 2:30 a.m. on August 10, the "sacreddecision" was
made to accept the Potsdam terms on one condition: the "pre-
I surmise that the atomic bomb was dropped with the intention of
posing a grave threat to Japanese leaders and the people at large,
forcefullycompelling them to end the war.And certainlythe bomb
had that effect. However,we of the peace party had alreadybeen
schemingfor a terminationof the war,and it is not correctto saythat
we were drivenby the atomicbomb to end the war.Rather,it mightbe
said that we of the peaceparty wereassisted by the atomic bombin our en-
deavorto end thewar.72(emphasis mine)
72. Ibid.
73. Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On ActiveServicein Peaceand
War(New York, 1948), 626. Stimson and his colleagues had been following the
power strugglewithin the Japanese government through interceptedJapanese ca-
ble messages.
74. Stimson and Bundy, OnActiveService,620-624, 630-632; Diary of Henry
L. Stimson (on microfilm;original in Yale UniversityLibrary),entries of June 18
and July 2, 1945;ForeignRelations,1945: TheConferenceof Berlin,1: 888-892.
75. Takagi Sokichi, Takagi kaigun shosho oboegaki [Memoranda of Rear Ad-
miral Takagi] (Tokyo, 1979), 351; Takagi Sokichi and Sanematsu Yuzuru, eds.,
Kaigun taisho YonaiMitsumasa oboegaki[Memoranda of Admiral Yonai Mitsumasa]
(Tokyo, 1978), 153-154.
76. Takagi, Takagi oboegaki,227.
77. Tominaga, ed., Gendaishi shiryo, 39: Taiheiyosenso (5), 743, 745; Takagi,
Takagi oboegaki,180, 198, 227.
78. Kido nikki, 1: 28-29, 2: 1020; Kido kankei bunsho, 46. The position of Hiro-
hito is critically treated in the following works: Tanaka Nobumasa, Dokyumento
showatenno,Vol. 5: Haisen2 [A documentaryhistoryof ShowaEmperor,Vol. 5: De-
feat] (7 vols., Tokyo, 1988); YamadaAkira and KoketsuAtsushi, Ososugitaseidan:
Showa tenno no senso shido to senso sekinin [The sacred decision that came too late:
ShowaEmperor'swarguidance and warresponsibility](Tokyo,1991); and Yoshida
Yutaka,Showatennono shusenshi[A history of Showa Emperor'swar termination]
(Tokyo, 1992). Bix's "Japan'sDelayed Surrender"relies heavilyon these works.
79. Togo,Jidan no ichimen, 329-330; Togo, Cause ofJapan, 299; Hayashi, ed.,
Nihon shusenshi, vol. 2, passim.
80. Terasaki Hidenari and Mariko Terasaki Miller, eds., Showa tenno
dokuhakuroku, TerasakiHidenari goyogakari nikki [Monologues of Showa Emperor
and the diaries of TerasakiHidenari] (Tokyo, 1991), 101-102.
81. Takagi, Takagi oboegaki,227-228.
82. Ibid., 228-229; Hosokawa Morisada,Joho tennoni tassezu[Information
that never reached the emperor] (2 vols., Tokyo, 1953), 2: 385.
Missed Opportunities
Some have argued that if the United States had only mod-
ified its "unconditional surrender" formula and explicitly guar-
anteed the continuation of the imperial institution, Japan
would have surrendered earlier, before the use of the atomic
bomb. This was the view of Acting Secretary of State Joseph C.
Grew, who urged President Truman to include an announce-
ment to this effect in the Potsdam Declaration. An early draft
of the proclamation, submitted to Truman on July 2, contained
an explicit assurance of "a constitutional monarchy under the
present dynasty."However, this passage was deleted from the fi-
83. Kido nikki, 2: 1209-1210; Kido kankei bunsho, 75-77; Gaimusho, ed.,
Shusen shiroku, 3: 91-94.
84. Kido nikki, 2: 1212-1213.
85. Sakomizu, Dai Nihon teikoku,28.
86. Kido nikki: Tokyosaibanki, 444; Butow, Japan's Decision to Surrender,231.
suade the military: "We have lost a scientific war. The people
may be dissatisfied with the military for the defeat. But if we say
we lost a scientific war, the people will understand."113
After the war Kido stated: "If military leaders could con-
vince themselves that they were defeated by the power of sci-
ence but not because of lack of spiritual power or strategic
errors, this could save their face to some extent."114In fact,
some army men accepted the argument that "the Japanese mil-
itary would never lose a war, but now that Japanese science has
been beaten, we must end the war just as soon as possible."
Along the same lines, Sakomizu, chief cabinet secretary, re-
called:
He added that "in ending the war, the idea was to put the re-
sponsibility for defeat solely on the atomic bomb, not on the
military. This was a clever pretext." From that viewpoint, the en-
deavor to end the war may be said to have been "a search for
ways to save the military's face," although such a face-saving ar-
gument was not needed for the highest army officials, Anami
and Umezu.115
As Sakomizu recollected, "Itwas commonly understood at
that time that the invention of the atomic bomb spelled the
end of the war. The power that possessed the atomic bomb will
win the war."116 In point of fact, the Japanese government and
the military had embarked on research on the bomb. Prime
Minister Tojo Hideki took a personal interest in the Japanese
bomb project, believing that "the atomic bomb would spell the
difference between life and death in this war."It was the con-
Is there not somehow a way to invent a new weapon that would fore-
stall the enemy? If we had such a weapon, it will be no problem to at-
tack [and recapture] Iwo Jima, the Ryukyus, and the Marianas.... It
would then be possible to annihilate the enemy's task force and attack
the mainland of the United States, thus turning the tables and af-
fording a golden opportunity to reverse the tide of war. Oh, what a
pity!118
Conclusion
The above analysis has shown that in August 1945 Japan's
peace party made the maximum political use of the atomic
bomb to end the war. To them the bomb was "a gift from
Heaven," "a golden opportunity,"and "apsychological moment"
to end the war; they saw the bomb as "assisting"their peace ef-
forts and as a means for the military to save face. But such a util-
itarian viewpoint, which regarded the atomic bomb merely as an
expedient for inducing surrender, hardly prompted an aware-
ness of the transformation wrought in the fabric of interna-
tional society by the appearance of the nuclear weapon.
Regarding the bomb as if it were a natural calamity also inhib-
ited soul-searching reflection on the war that Japan had started
and lost. An embodiment of scientific advances that went be-
117. Boeicho Boei Kenshujo Senshi Shitsu (War History Office, Defense
Agency), Senshisosho:Hondobokusakusen[Warhistory series: Air defense of the
homeland] (Tokyo, 1968), 632.
118. Yomiuri,ed., Showashino tenno,4: 310.
129. Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars:A Moral Argument with Historical Il-
lustrations(New York,1977), states:"Inthe summer of 1945, the victoriousAmer-
icans owed the Japanese people an experiment in negotiations. To use the atomic
bomb... without even attempting such an experiment, was a double crime" (pp.
263-268). Would such an "experiment"have met conditions demanded by Japan-
ese military?Martin Sherwin's "Hiroshimaat Fifty"offers yet another scenario:
Stimson could have declared that "our nation is too moral" to use the atomic
weapon and dissuaded President Truman from using it.
The moral ambiguities inherent in the use of the atomic bomb are more ju-
diciously treated by Melvyn P. Leffler, "Truman'sDecision to Drop the Atomic
Bomb,"IHJBulletin,15 (1995), 1-7. The psychological-and moral-implications
of the bomb are discussed at length in Lifton and Mitchell, Hiroshimain America.