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DIALOGUE
AND
UNIVERSALISM
JOURNAL OF THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY FOR UNIVERSAL DIALOGUE
Vol. XXVII No. 3/2017

VALUES AND IDEALS. THEORY AND PRAXIS
Part IV
Edited by Małgorzata Czarnocka and Emily Tajsin
IDEALS AND VALUES IN RELIGION AND MYTH

Konrad Waloszczyk — On Three Philosophical Premises of Religious Tolerance
Marshall Steven Lewis — Experimental and Applied Religious Studies for Reducing Religious
Intolerance
Robin S. Seelan SJ — Humanizing and Dignifying Cultures: Dialogues with Religious Utopias
IDEALS AND VALUES IN ART
Manjulika Ghosh — Autonomy of Art and Its Value
C. E. Emmer — Burkean Beauty in the Service of Violence
Tatjana M. Shatunova — Why Be Beautiful?
Stefan-Sebastian Maftei — The Elusive Sensus Communis of Nowadays Aesthetic Cosmopoli-
tanism
Tetiana Gardashuk — Bioart as a Dialogue
VALUES AND IDEALS IN SCIENCE AND VALUE OF SCIENCE
Vladimir Przhilenskiy — Theoretical and Post-Theoretical Philosophy
Małgorzata Czarnocka — The Ideal and Praxis of Science
Martha C. Beck — Neuroscience, Ancient Wisdom and the ISUD: Is There Anything New under
the Sun?
Mikhail A. Pronin — Dialogue as a Knot: The First Ideas of Dialogue Ontology
Published quarterly by
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ISUD
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Promotion Foundation of Ibaraki; Nobel Laureate 1973
 Steven V. Hicks (USA) — philosopher, former President of the ISUD, Director of
the School of Humanities and Social Sciences, the Behrend College of
Pennsylvania State University
 Wacław Hryniewicz (Poland) — theologian, ecumenist, propagator of oteriological
universalism, John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin
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United States, former President of the ISUD
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DIALOGUE AND UNIVERSALISM
No. 3/2017

Part IV
Edited by Małgorzata Czarnocka and Emily Tajsin
Editorial — Values and Ideals. Theory and Praxis ............................................... 5

Konrad Waloszczyk — On Three Philosophical Premises of Religious
Tolerance .......................................................................................................... 9
Marshall Steven Lewis — Experimental and Applied Religious Studies for
Reducing Religious Intolerance ....................................................................... 15
Robin S. Seelan SJ — Humanizing and Dignifying Cultures: Dialogues with
Religious Utopias ............................................................................................ 27

Manjulika Ghosh — Autonomy of Art and Its Value ........................................... 39
C. E. Emmer — Burkean Beauty in the Service of Violence ................................ 55
Tatjana M. Shatunova — Why Be Beautiful? ...................................................... 65
Stefan-Sebastian Maftei — The Elusive Sensus Communis of Nowadays
Aesthetic Cosmopolitanism ............................................................................. 71
Tetiana Gardashuk — Bioart as a Dialogue ......................................................... 83
Ilektra Stampoulou — Re-framing the Abyss: the Visual Writing
of Jacques Derrida in The Truth in Painting ................................................... 97
Elçin Marasli — Orange Alternative at the Convergence of Play, Performance
and Agency ..................................................................................................... 115
VALUES AND IDEALS IN SCIENCE AND VALUE OF SCIENCE

Vladimir Przhilenskiy — Theoretical and Post-Theoretical Philosophy .............. 125
Małgorzata Czarnocka — The Ideal and Praxis of Science ................................ 139
Giovanni Boniolo, Mattia Andreoletti, Federico Boem, Emanuele Ratti — The
Main Faces of Robustness .............................................................................. 157
4
Martha C. Beck — Neuroscience, Ancient Wisdom and the ISUD:

Is There Anything New under the Sun? ......................................................... 173
Maria Kli — The Ethical and Political Significance of Michel Foucault’s
Ancient Technology of the Care of the Self ................................................... 189
Mikhail A. Pronin — Dialogue as a Knot: The First Ideas of Dialogue
Ontology ......................................................................................................... 203
Anna Ivanova — The Trustworthiness of Science. Toward an Axiological Notion
of Scientific Objectivity .................................................................................. 213
Artur Ravilevich Karimov — John Locke on Cognitive Virtues ......................... 221
No. 3/2017
Editorial
Part IV
VALUES AND IDEALS IN SCIENCE AND THE VALUE OF SCIENCE
This is the fourth of a series of issues of Dialogue and Universalism featuring

a selection of peer-reviewed materials submitted to the 11th World Congress of
the International Society for Universal Dialogue, held in Warsaw, Poland, on
July 11–15, 2016.1
This Dialogue and Universalism issue includes papers on basic cultural

forms: religion and myth, art, and science. From a more general perspective, it
concerns sophisticated manifestations of human spirit (objective mind). Because
it is spirit which seems to be—if one freely follows Hegel’s tradition—a com-
mon core of all cultural forms as well as all ethnic, national etc. cultures. In
short, cultural forms in a generalized sense.
The concept of spirit (in German Geist, in English also: non-subjective mind,
collective consciousness) that is taken here into account comes from a sustained
philosophical tradition, among others from Hegel’s system of objective spirit.
Spirit has appeared as a basis of culture in philosophical conceptions in the past.
Its apogee seems to be in Hegel’s monumental Phenomenology of Spirit. The
concept of spirit was still used at the turn of the century and in the first decades
of the 20th century—in impressive considerations on culture by among others
Wilhelm Dilthey, Georg Simmel, Max Scheler and Ernst Cassirer. Especially
the significance of Cassirer’s now partly forgotten work for the philosophy of
culture cannot be overestimated.
—————————
1 One exception is a paper by Giovanni Boniolo, Mattia Andreoletti, Federico Boem and
Emanuele Ratti entitled “The Main Faces of Robustness,” which was submitted directly to Dia-
logue and Universalism.
6 Editorial
However, nowadays spirit is predominantly regarded as an anachronistic and

unfounded philosophical hypostasis. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to claim that
this concept might be restored in new contexts, in modified senses, and then it
might serve as an enlightened guideline in comprehending culture in a universal
way. Spirit as the objective mind may be regarded as a uniting, and at the same
time founding, factor for all cultural forms, or, in other words, for all the manifes-
tations of culture. Its drawbacks—when it is detached from a theoretical con-
text—are excessive generality and, in result, partial indefiniteness. So, it would
have to be built in a system of thought to gain a more concrete and definite sense.
In recent decades universalistic approaches to culture have been largely ex-
pelled from philosophy and intellectual thinking. In fashionable and prevailing
intellectual trends, culture has been (and still is) apprehended mainly as a varie-
ty of cultural forms, i.e. as a set of ethnic, national, humanistic, scientific and
religious cultures which are different from each other, even incomparable. In
studying culture, the focus has been on the differentiae specificae of cultural
manifestations, while their common attributes, in fact their essence, have been
set aside.
The highlighting of differences and simultaneous removal of similarities, as
well as the common foundation of cultural forms, have serious deficiencies, not
only for philosophy but also for collective awareness. They lead, or may lead, to
increasing gaps between nations and ethnic, religious, racial, scientific or reli-
gious communities—generally speaking, between communities of cultural
forms. These gaps, in turn, pose obstacles to intersubjective communication,
and, subsequently, to more integration and coexistence between people. While
humanity urgently needs a common modus vivendi, and for that a basis of un-
derstanding and communicating between different cultural communities.
A uniting cultural basis should rather be moved into the foreground—both in
collective and individual consciousness and in theoretical investigations. Be-
sides, from a theoretical point of view, only revealing a network of both cultural
differences and cultural common features can adequately characterize culture as
such, and approach its deepest layer.
Therefore, it seems that over the years of propagating radical variants of
multiculturalism (cultural particularism, as a matter of fact), philosophy could,
or even should, try to return to a universalistic perspective, one in which cultur-
al forms constitute a unity, because all they have—as may be maintained
against postmodernist beliefs—a common ground. It is the concept of spirit
which is a reasonable, or even the best candidate for an integrating common
ground. It, of course, also embraces so-called material culture which is founded
by spirit.
However, the concept of spirit—apart from being concretized and filled with
a precise content—should be adjusted to contemporary philosophical findings.
The point is that spirit—seen as the core of culture—may be now restored in the
philosophy of culture only when it “comes down to earth.”
Values and Ideals. Theory and Praxis 7
Culture comes down to earth in two steps: first, by connecting culture with
nature, and, second, by immersing culture in the entire human world.
In general, the intellectual attitude of our times postulates a bond and mutual
conditioning between nature and culture. Today culture is no longer considered
a pure sphere of transcendence separated from human biological life. Twenti-
eth-century theories of culture, among others those proposed by Scheler, Pless-
ner and Simmel, negate culture’s lack of animality. The mentioned thinkers, and
others, regard culture and nature (animality) as two complementary manifesta-
tions of humanity connected with each other by the relations of emergence and
constitution: nature (animality) co-constitutes culture and culture emerges from
nature. So, the pair culture-nature has been negated as a pair of opposites, and
instead is accepted as a complementary unit.
In the second step, culture comes down to earth by connecting it with all
human activity. On one hand, cultural forms are penetrated by praxis. Praxis, in
turn, co-forms art and science, and strongly influences religious systems.
Culture deals with all the social and individual spheres of human life. It cannot
be treated as an isolated land in the human world; it is its omnipresent layer,
affected by, and affecting, the whole human world.
This founding feature of culture, i.e. its bonding with human social
problems, is seen in most of the papers included in this Dialogue and Univer-
salism issue.
Małgorzata Czarnocka
Emily Tajsin
No. 3/2017
Konrad Waloszczyk
ON THREE PHILOSOPHICAL PREMISES OF RELIGIOUS

TOLERANCE
ABSTRACT
My contention is to adumbrate three general premises leading to religious tolerance.

The first is that emphasis should be laid much more on ethics than on metaphysics.
Religions greatly differ in supernatural beliefs but all advocate justice, love, truthful-
ness, self-control and other virtues. Second, the beliefs about God are not true in their
exact meaning, but rather as remote analogies to scientific truth. Religion is more re-
semblant of poetry than science. Third, real tolerance consists in the readiness to assimi-
late some of the values of other religions, since no one has expressed the transcendent in
an exhausting and perfect way.
Keywords: tolerance, ethics, objective knowledge, world religions, openness for the
Other.
As we can read in the Wikipedia, religious tolerance for most people may
signify no more than “mere forbearance and the permission given by the adher-
ents of a dominant religion for other religions to exist, even though the latter are
looked on with disapproval as inferior, mistaken, or harmful” (Zagorin, 2003).
I want to argue that the demands of forbearance or the peaceful coexistence of
religions are not enough, and constitute only a first step to fruitful communica-
tion between them. I will outline three general premises which may justify tol-
erance on a deeper level of understanding and spiritual communication between
people belonging to different religions and cultures.
I
The first is the priority of ethics over metaphysics. Under the term “meta-
physics” I understand beliefs relating to the nature of God, the afterlife, the
migration of souls, miracles, the beginning and end of the world, etc. Such be-
liefs play an enormous role in social life, although their distinctive feature is
that they are totally unverifiable by science. They provide millions of people
10 Konrad Waloszczyk
with spiritual energy and the feeling that life has sense, which should be appre-
ciated instead of demanding—as radical atheists do—that they be eradicated
from human consciousness. However, such beliefs are also a threat to social
peace, because most of those who adhere to them regard them to be literally
true. The past fifteen years have seen at least partly religiously inspired social
conflict between Palestinians and Israelis, as well as in Afghanistan, India, Iran,
Iraq, Kosovo, Macedonia, Northern Ireland, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Philippines,
Sri Lanka and Sudan. Also Poles are divided by conservative-religious views on
abortion, prenatal diagnosis, in vitro conception, homosexuality, women’s
rights and the political influence of the Catholic Church.
Already two centuries ago Arthur Schopenhauer pointed out that religions
differed considerably in their metaphysics, but were very similar ethically. In-
deed, the fundamental differences between religions are visible already in their
conception of God and divinity. The Biblical religions (Judaism, Christianity,
Islam) personify God, in Hinduism and Confucianism He is impersonal, and
Buddhism does without a God altogether. Christians believe in a single incarna-
tion of God, Hinduists in multiple incarnations. In Christianity sacramental rites
and obedience to the doctrine of the Church are essential premises of salvation,
something that does not appear in any other religion. Buddhism and Hinduism
profess reincarnation, Biblical religions do not. There are many more differ-
ences, but the ones listed sufficiently warrant the claim that it would be difficult
to build one, global religion from supernatural beliefs alone.
Therefore, in seeking inter-religious communication emphasis should be laid
on ethical content that is common to all faiths, and not on their doctrinal differ-
ences. In more recent times this approach has been propounded by philosophers
of religion known as pluralists, like Paul F. Knitter, Raimundo Pannikar, Perry
Schmidt-Leukel, John Hick and others. Paul F. Knitter, a retired theology pro-
fessor at Xavier University in Cincinnati, writes: ”doctrines and beliefs have to
appear in the court of ethics before they can be admitted to the churches and
schools of Christianity, and the same refers to every other religion” (Knitter,
2005 (2002), 135). According to the religious pluralists all major religions—
Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism and Chinese Universalism—
are able to lead humans to salvation or liberation by their ethics. They all
profess the golden rule that others should be treated as we ourselves would wish
to be treated, condemn hatred and greed, and advocate love, compassion, truth-
fulness, tolerance, mildness, self-control, etc. It is also impossible to prove by
statistics or in any other way that the followers of any of these religions are
morally inferior or superior to those of the others. Thus, ethic is the surest foun-
dation for inter-religious tolerance, and this view is shared by sensible repre-
sentatives of various faiths. As the English religion philosopher John Hick
rightly wrote: “the test by which both Christians and people of the other major
faiths judge the authenticity of religious experience is its moral and spiritual
fruit in human life” (Hick, 2004 (1989), xxvi).
On Three Philosophical Premises of Religious Tolerance 11
II
The second religious tolerance premise is the awareness that we possess no
objective knowledge about the divine and absolute, and only such knowledge
could be universally binding. Most philosophers of religion and leading theolo-
gians and mystics agree on this point. ”We cannot know who God is, only who
He is not,” Thomas Aquinas wrote in Summa contra gentiles (I, 30). Knowledge
is cognition certain and testable by others, and already the very existence of
God fails to meet these conditions as it is neither certain nor intersubjectively
testable. Indeed, as Herbert Spencer accurately noted, all cognition takes place
through, mostly unconscious, reference to something else: “in every proposi-
tion, a thought involves relations, difference, likeness. Whatever does not pre-
sent each of these does not admit of cognition” (Spencer, 1946 (1862), 66). We
would not know what day is if we had no knowledge of night, nor what red is if
there were no other colours. But God cannot be compared with anything, sal-
vage another deity, which, however, would negate the very definition of God as
the only one and infinite being. This is why Christian philosophers admit that
anything what is said about God can only be a remote analogy to created beings,
although many philosophers prefer the term “metaphor,” which is even a more
imprecise and ambiguous cognition tool than analogy.
The source of rational statements about God is, perforce, the world, both in
its physical and social/cultural dimension. However, both ordinary people as
well as philosophers tend to differ in their embracing the physical world: some
see it as sensible, good and trustworthy, others as indifferent to living beings,
deaf, unfathomed and full of unexplainable evil and suffering. These different
interpretations of the world find reflection both in the optimistic philosophies
of, for instance, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz and Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, and
the pessimistic conceptions of Arthur Schopenhauer, Sören Kierkegaard or
Jean-Paul Sartre. The social/cultural world seems to offer similarly weak
grounds for belief in the existence of God, as human history has experienced too
much warfare, genocide and repression of the weak during which God invaria-
bly remained silent. Thus, if despite everything we were to accept His existence,
we would have to simultaneously accept that His nature and relation to the
world are in the highest degree mysterious. His revelation to human minds is
very subtle and unimposing, leaving ample room for atheists and skeptics. This
is why the contemporary philosophy of religion, unlike its counterparts in the
Middle Ages and even during the Enlightenment, is moving away from proving
God’s existence towards unsubstantiated faith, which requires no strong persua-
sion. Here the existence of God manifests itself in a positive interpretation and
evaluation of the world as a whole, and not a conclusion logically founded in
the laws of causality, contingency or purposefulness (cf. Hick, 2010).
Biblical religions (Judaism, Christianity, Islam) profess that God, in the
knowledge that humans would find it hard to accept His existence on the
strength of their natural cognitive powers, revealed Himself to them through
prophets like Moses, Jesus or Mohammed. However, they differ considerably in

their interpretation of this revelation. Moreover, the Bible contains historical,
natural, cosmological and, from today’s vantage point, moral errors and inaccu-
racies. God in the Old Testament is not the father of mankind but the father of
one people who condones the ethnical purges this people carries out on its
neighbours. Therefore, today even the Church’s conservative wing admits that
not everything which is contained in the Bible is revelation but only that which
pertains to human salvation. This is a very general criterion which signifies
a retreat from the literal interpretation of the Bible, which until the nineteenth
century gave ground for intolerance towards dissenters, heretics and atheists (cf.
Pontifical Biblical Commission, 1993).
Today’s global religions emerged in the pre-scientific era, when legends,
myths and sagas were the accepted means of expressing abstract ideas. There-
fore, their accounts of miracles as well as some of their historical information
should not be taken word for word today, but rather perceived as poetry. As an
U.S.A. philosopher George Santayana assures, religion is better when under-
stood as good poetry than as bad knowledge (Santayana, 1900). Here narrow
dogmatism makes way for inter-religious dialogue, because there is no one
“true” faith but many equal visions of transcendence. This is contested by the
conservative wings of the revealed religions (Judaism, Christianity, Islam and
some variations of Hinduism). In these circles not only many so-called ordinary,
but also highly educated people believe that God revealed many truths unequiv-
ocally and as universally binding. This approach leaves no room for inter-
religious tolerance and dialogue, because God is not to be disputed with. There-
fore, it is important to teach (as Karl Jaspers does) that Revelation and the very
concept of Revelation is not literal but symbolic truth or, as Jaspers himself puts
it, encoded truth. According to Jaspers religious faith can be decoded by con-
science but not by a universally binding interpretation (Jaspers, 1999 (1962),
passim).
III
The third philosophical premise of religious tolerance is openness towards
the Other. This is much more than tolerance understood as peaceful coexistence
(as it is usually defined). Openness means showing interest in religious systems
other than one’s own, and the readiness to take from them what appears as
good, beautiful and creative. This readiness bases on the knowledge that no
man, group or culture possesses the whole truth about religion (or anything else
for that matter), nor has ever expressed such truth in an only appropriate and
perfect way. This especially concerns religious beliefs, which are by their nature
the least precise of all beliefs and resemble poetry more than knowledge. One
can indeed presume that a friendly interest in other religious and ethical systems
can prove enriching for one’s own religious experience.
On Three Philosophical Premises of Religious Tolerance 13
Openness to other existential systems (also to absence of faith, which is

a quite separate issue), the readiness to take over certain of their values, is the
second, higher level of tolerance. The first only involves acceptance of their
existence in multicultural society. For instance, a Christian can become interest-
ed in the fact that Hinduism, Buddhism and Taoism profess an energy that can
be obtained by practices which unite with the cosmos, or released within one-
self, where it lies dormant and weighed down by our daily troubles. The Bibli-
cal religions primarily strive to free man from his sense of guilt, the Far-Eastern
religions, especially Buddhism, focus on reducing human suffering. The con-
cepts of sin and suffering, as well as the practices that relate to them, are not
contradictory and can complement each other, because many people suffer
under a strong sense of guilt, while many others feel guiltless but unhappy.
The former will turn to confession and charitable deeds, the latter to Yoga and
Tai-Chi.
The Far-Eastern religions know no eternal hell, their hell lasts as long as it
takes to burn out “bad karma.” This appears more humane and just than what
the Biblical religions teach. Eastern religions also have an Ahimsa (compassion)
ethics which extends to animals. This is a value worth absorbing by the follow-
ers of Judaism, Christianity and Islam, whose scriptures do not forbid them to
kill animals, although they do command their humane treatment. While follow-
ers of Far-Eastern religions may want to adopt the Biblical religions’ faith in
divine interference in individual and social history, or the concept of divine
providence. This idea, also propounded by the ancient-Greek Stoics, is a source
of optimism as it offers a vision of life guided by God’s compassionate hand
rather than blind contingency and emphasises the value of humans as individu-
als. Human rights, the pride of Western civilisation, are partly inspired by the
Bible, which frequently appeals for the protection of widows, orphans, foreign-
ers and the poor (cf. Wojciechowski, 2010). Also, no other religion has such
a systematised theology as Christianity. Theology, or rational reflection on the
content of Revelation, allows far-going reconciliation of Revelation with the
findings of science and philosophy. For example, Christian theology (bar its
conservatives) accepts evolution and Christian clergy are required to possess at
least some philosophical training. These examples show that certain values pro-
fessed by the Far-Eastern religions may prove enriching for the spiritual life of
Christians, and vice-versa, followers of Far-Eastern religions may find some-
thing worthwhile to take from Christians.
To sum up, I outlined three premises of thought and activity which might
enhance greater religious tolerance in our times. The first is the fact that today’s
global religions greatly differ in their supernatural beliefs but are quite alike in
their basic ethical codes. Ethics is what binds people and what should be the
focus of attention. The second premise is the awareness that objective
knowledge about divinity and the afterlife is unattainable, and that they can only
be expressed in poetic and mythological terms which have no grounding in
science, and whose literal reception, although prevalent, breeds intolerance. The
third premise is the awareness that true religious tolerance means not only con-
sent to the free expression of religions that are different from ours, but the read-
iness to absorb some of their values. No religion has a monopoly for truth and
good, each expresses transcendence in its own fragmented and imperfect way.
I believe it advisable for such ideas to be a part of school education.
REFERENCES
Hick, John. 2004 (1989). An Interpretation of Religion. Human Responses to the Transcendent. II.
ed. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
——— , 2010. Between Faith and Doubt. Dialogues on Religion and Reason. New York: Palgra-
ve Macmillan.
Jaspers, Karl. 1999 (1962). Der Philosophische Glaube Angesichts der Offenbarung [Philosophi-
cal Faith and Revelation].
Knitter, F. Paul. 2005 (2002). Introducing Theologies of Religions. Maryknoll–New York: Orbis
Books.
Pontifical Biblical Commission. 1993. The Interpretation of the Bible in the Church. Website
Holy See.
Santayana, George. 1900. Interpretation of Poetry and Religion. New York: Charles Scribner’s
Sons.
Spencer, Herbert. 1946 (1862). First Principles. Sixth and final edition. London: Watts and Co.
Wojciechowski, Michał. 2010. Biblia a prawa człowieka [The Bible and Human Rights].
http://www.opoka.org.pl/biblioteka/T/TB/mw_prawaczl.html
Zagorin, Perez. 2003. How the Idea of Religious Toleration Came to the West. Princeton Univer-
sity Press.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR — PhD, full professor, The Main School of Fire Service,
Słowackiego 52/54, 01-629 Warsaw, Poland.
E-mail: [email protected]
No. 3/2017
Marshall Steven Lewis
EXPERIMENTAL AND APPLIED RELIGIOUS STUDIES

FOR REDUCING RELIGIOUS INTOLERANCE
ABSTRACT
If we wish to increase peace in the world, we must reduce religious intolerance. Po-
tentially, the way we learn about religion and conceive religion can be a strategy toward
this goal. How might we design and continually improve learning about religion if our
intention is specifically to reduce religious intolerance? This requires experimentation to
determine demonstrably effective solutions. In this paper, I briefly unpack the challenge
at hand, describe an approach toward collaborative experimentation, and outline a set of
mutually-supporting hypotheses with which to design solutions.
Keywords: religion, religious education, intolerance, conflict, violence, empathy,
exclusivism, engagement, worldviews, religious constructivism
Religion is a technology—a set of socio-cultural tools for aligning attitudes,

ideas, emotions and behaviours within a religious community. These tools in-
clude, for example, narratives, myths, rituals, institutions and various arts. To
press the tool analogy, one can use a hammer to build a house and also to hit
someone over the head. While religion may rarely be the proximate cause of
violence, religion is often instrumentalised in support of violence and in many
ways exacerbates violence. A 2013 Pew study identified 17 countries as having
“very high” levels of religiously-involved conflict, including: abuse of religious
minorities; violence and threats to compel adherence to religious norms; har-
assment of women over religious dress; mob violence; religion-related terror-
ism; and sectarian violence.1 If we wish to increase peace in the world, we must
reduce the various expressions of religious intolerance.
—————————
1
Pew Research Center. 2015. “Latest Trends in Religious Restrictions and Hostilities,” 10;
http://www.pewforum.org/files/2015/02/Restrictions2015_fullReport.pdf
16 Marshall Steven Lewis
One proposed strategy for reducing religious intolerance is the deployment

of secular, school-based religious education, as articulated in the Toledo Guid-
ing Principles on Teaching about Religions and Beliefs in Public School, pub-
lished in 2007 by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE), Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR). 2 This
report claims that “Misunderstandings, negative stereotypes, and provocative
images used to depict others are leading to heightened antagonism and some-
times even violence.”3 To address this, the report proposes that “Knowledge
about religions and beliefs can reinforce appreciation of the importance of re-
spect for everyone’s right to freedom of religion or belief, foster democratic
citizenship, promote understanding of societal diversity and, at the same time,
enhance social cohesion.”4 The Toledo report thus poses a general strategy and
rationale for applying religious education to the challenge of religious intoler-
ance, and similar language can be found in many curricular philosophies for
religious education. If this strategy can be demonstrated to be effective, then
peace can be fostered by continually improving such initiatives through experi-
mentation, evaluation and redesign.
DOES RELIGIOUS EDUCATION REDUCE RELIGIOUS INTOLERANCE?
While we might assume that religious education can help reduce religious
intolerance, I believe it is not known whether or which current forms actually
work. Evaluation projects have gleaned insights concerning whether parents,
children and teachers value religious education, but they have been inconclusive
regarding impact—and such measurement and evaluation is obviously difficult.5
—————————
2
Toledo Guiding Principles on Teaching about Religions and Beliefs in Public Schools. 2007;
http://www.osce.org/odihr/29154. Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)
Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR).
3
Ibid., 9.
4
Ibid., 76.
5
Religious education is rarely designed specifically to reduce religious intolerance. Other in-
tentions may include: reducing anti-social behaviours, fostering citizenship and human rights,
developing the spirituality of the learners, increasing religious literacy across a range of traditions,
addressing non-religious worldviews, developing the whole person, and many other goals. A 2013
Ofsted report emphasised that a key problem in religious education was a lack of clear under-
standing—on the part of teachers—about the purpose of religious education. See: The Office for
Standards in Education, Children’s Services and Skills (Ofsted). 2013. Religious Education:
Realising the Potential, 14; http://www.secularism.org.uk/uploads/religious-education-realising-
the-potential.pdf. Examples of evaluation initiatives for religious education include the following:
(1) REDCo (2006–2009): http://cordis.europa.eu/ result/rcn/47525_en.html, (2) Conroy, J. C. et
al. 2011. Does Religious Education Work?: http://www.secularism.org.uk/uploads/does-religious-
education-work-by-prof-c-conroy.pdf (3) RE for REAL. 2014–2015; http://www.gold.ac.uk/
faithsunit/reforreal/ (4) Living with Difference: Community, Diversity and the Common Good.
2015; https://corablivingwithdifference. files. wordpress.com/2015/12/livingwith-difference-
community-diversity-and-the-common-good.pdf.
Experimental and Applied Religious Studies for Reducing Religious Intolerance 17
Regarding educational strategy, many (perhaps most) non-confessional reli-

gious education initiatives are knowledge-oriented, such as world religions,
comparative religion and religious literacy courses. It is certainly questionable
whether or how well increasing knowledge is an effective strategy for reducing
intolerant attitudes and behaviours. Many of us perhaps know someone with
strong prejudices against particular groups, and we might ask ourselves: What
kinds of knowledge would change their attitudes and beliefs? Given the innu-
merable options for designing religious education, an experimental design
method is required if we wish to effectively apply and continually improve up-
on religious education strategies that intend to reduce intolerance. Importantly,
education does mean schooling, and we should not constrain our approaches to
school-based religious education. After all, our conceptions about religion are
not necessarily shaped in the classroom, but rather, in daily life: in our homes,
public spaces, work environments, popular media, etc.
PROPOSED WAY FORWARD
What might it look like to progress a coordinated effort to continually im-

prove the effectiveness of learning related to religion that intends to reduce
religious intolerance? A basic experimental method might include the following
steps:
1. Deploy multiple initiatives, with varying design strategies
2. Measure efficacy/impact
3. Compare initiatives and revise designs based on insights
4. Repeat indefinitely
As simple as this process might be, conceptually, it is much easier said than
done, and there is tremendous complexity within each step. However, given the
consequences of religious intolerance, we should not shy away from the chal-
lenge. For the first step, we need to conceive appropriate hypotheses for testing,
drawing upon available empirical studies. (I offer an initial set of hypotheses in
the next section.) For the second step, we need to clarify what we are trying to
measure and find or design instruments for this purpose. How might we meas-
ure ‘religious intolerance’ of target audience members? For the third step, how
do we glean insights that can be used to create or revise new initiatives? Com-
paring initiatives requires capturing common sets of quantitative and qualitative
data, such as the following:
— A context-setting narrative describing the recent, historical context for
religion in the geographical region, and in particular, issues related to re-
ligious intolerance.
— Goals of the initiative, and related metrics
— Participant demographics
— Learning objectives, behavioural objectives and other intended educa-

tional outcomes
— Statement of curricular philosophy, pedagogical approaches, etc.
— Lessons plans with learning resources, media and materials (source files
ready for use, modification, replication, etc.)
— Assessment instruments intended to measure achievement of the goals
and objectives
— Assessment results and other evidence of impact and efficacy
— Post-implementation review narrative: What may have worked and why?
— Recommendations to improve the solution
Following the above method, over time and with increasing confidence, a par-
ticipating community-of-practice could gather insights about what works and
why, and could therefore design and deploy increasingly effective initiatives. One
can easily imagine an internet-based environment designed to support the overall
effort, and such a system could also support synchronous and asynchronous learn-
ing delivery. In short, I am proposing an online, global and collaborative teach-
ing, learning and research effort—and purpose-built technical environment—for
religious education that intends to reduce religious intolerance and foster peace.
HYPOTHESES: HOW MIGHT RELIGIOUS EDUCATION REDUCE

RELIGIOUS INTOLERANCE?
The experimental approach described above requires hypotheses for testing,

and in this section, I offer a starting set of mutually-supporting strategies. Par-
ticular educational activities related to any such hypotheses should be the out-
come of collaborative and interdisciplinary design efforts, ideally leveraging
relevant empirical studies. My hypothesis set for educational initiatives that
intend to reduce religious intolerance includes the following:
1) Increase empathy for the religious other
2) Decrease exclusivism
3) Reframe religion functionally
4) Critically and creatively engage people with radically diverse worldviews
5) Practice a form of personal religious constructivism
INCREASING EMPATHY FOR THE RELIGIOUS OTHER
Empathy, the ability to understand and share the feelings of another, is fre-
quently cited as a desired outcome for religious education.6 Multiple studies
have suggested a strong correlation between increased empathy, increased pro-
—————————
6
Hess, M. 2012. “Mirror Neurons, The Development of Empathy, And Digital Story Telling.”
Religious Education, 107, 4, 401–414. Also, see the Toledo Guidelines description of “empathic
education,” 46.
social behaviour,7 and decreased prejudice.8 While many religious education

initiatives may have the intention of increasing empathy, the question remains
exactly how this might be accomplished. For example, perhaps the subject of
study and practice should be empathy,9 rather than hoping to achieve increased
empathy as a by-product of learning about religions. Instruments for measuring
empathy are available, so pre- and post-testing could support evaluation and
improvement.10
DECREASING RELIGIOUS EXCLUSIVISM
My second proposed strategy is to foster a decrease in religious exclusivism

—the position where one’s own beliefs are considered uniquely true in compari-
son with other religious beliefs. Alternative positions to exclusivism include vari-
eties of inclusivism and pluralism.11 Inclusivism roughly means that, while one’s
own religion is true and correct, some of this truth may be found in other reli-
gions. Pluralism suggests that many or most forms of religion might be consid-
ered equally valid approaches to living.12 I am in agreement with John Hull who
notes that, when people define religion in terms of exclusivist ideas, e.g., “the one
and only god,” or “correct faith” or “god is on our side—not theirs,” etc., negative
consequences of religion are reinforced and perpetuated.13 Some studies conclude
that exclusivity is a strong predictor of scapegoating, while theism in general is
—————————
7
Masten, C. L., S. A. Morelli, N. I. Eisenberger. 2011. “An fMRI Investigation of Empathy for
'Social Pain’ and Subsequent Prosocial Behavior.” NeuroImage 55, 1, 381–8.
8
Pettigrew, Th. F., L. R. Tropp. 2008. “How Does Intergroup Contact Reduce Prejudice? Me-
ta-analytic Tests of Three Mediators.” European Journal of Social Psychology, 38, 6, 922–
934. Psychology and Behavioral Sciences Collection, EBSCOhost (accessed April 10, 2015).
9
Gerdes, K. E., E. A. Segal, K. F. Jackson, J. L. Mullins. 2011. “Teaching Empathy: a Frame-
work Rooted in Social Cognitive Neuroscience and Social Justice.” Journal of Social Work Edu-
cation, 47, 1, 109–131.
10
Francis, L. J., J. S. Croft, A. Pyke. 2012. “Religious Diversity, Empathy, and God Images:
Perspectives from the Psychology of Religion Shaping a Study among Adolescents in the UK.”
Journal of Beliefs & Values: Studies in Religion & Education, 33, 3, 293–307. For a discussion of
pre- and post-deployment of “implicit association tests” to measure attitudinal change related to
prejudice, see: Monroe, K. R., M. L. Martinez-Martí. 2008. “Empathy, Prejudice, and Fostering
Tolerance.” PS: Political Science & Politics Volume, 04, 857–863.
11
De Cea, V. A. 2011. “A Cross-cultural and Buddhist-Friendly Interpretation of the Typology
Exclusivism-Inclusivism-Pluralism.” Sophia, 50, 3, 453–480.
12
For a discussion of various meanings of pluralism, see: Grimmitt, M. 1994. “Religious Edu-
cation and the Ideology of Pluralism.” British Journal of Religious Education, 16, Also, see: Eck,
D. What Is Pluralism?; http://pluralism.org/what-is-pluralism/
13
Hull, J. M. 2009. “Religion, Violence and Religious Education.” In: International Handbook
of the Religious, Moral and Spiritual Dimensions in Education. De Souza, M. et al. (Eds.).
Springer, 591–605 Hull’s recommendation is that we teach that religions are continually trans-
cending themselves through necessary and ongoing reinterpretations, and that therefore one
should not hold tightly to particularities, which leads to exclusivism, fanaticism, terrorism.
a weak predictor.14 This suggests that religious belief is not a cause of conflict, so
much as religious exclusivity. Reducing exclusivity could conceivably yield mul-
tiple benefits, including reducing religious extremism (where one’s own beliefs
warrant extreme and at times violent behaviour) and fostering empathy—i.e., it
should be easier to deeply understand and relate to the religious other if one
avoids judging them as necessarily in error. While reducing exclusivism is cer-
tainly controversial as an intended goal of an initiative, it may be a powerful strat-
egy for reducing religious intolerance, conflict and violence.
REFRAME RELIGION FUNCTIONALLY
Religion is often understood to codify truths, such as right and wrong ways of
believing and behaving; therefore, religious diversity is often conceived as
a competition or conflict. However, religion can instead be conceived functional-
ly—as the set of psychological, social and cultural tools that are common to human
societies and which reinforce and align attitudes, beliefs and behaviours of com-
munities. Religious differences are particular, cultural expressions—the clothing
on the exterior of a similar skeletal infrastructure. While the specific beliefs and
behaviours of various religious traditions may differ radically, the functions per-
formed by religious practices are largely the same. While focusing on the same-
ness of religions has been severely (and I believe, appropriately) criticised,15 I am
referring specifically to the sameness of underlying psychological and social func-
tions and impacts. Loyal Rue describes this functional perspective as follows:
“The general function of religious traditions is to educate the emotions of indi-

viduals so that they will think, feel, and act in ways that are conducive to their
personal and collective well-being. This general function may be seen in the
way the supporting strategies bear upon aspects of human nature, and in doing
so they engage individuals in the meanings of the myth. The strategies work
together to bias the various neural systems that are responsible for mediating
behaviour. In particular, the supporting strategies are designed to engage the
so-called social emotions in ways that enhance social cooperation.”16
—————————
14
2015. “Does Religious Belief Promote Religious Scapegoating?” Hansen, I., A. Norenzayan.
(in press) available online:
http://www2.psych.ubc.ca/~anlab/pdf/Hansen&NorenzayanScapegoating.pdf
Also see: idem. “Religion, Evolution and Intolerance;” http://www.ibrarian.net/navon/paper/
Religion__evolution_and_intolerance_Ian_Hansen_an.pdf?paperid=5695835
15 For example, L. Philip Barnes warns that focusing on the sameness of religions is “danger-
ous, disrespectful and untrue,” and will “necessarily fail to frame and implement policies and
methodologies that are effective in challenging religious prejudice and intolerance.” Barnes, L. P.
2014. Education, Religion and Diversity: Developing a New Model of Religious Education.
Routledge, 240.
16
Rue, L. D. 2011. Nature is Enough. State University of New York Press, 94.
The “supporting strategies” that Rue refers to are similar to Frank Whaling’s
elements of religion, and Ninian Smart’s dimensions of religion:17
— Narrative, mythic, scriptural
— Ritual
— Experiential, spiritual, emotional
— Social, institutional
— Aesthetic, material
— Ethical, legal
— Intellectual, doctrinal, philosophical.
There could be several pedagogical uses for such a functional framework,
most obviously as an analytical tool for learning about religious traditions, and
for reflecting on one’s own religious or cultural perspective and experience. 18
This framework can also supports creative activities, e.g., writing one’s own
cosmological narratives and designing rituals that reinforce one’s own goals and
intentions (see ‘Personal religious constructivism’ below). In addition, and in
connection with the next strategy, such a framework can support deep engage-
ment with others by providing a structure for dialogue—for understanding each
other’s lives through the lens of these categories.
PERSONAL, CRITICAL AND CREATIVE ENGAGEMENT WITH

RADICALLY DIVERSE WORLDVIEWS
Tying together the strategies proposed so far is perhaps the single most pow-
erful strategy: highly interactive engagement with the religious other. Increasing
empathy is supported by (and perhaps requires) intensive interaction with peo-
ple: working collaboratively, sharing meals, playing games, discussing shared
experiences, etc. Personal and critical engagement suggests deep learning
achieved through observation, questioning, reflection and, in particular, conver-
sation.19 This takes time, informality, rapport building and getting to know one
another. The overarching hypotheses is: When one becomes deeply engaged in
understanding diverse worldviews, it becomes harder to conclude that one’s
—————————
17
This list combines language from Rue, Whaling and Smart. See: Whaling, F. 1995. “Intro-
duction.” In: Theory and Method in Religious Studies: Contemporary Approaches to the Study of
Religion. Whaling, F. (Ed.). Walter de Gruyter, 34–35. Smart, N. 1990. Dimensions of the
Sacred: An Anatomy of the World's Beliefs. University of California Press, 10. Rue. L. 2005.
Religion Is Not About God: How Spiritual Traditions Nurture Our Biological Nature and What to
Expect When They Fail. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 128.
18 See: Rue, L. 2005, op. cit. for Rue’s application of his version of this structure to descriptions
of major religious traditions, 167–h313.

19
This kind of learning in emphasised in transformational learning theory. See: Mezirow, J.
1997. “Transformative Learning: Theory to Practice.” New Directions for Adult & Continuing
Education, 74, 5.
own worldview is obviously and uniquely correct or better—and therefore ex-

clusivism is likely to decrease; and it becomes easier to understand how and
why others live, think and feel the way that they do—and therefore empathy
should increase. For these reasons, I believe that any initiatives intending to
reduce religious intolerance should include deep engagement with the religious
other.
PRACTICE A FORM OF PERSONAL RELIGIOUS CONSTRUCTIVISM
A functional approach to religion can be explored creatively by prompting

learners to reflect upon their own, personal perspectives in relation to the func-
tional strategies (narratives, ritual, experiential, aesthetic, etc.) such as their
own:
— Descriptions of how things are (cosmology) and which things matter
(ethics);
— Narratives and myths that embody these descriptions;
— Rituals that enact aspects of these narratives and myths;
— Environments, activities, symbols and various expressions that support
all of the above (personal spaces, works of art, music, etc.).
How might such activities serve the cause of reducing religious intolerance?
Through creative practice, participants would deepen their understanding of the
functional nature of religion, making the various elements/dimensions/strategies
real for them. This would thereby reinforce each of the other strategies—i.e.,
increasing empathy and reducing exclusivism. Such activities would prompt
reflection about what is important to the individual, and about how their ideas,
attitudes, emotions and behaviours align with their notion of importance—or
how they do not align. In short, I am in agreement with Michael Grimmitt,
a pioneer of the pedagogical approach referred to as learning from religion:
“[I]n a world in which life-styles are often pre-packaged we should seek every
opportunity to strengthen young people’s capacity to ‘roll their own.’”20
CONTRASTING STRATEGIES:
KNOWLEDGE VERSUS ATTITUDINAL OBJECTIVES
How might educational initiatives based on the above strategies compare to

current forms of religious education? I propose that religious education that
intends to reduce intolerance should be less about religions (i.e., facts about
—————————
20
Grimmitt, M. 1987. Religious Education and Human Development. McCrimmons, 208.
Quoted in: Cooling, T. 2010. “Doing God in Education.” Theos, 32. Available online:
https://www.canterbury.ac.uk/education/our-work/research-knowledge-exchange/national-
institute-christian-education-research/docs/doing-god-in-education.pdf.
religious traditions, e.g., names and descriptions of gods, founders, beliefs, his-
tories, symbols, ethics, scriptures, institutions, rituals, holidays, etc.) and more
about attitudinal objectives, e.g., increasing empathy for the religious other and
reducing exclusivism. Facts and descriptions about particular religions are cer-
tainly useful: they serve as examples and illustrations of particular religious
functions, and they allow some adherents to feel represented in the learning and
to participate from a position of knowledge and experience. Also, as suggested
in Toledo and other writings about religious education, it may be that increased
knowledge about religions does indeed decrease intolerance. While I am cur-
rently sceptical of the assumed connection between knowledge and attitude, this
is an empirical issue. If reducing religious intolerance is an important goal, we
should find out what works best in which situations, ideally through methodical
experimentation by a community of practice that collaborates on the design,
evaluation and continual improvement of new and varied forms of learning
related to religion. This, I believe, will serve the goal of a more peaceful and
cooperative world.
CHALLENGES AND OBJECTIONS
The research question at hand is straight-forward: How should we design—

and continually improve—religious education if our goal is to reduce intoler-
ance? Yet there are numerous conceivable objections to my proposed hypothe-
ses; here is a sample: (a) Too atheistic or anti-religious. By attempting to re-
duce exclusivism, one might argue that this approach is fostering agnosticism or
even atheism: (b) Too religious. Some atheists and anti-religionists may argue
that my approach is too respectful of religion and may even foster or deepen
religious conviction—thus reinforcing the negative consequences of religion
and countering the anticipated demise of religion. (c) Circumvents parents’
rights. If applied to childhood education, this approach could arguably violate
parents’ rights to be responsible for the religious or worldview development of
their children. (d) Illegal. Depending on the jurisdiction, it might be argued that
my approach is illegal for government-sponsored initiatives or environments
(e.g., public school), violating the separation of religion and government. (e)
Misconceiving religion. One could argue that the entire functional perspective is
mistaken, that religion is not a cultural technology, but is, for example, God’s
guidance for humanity. These are all important issues to discuss, and for the
purpose of this paper, I offer one general response: We need all of these voices
at the table. The challenge of religious intolerance requires a highly interdisci-
plinary and interest-based collaborative response. Many domains can offer in-
sights and concerns with the mission I have described, and philosophy is one
such domain.
CONCLUSION: RELIGIOUS EDUCATION AS A FORM

OF TECHNOLOGY EDUCATION
Technology education fosters the safe and productive use of tools, because
powerful tools tend to be dangerous tools—and the technology of religion can
certainly be both powerful and dangerous. The functional strategies of religion
evolved with our bodies and minds, and are woven into culture and conscious-
ness. Unlike physical tools, religious technology cannot easily be avoided or
destroyed —humans use worldviews, narratives, myths, rituals, symbols, etc.,
whether or not these are conceived as being part of a religious context.21 There-
fore, turning off religion—as per new-atheist aspirations—is not a reasonable
strategy or expectation; and rejecting religion because one rejects supernatural-
ism is like throwing out the baby with the bathwater. As Rue contends: Religion
is not about God.22 Religion is a set of socio-cultural tools for aligning and rein-
forcing attitudes, emotions and behaviours. Religion is a technology, and a key
aspect of life for many millions of people around the world through which peo-
ple engage their ultimate concerns, including how things are and which things
matter. Clearly, one does not need religion to engage these issues. However,
just as clearly, this is what religion does for many people on our planet. Mean-
while, religious education is happening right now all around the world, so the
issue is simply whether and how to design such initiatives with the specific in-
tention of fostering peace. If we choose, we can design religious education—
like technology education—to focus on safety and well-being. The better we
understand religion and religiosity, the better we might protect ourselves from
abuses of religion that foment conflict, violence and suffering.
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—————————
21
See: Smart, N. 1999. Dimensions of the Sacred: An Anatomy of the World's Beliefs. Universi-
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ABOUT THE AUTHOR — PhD candidate in Religious Studies at the University of

Otago, 362 Leith St, North Dunedin, Dunedin 9016, New Zealand. He comes to the
study of religion with a thirty-year career in instructional design, instructional technolo-
gy and organisational learning. His research is exploring design methodologies for reli-
gious education that intends to reduce religious conflict.
No. 3/2017
Robin S. Seelan SJ
HUMANIZING AND DIGNIFYING CULTURES:

DIALOGUES WITH RELIGIOUS UTOPIAS
ABSTRACT
Cultures can be divided into two kinds: exclusive and inclusive. Exclusive cultures
are oppressed, vulnerable, and dehumanizing. Inclusive cultures are dignifying and
humanizing, and they move towards the ideals of egalitarianism, prosperity, justice, etc.
Religion, as part of culture, plays influential roles in the formation and promotion of
ideals. This promotion can be located in religious utopias, because almost all religions
hold utopias as central to their ideals and chart their ideologies towards these. In the
context of exclusion and inclusion, the poor, the oppressed, the marginalized, the vul-
nerable etc. need to be included into the main stream of social life and this requires
values such as liberation, justice, compassion, mercy, charity, etc. No authentic culture
is possible without the inclusion of the poor. The awakening of such inclusion is offered
by religious utopias. Hence dialogues between cultures and religious utopias and also
between various religious utopias are essential. This paper seeks to understand how
religious utopias can contribute to the dignifying and humanizing of cultures.
Keywords: religious utopia, exclusive culture, inclusive culture.
THE AWAKENING
Ideals awake us to a deeper reality—unseen and not totally comprehended

yet. Ideals are part of our reality; besides they are milestones or pointers to-
wards which societies and cultures need to direct. Ideals could be easily dis-
missed as fairy tales, but because of their power to influence, to lead and to
direct they awake society to hope and to development. This awakening raises
the standard of human living, thinking, and dreaming. When the awakening is
of religious nature, especially in societies in which religions are still considered
important and influential, the effects of it can be lasting. The ideals proposed by
religions are what we term here as religious utopias.
28 Robin S. Seelan
“Utopia” etymologically means “nowhere.” It comes from the Greek terms

“ou” (not) and “topos” (place), thus it literally means “nowhere.” The word was
first coined by the English statesman Thomas More in his book Utopia (1516)
to describe a perfect society in an imaginary island.1
The term “utopia” in the colloquial sense is “any idea or proposal that may be
desirable but is impractical or unrealizable, that is thought to be delusive or fatu-
ously out of accord with reasonable expectation, or that implies a radical depar-
ture from existing conditions,”2 but it is also a “vision or conception of a perfect
society.”3 It is not meant to be contemplated, but to be realized in the world.
The objective of this article is to explore the utopias offered by religions. I ask
how these pose challenges to the present cultures, which—apart from positive
factors—includes dehumanizing and non-dignifying elements. This paper attempts
to dialogue with religious utopias in order to humanize and dignify cultures.
CULTURES IN A CRISIS
We are in a crisis. The crisis was caused by us, humans, and to a great extent it
makes the lives of many people endangered. Therefore, we need alternatives that
will humanize and dignify us. A sample case: We still have bonded labourers in
India. On 30 June, in the city of Bengaluru in South India, 27 bonded labourers
were rescued by the Criminal Investigation Department, Departments of Revenue
and Labour, from two firms, which had employed these simple people from an-
other state, Chhattisgarh. Of these 27, four were minors, and almost all of them
were also subjected to physical abuse—were rescued on Thursday.4
The history of dehumanizing practices such as the above is long, but few
modern cultural patterns added to this list are truly disturbing today. The culture
of humiliation, depriving someone of his/her privacy, of some past wrong mat-
ter, e.g. Monica Lewinsky5 or Tylor Clementi, and the culture of internet gossip
that spreads on social media is not much noted. The culture of exclusion is on
the rise and in the name of progress, more and more people are under undue
—————————
1 Ghilan, M. 2016. Islam, Muslims, and delusions of Utopia. Accessed on 30 June 2016;
https://mohamedghilan.com/2016/03/21/islam-muslims-and-delusions-of-utopia/
2 Kateb, G. 1972. “Utopianism.” In: International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences. Sills,
D. L. (Ed.), vol. 15. New York: The Macmillan Company & The Free Press.
3 Ibid.
4
“27 bonded labourers, including minors, rescued from two firms in Bengaluru” The New Indi-
an Express, Saturday, July 02, 2016. Accessed on 02 July 2016. <http://www.newindianexpress.
com/states/karnataka/27-bonded-labourers-including-minors-rescued-from-two-firms-in-
Bengaluru/2016/07/01/article3507885.ece>
5 Monica Lewinsky shares her experience of being haunted even after 20 several years. In 2001,
Lewinsky was asked “How does it feel to be America’s premier blow-job queen?” sitting on the
stage of New York’s Cooper Union in the middle of taping a Q&A for an HBO documentary.
I was the subject. And I was thunderstruck. http://www.vanityfair.com/style/society/2014/06/
monica-lewinsky-humiliation-culture. Accessed on 01 June 2016
Humanizing and Dignifying Cultures: Dialogues with Religious Utopias 29
pressure. We have a skewed understanding of the progress. Zygmunt Baumann

puts in succinctly and powerfully:
“Progress, has moved from the discourse of shared improvement to that of
the individual Survival. Progress is thought about no longer in the context of
an urge to rush ahead, but in connection with the desperate effort to stay in
the race. We do not think of ‘progress’ when we work for a rise in stature,
but when we worry about staving off the fall. ‘Progress’ appears in the con-
text of the avoidance of being excluded.”6
The question of exclusion and alienation is more powerfully felt by the poor,
especially in the context of globalization, liberalization and privatization. The
Millennium Development Goals (MDG), though tried to address poverty as the
first goal or concern, has not been able to alleviate poverty. According to its
report7, poverty has declined by more than half, falling from 1.9 billion in 1990
to 836 million in 2015. Of the newly formulated Sustainable Development
Goals, the first goal is to “end poverty in all its forms everywhere” 8 More than
ever, 2015 has recorded the highest ever forced displacement (around 60 mil-
lion). Such is the new era of exclusion and alienation.
There are many other dehumanizing practices within cultures and they leave
behind us plenty of questions. Are our cultures humanizing and dignifying
enough? Are we doing sufficient enough to leave behind ‘worthy’ legacies for
the future generations?
Without losing hope, we should agree, that attempts at humanizing do take
place: There is a growing and felt need for ‘world citizenship’. Around the
world, we affect others, and we get affected. None of our countries can afford to
live in isolation any longer. We are “part of a functioning world community
that is interactive and interdependent.”9 Many international volunteers and
groups have been pressing for various demands across the globe and this new
culture is heartening to see. Though the social media is more of a trap, accord-
ing to the Polish born sociologist, Zygmunt Bauman,10 we also see that across
the globe there is an “unseen” solidarity building up.
The United Nations is the only organization that is seriously concerned
about humanity and dignity, though it has not much executive powers and could
—————————
6
Bauman, Z. 2005. LIVING IN UTOPIA, LSE, Thursday, 27 October 2005. Accessed on 01
July 2016; http://www.lse.ac.uk/publicEvents/pdf/20051027-Bauman2.pdf
7 UN. 2016. Sustainable Development Goals—Poverty. Accessed on 06 July 2016.
http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/blog/2015/12/sustainable-development-goals-kick-
off-with-start-of-new-year/
8 Ibid.
9 Corson-Finnerty. 1982. World Citizen: Action for Global Justice. New York: Orbis Books, 5.
10
Bauman, Z. 2016. Social Media Are a Trap. Accessed on 01 July 2016. http://elpais.
com/elpais/2016/01/19/inenglish/1453208692_424660.html
30 Robin S. Seelan
be termed as a “massive disappointing institution.”11 However, this institution

still offers hope of a utopian aspiration. Apart from official actions such as the
UN, there are also growing platforms such as world social forums, world peace
forums, campaigns for ecology etc., across the globe. Yet, this is insufficient.
Have we institutionalized our dehumanizing cultures? If we took our pun-
ishment and sanction methods, our governance styles, it might appear so. And
much of these begin from the early schooling days. Ivan Illich, in the Deschool-
ing Society, claims that “the institutionalization of education is considered to
institutionalize society and conversely that ideas for de-institutionalizing educa-
tion may be a starting point for a de-institutionalized society.”12 He proposed
a continuous learning throughout lifetime. Religious utopias are not institution-
alized, though they have been proposed by religions. For instance, Vasudeva
Kutumbakam, the religious utopia presented in the Hindu scriptures, can be
interpreted in various forms.13 It contains the cosmic dream of a large family
wherein no one is a stranger! Such an encompassing idea would go beyond the
institutionalized borders of the mind, attitudes, etc. Contemplating on this
would make the world a better place to live in.
THE RELIGIOUS UTOPIAS
Religious utopias are the ideal worlds envisaged by religions. They are visions
of the founders of the religions and their early followers and communities. They
are global alternatives to the present societies, which in the perspectives of reli-
gions, are far away from a perfect society. Religious utopias are similar to the
social utopias, but they have added transcendental elements, which take into con-
sideration certain “spiritual depth.” They are not to be considered as a harmony
between religions, as Wikipedia notes in its entry on utopia.14 Maybe interreli-
gious utopias are just a small part of the wider scope that religious utopias offer.
The content of the utopia point to three desires: The desire for a harmonious
totality, the desire for an enlightenment, the desire for panentheism. Particular
utopias do not point to all of them, but these desires could be found in most of
them.
The desire for a harmonious totality in the utopian world is about construc-
tive inter-relatedness. The three levels of the relationship presented in these
—————————
11 Corson-Finnerty, op. cit., 85.
12
Wikipedia. Deschooling Society. Accessed on 01 July 2016; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Deschooling_Society
13
The concept originates in the Vedic scripture Maha Upanishad (Chapter 6, Verse 72):
अयं बन्धुरयं ने ति गणना लघुचेिसां उदारचररिानां िु वसुधैव कुटु म्बकं
ayam bandhurayam neti ganana laghuchetasam udaracharitanam tu vasudhaiva kutumbakam
Only small men discriminate saying: One is a relative; the other is a stranger. For those who
live magnanimously the entire world constitutes but a family.
14 Utopia. Wikipedia. Accessed on 30 June 2016; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Utopia
utopias—with oneself, with others, and with creation—negate the present frag-
mented reality and construct a reality in which there is a space for every crea-
ture to live in relationship. There is a dynamic relationship between all the
creatures, and with the Creator God too. This harmonious totality is born out of
certain disillusionment, disenchantment with the existing social order. Being
critical of this order, but not being too exactly sure of how it can be attained,
a desire for harmony results in utopia, especially religious utopias.
The desire for enlightenment expresses the innate quest for wisdom. To
know the difference between right and wrong, good and bad, makes one grow in
sensitivity and sensibilities towards the others. Respecting and acknowledging
the presence of the other, and of oneself, enlightenment opens up reality. This
would mean that the world of reality that we actually now experience is not the
complete reality or in a way, is false reality.
The desire for pantheism is to re-connect the divine with the ordinary, the
sacred with the secular, and to enlarge the horizons of our visions. The word
pantheism refers to God being present in everything. In a secular understanding,
it would mean that we view divinity or sacredness in everything, may be even in
an unobtrusive way.
Utopias are probably the best ways of envisioning our deepest desires! The
deepest desires of humanity are peace-filled life, dignified and humanized cul-
tures, and a place for every creature on this planet. Utopias are not wishful
thinking. Ludwig Feuerbach regards religion as a projection of a wishful-
thinking15 and Sigmund Freud views religion as just psychological processes
projected into the outer world.16 Utopias, according to these two thinkers would
be mere extensions of religious wishful thinking. However, this view can be
countered by the arguments that wishful thinking arises because of a “lack” in
the actual context. These are pointers and “directors” of life, considering the
influence of “belief,” and “religion” on many a people.
In the Indian traditions, like Hinduism, the assertion that there is a continui-
ty of consciousness after death shapes the idea of the future. The future is free
of all bondages. In the Utopian world, the self realizes the true nature. Hence,
they emphasize on renunciation. “Both the Hindu and Buddhist renouncer tradi-
tions are emphatically ‘other-worldly’, rejecting the possibility of real happiness
and fulfilment within the confines of this existence.”17 This utopia is in contrast
with the idea of utopian society offered by the Abrahamic religions.
Sanātana dharma or perennial righteousness could be termed as the utopia
of Hinduism. This leads to supreme spiritual good. This is attained when there
—————————
15 Horosz, W. 1967. “Religion and Culture in Modern Perspective.” In: Religion in
Philosophical and Cultural Perspective. Clayton Feaver, J., W. Horosz (Eds.). New York: Van
Nostrand Reinhold Company, 310.
16 Ibid., 311.
17 Mills, M. A. 2003. Hinduism and Buddhism. A Companion to Religious Studies and Theolo-
gy. Bond, H. K. et al. (Eds.). Edinburgh University Press, 224.

32 Robin S. Seelan
is the union with the Absolute reality, Brahman. In order to attain this union
with the Divine Self, one would need to understand and realize the essential
unity and harmony of the created order of things. Manu, while concluding his
code of law, ends this way: “He who thus recognizes the Self through the Self in
all created beings, becomes equal-minded towards all, and enters the highest state,
Brahman.”18 Dharma is the key concept in Hindu utopia. Dharma is to be under-
stood as a way of life that is filled with compassion, truth, purity etc. It is the
overall term that encompasses ethics, virtues, but above all leads to transcend-
ence. It is an end in itself (the deontological character)19. Moksa or liberation is
caused by the aforementioned perennial righteousness or sanātana dharma.
Soham is another concept in Indian philosophy which means “I am that/He”
(I am that person). Theologically it might mean a union with the Self, but philo-
sophically and sociologically it could be interpreted as the sharing of the es-
sence with the other, with the entire creation and with the ultimate reality. This
realization would come from an enlightened reason, according to Bhagavad
Gita and cannot be attained either by the senses or the senses-bound mind.20
The presentation of these utopias are often found in myths, or in maha-
vakyas (literally core statements or motifs). A metaphoric language is often used
in these utopias. The “kingdom of God” of the Christians, the Paradise of the
Muslims, the Messianic Age of the Jews, etc. contain within them the great
hope and faith in the “utopia.” For instance, the Jews believe that upon the arri-
val of the Messiah, there will be peace and harmony, and no more wars and
hardship.
The religious utopia also finds its way in prayers. For instance, the
pavamāna mantra from the Brihanranyaka Upanishad (1.3.28) is world famous
for the possibility of a new life:
“From untruth lead us to Truth.
From darkness lead us to Light.
From death lead us to Immortality.
Om Peace, Peace, Peace.”21
—————————
18 Manusastras XII: 125–126. Manickam, T. M. 1977. Dharma according to Manu and Moses.
Banglore: Dharmaram Publication, 209.

19 Ibid., 204.
20 Swami Ranganathananda. 1991. Human Being in Depth: A Scientific Approach to Religion.
Linnea Nelson, E. (Ed.). Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications, 113.

21 The Pavamana Mantra is from the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad (1.3.28).
असिो मा सद्गमय । Asatō mā sadgamaya

िमसो मा ज्योतिगगमय । tamasō mā jyōtirgamaya
मृ त्योमाग अमृ िं गमय । mr̥tyōrmā amr̥taṁ gamaya
ॐ शान्तिः शान्तिः शान्तिः ॥ Om śāntiḥ śāntiḥ śāntiḥ
- Br̥hadāraṇyakopaniṣat 1.3.28
THE DIALOGUE WITH CULTURES
Why is it essential to dialogue with cultures? The fundamentals of people’s

lives are closely associated with morals, ideas, virtues, and values. Utopias
emerge from the actuality and focus on possibilities. If one does not aim high at
possibilities (though utopias are often termed as impossible), there would be
further deterioration and stagnation. Hence, it is essential to dialogue with cul-
tures. It is a new discourse, focused positively, philosophically, on praxis.
According to Baumann, utopias can be seen “as something immanent in re-
ality, as an alternative and parallel path not chosen or discovered, something not
yet realised but already present, although either suppressed or repressed by the
powers that be.”22 Religions have always desired and preached counter-cultures
and alternative living, (though some of them overtly attached to these practices
come to a state of stagnancy, called as fundamentalism).
Religious utopias delimit the conclusion that they are likely drawn up by
a community/culture that suffers for long and feels victimized. While a dehu-
manizing aspect of a culture restricts further “thought” or “vision,” religious
utopias serve as a method, as Ruth Levitas23 states in her book, Utopia as
Method, that a person/culture draws from a current situation of un-freedom.
When a person is able to move towards “a greater degree of human freedom
he/she discovers the essence of what it means to be human” 24 and this is human-
ization.
“The process of humanization occurs in history when human freedom is

opened up and allowed to expand in possibility and option, rational delibera-
tion and choice, the discovery of truth and value that leads to creative action.
Because the essence of human existence is freedom, the process of humani-
zation is liberation, the process of becoming free and responsible.”25
Religious utopias were responses to the dehumanizing cultures of the day.

For example, the utopia presented by the Prophet Isaiah in chapter 11: 6–9 pre-
sented an utopian world, in which all the present dehumanizing and non-
dignifying elements would be absent: “The wolf will live with the lamb, the
leopard will lie down with the goat, the calf and the lion and the yearling to-
gether; and a little child will lead them.” “The cow will feed with the bear, their
—————————
22
Jacobsen, M. H. 2016. Utopianism in the Work of Zygmunt Bauman: Towards a Sociology of
Alternative Realities. Accessed on 01 July 2016. http://sociologi.samf.aau.dk/fileadmin/
user_upload/dokumenter/Sociologiske_arbejdspapirer/Arbpapir_nr16.pdf
23
Levitas, R. 2016. Utopia as Method (book review). Accessed on 01 July 2016; https://dspace.
lboro.ac.uk/dspace-jspui/bitstream/2134/16622/3/RK%20Levitas%20Review%2014.7.14.pdf
24 Haight, R., SJ. 1985. An Alternative Vision: An Interpretation of Liberation Theology. New
York: Paulist Press, 39.

25 Ibid., 39.
34 Robin S. Seelan
young will lie down together, and the lion will eat straw like the ox.” “The in-
fant will play near the cobra’s den, and the young child will put its hand into the
viper’s nest. They will neither harm nor destroy on all my holy mountain, for
the earth will be filled with the knowledge of the Lord as the waters cover the
sea.”
It is inclusive culture that religious utopias aim at. Vasudeva Kutumbakam
aims at visualizing the entire world as one family. In such a world, there is ac-
ceptance and the absence of the urge to change others. There is a lack of mo-
nopoly and hegemony of any particular wisdom, and it values everyone and
every culture, all the while appreciating differences, varieties, various identities
and recognizing as well.
Fictions like Thomas More’s Utopia (1516), Francis Bacon’s New Atlantis
(1627), Burrhus F. Skinner’s Walden Two etc. try to offer imaginative commu-
nities that capture human imagination. Christian religious communities were
experiments of the utopia of the Kingdom of God. The Dead Sea Scrolls set
forth in detail the manual of discipline of the Qumran Community, and similarly
other monastic communities, tried to create their own cultures that would real-
ize the utopia presented by their founders.26
INCOMPLETENESS: When does a society become humanized? According
to Gerhard Szczesny, this happens when it is possible for a society to link social
prestige with individual human accomplishment. He viewed Christianity to be
too focused on “impossible ideals” and renouncing this world27 and this did not
help the society to be humanized. In his opinion, humans have a “humanizing
impulse” and it should be allowed to be felt and realized.
“The motivating power of this inclination is the need for prestige, a kind of
vanity which drives a man to seek to realize in himself the best images of
humanity available to him [...] Man’s humanizing of himself and his world
will always remain unfinished, but the important truth is that he acknowl-
edges that its continuing achievement is entirely in his own hands.”28
However, he seems to forget the transcendental elements in human beings,

and the need to reach out to the other selflessly arises out of a deeper motiva-
tion. Religious utopias offer an added motivation, and these, when learnt early,
inspire the person to humanize oneself and others as well. One who seeks an
individual prestige could turn out to be insensitive to the genuine need of the
other for dignity and being humanized.
—————————
26 Skinner, B.F. 1972. “The Design of Experimental Communities.” In: International Encyclo-
paedia of the Social Sciences. Sills, D. L. (Ed.), vol. 15. New York: The Macmillan Company &
The Free Press.
27 Tyrrell, F. M. 1974. Man: Believer and Unbeliever. New York: Alba House, 100.
28 Ibid., 100.
UNNECESSARY: Religious utopia only adds to the alienation process, Karl

Marx claims. Religion often presented the “other world” as a possible world,
making him forget the present miseries of the world.
“Religion as the alienating projection of man’s hopes and aspirations to anoth-

er world above this world and after this life is only the symptom of the more
fundamental alienation of the socio-economic structure in which the worker is
deprived by the profit system and its capitalist masters of the fruits of the very
work in which he creates and realizes his authentic self by his labour.”29
With human intelligence abounding, who needs utopias? With Nietzsche’s

famous phrase “God is dead,” and several atheists promoting atheistic human-
ism, does not one need to become more pragmatic, rather than fall upon “uto-
pio-matic”? John Dewey considered science and democracy as the two main
principles that would assure “man’s free openness to nature and its possibilities
and to his fellow-man with whom he shared those possibilities as a common
destiny.”30 However, a common destiny is what the religions have projected in
their metaphorical presentation of the “utopia.”
Religious utopias, when falsely interpreted, can lead to fundamentalism.
Almost all religions have fallen prey to such fundamentalism, which defeats
the very purpose of harmony. For instance, the hindutva movement backed
by RSS,31 in India, the ISIS idea of Islamic state, the Ku Klux Klan, etc.,
operate on fundamentalism, leaving behind an de-humanized and bruised
society. In such instances, Inter-faith dialogues for better understanding are
essential.
In such a dialogue, what is essential and pertinent is a re-reading of the ide-
als. Without falling into the traps of absolutism or universalism, each generation
or each context needs to be allowed to derive new meanings into the symbols
offered by the religious utopias. Quite often a narrow and shallow understand-
ing tends to be exclusive, while a deeper and a broader approach to these utopi-
as are inclusive, and they actually dignify cultures.
When dialoguing with cultures and utopias, we also see that horizons are
widened, and cultures actually grow and progress while understanding imper-
fections, vulnerabilities, and weaknesses as stepping stones, both at the individ-
ual level and also at the collective levels.
—————————
29 Ibid., 27.
30 Ibid., 87.
31
Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, abbreviated as RSS lit. “National Volunteer Organisation”
or “National Patriotic Organisation,” is a right-wing, Hindu nationalist, paramilitary volunteer
organisation in India that is widely regarded as the parent organisation of the ruling party of India,
the Bharatiya Janata Party. Wikipedia. Accessed on 02 July 2016.
36 Robin S. Seelan
CONCLUSION
Religious utopias offer HOPE and DIRECTION. From the perspective of the
voiceless, the victims, the oppressed, etc. who are in real search for hope who
continue to live amidst a culture of hopelessness and frustration, religious uto-
pias cannot be easily dismissed as impractical, impossible, or mere projection.
Approaching this dialogue from a holistic perspective, taking into consideration
the transcendental element too as an important aspect of culture, we can consid-
er a reciprocal relationship between religion and society.
May the world be one!
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humiliation-culture. Accessed on 1 June 2016.
Jacobsen, Michael Hviid. 2016. Utopianism in the Work of Zygmunt Bauman: Towards a Sociol-
ogy of Wikipedia. Deschooling Society. Accessed on 01 July 2016. https://en.wikipedia.
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Wikipedia. Utopia. Accessed on 30 June 2016. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Utopia
ABOUT THE AUTHOR — assistant professor of philosophy in the Department of

Philosophy, Loyola College, Chennai, Sterling Road, Nungambakkam, Chennai, Tamil
Nadu 600034, India.
No. 3/2017
Manjulika Ghosh
AUTONOMY OF ART AND ITS VALUE1
ABSTRACT
The problem investigated in this paper is that of the value of art in terms of its auton-
omy. The value of art does not reside in the imitation of life nor does it consist in its repre-
sentational function. This idea is as old as Plato. Art’s autonomy wherein we locate its
value, is actually the autonomy of the artist. The artist is not merely free to choose his
subject matter, he is also free to bring about the contrasts and the syntheses among the
diverse constituents of the work in a particular medium. Artist’s function in this regard is
one of problem-solving. To the aesthetic mind problem solving suggests finding for the
line, arrangement of mass, colour, shape, etc., a support which passes through them and
goes beyond itself to the less definable. If this autonomy of the artist is compromised, art
becomes causally determined and is made to serve some ideological agenda.
There are, indeed, great works of art which have inspired the human mind and ena-
bled it to withstand unabashed inhumanity; in which man has taken refuge in suffering
and death. It may promote inter-cultural understanding. Yet, the value of art is not to be
judged by ends extraneous to it. It is not given antecedently nor is it an established
property of things. The value of art is intrinsic to it unfolding the inexhaustibility of the
aesthetic spirit.
Keywords: value of art, art’s autonomy, inter-cultural dialogue, aesthetic spirit.
INTRODUCTION
In this essay I intend to address the broad topic, “Art, Its Value and Ideal:
Theory and Praxis” from the perspective of art’s value in terms of its autonomy.
The value which is distinctively attached to works of art does not consist in
representing nature and life. Representation, by its very nature, is unoriginal.
—————————
1 This paper has been awarded by the Jacobsen Research Prize (2016).
40 Manjulika Ghosh
This point is as old as Plato. He says, “paintings and works of art in general are
far removed from reality …”2 Here, of course, by reality Plato means the eternal
forms rather than reality which is earth-bound. Plato’s criticism of the poets as
imitators in the Republic can be favorably interpreted. Why should we value art
if it fails to bring news that is fresh and enlightening? What entitles the artist to
demand our attention? What constitutes the worthwhileness of his art? Unless
his art embodies hitherto unknown forms of being, unless by means of his art,
he enables us to see what we have missed so far, the artist cannot claim serious
attention of the spectator. To say that Plato had no such points to make should
be held as surprising.
Let us clarify our intent. Sculptures, as works of art, are not exact replicas of
the originals, the models. Yet, there is no mistake in identifying in them the
originals, as for example, in our encounter with and appropriation of Auguste
Rodin’s Balzac. Even portraits, which are expected to be representational to the
highest degree, are not exact copies of the originals. They bring home the as-
pects of their subjects that were not previously apparent; but once revealed,
divulge something essential about these subjects. It is in this light, that we may
understand Alasdair MacIntyre’s comment on Rembrandt’s The Night Watch,
namely, the artist “teaches us to see in the human face that he could not—and
perhaps did not want to see before.”3 An almost analogical instance is to be had
in Lev Tolstoy’s novel Anna Karenina. We may recall the expression on Anna’s
face which Vronsky noticed on her portrait. The expression hardly fell outside
his experience since he had often seen it. But what he had seen he really did not
notice unless it was recreated for him in art.4
ART AND ITS AUTONOMY
Before we go ahead, I may be permitted to make a couple of points in clari-

fying the idea of autonomy. The idea is a borrowing from jurisprudence and
politics. It was Immanuel Kant’s style of thinking to borrow judicial terms and
use them as metaphors. Hence we have the celebrated notion of the autonomy of
the will. For him, autonomy was on par with freedom from empirical determi-
nation. It amounts to an analogy of an autonomous state, that is, sovereign, self-
governing, not depending upon, not interfered with directions from beyond its
—————————
2
The Republic of Plato. 1955. Cornford, F. M. (Trans.). Oxford: Clarendon Press, X 602, 327.
3
MacIntyre, A. 1976. “Context of Interpretation: Reflections on Hans-Georg Gadamer’s Truth
and Method.” Boston University Journal, 27, 11–16.
4
Mounce, H. O. 2001. Tolstoy on Aesthetics: What Is Art? U.K.: Ashgate, 65.
Autonomy of Art and Its Value 41
borders. This, of course, does not preclude the state to negotiate diplomatic
exchanges with its neighbours. Now situating the concept of autonomy in mat-
ters relating to art should allow freedom in the affairs of imaginative for-
mations. Autonomy is the matter of self-governance. Art can be said to be au-
tonomous if what the artist does is truly his own. He is not enslaved by extra-
artistic considerations.
The idea of autonomy in matters of art was, in the beginning, an innocent
affair. It was only later that the idea was launched as a warring slogan. This was
derived from Victor Cousin’s statement, “art for art’s sake,” de l’ art pour l’
art.5 In Cousin’s assertion there was nothing disharmonious between the do-
mains of religion, morals and art; they have a federal status within a larger
whole. Rabindranath Tagore has interpreted the adage, art for art’s sake, a little
differently. Apropos of his philosophical anthropology, in the domain beyond
economical necessity and biological exigency, man has a fund of emotional
energy which seeks its outlet in creations of art. Art comes when we forget the
claims of necessity, the thrift of usefulness. This might be meta-psychology,
telling us more of the origins of works of art, in the mind of the artist, as
a transcendent mode of existence, than of the work of art per se. In the West,
the autonomy thesis focuses on the art object, as an artifact, how it is made and
what is to be done with it; the aspect of form, of making, medium and tech-
nique. There is, then, no one unanimous way to understand the autonomy thesis.
The idea of autonomy in Tagore focuses on the why of art, while the thesis in
the West lays stress on the how.
The thesis has linkages with the problem of definition in aesthetics. The au-
tonomy thesis suggests that no work of art can be pre-ordained. We cannot fix
the definition of art type. Take the case of the literary art of sonnet. One cannot
sensibly answer the question, “What is sonnet?” There are sonnets by William
Shakespeare, by John Milton, by William Wordsworth, by John Keats. There
are, again, sonnets by Petrarch, by Dante, by Stéphane Mallarmé as also by
Rainer Maria Rilke. They differ in intention and content, feel and craft. This
variety would not have been possible were autonomy not available to the poets
concerned. Even in my own language, the sonnet is a century old literary form,
and in my own time sonnets by Jibanananda Das in Rupasi Bangla have broken
newer grounds differing from such earlier masters, like Madhusudan Datta and
Tagore. The point that I love to make is that autonomy breaks from essentialism
in the affairs of creating or bringing forth the unknown figures or forms of im-
agination. The idea of autonomy is the a priori of any art, an “esemplastic,” i.e.,
—————————
5
Cohen, J. M., M. J. Cohen (Eds.). 1964. The Penguin Dictionary of Quotations. Great
Britain: The English Language Book Society and Penguin Books, quotation no. 23, 120.
42 Manjulika Ghosh
“essential power,” a la Coleridge, of imagination for making or fashioning art

forms in any medium, verbal or non-verbal, performing, visual or plastic.
AUTONOMY AND FORM IN ART
In my consideration, the autonomy of art is related to the issue of form in art.

An object of art is a “figuration,” a formed presentation of diverse, often antag-
onistic elements, to yield a coherent satisfying experience which is valuable in
itself. There is considerable ambiguity surrounding the idea. It seems to have
begun its philosophical career with Plato and Aristotle, in the West in particular.
The binary of form and matter has remained alive in Kant’s epistemology in the
guise of the distinction between sensation and the form of appearance.6 The
distinction gets translated in the language of talking about the art form and
medium. The point about imposing form over matter, ordering the sensible
manifold in terms of the categories of understanding in Kant’s epistemology
reappears, so to say, in aesthetics in the dialectic of form and medium. When
Mallarmé said that poetry is written with words, not ideas, he was insisting on
the medium—the words—and the poet’s mode of dealing with them. When
Aristotle held that poetry was more philosophy than history, he advanced the
thesis of form over matter.
As for the ambiguity of the notion of form we need to remind ourselves that
there is no one form everywhere. There are forms of inference in logic, forms of
syntax in grammar, mathematical forms; in painting form is contrasted with
colouring, in literature form is contrasted with subject matter. A form is the
principle of organization, a kind of arrangement or structure, the manner in
which a thing exists or a subjects stands. A novel stands differently from a po-
em, while both have forms, although not in the same way. A piece of music has
formal structure in no way the same as the form of a poem, although poems are
often set in tune. The one has notes to organize, the other has words to deal
with. The problem of meaning does not arise in music as it does in case of
a poem or in any of the variants of literary art. It can be unexceptionally as-
sumed that in any of the arts, the artist, be he a painter or musician, has to solve
the problem of form and matter (content). The Vedic term for form is Chandas,
and the artist’s task is to bring order among the disorderly mass of contents.
When the poet says, adhara madhuri bedhechi chandabandhane, he means that
a song enchants through captivating the elusive charm.
—————————
6
Kant, I. 1933. Critique of Pure Reason. Kemp Smith, N. (Trans.). London: Macmillan. A20.
ART’S AUTONOMY AS ARTIST’S AUTONOMY
Art’s autonomy, as sketched above, is actually the artist’s autonomy. It con-

sists not only in the choice of subject matter but also in working out the simi-
larities and contrasts amongst the diverse constituents of the work in a particular
medium. This is achieved by the imposition of form on the diversity. In our
context, form is the “principle aspect of a work of art.”7 Form is an aspect be-
cause it is the perceived features of a work of art which enable us to take up
a point of view or perspective with regard to that, namely, whether to approach
a piece of architecture as the Renaissance or Baroque. Form is called primary
because our experience of the work begins, continues and terminates in that
perspective. If a form is apprehended as altered significantly that would give us
a new work. This is achieved by the imposition of form on the diversity.
Artist’s concern with form often takes the character of problem-solving. This
can be illustrated with reference to both Indian and Western art. In the context
of Indian art, especially religious art, while modeling, say, the image of goddess
Durga with ten hands, the artist’s contemplation of form consists in solving the
problem of whether the hands would come out from the shoulder or from the
elbow. The same problem of form as configuration and balance is confronted by
the artist while8 fashioning the metal icon of the four-handed dancing Nataraja,
that is, Shiva, the master dancer. In the West, while painting the Madonna, in
the Christian world, theological categories will work. Yet, it remains within
artistic originality as to how to depict the young mother with the child. It is
purely a matter of imposing form whether the child would be seated on the right
side, as is predominantly the case in Russian art, or on the left as in Byzantine
art. A tribal, untutored in the language of art, will just see a young mother with
a child.
We may, in this connection, refer to Max Rieser, who following the com-
ment of Jacob Burckhardt9 on Michelangelo’s Creation of Adam, says, “In the
Creation of Adam Michelangelo chose a biblical subject (Genesis I: 26 and II:
7) but he changed the presentation … ” According to Rieser,
—————————
7
Yoos, G. E. 1985. “The Work of Art as a Standard in Itself.” Journal of Aesthetics and Art
Criticism (henceforth cited as JAAC), XXVI, 1, 81–89.
8
Hegel has bitterly criticized Indian religious/temple art as “the result of a problem-solving
strategy gone awry.” Hegel, G. W. F. 1977. Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art I. Knox, T. M.
(Trans). Oxford: Clarendon Press. 333, 335, 338. We, however, do not accept Hegel’s criticism
because it is not possible to understand certain peculiarities of Indian art without its verbal tradi-
tion, literary references and iconology. All these are elements of the formal composition and
design.
9
Burckhardt, J. 1925. Der Ciceron. Leipzig, 826.
44 Manjulika Ghosh
“This is […] a comment on the relation of form and content. The original
content, namely, the verbal ideas about the creation of Adam existed already.
But Michelangelo gave it a new image; […] he gave it a new perceptual
form so that the whole painting is […] nothing but form […] finding of the
new perceptual form and this is the work of the artistic imagination […] the
principal artistic factor.”10
The point that we are trying to articulate is as follows: how does the artist
solve the problem of imposing form, and how does this constitute his creativity
or originality. The artist does not create his medium. It is given. The manner in
which he moulds the medium in a particular style of art is his mastery and
marks off art from fact. The formal elements determine the meaning and inter-
pretation of meaning in art.
It has, however, been pointed out by John Hospers that “… as a general
account of artistic creativity, the problem-solving theory is false, for often
no problem presents itself at all.”11 In support of his contention, Hospers
quotes from a letter written by Mozart to his friend recounting that much of his
music came to him with little effort. An opposite position, however, is main-
tained by Denis Dutton. Commenting on Franz Schubert’s setting to music one
of Wolfgang von Goethe’s poems, he sees it “as overcoming various problems
“posed by the text.” “It is surely,” Dutton observes, “more than merely a pretty
piece of music sprung from the mind of someone on an autumn afternoon in
1815.”12
Hospers’ criticism, of course, does not take away the relevance of problem-
solving aspect of art as a good reason for valuing it. It may be that the artist
begins with a problem, say, how marble, which is neither flesh nor cloth, can
take on the form of a person draped with clothing. Unfinished carvings of Mi-
chelangelo, the Four Captives or Giants betray the artist’s attempt at problem-
solving—his struggle to unfold the figures in an alien medium. The problem
may not present itself at the outset, or does so only vaguely, but it appears at
different levels of the work’s coming to being.
—————————
10
Rieser, M. 1969. “Problems of Artistic Form: The Concept of Art.” JAAC, XXVII, 3, 263–
64. Also, Kraft, S. 1985. “Content, Form and Originality.” JAAC, XLIV, 4, 406–409.
11
Hospers, J. 1985. “Artistic Creativity.” JAAC, XLIII, 3, 251–252.
12
Dutton, D. (Ed.). 1983. The Forger’s Art: Forgery and the Philosophy of Art. Berkeley: Uni-
versity of California Press, 177.
FORM, CONTENT AND KANT
It is Kant who has initiated us to the idea that form is the source of aesthetic
delight as disinterested. An aesthetic judgment, judgment of taste, is based upon
the conscious abstraction from all cognitive and ethical categories—in other
words—upon a technique of “bracketing” the categories of the good and the
beautiful. From the point of view of the moment of quality aesthetic judgments
are disinterested. Content is secondary with regard to maintaining disinterested-
ness; form is essential. “Disinterested” does not mean “uninterested.” Disinter-
ested, according to Kant, means that beauty in a representation is its formal
properties; its appearance of being designed but for no specific purpose. When
we experience beauty, the disinterested delight or aesthetic pleasure accrues
from recognizing or responding to formal qualities. If it did depend on the ob-
ject’s existence, its spatio-temporal location, the feeling of aesthetic pleasure
would not remain disinterested. Kant does not mean by this that someone who
judges, for instance, that a particular oriental carpet is beautiful, is wholly indif-
ferent to the real existence of the carpet but simply that in judging its beauty
one’s attention is directed to its qualities or appearances rather than to the exist-
ence of what makes such perception possible. The judgment of taste may well
be succeeded by an interest in the real existence of the rug and by a desire to
possess it but that interest and that desire are not elements of the judgment of
taste.
The question is, if we introduce the existential content, what would be the
harm? The answer is we shall fail to distinguish between what Peter Strawson13
calls identification in story or discourse and identification in history, that is,
spatio-temporal identity. Shakespeare as the author of the Romeo and Juliet is
identification in history. “Juliet was born in the city of Verona” is an identifica-
tion in story, that is, a story-relative identification. Why does it matter that we
make this distinction? Unless we make this distinction we would be deprived of
relishing a piece of literature. Our training in deriving aesthetic pleasure from a
literary text in a spirit of detachment would be defeated. We would start making
determinant judgments when we should have made only reflective ones.
Delight in beauty is free delight not only because it is disinterested but also
because one’s activity of mind in respect of it is not circumscribed by a definite
concept that imposes limits on one’s reflections. This does not mean that con-
cept and existence are nullified; only they are not in the focus. The apprehen-
sion of the beautiful, for that matter, does not become chaotic; for imagination
—————————
13
Strawson, P. F. 1977. Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London: Methuen,
19 ff.
46 Manjulika Ghosh
and understanding interact as harmoniously as if they are still concept-

governed. Hence Kant holds that a work of art pleases by its form alone, that is,
by the finality of form. We may attend to Kant’s own words: “In all painting,
sculpture, and in fact in all the formative arts, in architecture and horticulture, so
far as fine arts, the design is what is essential. Here it is not what gratifies in
sensation but merely what pleases by its form that is the fundamental prerequi-
site of taste.”14
It is to be noted that for Kant, neither a cognitive judgment of the sort “This
X causes Y” nor a moral judgment of the sort “This X ought to be done” is dis-
interested. He says, “Interest is that by which reason becomes practical, i.e.,
a cause determining the will.”15 He also says, “The subjective impossibility of
experiencing the freedom of the will is the same as the impossibility of discov-
ering and experiencing an interest which man can take in the moral law.”16 And
further, “To every faculty of mind an interest can be described, i.e., a principle
which contains the condition under which alone its existence is advanced.”17
Kant does not maintain that “beautiful” or “ugly” refers to what is depicted
in works of art. It is formal configuration that counts. That only can be called
“beautiful” in the specifically Kantian sense, when it pleases because of having
that kind of perceptual form that brings the cognitive powers of the experience
into free and harmonious play. Being beautiful does not mean having aesthetic
merit. Examples of ugliness in art could count against Kant if something did
please in the required sense and yet be ugly on the level of perceptual form.
CLIVE BELL AND SIGNIFICANT FORM
An influential theory of aesthetic enjoyment of form is presented by Clive

Bell.18 Bell, who belonged to the Bloomsbury Group, and believed in the full-
fledged autonomy of art, characterizes it as “significant form.” He does not
specify significant form independently of aesthetic emotion. Bell starts his ex-
position by stating: “All sensitive people agree that there is a particular emotion
provoked by works of art […] This emotion is called aesthetic emotion; and if
—————————
14
Kant, I. 1973 (reprint). Critique of Judgment. Meredith, J. C. (Trans.). London: Clarendon
Press, 67.
15
Kant, I. 1959. Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, Beck, L.W. (Trans.). Indianapolis:
Bobbs-Merrill, para 460, footnote 4, 79.
16
Ibid.
17
Kant, I. 1956. Critique of Practical Reason. Beck, L. W. (Trans.). Indianapolis: Bobbs-
Merrill, para 120, 124.
18
Bell, C. 1961. Art. London: Chatto and Windus.
we can discover some quality common and peculiar to all objects that provoke
it, we shall have what I take to be the central problem of aesthetics.”19 To the
question, namely, what quality is shared by all objects of aesthetic emotion, Bell
replies as under:
“Only one answer is possible—significant form […] lines and colours com-
bined in a particular way, certain forms and relations of forms, stir our aes-
thetic emotions. These relations and combinations of lines and colours, these
aesthetically moving forms, I call ‘Significant Form,’ and ‘Significant Form’
is the only quality common to all works of visual art.”20
It would be interesting to find parallels between Kant’s and Bell’s views on

form and content and the representational aspect of art. We have already noted
that form is at the center of attention in Kant’s aesthetics, it being the last word
in the appreciation of beauty. Bell, too, in a Kantian mode, emphasizes the im-
portance of form in aesthetic experience, aesthetic emotion being a response to
form itself. Significant form elicits the aesthetic response which is divorced
from practical life and its interests. It is disinterested a la Kant. Regarding the
second point Kant does say that fine art is a representation of nature. But the
word “representation” is to be taken in the sense of something being made by
imagination and as such it does not refer to imitation of nature or fidelity to it.
The content or matter must be given a form which must exhibit finality without
a purpose.
As Kant maintains: “Nature proved beautiful when it wore the appearance of
art; and art can only be beautiful, where we are conscious of its being art, while
it has the appearance of nature.”21
Bell is more forthright in rejecting the relevance of the representational
aspect of painting for an aesthetic appreciation of it. This is clear from his as-
sessment of Firth’s popular painting, Paddington Station, a painting full of inci-
dents, characters and social details.22 However, Bell’s contention has been ques-
tioned. It is suggested that if we shift our attention from Bell’s example to Pi-
casso’s Women Weeping, we find that
“It is […] not simply that its lines, colours and shapes are satisfyingly related
in a formal complexity, but that in being so related they perfectly and mov-
—————————
19
Ibid., 21–22.
20
Ibid., 23.
21
Kant, I. 1973, op. cit., 167.
22
Bell, C.1961, op. cit., 30–31.
48 Manjulika Ghosh
ingly express grief. It is the mutually satisfying union of form and content in
that work that may seem to be the source of its aesthetic excellence.”23
Bell may well respond to this criticism by insisting that aesthetic emotion is
a response to form itself and not to human circumstances or characters or events
that the form may be used to depict or embody. He, however, “… does not say
that realistic representation must necessarily be bad; it may well be significant,
but its artistic value, in his view, lies in its formal aspects.”24 Significant form
elicits the aesthetic emotion which is divorced from practical life and its inter-
ests.
The overwhelming importance that Bell reposes on form brings about
a separation of art and the aesthetic from the concerns of life. He says: “to ap-
preciate a work of art we need bring with us nothing from life, no knowledge of
its ideas and affairs, no familiarity with its emotions […] Art transports us from
the world of man’s activity to a world of aesthetic exaltation.”25 While Bell is
right in imputing to aesthetics freedom from life’s concerns, he appears to over-
state the bifurcation between form and content. He overlooks the fact that con-
tent can be viewed as formally palpable. Again, form in art is not something
immutable. The artist is constantly or intermittently experimenting with form,
introducing variations. We are told of Picasso’s breaking down the form in dif-
ferent periods of his cubism. Form does not stand still; it keeps changing from
style to style. The form in Leonardo is different from that in Matisse. In paint-
ing, for example, the lines and colours are not only of interest in themselves but
also for their inexhaustible and unexpected compositional powers. The poetic
use of metaphors is creative insofar as it brings out a new aspect or shows a new
way of feeling towards something which is already discernible in language. But
the effect comes through; the material becomes expressive; the artist becomes
a creator and not a mere adaptor of forms.
Music, which is non-representational to the highest degree, also provides
a corroboration. The distinct function of music is not just to transform our expe-
rience. The transformation occurs through audible notes of music holding out
inexhaustible possibilities of interpretation by the performer and understanding
by the audience. I propose to document this by a reference to the classical music
of India: not for any other reason but for the fact that I know it a little more
closely. In Indian classical music—both vocal and instrumental—there are cer-
—————————
23
Collinson, D. 1992. “Aesthetic Experience.” In: Philosophical Aesthetics: An Introduction.
Oswald, H. (Ed.), Oxford: Blackwell, 147.
24
Bell, C. 1961, op. cit., 146.
25 Quoted by Collinson, D. 1992, op. cit., 177, from Bell, C. 1961, op. cit.
tain canonical structures which are handed down from antiquity. The endowed
and competent musician’s, the maestro’s rendering of the basic structures teams
with suggestions of creative freedom and vitality. The permutations and combi-
nations of musical notes are liberated from the dominant, almost dictatorial,
established canons to manifest their free, improvising character. In the process,
the content does not remain unchanged either. There is an overflowing of
content over the bounds of form. This accounts for the unorthodox musical ex-
pressions that are set apart from conventionally accepted lines of development.
Consequently, in the context of Indian classical music, under the rubric of the
raga Mallara, we have different raga-rupas or melody types like Suddha Mal-
lara, Mian-ki-Mallara, Megha-Mallara, Suradasi-Mallara, etc.
It is not the case that the artist aims for an ideal formalism. He begins with
a strong tradition, with a set technique, style and conventions. But an artist
worth the name, gradually or all of a sudden, gets over the constricting “repeti-
tions of the same”—the convention, technique and style and takes wings to the
realm of possibilities. What we intend to say is that autonomy or freedom goes
hand in hand with in-forming the content. Again, form and content are so indis-
tinguishably undecipherable that one might take nakedness to be what is called
a nude. As we are informed by Kenneth Clark26 that nude is a form while na-
kedness is an embarrassment to the spectator. People who gather to witness
a strip-tease show will hardly care for contemplating a nude painting by Au-
guste Renoir or Peter Paul Rubens, or for that matter the beautiful nymphs
sculpted in Indian temple art. A young Tagore was enthralled by sighting
Sandro Botticelli’s Birth of Venus, and the experience impacted his sensibility
to such a degree that he celebrated the nude form in two of his poems, “Urvasi”
and “Vijayini.” The distinction between the celestial Venus and the earthly
Venus is so heightened as to take away all grossness from the persona of these
two women.
RELOOKING AT FORM AND CONTENT
In what has gone before, we have attempted to show that, important though
the content or subject matter is, form is more than that. No work of art would be
of value if it lacks unity or organization, however lofty the content is or what
new vision it offers. Sculptures or paintings which are minimalist in respect of
their content, as for example, Constantin Brâncuşi’s sculptures and Mark Roth-
ko’s paintings, arrest attention due to how the form is conceived. Every degree
—————————
26
Clerk, K. 1956. The Nude: A Study in Ideal Form. New York: Pantheon Books.
50 Manjulika Ghosh
of unity or organization, no matter how low, contributes to the positive value of

the work.
The play with form gives an artist a peculiar freedom to mould or express
the subject matter without remaining a slave to it. Even when the artist draws
his theme from society he never expresses it directly but only obliquely. The
point is that new artistic forms and ideas do not completely coincide with new
social realities. It would be a complete misunderstanding of the nature of art to
bypass the formal or say that all problems in art are directly connected with
social situations. To analyze the artistic development of a particular period, we
must take into account the stylistic and formal problems and experimentations
with form. The artists who repeat the aesthetically significant form of their ear-
lier works and present them as if they are creatively original, are considered
guilty of self-plagiarism.27 When the autonomy of the artist to see through the
content in terms of the laws internal to art itself is compromised, and is made to
serve ideological, religious or moralizing agenda, the artist becomes causally
conditioned and his art is made to serve the interest of other social institutions.
ARTIST AND SOCIETY
It is sometimes suggested that form being an abstraction has nothing to do

with society. If art is autonomous and founded on abstraction, does it have any
traffic with life? Tolstoy’s What Is Art?28 deserves to be heard as challenging
the fashionable slogan of art for art’s sake. By art, according to him, the artist
transmits the feelings that (1) he has lived through, and (2) the feelings are such
as to promote the brotherhood of humans. And the writing can be understanda-
ble by simple men and not merely by the coterie. This entails the social respon-
sibility of the artist and reduces art to a social phenomenon. Tolstoy was a su-
preme artist and yet he chastised such great names as William Shakespeare and
Ludwig Beethoven and his great novels, Anna Karenina and War and Peace, by
implication, suffer the same fate. The idea of Marxist art highlighting social
realism owes a great deal to Tolstoy.
One common feature that can be identified in the many variants of Marx-
ism is the compulsion to situate works of art within a political context. All of
Marx’s writings from the Communist Manifesto onwards are directed towards
the goal of class struggle. And the artist becomes one more means of contriving
to bring it about. Abstract art, for example, Cubism, is seen as belonging to
—————————
27
Gottlob, D. 1984. “Self-Plagiarism.” JAAC, LXIII, 1, 71–77.
28
Tolstoy, L. 1930. What Is Art? Maude, A. (Trans.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
bourgeois ideology and representing artistic “decadence.” Politics will, there-

fore, be the ultimate determinant of a given work of art’s value. Now, it is one
thing to say that the artist could express his individuality by an original handling
of a given subject and at the same time portray the processes taking place within
society. It is quite another thing to say that artistic value simply is a sub-class of
political value and could not be otherwise.
Even in Marxist circles, of late, Marxists, oriented to Structuralism, have ar-
gued for a much more complex relationship between the arts and the economic
base, to the extent of claiming relative autonomy for the arts as a social practice.
Nevertheless, it gives way to the consideration of the base/super-structure mod-
el on which so much of Marxist cultural theory depends. A base is invariably
the dominant partner in the relationship.
THEODOR ADORNO ON ART
In his Aesthetic Theory,29 Adorno carries aesthetics beyond original Marxism

to a new level of sophistication. He presents, in a complex way, the general
thesis of the polarities of the principle of autonomy and art’s social significance,
the thesis that art derives from a larger social process, opposes and points
beyond it. Art “dissociates itself” from society and “belongs to it.”30 While aes-
thetics may be powerless to combat the basic social determinants, it may never-
theless contribute, within the terms of these determinations, to its resistance to
them. The complex polarity comes together in the claim that autonomous arts
are fetishes.31 In the entire book, Adorno draws out the implications of the po-
larity-thesis, and at the same time he qualifies each of these implications. He
always insists that art’s critical function, social criticism, flows from within—
from a work’s form—and not its content. Art must intervene consciously in
consciousness, through its own form. His emphasis on form should not be mis-
taken for a simple insistence on the primacy of style and technique. Rather,
form refers to the whole “intentional organization” of art—the capacity of art to
restructure conventional patterns of meaning.
The polarity of autonomy and social character marks the position of art
within Adorno’s model of aesthetics. The social relevance of art does not ex-
haust its primary artistic quality. It has a life of its own, a self-sufficiency,
—————————
29
Adorno, T. W. 1984. Aesthetic Theory. Lenhardt, C. (Trans.). London: Routledge and Kegan
Paul.
30 Ibid., 358.
31 Ibid., 324, 338.
52 Manjulika Ghosh
which is distinct from relations and forces within other social institutions. This
may, again, be illustrated from the point of view of Indian classical music, say,
a difficult composition in a rare raga, melody type, set in a difficult tala,
rhythm. The performer appreciates this primarily in terms of its musical chal-
lenges. The audience listens to it in terms of how well those challenges are met
relative to other compositions and to other performances of the same composi-
tion. A national anthem, by contrast, is composed to meet a new political con-
sciousness and awakening. It is sung as a way of fulfilling this purpose. It is not
easy to imagine a situation where the two musical pieces reverse their roles so
that singing a national anthem would be aesthetically appropriate and the piece
of classical music would do justice to the established formula of a national an-
them. It is such an understanding of works of art that explains their value and
significance.
VALUE AND IDEAL IN ART
So far we have tracked the value of art in terms of its autonomy. This is tak-
en to mean structuring of materials into some form. Values are intimately relat-
ed with ideals. Values represent qualities which are meritorious and hence
commendable. All value terms are evaluative or normative in character; ideals
are standards or measures of evaluation. Both values and ideals are contingent
on what we are valuing, but in different ways. The reasons for the aesthetic
value of drama are different from those for the artistic value of novel. Whatever
be the art type, ideals in art are concerned with the art work’s similarities to and
differences from the original. This similarity coupled with dissimilarities
contributes to the “intensity of contrast” in every kind of art. This intensity of
contrasting qualities “is the basis of artistic value.”32 Near identity but radical
differences is a vital contrast which opens up an inexhaustible perspective of
relations in which the work stands to the object.
The interplay of similarities and differences holds out inexhaustible promises
and possibilities of formation. Because of this a work of art, particularly
a great work of art, posits challenges to other artists, to other works of the same
artist, to new generations of artists and becomes relevant to the art-world and
the artistic tradition. This richness and fecundity of art constitutes its ideal. No
work of art, however valuable it is, can ever exhaustively incorporate the ideal.
The ideal of art is always regulative and never constitutive of it. The value of art
—————————
32 Ross, S. D. 1982. A Theory of Art: Inexhaustibility by Contrast. New York: State University
of New York Press, 19 ff.

is mediated through its ideal. The manner in which the ideal is expressed in
a particular medium is the basis of its value.
TOWARDS A CONCLUSION
An attempt is made above to distinguish between what a work of art is and

what it does. The former maintains the autonomy of art—trying to see through
art in terms of laws internal to art itself. When art is made to serve the interests
of other institutions—religion, morality or politics—it loses its value as art. To
put the matter in a different way, art is often viewed as instrumental to
knowledge or edification, having beneficial effects on character building, ap-
preciating the world and human nature more richly and so on. This is indisputa-
ble. The point at issue is that these extraneous values do not contribute to the
value of a work as art. Picasso’s Guernica, for example, is not neutral to the
shortcomings, frustrations and ruins of the time to engender counter-perceptions
or realizations. But this is not integral to its creation as art. Art and life meet at
tangents. Shakespeare makes us wiser. A mountainscape painted by Nicholas
Roerich makes us to look at the Himalayas in a “light that was never on land
and sea.” Or, as Dante held, art instills in us a new form of consciousness, and
the vision of Beatrice (= art) leaves us no longer able to look upon life as be-
fore. “Only the experienced can understand.”33
All told, art remains a miracle. As Browning has put it, in describing an or-
ganist playing: “here is the finger of God […] That out of three sounds he frame
not a fourth sound, but a star.”34
ABOUT THE AUTHOR — PhD, UGC Emeritus Fellow, University of North Ben-
gal, Darjeeling-734013, West Bengal, India.
—————————
33
Alighieri, D. 1964 (1295). The New Life, Anderson, W. (Trans.). Penguin, 86.
34
Browning, R. 1983. “Abt Vogler.” In: Anthology of the World’s Best Poems, vol. IV. New
York: Wm. H. Wise & Co. Inc.
No. 3/2017
C. E. Emmer
BURKEAN BEAUTY IN THE SERVICE OF VIOLENCE
ABSTRACT
Examining the images of war displayed on front pages of the New York Times, Da-
vid Shields makes the case that they ultimately glamorize military conflict. He anchors
his case with an excerpt on the delight of the sublime from Edmund Burke’s aesthetic
theory in A Philosophical Enquiry. By contrast, this essay considers violence and war-
fare using not the Burkean sublime, but instead the beautiful in Burke’s aesthetics, and
argues that forming identities on the beautiful in the Burkean sense can ultimately shut
down dialogue and feed the lust for violence and revenge.
Keywords: Aesthetics, anger, beautiful, beauty, Candida Moss, Charles Brown,
Christianity, dialogue, Edmund Burke, forgiveness, Friedrich Nietzsche, identity, just
war theory, martyrdom, peace, persecution, revenge, religion, sublime, sublimity, sym-
pathy, violence, warfare
My goal here is to utilize Edmund Burke’s aesthetic phenomenology in

a somewhat unusual way to address sectarianism, violence, and militarism.
Usually, when Burke’s aesthetics are applied to war or other forms of violence,
power, or force, the natural move is to appeal to his discussion of the sublime.
And that move is fully justified! Here, however, I will appeal instead to Burke’s
discussion of the beautiful. I will argue that, in certain contexts, Burkean beauty
can serve to shut down dialogue and support conflict, violence, and warfare.
A better case might be made than the one I make here, but I want to make a first
attempt.
56 C. E. Emmer
1. WAR AND THE VARIETIES OF THE BEAUTIFUL
The recent publication of David Shields’s book, War Is Beautiful: The New
York Times Pictorial Guide to the Glamour of Armed Conflict,1 a book which
for the most part simply collects and displays war photographs printed on the
front page of the New York Times, serves as a concrete and graphic reminder of
the frequent collusion of aesthetics and warfare. Shields’s War Is Beautiful
makes the case that the images of war presented by the New York Times on its
front page (particularly those of the United States’ military occupation of
Afghanistan and Iraq) are meant to convey not the horror and injustice of war,
but rather the ability of its photographers to use the horror and injustice of war
to create beautifully captured, visually stunning images, what his title calls the
“glamour of armed conflict.”
Notably, the body of the War Is Beautiful book opens with an epigraph from
Edmund Burke’s 1757/1759 study on aesthetics:
“When danger or pain press too nearly, they are incapable of giving any de-
light, and are simply terrible; at a certain distance and with certain modifica-
tions, they may be, and they are delightful, as we every day experience. The
cause of this I shall endeavor to investigate further.”2
Though Shields makes the case that the beauty of the front-page New York
Times photographs of military conflict effectively sell warfare to the American
public3 (or at least turned it into a form of entertainment for them), and though
he does frame his discussion with a passage from Burke’s essay on aesthetics,
what some readers may not catch is that the passage from Burke that Shields
deploys does not describe the beautiful. Instead, it discusses “delight,” the at-
tractive sensation of viewing fearful things from a certain remove, which on
Burke’s theory is the territory of the sublime, not the beautiful. (Indeed, the
section from which it comes is entitled, “Of the SUBLIME.”) This is not a mis-
take on Shields’s part; for his focus includes the “delight” which viewers can
find in the glamorous New York Times war photographs. Those photographs are
arguably closer to Burke’s idea of the sublime than his idea of the beautiful. But
his framing raises the question: could there be a connection between the beauti-
ful in Burke’s aesthetics and warfare and other forms of violence?
—————————
1 Shields, D. 2015. War Is Beautiful: The New York Times Pictorial Guide to the Glamour of
Armed Conflict. New York: Penguin/Random House.

2 Burke, E. 1990. A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and
Beautiful. Oxford–New York: Oxford University Press, part I, section VII, 36–37. Quoted in:
Shields, D. 2015, op. cit., 11. I am providing part and section numbers so that passages from
Burke’s Enquiry can be found regardless of the edition.
3 Given that the term, “American,” can obscure the other Americas of the hemisphere, I hope
to be forgiven for using the term as shorthand for “related to the United States of America.”
Burkean Beauty in the Service of Violence 57
The specificity of Burkean beauty is worth dwelling on, for, as a little reflec-
tion will show, there are different kinds of beauty, and not every discussion of
beauty refers to the same kind. The play of mental faculties invoked by Imman-
uel Kant in his discussion of beauty in the Critique of Judgment, for example,
draws from a long tradition focusing on philosophical and religious contempla-
tion. The sort of beauty often associated with present-day fashion models and
film stars, on the other hand, is not merely not contemplative, but carries with it
a feeling of being overpowered by a commanding avatar of glamour. In the case
of Burkean beauty, a different non-contemplative power relation is at work,
namely, a sympathetic, protective attraction to something perceived as weak,
incapable, less powerful, and in need of assistance; it pulls one in emotionally in
order to help it, take care of it, and perhaps most importantly for our discussion
here, protect it.
For example, having distinguished between passions which protect and fur-
ther the individual (these are connected to pain) and passions which protect and
further society (these are connected to pleasure), he remarks of the pleasure of
beauty that, when we see it, it operates as
“a social quality; for where women and men, and not only they, but when
other animals give us a sense of joy and pleasure in beholding them, (and
there are many that do so) they inspire us with sentiments of tenderness and
affection towards their persons; we like to have them near us, and we enter
willingly into a kind of relation with them.”4
Before going further, I should briefly make at least one distinction for clari-
ty. As Burke makes clear in the same section, this passion or quality in objects
is not akin to lust; the usually small and frail things we find beautiful in his
sense are things, which, at least as long as we find them beautiful, we want to be
tender towards, not sexually conquer. Burke explicitly states that here he does
not have lust in mind, but rather a form of love. Burke sets out this distinction in
an indirect way, too, insofar as he claims that not merely women and children,
but also many animals cause the passion of beauty. We are generally not sexual-
ly aroused by kittens and puppies; instead we want to cuddle them, pet them,
and take care of them. Indeed, Burke is at a loss to explain providentially why
we feel such a strong and widespread caring and tenderness for species other
than our own.5
—————————
4 Burke, E. 1990, op. cit., part I, section X, 39.
5 Ibid., “But to what end, in many cases, this [tenderness and affections towards beautiful non-
human animals] was designed, I am unable to discover; for I see no greater reason for
a connection between man and several animals who are attired in so engaging a manner, than
between him and some others who entirely want this attraction, or possess it in a far weaker
degree.” In explaining this often-seen human tenderness for many non-human animal species, an
evolutionary approach arguably does a better job than a providential one.
58 C. E. Emmer
Granted, it can be easy to belittle many aspects of Edmund Burke’s arguably

quirky physiological take on aesthetics in his Philosophical Enquiry, particular-
ly as he delves into the physical characteristics of objects he somewhat pro-
grammatically marks as causes. But the core of his theory, the passions of the
beautiful and the sublime, particularly the phenomenological aspects of the
beautiful and the sublime he addresses, should not be overlooked, because they
are still being (and promise to continue to be) put to use in present-day political
discourse, such as election campaigns, political speeches, and political rallies—
especially when one considers their ominous application to violent, even mili-
tary ends.
There are precedents for Burke’s teleological pleasure/pain pairing, such as
Aristotle’s psychological and biological discussions of pleasure and pain as
animal life functions in De Anima (also touched on in the Nicomachean Ethics).
After Burke, Kant, among others, picked up on the seemingly providential roles
of pleasure and pain (e.g., in his Speculative Beginnings of Human History). Of
course, utilitarianism is another important branch of thought centered on pleas-
ure and pain. Today, similar roles for pleasure and pain could be laid out on an
evolutionary basis. But it is the special status of pleasure as articulated through
beauty in Burke’s aesthetics that deserves our attention, because of the degree to
which Burke connects beauty to sympathy and care.
I want to be as explicit as possible here, and lay out my cards: in this essay,
I am making two moves which pull me away from my starting point in Burke’s
aesthetics, each of which could be questioned. 1) First, I am drawing upon
a causal link which does not appear in Burke’s aesthetic theory (though his the-
ory does not rule it out, either), namely, I want to argue that, when one sees
oneself, one’s group, one’s culture, or one’s country through the lens of the
Burkean beautiful, that can serve to motivate a desire for revenge and violent
action. 2) And, secondly, I am focusing on the beautiful in Burke not as he has
laid it out according to particular “beautiful” physical characteristics (though, to
the degree those are present in any particular case, they also could be involved).
Specifically, I am suggesting that one look to the phenomenology or psycholo-
gy of the beautiful in Burke, and I am looking at the use of that emotional phe-
nomenology in contexts which are not necessarily aesthetic in the narrow sense:
culture, politics, and identity. Now either of these two moves can be questioned.
By spelling them out here, I want to mark them simultaneously as the main
moves of the essay but also as the two places where my attempt may fail. By
being as explicit as possible here, I want not only to make sure that my moves
are not hidden, but also to indicate where, because of the admitted vulnerability
of these moves, others might be able to assist me, if they believe a better case
could be made.
In an earlier publication, using a similar focus on Burkean beauty, I have ar-
gued that it can promote a kind of comfortable political complacency, blinding
Americans to their country’s aggression and war crimes.6 Here I am attempting

to draw out that line of thought one step further, from a mere complacency or
complicity to an active and vengeful engagement. This extra step is more admit-
tedly more tenuous, especially if one feels obligated to utilize only that which
Burke has explicitly stated in his aesthetic theory. If it is true that Burkean beau-
ty can be used to solidify political complacency, then the present analysis makes
the case for an additional use of Burkean beauty. These two functions could of
course work together to similar ends.
Again, my focus is not Burke’s specific physiology, but instead his phenom-
enology of the basic emotional tone of the beautiful for Burke. In particular,
I am interested in the mostly unspoken relation between the Burkean beautiful
and the urge to protect. Burke describes how beautiful things, because of their
perceived smallness, frailness, and weakness (coupled with other qualities),
elicit in the onlooker not only feelings of pleasure and relaxation, but also feel-
ings of sympathy, affection, love, and care. That these feelings in addition also
lead to a desire to protect is for the most part not explicit in Burke’s Philosophi-
cal Enquiry. But Burke’s providential framework reveals the implicit connec-
tion: as we have seen, the purpose of these feelings of affection is to promote
society, to benefit others.
Which society? Which others? Burke’s examples and language make it clear
that he sees these feelings of affection as promoting primarily the survival of the
family (though of course others could be included). The image that Burke
sketches is that male head of the family is meant feel affection for, and thus to
care for and protect, his wife and children; likewise, the wife is spurred by af-
fection for the children below her to care for and protect them. If caregiving and
protection are not included, it is hard to see how the feelings presumably im-
planted in us would promote the survival of the family. Now, there is no need to
carry over Burke’s patriarchal assumptions. But following out the implications
of those assumptions does expose a somewhat obscured bridge between the
beautiful, and its connected feelings of affection, on the one hand, and a desire
to protect, on the other.
It is here, then, that my first expansive or speculative move comes into play.
What I am adding here, beyond simply bringing out the implied desire to pro-
tect, is that, when a harm or threat is perceived (or merely suspected), this desire
to protect can trigger or occasion a second passion, namely, a desire for destruc-
tion or revenge. If we add the second move, namely, applying this Burkean idea
of the beautiful beyond narrow aesthetic applications and into the realm of cul-
ture, politics, and identity, many possibilities open up. If a person takes on for
his or her self the identity of the small, defenseless, beautiful one who needs
protection, or if that person identifies as (or strongly sympathizes with) their
—————————
6 Emmer, C. 2007. “The Flower and the Breaking Wheel: Burkean Beauty and Political
Kitsch.” The International Journal of the Arts in Society, 2 (1), 153–164.

60 C. E. Emmer
family, subculture, political party, or country, and sees these as beautiful ac-
cording to Burke’s emotional phenomenology, then the number of situations in
which a desire for revenge could arise as a result multiplies incredibly.
But perhaps these conjectures need a more concrete expression. I will spend
the rest of the essay considering two possible examples of the emotional mech-
anism I have just described. Once we begin looking for beauty with Burke’s
phenomenology in mind—with my two speculative moves added—a number of
instances shake out. One example that leaps to the fore is Friedrich Nietzsche’s
analysis of religious ressentiment. A second example arises in the realm of just
war theory.
2. MEEKNESS AND REVENGE IN THE CASE OF CHRISTIANITY
Friedrich Nietzsche’s analysis of Christianity provides a signal historical

precedent for this coupling of the emotions or “passions” of meekness and
vengeance.7 Nietzsche’s phenomenological analysis of common, indeed, histor-
ically leading, Christian attitudes draws our attention to the vindictiveness and
will for revenge which can reside just under the surface of the supposedly es-
sential meekness, humility, and forgiveness of the Christian spirit. Nietzsche
famously poses a question at the opening of section 15 of the “first essay” in the
Genealogy of Morals:
“Dante, I think, committed a crude blunder when, with a terror-inspiring in-

genuity, he placed above the gateway of his hell the inscription ‘I too was
created by eternal love’—at any rate, there would be more justification for
placing above the gateway to the Christian Paradise and its “eternal bliss”
the inscription “I too was created by eternal hate”—provided a truth may be
placed above the gateway to a lie! For what is it that constitutes the bliss of
this Paradise?”8
The answer comes from the great theologians and church fathers themselves.
Nietzsche’s first witness is the famed theologian Aquinas, who declared that:
“In order that the bliss of the saints may be more delightful for them and that
—————————
7 Presumably a similar analysis could be provided for many other, non-Christian religions, but
within the United States, Christianity is the dominant religion. No matter how much present-day
politicians in the United States point to the dangers of Islamic extremism, from a historical
perspective the Christian precedent for revenge and violence was set centuries before Islam even
existed. The story of Hypatia, the female philosopher of Alexandria, Egypt, shows how the pagan,
Jewish, and Christian religions could all serve as tools in the furtherance of violence, almost two
centuries before Muhammad’s formulation of Islam.
8 Nietzsche, F. 1967 (2000). Basic Writings of Nietzsche. Kaufmann, W. (Trans.). New York:
The Modern Library, 484–485.

they may render more copious thanks to God for it, it is given to them to see
perfectly the punishment of the damned.”9
Nietzsche’s second witness, the early church father Tertullian, provides
much more detail. Tertullian explained that Christians have no need for the
bloody spectacle of the gladiators, since Christians may anticipate an everlast-
ing spectacle of bloody torture, namely, the eternal sufferings of the damned,
from which they will gather a never-ending joy. On the day of judgment, Tertul-
lian imagines himself asking, “How vast a spectacle then bursts upon the eye!
What there excites my admiration? What my derision? Which sight gives me
joy? Which rouses me to exultation?” Tertullian’s answer: the eternal tortures of
the world’s leaders who persecuted the Christians. Here it is clear that the moti-
vation is not love and forgiveness, but revenge. Tertullian exulted in joy not
merely at the sufferings of those in power who might have persecuted the Chris-
tians, but also at the torments of any philosophers or poets who might have
merely questioned Christians’ ideas:
“What world’s wise men besides, the very philosophers, in fact, who taught
their followers that God had no concern in aught that is sublunary, and were
wont to assure them that either they had no souls, or that they would never
return to the bodies which at death they had left, now covered with shame
before the poor deluded ones, as one fire consumes them! Poets also, trem-
bling not before the judgment seat of Rhadamanthus or Minos, but of the un-
expected Christ!”10
Even philosophical or artistically composed critique—free speech—is perceived
by prominent theologians as a persecution worthy of never-ending torture, and
the object of eternal gloating by the resurrected Christians in heaven.
More recently, the professor of New Testament studies and scholar of early
Christianity, Candida Moss, has also pointed out a similar early example of
presumably meek, forgiving, and self-controlled Christianity that reveals an
underlying aggression. In her 2013 book, The Myth of Persecution, she observes
that the traditional self-image of Christianity as a victim of continuous and un-
ending persecution arguably contributes to further aggression rather than for-
giveness.11 Returning to the stories from the so-called “Age of Martyrs” (the
first 300 years of Christianity), she notes that the story of martyrs Perpetua and
Felicitas contains a scene in which their fellow martyr, Saturus, declared to their
—————————
9 Aquinas. Summa Theologiae, III, Supplementum, Q. 94, Art. 1, as quoted in Nietzsche, F.
1967 (2000), op. cit., 485.

10 Tertullian. De Spectaculis. Thelwall, Rev. S. (Trans.), as quoted in Nietzsche, F. 1967
(2000), op. cit., 485–486.

11 Moss, C. 2013. The Myth of Persecution: How Early Christians Invented A Story of
Martyrdom. New York: HarperOne. Though she takes her Nietzsche with a grain of salt, she
confirms his core observation of early Christian revenge fantasies, herself adding that they are
found not merely in martyr narratives, but also often in Christian (and Jewish) apocalyptic
literature; see 206–207.
62 C. E. Emmer
onlookers, “Take a good look at our faces, so that you will be able to recognize
us on that day”—that is, the day of judgment, when the martyrs will be gloating
over their suffering critics.12 Saturus anticipates ultimate triumph, and ultimate
revenge.
What is especially remarkable here (both in the Aquinas and Tertullian pas-
sages provided by Nietzsche, and in the Saturus declaration singled out by
Moss) is the way in which a self-image of forgiveness, meekness, and self-
sacrifice (“Turn the other cheek”) is shown—by the testimony of theologians,
church fathers, and saintly martyrs—to reveal or motivate an inner core of an-
ger, hatred, aggression, and thirst for revenge. To be fair, this early testimony
cannot determine what any particular Christian sees as the true meaning of
Christianity or what any particular Christian might take the original doctrine
of Jesus to be, but this testimony does undeniably come from early and well-
established Christian authorities and role models. Should they be needed, con-
temporary examples of such Christian lust for revenge, however, are easy to
find in fire-and-brimstone highway billboards, online sermons, and Internet
comment threads.
Even though Moss ultimately argues that the story of the continuous perse-
cution of Christians is almost completely mythological, she also points to the
dangers of deploying the story of continuous Christian persecution as a frame-
work for Christians to make decisions and take actions today, a danger which
would still threaten those decisions even if the stories of the martyrs were not
mostly mythological. As she sums up her position:
“The view that the history of Christianity is a history of unrelenting persecu-
tion persists in modern religious and political debate about what it means to
be Christian. It creates a world in which Christians are under attack; it en-
dorses political warfare rather than encouraging political discourse; and it
legitimizes seeing those who disagree with us as our enemies.”13
Grounding one’s identity in the narrative of martyrdom shuts down dialog

and promotes revenge, violence, and warfare. When a person or a people creates
an identity based on being vulnerable, and under attack (the Burkean beautiful
in a context of perceived persecution), the result can be an inability to seek non-
violent solutions on the one hand, and a thirst for revenge on the other. Granted,
some people and some communities have in fact been harshly and continuously
persecuted. Even then, seeking peace and reconciliation may be the better tack,
difficult though it may be. But when the story of continuous persecution is false,
or numerous martyr narratives are fabricated, the person or people who so de-
fine their identity cut themselves off unnecessarily from dialogical solutions.
And that was the danger to which I was pointing at the outset.
—————————
12 Ibid.,205.
13 Moss, C. 2013, op. cit., 21.
I will now (if only briefly) turn to a second possible locus of innocent beauty
which can serve to shut down dialogue and promote a violent reaction, namely,
just war theory.
3. INNOCENT REVENGE AND JUST WAR THEORY
Within the constraints of this essay, I will not be able to delve into richly de-
tailed examples, but suspect that many readers of this essay will have already
begun thinking of the mythology of American innocence as they have been
reading. Americans are encouraged by their political leaders and wider culture
to see themselves and their country as always enjoying a default position of
purity and innocence, and to believe that the political and human rights disasters
in which the country gets involved (such as the Latin American death squads
backed by Ronald Reagan, the Abu-Ghraib torture center under George W.
Bush, the drone warfare of Barack Obama, or Donald Trump’s self-proclaimed
“Muslim ban”) always result from an essentially innocent America falling under
unprovoked attack from international “bad guys” who as it were trap it. (How
one is supposed to square a presumably Christian America’s essential innocence
with the theological doctrine of universal original sin is a question all its own.)
Clearly, the American mythology of innocence—according to which all the
foreign civilian deaths brought about by the United States automatically qualify
as accidental and unintentional, and (by default) only result from last-option
decisions into which the country is forced by nefarious international “evildo-
ers”—rests on an aggressive cultivation of the simultaneous belief (and feeling)
that the Unites States is weak, incapable, and innocent, along with the belief
(and feeling) that—precisely because the United States is meek, pure, and inno-
cent—any injury the United States suffers deserves an unforgiving and over-
whelming military response—one which, therefore, no matter how many deaths
it brings about, cannot be seen as violent, but must instead be seen as righteous,
perhaps even restrained. Again, it seems that we have stumbled into the territory
of the Burkean beautiful as a trigger or occasion for violence or vengeance.
In his article, “Defending the Indefensible: A Dialogical and Feminist Cri-
tique of Just War Theory,” Charles Brown points out that, for all its attempts to
reign in aggression, standard-issue just war theory only exacerbates, instead of
de-escalating war: “Just war theory assumes that the differences between unjust
aggressors and just self-defenders are clear, unambiguous, and mutually exclu-
sive,” and for that reason, the structure of just war theory itself can contribute to
escalation, given that, by definition, the “other” must be cast as the aggressor,
which shuts down the possibility for dialogue.14 As he summarizes: “As long as
the current value-hierarchical dualist conceptual system is dominant, just war
theory simply becomes a way of legitimating ‘our’ involvement in war while
—————————
14 Brown, C. 2010. “Defending the Indefensible: A Dialogical and Feminist Critique of Just
War Theory.” Skepsis, 21 (1), 90.

64 C. E. Emmer
de-legitimating the ‘others’ involvement in war.”15 The present article, turning

as it does on Burkean beauty as a potential contributing factor in the exacerba-
tion of conflict, may be able to contribute to a fuller understanding of the emo-
tional (as opposed to the merely conceptual) side of Brown’s critique of just war
theory. Additionally, here in the context of just war theory, we might remember
what Moss observed about the narrative of Christian martyrdom: “it endorses
political warfare rather than encouraging political discourse; and it legitimizes
seeing those who disagree with us as our enemies.”16
4. CONCLUSION
What, then, has this essay accomplished? This essay started from the fact
that Shields framed his book on the beauty of war on the New York Times front
page with a quotation from Burke’s aesthetic theory. What I have asked here is,
can anything useful result from considering the Burkean beautiful in relation to
warfare and violence, instead of the Burkean sublime? If my analysis is sound,
it turns out there may indeed be good reason to suspect that Burkean beauty can
play a part in shutting down dialog and fostering confrontation, violence, and
revenge instead.
REFERENCES
Brown, C. 2010. “Defending the Indefensible: A Dialogical and Feminist Critique of Just War
Theory.” Skepsis, 21 (1), 85–106.
Burke, E. 1990. A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beauti-
ful. Oxford–New York: Oxford University Press.
Emmer, C. 2007. “The Flower and the Breaking Wheel: Burkean Beauty and Political
Kitsch.” The International Journal of the Arts in Society, 2 (1), 153–164.
Moss, C. 2013. The Myth of Persecution: How Early Christians Invented A Story of Martyrdom.
New York: HarperOne.
Nietzsche, F. 1967 (2000). Basic Writings of Nietzsche. Kaufmann, W. (Trans.). New York: The
Modern Library.
Shields, D. 2015. War Is Beautiful: The New York Times Pictorial Guide to the Glamour of
Armed Conflict. New York: Penguin/Random House.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR — PhD, Professor, a member of the philosophy depart-

ment at Emporia State University, 1 Kellogg Cir, Emporia, KS 66801, USA. He has
studied philosophy at Stony Brook, Tübingen, and Marburg. His publications focus on
aesthetics, particularly Immanuel Kant’s and Edmund Burke’s aesthetic theories, as well
as questions surrounding kitsch. He also translates philosophical texts from German to
English.
Email: C Emmer <[email protected]>
—————————
15 Brown, C. 2010, op cit., 105.
16 Moss, C. 2013, op. cit., 21.
No. 3/2017
Tatjana M. Shatunova
WHY BE BEAUTIFUL?
ABSTRACT
The subject of the article is the problem of necessity of being beautiful. The beauty
of the person is presented as a human value that can be achieved by the person her-
self/himself. Nevertheless, beautiful people are considered to be guilty of all sins. That
is why beauty needs justification. The article provides a number of arguments to protect
beauty. Creating beauty is—as it is shown—an anthropological task of the human
being. Hence the main thesis of the paper is: We have to philosophize aesthetic virtues,
and we are responsible for being beautiful.
Keywords: beauty, justification of beauty, beauty protection, aesthetic virtues.
People often ask why they need to be moral, clever, why it is necessary for
a human being to love, to believe, but the necessity of being beautiful is never
questioned. It seems so natural for a human being to want to be beautiful. How-
ever, this subject can and should be discussed in philosophy, because beauty
needs justification.
1. IS BEAUTY GUILTY?
Beauty has quite often been found guilty of many sins in the history of cul-
ture as well as in philosophy. It was considered a sin and even a sign of the dev-
il by many medieval thinkers. Saint Augustine treated the beauty of things and
bodies as temptation and deception. The exception was Thomas Aquinas who
thought that it was possible to simply admire beauty; it needs no prayer, and
there is not any sin in it. It is good for people, and that is enough.
Søren Kierkegaard’s aesthetic man was considered to be an absolutely ordi-
nary being. It is a poor being, and its existence is the only representation of
human nature, naïve and spontaneous. One of Chuck Palahniuk’s heroines felt
66 Tatjana M. Shatunova
tired of her beauty and shot herself in the face. It is frequently opined that
a beautiful person is less moral and clever. Beauty often deceives us. Even the
concept of social relations was once defined as the “exchange of deception:”
“The communication of two reasonable beings of the human race is inherently
an exchange of deception” (Sekatsky, 2000, 33).
All these ideas and facts demand the protection of beauty. Let us note that all
the arguments which will be given below for the defense of beauty can also be
used to explain why it is not only possible or useful, but necessary to be beauti-
ful.
The arguments for justification of beauty can be the following ones. The
human being is the only being on the Earth that is able to create beauty and to
store it. The creation of a work of art is very similar to divine creation: God
creates the world out of nothing, and the artist creates something aesthetic out of
nothing aesthetic. This aesthetic model of creation out of nothing is a pure mod-
el of creative activity of a human being as such, applicable to all the fields of
creative activities. Moreover, the human being can produce a lot of sorts and
types of beauty in each historical epoch, and all these types of beauty can be
embodied not only in art creations, but also in human’s own appearances and
voices, the manners of movement and figure, etc. The beauty creation including
one’s own beauty is an anthropological task for humans. Therefore, the justifi-
cation of mankind (anthropodicea) has an aesthetic character. That is why Frie-
drich Nietzsche thinks that the world and being can also be justified only as
aesthetic phenomena: “… only as an aesthetic phenomena are existence and the
world eternally justified” (Nietzsche, 2009, 42). Therefore, the person, being
beautiful, becomes an element of being which is also to be justified as the object
of anthropodicea.
It is necessary to be beautiful for a human being so as communication with it
evoked a catharsis, a feeling of living life, a joy of being. As for catharsis, Nie-
tzsche wrote about this rather rare impression in The The Birth of Tragedy Out
of the Spirit of Music:
“… an effect, as unexpected as it is entirely incomprehensible, of the sort

which a work like a happily successful production of Lohengrin has had on
them, except perhaps they lacked any hand which could assist them with ad-
vice and interpretation; thus, that incredibly different and totally incompara-
ble sensation which so shook them at the time remained a single example
and, after a short period of illumination, died out, like a mysterious star”
(Nietzsche, 2009, 135).
Nietzsche does not think it is catharsis but the description appears to be pret-
ty similar, and it is possible to assume that a beautiful person can cause a simi-
lar feeling. A meeting with such a person, the joy of communication with
her/him causes a catharsis as if it was? not a human being, but an art creation.
Why Be Beautiful? 67
Naturally, it is very difficult to evoke such an impression on? people. Children

cause this emotion very naturally, but it is not easy to do the same for adults.
The adult who is capable to evoke a feeling of catharsis on people must have
not only an attractive physical appearance, but the feeling of life as well. The
person has to be, so to say, very alive. She/he has to be able to feel the joy of
being and to share this feeling with others. Therefore, we have the right to say
that beauty is also a social phenomenon.
2. THE SOCIAL BEAUTY
There are some reasons to consider the beauty of a person as a social phe-
nomenon. First of all, it is known that the beauty of a person has always had
historical, cultural, and social characteristics. Secondly, and this reason is more
peculiar, sometimes people have had to struggle and suffer to get the right to be
beautiful in their own individual and unique social manner. This is a space of
human freedom turning the person into a real fighter. This social beauty phe-
nomenon needs justification as well: Guy de Maupassant purposely asked that
question regarding the nature and specifics of beauty of the kind. For example,
the heroine of his story Useless Beauty literally turned her life around proving
the right for the beauty of that kind. She proved to her husband that being
a mother and wife, she nevertheless had the right to be beautiful not only for her
children and husband, but to be beautiful also “just as she is,” for the sake of
beauty-in-itself. Maupassant writes:
“He looked her full in the face, and how beautiful she was, with her gray
eyes, like the cold sky. In her dark hair sparkled the diamond coronet, like
a radiance. He suddenly felt, felt by a kind of intuition, that this grand crea-
ture was not merely a being destined to perpetuate the race, but the strange
and mysterious product of all our complicated desires which have been ac-
cumulating in us for centuries but which have been turned aside from their
primitive and divine object and have wandered after a mystic, imperfectly
perceived and intangible beauty. There are some women like that, who blos-
som only for our dreams, adorned with every poetical attribute of civiliza-
tion, with that ideal luxury, coquetry and esthetic charm which surround
woman, a living statue that brightens our life” (Maupassant, 2005).
The person is responsible for the quantity and quality of beauty in the world.
Of course, it seems to be unacceptable to apply the categories of quality and
quantity to the beauty phenomenon. Nonetheless, what about the quantity of
beauty? Why is it responsible for this quantity? Each person, even not an artist,
can increase or reduce the amount of beauty in the world. Being and becoming
beautiful, the person creates a new source of arts—his/her own portrait and
sculpture may bring a joy and pleasure to people around. Why is the person
responsible for the quality of beauty in the world? The reason is that there are
different types of beauty. Some of them are very aggressive. They force the
person to feel ugly and miserable, to notice only ugly features in her/his and in
people around. It is a paradox but this sort of beauty reduces the total quantity
of beauty in the world.
Other types of beauty spread their good and kind influence all around and
this way they catalyze the appearance of nicer, prettier, more amazing, wonder-
ful phenomena. Thus, the type of beauty the person has makes a difference. The
person is responsible if one may put it that way, for the humanistic, creative
potential of it beauty. Beauty must create but not destroy; it must arouse good
feelings and thoughts. For this reason, the beauty of the contemporary person
must be rather complicated. Obviously, the beauty of the physical features and
figure is not sufficient. It is surely well known that the person can have a com-
plicated, interesting inner world, but the matter is that she/he must also try to
make this world visible for other people. In this case, the beauty of a certain
person turns into the catalyst of other people’s beauty: such a person attracts
people to herself/himself, and they begin to form their own beauty.
The social beauty of this kind forms the beauty of society. To increase the
beauty of society, the beauty of a person must go beyond an appearance and the
inner world; it also must be the beauty of acts, deeds, and actions. Social rela-
tions become an aesthetic phenomenon. That is why the person has to remain
beautiful even in grief and in trouble, just to be a person, to build beautiful so-
cial relations. It is worth reminding here Hegel’s famous remark about weepers.
They cried instead of the dead man’s relatives so that these relatives could take
a look coming from outside at their grief and feel their deep sorrow culturally
formed. They have got an opportunity to retain their human dignity even in
grief. Hegel writes that this cultural form helps humans to stop their savagery
and to rise over the nature, and later as a Social-Cultural Human Being the per-
son, she/he overcomes her/his own social nature, constructs a new one, over-
comes it as well, and this procedure repeats endlessly. Thus, beauty represents
the forms of construction of human nature and the forms of social relations as
well.
Last but not least, as Immanuel Kant believes, the beauty of a person is
a symbolical expression of the moral maxim adopted by mankind.
Beauty is a world clamp or brace which brings the absolutes of the human
being out to the everyday lifeworld. That is why love must be beautiful. If it is
not, it becomes boring and comes to an end, it dies.
The good must be the art as well. Otherwise, it will not achieve the objective
and the addressee. Each hypostasis of the Absolute must be beautiful in order to
find its place in everyday life. Thus, beauty carries the Absolute out to the ordi-
nary world and, vice versa, all the best that is created by people turns into the
Absolute by means of beauty and arts. All these social manifestations of beauty
Why Be Beautiful? 69
lead us to the formulation of the question regarding personal social-aesthetic

virtues.
3. AESTHETIC VIRTUES
Philosophers often dwell on moral, intellectual, or even cultural virtues. The

main idea of the paper is that we must think of aesthetic virtues. Edmund
L. Pincoffs is one of the first specialists who wrote about aesthetic virtues.
However, he insisted on the practical character of these virtues: aesthetic taste—
in order to correctly choose both clothes and husband, whereas charm—in order
to be successful and pleasant to people around (Pincoffs, 1986). As for me,
I opine that aesthetic virtues have not only a practical, but also deep metaphysi-
cal meaning for humans.
Beauty is a symbol of the high moral stature of mankind. So, it is an aesthet-
ic virtue of each person which is able to develop her/his own beauty and the
beauty of others, to bear beauty in figure and face.
Beauty is a symbol of freedom. From the dancing atoms of Democritus
which are free in their necessity and, therefore, beautiful, to the Statue of Liber-
ty in America or Eugène Delacroix’s Liberty on the Barricades, beauty express-
es and represents freedom. It means that the person, being beautiful, reminds
people that they have a duty to be free.
The Russian writer Maxim Gorky believed that beautiful people were always
courageous. It is arguable but what is true is that beauty is a symbol of courage.
We can use Kant’s logic in this case: a beautiful person is not necessarily cou-
rageous. However, its beauty is a symbol of courage of which other people,
people (in general), are capable.
Besides, beauty is a living life symbol: a beautiful Person leading a living
way of life and having a sense of life is a symbol of being. Da-sein entirely
expresses the aesthetic nature of Sein.
4. CONCLUSION
The conclusion is that we must study and cultivate all aesthetic virtues:
charm, sympathy, dignity, imagination, eсcentricity, optimism. All of them are
not given by God, parents, or nature. The aesthetic virtues can be cultivated by
humans themselves only in their intersubjective communication. If we consider
beauty a social phenomenon, then each person is obliged to bear and keep it in
her/his appearance and face. The person must create his/her own wonderful
eidos in order to catalyze and strengthen the success of communication. The
success of communication produces an emotion of common feeling and com-
mon pleasure. People act in connection with each other creating the mass or
collective productive force of spiritual production—the productive force of
beauty. Reflected in each other, these people become more and more splendid
and wonderful.
We are responsible for being beautiful.
REFERENCES
Maupassant, Guy de, 2005. Original Short Stories. McMaster, Albert et a. (Trans.).
eBooks@Adelaide. The University of Adelaide Library University of Adelaide. South
Australia https://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/m/maupassant/guy/m45s/index.html Last updated
Sunday, August 28, 2016 at 16:58.
Nietzsche, Friedrich. 2009. The Birth of Tragedy out of the Spirit of Music. Johnston, Ian (Trans.).
Vancouver: Island University Nanaimo, British Columbia Canada Richer Resources Publica-
tions.
Pincoffs, Edmund L. 1986. Quandaries and Virtues: Against Reductivism in Ethics. University
Press of Kansas.
Sekatsky, Alexander. 2000. The Ontology of Lie [Ontologija lzhi]. St. Petersburg: St. Petersburg
University Press.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR — PhD, University Professor in the Kazan Federal Uni-
versity, Department of Social Philosophy, Kremlyovskaya St, 18, Kazan, Tatarstan,
Russia, 420000. She is the author of: 2007. The Social Sense of Ontology of Aesthetic:
Experience of Justification by Beauty [Social’nyj smysl ontologii jesteticheskogo: opyt
opravdanija krasotoj]. Kazan University Press; 2012. The Aesthetics of the Social
[Jestetika social’nogo]. Kazan University Press. Her research focuses on the problem of
metaphysical capabilities of an aesthetics and arts in the contemporary society.
No. 3/2017
Stefan-Sebastian Maftei
THE ELUSIVE SENSUS COMMUNIS OF NOWADAYS

AESTHETIC COSMOPOLITANISM*
ABSTRACT
The theory of aesthetic cosmopolitanism is a part of a new trend in cultural sociolo-

gy. In recent years, varieties of cosmopolitanism surfaced in cosmopolitanism theory,
one such version IS the aesthetic cosmopolitanism. Inspired by the new cosmopolitan-
ism theories, sociologists and philosophers translate the difference between normative
cosmopolitanism and “lived” cosmopolitanism into the aesthetic realm, arguing that the
aesthetic cosmopolitanism which can be found in the perceptual qualities brought to
light by the contemporary artworks is a version of the lived cosmopolitanism accepted
by cultural sociology today. Our study will try to shed light on the elusiveness of the
notion of sensus communis which lies at the heart of contemporary aesthetic cosmopoli-
tanism.
Keywords: cosmopolitanism, cultural cosmopolitanism, aesthetic cosmopolitanism,
sensus communis, distribution of the sensible.
THE ARTISTIC USES OF GLOBALIZATION
Due to economic, technical, social, political, cultural and communicational

changes in the global world, arts today are going through a process of changing
and adapting. The transformation of arts within the informational society is so
overwhelming, that aesthetics persistently raises questions about the nature and
the social role of contemporary arts. The innovative elements that define nowa-
days art permanently attack and cause the theoretical delineations established by
the discourse of traditional aesthetics. One of the sources for the debate in con-
temporary aesthetics is globalization or, more accurately, globality. Globaliza-
tion theories accept the difference between globalism, which represents the
political and economic component of globalization—also its most controversial
element, and globality, reflecting the capability of globalization to accommo-
72 Stefan-Sebastian Maftei
date global interconnection, so that nothing of what is going on in the world

cannot stand isolated (Wunderlich, Warrier, 2007). At the same time, globaliza-
tion has been seen as embracing two fundamental tendencies, yet distinct and
sometimes in tension to each other (Held, 1995). The first starts from the eco-
nomic and social and refers to transnational and interregional interactions and
the exercise of power. The second considers interconnection and refers to the
emergence of a “global self-conscience.” This second tendency of contemporary
globalization also represents the elevated conscience of the world as a whole.
This is, in fact, a difference that has been described as the difference between
globalization as the ensemble of relations and physical forces (Wallerstein,
1979) and globalization as the idea of a global conscience (Robertson, 1992).
The world of contemporary arts fully benefitted from this emergence of
global conscience. Its appearance gave birth to the so-called “global aesthetics”
(Amor et al., 1998; Mosquera, 2011; 2001; Belting et al., 2013), firstly de-
scribed by the art critics as a method of coagulating the cultural criticism of the
“periphery” of the contemporary globalized artworld and also of emphasizing
the difference. That is why the critics of global aesthetics dealt with matters of
cultural difference. Global aesthetics came into being as a subfield of cultural
theory and of post-colonial theory. Nowadays, the new generation of art critics
active after 2000 (such as Kobena Mercer, Gerardo Mosquera, Irit Rogoff,
Monica Amor) has focused again on the aesthetics of the periphereal, the mar-
ginal. This time they confront it with new elements of globalization and criticize
the very “cultural normalization” of the difference (Mercer), thus suggesting
(Mosquera) the possibility of a meta-global culture living beyond the paradigm
of cultural difference, seen usually as a difference between a universal centre
and a local periphery. In other words, the meta-global would embrace today not
just more and more negotiated connections between centres and peripheries, but
the reality of a global meta-culture based on the “from here” paradigm. The
“from here” paradigm would offer the critic the chance to go beyond the idea of
cultural appropriation and to perceive the global contemporary artist as a creator
of international culture, and not as an imitator of it. So, a “culture of resignify-
ing” the cultural messages coming from the centre emerges, a culture where the
“global” artist is not satisfied with just a passive relation to the centre, but be-
comes in fact its international creator.
THE AESTHETIC USES OF COSMOPOLITANISM
It seems that cosmopolitanism, when is put to the test, is quite an elusive

concept (Beck, 2002). Historians argue that the roots of the term “cosmopolitan-
ism” are Greek and Roman, and that Antiquity understood it as mediating “the
tension between global and local, universal and particular” (Miller, Urry, 2010,
340). The modern history of the concept “cosmopolitanism” has been tied up to
The Elusive Sensus Communis of Nowadays Aesthetic Cosmopolitanism 73
the emergence of the nation-states. From the 19th century onwards, “cosmopoli-
tanism” has been usually perceived as the opposite to “nationalism.”
Recent studies (Motti Regev, Nikos Papastergiadis, David Chaney, Grohe
Nova) have emphasized the emergence of an aesthetic or cultural cosmopolitan-
ism in our nowadays globalized societies, a cosmopolitanism located “at the
individual level,” defined as a “cultural disposition involving an intellectual and
aesthetic stance of openness towards peoples, places and experiences from dif-
ferent cultures, especially those from different ‘nations’ […] or as having taste
for ‘the wider shores of cultural experience’ ” (Regev, 2007, 124). Regev de-
scribes the ethno-national uniqueness, which is still the predominant cultural
characteristic in late modernity, as embedded into a paradigm which focuses on
openness rather than essentialist purism and thus discarding the idea of national
uniqueness envisioned as an “exclusive, relatively isolated space of cultural
content and aesthetic form.” Instead, Regev emphasizes a “fluid conception of
ethno-national uniqueness” distinguished by a willingness to absorb other ethnic
cultural characteristics into a national cultural makeup (Regev, 2007, 125).
Thus, Regev quotes Beck in stating that his definition of cosmopolitanism cap-
tures the moment when “the otherness of the other is included in one’s own
self-identity and self-definition” (Regev, 2007, 126). This description seizes
perfectly the image of inclusiveness embedded in Regev’s notion of cosmopoli-
tanism. The tendency of inclusiveness which characterizes cultural consump-
tion, according to Regev, transforms the cultural consumers into “inadvertent
aesthetic cosmopolitans,” due to the integration, insertion and absorption of
alien elements into the national cultural fabric. Paradoxically, this new fabric
becomes the upholder of a new sense of national uniqueness Thus, the aesthetic
cosmopolitanism which is at work here signals a transformation of national
peculiarity and uniqueness “from essentialism to fluidity” (Regev, 2007, 126–
127). Due to the peculiar stance of an artistic object situated both in the global
flux of artworks and in its national original fabric, aesthetic cosmopolitanism
emerges precisely at the interplay of the two fields: global and national (Regev,
2007, 128). Moreover, cultural industries all around the world have caught up
with this trend and capitalized on it successfully. Film and pop or rock music
are perfect examples of this kind of cultural syncretism.
Nava identifies the rise of a “popular modern cosmopolitan consciousness”
from the 19th century onwards (her historical example is the British Empire),
and sees cosmopolitanism as an aspect of modernity involving a network of
attitudes forged in the milieu of a cultural horizon emerging at the intersection
of urban life, global markets, entertainment industry and cultural consumption
in general. A cosmopolitan agent would thus become recognizable by her inter-
est in transnational identifications and cultural difference (Nava, 2002, 82). The
general attitude of a cosmopolitan agent is to value the Other particularly “for
his difference.” In addressing the cosmopolitan atmosphere created by the glob-
al consumer culture, Nava rightly assumes an “aesthetic stance of openness”
towards cultural diversity, an attitude which is educated and refined as an aes-

thetic taste, a taste for difference. Throughout the process, however, the subject
remains detached “culturally and emotionally” (Nava, 2002, 86, 88). Nava’s
emphasis is on women and their relationship to aesthetic cosmopolitanism—
“search for contrast” is precisely the attitude of the flâneur, the 19th century
cultural icon of the refined and curious fan of cosmopolitan cultural consump-
tion goods. In a very profound sense, she is the embodiment of the cosmopoli-
tan aesthete of the 19th century, the unyielding admirer of urban life, the bohe-
mian onlooker, the self-made amateurish connoisseur of popular culture. Com-
merce and cinema are the flâneur’s favourite attractions. Her gaze upon the
urban life and goods is a free, unbiased one, not hindered by the panoptic con-
trolling of the optical regime of museums and institutions, but mobile and, thus,
open to novelty, as Nava suggests (Nava, 2002, 87). Because the look of the
flâneur is able to transform difference into novelty, peculiarity into taste. In
immersing herself into this admiration for strangeness and difference, the
flâneur also contemplates her own eccentricity, her own strangeness and inade-
quacy. The flâneur reflects the perfect type of the migrant, vagrant, diasporic,
countryless person.
Her engagement is not just personal and cultural; it is also a political one
(Nava, 2002, 90). It states the person’s deep inadequacy towards his/her own
perceived identity and thus marks one of the leitmotifs of the modern “discur-
sive regime:” the identity crisis of the modern subject. A very important charac-
teristic of the cosmopolitan aesthete represented by the flâneur is that her con-
noisseurship is always inspired not by high-cultured principles, but by the
continuous contact with everyday urban life. The flâneur defies the high-class
establishment, as well as all its institutionalizing and normalizations. She/he is
the best representation of the boundary subjects described by Julia Kristeva as
being more attracted to the worldliness of the world than to “the being at home”
of the world: “Cosmopolitanism [...] is a flirtation with difference, with the out-
side, the elsewhere, the other” (Nava, 2002, 94).
Thus, the individual attitude of openness towards difference transforms the
cosmo-logy of the cosmopolis into a cultural ideal, a “place or political space
that encompasses the variety of human culture” (Chaney, 2002, 158). The cos-
mopolitan view effectively tells us that the terms “culture” and “cultural identi-
ty” must be reread within the new situatedness generated by a “glocal world”
(Roland Robertson), whose realities are transforming, perceptibly or not, our
major ways of looking at it.
Although the historical, political and social conditions for the development
of a cultural and artistic cosmopolitanism cannot be overlooked, since these
have shaped at least the background on which arts and their subsequent cosmo-
politanism flourished (Shapiro, 1976), there is another dimension of cosmopoli-
tanism in the arts which is yet to be fully debated. Nikos Papastergiadis specu-
lates upon the possibility that aesthetics itself is the provider of an “imaginary
constitution of cosmopolitanism through aesthetic practices,” i.e. “a cosmopoli-

tan worldview produced through aesthetics” (Papastergiadis, 2012, 221). Ap-
pealing to the idea of a cosmopolitan imaginary, he stresses that “the process of
world making” itself is a radical act of the cosmopolitan imaginary. He is thus
viewing imagination—thus paying tribute to a perspective suggested by Hannah
Arendt—as a “faculty for both representing and creating realities through the
form of images” (Papastergiadis, 2012, 221, 229). This confidence in the imagi-
nary provides art with the power of not only shaping a new “orders of politics”
(Jacques Rancière), but, we suspect, also of transforming itself during the crea-
tive process of shaping new images.
On another occasion (2014), Nikos Papastergiadis acknowledges that the
cosmopolitan imaginary cannot be predetermined by certain processes and that
also it cannot predetermine the “cosmopolitanization” of contemporary arts:
“a cosmopolitan imaginary is not an abstract ideal, a speculative vision of
the future, nor even the necessary illusion that spurs contemplation of
a better life. The cosmopolitan imaginary is the proposition of new forms
of worldly existence. These forms are not bound by the outcomes imposed
by the regulative mechanisms of globalizing forces, nor are they produced
through the corporatized assemblage of transnational exchanges. The form
of the cosmopolitan imaginary starts with the creative ideas and critical at-
titudes that artists and ordinary people use in their daily reflections and
worldly engagements. Therefore in the beginning of globalization there is
also a cosmopolitan imaginary.”
Art serves as the benchmark for funnelling future political and ethical equali-
ty. It does not, however, create this equality by itself, it only stimulates it within
its imaginative spectrum. Because Papastergiadis does not find cosmopolitan-
ism in the arts as a project of a social order proposed by the artists’ images, he
only identifies several tendencies that are “shaping the trajectories of contempo-
rary art,” such as denationalization, reflexive hospitality, cultural translation,
discursivity, and the globalization of the public sphere. These tendencies are all
deemed “cosmopolitan.”
CULTURAL COSMOPOLITANISM DEBATED
The following section will debate cultural cosmopolitanism as it emerges in

contemporary sociology. The sociologist Ulrich Beck was amongst the first to
make the difference between a lived cosmopolitanism and a normative cosmo-
politanism, i.e. a cosmopolitanism brought up by everyday experiences of cul-
tural encounters and technological possibilities and a normative version of it,
which is inspired by political theory. Following the new cosmopolitanism theo-
ries of sociologists such as Gerard Delanty and Ulrich Beck, Papastergiadis
translates the difference between normative cosmopolitanism and lived cosmo-
politanism into the artworld, arguing that the aesthetic cosmopolitanism which
can be found in everyday artistic practices and experiences is a version of the
lived cosmopolitanism accepted by cultural sociology today and distinguished
from the normative cosmopolitanism of traditional political theories. In short,
Papastergiadis tries to insulate cosmopolitan “aesthetic” qualities out of the
cultural makeup of our everyday cultural cosmopolitan experience.
Following the lead about the possibility of a lived cosmopolitan experience,
Zlatko Skrbiš and Ian Woodward point to the emergence of a material cosmopoli-
tanism brought up by “objects, places, networks.” According to their general the-
sis, cosmopolitanism is as “ideal” as it is “pragmatic.” In other words, in order for
a cosmopolitan change to appear, one needs not only political and ethical com-
mitment, but what is essential is a “relation between these dimensions and the
networks of technology, images, spaces and material exchanges with which they
go hand in hand” (Skrbiš, Woodward, 2013, 53). The authors consider the living,
experiential cosmopolitanism emerging out of “cosmopolitan encounters […]
tangible, experiential and contextual encounters with cultural difference.” The
theory tries to join together the “macro” perspective with the “micro” perspective
on cosmopolitanism. The “macro” is represented by the civil society whose nor-
mative conception corresponds to values such as obligation, generosity, hospitali-
ty, belonging, whereas the “micro” stands for the cosmopolitan encounters. The
“micro” is situated at an “everyday level of analysis of streetscapes, spaces, bod-
ies and practices” (Skrbiš, Woodward, 2013, 67). These practices may support the
prospect of an “everyday cosmopolitanism,” where objects, networks and materi-
ality are visibly contributing to socialization. This “micro” cosmopolitanism is
thus a materialistic solution for the conjuring up of a community. The authors
suggest that materiality and objects can be incorporated into cosmopolitan theo-
ries. However, the objects themselves are never absolutely cosmopolitan (Skrbiš,
Woodward, 2013, 73), as they clearly cannot be.
Besides the cosmopolitanism of objects, there is also the issue of the cos-
mopolitan attitude and bonding stimulated by various artistic media (television,
music, art, photography). Do art and the global mass-media really encourage
cosmopolitanism? The authors inquire upon the possibility of the emergence of
a cosmopolitan attitude identifiable in the cosmopolitan bonds that the cosmo-
politan culture of media and global entertainment should generate beyond the
thin skin of “economically-driven processes associated with global capitalism’s
cultural industries” (Skrbiš, Woodward, 2013, 75). In other words, whether
there are deep cosmopolitan connections embedded in the global media beyond
the everyday messaging of global markets and global cultural industries that use
cosmopolitan communication sometimes as one of their global marketing strat-
egies. An acknowledged fact is that mediated cosmopolitanism reflected in the
global and artistic media “brings people into contact with each other.” Also true
is the fact that this global mediated cosmopolitanism has the power to forge new
global moral communities and interest groups. However, Skrbiš and Woodward
draw a thick line between perceived cosmopolitanism and real cosmopolitan-

ism, between “cosmopolitanisation processes” that secure the “visual, routine
availability” of the Other in the mass-media and real cosmopolitanism, i.e.
“concrete existence of cosmopolitan patterns of thought, behavior and values”
(Skrbiš, Woodward, 2013, 77–78). One cosmopolitanisation process induced by
media that the authors indicate is the effect of “pity cosmopolitanism” generated
by mass-mediated global tragedies, suffering and inequalities, where social
tragedy and social suffering are presented, yet without addressing the “real
causes, only the effects.” Another is the charity effect of celebrity charity cos-
mopolitanism portrayed and celebrated by the mainstream global media. The
authors contend that these mediated processes do create cosmopolitan empathy
and identification. However, these mediated “pity and charity” cosmopolitan-
isms may hijack the deeper meanings of these phenomena by remaining focused
only on the “emotional” reality of the facts and being less interested in the role
of its public as a “political” agent, conscious of its position in the alleviation of
global suffering (Skrbiš, Woodward, 2013, 87).
So far, the arguments presented by theoretical sociology remain problemat-
ic. On one hand, in some cases, there is a perceptible cosmopolitan impetus
behind the globalisation effects fostered by economic and social globalization.
On the other hand, economic and social globalizations remain ambiguous in
terms of their effect on people’s attitudes and behaviours. There is no straight
causality between economic and social processes of globalization and cosmo-
politan attitudes. Cultural cosmopolitanism, the cosmopolitanism allegedly
brought up by cultural mixtures and encounters, the mediated cosmopolitanism
depicted by the media and even the so-called material cosmopolitanism of ob-
jects, places, networks are at best inspirational in terms of the emergence of real
cosmopolitan attitudes and habits.
Thus, we are not fairly sure of when and where to look for a “cosmopolitan
experience” within our everyday globalized experiences of cultures, prefer-
ences, attitudes, networks and objects. But what about art and the aesthetic? Are
these privileged realms for the emergence of real cosmopolitan attitudes? Some
sociologists say yes, and they are already beginning to theorize upon the cos-
mopolitan aesthetics elicited by aesthetic experience. In fact, it all comes down
to find a justification for the possibility of a certain sensus communis which
would ensure the possibility of a cosmopolitan aesthetics.
LOOKING FOR A SENSUS COMMUNIS IN THE “COMMUNITY OF SENSE:”

JACQUES RANCIÈRE
The work of the French philosopher and critic Jacques Rancière alludes to
a common-sensuousness which is to be found not in the cultural makeup of our
experiences, but in the basic tissue of our everyday aesthetic experiences. The
peculiar “sensory faculty of aesthesis” (Papastergiadis, 2014) would foster

a sensus communis which is much more profound than the reason-based politi-
cal one.
It would seem thus that through imagination and perception, faculties pre-
cursory to reason, we should gain access, Papastergiadis argues, to a more basic
worldview. As it is also argued by Rancière, we belong to a universal communi-
ty which is more profound than the political one: the perceptual community.
Nevertheless, this “community of sense” does not allow itself in any way to be
universalized. As explained by Hinderliter et al. (2009, 2) in their introductory
chapter, the term “community of sense” tends to portray an intricate reality,
since what is described in using the term is the recognition of “a contingent and
nonessential manner of being-together in a community whose coherence is no
more than a fiction or a potentiality.” “Community of sense” indicates a sense
of community whose politics includes “a sensuous or aesthetic aspect that is
irreducible to ideology and idealization.” Paradoxically, “community of sense”
indicates a sense of community which fosters the bringing together only by the
“consistent dismantling” (Hinderliter et al. 2009, 2) of any idealization of it. It
is a paradoxical situation, which thwarts any description of “community” as
a concept, thus unfolding a situation almost impossible to theorize. “Communi-
ty” is a frighteningly elusive concept in this case. Rancière’s own definition is
no less comfortable:
“I do not take the phrase ‘community of sense’ to mean a collectivity shaped

by some common feeling. I understand it as a frame of visibility and intelli-
gibility that puts things or practices together under the same meaning, which
shapes thereby a certain sense of community. A community of sense is a cer-
tain cutting out of space and time that binds together practices, forms of vis-
ibility and patterns of intelligibility. I call the cutting out and this linkage
a partition of the sensible” (Rancière, 2009, 31).
What Rancière tries to suggest is that “community,” particularly a communi-

ty in aesthesis, is not at all easy to decipher. What Rancière describes as “com-
munity” he immediately equates with a certain distribution of the sensible
(partage du sensible). According to Deranty (2010), who analyses Rancière’s
concepts, the French term “partage” has a double meaning, signaling sharing
and dividing at the same time. At the same time, sharing an aesthesis is not just
being passively affected by a perception in common. It also signifies the active
involvement of the viewer into that perception. This active involvement into the
act of perception means that what is present there is not just the act of seeing—
as in looking—but also its interpreting. In other words, seeing (sharing in the
experience of seeing) is at the same time interpreting, cutting out, reconfiguring
reality. Seeing is automatically taking part in and dividing, cutting out some-
thing. This act of seeing is what Rancière defines as “politics” of the sensible:
“Politics is an activity of reconfiguration of that which is given to the sensible”

(Rancière, quoted by Deranty, 2010, 100). Thus, seeing is never just the materi-
al act of looking at. Seeing also involves the meaning-making act of interpret-
ing. In a certain way, seeing is already the interpreting of that reality: “looking
is also an action that confirms or modifies that distribution, and that ‘interpret-
ing the world’ is already means of transforming it, of reconfiguring it.”
(Rancière, quoted by Deranty, 2010, 101). What Rancière will describe by the
“distribution of the sensible” is never a clear-cut aesthetic problem, but always
also a political problem, since to Rancière “aesthetics” means “politics” at its
most basic level. Rancière aesthesis is never value-blind, or value-neutral, but
always political, and in a very profound way. Therefore, the crux of Rancière’s
analysis, as observed by commentators, is never just an aesthetic problem, but
always also a political problem. And this most basic political problem is ine-
quality, since partage du sensible is essentially a problem of distribution which,
unavoidably, elicits the issue of inequality. This is because, as we said before,
the sharing is also an issue of distribution and, consequently, also of inequality:
“the central question for Rancière concerns the ways in which the thoughts,
voices and actions of the dominated are made invisible and inaudible in the
hierarchy of activities underpinning social orders” (Rancière, quoted by Deran-
ty, 2010, 11). Being visible, being shared, is also the question of being distrib-
uted, of being allocated, of being assigned, explains the commentator. Conse-
quently, aesthetics is also a matter of politics, since being part of the practices of
aesthesis means also being part of a certain order of distribution:
“At the root of inequality therefore is a problem of perception, of ‘aesthesis,’

in classical philosophical terms: the question of social domination can be re-
phrased in terms of which activities, and whose activities, can literally be
seen and heard. The ‘sharing of the sensible’ denotes the ambiguous logic
whereby society relies on a bringing together of individuals and groups,
while functioning on the basis of the separation between those whose voices
and actions count, are meaningful, and those who remain invisible and inau-
dible” (Deranty, 2010, 11).
Under the rule of aesthesis, the distribution of the sensible becomes a “way
of determining the order of appearance, of what can be apprehended by the
senses.” The aestheticising of the senses, which is one of the tasks of aesthetics,
creates a powerful mechanism of distribution, ordering and, in the end, of “po-
licing” (the term used by Rancière’s) the experiences, as explained by the com-
mentary. Aesthetics thus shapes “frames of visibility and intelligibility,” since,
as Deranty argues, being policed by aesthesis, being a part of the aesthetic expe-
rience, sharing-in the aesthetic experience also determines the “intelligibility” of
the part of experienced which is shared in. Police is when the order of the sensi-
ble becomes also the order of intelligibility, as Rancière argues, since every
aesthetic experience, which is also a material, sensual experience, is at the same

time a meaningful experience, however ordinary it may be.1
In sum, one of Rancière’s merits is to make visible the possibility of a sen-
sus communis in the community of sense shaped by the work of aesthesis. The
experience of aesthesis is able to forge a community of sense understood as a
partage du sensible. However, he draws attention to the fact that partage means
also a distributing of roles in frames of visibility and intelligibility. The sensus
communis elicited by aesthesis is never without its downside as distribution.
This means that this sensus communis will never be universal and will always
select through its visibility and intelligibility.
On the other hand, the additional major merit of Rancière’s analyses is to em-
phasize the historical aspect of the partage and the fact that modern aesthetics
brought about a new aesthetic regime of the arts and a new distribution of the
sensible, which opened up the possibility of emancipation from pre-existent ine-
quality. According to the definition, “regime of the arts defines the specific ways
in which a give epoch conceives of the nature and logic of artistic representation”
(Deranty, 2010, 117). Officially invented in the century of the French Revolution,
aesthetics emerges as a framework for holding up equality as a new paradigm of
visibility and intelligibility in the arts. Rancière acknowledges that equality in
modern aesthetics is present in a twofold manner: either as an equality meant as a
result of the “collapse of the system of constraints and hierarchies that constituted
the representational regime of art,” or as an equality emerging out of the power of
aesthetic experience to create “the constitution of Art as a separate form of human
experience” (Rancière 2009, 36–37). Paradoxically, aesthetics expressing a type
of human experience (“free play”), free from active understanding and passive
sensibility is not dominating, but empowering. It brings to the fore the equality
elicited by the free realm of aesthetic freedom over the domination or pure reason
or raw sensibility. Expressed as aesthetic freedom, aesthetic experience reverses
inequality by the power of an ideal sensus communis to “ground the universality
of an aesthetic judgment” (Malpas, 2000). According to Malpas, Kant defined
sensus communis as the idea of a sense shared by all, remaining thus beyond the
limits of any empirical experience. By sensus communis, Kant also suggests its
a priori, in being “an intrasubjective community of the faculties that prepares the
ground for knowledge; a potential universality, a potential community, that is
never fully or empirically realized in the aesthetic response.” The idea of a sensus
communis thus “provides the conditions of possibility and the categories for con-
ceptual understanding” (Malpas, 2000). Kant’s sensus communis can thus never
reach the empirical reality of a “consent between subjects” yet can provide the
maximum of possible equality necessary for a subject’s free response of pleasure
or displeasure.
—————————
1 See, on the ordinariness of everyday aesthetic experiences, the current work on “everyday
aesthetics” (Saito, 2015; (Raţiu, 2013).

CONCLUSION
So far, the analysis leaves us with no definite answer regarding the power of
art or aesthetic experience to influence cosmopolitan responses. Sociology pro-
vides us with only some material evidence of some processes of cosmopolitan-
isation in the arts, yet it cannot provide an evidence of causality between, for
example, economic globalization and cosmopolitan responses. On the other
hand, aestheticians and art critics seem reluctant to endow arts with more than
a motivating power in conducing towards cosmopolitanisation. Some authors
seem to go even further and appear to seek out a cosmopolitanisation impetus in
the realm of aesthetic practices or aesthetic experiences. It is true that aesthetic
freedom seems like the perfect place for imaginative freedom and for the reali-
zation of cosmopolitan ideals. However, authors such as Rancière appear con-
cerned about the capabilities of the aesthesis to provide us with only emancipa-
tory effects in its sharing of the sensible. Rancière adresses the ambiguous na-
ture of the aesthetic community of sense in terms of its effects. Aesthetics pow-
er as a disciplinary power over the senses has been often put under scrutiny by
Michel Foucault and Foucauldians who examine the ambiguous effects of “aes-
thetic disciplinarity” in terms of its both “observing” and “resisting” the “hier-
archical normative codings” historically embedded in cultural and cognitive
hierarchizations and oppositions, such as “reason and affect,” “sensation and
imagination,” “public and private,” “individual and society” (see Roelofs, 2009
about the racial encoding of aesthetic preferences in everyday encounters).
Acknowledgements
This work was supported by a grant of the Romanian National Authority for
Scientific Research, CNCS –UEFISCDI, project number PN-II-ID-PCE-2011-
3-1010.
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ABOUT THE AUTHOR — PhD in Philosophy at Babes-Bolyai University, current-

ly Lecturer at the Babes-Bolyai University, Department of Philosophy, str. Universitatii
7–9, Cluj-Napoca 400084, Romania. His main research areas are philosophy of art,
rhetoric, hermeneutics, and philosophy of culture. His current research interests include
everyday aesthetics, avant-garde aesthetics, and contemporary rhetorical theory.
No. 3/2017
Tetiana Gardashuk
BIOART AS A DIALOGUE
ABSTRACT
Three definitions of bioart are analyzed in the paper: bioart—as a part of science art,
as the creation of some new exciting artworks, and/or as the visualization of certain
stages of biomedical and life science research. Bioart is an in vivo practice which pro-
duces “living artworks” and creates a new reality. It represents the dialogue between art,
science and technology and between academic and amateur science. It promotes the
dialogue aimed at rethinking the phenomenon of life. It blurs the boundaries between
natural and artificial and the limits of human manipulations with the fundamentals of
life.
Keywords: dialogue, science art, bioart, art-science-technology intersections (re-
approchement), living artworks, visualization.
The development and expansion of novelties provide the human with un-
precedented abilities to change nature in its very fundamentals. This raises ques-
tions about the goals and intentions of technological interventions in nature and
manipulation with nature as well as about human responsibility for both human
and non-human nature.
The development and expansion of new emerging science and technologies,
also called NESTs, challenges society and impacts all the aspects of social life
and the human perception and attitude towards the world. Modern art is also
very sensitive to achievements in science and technologies. It is manifested in
various forms, one of which is bioart.
Bioart is a relatively new phenomenon; it appeared at the turn of the 20–21st
centuries. Nevertheless, the term “bioart”1 acquires a rather significant prolif-
eration in modern scientific, artistic, media and social discourses, being filled by
a variety of contents.
—————————
1 There are several forms of wording: “bioart,” “bio art” and “BioArt.” In this article the term
“bioart” is used.
84 Tetiana Gardashuk
In this article mainly three definitions of bioart are analyzed, namely:

1) bioart as a part of the science art, 2) bioart as the process of the creation of
new exciting (thrilling) artworks, 3) bioart as the process of the visualization
of certain stages of biomedical and life science research and an illustration of
complex research discoveries. The relationship between them will also be con-
sidered and an outline of the specific features of bioart will be drawn, that allow
us to define and specify bioart as a dialogue.
BIOART AS A PART OF THE SCIENCE ART
In order to analyze bioart as a part of the so-called science art it is worth to

examine briefly the phenomenon of science art. Science and art traditionally
were considered the opposite forms of human activities and cognition. As it is
already mentioned above, modern art reacts to the challenges of NESTs and
tries to rethink the interaction between the human, nature, science and technolo-
gy and to draw public attention to them as well as to model and simulate the
human future. At the same time, art seeks new tools, techniques and materials
(electron microscopy, nanoparticles, living cells, tissues, bacteria, etc.) to
express the artistic comprehension of the world and changes that it faces. As
a result, artistic materials have often been taken over from sciences and adapted
to the artistic context where they play metaphorical, hermeneutical and specula-
tive roles.2
Now we are witnessing a steady rapprochement between science, technology
and art. Science art is one of the results of such a rapprochement (approxima-
tion), and it happens to be a derivate from the convergence of art, science and
technology. Science art is a complex, multi-faced phenomenon that includes
Information Art, NanoArt (nanoart), High-tech Art, BioArt (bioart), Transgenic
Art, etc. There are no strict boundaries between the mentioned forms of arts
because many of them have no fixed areas; they are moving, varying, and over-
lapping each other, depending on the concept and content of the particular artis-
tic project. This significantly complicates the analysis of science art and its
components. For instance, the Information Art analysis includes the surveys
of artistic work related to biology (microbiology, genetics, animal and plant
behavior, ecology, and medicine), physical sciences (particle physics, atomic
energy, geology, physics, chemistry, astronomy, space science, and Global Po-
sitioning System (GPS) technology), mathematics (algorisms, fractals, genetic
art, and artificial life), kinetics (conceptual electronics, sound installation, and
robotics); telecommunications (telephone, radio, telepresence, and Web art);
digital systems (interactive media, virtual reality (VR), alternative sensors, arti-
—————————
2 Boland, H. 2013. Art from Synthetic Biology; http://westminsterresearch.wmin.ac.uk/
12742/1/Howard_BOLAND.pdf
Bioart as a Dialogue 85
ficial intelligence, 3-D sound, speech, scientific visualization, and information

systems).3
Nanoart also represents a new art discipline at the art-science-technology in-
tersections. It is based on nanotechnology as a leading direction of modern sci-
ence and technology which inspires great expectations and hopes for solutions
of many problems in different domains of human life, now and in a future.
Nanoart represents itself in the forms of nanolandscapes (molecular and
atomic landscapes which are natural structures of matter at corresponding
scales), nanosculptures (structures created by scientists and artists by manipulat-
ing matter at molecular and atomic scales by using chemical and physical pro-
cesses). These structures are visualized with powerful research tools like scan-
ning electron microscopes and atomic force microscopes, and their scientific
images are fixed and further processed by using different artistic techniques to
convert them into artworks showcased for large audiences.4 In fact, nanoland-
scapes and nanosculptures are the visualizations of objects created by using
nanotechnology, and they represent both the scientific and artistic interest.
In many cases, as Martin Ruivenkamp and Arie Rip show, visualizations
combine images and imaginations, data-based imaging and impressionistic im-
agining. Visualization is also an attempt to combine “scientific correctness”
with the best way of the presentation of the achievements of nanoscience and
nanotechnology in scientific journals, reports, political papers as well as in me-
dia not only for specialists but also for a broader audience. This is why Ruiven-
kamp and Rip propose to use the term “imag(in)ing” that combines some fea-
tures of real data-based images and imagination about the objects invisible to
the human (public) eye. These authors also conclude that nanoart serves as
a showcase for nanoscience, and some images of nanotechnology (like The
Nanolouse, Nanogear images and the IBM nano-logo) become already iconic:
that is, they are widely seen as representing techno-scientific achievements,
even when they only offer a promise.5
Nanoscience and nanotechnologies are represented in art not only through
visualization, but also in the forms that target other senses. Nanoart is not only
a specific type of visual art, but it also appears in other forms, e.g. in Eduardo
Kac’s project “Aromapoetry,” which he calls “a book to be read with the nose”
(2011).6 This book consists of twelve poems, each of them is a distinct and self-
contained composition of flavors. At the same time, the book has a dynamic
—————————
3 Wilson, S. 2002. Information Arts: Intersections of Art, Science, and Technology. Accessed
14 September 2016; https://monoskop.org/images/3/33/Wilson_Stephen_Information_Arts_

Intersections_of_Art_Science_and_Technology.pdf
4 Orfescu, C. 2016. Nanoart—Nanodesign. Accessed 14 September 2016; http://crisorfescu.com/
5 Ruivenkamp, M., A. Rip, 2011. “Entanglement of Imaging and Imagining of Nanotechnolo-
gy.” Nanoethics, 5, 185; http://link.springer.com/article/ 10.1007%2Fs11569-011-0122-2

6 Rossi, E.G., E. Kac. 2014. “Language and Life.” Arshake; http://www.arshake.com/
en/eduardo-kac-la-vita-nel-linguaggio/
internal rhythm produced through the alternation of different or contrasting

smells. Nanotechnology binds an extremely thin layer of a porous glass to every
page, trapping the odorants (i.e. the volatile molecules) and releasing them very
slowly. To ensure even greater longevity, a set of small bottles is integrated into
the book, allowing the reader to recharge every individual page.
Bioart is also a part of science art, represented by very heterogeneous types
(forms) of activities, that makes its analysis rather difficult. Many actors in-
volved in the process of institutionalizing bioart try to formulate a right name
for it on the basis of their own practices. However, it is hard to reach consensus
on terminologies and subject boundaries.7
The term “bioart” unites various practices (activities) dealing with different
forms of living materials. These forms and these practices have also their spe-
cific names, like microbial, or bacterial art, transgenic art, tissue culture, etc.
Microbial art presents a collection of pieces by scientists and artists from around
the world who make use of a wide variety of taxa (bacteria, fungi, and protists)
and different techniques for expressing qualities of these materials.8 Most often
representatives of bacterial art use bacterial culture or colonies to create images
(like “Ode to Autumn,” created by Maria Eugenia Inda, a postdoctoral research-
er at the Cold Spring Harbor Labs in New York, American Society for Microbi-
ology; fanciful patterns/ornaments that are actual colonies of tens of billions of
individual microorganisms, created by Eshel Ben-Jacob, Tel Aviv University;
bioluminescent paintings, created by members of the Center for Biofilm Engi-
neering and the Montana State University School of Art) on agar substrate in
petri dish. This is why this type of bioart as also called agar art.
A British artist Anna Dumitriu, in her project called “Communicating Bacte-
ria,” used colonies of genetically modified bacteria that change colors depend-
ent on the behavior and interaction (communication) of these microorganisms.
These specific qualities of bacterial colonies are applied for the colouring em-
broideries of an antique whitework (white on white) and are exhibited to
a broad audience. The bacterial art projects are aimed to change the public atti-
tude toward bacteria. One of the goals of the project “Communicating Bacteria”
is to underline the importance of the public understanding of microbiology.
Dumitriu stresses that many businesses play on public fears in order to add
a value to their products (detergents), and newspapers and TV-shows “fill our
minds with images of bacteria as armies of tiny monsters ready to attack unless
we buy some new hand wash or detergent.” Instead, she discovers alternative
forms of bacteria control based on the interaction of bacterial colonies. The
Communicating Bacteria Project combines bioart, historical textile techniques
and 3D mapped video projections to explore a new research currently being
undertaken in the field of bacterial communication, to engage a wide audience
—————————
7 Boland, H. 2013, op. cit.
8 Microbial Art. 2016; http://www.microbialart.com/
increasing the debate and understanding of this potentially new form of infec-
tion control.9
At the same time microbial (bacterial or agar) art exhibited in the form of
photographs or video images can be considered a kind of visual art. It should be
noticed that such a use of living materials (trees, bushes, herbs, flowers etc.) has
got a long history in culture. They are applied by landscape architects, garden-
ers, florists and designers for the decoration of parks, urban areas, courtyards,
houses etc. In these cases, artists apply the aesthetically featured characteristics
of different plants (their color, form, texture, size etc.) mostly for decorative
purposes. The Traditional Flower Carpet in Brussels and numerous flower festi-
vals all over the world are examples of such arts.
It is obvious that both the traditional flower art and microbial art belong to
visual arts, but the differences are in materials used, also in the forms of public
perception, aesthetic value and in messages addressed to audience. The tradi-
tional use of plants for decoration or flower festivals are aimed to demonstrate
both the intrinsic beauty of nature (natural materials, mostly higher plants) and
skills and mastery of breeders, floral artists and designers. Such a kind of per-
formances and exhibition usually are of a high aesthetic value which is also
shared by spectators generating positive emotions. In contrast, microbial art
masterpieces present a part of the invisible living world to the audience through
photos and videos, and it is aimed at broadening public imagination about this
world as well as about the very nature of it. The aesthetic and ethical value of
such masterpieces is a matter of heated debates and controversial assessments.
Nora S. Vaage points out that bioart is rarely aimed “to give pleasure
through the experience of harmonious beauty. Instead, artists seek to reflect
some aspect of human existence, to provoke, criticize, or create immersive
experiences.”10
BIOART AS A PROCESS OF CREATION

OF NEW THRILLING ARTWORKS
Another meaning of bioart is connected with a drastic transformation of the

fundamentals of life. In this sense, bioart is considered a derivative from new
emerging sciences and technologies (NESTs) which operate with genetic mate-
rials, living tissues, bacteria and organisms and can be used for producing new
functions in living systems by modifying biomolecules and cells, or designing
artificial cells. These practices are based on achievements of DNA technology,
molecular and synthetic biology (SynBio), genomics, xenotransplantation, etc.
—————————
9
Bioart and Bacteria—The Artwork of Anna Dumitriu, 2016; http://annadumitriu.tumblr.
com/CommunicatingBacteria
10 Vaage, N. S. 2016. “What Ethics for Bioart?” Nanoethics, 10, 87–104.
Hundreds of artists around the world use different techniques of molecular biol-
ogy, biotechnology and nanobiotechnology.
It was Eduardo Kac who coined the term “bioart” (“BioArt”) in the end of
the 1990s, especially to describe a process of creation of certain new thrilling
artworks. Kac also introduced the term “transgenic art” to indicate new forms of
art based on the use of genetic engineering techniques in order to transfer syn-
thetic genes to an organism or to transfer natural genetic material from one spe-
cies into another, to create unique living beings. Both bioart and transgenic art
may be described as the synthesis of art, science and technology, and they rep-
resent a part of science art.
Bioart is an attempt, chance or opportunity to embody the human fantasy in
creating chimeric creatures not only in human imagination, but also in reality
and to present them to public eye. The chimeric creatures that embody the hu-
man fantasy (like “GFP Bunny”—a green fluorescent rabbit, and “Edunia”
created by Kac or “The Pig Wings Project” by Oron Catts and Ionat Zurr in
cooperation with Guy Ben-Ary) are among the works of bioart.
It also demonstrates human abilities to change nature or even to improve it.
In the Introduction to the book Sings of Life: Bio Art and Beyond (2007) Kac
refers to the writing of Jorge Luis Borges Manual de zoologı’a fanta’stica (The
Handbook of Fantastic Zoology) first published in Mexico in 1957, and he cites
this famous Argentinian writer, stating that people’s imagination can create “an
endless variety of monsters” and to be described in legends and literature; but,
fortunately, “our monsters would be stillborn, thank God.”11 In nature chimeras
may appear as a result of chromosomal anomalies, but they have a very little
chance of survival. Nevertheless, since 1980s, as Kac notices, living chimeras
(that is, animals with cells from two beings) became a part of our reality thanks
to advances in genetics and other fields of life science. The term “transgenic
art” was proposed for denoting this new form of activities based on the use of
genetic engineering techniques to create fanciful living organisms. 12 Bernard
Andrieu proposes to call such creatures scientific chimeras.13
Catts and Zurr emphasize in the comments of their The Pig Wings Project
that winged bodies have been used in most cultures and throughout history.14
As a rule, many fanciful winged creatures embodied either good/angelic (bird-
wing) or evil/satanic (bat-wing) aspects of life. Bird wings have been associated
with angels while bat wings symbolized dark satanic forces. Catts and Zurr in
—————————
11 Kac, E. 2007. “Introduction. Art that Looks You in the Eye: Hybrids, Clones, Mutants, Syn-
thetics, and Transgenics.” In: Signs of Life Bio Art and Beyond. Eduardo Kac (Ed.);
https://www.digitalartarchive.at/fileadmin/user_upload/Virtualart/PDF/360_Signs_of_Life_-_Bio
_Art_and_Beyond.PDF
12 Kac, E. 2016. Transgenic Art; http://www.ekac.org/ transgenic.html
13 Andrieu, B. 2016. “Embodying the Chimera: Biotechnology and Subjectivity.” In: Signs of
Life Bio Art and Beyond.

14 The Pig Wings Project: Oron Catts & Ionat Zurr in Collaboration with Guy Ben-Ary. 2016;
http://www.tca.uwa.edu.au/pig/pig.html
cooperation with Guy Ben-Ary and many other researches in biomedical sci-
ence have used tissue engineering and stem cell technologies in order to grow
pig bone tissue in the shape of three sets of wings. It was presumed that the
living tissue of engineered pig wings will be animated by using living muscles.
From this position bioart can be also considered a transition from mystical to
scientific chimeras.
Some representatives of bioart proclaim an ambition to increase biodiversity
under the conditions of loss of natural diversity of plants, fungi and animals and
manifest human power to outmatch natural evolution. Kac compares the work
of modern artists, who deal with living material, with the “work” of natural
evolution: “In art, to work with biomedia is to manipulate life, and any kind of
life manipulation is part of the global network known as evolution.”15 This
trend has been developing within the transhumanism discourse and debates
about nature and human enhancement. In such a way man takes on the role of
God as a creator of living beings or the function of natural evolution (new crea-
tionism). At the same time many representatives of bioart emphasize creative
“cooperation” with nature and true care about nature.
Despite the great diversity of projects united by bioart it is possible to identi-
fy some common traits. First of all, bioart is in vivo practice and life is a raw
material for bioart. Consequently, bioart is a form of artistic activity that pro-
duces “living artworks” and creates a new reality that needs to be defined, ana-
lyzed and evaluated.
In order to understand bioart and science art, in general, this phenomenon
should be considered in the context of art evolution in the 20th century and
the dynamics of the relationship between science, technology and art should
be taken into account. Stephen Wilson in the preface to his book Information
Arts: Intersections of Art, Science, and Technology (2002) proposes to consider
science and technology as a means for the analysis of interaction between
science, technology and art. He believes that such an approach can be seen
as part of essential rapprochement between art, science and technology and as
a key to what art may look like in the 21th century. At the same time, it is cru-
cially important to examine the role of science and technology in art develop-
ment.16
Wilson also emphasizes that the investigation of convergence, interaction
between art, science and technology and the interpenetration of them will help
to understand the radical shift in the boundaries of “art” over the last century
that makes it difficult to achieve consensus on the definitions of art, as well as
the nature of the aesthetic experience, the relative place of communication and
expression, or criteria of evaluation. However, there is some agreement on these
—————————
15 Kac, E. 2007, op. cit.
16 Wilson, S. 2002, op. cit.
features: art is intentionally made or assembled by humans, and it usually con-

sists of intellectual, symbolic, and sensual components.17
Bioart as a part of the general process of cultural changes during the 20th
century reflects some key tendencies which take place for a hundred years. The
changes are rooted not only in a gradual convergence between science, technol-
ogies and art (cinema, photography, media art etc.), but also presume a shift of
the cultural paradigm. For instance, Carol Becker notices the significant bias in
the area of the artistic quests (displacement interests) and theorization about
them. During the 1980s–1990s artists and philosophers were focused on the
topic of “mining of the nuance of one’s historical self, conceptualized in socie-
ty, or what one is.”18 The unprecedented development of science and technolo-
gy and their rapid entry into all the spheres of society displaced emphasis
(accents) on the questions of incorporation of otherness, the recombination of
the natural and the fabricated, the combination of physical and virtual, the
breakdown of distinctions between art and science.19
These shifts can be illustrated by Kac’s project Natural History of the Enig-
ma, which was developed in years 2003–2008 and first exhibited at the Weis-
man Art Museum, in Minneapolis from April 17 to June 21, 2009. This project
demonstrates the contiguity of life between different species and represents
artist’s reflection on this question. The central work in the Natural History of
the Enigma series is a plantimal, a new life form created by the artist and called
Edunia. “Edunia” is a genetically engineered flower that has red veins on light
pink petals. The red veins are results of the expression of the artist’s gene iso-
lated and sequenced from his blood.20 The living being called “Edunia” repre-
sents not only experimentations on the genetic compatibility of different spe-
cies, but also a new kind of “self” that is partially flower and partially human,
which would never appear in natural condition. The construction of such crea-
tures is possible only in the laboratory thanks to the advances in genetics and
molecular biology. Moreover, Kac states that care for this plant is also the con-
cern for ourselves.
BIOART AS POPULARIZATION OF SCIENCE
While art searches for new forms of expressions of artistic ideas and rethink-
ing the challenges of NESTs, science also searches for new forms of self-
presentation in professional and business circles, for policy and decision mak-
ers, as well as for broader community through media, exhibitions and perfor-
mances. In other words, modern science and technologies need to be more un-
—————————
17
Ibid.
18 Becker, C. 2016. “GFP Bunny.” In: Art Journal (2000); http://www.ekac.org/cbecker.html
19 Ibid.
20 Kac, E. 2016. Natural History of the Enigma; http://www.ekac.org/nat.hist.enig.html
derstandable for society, so they seek new ways of communication with the
public outside of scientific communities. For the popularization of results of
their research, science and technologies apply not only traditional methods like
popular science magazines, television and radio, but they also employ artistic
means and language.
Researchers involved in the spheres of molecular biology, nanobiotechnolo-
gy, biomedicine etc. pay special attention to the promotion of the results of their
studies because these spheres are closely related, on the one hand, with human
hopes for better life, and, on the other hand, with the fears of intervention in
human identity. Consequently, people’s attitude towards science and technology
depends on message which NESTs send to the society and its particular target
groups.
For instance, FASEB (Federation of American Societies for Experimental
Biology) initiated in 2012 annual exhibitions to share the beauty and breadth of
biological research with public.21 The images (photos, graphs or videos from
different parts of research, e.g., electron microscopy, fluorescent microscopy,
medical/anatomical illustrations, x-ray crystallography, histology, gel electro-
phoresis, data visualizations, etc.) presented at such kinds of exhibitions are also
a part of bioart. In this sense, bioart is becoming public relations for corporate
science, especially for pharmaceutical companies and life-science research insti-
tutes.22
The efforts of scientists and companies which deal with NEST in the promo-
tion and popularization of their findings in media and in artistic areas stimulate
the development of so-called amateur science or do-it-yourself biology
(DIYBio). As a part of amateur science DIYBio is performed outside academic
and business institutions (at home, in garages, and offices); all equipment for
such amateur experiments can easily be purchased on ecommerce sites, and
materials used in these experiments are ordered via conventional mail. DIY
biologists are represented by a large number of individual and amateur research
groups throughout the world. In 2008 they founded the global network with the
mission of establishing a vibrant (exciting), productive and safe community of
DIY biologists (DIYbio.org).23 Significantly, the DIY biologists define their
central mission as the establishing and development of a dialogue with a broad-
er public for a better understanding of modern biotechnologies and their poten-
tial able to benefit everyone. This mission coincides with the definition of bioart
as activity aimed at dialogue.
In 2011 a series of congresses in Europe and the USA was conducted to
agree upon principles for the code of ethics for the emerging DIY Bio move-
—————————
21 “BioArt Scientific Image & Video Competition.” 2016; http://www.faseb.org/Resources-for-
the-Public/Scientific-Contests/BioArt/About-BioArt.aspx
22 Thacker, E. 2006. “Open Source DNA and Bioinformatic Bodies.” In: Signs of Life Bio Art
and Beyond. Kac, E. (Ed.). Cambridge (Mass.)–London: The MIT Press.

23 An Institution for the Do-It-Yourself Biologist2016; https:// diybio.org/
ment. The key principles of European DIY Bio movements are the following
ones: transparency, safety, open access, education, modesty, community, peace-
ful purposes, respect, responsibility, accountability. The North American DIY
Bio community builds its code of ethics on the principles of open access, trans-
parency, education, safety, environment, peaceful purposes, tinkering (“Tinker-
ing with biology leads to insight; insight leads to innovation”).24 From this point
of view the DIY biologists represent not only private independent activities, but
they also play a role of a mediator between science and the general public.
While DIY Bio groups are experimenting with biomaterials, boiart is also
a part of DIY Bio and vice versa.
The cooperation between representatives of bioart and DIY-biologists proves
this. The world-renowned artist Oron Catts, the current director of SymbioticA,
the Centre of Excellence in Biological Arts, within the School of Anatomy and
Human Biology (The University of Western Australia), in cooperation with
other artists and scientists starts tissue engineering (tissue culture) and biotech-
nology in an artistic context and ethical aspects of regenerative biology technol-
ogies.25 Since the early 2000s he and his collaborators have also organized
a series of workshops for artists and other interested parties including DIY biol-
ogists. Nora S. Vaage from the University of Bergen considers these workshops
as an evidence of flexibility of the boundaries between bioart and DIY biology
in practice.26
WHY BIOART IS A DIALOGUE?
Many representatives of bioart emphasize the dialogic orientation of their ac-

tivities. For instance, Kac regards dialogue f as a core of his artistic projects. He
states that he has used each of his art pieces and performances to attract media
attention and to encourage thereby a public dialogue about the social issues of
the topics raised in his projects.
Dialogue is deeply rooted in human culture and in the history of philosophy.
Generally, dialogue is defined as a conversation of two or more persons or as an
exchange of ideas or opinions on a particular issue with a view to reaching
truth. At the same time dialogue has specific features which differ it from other
types of conversation, among others debate—a formal contest in which the af-
firmative and negative sides of a proposition are advocated by opposing speak-
ers.27 Debate is built on opposing positions; each side is convinced in the right-
eousness of its own arguments.
—————————
24
Ibid.
25 Royal College of Art Triumphs Bioart with New Appointments2016; http://www.wired.co.uk/
article/catts-and-zurr-synthetic-biology-rca
26 Vaage, N. S. 2016, op. cit.
27 Swidler, L. 2016. Debate; http://www. dictionary.com/browse/debate
In contrast, dialogue is based on the assumption that neither side has a full
understanding or comprehension of the subject. Consequently, no one side has
a monopoly on the truth of the subject, but both need to seek further. Dialogue
is the means of learning a new truth that both sides can agree on and a two-way
communication between persons who hold significantly differing views on
a subject, with the purpose of learning more truth about the subject from the
other.28 The extrapolation of this understanding of dialogue onto the situation of
the relationship between science, technology and art allows to speak about bio-
art as a dialogue.
Leonard Swidler, a founder and president of the Dialogue Institute, provides
an analysis of different approaches to the understanding of truth as a goal of
dialogue in the Western culture. He stresses that our understanding of truth
and reality has underwent a radical shift. In short, it has become “deabsolutized”
or “relational,” that is, all statements about reality are now seen to be related to
the historical context, praxis intentionality, perspective, etc. of the speaker, and
in that sense dialogue is no longer “absolute.” He clarifies its position as fol-
lows:
“If my perception and description of the world is true only in a limited sense,
that is, only as seen from my place in the world, then if I wish to expand my
grasp of reality I need to learn from others what they know of reality that
they can perceive from their place in the world that I cannot see from mine.
That, however, can happen only through dialogue.”29
When we consider bioart as a dialogue we have also to identify the parties of

this dialogue (or dialogues) and answer the question what is this dialogue about.
From the brief analysis of definitions of bioart it follows that this dialogue is
multi-dimensional, multilateral and multidisciplinary one, because it relates to
art, science, technology, media, law, education, religion, and to society as
a whole.
The multilateralism and complexity of issues raised by bioart was, for in-
stance, demonstrated by the posters with images of Kac with his creature rabbit
Alba (GFP Bunny), which already became an icon of the transgenic art. These
posters were placed on the streets of Paris (December 3 and December 13,
2000). The goal of that action was not only to inform public about the achieve-
ments and potential of genetic engineering, but also to encourage thinking about
the questions raised in the realms of ethics, art, science, religion, media, rela-
tionships between human and non-human species (family) and about human
attitude toward nature.
—————————
28 Swidler, L. What Is Dialogue? 2016; http:// dialogueinstitute.org/what-is-dialogue/
29 Ibid.
While there is no single body of knowledge controlling research in the area

of bioart,30 it is extremely important to keep in mind that dialogue is a continu-
ous learning process for the sides participating in it.
Swidler defines the general goal of dialogue as an opportunity for each side
to learn more about each other, and to change accordingly. At the same time
dialogue is an opportunity to learn more about itself (Self),31 i.e., dialogue is
a way to understand others and a form of self-understanding. From this point of
view, bioart is an attempt of a better understanding of modern art, science, tech-
nology, and, last but not least, important problems of modern society. To para-
phrase the statement that the dialogue partner becomes for us something like
a mirror in which we perceive ourselves in ways we could not otherwise do,32 it
is possible to say that bioart is a mirror of science. In bioart science adapts the
language of art and vice versa, and artists cooperate with scientists. This process
is called the scientisation of art. According to Eugene Thacker, bioart projects
can contribute to the discourse on biotechnology. He underlines theoretical,
pedagogical, political and institutional standpoints in this discourse. From
a theoretical standpoint, bioart creates certain contexts in which diverse provoc-
ative, controversial issues of our days can be raised.33 Bioart is an integral
inseparable part of these contexts. This is why a particular individual bioart
project should also be assessed within the context in which it is created and
presented.
Nora S. Vaage proposes the term “contextualism” as the most adequate and
preferable one for the analysis and assessment of bioart projects including their
moral and aesthetical values. Taking into account that bioartists apply different
approaches, and their artworks generate different ethical issues, she believes
that the contextualist approach is “the most productive perspective for bioart
assessment, that is each artwork should be treated locally and considered sepa-
rately for its specific ethical relevance.”34
Contextualism corresponds to the multi-dimensional dialogic nature of
bioart. Moreover, Thacker states that the context in which bioart is met is
crucial, and it needs to be problematized in order to avoid the reduction of bio-
art to the role of commentator of science for ordinary public or “tired narrative
of recuperation of the avant-garde.”35 Bioart does not only create a medium
for a dialogue between science, technology and society enabling a public
understanding of modern science and technology and an adequate assessment
of public fears and hopes related to NESTs, but it also designs a new (third)
—————————
30 Bolland, H. 2013. Art from Synthetic Biology; http://westminsterre-search.wmin.ac.uk/
12742/1/Howard_BOLAND.pdf
31 Swidler, L. 2016, op. cit.
32 Ibid.
33 Thacker, E. 2006, op. cit.,
34 Vaage, N.S. 2016, op. cit.,
35 Thacker, E. 2006, op. cit.,
reality which does not belong entirely to the realms of science nor technology,
nor art.
CONCLUSION
It can be concluded that bioart encourages dialogue on the number of issues

which can be contingently divided at least into the following blocks, or clusters.
First, bioart represents a dialogue between art, science and technology or be-
tween art and techno-science (NESTs), aimed at the mutual adaptation of the
means of the cognition of reality, languages, forms and methods of communica-
tion with public and particular social groups. These result in the rapprochement
of the mentioned spheres of activities and in a closer cooperation between scien-
tists and artists.
Second, bioart induces dialogues aimed at the rethinking and redefinition of
the phenomenon of life, and boundaries between the natural and artificial. It
also stimulates discussions about human responsibility for the preservation of
identity of life and about the status of bio-facts and bioartistic (living) artefacts.
The need to define certain “permitted” limits of nature transformation by means
of NESTs and the boundaries of human activities, as well as the basics of inter-
ference in life and manipulation with living forms follows from this. Biosafety
and biosecurity (biohacking; green-goo scenario; environmental impacts) are in
the time-table of this dialogue. Here we do not consider the participation of
religion in the dialogue about and within bioart because this participation forms
a special dimension of the rethinking of many ethical questions actualized by
both NESTs and bioart. Neither do we touch the question about the place of
media in the development of bioart, nor its presentation to the audience, nor the
role of media in maintenance of the dialogical character of bioart. Modern me-
dia do not just transfer images from the spheres of techno-science or bioart la-
boratories to the public. They actively construct new realities and new forms of
communication.36 This is why media and bioart should be a topic of a special
detailed thorough analysis.
Third, bioart is a dialogue between academic and amateur science, including
the ways of the cooperation and involvement of DIY-biologists in research for
scientific and commercial purposes. Simultaneously, the question about the
development of the DIYbio Code of Ethics and the risks/benefits assessment of
DIY activities becomes a crucial one.
—————————
36 GLOBALE: Exo-Evolution. 2016; http://zkm.de/en/event/2015/ 10/globale-exo-evolution
ABOUT THE AUTHOR — PhD, Doctor hab.; leading scientific researcher, De-
partment of Logic and Methodology of Science, H. Skovododa Institute of Philosophy,
National Academy of Science of Ukraine. She is a member of: Bioethics Committee of
the National Academy of Science of Ukraine, since 2014; IUCN’s ESUG / SULi, since
1997; country coordinator for Ukraine; The Specialist Group on Cultural and Spiritual
Values of Protected Areas—CSVPA, since 2012; Society for the Studies of New and
Emerging Technologies (S.NET), since 2014.
No. 3/2017
Ilektra Stampoulou
RE-FRAMING THE ABYSS: THE VISUAL WRITING

OF JACQUES DERRIDA IN THE TRUTH IN PAINTING
Hamlet — Do you see nothing there?

Gertrude — Nothing at all; yet all that is I see.1
ABSTRACT
In this paper I intend to discuss some notions encountered in Jacques Derrida’s The
Truth in Painting (1978) immediately linked to the manner in which the art object2 is
understood and addressed, its limits, what it does/does not include/exclude, what it
touches upon—if we can use such formalist terms in a deconstructive framework. These
notions have perhaps formed in the past decades the art object, even though there is no
frequent reference of Derridean deconstruction in texts regarding art.3 The ones I will
mostly refer to are the parergon, the frame and the abyss. I intend to support that Derri-
da has not just doubted the limits between ergon and parergon but has also illustrated in
an almost painterly manner the abyss and the parergon, thus reframing fields of aesthet-
ics, philosophically and visually.
Keywords: deconstruction, aesthetics, parergon, abyss, frame
—————————
1 Shakespeare, W. 2005. Hamlet. Jenkins, H. (Ed.). London: The Ardent Shakespeare, act III,
scene IV, l, 132–133, 326.

2 The work of art as an object.
3 In order to avoid any mistaken allusions of Derrida’s theory or the postmodern art object as
stemming from, referring to or based on each other, I only support that Derrida’s theory has coex-
isted in parallel with changes in the postmodern art field and co-influenced along with countless
other factors (political, social, technological, artistic, financial, theoretical, etc.) the development
of the art object.
98 Ilektra Stampoulou
“PARA-TO-ERGO”
In the introduction of The Truth in Painting,4 with the title “Passe-Partout”

Derrida gives a “definition” of the parergon: “parergon: neither work (ergon)
nor outside the work [hors d’oeuvre], neither inside nor outside, neither above
nor below, it disconcerts any opposition but does not remain indeterminate and
it gives rise to the work” (TP, 9).
The parergon is “para to ergo,” beside the work, that which is not work but
not irrelevant to it since it is beside, next to it, maybe around it. Also, through
the parergon the existence of ergon is verified in a way; through it the work is
“delimited,” demarcated.
After this rather brief reference to the parergon, to which I will return,
I would like to use as a starting point a rather interesting feature of the first part
of the book. This is a graphic detail, a repeated choice that Derrida makes
throughout the first chapter of The Truth in Painting bearing the title “Parer-
gon.” It is an odd symbol or mark of two “corners,” one top right and one bot-
tom left (marked like this: |--- |
) As David Wills mentions, this symbol is a
relative of our familiar quotation marks and was used in the first printed books
of the 15th century in order to distinguish between the text and comments on it.5
It was the symbol distinguishing lemmata, placed one before and one after each
lemma. Lemmata were usually brief excerpts of classical texts or of the Bible
often used as a kind of title on the following commentary in the book.6
Derrida’s corners or “half-crochets,”7 however, do not include some text or
a lemma.8 They “demarcate” a conceivable, completely blank, hypothetical 9
rectangle. The sentences which meet those half-crochets remain open or incom-
plete, sometimes without punctuation marks and may/may not be continued
—————————
4 Derrida, J. 1987 (1978). The Truth in Painting. Bennington, G., I. McLeod (Trans.). London–
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Hereafter referred to as TP.

5 While researching on these symbols and The Truth in Painting I encountered David Wills’s
paper: Wills, D. 2001. “Derrida and Aesthetics: Lemming (Reframing the Abyss).” In: Jacques
Derrida and the Humanities: A Critical Reader. Cohen, T. (Ed.).Cambridge University Press
(UK), 108–130, which inspired this paper in many ways and to which I will repeatedly refer.
Wills, however, seems to analyse these marks as lemmata and graphic examples of an illustration
of the abyss; not as I will attempt to support here (that is not as an illustration but as a choice of
visually, artistically rendering, drawing the “empty” space and the abyss). See also, Parkes, M. B.
1992. Pause and Effect: An Introduction to the History of Punctuation in the West. London: Sco-
lar Press. Parkes mentions that when Franciscus Renner printed the Bible in Venice, in 1482–1483
(also known as Biblia Latina cum Postillis Nicolai de Lyra) he introduced this corner symbol.
6 See Wills, D. 2001, op. cit., 111.
7 I rather use “corners” than “half-crochets” since in our case this graphic symbol is primarily
used as a drawing, an illustration of a corner (corner being the place at which two converging
lines or surfaces meet. Here, it spatially frames (as a rudimentary “frame”) the blank space Derri-
da leaves between his paragraphs.
8
We should note that “Lemmata” is the title of the first subchapter of “Parergon.”
9 Hypothetical since it is not circumscribed, but the reader supposes its existence because of the
way the corners are placed. In a way it is a process of the eye “filling in the gaps.”
Re-Framing the Abyss: The Visual Writing of Jacques Derrida in The Truth in Painting 99
after the blank, usually without the indication of a new sentence (e.g. capitaliza-
tion or new paragraph indication). These corners, however, unlike their ances-
tors (containing lemmata) and their descendents (containing words and phrases)
contain nothing or to be more accurate, nothingness; they frame blank space, the
void; they have among them or between them, a chasm, the abyss. Furthermore,
the lemma, the section missing from between them is now a kind of title for our
text (“Lemmata”). However, as designated also by the former use of these cro-
chets, it also constitutes a parallel argument, a subject, something which also
applies for Derrida’s text. In The Truth in Painting the void is in the position of
lemmata and these corners are pieces of a frame surrounding the void in a rudi-
mentary manner. Even more interestingly, these corners are not even actual
corners since the vertical and horizontal lines forming them only approach but
never intersect; they come near within millimeters but never reach each other.
The corners of Derrida’s “frame” are open and the actual frame (the one without
sides and with its rudimentary corners) signifies, or describes, or better “in”-
scribes the void.
According to David Wills, lemma is fundamental in Derrida’s discussion not
only because it holds the title of this subchapter but also because it exposes the
basic arguments of his position. He places, however, these arguments in a pe-
ripheral place since we are still in the subchapter of the first chapter. This
placement of deconstructive arguments in such a peripheral place in the text can
be viewed as a parergonal frame, something which we will further analyze in
a while.10 So, with this subchapter we are introduced to the next chapter which
refers to Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Judgment11 and the abyss.
The abyss constitutes a key concept that occurs from the beginning of The
Truth in Painting and constantly reappears. Kant first recognizes a “broad gulf,”
an abyss between “the concept of freedom” as “supersensible” and “the concept
of nature” as “phenomena”12 which he tries to bridge with his aesthetic and
which Derrida in his turn recognizes since according to Kant there is a need for
the realm of freedom and the supersensible to affect the domain of the natural
and sensible and vice versa (TP 36). For Kant: “judgment makes possible the
transition from the realm of the concept of nature to that of the concept of free-
dom.”13 Derrida supports that this analogy of the abyss between Kant’s two
different worlds and the bridge that will supposedly unite them is a way out,
—————————
10 See Wills, D. 2001, op. cit., 112.
11 Kant, Ι. 2007. Critique of Judgment. Meredith, J. C. (Trans.). Oxford University Press.
12 In Kant’s text: “The realm of the concept of nature under the one legislation, and that of the
concept of freedom under the other, are completely cut off from all reciprocal influence that they
might severally (each according to its own principles) exert upon the other, by the broad gulf that
divides the supersensible from phenomena. The concept of freedom determines nothing in respect
of the theoretical cognition of nature; and the concept of nature likewise nothing in respect of the
practical laws of freedom. To that extent, then, it is not possible to throw a bridge from the one
realm to the other.” Ibid., 30.
13 Ibid., 31.
a refuge, an analogy that verifies itself as such by claiming and assuming that
there must be some kind of analogy between two worlds; some kind of bridging
or connection. Kant thus poses an arbitrary presupposition of the existence of
a liaison, which is a characteristic practice and rationale of the western meta-
physical tradition from which his philosophy is formed and forms in its turn.
The connotative associations and the arbitrary presuppositions existing in this
analogy “justifying” it philosophically are many and among them, the possibil-
ity of comparison, connection, unity, unification and logical continuity (TP 36).
This aporetic—as Derrida would put it—opposition between two “areas”
which, on the one hand, are separated by an abyss, but, on the other, it is possi-
ble to connect them with a transition process, is the main cause that Derrida will
treat Kant’s third Critique as a question regarding the bridging and the frame in
particular—the framing of the abyss. All this seems to happen because as Wills
puts it “Kant had set out to divide architectonically the entire human conceptual
field.”14 Thus when he attempted the analysis of the beautiful in relation to an
object and the work of art, he was obligated through the system he had formu-
lated in his two former Critiques to retreat to an additional engagement with
what he considers as excessive to a work of art, that is, all the additional, orna-
mental elements (TP, 35–36). So he will have to mention the parergon, that
which is not ergon, that which is outside of the work, the “hors d’oeuvre.”15
And that is exactly what attracts Derrida, the random, arbitrary presupposition
that not only the parergon exists as “hors d’oeuvre” but also that according to
Kant examples of parergon might be the frame of a painting, the clothes of
a statue or the columns of a building.16
To further discuss Derrida’s parergon, its characteristics and its function,
I quote the following: “… the parergonal frame stands out against two grounds
[fonds], but with respect to each of those two grounds, it merges [se fond] into
the other (TP, 61).” We cannot support that the frame of a work belongs to the
work or to the non-work, that it stands with one surface (e.g. a painting) or the
other surface (e.g. the wall on which the painting is), we can neither say that it
is part of the center or the periphery. The frame is neither part of the work, nei-
ther part of the surface on which the framed work is placed; it is part of both
and neither of them since it connects and separates the two simultaneously. It is
the limit, which concentrates on itself many seemingly contradictory character-
istics. While it is a limit, an edge between two different fields, it is not negligi-
ble, insignificant in terms of space; on the contrary, it constitutes a field itself—
it occupies a locus between what is considered and what is not considered art.
While having this “thickness” (TP, 61) this limit in a first encounter with the
work, it appears as nonexistent, it separates the two (work/not work) and dis-
—————————
14 See Wills, D. 2001, op. cit., 110.
15 Derrida supports that Kant’s distinction creates a kind “pathology of the parergon” (TP, 64).
16 The external, sometimes ornamental columns of buildings. See Kant, I. 2007, op. cit., 57,
151.
solves for the sake of both. To put it simply, in the case of viewing an artwork
the viewer is not aware of its existence; it is not observable. Its function is the
framing of the work and nothing more: it separates from and unifies between
oeuvre and hors d’oeuvre and disappears: “There is always a form on a ground,
but the parergon is a form which has as its traditional determination not that it
stands out but that it disappears, buries itself, effaces itself, melts away at the
moment it deploys its greatest energy” (TP, 61).
In the paragraph right above this abstract he writes:
“Parerga have a thickness, a surface which separates them not only (as Kant
would have it) from the integral inside, from the body proper of the ergon,
but also from the outside, from the wall on which the painting is hung, from
the space in which statue or column is erected, then, step by step, from the
whole field of historical, economic, political inscription in which the drive to
signature is produced (an analogous problem, as we shall see further on). No
‘theory,’ no ‘practice,’ no ‘theoretical practice’ can intervene effectively in
this field if it does not weigh up and bear on the frame, which is the decisive
structure of what is at stake, at the invisible limit to (between) the interiority
of meaning (put under shelter by the whole hermeneuticist, semioticist, phe-
nomenologicalist, and formalist tradition) and (to) all the empiricisms of the
extrinsic which, incapable of either seeing or reading, miss the question
completely” (TP, 60–61).
By signifying the frame, a seemingly coincidental characteristic of the work

of art, as a substantial in-between term, he draws attention to the limits, struc-
tures, connections and contradictions through which an art object is perceived.
He renegotiates what a work of art includes or excludes, fundamental notions in
philosophy and aesthetics, deconstructing the oppositions inside–outside / part
of– not part of and the “rationale” which governs them and consequently the
objects treated in terms of such discrimination (i.e. in terms of internal and ex-
ternal, inclusion and omission).17
It is possible to support that the notion of the parergon in The Truth in Paint-
ing is part of the recurrent and elemental argument of Derrida, against the “met-
aphysics of presence,”18 but also an example of “différance.”19 He mentions
regarding the relationship between frame and philosophy:
—————————
17 Mariner, R., 2002. “Derrida and the Parergon.” In: A Companion to Art Theory. Smith P., C.
Wilde (Eds.). Blackwell, 351–352.

18 In “Limited Inc a b c” of Limited Inc., Derrida mentions that metaphysics can be viewed as:
“The enterprise of returning “strategically,” ideally to an origin or to a “priority,” held to be sim-

ple, intact normal, pure, standard, self-identical, in order then to think in terms of derivation,
complication, deterioration, accident, etc.” See Derrida, J., 1988. “Limited Inc a b c.” In: Limited
Inc. Weber, S., J. Mehlman (Trans.). Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 93.
19 From one of the rather important abstracts on the term “différance”: “Différance is the sys-
tematic play of differences, of the traces of differences, of the spacing by means of which ele-
“Philosophy wants to arraign it and can’t manage. But what has produced
and manipulated the frame puts everything to work in order to efface the
frame effect, most often by naturalizing it to infinity, in the hands of God
(one can verify this in Kant). Deconstruction must neither reframe nor dream
of the pure and simple absence of the frame. These two apparently contradic-
tory gestures are the very ones—and they are systematically indissociable—
of what is here deconstructed” (TP, 73).
So the frame as understood and analyzed operates in a subsidiary manner in the

deconstructive process as does différance; the frame deconstructs and is decon-
structed.20 Consequently, the parergonal frame can be viewed as an example of
différance and as a threshold, a verge, that space which allows the passage from
terms of hierarchy, sovereignty, division and units, to terms of correlation,
combination and field, by making possible the transition from oeuvre to hors d’
oeuvre and vice versa. In other words, the field of the parergonal frame in the
field of action of différance. Therefore, through the parergonal frame there is no
longer a work of art as an object in itself, separate, but an art object formed
under circumstances of dialogue where there is nothing inside or outside it to
find or explain (e.g. meaning, cause etc). Derrida thus renegotiates the aesthetic
object at the same time as separate from and connected to theory, the ethico-
socio-political frame and the gaze connecting them.
The frames that we just referred to, (conceptual and material) have another
direct connotation in the English language. The verb “frame” does not only
mean to put something into a frame but also to utter and most importantly, in-
formally, to incriminate an innocent person through the use of false evidence.21
This subsequently makes our noun-frame to bear some similarity to a trap,
something which the translators of the book in English seem to have ignored.
ments are related to each other. This spacing is the simultaneously active and passive
(the a of différance indicates this indecision as concerns activity and passivity, that which cannot
be governed by or distributed between the terms of this opposition) production of the intervals
without which the “full” terms would not signify, would not function. It also the becoming-space
of the spoken chain—which has been called temporal or linear; a becoming-space which makes
possible both writing and every correspondence between speech and writing, every passage from
one to the other.” See Derrida, J., 1981 (1972). “Semiology and Grammatology [Interview with
Julia Kristeva].” In: Positions. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 27.
20 Further down Derrida elaborates on the relationship between the parergon, différance and
metaphysics: “… the self-protection-of-the-work, of energeia which becomes ergon only as

(from) parergon: not against free and full and pure and unfettered energy […] but against what is
lacking in it; not against the lack as a posable or opposable negative, a substantial emptiness,
a determinable and bordered absence […] but against the impossibility of arresting différance in
its contour, of arranging the heterogeneous (différance) in a pose, of localizing, even in a meta-
empirical way, what metaphysics calls, as we have just seen, lack, […]. Although apparently
opposed—or because opposed—these two bordering determinations of what the parergon is
working against (the operation of free energy and of pure productivity or the operation of the
essential lack) are the same (metaphysical)” (TP, 80–81).
21 http://www.dictionary.com/browse/frame?s=t
Maybe Derrida himself would not be interested in that—it would, however,

surprise the so accustomed to puns and deconstructive double entendres reader
of his. It could of course serve as an ideal deconstructive analogy if we think of
“(re)framing” as “(re-) trapping” especially since it is closely related to the con-
cept of the abyss.
With a rather rough mention we can retrieve the abyss-trap into which Kant
fell according to Derrida in his effort to bridge his two Critiques which Derrida
deftly avoids with his open corners or half-crochets letting the abyssal void
invade the work/text from the margins of his page and vice versa. The reference
to the lemma also indicates the lack of any examination on behalf of Kant be-
yond the concept of the frame as supplementary or parergonal while allowing
Derrida’s position to subtly emerge considering Kant’s aesthetics and all philo-
sophical treatises on aesthetics as having the tendency to overlook what they
consider as secondary in order to reach what they attempt to define as the es-
sence of a work of art. They move, one would say, from outside in, from what
they perceive as peripheral to what they understand as central.22 They move
from the frame into a frame, a trap. This movement from frame to trap and vice
versa, the conceptual, philosophical, metaphysical frame, trap, of viewing one
thing as internal and another as external, one as of substance and another as
irrelevant, being framed inside the frame is also the status quo of the passe-
partout as frame within the frame, but also that which Derrida tries to avoid
outlining the framework of his own analysis.23 Deconstructive theory should:
“neither reframe nor dream of the pure and simple absence of the frame. These two
apparently contradictory gestures are the very ones -and they are systematically indisso-
ciable- of what is here deconstructed” (TP, 73). So we could say that the frame
is not a frame (trap) but it is possible for one to be framed inside the/a frame.
Exactly as the word “frame” needs a specific framework for this discussion—
the frame needs framing so that one may not be framed. So re-framing in the
sense of making another frame, would frame (trap) the deconstructive effort; re-
framing would re-frame deconstruction. The aim of deconstruction is the frame
as a trap of western metaphysics and field of action of différance24 or, in other
words, framing western metaphysics through the frame. Consequently, it is the
trap of the frame that Derrida manages to avoid, into which, however, western
metaphysics and Kant’s third Critique has fallen. Ironically, the literal frame,
—————————
22 Derrida discusses this thoroughly in the final part of his book with the title “Restitutions,”
where he repeatedly asks the question of identity of the shoes depicted in Vincent van Gogh’s
painting drawing from the texts of Μartin Heidegger and Meyer Schapiro (TP, 255–382).
23 “To ask the question of truth is not without relevance here in the sense that one might well
conclude that Derrida has offered up the truth of Kant’s example; indeed the truth of exemplarity
as parergonality could be the last word of the matter: framed.” See Harvey, I. E. 2004 (1989).
“Derrida, Kant, and the Performance of Parergonality.” In: Derrida and Deconstruction. Silver-
man H. J. (Ed.). Taylor & Francis e-Library, 58–74.
24 See footnotes 19 and 20.
that of the painting that Kant25 comments on and the framework in which he
places the concept of the beautiful in his third Critique is a trap for his rationale
at least as it is viewed by Derrida.
ABYSSAL FRAME
Wills also analyses how Derrida has often referred to the relationship be-
tween the syntactic and the semantic nature of language through which the
graphicality and scriptural aspect of language come to the foreground as cohe-
sive or disruptive forces in a text.26 Those repeated abyssal blank spaces with
their corners in our case, is not the first figural or graphical reference in Derrida.
Glas27 may be the most obvious figurative and pictorial example of his writing.
So it is not coincidental that Derrida quotes himself from Glas at the beginning
of The Truth in Painting, asking the readers to imagine: “… the damage caused by
a theft which robbed you only of your frames, or rather of their joints, and of any possi-
bility of reframing your valuables or your art-objects)” (TP 18). As writing, text and
dialogue intrude the artwork, accordingly, every writing has its semantic-
syntactic and morpho-visual part. It consists of words, letters, shapes, forms,
fonts, open space and gaps. All the above have a material dimension, a kind of
aesthetic. Let us, however, move to another “material” example related to the
parergon literally and metaphorically.
Already in the introduction Derrida mentions that when he writes “four times
around painting” (TP, 9) in the four following chapters. He continues saying
that the thing unifying these parts (the same linking oeuvre with hors d’ oeuvre)
is the trait,28 characterized by dissemination and divisibility, found in the work,
the text, the traces and their remains. The trait is a recurrent element in Derri-
da’s work, as a notion but also as a function of iterability.29 Iterability we view
as the minimum of différance30 in the sense that it constitutes that which renders
—————————
25 See Kant, I. 2007, op. cit., 57.
26 Wills, D. 2001, op. cit., 114.
27 Derrida, J. 1986 (1974). Glas, Leavey, J. P. Jr., J. Rand (Trans.). Linconl–London:
University of Nebraska Press.

28 Here, the trait is a field not the verge or a course towards something.
29 The term appears in Limited Inc and is about the following paradox: in the moment of
conception and articulation of a concept, similarity and difference simultaneously coexist. See
Derrida, J. 1988. “Afterword: Toward an Ethic of Discussion.” In: Limited Inc, op. cit., 119.
There he examines iterability as a term of the linguistic act. Iterability implies that every
reiteration is a restatement, a posiibility to reform the same meaning. So, what is (re)iterated
(a (non)linguistic sign, written or spoken) may exist in endless possible environments (linguistic
or not, etc) that is, it may be (re)iterated as a sign—like we reiterate in quotes, or in our case in
“corners”—and in this way “inseminate/contaminate” the given field and possibly cause more
reiterations. This does not mean that the sign exists autonomously and independent of field but
that fields do not have what Derrida calls ancrage, and we could possibly translate into a point of
anchoring or a conceptual center.
30 Wills, D. 2001, op. cit., 121. For more on différance see footnotes 19 and 20.
it possible.31 The interesting thing is though that in the introduction to The Truth
in Painting, he develops the concept of the passe-partout as a “symbol” of the
space trait. Let us note that the passe-partout is not a key, able to change pos-
sessor and open various doors, but a mobile endo-frame,32 a frame inside the
frame. And since iterability—an element of which the trait is33—is a concept
used in the analysis of structural and conceptual aporias, it is now used in the
field of aesthetics as a passe-partout in order to question the role of the frame as
a limit and displace the notions regarding inside/outside-ness by which the
western metaphysics structure, delimitate and define the art object. So the frame
and the passe-partout are given a field, some space in which new areas could be
created, where meaning could be displaced, transformed or altered.34
As we briefly saw before, the abyss and its bridging is Kant’s initial and ul-
timate problem in his third Critique. Kant has to create a third frame/field to
unite the abyssally divided fields of nature and freedom. According to Derrida,
this bridge is swallowed by the abyss it attempts to cross. This abyssal space
indulges aporias, questions, iterability, and the renegotiation of relations in
terms of différance. We could perhaps support that as the aesthetic bridging of
the first two Critiques of Kant submerges, Derrida’s passe-partout—or its ra-
tionale—re-emerges in his texts as a field of renegotiation of the notions he
discusses. And if we consider the abyss between notions, philosophical frames
as well as the possibility of iterability as “given” we will not be surprised to find
the abyss in more of his works.35
To return closer to our subject, wherever there is an abyss, there is also the
"demarcation/framing" of the abyss, rudimentary of course. Between the work
—————————
31 “The concept of iterability is the singular concept that renders possible the silhouette of
ideality, and hence of the concept, and hence of all distinction, of all conceptual opposition“
(Derrida, J. 1988, op. cit., 119). From this aspect it is possible to find traces of iterability in many
parts of The Truth in Painting. For example, in the phrase “I owe you the truth in painting and
I will tell it to you” (TP, 2) Derrida spots and describes at least four re-iterations four “meanings”:
restoring or revealing the truth (“aletheia”), truth as related to a model (“adæquatio”); truth as
presented or represented through art and finally what is true about or in relevance to art (TP, 5–8).
32 From the ancient Greek “ένδοv,” inside.
33 If we accept about the trait that “Its divisibility founds texts, traces and remains” (TP, 11).
Then iterability gives the possibility of this divisibility as a possibility of reiteration as does
perhaps, différance. See Derrida, J., 1988, op. cit., 71.
34
“This partition of the edge is perhaps what is inscribed and occurs everywhere [se passe
partout] in this book; and the protocol-frame is endlessly multiplied in it, from lemmata to
parerga, from exergues to cartouches. Starting with the idiom of the passe-partout” (TP, 7). We
can also draw connections between the passe partout and the term “undecidability” used in his
political and ethical texts working similarly in polital and ethical matters as in our case the passe-
partout does in aesthetic matters. See Derrida, J. 2002. “Force of Law: The ‘Mystical Foundation
of Authority’.” In: Acts of Religion, Anidjar, G. (Ed.). New York: Routledge, 228–298, on
“undecidability” see 66–72.
35 In The Politics of Friendship Derrida analyzes the abyss extending between two different
beings by elaborating on the phrase “tout autre est tout autre.” See Derrida, J. 1997. The Politics
of Friendship. Collins, G. (Trans.). London: Verso, 232.
of art and the "exogenous" elements surrounding it, however, the abyss (passe-
partout, frame) remains to negotiate correlations. It still stands as a space of
différance where all parts inside and outside of the frame, all fields are dis-
placed and their position and relation to one another is re-decided. In this abys-
sal void the meanings of terms are dispersed, disseminated.36
This allows us to close our sizeable parenthesis and return to the trait which
as Derrida claims, “links” the parts of his book. This trait is, as he reveals, the
passe-partout. The passe-partout is a space, a field: a movable structure that
allows the work to reveal itself without forming a strict frame—perhaps a pre-
frame, a frame inside the frame:
“Without ceasing (that goes without saying) to space itself out, it plays its
card or its cardboard between the frame, in what is properly speaking its in-
ternal edge, and the external edge of what it gives us to see, lets or makes
appear in its empty enclosure: the picture, the painting, the figure, the form,
the system of strokes [traits] and of colors. […] The internal edges of
a passe-partout are often beveled” (TP, 12–13).
Before we return to the analysis of the parergon and the corners, I would like
to refer to the intended remark of the passe-partout’s inclining internal edges.
Inclination is a condition that facilitates diffusion between fields on a practical
level but also allows the crossing of concepts between fields—from work/ergon,
to passe-partout, to frame, title, signature, museum, archive, representation,
conversation, market and vice versa. It allows, facilitates, or causes the insemi-
nation, multiplication and creation of meanings and new fields, signs, environ-
ments—it renders iterability and dissemination possible.37
CORNERS
What is also of interest for our case is that Derrida acknowledges the pro-
found references and symbolisms of the idiom of painting38 both in general but
also in particular as we can see from his remarks on Valerio Adami’s draw-
—————————
36 Derrida quotes himself from the Dissemination: “We are in an unequal chiasmus […]
According to the X (the chiasmus ) (which can always, hastily, be thought of as the thematic
drawing of dissemination), the preface, as semen, can just as well remain, produce and lose itself
as seminal difference, […] Hors livre,” (TP, 166) and further: “Always a box in the box, […],
a parergon, […] Always a box outside the box” (TP, 231); see Derrida, J., 1981. Dissemination.
Johnson, B. (Trans.). London: The Athlone Press.
37 Since the passe-partout is (a) trait, on page 11 of The Truth in Painting, he mentions that he
writes “four times around painting” following the distinctions of the trait thus the framings of the
passe-partout (through which meaning flows from the inside of the work outwards and vice
versa).
38 In the sense that when painting, there is a new system formed, using different materials than
the ones of language but still functioning at a somehow linguistic level.

ings—which the latter has produced inspired by Glas. Derrida follows them
successfully not because they refer to or draw from his work, but mostly be-
cause they materially form, in a way, the ideas he addresses. We could support
that they share a common search concerning the frame but they actualize it us-
ing “different” languages, tools, i.e. linguistic and philosophical in one case and
material or painterly in the other. Still, this cannot be absolute since both make
use of the other’s means to reach their result. Even if Derrida’s result is written
and Adami’s visual,39 they coexist in a chiasmus: the written philosophical work
includes clear visual elements (that is the images and the corners with their
gaps) while Adami’s visual includes written philosophical parts (Derrida’s cita-
tion and signature and a visualised philosophical reflection on the frame and the
limit of the visual).
After this brief reference to Adami I would like to mention that in the field
of visual arts, various artists have dealt with the theme of emptiness, the void,
the abyss and the blank surface using various means and techniques.40 The vast
variety of means, materials and approaches to the subject reveal and highlight
the immeasurable ways in which someone may chose to create a visual, artistic
result on just a single idea or concept.41 After this brief mention and having
—————————
39 As in “visual art.”
40 Various artists have chosen to “fill” the empty space (of the room, the canvas, of time,
silence etc) in order to underline the emptiness, the void or the abyssal. Here however, I have
chosen to mention cases in which the visual result is closer to blankness or emptiness (concerning
space, material, time, etc.) as it facilitates the analogy I am trying to draw with Derrida’s corners.
41 I have to apologize for the brief, superficial mention of the artworks but there could not be
a further discussion due to lack of space. By plane apposition of facts, without keeping chronolog-
ical order and without specific explanations and commentaries we can refer to: 1) Yves Klein and
his exhibition in Iris Clert gallery in 1958, where (to put it rather naively) he exhibited the actual
gallery space. He entitled the exhibition “La spécialisation de la sensibilité à l’état matière prem-
ière en sensibilité picturale stabilisée, Le Vide.” As Klein put it, the exhibition was intended to be
a “space of Blue sensibility.” See Stich, S. 1994. Yves Klein. London: Hayward Gallery, Stuttgart:
Cantz Verlag, (Exhibition Catalogue), 133. For the exhibitions see: http://www.yveskleinarchives.
org/documents/bio_us.html. Accessed February 11, 2016. For Klein’s Manifesto; http://www.
yveskleinarchives.org/documents/chelsea_us.html. Accessed February 11, 2016). The Manifesto
can also be found in print in: Riout, D. 2004. Yves Klein, Manifester l’immatériel, Paris: Gal-
limard. 2) Andy Warhol who exhibited in 1985 the “Invisible Sculpture” which consists of a
plain, “empty”, white pedestal, or block like the ones used to place sculptures on, next to which
the artist stood shortly. http://www.modernedition.com/art-articles/absence-in-art/the-invisible-
artwork.html Accessed February 11, 2016. 3) The work “1000 Hours of Staring” of Tom Fried-
man, which consists of a simple white square, an empty, blank piece of paper which the artist
periodically stared upon within a timespan of five years—between 1992 and 1997. Materials used
by the artist: “stare on paper” 82,6 x 82,6 cm. Image at: http://www.moma.org/collection/
works/114939?locale=en. Accessed February 11, 2016. By the same artist there is also the invisi-
ble sculpture “Untitled (A Curse)”, exhibited in Saachi Gallery in 1992. See image 8 at:
http://www.saatchigallery.com/aipe/tom_friedman.htm. Accessed February 11, 2016. 4) Also the
“Erased de Kooning Drawing” which in 1953, during his early career, Robert Rauschenberg
made, now owned by the San Fransisco MoMA. Image at:https://www.sfmoma.org/artwork/
98.298. Accessed February 11, 2016. 5) The work “Live-Taped Video Corridor” of Bruce Nau-
man, exhibited in Annual Exhibition: Contemporary American Sculpture in Whitney Museum,
gone through elemental notions found in The Truth in Painting I will attempt
the perhaps unthinkable act of justifying the gaps and the half-crochets of the
“Parergon” in terms of visual art.
At this point I would like us to return to the blank space that Derrida rudi-
mentarily “defines” or “delineates” and for us now “pseudo-frames” throughout
the first chapter—rudimentarily, because the corners are open and the sides
nonexistent. However, as a visual artist would put it, what we are taught in the
academies of fine arts is that we do not have to necessarily de-sribe something
with the utmost detail and precision in order to make a visual or artistic refer-
ence. In Derrida’s case, for example, all it takes is two open corners just to
New York, in 1970, where the viewer can see him/herself monitored live while walking along an
empty corridor. Image at: http://www.guggenheim.org/new-york/collections/collection-online/
artwork/3153. Accessed February 11, 2016. Or “Room with My Soul Left Out, Room That Does
Not Care,” by the same artist, in 1984, part of the permanent collection of Staatliche Museen zu
Berlin, Nationalgalerie, a large scale empty architectural sculpture in which the viewer may stand
or walk. Image at: http://www.smb.museum/en/museums-and-institutions/hamburger-bahnhof/
exhibitions/ausstellung-detail/bruce-nauman.html. Accessed February 11, 2016. 6) Tehching
Hsieh who between 1986 and 1999 created the “Thirteen Year Plan,” for which he would produce
art in the following thirteen years, but never publically exhibit, thus going through thirteen “emp-
ty” years of public artistic activity. He started on his 36th birthday (Dec. 31st 1986) and continues
until his 49th birthday (Dec. 31st , 1999). His report on January, 1st 2000 was: “I kept myself
alive. I passed the December 31st, 1999.” More at: http://www.tehchinghsieh.com/. Image in
section “artworks” 1986–1999, Accessed February 11, 2016. 7) Yayoi Kusama who exhibited
“Obliteration Room” in Queensland Art Gallery for the first time in 2002. A large scale interac-
tive installation resembling an interior domestic space (with the difference that it is completery
white) on which the viewer can stick various colorful round stickers and thus obliterate the empty
surface. The artwork was re-exhibited in 2011 and 2015. http://interactive.qag.qld.gov.au/ look-
nowseeforever/works/obliteration_room/. Accessed February 11, 2016. 8) There have also been
some exhibitions dealing with this emptiness and the void in art. In 2012 the exhibition “Invisible:
Art about the Unseen 1957–2012,” in Hayward Gallery, London, in which Andy Warhol’s “In-
visible Sculpture,” and Tom Friedman’s “1000 Hours of Staring” mentioned above, were part of.
Image at: http://www.southbankcentre.co.uk/find/hayward-gallery-and-visual-arts/0/tickets/ invis-
ible-67209. Accessed February 11, 2016. 9) We also perhaps have to mention the practice of
graffiti and its possibly peregonal position in the art world. Whether it is the case of “vandalism,”
(unpermitted intervention on a private or public surface usually in the urban environment) or it is
the case of permitted, commissioned visual interventions in public space (included in a frame-
work of aesthetically improving the urban surroundings), graffiti still is received and perceived
atypically. Even after its growing status it is rarely acknowledged as an art form, thus remaining
“outside of the frame,” or maybe exactly on the frame, at best considered something ornamental.
In a very interesting study on graffiti Rafael Schacter presents it as the parergon of the urban
canvas, with graffiti artists creating the parergonal frame in which the city’s inhabitants, experi-
ence the urban. See: Schacter, R. 2014. Ornament and Order: Graffiti, Street Art and the Parer-
gon. Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate Publishing Limited. For the connections between graffiti and
parergon see page 222 and for more on the urban canvas see pages 19, 106, 181. 10) Finally,
returning to our “frame,” we can also mention the 2015 exhibition in National Gallery of London,
focused on “Sansovino” frames (term describing rather elaborate early Baroque frames, named
after the architect and sculptor Jacopo Sansovino). The exhibition highlights that the frames of
artworks can be considered as autonomous works of art, coming to the foreground and demanding
their “proper” position in the history of art. More at: http://www.nationalgallery.org.
uk/sansovino-frames. Accessed February 11, 2016.
assume four closed corners and another four sides, to finally refer to a frame,
even if that may be a “pseudo-frame”—something which he seems to be aware
of, of course. In our text a “corner” appears at the end of a half line and after
a few blank lines (which are actually not lines but blank space even though we
assume lines just because we read the text in lines) its “opposite twin” appears
at the beginning of another line. Thus we have the example of a (different from
the lemma) space, an abyss or the void, the blank space of difference or diffé-
rance produced by a lemma (as a theme or a frame in the sense of framework)
a visualized space of the vast, abyssal, conceptual field opened by a lemma.
So what do these vertical and horizontal lines -that never touch but compel
us to assume corners without them existing- do? This gap between them is small
and at the same time abyssal because it remains unbridgeable, with the aesthetic
that these corners and lines attempt to frame (i.e. the third Critique) flowing
out of its pseudo-frame, to the parergon, or better, to all space that these small
lines do not occupy: assuming all in-between blank space of the work, the
parergon, the surrounding space, the text, the blank space around the text,
the surface on which we read it, etc. One could support that these corners are
framing the blank space or the void but also the text, separating its parts,
remaining open, with their corners unclosed, so that they turn into simple lines,
traits, traces—visual, painterly and conceptual—which Derrida repeatedly
mentions in his text. Or we could with reference to Kant, take it a step further,
opening these “corners” of the frame of the abyss even more, covering philoso-
phy and art, making the work of art part of the abyss ant the abyss part of the
artwork.42
Reading The Truth in Painting and taking notes on the sides of the page,
I realized that for some reason I did not “violate” these blank spaces, at least
at first, somehow having the urge to respect this space as part of the “body”
of the text. The reader usually writes “para to ergo,” parergonically, on the
margins. So what do these frames with their open corners do? Do they
“re-frame” the abyss? Do they leave space for the reader? Is all this a simple
illustration of the idea of the writer? Is it a morpho-graphic reference or perhaps
even art? Is it the abyss or a satire of the abyss?43 Do these blank spaces have
“depth” or are they condemned to remain on the flatness of paper, the two di-
mensions of its white surface? What is it that escapes these corners and straight
—————————
42 “Philosophy, which in this book has to think art through art in general and fine art—as a part
of its field or of its edifice, is here representing itself as a part of its part: philosophy as an art of
architecture. It represents itself, it detaches itself, detaches from itself a proxy, a part of itself
beside itself in order to think the whole, to saturate or heal over the whole that suffers from
detachment. The philosophy of art presupposes an art of philosophizing, a major art, but also
a miner’s art in its critical preliminaries, an architect’s art in its edifying erection. […] The desire
of reason would be a fundamental desire, a desire for the fundamental, a desire to go to the
bythos” (TP, 40–41).
43 In the first subchapter of “Parergon” Derrida starts by saying: “It’s enough to say: abyss and
satire of the abyss” (TP, 17).

lines? Derrida’s corners may be allowing the abyss to surge. One can imagine it
flowing out of the book, “contaminating” the margins, the desk, the room, the
whole surrounding space and area with the white blank space of the visualized
abyss covering all surfaces and each of the small horizontal and vertical lines of
the “corners” floating.
I agree with Wills that these corners with the multiplicity of the possibilities
that they open and the abyss with which they coexist may be the most character-
istic example of Derrida’s figural writing.44 Here he does not handle the text in
an illustrative, visual manner, leaving the typography and the set up of the page
illustrate the idea but he rather visualizes. Even better however, we could say
that he treats the blank space, the void or the abyss in an almost painterly man-
ner; he frames the void as a visual artist would do; he makes a visual comment
on the framing of the abyss. He does not strictly illustrate and that is because in
the visual arts illustration usually has “negative,” connotations and is mostly
linked to explaining an idea through image in an almost didactic manner, ex-
plaining, that is, a concept through imagery. Derrida does not seem to aim at
a didactic or explanatory result. Besides the visualization of the abyss in a par-
ergonal manner cannot be used to explain or teach since it occupies space being
a field itself—yet a field of encounter rather than confirmation. Derrida himself
mentions the random illustrations used in his first chapter, showing that he
acknowledges the difference between illustrating and making an artistic visual
choice:
“The first version was not accompanied by any ‘illustrative’ exhibition. Here
it is different. But in this first chapter or quarter-book, the iconography has
not the same purpose as in the three following it, where the writing seems to
refer to the ‘picture.’ Here, a certain illustrative detachment, without refer-
ence, without title or legitimacy, comes as if to ‘illustrate,’ in place of orna-
ment, the unstable tapas of ornamentality. Or in other words, to ‘illustrate,’ if
that is possible, the parergon” (TP, 16).
These parerga which he mentions here are images “para to ergo,” with the
work but rather next to it. So as work we would consider Derrida’s written phil-
osophical text and those images as parergon; since they do not refer to the text
neither does the text to them. Those images, however, are not irrelevant to the
subject of the text even though parergonically placed among the pages; they are
just chosen as to not strictly refer to it. So what is the role of these pictures, if
there is such a thing? It would be perhaps acceptable to support that they are
borrowed representations to Derrida’s argument concerning what Kant defines
as excess or ornament in the aesthetically beautiful or in a work of art (columns
of buildings, frames of paintings and clothes of statues that we mentioned be-
—————————
44 Wills, D., 2001, op. cit.
fore). Those images are examples of works of art that Kant would consider im-
balanced, because of what he considers as ornamental excess. The interesting
part with this apposition of images is, though, that Derrida’s corners and blank
spaces are considered to be part of the work, the ergon, not the parergon. They
are part of the work without being text. So we return to the question: What is
happening with his multiple re-framed abyssal blank spaces? And we should
also note that those spaces are not that few—there are sixty three of them (TP,
17–147).45
As long as these blank spaces are part of the text, even without being text or
tracing writing within them, they constitute work. Four straight lines are traced
resembling corners with blank space between and around them, but their trac-
ing, their writing is pictorial, visual not linguistic—their graphḗ 46 is graphic.
The work, or at least what Derrida sketchily defines as work beyond the use of
language, makes use of these corners and these blank spaces; it makes use of
what a visual artist would commonly characterize as an image even though it is
utterly minimalistic in its synthetic and material elements.
Derrida shapes corners and lets the reader (rather a reader-viewer) to wander
about the pages of his text, reading-viewing the repeated blank spaces, wondering
about them, writing around them, inside them, on them, interacting with them. It
is also possible to ignore them as it would be possible to ignore a work of art that
does not draw the viewer’s attention in an exhibition, passing by it, to gaze at
something else. Or, if we consider these abyssal blank spaces as an ensemble
framing or accompanying the text or the opposite, the viewer could ignore that
detail in the work (the corners and their free spaces, the small straight lines, the
field they attempt to frame, the white of the page surrounding the lines and letters,
etc) and deal with what is considered of “essence” in a book, the text. In which
way would it be possible to better draw, or rather visually render in the given
space of a piece of paper in a book, typographically, the abyss and the parergon?
We could perhaps support that Derrida, writing about the parergon (granting
it a new place next to the work) and the abyss (leaving it unbridgeable and in
diffusion in both conceptual and visual level), produces work—not only philo-
sophical work with the deconstruction of an onto-theological47 consideration of
the work of art- but also produces a paradox of a visual shape using the mini-
mum of the visual unit: four small straight lines and the blank white space of the
printed book, all meticulously placed.
However, the most important clue to the way in which the blank abyssal
spaces are employed may be revealed by Derrida himself when commenting on
Kant. There, he spots parts which are parentheses, notes or supplements (neither
—————————
45 Subchapter ΙΙ, “The Parergon” starts with just the bottom left corner (without the top right
corner being left open in the end of the first subchapter), (TP, 36–37).
46 From the Greek “γραφή,” writing, way or procedure of writing or something written.
47 See TP 29–30, where there is reference to the onto-theological viewing of the work of art as
this is formed by Heidegger.

part of the work nor outside of it) concluding that Kant’s work is full of parerga.
Even the part where Kant refers to parerga is parergonal.48 The parergon, the
secondary work, which works beside and under the main work, has already
made its way to the rationale of Kant’s third Critique.
So we could wonder if here lies the function of Derrida’s abyssal spaces and
their corners. Maybe, since the photographs are an attempt to illustrate the parer-
gon, then these empty spaces are “inside” the work, part of it but inside as parer-
gonal parentheses. The case may be that these blank spaces and the corners are
parerga in or of a work in which the parergon has managed to glide into: in which
case the corners and the spaces are parenthetical and parergonal endo-erga49 in
a work that allows the abyss to flow almost unframed, un-bridged, recognizing
that within the plethora of heterogeneity and conceptual dispersion or diaspora an
effort to frame would be meaningless. These “corners” insist on floating, in
a way, visually, artistically and conceptually since they touch nothing, not even
each other, but they are printed on white paper along with a ton of letters. They
treat however in a visual manner what this ton of letters compiling a text analyses
in a philosophical manner. As Derrida wrote four times around painting, he paint-
ed or wrote four times, or four lines around blank space and the abyss.
CONCLUSION
As we come to an end, I would say that Derrida using each time four straight
lines and blank space has created an image that does not symbolize or illustrate,
but visualizes the abyss, the impossibility of framing it, the deconstructive and
deconstructed frame which tries to re-define it, as well as a sense of field, sus-
pension dissemination and void. I personally consider such a visual result as one
which can only be viewed artistically. Besides, it constitutes an intentional
choice; it has been placed there by the author, created by him and of course it
has been meticulously and strategically placed in the chapter renegotiating the
Kantian abyss and deconstructing the limits of the work of art through its very
frame. Furthermore, the frame is recurrent as all deconstructive terms in Derri-
da’s work are while simultaneously being characterized by them. It can be ana-
lyzed that is in their terms (terms of metaphysics of presence, différance, aporia,
undecidability, trace, trait, iterability, dissemination of meaning and so forth).
I thus conclude that Derrida managed, in a sense, to both bring together and
disintegrate or deconstruct the work of art which conceptually is an assembly of
ideas and meanings that disperse: he managed to analyze those ideas and con-
cepts deconstructing, through the text, western metaphysics as it has been
formed in the field of aesthetics, but also to create a painting, an image, a work
—————————
48 The analysis continues with many interesting problems in Kant’s syllogism on the distinction
between the inside and the outside of the artwork but also between form and matter (TP, 55–56).
49 From the ancient Greek “ένδοv,” inside.
as an “effect” of those concepts. He managed with this work to create “two”

works: write his inexhaustible and fluent text and draw the “sovereign silence”
of the unframable abyss.
ABBREVIATION
ΤΡ — Derrida, J. 1987. The Truth in Painting. Bennington, G. I. McLeod (Trans.). London—

Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
REFERENCES
Derrida, J. 1988. “Afterword: Toward an Ethic of Discussion.” In: Limited Inc. Weber, S.,
J. Mehlman (Trans.). Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 111–154.
–––– . 1981. Dissemination. Johnson, B. (Trans.). London: The Athlone Press.
–––– . 2002. “Force of Law: The ‘Mystical Foundation of Authority’.” In: Acts of Religion.
Anidjar, G. (Ed.). New York: Routledge, 228–298.
–––– . 1986. Glas. Leavey, J. P. Jr., R. Rand (Trans. Eds.). Linconl–London: University of
Nebraska Press.
–––– . 1988. “Limited Inc a b c.” In Limited Inc. Weber, S., J. Mehlman (Trans., Eds.). Evanston:
Northwestern University Press, 29–110.
–––– . 1981. “Semiology and Grammatology (Interview with Julia Kristeva).” In: Positions. Bass,
A. (Trans., Ed.). Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
–––– . 1997. The Politics of Friendship. Collins, G. (Trans.). London: Verso.
–––– . 1978. Writing and Difference. Bass, A. (Trans.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Harvey, I. E. 2004. “Derrida, Kant, and the Performance of Parergonality.” In: Derrida and De-
construction. Silverman, H. J. (Ed.). Taylor & Francis e-Library.
Kant, Ι. 2007. Critique of Judgment. Meredith, J. C. (Trans.). Oxford University Press.
Mariner, R. 2002. “Derrida and the Parergon.” In: A Companion to Art Theory. Smith, P., C.
Wilde (Eds). Blackwell (UK), 349–359.
Parkes, M. B., 1992. Pause and Effect: An Introduction to the History of Punctuation in the West,
London: Scolar Press.
Riout, D., 2004. Yves Klein, Manifester l’immatériel. Paris: éditions Gallimard.
Schacter, R. 2014. Ornament and Order: Graffiti, Street Art and the Parergon. Farnham: Ashgate
Publishing Limited.
Shakespeare, W. 2005. Hamlet. Jenkins, H. (Ed.). London: The Ardent Shakespeare.
Stich, S., 1994. Yves Klein. London, Hayward Gallery, Stuttgart, Cantz Verlag (exhibition cata-
logue).
Wills, D., 2001. “Derrida and Aesthetics: Lemming (Reframing the Abyss).” In: Jacques Derrida
and the Humanities: A Critical Reader. Cohen, J. (Ed.). Cambridge University Press (UK),
108–130.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR — Visual artist, BA graduate of the Faculty of English

Language and Literature of National and Kapodistrian University of Athens. She also
holds a BA in Visual Arts from Athens School of Fine Arts and has received an MPhil
in Philosophy from National and Kapodistrian University of Athens. Her research inter-
ests mostly include narration and deconstructive theory. She has participated in confer-
ences, seminars, workshops and has taken part in group exhibitions and performances.
No. 3/2017
Elçin Marasli
ORANGE ALTERNATIVE AT THE CONVERGENCE OF PLAY,

PERFORMANCE AND AGENCY
Can you treat a police officer seriously, when

he is asking you the question: “Why did you
participate in an illegal meeting of dwarfs?”
Waldemar Fydrych
Manifesto of Socialist Surrealism (1980)
ABSTRACT
By observing the mediating role of Pomarańczowa Alternatywa (Orange Alterna-

tive), the Polish artistic-activist formation of the 80s and 90s, this paper aims to deter-
mine the properties, values and ideals that make a piece of art a public act that can
engage people from different social groups in play, and can allow them to reveal their
self-determining agency in light of social change. Within the system of varying degrees
of social permission, art should allow for the transition from the realm of the “unoffi-
cial” to the realm of the “forbidden,” and should facilitate a transformation from the
realm of thought to the realm of action. Art introduces an element of play into the
sphere of collective behavior, and is a bridge over dichotomous social and political
forces.
Keywords: Orange Alternative, play, agency, performativity, performance art, the
public sphere, social activism, values and ideals in art.
ORANGE ALTERNATIVE AT THE CONVERGENCE OF PLAY,

PERFORMANCE AND AGENCY
In this paper, I present a discussion on the Polish artistic-activist formation,

Pomarańczowa Alternatywa (Orange Alternative) as an important example of
social activism that can mediate between public spheres by use of forms of ar-
tistic play and agency. My discussion on Orange Alternative also aims to exam-
116 Elçin Marasli
ine the problem of performance art in the context of the Habermasian public
sphere and the post-Habermasian counter-publics. Inspired by the definition of
art as a certain kind of “performance” with a “specific focus of appreciation,”1
I turn to the case of Orange Alternative with the intention to answer a few other
related questions: What can the contemporary public sphere learn from the leg-
acy of this group? Did their artistic legacy deal with transforming the public
sphere, or did it remain a performative force of counter-publics? How can their
legacy transform the contemporary public sphere today?2
I begin to evaluate the Orange Alternative group in the context similar to
that introduced in Elzbieta Matynia’s treatment of the Polish Solidarity move-
ment, i.e. as a “difficult to categorize” social movement that, however, allowed
for “the rebirth of civil society,” and that empowered the “agency of self-
determining citizens.”3 I suggest that Orange Alternative represents an artistic-
performative genre that blends the notion of free play with the agency of the
artist in order to give citizens a self-determining autonomy. I also evaluate the
Orange Alternative movement in the context of Matynia’s more recent perspec-
tive, which reflects upon to the historical approaches by Jűrgen Habermas, Hen-
ri Lefebvre and Guy Debord. I intend to highlight the movement’s relevance to
both the contemporary and historical forms of political protest around the world
today.
Various samizdat and peculiar techniques employed by Orange Alternative
suggest that the group had more to do with counter-publics than with transform-
ing the public sphere itself. The group stood at a point of merging the public
sphere with the counter-publics. The social transformative change made possi-
ble by Orange Alternative is parallel to the transition from the Habermasian
bourgeois public-sphere to the voice of the subordinate groups, from the salons
to the streets. Moreover, such a change offers new forms of solidarity and bond-
ing, resulting from a collective experience of being marginalized.
A BRIDGE OVER DICHOTOMIES
The Orange Alternative movement is, in my view, a considerable artistic

victory over the communist regime. Led by its founder and visual artist, Wal-
demar Fydrych, members of Orange Alternative resorted to graffiti, happenings
and samizdat. Those events were frequently studied and referenced by sociolo-
—————————
1 Davies, D. 2004. Art as Performance. Oxford: Blackwell.
2 Davies defines artwork as “a performance that specifies a focus of appreciation,” cf. Davies,
D. 2004, op. cit., 151. He focuses on the ontological question of what makes art art. In this re-
gard, Davies suggests the main constituent elements are structure and context. On the other hand,
I aim to determine a few other constituent variables such as the properties, values and ideals that
make a piece of art art, and also, potentially, a socially engaging public act.
3 Matynia, E. 2001. “The Lost Treasure of Solidarity.” Social Research, 68, 4.
Orange Alternative at the Convergence of Play, Performance and Agency 117
gists, anthropologists, art historians, etc. throughout the movement’s active

years. With roots in Dada and Surrealism, the group’s underground campaign
ridiculed the social and political condition of the Eastern European situation in
the 80s and 90s.4 The group initially started painting dwarves on walls that had
been freshly painted to cover up anti-government slogans. Waldemar Major
Fydrych and Wiesław Cupała painted the first dwarf in 1982, on one of the resi-
dential buildings in the Biskupin neighborhood of Wrocław.5 The action soon
sparked interest, resulted in more than a thousand dwarf graffiti in Polish cities,
eventually led to the arrest of several members, and certainly raised the group to
the public forefront.6
Even though Orange Alternative is commonly considered standing to the left
of the Solidarity movement, it is recognized by various scholars as a bridge across
the state and the public, as well as the Party and the Solidarity group.7 For those
who make far-distance observations on Communist Poland, the spectrum of
recognition is quite narrow. Stereotypically, the actors involved are always oppos-
ing parties, i.e. the state and the church, the Party and Solidarity, or the state and
society etc. Contrary to this mainstream image, the Orange Alternative movement
bridges the gap between the dichotomous social and political forces, enriches the
sphere of criticism, and introduces a “new quality into the sphere of collective
behavior.”8 This is precisely why Orange Alternative should be considered an
important case of social mediator between different public spheres.
FROM THE SALONS TO THE STREETS; THE UNOFFICIAL

TO THE FORBIDDEN
To elaborate on the role of Orange Alternative as a mediator between differ-

ent social groups in Poland, I briefly review the historical structural transfor-
mation of the public sphere. Habermas’s key text, “Structural Transformation of
the Public Sphere” (1962), deals with the commercialization of cultural rela-
tions via the social transition from culture-debating to culture-consuming, hence
—————————
4 The Official Website of Orange Alternative. Last accessed 14 September 2016; http://
www.pomaranczowa-alternatywa.org/
5 Fydrych, W. 2014. Lives of the Orange Men—A Biographical History of the Polish Orange
Alternative Movement. With a foreword by The Yes Men; http:// www.minorcompositions.info/

?page_id=24
6 Ibid.
7 Misztal, B. 1992. “Between the State and Solidarity: One Movement, Two Interpretations—
The Orange Alternative Movement in Poland,” The British Journal of Sociology, 43, 1, 55–78;
Chesters, G., I. Welsh. 2005. “Complexity and Social Movement: Process and Emergence in
Planetary Action Systems.” Theory, Culture and Society, 22, 5, 144. “Poland’s ‘Orange
Alternative,’ a color distinct from both socialist red and Papal yellow, engaged in an extended
communal party deploying street theatre and iconic acts such as banner drops. Orange Alternative
became a focal point of conversation across Poland.”
8 Misztal, B. 1992, op. cit., 58.
118 Elçin Marasli
from rational-critical debate to consumerist behavior.9 Another major contribu-

tion by Habermas is his recognition of the term “public.” The public is for him
different from the state, the marketplace, and the rather private sphere of family.
However, this Habermasian distinction between the “public” and the “private”
is embedded with a rather “problematic principle of generality,” which results in
the exclusion of minority groups from entering into the ideally shared space of
the public sphere, as Negt and Kluge argue.10 Precisely, this problematic be-
comes an entry point for future studies on the public sphere and its exclusion of
certain groups (“proletarian public sphere,”11 the “counter-publics,”12 as well as
the “subaltern” and “subordinate” groups13).
The opening of the public sphere to the street begins with developing a new
understanding of the relationship between everyday social production and the
individual experiences of each different social group. As soon as these counter-
publics can begin to tolerate difference and heterogeneity within their own bor-
ders, they will be able to form an operational mechanism that can challenge the
existing power structures of exclusion. This is precisely the discursive endeav-
or, the process of bonding and the alliance formation that the notion of the sub-
ordinate counter-publics operates upon. Hence, the notion of counter-publics is
a rather modern phenomenon, which offers new forms of solidarity and bonding
resulting from a collective experience of being excluded and marginalized.
Orange Alternative is a unique example of precisely this form of kinship and
solidarity among marginalized groups, formed to overcome their marginaliza-
tion. Originally coined in reference to the Solidarity movement, the definition of
“Aristotelian friendship in times of cultural crisis” by Michael Walzer, can be
understood in the context of acts of performative action as transgressive. Like-
wise, the best entryway into discussing the position of Orange Alternative in
engaging the counter-publics via kinship and solidarity is to evaluate the signif-
icance of the notion of play. Thus, this notion motivates a change from the
realm of personal thought to the realm of collective action. It is also the act
through which things evolve from the unofficial to the illegal and the forbidden.
It is reasonable to identify—following Elżbieta Matynia—the Orange Alter-
native movement as a social development in the realm of forbidden action.
Matynia interestingly presents a system of varying degrees of social permission:
“In terms of the regime’s policies vis-a-vis the population, one can distinguish
four kinds of citizen engagement or initiative: the preferred and rewarded; the
—————————
9 Habermas, J. 1965. The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into
a Category of Bourgeois Society. The MIT Press, 159.

10 Kluge, A, O. Negt. 1993. Public Sphere and Experience: Toward and Analysis of the Bour-
geois and Proletarian Public. Minneapolis–London: University of Minnesota Press.

11 Ibid.
12 Warner, M. 2002. Publics and CounterPublics. Zone Books.
13 Fraser, N. 1990. “Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually
Existing Democracy.” Social Text, 25/26.

permitted, but limited; unofficial; forbidden.”14 Thus, the shift from the unoffi-
cial to the forbidden is a gradual shift from a realm of dialogue to a realm of
action. Orange Alternative represents this shift via happenings and actions that
engage the counter-publics with the notion of play, and allow them to reveal
their autonomous agency in using action and dialogue interchangeably.
THE NOTION OF PLAY AND THE RIGHT TO THE CITY
In the case of Orange Alternative, the notion of play is represented by

a combination of artistic and political social acts. Likewise, the two historical
examples of artistic and political play I refer to here are considered among the
driving forces behind the 1968 student uprisings in France. The artistic version
of play employed by Orange Alternative members is closest to the notion “dé-
rive” utilized by the Situationist International (SI) and Guy Debord, in particu-
lar. “A mode of experimental behavior linked to the conditions of urban society:
a technique of rapid passage through varied ambiances. The term also desig-
nates a specific uninterrupted period of dériving.”15 The SI’s definition of the
“dérive” deals with the notion of play by associating it with the city space. Re-
ferring to urban space as a “site of play with psychogeographical effects,”
Debord’s notion of the dérive is among the pioneering modern-day artistic at-
tempts at directly working with the city as a site for play.16
Henri Lefebvre’s approach to art and art’s capacity to fulfill the need for
play in social space is worth mentioning here, especially because his view sug-
gests an integration of the notion of play as a right to all inhabitants of the city.
By borrowing from “The Production of Space” (1974), we understand that
“[social] space is a [social] product […] the further claim [is] that the space
thus produced also serves as a tool of thought and of action; that in addition
to being a means of production it is also a means of control, and hence of
domination, or power; yet […] it escapes in part from those who would
make use of it.”17
Lefebvre formulates the right to the city as a transformed and renewed right
to urban life, thus presuming an integrated theory of the city and urban life. To
do this at best, Lefebvre suggests using resources of science and art. He sug-
gests that art in particular brings to the realization of urban society “its long
meditation on life as drama and pleasure.”18 “Oeuvre,” in Lefebvre’s terms,
—————————
14 Matynia, E. 2001, op. cit., 920–922.
15 Definitions of SI terms, SI online; http://www.cddc.vt.edu/sionline/si/definitions.html
16 Debord, G. 1956. “Theory of the Dérive.” In: Les Lèvres Nues, 9.
17 Lefebvre, H. 1974. “The Production of Space.” Nicholson-Smith, D (Trans.). Blackwell, 26.
18 Lefebvre, H. 1996. “The Right to the City.” In: Writings on Cities. Kofman, E., E. Lebas
(Eds., Trans.). Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 157–158.

120 Elçin Marasli
corresponds to “the need for creative activity, information, the imaginary, and
most curiously, the need for play.”19 Lefebvre recognizes art’s special ability to
redefine the meaning of “oeuvre” by giving it “multiple facets of appropriated
time and space.” Thus, art and the history of art are a part of a meditation on the
urban, and any social force (i.e. the state) should aim at creating urban society
in the form of an “efficient and effective unity of art, technique and
knowledge.”20 Orange Alternative’s approach is quite close to the combination
of these Lefebvrian elements in the form of public performance art that helps
bring forth the self-determining agency of its participants and transform their
voices into public dialogue as well as counter-public mobility.
The notion of play therefore serves as the link between artistic performance
and social political activism. “Can you treat a police officer seriously, when he
is asking you the question: ‘Why did you participate in an illegal meeting of
dwarfs?’”21 In spite of their sense of humor, Orange Alternative’s members
were very serious in their endeavors to present Polish citizens with a way of
protesting peacefully. They managed to do this by allowing people to regain
political agency via the transgressive power of artistic play for social and politi-
cal change. Through texts such as the Manifesto of Socialist Surrealism (1980),
they managed to promote a keen sense of humor that could provide the public
sphere with a much-needed self-disciplining agency; if dwarfs could do it, the
people will do it! “Pure Rationalism failed to dominate toilets. Surrealism was
kept alive in toilets thanks to the politicians […] The politicians have always
been great surrealists.”22
Throughout history governments were frequently trying to ban theatre and
other acts of performance, because they believed that the performative genre
were capable of spreading and encouraging rebellions against the established
order. It is so because performance enables an evaluation of the ways in which
individuals act and react in the world, for themselves and for others. From
Turner’s concept of social drama (1957) to Goffman’s dramaturgical model of
everyday behavior (1959), anthropological approaches to performance reveal
how events, rituals and daily life are governed by a code of performance. Like-
wise, the notion of performativity (including Butler’s “gender performativity,”)
as a study on the discourse used in identity formation, as well as the performa-
tive arts in general, are associated with ideologies connected with performativi-
ty in everyday social life. Althusser’s notion of the Ideological State Apparatus-
es (1970), as a driving force that shapes us into subjects that think and behave in
socially acceptable ways, should also be mentioned here. These social and polit-
ical approaches (while it may be assumed that artistic theatrical performances
—————————
19 Ibid, 147.
20 Ibid, 157.
21 Fydrych, W. 1980. “Manifesto of Socialist Surrealism.” Last accessed on 14 September
2016. http://www.pomaranczowa-alternatywa.org/images/manifest-eng-big.jpg
22 Ibid.
may not directly intend to affect social transformation) can succeed in demon-
strating the grounds necessary for change. We can also conclude that the critical
potential of change and transformative power lies in the interaction between
performance and the audiences. And this is precisely the model through which
Orange Alternative appealed to the masses in providing them with an alterna-
tive tool for calling forth their own self-determining agency. They did so by
means of a kind of performance art that enabled people to merge performativity
with an empowering philosophy for social change.
HAPPENINGS AND CARNIVAL
Orange Alternative succeeded in facilitating social change precisely by pre-

senting a bridge over the artistic agency of performance and the political agency
of performativity in building an agency of self-determination on the side of the
audience. Through a sense of humor and acts of play, Orange Alternative pro-
vided the public sphere with modes of action. The Orange Happenings were
most important among them. The movement organized over sixty happenings
between the years 1985–1990 in Wrocław, Warsaw, Łódź, and other Polish
cities. Orange Alternative’s surrealist forms of political activism and the open
structure of their happenings recalled Tadeusz Kantor’s revolutionary perfor-
mances in the 1960s. Thanks to this kind of inclusiveness, the happenings could
gather thousands of participants in a very short amount of time. The so-called
“open street formula” of the Orange Happenings allowed all individuals to par-
ticipate, openly. The Orange Gathering organized on 1 June 1988, also known
as the Revolution of Dwarfs, attracted over ten thousand people who marched
through the city center in Wrocław, wearing orange dwarf hats. Their slogans
read: “… there is no freedom without dwarfs.”23
Moving along from the happenings, another mode of action that Orange Al-
ternative made popular coincided with the notion of the Bakhtinian carnival.
The Mexican Zapatista movement as well as various other contemporary activ-
ist groups have been actively referencing the concept of carnival as a part of
their political agenda: “The revolution in general is no longer imagined accord-
ing to socialist patterns of realism, that is, as men and women stoically march-
ing behind a red flag, waving flag towards a luminous future: rather it has
become a sort of carnival.”24
The Bakhtinian concept of carnival—which is “a subversion of the estab-
lished social and political order of things that otherwise appear as fixed and
—————————
23
Fydrych, W., 2014, op. cit.
24Quote from an anonymous essay, 2003. “Carnival: Resistance is the Secret of Joy.” In We
Are Everywhere: The Irresistible Rise of Global Anticapitalism. Verso; Online pdf. Last accessed
on 23 July 2017; http://artactivism.members.gn.apc.org/allpdfs/173-[essay]Carnival.pdf
122 Elçin Marasli
unchangeable”—is derived from cultural performances of the late medieval

period and the early Renaissance in Europe.25 However, the notion of carnival is
rather “an overall image of the will of the people,” distinguishing it from any
social or political structure.26 As Bakhtin notes: “Carnival is not a spectacle seen
by the people; they live in it and everyone participates because its very idea
embraces all the people. While carnival lasts, there is no other life outside it.” 27
The image of the Bakhtinian carnivalesque is referred to in numerous fields
from stand-up comedy to political demonstrations. There are numerous occa-
sions where Orange Alternative’s artistic activism has been argued to display
Bakhtin’s notion of the “therapeutic force of laughter.”28 Through various ele-
ments of street theatre and absurd street painting bordering carnivalesque fea-
tures, Orange Alternative’s actions can be regarded as the pioneers of guerrilla
communication and carnival resistance, also commonly practiced in contempo-
rary political protest.
CONTEMPORARY REFLECTIONS
Orange Alternative’s influence on contemporary forms of political protest is

undeniable, while their socialist surrealism remains a remarkably artistic form
of nonconformist philosophy. With their absurdist yet highly complex social
acts, the group’s surrealist artistic activism represents a bridge across the
Ukrainian Orange Revolution (2004–2005) and the most recent Pastafarian
Church of the Flying Spaghetti Monster (FSM). Likewise, it cannot be a mere
coincidence that The Yes Men of the United States—creative activists who per-
form nonviolent resistance by misleading American mainstream media, as well
as pulling pranks on major corporations—wrote a foreword to the autobiog-
raphy by Fydrych, Lives of the Orange Men—A Biographical History of the
Polish Orange Alternative Movement (2014).
Contemporary actions by imaginative, aesthetic and self-organizing activist
groups such as The Yes Men, Tactical Frivolity, Laboratory of Insurrectionary
Imagination, or even individual forms of protest, such as the Duran Adam
(Standing Man) of Gezi Park protests and others can best be understood in the
context of facilitating social change by merging the artistic agency of perfor-
mance with the political agency of performativity, hence delivering a self-
determined agency to the citizens.
—————————
25 Bakhtin, M. 1984 (1965). Rabelais and His World. Iswolsky, H. (Trans.). Bloomington: Indi-
ana University Press.
26 Auslander, Ph. 2008. Theory for Performance Studies. A Student’s Guide. Routledge.
27 Bakhtin, M. 1984, op. cit., 7.
28 The Orange Alternative. Last Accessed 14 September 2016; https://monoskop.org/
Orange_Alternative
Social media represent the hand of globalization taking over anarchist

movements at large. Historical reflection upon mass street happenings should
not miss out on the value and the contemporary relevance of the non-conformist
philosophy of the Polish Orange Alternative movement. The case of Orange
Alternative demonstrates the social role of art and particularly performance art
at the convergence of the public sphere with the counter-publics. Art should
allow for the transition from the realm of the unofficial to the realm of the for-
bidden. It also should facilitate the transformation from the realm of thought to
the realm of action. This can best happen via agency, via play. Art introduces an
element of play into the sphere of collective behavior; is a bridge over dichoto-
mous social and political forces and can prove an intermediary across time and
space.
REFERENCES
Althusser, Louis. 1970. “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses.” In: Lenin and Philosophy,
and Other Essays. Brewster, Ben (Trans.). London: New Left Books.
Auslander, Philip. 2008. Theory for Performance Studies. A Student’s Guide. Routledge
Publishing. Pdf copy last accessed on 14 September 2016; http://www.mohamedrabeea.
com/books/book1_13905.pdf
Bakhtin, Mikhail. 1984 (1965). Rabelais and His World. Iswolsky, Helene (Trans.). Bloomington:
Indiana University Press; Pdf copy last accessed on 14 September 2016; http://monoskop.
org/images/7/70/Bakhtin_Mikhail_Rabelais_and_His_World_1984.pdf
Bambara, Toni Cade. 2004. Essay #4 “We Are Everywhere: The Irresistible Rise of Global
Anticapitalism.” In: Carnival: Resistance is the Secret of Joy,. Last accessed on 14 September
2016. http://www.narconews.com/Issue34/article1097; and http://artactivism.gn.apc.org/
allpdfs/173-[essay]Carnival.pdf
Chesters, Graeme, Ian Welsh. 2005. “Complexity and Social Movement: Process and Emergence
in Planetary Action Systems.” Theory, Culture and Society, 22, 5, 187–211. Word copy last
accessed on 14 September 2016; chrome-extension://gbkeegbaiigmenfmjfclcdgdpima
mgkj/views/app.html
Davies, David. 2004. Art as Performance. Oxford: Blackwell.
Debord, Guy. 1956. “Theory of the Dérive.” Les Lèvres Nues #9 (November issue). Last accessed
on 14 September 2016; http://www.cddc.vt.edu/sionline/si/theory.html
_____. 2000 (1967). Society of the Spectacle. Black & Red.
Deutsche, Rosalind. 1992. “Art and Public Space: Questions of Democracy.” Social Text,
issue 33.
Fraser, Nancy. 1990. “Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually
Existing Democracy.” Social Text, 25/26.
Fydrych, Waldemar. 2014. Lives of the Orange Men—A Biographical History of the Polish
Orange Alternative Movement; Pdf copy last accessed on 14 September 2016; http://
www.minorcompositions.info/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/livesoftheorangemen-web.pdf
_____. 1980. Manifesto of Socialist Surrealism. Last accessed on 14 September 2016;
http://www.pomaranczowa-alternatywa.org/images/manifest-eng-big.jpg
Habermas, Jürgen. 1991 (1965). The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry
into a Category of Bourgeois Society. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press.
Kluge, Aleksander, Oskar Negt. 1993. Public Sphere and Experience: Toward and Analysis of the
Bourgeois and Proletarian Public. Minneapolis–London: University of Minnesota Press.
124 Elçin Marasli
Lefebvre, Henri. 1996. “The Right to the City.” In: Writings on Cities. Kofman, Eleonore,
Elizabeth Lebas (Eds., Trans.). Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell.
_____. 1974. “The Production of Space.” Nicholson-Smith, Donald. London: Blackwell;
https://monoskop.org/images/7/75/Lefebvre_Henri_The_Production_ of_Space.pdf;
Matynia, Elzbieta. 2001. “The Lost Treasure of Solidarity.” Social Research, 68, 4.
Marasli, Elçin. 2015. “The Orange Alternative—There is no Freedom without Dwarfs.”
Culture.pl. 22 December 2015 Last accessed on 14 September 2016. http://culture.pl/en/
article/the-orange-alternative-there-is-no-freedom-without-dwarfs
Misztal, Bronislaw. 1992. “Between the State and Solidarity: One Movement, Two
Interpretations—the Orange Alternative Movement in Poland.” The British Journal of
Sociology, 43, 1, 55–78; Pdf copy last accessed on 14 September 2016; http://www.
pomaranczowa-alternatywa.org/misztal.pdf
Warner, Michael. 2002. Publics and Counterpublics. Zone Books.
ORANGE ALTERNATIVE ONLINE

Orange Alternative; Monoskop.org. Last accessed on 14 September 2016;
http://monoskop.org/Orange_Alternative
Orange Alternative Official Website. Last accessed on 14 September 2016;
http://www.pomaranczowa-alternatywa.org/
Orange Alternative Virtual Museum. Last accessed on 14 September 2016;
http://www.orangealternativemuseum.pl/#homepage
ABOUT THE AUTHOR —postgraduate student, School for Social Research at the
Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, Polish Academy of Sciences, Nowy Świat 72,
00-330 Warsaw, Poland. Istanbul-born artist and researcher. 2007–2013 she was study-
ing and exhibiting in the United States, 2014–2015 – managing editor of turki-
ye.culture.pl/ Research interests: comparative study of visual arts, literature and mass
media; critical cultural theory; aesthetics; globalism/cosmopolitanism; curatorial prac-
tice.
No. 3/2017
Vladimir Przhilenskiy
THEORETICAL AND POST-THEORETICAL PHILOSOPHY
ABSTRACT
An important revolution in modern philosophy consists in postulating that philoso-

phy does not cognize the world, but is able only to study thinking, or, which in this
context is the same, to cognize knowledge. This thesis has allowed reorganizing the
pattern of interaction between philosophers and the representatives of special sciences.
Ancient philosophers created general theories of the world by basing on the principles
“revealed by the power of the mind” and then entrusted it as an intellectual weapon to
other intellectuals. Nowadays philosophers develop theories of knowledge; transmit the
methods built on their basis to the special sciences, and wait for the results of its appli-
cation. It is assumed that the theories of the animate and inanimate nature, of the hu-
mans and society, constructed by using the scientific method, could be generalized, and
only on this basis an ontology, i.e. a philosophical theory of being, can be built. Then
philosophers must be re-engaged in performing generalization and reflection, which
replaces speculation. But today, philosophy is neither speculation nor reflection. Philos-
ophy seems to become “post-theoretical thinking,” which determines the boundaries of
a theory, and articulates the use of theoretical knowledge in a variety of intellectual and
social practices.
Keywords: visualization, coherentization, construction, interpretation, theoretical,
post-theoretical.
What is specific of the 20th-century philosophy? Or, in other words, how

does it differ from the older philosophical doctrines and how can the increase of
knowledge, change of content or even the “role shift” be revealed in it? And, in
general, does it exist at all—the specific philosophy of the 20th century?
In search for answers to these questions let us consider the most popular
trends and schools in contemporary philosophy. Analytic philosophy, pragma-
tism, phenomenology, hermeneutics, and postmodernism constitute their own
visions of the world and at the same time reject metaphysics, overcome the Car-
tesian paradigm, etc.
126 Vladimir Przhilenskiy
Metaphysics here is understood differently in each case; the task of over-

coming it has been carried on by Immanuel Kant, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich
Hegel, Auguste Comte, Karl Marx, Friedrich Nietzsche, and many others. Mar-
tin Heidegger’s overcoming of metaphysics was so different from logical posi-
tivism’s antimetaphysical attitude that Carnap considered the whole philosophy
of Heidegger to be a typical metaphysics. And vice versa: logical positivism
was for Heidegger a metaphysics. For the Soviet dialectical materialists, both
Carnap’s and Heidegger’s works include all the generic features of metaphysi-
cal thinking.
The aim to overcome metaphysics led some philosophers to empiricism,
whereas some others were pushed into the regions of poetry and music; and still
more thinkers came to recognize dialectical contradictions. Is it possible to find
something common in their views, or does every philosopher create and con-
struct his individual opposition, giving it only the common name?
“We think the universal explains, whereas it is what must be explained, and
we fall into a triple illusion of contemplation or reflection or communication.
Then there is an illusion of the eternal when it is forgotten that concepts
must be created, and then the illusion of discursiveness when propositions
are confused with concepts.”1
This view seems to be radically different from all the previous views on the
history of philosophy, but behind it there is a certainly worth attempt to under-
stand the present through reforming the past. Today we can say that the majority
of the previous typologies and classifications, combining individual schools and
teachings into the historical types or ideological clusters, has been disqualified.
The analysis of the history of philosophical thinking from the today perspec-
tive sometimes actualizes the almost forgotten foundations, and sometimes it
requires the adoption of new ones. To modernize the typology of philosophical
teachings is necessary to find or construct a possibility of determining the
meaning and significance of changes that have taken place. Thus, the estimation
of what had happened in the context of the newly constructed retrospective of-
fers a path to the self-justification of our time.
So, we have contemplation, reflection, and communication. Can these three
words become names of historical types of philosophy? It is clear that first two
cases depict the well-known historical or historical-philosophical eras. Indeed,
contemplation was the main method in speculative philosophy, especially in the
ancient and medieval thought. Speculative schemes give way to reflexive con-
structions in the Enlightenment, when the philosophical theories of knowledge
occupy the place of scholastic metaphysics.
—————————
1 Deleuze, G., F. Guattari. 1994. What Is Philosophy? Tomlinson, H., G. Burchell (Trans.). Co-
lumbia University Press, 49–50.

Theoretical and Post-Theoretical Philosophy 127
But why epistemology has become the core of philosophy in modern times,
instead of metaphysics? Only because—according to Descartes, John Locke,
Kant and others—we are not able to know anything about the laws of nature
without at first experimentally studying it. We cannot build a theory of the
world, deducing it from our contemplation or speculation. Instead we can con-
struct a theory of knowledge. Having created such a theory or doctrine of the
scientific method we will be able to explore nature and discover its laws. The
natural laws become a key of constructing the general theories of the world, or
pictures of the world that allows one to answer the questions of being and its
essence, that is to build ontology. Both gnoseology and ontology are created by
use of the new European analogue of contemplation, i.e., reflection.
The speculative type of philosophy had already appeared in the first pre-
Socratic philosophical teachings, and it reached its classical implementation in
the systems of Plato and Aristotle. Despite of a withering criticism and repeated
statements on the final overcoming of metaphysics, speculation still plays
a huge role in thinking, reasoning, and action. Moreover, it became a part of
Western culture, i.e. the rationalist tradition relevant to the entire modern world.
The speculative type of philosophy is based on the following fundamental prin-
ciples:
— Both the world and human-being are reasonable (the world is created by
the mind, the human is a sentient being).
— Reasonableness is expressed in a small number of principles; those of
the mind are comprehended speculatively (intuitively) by contemplation
on the world.
— Philosophy is a theory of the world that has been recognized directly
through the principles of the mind.
— It is possible to expand the theory of the world on the account of princi-
ples by means of logic (the doctrine of forms and laws of thought).
— Humans should deduce the goals of an individual action (ethics) and
these of collective actions (politics) by means of reasoning from the
principles of being.
— “To be free” means to follow one’s own nature.
The reflective type of philosophy originated in modernity. It was actively
developed, opposing the speculative one, and it is now seen as the overcoming
of scholasticism. This new type of philosophy corresponded much better with
the rapidly developing natural sciences, and it was widely used in the justifica-
tion of the social and political movement of the Enlightenment. It is still present
in contemporary philosophy, among others founding the basis of the university
disciplines and the specialties of scientific dissertations. Today it is often called
the academic or classical philosophy.
Reflection is also a kind of intuition. Its shape is formed by the theory of
knowledge and ontology, and not by metaphysics or logic. Now philosophers
create the doctrines of method and theories of knowledge, then pass them to
specialists (physicists, biologists or linguists), and, when receiving in return

their specific scientific theories, combine them with the help of reflection into
some ontology.
The following statements can be considered the main tenets of reflective phi-
losophy:
— Principles of the world are not given directly to the human being in con-
templation, but some of its manifestations (phenomena) are compre-
hended in experience.
— The pictures of the world are not determined by the principles (set-
outs), but by the laws the world obeys (it does not start from these
springheads, but it is controlled by the laws).
— The human intellect is expressed through the activities of person’s con-
sciousness, connecting reason and senses; consciousness is subject to
certain laws, though these are not the laws of logic, but the laws of psy-
chology.
— Philosophy is, presumably, the theory of knowledge which legitimizes
science and combines the results of scientific research.
— The human being should build up a system of values (axiology) which
determines the goals of actions (praxeology).
— To be free means to overcome one’s own nature.
Now back to the triad. Is the communication really capable of characterizing
the type of thinking that favors a new historical type of philosophy? Surely, yes.
The linguistic turn, from the Cartesian paradigm to post-Cartesian one, has thus
made communication one of the tools of understanding the new configuration of
things, thoughts, and words. Let us recall that in the speculative philosophy
things are the starting point; they act as a subject.
One of the main issues explicating the Cartesian paradigm is the question of
its origin. The Cartesian paradigm is a “molecular” rational initiative, consisting
of a series of “atomic” initiatives, where “initiatives” meant here “reasoning;”
the paradigm constitutes the concepts of subject, object, reality, etc. Their his-
torical reconstruction does not coincide with logical one. In fact, the forming of
the Cartesian paradigm was motivated by the pursuit to replace scholasticism
with a more reliable and efficient style of philosophizing. For example, a “sin-
gle reality,” subordinated to a small number of universal laws, liberated philos-
ophy from excessively overgrown hierarchies, taxonomies and classifications.
The neglecting of such concepts as “latent qualities,” “natures” and “essences”
also was made possible by the introduction of “bodies” in which there is noth-
ing but motion, number, and figure. But the self-presentation of Cartesianism
was built as a transition from pre-scientific to the scientific.
Scholasticism has been was reborn in some philosophical trends of the 20th
century; analytic philosophy, phenomenology and pragmatism pay much more
attention to the Middle Ages than their predecessors. Franz Brentano, Edmund
Husserl, Bertrand Russell, and Charles S. Peirce were seeking ways out of the
impasse in such a reconstruction of the modernity paradigm, which would allow

to understand the objective of the polemics in which this paradigm emerged.
This paradigm was first presented in such a way that Descartes and Locke ap-
peared innovators in relation to Plato and Aristotle, and also opponents to scho-
lasticism. If they argued with Plato and Aristotle, then only to the extent needed
to crush down scholasticism. This dispute was the revival of the ancient classics
more than their refutation. Peirce wrote that not ideas, but the spirit of Cartesi-
anism replaced scholasticism. In his article “Some Consequences of Four Inca-
pacities” he brought “the spirit of Cartesianism” to four points, or four differ-
ences from scholasticism: 1) It teaches that philosophy should begin with uni-
versal doubt, while scholastics never called its basic principles into question.
2) It teaches that the final criterion of reliability is to be found in the individual
consciousness; while scholasticism relied on the testimony and authority of the
Church. 3) The various types of reasoning, characteristic of the Middle Ages,
are replaced by a single chain of inference, often dependent on subtle assump-
tions. 4) Scholasticism had its own mysteries of faith, but it tried to explain all
things created. However, there are many facts which Cartesianism does not
explain; moreover, it makes them absolutely inexplicable, unless we consider
the universal explanation “God makes them so.”2
Peirce rejects these provisions, replacing them with other grounds, which are
expressed as denials. Rationalistic intuition, or introspection, in question in the
famous motto of Descartes, is primarily exposed to denial. Peirce formulates
anti-Cartesian axioms in the following way: “It teaches that philosophy must
begin with universal doubt; whereas scholasticism had never questioned funda-
mentals. It teaches that the ultimate test of certainty is to be found in the indi-
vidual consciousness; whereas scholasticism had rested on the testimony of
sages and of the Catholic Church etc.” 3
In these lines the pursuit is established to get rid of the fundamental distinc-
tion of all the earlier philosophy, namely, discriminating thoughts and things,
that is, consciousness and reality. The separation of the things external to our
consciousness from the things internal to it is the essence of the modern Euro-
pean philosophy since Descartes. Descartes distinguished two kinds of being:
res extensa and res cogitans. By “thinking entities” he does not mean any hu-
man thoughts, but only that what is born thanks to the activity of the reason,
referring to the “enormous book of light.” These “things” have no real certainty,
they exist beyond time and space, have no mass or shape. But they can be stud-
ied in parallel with exploring “extended things” determined by measuring the
movement, number, and shape. The res cogitans are within the purview of theo-
ry of knowledge. This is, in short, the logic of Cartesianism.
—————————
2
Peirce, Ch. S. 1868. “Some Consequences of Four Incapacities.” Journal of Speculative Phi-
losophy, 2, 140.
3
Ibid., 144.
Not only the transcendentalism of Kant and Husserl, but also the empiricism
of Locke, Paul H. Holbach’s materialism, John Stuart Mill’s positivism and
Richard Avenarius’s empiriocriticism grew from it. Arguing with Descartes,
they still remain within the Cartesian paradigm, substantivizing thinking, con-
sciousness, and the ideal. Reflection comes in place of speculation, which is just
contemplation, facing inward. It is no coincidence that the consistent implemen-
tation of Cartesianism resulted in the development of psychology, when the
latter began to claim to be the foundation of philosophy and logic, the natural
sciences, social sciences, and the humanities.
The aim to get rid of the “thinking things” has led Peirce to the concept of
sign and prompted him to replace the theory of knowledge with the science of
signs: i.e., semiotics. It is not by the laws of mysterious res cogitans that the
human mind moves, but by the rules that govern the signs, Peirce claimed.
These rules are expressed in semantics, pragmatics and syntactics, because signs
must somehow correspond with their meanings, relate with each other, and
serve as the instruments of human action.
The thesis that the philosophers do not cognize the world, but are able only
to study thinking, or, which in this context is the same, to cognize knowledge
can be qualified as a revolution in philosophy. This thesis has allowed reorgan-
izing the pattern of interaction between philosophers and representatives of the
special sciences. Ancient philosophers created general theories of the world by
basing on the principles revealed by “the power of the mind” and then entrusted
it as an intellectual weapon to others. Nowadays philosophers construct theories
of cognition, then they transmit the methods built on its basis to representatives
of special sciences. It is assumed that the scientific theories of animate and inan-
imate nature, of human and society can be generalized, and only on this basis an
ontology can be built—a philosophical theory of being. Then philosophers must
be re-engaged in performing generalization and reflection, replacing specula-
tion; this double operation is to become their main cognitive tool.
The third identity could be bound to religious, ethnic or some other specific
roots, if only the idea of progress and movement forward did not interfere with.
“The topization” of time and the “temporalization” of space lead to the fact that
the value-civilizational identity is explicated by means of the schemes classic–
contemporary, old–new, traditional–innovative, etc. But the organic identity
presumes, of course, a subject like a Western philosopher, or an intellectual,
considering itself an heir to the Enlightenment.
All three mentioned identities are mutually convertible and represent differ-
ent projections of the self-identifying of modernity, of the West, etc. The role of
the world picture concept is hard to overestimate in this case; the same is true
about the dangers that the uncritical use of any instrument bears, be it a tech-
nical device or a conceptual-theoretical construct.
Thus, we can assert that contemplation, reflection and communication are
not historically successive types or epochs, but the co-existing ways of philoso-
phizing. They complement each other and can significantly extend the cognitive
abilities of philosophical thinking.
In this context, the concept of ideal type, introduced by Max Weber, also de-
serves attention. The construction of the ideal types plays heuristic functions in
Weber’s social theory, and it serves as the basis for cataloging and categorizing
the diverse phenomena which cannot be reduced to a common denominator. So,
what are the ideal types of philosophizing, and what forms of life, or social
practices do lie behind them?
Geometry: from speculation to visualization. There is no doubt that the most
of ancient social and cultural images of the philosopher is associated with
the notions of contemplation, speculation. Reflecting on the specifics of the
ancient culture and ancient society included in this image, a Russian philoso-
pher A. Losev writes that slaves and slaveholders were not people, but the
abstract ideas of physical and mental labor. Hence comes clearly that in order to
become a true slaveholder, a real owner of mental activity, one needs to become
a philosopher, a theorist, that is ... not quite human. Stoics, Cynics, etc. trans-
formed theorizing from the type of intelectual activity to a particular lifestyle.
Although we find some religious or proto-religious motives of penance and
purification, as well as the rational demand of moderation and “golden medi-
um,” the idea of theoretician as half-human – half-function is quite remarkable.4
Philosophers used to talk about geometry since times immemorial. Accord-
ing to a legend, Plato forbade to enter his Academy those who were not familiar
with geometry. Descartes’s doctrine of innate ideas and Spinoza’s Ethics, con-
structed by analogy with the Euclidean treatise, undoubtedly demonstrate that
the modern European reflection was dependent on geometry, similarly as an-
cient speculation. Postmodernists updated the problems of geometrical influ-
ence on philosophy, science, theoretical thinking and rationality.
Henri Poincaré pointed out that in the history of mathematics there were
“two very different kinds of minds.”5 Some are primarily engaged in compli-
ance with the rules of logic, and each step in their study is lawful, justified and
subject to a single plan. Others rely on intuition and make spontaneous and un-
expected steps, the effectiveness of which is sometimes very high.
As is well known, the struggle against metaphysics is a mandatory compo-
nent of most philosophical conceptions since the 17th century. It is noteworthy
that whenever the next scheduled overcoming of metaphysics is projected, met-
aphysics is understood in a new way. But the distrust of contemplation, specula-
tion and intuition is the hallmark of the epoch, despite all efforts of intuitionists,
whether they are experts in the field of mathematics, logic, ethics, or any other
philosophical discipline.
—————————
4
Losev, A. F. 1989. Istoriya antichnoi filosofii v konspektivnom izlozheniik [The History of
Ancient Philosophy in a Brief Presentation]. Moscow: Mysl, 12.
5 Poincaré, H. 1907. Intuition and Logic in Mathematics. The Value of Science. Halsted, G. B.
(Trans.). New York: The Science Press, 19.

The role of metaphors in philosophical and scientific thinking is significant,

because the reference to metaphorical thinking can be seen as a kind of funda-
mental theoretical action, creating separate terms or whole conceptual schemes,
paradigms, or programs. But it does not produce a new meaning, performing
rather a role of means than the function of a generator. A metaphor is rather an
instrument of visualization or a part of its structure, and the birth of a new
meaning, new domain, new theoretical knowledge depends both on the fine
visualization, and on its successful combination with the three other procedures
of theoretical thinking—reasoning, construction and interpretation. One or even
several metaphors are not enough to create a meaning, or construct a new
reality.
However, metaphors continue to live and act after the birth of new images;
they play the role of regulators in building knowledge as a single system. Phi-
losophers standing close to philologists, men of letters, and artists, are turning to
the art of visualization much more safely and naturally than philosophers fo-
cused on scientific knowledge and, in particular, experts in the field of philoso-
phy of physics.
Uttering phrases was considered a special manufacturing process by
Ludwig Wittgenstein, who was comparing language with the engine running at
idle, etc. After him the postmodernists turned to the metaphor of meaning pro-
duction.
It is hard to call a jumble of images—a theory, but there is nothing else
in philosophy, i.e., made by means of philosophy, yet. Truly, what cannot be
uttered, can only be shown.
Is visualization the only means of giving birth to a new knowledge, and were
ancient geometers the main forerunners of the philosophers? Probably so, but
we should not forget that the ancient geometers were not only experts in the
field of spatial forms. Slicing land, measuring area, and settling property dis-
putes, most of those geometers played the role of lawyers, too. However, those
were rather sophists who played the roles of genuine lawyers; and Plato’s Apol-
ogy of Socrates served a model of meeting of philosophical ideas and law en-
forcement practice for thousands of years. But it actually stayed the one single
though important fact of this kind until the birth of Christian apologetics, when
the course of the proceedings began to determine the trend and the content
of philosophical thought. And law enforcement practice laid the foundations of
a new way of philosophizing.
Judges: coherence and argumentation. The impact of law enforcement on
philosophy and science was very important in classical antiquity. But it was
precisely during the meeting of Athens and Jerusalem, connecting the Greek
wisdom and the Judeo-Christian revelation, that juridical onset gained para-
mount importance. We are talking about the circumstances that contributed to
the birth of apologetics, a special stage in the history of the Christian Church,
a particular kind of theological literature and, most importantly for this discus-
sion, a special kind of rational thinking. Numerous cases of appealing to the

Court against the Christians, sometimes taking the character of persecution, and
sometimes not going beyond the usual conflict resolution in the daily life of the
era, was an external cause. While the first Christian missionaries walked with
good news from one Jewish village to the other, their preaching went well with
the ancient traditional calls for faith. These calls, as befits the religious appeals,
pointed to the need to refer, or, what in principle is the same, to return to the
true faith. These appeals were addressed either to the mystical religious feel-
ings, or to the pious desire to follow the true faith—faith of fathers, to preserve
the traditions, customs and morals of bygone eras, which for some reason have
been forgotten or distorted. The same process was going on when the Christian
message of adherents reached the Syrian or Coptic settlements, also when they
entered the city like Jerusalem, for which the power of Rome had not become
the cause of cultural westernization in the form of Hellenization. In these cities
and settlements that have preserved eastern religious culture and the appropriate
type of thinking, the effectiveness of the sermon was associated with stories of
miracles, with appeal to meaningful images by way of parables and allegories,
metaphorization of reality, etc.
But as soon as the apostles or their companions, carrying the good news,
stepped into the street of a Hellenized city—reaction to their stories used to
change radically. They were accused of lying, because of numerous contradic-
tions found in their words; just like today, when the existence of contradictions
in the testimony of witnesses or the suspected is the basis for their denial.
But the apostles imagined the way to truth quite differently, paying no atten-
tion to the logical component of their faith. As Sergei Averintsev underlines, in
Athens of the classical period the never seen before culture had been worked
out—that of definitions; defining had become a major element of evaluating
human thoughts and actions. Rationalistic thinking reorganized the whole sys-
tem of interpersonal interactions.6
This property of rational thinking, being rooted in human life and society, is
radically changing both them. But philosophical thought is only partly its
source. Law enforcement practice means no less, if not more so, because it
makes the question of accuracy in definition into a matter of life and death, for
the charges brought in court force to look exactly for the exact definition which
must save not only the idea, but also human life. The reason for this striking
thrust to definitions lies within a historically unprecedented situation that has
arisen as a result of the spread of Christianity in the period of early Christian
apologetics. Today, when researchers consider the circumstances of how the
followers of the Christian faith became heralds of a new life turning into the
apologists of the true faith, and then onto the martyrs, these circumstances are
—————————
6 Averincev, S. 2004. Poètika rannevizantijskoj literatury [The Poetics of the Early Byzantine
Culture]. Sankt-Peterburg: Azbuka-klassika.

treated by analogy with the present. The persecution of Christians looks like the
reaction of the authorities and traditionalists to all the sorts of dangers, which
this “modernization from below” brought with. This is certainly true, but only
partly. The persecution of Christians was accompanied by an unprecedented
phenomenon: mass proceedings in the courts—of ideas, beliefs and attitudes,
though external to the natural distribution range of ancient philosophy, but ca-
pable to compete with the latter. This is the reason why the works of Justin the
Philosopher, Polycarp of Smyrna, Theophilus of Antioch and many other
authors have become so popular in Christian circles, which have been written to
assist in the preparation of the righteous apology. Apology is the speech of
a defendant or its counsel in court, containing answers to the charges. Such
speeches had to be not only uttered, but enforced in writing, as well as the pros-
ecution itself. Then you had to not only speak, but also be able to write down,
i.e., to formulate ideas and principles, present them in the form of universal
judgments, arrayed in a system. All this had to be done either to declare them
false and contradictory, or in order to defend the right to have these ideas, and
to openly proclaim them.
Engineers: design and coordination. The third ideal type of philosophizing
can be called constructive-technical. As well as the speculative-geometrical and
logical-judicial types, this one is present in ancient thought from the very be-
ginning, but its golden age falls within the period of the 14–17th centuries. In
his study of “the sources and driving forces” of the scientific revolution of mo-
dernity, Ilya Kassavin draws attention to the fact that historical reconstructions
are dominated by the aim to induce the essential features of modern European
science from the medieval and Renaissance university scholarship. The transi-
tion from the theoretical speculative view of the world to the experimental
method in most cases is explained by the logic of the development of theoretical
knowledge, and at the same time by the influence of the great discoveries.7 Fur-
ther, the study examines the role of changes in the daily activities of physicians,
printers, and sailors, from the point of view of the changed tasks. The role of the
great geographical discoveries, as well as the role of equally great discoveries in
medicine, human anatomy and physiology, has long been appreciated by histo-
rians of science.
The birth of printing did not go unnoticed, hitting all relevant textbooks. But
Kassavin defends the thesis that the new understanding of the world, which
caused the scientific revolution, is not so much a reaction to the discoveries
themselves, but it is a consequence of changes in professional and social prac-
tices, which preceded those discoveries. Those travelers who were able to reach
India and America, could not do it without radical improvements in mathemat-
—————————
7 Kasavin, I. T. 1999. “Predtechi nauchnoi revolyucii” [Forerunner of the Scientific Revolu-
tion]. Filosofiya nauki. Filosofiya nauki v poiskah novyh putei [Philosophy of Science in the
Search for New Paths], vol. 5. Moscow, 31.
ics and, most importantly, without any improvement in the ways of its applica-
tion. Those who were going to treat people, and not to seek the truth, focused
their interest on anomalies, had been busy finding and exposing the secrets of
nature, etc.
The problem of the genesis of Galileo’s geometric method had been formu-
lated in a fundamental work by Husserl, which, unfortunately, was left unfin-
ished, namely The Crisis of European Sciences. Husserl analyzed in details the
specificity of methodological induction, which Galileo had used for the extrapo-
lation onto infinity of certain assumptions. In this work, and in the less known
Foundations of Geometry, Husserl revealed the technical features of the new
method and the dependence of the structure and content of the new world pic-
ture on these methodological innovations. The importance of the constructing
procedure becomes obvious hereby.
It would seem that the analogy of scientific and philosophical theorizing
with design and building, construction, and engineering activities arises all by
itself. Moreover, its use is so common that the phrase “building a scientific the-
ory” has become familiar and daily. But, just as in the case of the influence of
geometry, the latest discoveries do not just allow to see some similarities to the
fact of a certain influence. Thanks to phenomenology and other contemporary
rational initiatives, it became possible to talk about the mechanisms of produc-
tion and the subsequent presence of the practices under study—i.e., visualiza-
tion and construction—in philosophical theorizing.
What does theoretical construction give? It allows to find the right “parts” or
“manufacture” them. It is exactly in the process of designing that we provide
manipulation, transfer, reconstruction and even deconstruction, going beyond
the contexts of both discovery and justification, moving on to the context of
designing, which is a completely different outfit, a different form of life, and
a different game with its own system of rules. These rules differ from the rules
under which discovery and justification are conducted. The hidden teleologies
that are genetically linked to the corresponding practices and goal-settings con-
tained in them differ from each other in the same way.
Interpreters: from geometry to philology. And finally, there exists a fourth
practice, or fourth form of life associated with the understanding, finding and
identification of sense. In the twentieth century the study of hermeneutics in the
humanities and philosophy have caused so much interest and spawned such
a vast literature that to evaluate the significance and meaning of this process is
not easy. It is possible to assert something like a result here, but to substantiate
this claim is unlikely. Husserl, Heidegger and their followers proclaimed an
obviously new role model for philosophers: it is not a geometer, but a philolo-
gist that the philosopher should imitate, if he/she wants to learn the truth. The
philosopher must seek not the scheme, nor a formula, nor a set of assertions
of universal nature, but the sense and meaning of the phenomenon that is of
interest.
One can evaluate this pledge as another philosophical theory, which states
new ideals of cognition. But there is another point of view, namely, the claim
that hermeneutics is not a theory and it does not depend on theory, but on con-
trary, the theories depend on reading them hermeneutically. I propose to call
hermeneutics a post-theoretical discipline, although it dates back to the pre-
theoretical experience and pre-theoretical practice.
The social practice that laid the foundation of hermeneutics usually is raised
to the activities of the ancient Greek oracles, Hebrew and early Christian inter-
preters, and medieval commentators. All this is true, and there is no reason to
doubt the canonical history of hermeneutics. But the true meeting of the art of
interpretation and philosophy, the meeting that changed philologists into
philosophers, the “opinion leaders” and “spokesmen of the spirit of the era,”
occurred in the Renaissance.
The Renaissance has a special place in the history of philosophy. If the me-
dieval thought was qualified as theological rather than philosophical for a long
time, or at least not “very” philosophical, then the humanists are recognized as
full hundred percent philosophers: the Platonists, Peripatetics, neo-Epicureans,
etc. But it is usually omitted that the humanists have not created any doctrines
and conceptions, which is so typical of modern, ancient, and medieval philoso-
phy. Of course, it is possible to reconstruct the conceptions of humanists, but
such a reconstruction is more reminiscent of a remodel construction, filling-in,
the attribution of an afterthought. And now there are allegations that the human-
ists did make aesthetics the base of their ontology, etc.
The humanists, indeed, created a new understanding of the human as unique
and inimitable; they forwarded the thesis of the macrocosm and microcosm
unity. All this is true, but they also have developed the methods of literary criti-
cism, worked out a historical-critical approach to the texts, created entirely dif-
ferent conditions of understanding the world as a text, for comprehending other
cultures. That is what would later come in handy for the historical-critical
approach to theoretical thinking as a whole and to its individual structures in
particular. If the humanists of the Renaissance received funds for the “disen-
chantment” of sacred texts, then the phenomenologists and historians of science
nowadays take an “non-equable” look at less sacred texts: scientific theories.
Interest in everyday life is not just a discovery of another mode of being or
another sphere of social experience. On the basis of everyday life one can find
a common denominator for the horizontal comparison of the scientific and non-
scientific for the possible critical evaluation of the former. Today, science has
created a world, or rather, a set of possible worlds, the entrance from which to
everyday life, to the world of common sense, requires a whole arsenal of special
equipment. Philosophy of science is engaged in the development of such tools.
Natural language is a key to understand everyday life. When a person speaks
in a plain language, then, in fact, language speaks through the medium of a per-
son, according to Heidegger's view. Thus, among the variety of facts of philo-
sophical life, four basic ideal types of philosophizing can be singled out; each of
them has its own cultural meaning, and each of them is backed by its own form
of life.
Visualization allows operating the images of scientific ideas and concepts, it
enables to find a correspondence among them, and build them up into the most
unexpected designs.
Coherentization is the inclusion of any newly acquired knowledge in the ex-
isting complex. It is a check for compliance: moving from a simple search of
contradictions to the analysis of changes in the overall picture of the research
subject. This type of activity can be called, in accordance with the well-known
tradition, the justification of the discovery (though in fact the separation in time
of the two operations—discovery and justification—can only take place in the
retrospective descriptions). In fact, the historical never corresponds to the logi-
cal. An idea—no matter how stunning and crazy for the later historians of sci-
ence, or even for the author of the discovery—should be formulated. And in this
process of searching for “a formula” for the idea, there are so many agreements,
that to equate it to the discovery is hardly possible. Therefore, in reality, the
“coherentization” process is more likely searching for a suitable replacement
part in any gear, and not finding grounds for a discovery already made.
Construction as a special kind of research practice can also be a model of
discovery, or may act as a model for justification. The main feature of this type
of activity had been identified by the ancient Greeks: you take something in one
place and move it to another. For example, it is to attach the wings to a human,
whether in the form of an airplane, or in the form of a parachute, or of a glider.
Similarly, as in any organic projection, designing is some sort of substitution,
some kind of transference, performed both in the genres of nature imitation
and of its deception. Very often this process is confused with visualization and
“coherentization.”
Interpretation—despite differences of its forms in various sciences—plays
an important role in scientific activity. Today the view dominates that the her-
meneutics expresses a specific method for the humanities. It is viewed that this
method, when applied to the natural sciences, serves only to meet needs of phi-
losophers, culture researches, or social scientists. It looks (allegedly) as if e.g. in
physics there was no need to understand something; one just explains the facts
by summarizing them under a law. In fact, the role of hermeneutics in science is
much greater, although the term was not used in natural sciences until recently.
However, a debate between scientists was initiated by the need for interpreta-
tion; in this debate they went far beyond the problems of discovery and justifi-
cation of new knowledge.
REFERENCES
Averincev, S. S. 2004. Poètika rannevizantijskoj literatury [The Poetics of the Early Byzantine
Culture]. Sankt-Peterburg: Azbuka-klassika.
Deleuze, Gilles, Felix Guattari. 1994. What Is Philosophy? Columbia University Press,
49–50.
Kasavin, I. T. 1999. “Predtechi nauchnoi revolyucii”. [Forerunner of the Scientific Revolution].
Filosofiya nauki: Philosophy of Science in the Search for New Paths, vol. 5. Moscow.
Losev, A. F. 1989. Istoriya antichnoi filosofii v konspektivnom izlozhenii [The History of Ancient
Philosophy in Brief Presentation]. Мoscow: Mysl.
Peirce, Charles S. 1868. Some Consequences of Four Incapacities. Journal of Speculative Phi-
losophy, 2, 140.
Poincaré, Henri. 1907. Intuition and Logic in Mathematics. The Value of Science. New York: The
Science Press.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR — PhD, DSc, professor; affiliation: Kutafin Moscow State
Law University; 123995, Moscow, Sadovaja-Kudrinskaja street, 9, Russia. Main re-
search fields: sociology of knowledge and social epistemology. Main publication (in
Russian): Kohanovskiy W. P., Przhilenskiy V. I., Sergodeieva E. A. 2006. Filosofjya
nauki. Мoskwa–Rostov: МаrТ.
No. 3/2017
Małgorzata Czarnocka
THE IDEAL AND PRAXIS OF SCIENCE
ABSTRACT
My reflections focus on the ideal of science and the contemporary condition of sci-
ence. I believe the distinction between the ideal of science and praxis of science is es-
sential in inquiries into what science is today, what its position is and should be in the
human world. I analyse the critical stance towards science that is so widespread in con-
temporary philosophy. It is demonstrated that today’s ever-widening chasm between the
ideal of science (its nature, established anthropically already in ancient times) and its
contemporary praxis is the main problem hampering the science of our day and a prob-
lem for the entire human world, present and future. In the paper it is proved inter alia
that main philosophical arguments against science (first of all, arguments about the
instrumentalisation of the reason by science and the oppressive role of science in to-
day’s world) arouse serious doubts.
Keywords: ideal of science, practice of science, instrumentalisation of the reason,
oppressive role of science.
THE IDEAL OF SCIENCE
I understand the ideal of science as that which underlies the essential intent
and purpose of science, a universal pattern of science reflected in its practical
functioning. The ideal of science is, therefore, its fundamental normative–
descriptive foundation, the constituting basis of science. It determines the iden-
tity of science and lies at the core of its praxis which is—or in any case should
be—subordinated to it. The ideal regulates science dually: by establishing, first-
ly, its functions and, secondly, the general way in which it pursues its cognitive
coping with the world. The latter condition constitutes the epistemic basis of
comprehending the world by science and determines the cognitive values ac-
cepted and fulfilled by it and the basis of its methods. These two components of
the ideal of science are related with each other and determined by human nature.
140 Małgorzata Czarnocka
It may be claimed that the ideal of science arose from basic human needs:
they were what led to the establishing of science and to the formation of its
ideal in the ancient and early-modern eras. And it is human needs that uphold
the existence of science till today, giving it sense and importance. Therefore, the
ideal of science is not a product of convention, neither is it an accidental project
born from a unique coincidence of historical and cultural factors. The existence
and development of science is driven by human nature, and especially human
needs, i.e. the part of human nature which generates human beings’ activity.
More precisely, the ideal of science is determined by three kinds of funda-
mental human needs: biological, psychic and transcendental. Jűrgen Habermas in
his conception of three interests, presented in the Knowledge and Human Inter-
ests, indicates the biological and transcendental needs (he calls them “interests”),
but he does not refer to psychic needs.1 Biological needs emerge from the pursuit
of biological survival. Also important for the constitution of the ideal of science
are the psychic needs: to relieve existential sensations and emotions like wonder-
ment (pointed to e.g. by Max Scheler), concern, fear, the feeling of nonsense
(mentioned among others by Søren Kierkegaard and generally by existentialism),
the feeling of strangeness toward the world. Knowledge, especially scientific one,
is a rational, non-emotional response to such existential emotions.
Transcendental needs—as Habermas claims—arise from man’s desire to
transcend his animality. This category includes the need to grasp the world as
a whole, explain it by constructing images of it, and, in consequence, endow it
with sense. It may be added that present in human consciousness and self-
consciousness is the need to cognitively investigate and master the world (“mas-
ter” it in the spiritual and cognitive senses), and also to determine humanity’s
position in the hierarchy of beings or, to use Arnold Gehlen’s words, find man’s
place in the cosmos. The discerned world (i.e. cognitively represented by some
kind of symbolic model) is familiar, emotionally and transcendentally safe or at
least safer, and does not evoke constant feelings of endangerment, insecurity or
fear. The unknown, cognitively unmastered world appears as a constant threat
and continuously induces fear. Since the dawn of time people in all cultures—
also primeval, like that of the Aborigines—created comprehensive images of
the world unlimited to the immediate environment in which they fought for
biological survival. The most spectacular evidence of this are the cosmogonies
developed by primeval cultures. Generally speaking, the transcendental need to
move beyond the limitations of the daily survival battle is embedded in human
nature. The creation of world outlooks (comprehensive images of the world)
which are unrestricted to the human habitat is an attribute of humanity, not
a chimerical or contingent phenomenon appearing only in some cultures or
some historical eras. World outlooks, also those that are formulated in science,
—————————
1 Habermas, J. 1968. Erkenntnis und Interesse. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp; English edition:
1972. Knowledge and Human Interests. Shapiro, J. (Trans.). Heinemann Educational Books.
The Ideal and Praxis of Science 141
are an essential part of human consciousness and the lifeworld. Today it would
be hard to imagine human consciousness, the human lifeworld, and culture
without convictions and beliefs derived from science.
The psychic and transcendental needs which generate the ideal of science are
related to each other; both appear to belong to the same area of human spiritu-
ality. Both these types of needs are sometimes identified as pure curiosity or
a selfless drive towards knowledge. Pure curiosity, however, seems to take its
beginning in psychic and transcendental needs.
The functions of science as implied by psychic and transcendental needs re-
semble the functions of myths and religions. In creating their visions of the
world, these three cultural forms strive to “tame” it in a non-material, strictly
cognitive sense, to make it comprehensible, and therefore more familiar and
acceptable. Like mythology and religion, science creates comprehensive visions
of the world which reach beyond human habitats—visions which are useless for
biological survival.
In general, science realises numerous human needs, both shallowly material
and pseudo-material, and spiritual (psychic and transcendental). Needs which
are important for the constitution of the ideal of science and define its functions
are located also on the transcendental level of human nature. Contemporary
science critics are essentially wrong in ascribing to science the fulfilment of
exclusively material needs and claiming that it is merely an instrument of tech-
nology. It is precisely the multifariousness of human needs, non-restricted to the
biological and pseudo-material sphere that constitutes the fundament of science.
The forces which rule today’s world with their official ideologies and offi-
cial culture deprecate all the non-technological functions of science which real-
ise psychic and transcendental human needs, and strive to banish them from
social consciousness and lifeworlds and even from the consciousness of scien-
tists as unimportant and antiquated. Surprisingly, the forces of power and the
economic growth heralds who serve them resort to the argumentation which
strongly resembles that of science-critical philosophers, or, in a broader sense,
science-critical intellectuals. They all deform, narrow down and bring down
the ideal of science. Indeed, today the ideologies and other world-shaping
means at the disposal of the forces of power have managed to remove it from
social awareness almost entirely. What is especially astounding is that philoso-
phers increasingly take this obscure stance inspired by the interests of the global
forces of power, thus destroying the identity of science and obliterating its
true importance for humanity. It is so because science critics see only contem-
porary scientific praxis, which they take for the ideal of science, or, omitting the
ideal and praxis distinction, with science as such. The absence of categorisation
leads to an erroneous recognition of science nature, which in turn begins the
march towards a total critique of science—science in general, its ideal, and not
just the detachment of current scientific praxis from the ideal due to external
forces.
The ideal of science offers no concrete methodological prescriptions. In other

words, it does not prejudge the methods applied in scientific study. The ideal only
defines the epistemic fundament of the scientific method (or methods), and this
fundament consists of rationality and sensuality, which—as has been postulated at
least since Kant—are capable of cognising the world if rightly combined. The
ideal of science postulates the constitution of scientific methods in a specific rela-
tionship between rationality and sensuality which enables the acquisition of
knowledge which is rational and true, hence valid. Contemporary science critics
forget about the role of the senses in science, their alliance with the mind which
forms the base of scientific cognition. They focus on the rational without heed for
its connections to the sensual, which in a sense keeps the rational at bay by forc-
ing it to take account of the dictates of sensual experience.
The ideal of science determines only the general epistemic basis for scien-
tific methods, and allows for their diversity, which is reflected in scientific prax-
is. Scholars use different methods depending on their field, the development
phase of that field and the scientific community they belong to, without limiting
themselves to a single, universal methodical schema. The 20th century’s lengthy
and heated disputes between the supporters of inductionism, falsificationism,
Imre Lakatos’s research programmes, Thomas Kuhn’s cognitive paradigms, or
of methods based on building models went out from the false assumption that
science had to follow a single method (the Method) which needed to be extri-
cated from a multitude of ineligible variants.
If it is assumed that the ideal of science defines only the epistemic founda-
tion of science, and not its concrete methods, it can be admitted that this ideal
provide the basis for a variety of methods—methods which respect the cogni-
tive bond between sensuality and rationality. Accepted by the ideal of science
and present in scientific praxis, methodological pluralism is not tantamount to
methodical anarchy as the methods are not arbitrary— they must meet the con-
ditions set by the ideal.
Aiming at the construction of symbolic representations of the world, science
takes part—among other things—in forming the human sphere of transcend-
ence. In this respect its task is similar to the tasks posed in other cultural forms
like art, and especially literature, mythology and religion.
CRITIQUE OF SCIENCE
Today critique of science is usually associated with the appearance of

the postmodernism. Is it, then, appropriate to ascribe the role of the leading
science critic to Lyotard, whose The Postmodern Condition: A Report on
Knowledge2 is the most comprehensive postmodern work on science? I think
—————————
2 Lyotard, J-F. 1984. The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge. Bennington, G., B.
Massumi (Trans.). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984; French edition: La Condi-
tion postmoderne: Rapport sur le savoir. Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1979.
not, because the postmodern critique of science stems from the more fundamen-
tal critique of reason, the Enlightenment and modern rationality. To put it in the
most concise terms, the postmodernists criticise science because it is rational,
while they distance themselves from reason in general, seeing a different devel-
opment path for contemporary civilisation. Their view of science is negative
first of all not because of any specific feature of science, and not even because
of its methodology and destructive social roles (although these are also criti-
cised), but because of its rationality. The famed concept of instrumental reason
appears among others in The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge,
but basically only as a term customarily used to deprecate science and rationali-
ty in general. Lyotard pursued no extensive argumentation in this respect.
The pioneers and main representatives of the science-critical trend in con-
temporary philosophy are the Frankfurt School thinkers, especially Horkheimer
and Marcuse; it was they who authored the main argumentation behind claims
about science’s negative social and even civilisational roles. Their arguments
are still used today, quite often without reference to their sources whereas the
postmodernists managed to revive an ideologically-tainted aversion to science
and a general reluctance towards the rational, which, in the broader context of
their anti-Enlightenment programme, they implanted into intellectual circles,
especially those close to the humanities.
The first-generation Frankfurt School philosophers step out against science
as a social phenomenon enmeshed in relations to capitalism and its interests;
they see science through a set of modified Marxian categories. Horkheimer’s
Eclipse of Reason3 and Habermas’s Knowledge and Human Interests do not
question the ideal of science that had been accepted over ages,4 although Mar-
cuse does criticise it in parts of his One-dimensional Man.5 Also, the Frankfur-
tians oppose what they called instrumental rationality, which is, in their opinion,
typical for science and through it spread to entire civilisation. Lyotard’s The
Postmodern Condition contains critical comments similar to the Frankfurtians’
complaints, but—as I already mentioned—they are not very extensive. Lyotard
makes them as if in passing, directing the brunt of his critical attention to the
question of the validity of science, the fundaments of its legitimacy, which in
his opinion was ensured by philosophy. In fact, Lyotard criticises the historical
evolution phases of science (modern science) and does not propose its annihila-
tion but a methodological and axiological reconstruction—which, in fact, was
not, in the of time of publishing The Postmodern Condition, an absolutely novel
concept, as here he took amply from the ideas of Ludwig Wittgenstein, as well
—————————
3 Horkheimer, M. 1947. Eclipse of Reason. Oxford University Press. German edition:
1967/1968. Zur Kritik der instrumentellen Vernunft. Frankfurt am Main.
4 Habermas links the so-called critical sciences to the emancipatory interest, which strives to-
wards transcendence and the enrichment of human spirituality.

5 Marcuse, H. 1964. One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial
Society. Beacon Press.

as Paul Feyerabend and Thomas Kuhn. To put it quite simply, Lyotard formu-
lates a new scientific methodology programme based on Wittgenstein’s lan-
guage game conception; this project postulates multiple equivalent methods
which have no external legitimisation, especially philosophical one. Thus,
a comparison of both main lines of criticism clearly shows that it was the Frank-
furtians who first protested against science’s social role and its instrumentalisa-
tion of reason, and it is these accusations that are brought forth against science
today in countless writings—quite often as a side issue, nonetheless as unques-
tionable axioms.
In a very broad sense one could say that the disavowal of science belongs to
the ideological canon of the contemporary intellectual, who sees himself as
a postmodern humanist concerned about the human world and the Earth, or, less
grandiloquently, does not consider himself a technocrat and defies the oppres-
sive influence of science and technology. This canon, propounded among others
by the postmodernists (whose ideas, although somewhat ectypal,6 are still quite
audible in philosophy) binds reluctance, or even hostility towards science with
leftist views—unfairly and without convincing grounds. In denial of this claim
it is definitely worth reminding about its rejection by eminent leftist thinkers
like Habermas and Noam Chomsky, as well as other left-minded intellectuals
who advocated modified and simultaneously expanded Enlightenment ideals.
Most of the accusations against science raised today by philosophy and out-
side it as well (e.g. by some ecologists, genderists and so-called people of cul-
ture, especially those more or less associated with the arts) are not new, and
were forwarded already by Horkheimer, Marcuse, and a bit later by Habermas.
Today these accusations appear in multiple versions and contexts which may
differ in aspect and focus, but basically come down to the same. Below I present
a list of the main charges with my critical commentaries and, in some cases, my
reasons for their rejection.
Science and Instrumental Rationality
Science leads to the degradation of the spirituality of the individual “I” as

well as collective spirituality by processes which formalise, automate and limit
rationality. Science has changed the binding form of rationality and has thereby
degraded entire civilisation. The source of this degradation lies in science’s
imposition of an instrumental rationality sometimes identified with calculative
or formalistic rationality.
—————————
6 Ectypal insofar as the postmodernists today forward no new ideas, mainly building upon their
long-known conception, which they comment, polish up, expand, explicate or reflect on in refer-
ence to chosen cases.
This argument was extended by Horkheimer, who reflected on the matter

broadly in the Eclipse of Reason. Instrumental rationality is based on a science-
typical kind of subjective reason which stands in contrast to objective reason.7
Science was charged with instrumentalising reason even earlier by Wilhelm
Dilthey, Henri Bergson and Friedrich Nietzsche from the Lebensphilosophie
movement, who criticised both scientism and formalistic rationalism. It was
Nietzsche who coined the term “calculative” for the rationality which underlies
science.
The argument about instrumentalising reason continues to be one of
the more frequent accusations against science and is the Leitmotiv of many
science critiques—and of probably fundamental weight in philosophy. It is
frequently used without reference to its authors, nor to Max Weber, who intro-
duced the concept of instrumental rationality. Instrumental rationality is defined
loosely after Max Weber, as follows: Someone displays instrumentally rational-
ity insofar as he or she adopts suitable means to his/her ends. The concept of
instrumental rationality does not include the criterion of estimation of rationali-
ty of goals:
“It attaches little importance to the question whether the purposes as such are
reasonable. If it concerns itself at all with ends, it takes for granted that they
too are reasonable in the subjective sense, i.e. that they serve the subject’s
interest in relation to selfpreservation—be it that of the single individual, or
of the community on whose maintenance that of the individual depends.”8
Horkheimer assumes that instrumental reason and subjective reason (i.e. ab-
stract functioning of the thinking mechanism)9 are the same, however, his ex-
planations of both of them do not prove this identity. “Formalistic rationality”
means “thinking or reasoning based on calculations or expressed by use of
numbers and/or other mathematical constructions.”10
The Frankfurt School’s stand on rationality arouses two reservations. First,
it is doubtful whether—as, among others, Horkheimer believes—science has
obliterated objective rationality, this fundamental metaphysical creation which
is the ground for other ontological concepts and gives the world its meaning.
The thesis that science has destroyed objective reason stems (exclusively) from
the positivist conception of science with its uncompromising rejection of meta-
physics, and with phenomenalism which reduces science to collecting experi-
mental data. Epistemological realism rejects this view. From its perspective
—————————
7 Horkheimer wrote about this earlier in The Rationalism Debate in Contemporary Philosophy
(1934).
8 Horkeimer, M. 1947, op. cit., 12.
9 Ibid., 12.
10 The authors of the essay “Instrumental Rationality” in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philoso-
phy make no mention of any of the authors of the concept. Cf. Kolodny, N., J. Brunero. 2016.
"Instrumental Rationality.” In: The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2016 Edition).
Zalta, E. N. (Ed.); https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/rationality-instrumental.
science is based on the assumption that objective reason does exist—in the form
of ontic laws which “rule” reality. Here the main declared and practical purpose
of science is to construct theories which are symbolic representations of the
various aspects of reality it investigates—nature, man and the social world. And
if so, then science must assume the existence of objective reason as otherwise it
would be pointless in the realistic sense. According to epistemological realism,
the fundamental role of science is to reveal objective reason, that is, the reason
of the world beyond the subject.
Secondly, instrumental rationality, defined as focusing on the most efficient
or cost-effective means to achieve a specific end, but not in itself reflecting on
the value of that end—seems to be hardly questioned as a universal and neutral
aspect of rational activity which is non-destructive to humans and society. Such
partial (aspectual) rationality seems to be natural and desirable not only in sci-
ence, but in all human activity, especially of the cognitive kind. For instance,
a philosopher who decides to investigate the ideas of Plato will be acting ration-
ally if he does this by reading and analysing Plato’s and his commentators’ writ-
ings. He will not be acting rationally if he does it by visiting a cave or travelling
to Greece to absorb the atmosphere of the antique among its ancient relics in the
hope of gaining more insight into Plato’s philosophy. In the first case the phi-
losopher adapts his mean to his goal, in the latter two he does not. Nonetheless,
instrumental rationality alone does not guarantee that our activity will be suc-
cessful; there are more conditions to be met. Therefore instrumental rationality
seems to be a necessary, weak condition of every kind of human activity that
can be regarded as rational.
However, adapting means to ends is not a sufficient criterion of subjective
rationality. Instrumental rationality does not embrace inquiries into the effects
(i.e. achieved goals) of activity, simply because it is so narrowly defined. It is
a partial rationality which concerns only one aspect of activity, i.e. effective-
ness in achieving goals, or how they are achieved. Complete, comprehensive
subjective rationality (i.e. rationality of human activity) requires instrumental
rationality to be “glued together” with other rationality aspects. The evaluation
of values of attained goals, especially of their rational character as well as of
their desirability for humans, whether they serve to develop humanness, etc., is
a separate task which demands an inclusion of the value sphere in the debate.
Such comprehensiveness lies beyond the possibilities of instrumental rationali-
ty, which by definition plays a smaller, partial role in human activity, especially
in cognition. However, it should be mentioned that the axiological neutrality of
this rationality is nevertheless a matter for debate, because the means of realiz-
ing goals, and not only goals, should be evaluated, e.g. in respect of their right-
fulness or cognitive adequacy.
Generally speaking, subjective rationality appears to consist of a number of
criteria, instrumental rationality being only one of its necessary conditions, and
a weak and neutral one at that. I find it hard to understand why it is so heftily
criticised. It seems to me that instead of being disavowed and rejected, it should

be conceded its due place and role. Moreover, we should also seek other neces-
sary conditions besides instrumental rationality—conditions, which taken to-
gether would offer a comprehensive picture of subjective rationality.
The criterion of adapting means to ends evokes a rather strong protest from
philosophers, among others because they see instrumental rationality as full
rationality and not just a partial condition of rational activity. Instead of setting
different types of rationality against each other, it may be advisable to recognise
them as only aspects (sides, elements) of full rationality and search for the rest
of the set of criteria which define it.
A closer look at the Eclipse of Reason shows that in his critical reflection on
instrumental rationality Horkheimer was basically criticising the pragmatic spir-
it of our times and saw instrumental rationality as its signum temporis. The aim
and main object of his critique was the pragmatic character of contemporary
civilisation. In my opinion Horkheimer’s postulate that practicality is closely
tied to instrumental reason is doubtful, as the pragmatic attitude and then prag-
matism focus on the aims, and the means of attaining them are of secondary
importance. In our contemporary strongly pragmatic world we consistently re-
sort to the “ends justify means” maxim, among others in social reality. In our
pursuit of our aims and goals we pay little heed to the means we employ, which
may be unreliable, unethical or inconsistent with binding moral norms or laws.
Such means can take the form of false ideology (a mighty instrument of enslav-
ing societies), the barefaced lies often propounded by politicians or economists,
or emotional manipulation. An example are the notoriously noble aims official-
ly professed as the reason for warfare (defence of democracy, human rights,
etc.), where lies are constructed to play on both the highest and the lowest emo-
tions, and sometimes on the most trite and primitive sentiments. No mention at
all is made of the means by which these aims are to be achieved (human loss,
suffering, mass-scale death, violation of moral standards, laws and rights, in-
cluding human rights, the brutalisation and moral regression of humanness,
etc.). Today useful lies are an instrument frequently employed to influence so-
cial consciousness. In such situations the main focus is on the ends, and the
means are adjusted to their attainment. Along the path towards achieving the
ends such means are often freely manipulated, replaced or supplemented by
others. Means are of secondary importance for today’s forces of power, and this
tendency seems to be spreading to entire societies, leading to their moral and
civilisational degradation.
The Enlightenment laboured under the delusion that reason was the sole
source of morality and human improvement, that it was not only the subject
of cognition, but, through cognition, it also revealed moral values; hence cogni-
tion itself (rational, mainly scientific) led to human development and better-
ment. Enlightenment ideas expected rationality to construct the entire moral
value sphere, to penetrate the sphere of emotions and values and control it by
taming and subordinating these emotions and values, and thereby making them
rational.
This expectation is too radical and therefore unfulfillable. Forgotten here is
the partially autonomous character of the human spheres. It can be claimed that
the sphere of rational thought, or, in a broader sense, rational activity, is one of
several spheres which denote humanness. It can also be reasonably assumed that
these spheres interact, are bound with each other and mutually shape and modi-
fy themselves, but at the same time remain partly autonomous. Reason is tied to
emotions and values, it can bridle them to some degree, but it is wrong to claim
that it can gain total control over them and transform them into something pure-
ly rational. In this context one may well wonder if the Enlightenment idea could
not be rectified by the assumption that the sphere of reason is bound with that
what differs from reason, and that reason, values and emotions mutually influ-
ence each other, but at the same time they preserve their separateness and partial
autonomy.
In the Eclipse of Reason Horkheimer stands up in defence of philosophy as
a quest after knowledge which can meet human spiritual needs and develop
humanness, or the human spiritual sphere. Unlike the postmodernists, he does
not postulate the removal or marginalistion of rationality. Quite to the contrary,
he speaks out for rationality in its highest dimension, full, unlimited to one (sci-
entific) way of thinking, and value-related. Horkheimer’s views carry some
elements of Enlightenment rationalism, which claimed that reason, and specifi-
cally science, was the main force behind human improvement. According to
Horkheimer and other science critics, this was something that never was and
never would be the case, as science with its human-degrading instrumental
rationality stood on the side of those social forces which led mankind to regres-
sion. Horkheimer saw instrumental rationality as narrow, mechanical and calcu-
lative, and its propagation as a tool of oppression and a path towards a civilisa-
tion of human automatons who submit to the pressure of authority.
Further doubts arise in connection with the equating of instrumental ration-
ality with formalistic, or calculative, rationality that is often encountered in
subject literature. “Formalistic rationality” means thinking or reasoning based
on calculations or expressed by the use of numbers and/or other mathematical
constructions. Horkheimer and especially Marcuse interweave these two types
of rationality and treat them as one. So-called calculativeness is a permanently
criticised feature of scientific reflection. However, does calculativeness, or the
use of mathematical language in reasoning, hence also in representations of
reality, constitute a specific form of rationality as Nietzsche, Heidegger, Lyo-
tard and others claim? No, if mathematical language and the mathematical
means of conceptual expression are understood as one of many ways of con-
structing symbolic and cognitive representations of reality. The mathematical
means used to represent reality in the empirical sciences are not the only means
admitted in science, and are neither necessary nor determined by the ideal of
science, but only one of the ways of representing, which science considers to be
convenient and capacious. The degree of mathematisation (i.e. the extent in
which mathematical means are used) differs from field to field and in the vari-
ous development stages of science. Contrary to what science critics maintain,
neither adherence to a single scientific method nor mathematical representation
are identity attributes of science. Calculativeness is one of the form in which
thoughts are “clothed,” and mathematics is one of the means by which reality is
symbolically expressed. However, calculativeness is not a form of rationality.
The Oppressive Nature of Science?
Science stands on the side of politically conservative forces and it is a tool of

social oppression which destroys humanity by technification. This argument
against science was brought forth by the Frankfurt School, and, in a somewhat
more diffuse and less theoretically grounded form, is typically present in the
intellectual awareness of circles who consider themselves progressive or leftist,
or, as the postmodernists, a human avant-garde.
The Frankfurt School took its vision of science as an additional production
means, and, in consequence, a tool of oppression, from Karl Marx (Horkheimer
in the Eclipse of Reason and Marcuse in the One-dimensional Man), whereas
Lyotard claims—using another Marxian concept—that scientific and technolog-
ical knowledge is a commodity.11 In general, the claim about science’s oppres-
sive character is theoretically grounded and justified in those philosophical
trends which accept at least some Marxian ideas. In other contexts, and also
outside philosophy—e.g. in ecological and gender milieus which strongly reject
Marxism—it is nothing but a theoretically unfounded ideological slogan.
This diagnosis was and still is in many ways perfectly right in its claims
about the relations between science and the social sphere. However, I seriously
doubt if science’s alliance with political and economic power is voluntary. In
my view, science is not a side of the politically conservative forces of the world
but their victim.
So, in other words, the position and status of science today can also be de-
fined in reverse to the dominating trend. Namely, science can be seen as the
victim of the conservative forces of power and economic forces, and not their
ally. It is easy to see that science in our times has reached a crossroads: incapac-
itated by the forces of power (political, economic and also religious, although
the last to a lesser degree less than in previous ages), it can either succumb to
their pressure or try to fight for its autonomy, for the ability to retain the funda-
ments of its identity and evolve according to its own ideals. But what chance
does science have in this battle if the pressure exerted by the social world, the
world of power, is almost overwhelming? Contemporary scientific praxis re-
—————————
11 Lyotard, J-F. 1984, op. cit., 4–5. Cf. also “Foreword” (ibid.) by Fredric Jameson, xv.
sembles all today’s human world submitted to the pressure of political and eco-
nomic forces of power, which shape social consciousness and impose not only
lifestyles but whole cultures. Non-scientific forces are steadily deforming the
ideal of science. Science is being deprived of its autonomy, it is becoming
a puppet manipulated in the interests of the forces of power, which in their offi-
cial ideologies rather cynically identify their interests with human welfare and
civilisational progress. The increasingly aggressive imposition of lifestyles
eradicates from social consciousness the image of man as a transcendental being
which has spiritual (transcendental) needs, not only material and compulsive
and ideologically-steered pseudo-material ones.
At least since World War II science has suffered under a growing gap be-
tween its ideal and its praxis to an incomparably greater degree than in earlier
times.12 This is a basic problem of science in today’s world. This constantly
widening chasm is the effect of the increasing and aggressive pressure on sci-
ence by external social factors, predominantly institutionalised forces of power.
These forces strive to take possession of science, to change it into an instrument
by which they will be able to pursue their goals. Science is increasingly subor-
dinated to these forces, which have beset it and are striving to gain control over
it. As in the case of their pressure on other spheres of human activity, here too
the forces of power have the means of taking possession and enslaving, includ-
ing financial (steered funding), legal (regulation of the character of academic
schools) and ideological (imposition of the desired image of science on socie-
ties). Constant pressure is being exerted on science by political and economic
authorities and, although to a limited extent, conservative religious institutions.
Official ideologies propagate the view that science has only a utilitarian role,
whereby this usefulness has to serve the consumer lifestyle model, one of the
driving forces of capitalism. The imposition of lifestyles is an important instru-
ment by which capitalist forces secure their interests.
A no less important element of the ideological game involves the implanta-
tion of anti-intellectual attitudes by limiting the role and functions of reason to
narrowly-defined practical tasks. According to the ruling ideologies, and, in
consequence, the dominating attitudes, intellectual zeal, pure cognitive passion,
enrichment of the human spiritual sphere, etc., are either an eccentricity or an
anachronism, or at most provide fleeting entertainment, information noise with
no intellectual effect on its receivers. The mass media report about, say, discov-
eries in astrophysics very rarely and between accounts of the marital turbulenc-
es of so-called stars. In other words, without a theoretical context to explain the
purpose and aims of what it refers to, scientific information becomes an exotic
and ephemeral oddity without import for the construction of collective and indi-
vidual consciousness.
—————————
12 Approximately—as precise dating in such cases is always risky.
Ideologies also propound an ambivalent and deformed image of scientists.

One the one hand, they play the role of experts—who usually confirm opinions
spread by the mass media (being, among other things, tools of ideology), or
technocrats—useful mediators in the production of commodities (consumer
goods, but also medical as well as lethal products). On the other hand, they are
pictured as eccentric outsiders, especially when they involve themselves in fun-
damental research which is commercially useless. According to the mass media,
science is a useless eccentricity and a waste of public funds and energy if it does
not serve the needs imposed by ideology and propagated lifestyles.
Outside pressure on science aims to transform it into a subordinated sphere
suitable for the pursuit of interests which lie beyond it and are to a large degree
alien to it. This pressure leads to the gradual relegation of the ideal of science
and, in effect, the deformation of the identity of science and successive re-
striction of its autonomy. The permanent pressure first degenerates scientific
praxis, and through this gradually destroys the ideal of science—this normative-
descriptive fundament which establishes the identity of science and guards it.
As I said before, the promoted ideologies and their authors officially main-
tain that the role of science is to serve humanity, but in fact they mean service to
their own interests. Sometimes the interests of the forces of power coincide with
those of humanity (basic research in medicine, biochemistry, healthcare tech-
nology, etc.), and sometimes not at all. It is also still maintained—to a limited
degree and certainly less that during the Middle Ages or the Renaissance era in
Europe, but with rising frequency—that religious truth has priority over scien-
tific truth, which de facto postulates the subordination of science to religious
dogma. And this although still quite recently one could have thought that centu-
ries of strife had settled the issue once and for all.
In today’s world, however, science is very rarely regarded as a creator of
world outlooks or a sphere that is crucial for human spirituality, neither is sci-
ence (or, in a broader sense, rationality) seen as a desired path of education or
upbringing (Bildung). No one refers to Weber’s rationalisation (disenchant-
ment) of the world, or transformed Enlightenment ideals. The attitude towards
science is a sign of our times, which are ruled by the narrow-minded myth of
commercial utility and, in their disavowal of transcendental human needs, ham-
per human development.
In some ways today’s explosion of anti-rationalisms and anti-intellectualism
has put the world in regression, back into the pre-Enlightenment era, when emo-
tions, false authorities, religious faith and interests and dogmas smuggled
through by ideologies played a major role, and reason was considered subsidi-
ary to the diverse pursuits of the forces that ruled the world. Despite all the pro-
gress and its truly positive fruit it brings, civilisation leads to man’s regression
because it narrows down his nature.
The Frankfurtians and postmodernists were—and still are—in many ways
perfectly right in their conclusions about the place of science in the contempo-
rary human world. What arouses my reservations is their claim, or outright in-
sistence, that science’s alliance with power is unforced, that science binds itself
to power voluntarily because that is its nature, and that it therefore stands on the
side of oppressive social forces. To my mind it is not science that should be put
in the dock here but forces that are external to it.
These diagnoses also have inconsistencies: their authors define science as
a production means or commodity and claim it is objectified, therefore non-
autonomous, deprived of the power of self-determination and easy to manipu-
late, an inert object and not a subject that can be a partner in any kind of social
game. But if so, then neither can it be held responsible for anything, including
its present status quo.
As I have already noticed it would be more appropriate to say that science is
a victim—stripped of subjectivity and autonomy and demoted to an object, it
becomes an object. One that is taken possession of, manipulated and enslaved,
a victim of oppression. To use another Marxian term, science is becoming al-
ienated and is losing its subjectivity. Science’s gradual submission of its auton-
omy, its remote steering without heed for its nature, the degeneration of the
ideal of science and the trend to reform science to serve the interests of the
powers that rule the world—all this has been clearly visible in science over the
past decades. Similar pressure and enslavement can be witnessed in other cul-
ture spheres, including art.
To sum up, science-critical philosophy, notably that of the Frankfurt School
and its diverse followers, offered accurate and still valid diagnoses of the condi-
tion of science in today’s world and its role in social and economic processes.
However, their reflections led them to a seemingly doubtful (or at least debata-
ble) conclusion, on whose strength they accused science en bloc.
Science and Technology
Science critics see science in an inseverable bond with technology. They be-
lieve both are similar and bound with each other, or even totally united. This
view has given birth to a new category—technoscience. In fact, however, the
application of science as a technological instrument is relatively late and con-
cerns only one of science’s functions, namely that of fulfilling biological needs,
which today are extended to the pseudo-biological needs.
Some popular conceptions say that science and technology (i.e. technified
science or “technoscience” in one of the term’s meanings) lead to the degrada-
tion of the human material world because they create technological means
which endanger the natural environment and social technologies which ruin
traditional social structures, and that therefore science and technology play
a part in transforming natural and social reality.
What is surprising in this view is its one-sidedness and the discernible long-
ing for times when there was no science or technology, for a civilisation con-
temporary humans are not even able to imagine. Doubtless it is to a large degree
founded on opposition to the negative civilisational effects of ever-newer tech-
nology and unbridled progress, like dwindling natural resources, environmental
pollution, the destruction of traditional social bonds and other undesired and
harmful phenomena. The list is much longer as there are countless negative
phenomena at play here. And topping them all is annihilation technology—
weaponry and other lethal means, e.g. drones. Nonetheless, one rarely hears any
doubts or queries in this matter. On the other hand, everybody is able to name as
many positive sides to technology—from the local to the pan-human level. In-
deed, it is difficult to understand where this demonstrative and radical one-
sidedness comes from.
Science grew out of philosophy. For centuries both had the same goal: to
define the world by means of rational theory, by conceptions relating to the
various spheres and levels of reality. The technological application of scientific
findings, their use for the introduction of chiefly material change in the world,
gives science a new function, which has in a sense been “added” to it by history.
Derivative in character, this function developed gradually and rather recently
and does not suppress science’s primary functions or relegate the ideal of sci-
ence, but expands and enriches them.
Science and Other Culture Spheres
Science threatens and destroys culture, among others by marginalising

some of its spheres like art and the lifewords. This argument put forward by the
science critics opposes science culture as such, and says that both stand in
a natural conflict. It is more or less explicitly claimed that culture and science
do not form a whole growing out from the common basis of human nature, but
are essentially different. This view is extensively discussed among others by
Charles Percy Snow in his still-referred to book The Two Cultures.13
If we accept science as a form of culture (in Ernst Cassirer’s meaning) and
the ideal of science in the above-proposed version, then it is reasonable to say
that science as one of the forms of transcendence is related to other culture
forms, and, as in the case of other culture forms, has the task of fulfilling human
psychic and transcendental needs. Like other forms of culture, science creates
worldviews, which in turn co-form lifeworlds, thus fulfilling man’s need to
reach beyond his animality. Also the ways in which science meets this task re-
semble those employed in other culture forms: they all construct symbolic rep-
resentations of reality.
—————————
13 Snow, Ch. P. 1959 (2001). The Two Cultures. London: Cambridge University Press.
Is Science a Threat to Philosophy?
Science usurps the right to replace philosophy. This charge, which among
others Horkheimer forwarded in the Eclipse of Reason, is a reaction to the stand
held by radical scientists, and in Horkheimer’s day pragmatists and positivists,
and not a belief proclaimed by scientists themselves. It is not scientists and sci-
ence but radical scientists, including scientism-close philosophers, who claim
science is able to respond to all the problems which traditionally lay in the
scope of philosophy. Indeed, a subject of philosophical debate today are the
essentially scientistic conceptions contributed by some thinkers, and projects
addressing philosophy’s status, objectives and tasks in view of its retreat from
certain traditional exploration fields (among others in effect of the emergence
from philosophy of exact empirical sciences like psychology, sociology or
logics).
One of the defenders of the claim that philosophy is superfluous as a source
of cognitive insight into the world is the postmodernism-associated Richard
Rorty. Earlier similar views were proclaimed by Ludwig Wittgenstein, who
denied philosophy the function of creating knowledge, or even an ideological
function, and postulated limiting it to therapeutic roles. Rorty speaks about the
death of philosophy, at least as a source of any reliable knowledge about the
world, and relegates this task to science. Similarly the postmodernists refuse
philosophy the position of a field offering any kind of knowledge about the
world and transfer its cognitive functions to science. Anyway all the findings of
science in keeping with the postmodernist view are binding only as a game le-
gitimised by convention. Postmodernism waives the very idea of reliable
knowledge about the world; it is accompanied by an irremovable and universal
cognitive scepticism, which paradoxically comes from a surplus of equal in-
sights into the world. In a more general sense, in the 20th century members of
various philosophical schools raised doubts about philosophy’s role as a source
of knowledge about the world. They suggested diverse new aims and tasks for
philosophy, and transferred its cognitive tasks (executable or not) to science.
Interestingly, projects based on the claim that science generates knowledge
about the world (and is not merely a technological tool) emerge in milieus
which deny science a purely cognitive function, which would suggest a certain
duality of approach.
Contemporary philosophical analyses and conceptions draw vastly on the
findings of science. Science is a source of knowledge and inspiration for philo-
sophical anthropology, Darwinism, social philosophy (which makes use of so-
ciological surveys), the philosophy of the mind, language, nature, etc. In fact,
scientific findings are also used by philosophers representing schools and trends
which profess philosophy to be an autonomous field, and at the same time reject
Quine’s restrictive naturalism and scientism. It can be said that science is a con-
dition of the existence of contemporary philosophy, so it cannot jeopardise it.
SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHICAL SCIENCE CONCEPTIONS
The image of science professed by science critics is to a large degree based

on the views of their most ardent adversaries over the past few decades—the
positivists and neopositivists. Regardless of the philosophical school or tradition
they come from, science critics stand in an inner conflict: they reject positivism
en bloc and claim that its conception of science is inadequate, and simultane-
ously they use this conception as the core of their own concept of science, and
in effect perceive science from a positivist perspective. Horkheimer states this
clearly, when he says in the Eclipse of Reason that, “positivist philosophy […]
after all reflects the character of science at a given historical stage.”14 These
words are preceded by an extensive critique of the positivist view of science, in
which Horkheimer writes among others: “The positivists seem to forget that
natural science as they conceive it is above all an auxiliary means of production,
one element among many in the social process.”15 Similarly Lyotard in The
Postmodern Condition derives some his views on science from parts of already
classical verificationist and falsificationist science conceptions. What is ignored
here is the fact that the positivist, and especially logical empiricist science con-
ceptions were branded as outdated, inadequate and artificial already in the early
1960s. The two milestones here were the publication of Thomas Kuhn’s The
Structure of Scientific Revolutions and the English version of Karl R. Popper’s
Logic of Scientific Discovery. Thus, the science critics’ attacks on science in the
positivist and logical empiricist understanding is today an antiquated approach.
IDEAL OF SCIENCE VERSUS SCIENTIFIC PRAXIS

—A FORGOTTEN DISTINCTION
Philosophical science critics usually fail to distinguish between the scientific

ideal and contemporary scientific praxis. In effect, they take what scientific
praxis is today to be the nature of science, or claim outright that contemporary
scientific praxis perfectly reflects the ideal of science. Marcuse in One-
Dimensional Man went further, insisting that it was precisely contemporary
science that embodied the ideal of science and that science owed its present
condition to its nature. Among others, Marcuse maintained that by its nature
science tended towards a rationality that was instrumental, formalised and cal-
culative, but he was rather isolated in this view.
If the distinction between the ideal of science and the praxis of science were
taken into account in judgements about contemporary science, we would have
a totally different situation: not science itself would stand accused by philoso-
—————————
14 Horkheimer, M. 1947, op. cit., 50.
15 Ibid., 40–41.
phy, but the way science is realised today. In other words—contemporary scien-
tific praxis.
It is difficult to resolve today issues which belong to the future. However,
one may suppose that the present phase of an increasing chasm between the
ideal of science and the praxis of science, of the non-recognition of the consti-
tuting role of the ideal of science, and of the abandonment of this ideal for the
particularistic interests will threaten with a certain form of post-science which
will be a distressing caricature of the ideal science has adhered to over ages.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR — PhD, full professor of philosophy, Institute of Philoso-

phy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences; Nowy Świat 72, 00–330 War-
szawa, Poland; research fields: epistemology, philosophical anthropology, philosophy
of dialogue; editor-in-chief of Dialogue and Universalism.
No. 3/2017
Giovanni Boniolo, Mattia Andreoletti,

Federico Boem, Emanuele Ratti
THE MAIN FACES OF ROBUSTNESS
ABSTRACT
In the last decade, robustness has been extensively mentioned and discussed in bio-
logy as well as in the philosophy of the life sciences. Nevertheless, from both fields,
someone has affirmed that this debate has resulted in more semantic confusion than in
semantic clearness. Starting from this claim, we wish to offer a sort of prima facie map
of the different usages of the term. In this manner we would intend to predispose a sort
of “semantic platform” which could be exploited by those who wish to discuss or sim-
ply use it. We do this by starting from a core distinction between the robustness of re-
presentations, which is a philosophy of science issue, and the representations of robust-
ness, which instead pertains to science. We illustrate our proposal with examples from
biology, physics and mathematics.
Keywords: robustness, representation, robustness of representations, representations
of robustness, scientific terminology.
1. INTRODUCTION
Over the last ten years the term “robustness” has been diffusely used in the
biological community (see Wagner, 2005). This is because a lot of things in
biology could be considered robust:
“[t]he genetic code is a robust encoding of aminoacids into codons, RNA
molecules are robust to point mutations, proteins are robust to translation er-
rors, developmental pathways are robust to environmental or genetic dis-
turbances, metabolic networks are robust to changes in enzyme efficiency
[…] the list goes on and on” (Wilke, 2005, 695).
However, there is a danger in exploiting in such a way a concept: it may be-
come “so generic and widely applicable that its use may contribute little to the
understanding of specific biological systems” (Wilke, 2005, 695).
158 Giovanni Boniolo, Mattia Andreoletti, Federico Boem, Emanuele Ratti
A similar situation has also occurred in the philosophy of life sciences. Since
the seminal papers of Richard Levins (1966), William C. Wimsatt (1981) and
Steven Orzack and Elliott Sober (1993) (see also Levins, 1993), robustness has
become the target of an ever-increasing interest. Unfortunately, such an interest
has not always produced a better explication. Certainly, there have been at-
tempts to set the situation in a more effective way (see Weisberg, 2006), or to
propose a classification of different kinds of robustness (see Woodward, 2006;
Weisberg, Reisman, 2008; Raerinne, 2013). For instance, Jacob Stegenga
(2009, 650) claims that, at the very end, “[r]obustness is a recent term for
a common platitude: hypotheses are better supported with plenty of evidence
generated by multiple techniques that rely on different background assump-
tions.” However, even though there is nothing wrong in this definition, it sounds
too much general that we might wonder why we need use the term “robustness”
at all. Indeed, we agree with Thomas Nickles (2012, 330) affirming that “[i]n
recent years the term ‘robustness,’ its cognates and neighbours (solidity, persis-
tence, hardiness, reliability, resilience, viability, flexibility, healthiness, etc.)
have been applied to just about everything.” As a consequence, the notion of
robustness could become a sort of a scarcely informative umbrella-term Never-
theless, we think that we should not abandon the term. On the contrary, it
should deserve a greater attention since it is correlated with, many interesting
questions regarding both science and philosophy of science (issues concerning
realism, confirmation, modelling, etc.). By starting exactly from this idea, we
wish to construct a sort of “semantic platform” in which many (the list is not
exhaustive) uses of the term could find their proper place. From a certain point
of view, our task is very humble since we want only to construct a sort of pre-
liminary (and non-exhaustive) map that could be useful for orienting those who
decide to navigate through the waters of “robustness.”
In order to better predispose such a semantic platform we should, on the one
hand, not limit ourselves to biology but consider also other sciences, in particu-
lar mathematics and physics, and, on the other hand, speaking in a general way
of scientific representations without entering the old and never ending debate on
theories and models. Concerning this point, it is not even the case to dwell here
upon what a scientific representation is (see Boniolo, 2007; van Fraassen,
2008). For our aim it is enough to recall that it, as we know since long time, has
to be as much as possible logically coherent and empirically adequate in the
domain in which it has been designed to work. Thus it is not worth discussing
here if classical mechanics, quantum mechanics, general relativity, molecular
biology, population genetics, etc. are theories or models or which is the differ-
ences between them and the nuclear models, or the Lotka-Volterra model, or the
mathematical models of physiological processes, etc. For our purposes, it is
enough to consider all of them as scientific representations.
As said, the main aim of our analysis consists in distinguishing and mapping
the multiple meanings of robustness, starting from a very general definition
The Main Faces of Robustness 159
according to which it concerns the persistence of certain characteristics under

some variations or perturbations. The first move towards that goal could be to
separate the persistence of certain characteristics of the piece of nature grasped
by the scientific representations, from the persistence of the characteristic of
the scientific representations as such. That is, we propose to distinguish between
(1) the scientific representations of robustness, which is a topic pertaining to
scientific inquiry and, because of that, of some interest for the philosophers of
science, and (2) the robustness of the scientific representations, which is an
epistemological topic to be analysed precisely by the philosophers of science.1
For example, Claus O. Wilke (2005) and Andreas Wagner (2005) address the
former, while Stegenga (2009) and Nickles (2012) address the latter.
Starting from this division we will see that a conceptual review of the several
uses of the term will permit us to touch many questions. In particular, concern-
ing the scientific representations, the unravelling of “robustness” becomes a sort
of philosophical tool to better comprehend certain classical issues concerning
the scientific representations and their relations with what is represented (e.g.,
justification, underdetermination, etc.).
Moving to the representations of robustness, we will show that beyond the
everyday and non-technical meanings of the notion of robustness (that could be
used by biologists and physicists as intuitive term of the ordinary language that
they introduce in their jargon), there are at least two precise and technical mean-
ings which are worth mentioning: one coming from dynamical systems theory
and one coming from graph theory.
When completed the conceptual review in the two ambits just mentioned, we
should have a semantic platform that could be used whenever someone feels the
necessity of talking in terms of robustness.
2. ROBUSTNESS OF THE SCIENTIFIC REPRESENTATIONS
Roughly speaking, the self-declared scope of natural sciences is to (both the-

oretically and empirically) grasp the world around us in order to explain it and
forecasting future events. Moreover, as said, this scope is mainly realized by
constructing scientific representations.
Once accepted this plausible preamble, we may focus the attention on our
topic. There are many classifications of robustness in the philosophical litera-
ture, but more or less all of them deal with Levins’ account (1966), rethought by
Wimsatt (1981), revised by Weisberg (2005, 2006) and synthesized and gener-
alized by Stegenga (2009) in this way: Robustness: The state in which a hy-
—————————
1 A quite similar distinction has been proposed also by Wimsatt (2012). Indeed, he distin-
guishes inferential robustness from material robustness: the former deals with what we have
called scientific representations, while the latter deals with robustness as a property of material
systems. We prefer the nomenclature above, since it appears clearer to us.
pothesis is supported by evidence from multiple techniques with independent

background assumptions (651).
Note that, here, in question there are representations (which are always hy-
pothetical) and that, according to Stegenga, “[t]echnique’ is unspecified in this
definition, since robustness can be a feature of statistical analyses, models, and
experiments.”
Let us begin to put things straight. First of all, an empirical result can be
either the outcome of an experimental procedure or the conclusion of an obser-
vation.2 Nevertheless also a representation of natural processes usually leads to
a result. Thus the validity of that representation is given by the comparison be-
tween the result (and the error interval with which it is given) obtained through
the experimental/observational procedure and the result (and the error interval
with which it is given) obtained within the representation. By taking this point
into consideration, in the aforementioned definition there are actually three dif-
ferent epistemological layers, or, if you prefer, three different notions of robust-
ness: what we call (i) empirical robustness, which will allow us to meet topics
concerning empirical justification; (ii) inter-representational empirical robust-
ness, which will permit us to touch themes regarding different formulations of
the same piece of the empirical world; and finally (iii) inter-representational
inferential robustness, which will consent us to enucleate deductive parts com-
mon to many representations. Let us see each of them one by one.
2.1. Empirical robustness

By “empirical robustness” we indicate the fact that a representation is empir-
ically supported by the same set of empirical results which, however, have been
obtained through independent experimental/observational procedures. More
precisely,
a representation is empirically robust if there is a persistence of its empirical
support under the variations of the experimental/observational procedures.
Needless to say, what we call here empirical robustness is nothing but an ex-
tremely well known methodological issue. In fact, since there has been a meth-
odological reflection on the relationships between a scientific representation and
“reality” (see the seminal: Bernard, 1865; Duhem, 1906; Mach, 1905; Camp-
bell, 1920; Dingler, 1928; Schrödinger, 1955), it has been clear that the more
convergent and independent empirical results there are, the more the correlated
representation is empirically confirmed (or supported, corroborated, etc.). Wil-
liam Whewell (1840) would have claimed that “[i]t is a matter of consilience,”
and Edward O. Wilson (1998) would have re-claimed the same many decades
after.
—————————
2 Here we do not enter the classical discussion on the relationship experiment-observation.
A paradigmatic example, on which we will be back in a while, is given by

the supposed numerical equivalence between inertial and gravitational mass
that, in the course of about four centuries, has been empirically supported by
several different experimental/observational procedures. Indeed, Galileo Galilei
(1638), Isaac Newton (1687) and Friedrich Bessel (1832) used swinging pendu-
lums, of course, inside totally different experimental contexts; Loránd Eötvös
(1891) and Eötvös, Dezsö Pekár and Jenő Fekete (1922) used a torsion balance
with asymmetric arms; Peter G. Roll, Sergei S. Krotov and Robert H. Dicke
(1964) and V. B. Braginskij and V. I. Panov (1972) used a torsion balance with
symmetric arms. Just to mention another case, consider the quantum representa-
tion claiming that light is both a wave and a corpuscle: it has been empirically
confirmed an uncountable number of times by means of different experimental
procedures. In situation of velocities much slower than light and in meso- or
macroscopic dimensions, also the representation of the world offered by classi-
cal physics has been empirically confirmed innumerable times by a myriad of
different empirical procedures, as we know simply by our everyday life. From
this point of view, we should say that the numerical equivalence between iner-
tial and gravitational mass, the quantum mechanical understanding of light (in
the microscopic domain with objects moving at classical velocities) and the
classical mechanical formulation (in a supra-microscopic domain with objects
moving at classical velocities) are empirically robust. To make it simpler and
clearer, empirical robustness could be the label for the empirical confirma-
tion/corroboration/justification of a representation by means of different obser-
vational/experimental procedures. Something extremely well known, even if
under a different name, since the birth of the reflection on what the methodolog-
ical role of an experiment/observation is. Something that, paradoxically enough,
seems to be nowadays questioned in many biomedical researches (see Boniolo,
Vaccari, 2012).
2.2. Inter-representational empirical robustness

By “inter-representational empirical robustness” we propose to designate the
possibility that a hypothetical statement, belonging to different scientific repre-
sentations, each one having different background assumptions, may be support-
ed by the same empirical results, sometimes obtained through independent pro-
cedures. This is an epistemological claim affirming that there could be at least
two scientific representations in which the same statement concerning a state of
the world is derived, and that it is empirically confirmed sometimes via the
same empirical procedure, sometimes via independent empirical procedures.
That is,
A scientific statement is inter-representationally empirically robust if there is
a persistence of its empirical support under the variations of the scientific rep-
resentations which it belongs to.
Before exemplifying this use, it is worth noting that there is another way of
seeing this situation and that such an alternative is well known since a very long
time. Indeed, since Apollonius of Perga and Hipparchus of Nicaea’s works in
the 3 century B.C., it was quite clear that the same situation (in their case the
apparent motion of the planets and the varying speed of the Moon) could be, on
the one hand, supported by the same set of observations and, on the other hand,
grasped by several different representations starting from very different assump-
tions. In particular, by one in which there are deferents and epicycles and by one
based on eccentric orbits. In this case, we could say that the statement concern-
ing the apparent motion of the planets is inter-representationally empirically
robust.
Concerning this point, it could be recalled that to have the first clear theori-
zation of this epistemological situation we had to wait until 1894 when Heinrich
R. Hertz discussed it in the introduction of his Die Prinzipien der Mechanik in
neuem Zusammenhange dargestellt.
Actually, thanks to Hertz and the philosophers of science following him, we
now distinguish between theoretically equivalent representations grasping the
same set of empirical results and representations which are underdetermined by
the same set of empirical results. Our inter-representationally empirically robust
statement can belong to both kinds of representation. Let us illustrate this situa-
tion with a pair of examples.
Usually in classical mechanics, when we represent the motion of a rigid
body (be it a car, a ship or an airplane), we adopt the three spatial coordinates of
the centre of mass and the three angular coordinates of rotation about the mass
centre. In this way we can define the position and the angular orientation of the
body at each instant of time. Starting from the knowledge of these six coordi-
nates as functions of time, we can find the velocity of the mass centre and the
angular velocity about the mass centre by differentiating them with respect to
time. By means of an additional differentiation we can have also the linear and
angular accelerations of the body. Thus we can arrive easily at the equation of
the motion. This usual mode of representing the motion of a body is called
Lagrangian. Now let us consider a fluid. We could think of it as composed of
a very large number of individual material particles and then employing a La-
grangian language for each of them. Intuitively this involves a lot of complica-
tions in the calculus. Fortunately, we can choose a different language to repre-
sent the same situation: the Eulerian one. That is, we could begin thinking to the
velocity v of the fluid particle that occupies a point x in space at the time t and
analyse v = v(x, t). If we differentiate v = v(x, t) with respect to time, we can
find the acceleration of the fluid particle at any position x and time t. If we inte-
grate it, we find the displacement of the particle from its position. At the end of
the day, we have two languages (the Lagrangian and the Eulerian one) repre-
senting the same process (the motion of a fluid) inside the same theoretical con-
text (classical mechanics). Summing up, we could say that the statement de-
scribing the motion of a fluid is inter-representationally empirically robust with

respect to the Lagrangian and Eulerian formulations, which are two mutually
inter-translatable representations empirically supported by the same set of data
(that is, they are theoretically equivalent).
Let us think now to the so-called Parameterized Post-Newtonian Formalism,
proposed in 1922 by Arthur S. Eddington and then reformulated in the Seven-
ties by Kenneth Nordtvedt and Clifford M. Will. It deals with all the theories of
gravitation which satisfy the Einsteinian principle of equivalence and are empir-
ically confirmed by the same set of results whenever we are in a context of
weak gravitational field generated by object moving slowly than light. It means
that, within these constraints, we have a bunch of different (and not mutually
translatable) representations of gravitation (Albert Einstein’s included) underde-
termined by the same set of data. In this case, the statement, for example, con-
cerning the precession of Mercury perihelion is inter-representationally empiri-
cally robust since it, on the one hand, belongs to many different representations
of gravitation and, on the other hand, is empirically supported by the same set
of observations.
2.3. Inter-representational inferential robustness
By “inter-representational deductive robustness” we suggest that there are

the same deductive structures belonging to different representations in which
there can be different background assumptions. That is,
A deductive structure (a theorem) is inter-representationally inferentially robust

if there is a persistence of its validity under the variations of the scientific rep-
resentations which it belongs to.
In this way, we also co-opt the main idea suggested by Levins and then
developed by his critics, according to which there could be what they call
a “common theorem,” or a “robust theorem.” Rephrasing Weisberg (2006), but
taking away his causal jargon that does not fit any case, we are in
a situation in which (1) there is a theorem of the form
Ceteris paribus,
if (certain initial conditions) obtain,
then (robust statement) will obtain;
and (2) this theorem pertains to different representations. Weisberg, in his anal-
ysis of the Lotka-Volterra model, shows that the Volterra’s principle is as such.
It claims that if predator and prey populations are more or less in balance with
one another and if an environmental change raises the death rates in both preda-
tor and prey populations, there will be a disproportionate decline in the number
of predators (see Weisberg, 2006).3 And this principle arises in “any model in
which the abundance of predators is controlled mostly by the growth rate of the
prey and the abundance of prey by the death rate of the predators” (Roughgar-
den, 1979, 439). Thus, the common theorem becomes
Ceteris paribus,
if the abundance of predators is controlled mostly by the growth rate of the
prey and the abundance of the prey controlled mostly by the death rate of preda-
tors,
then a general pesticide will increase the abundance of the prey and decrease
the abundance of predator.
Actually if we give a look to physics we discover hundreds of cases of inter-
representational robustness. Think, for example, to the theorem of the conserva-
tion of momentum or to the principle of the conservation of energy. But, proba-
bly, the best example is given by the Noether theorem according to which
Ceteris paribus,
if a process involving a system can be represented in terms of action4 and
this action is characterized by a differential symmetry,
then there is a correspondent conservation law.
Thus, time translation symmetry gives conservation of energy; space transla-
tion symmetry gives conservation of momentum; rotation symmetry gives con-
servation of angular momentum; etc. And this theorem holds in classical me-
chanics, special and general relativity, quantum mechanics, quantum field theo-
ry, etc. That is, we could claim that the Noether theorem is inter-represen-
tationally inferentially robust.
3. SCIENTIFIC REPRESENTATIONS OF ROBUSTNESS
At the beginning of our analysis, we argued that there are two issues related
to robustness: one pertaining to philosophers of science (the robustness of rep-
resentations) and another one pertaining to scientists (the representation of
robustness).
So far we have discussed the first. Now it is time to move to the second re-
garding how scientific representations capture the robustness of empirical pro-
cesses or systems. As noted in the introduction, also in this case, the term
—————————
3 To be precise, in Weisberg’s formulation there is also a part concerning the empirical confir-
mation. We could consider the case he discusses as one in which both trans-representational
empirical robustness and trans-representational deductive robustness are present.
4 We are speaking of the physical meaning of ‘action’, that is, the integral over time, taken
along the path of the system between the initial and the final time of the Lagrangian of the system.
“robustness” has been used extensively. Considering this point, we should ac-
cept that scientists use terms with a precise, technical meaning but that they also
use terms in an intuitive and non-technical manner. This happens in particular in
the biological sciences as it is illustrated by the use of terms like “information”
(Boniolo, 2003) or “mechanism” (Boniolo, 2013). Similarly, there are situations
in which “robustness” has a precise technical meaning and situations in which it
is used in a rather intuitive way to speak about the maintenance of certain char-
acteristics notwithstanding certain perturbations. We wish to limit ourselves to
the precise meaning and not to embark in a very vacuous adventure to render
more precise what scientists need not to specify. Thus, we will focus on two
meanings: one linked to the complex systems and the other linked with the per-
manence of the functionality of the system. Nevertheless, to better enter these
two different uses, it is worth spending some words on systems and processes.
Let us begin with the former.
Any representation of a system S can be stated in terms of the properties Pi
characterizing it, that is, we could write S = {P1, …, Pr }. For example, let us
consider the representation of a system described in two independent papers
by Hardy [1908] and Weinberg [1908]. In this case the properties at issue are:
(1) a population in which only two alleles A and B sit at the same locus, (2) the
individuals can be AA homozygotes, or BB homozygotes, or AB heterozygotes,
(3) there are only diploid organisms, (4) there is sexual reproduction, (5) the sex
ratio is genotype-independent, (6) fertility is genotype-independent, (7) survi-
vorship is genotype-independent, (8) there are non-overlapping generations,
(9) there is random mating, (10) the population is very large, (11) there are
equal allele frequencies in the two sexes, (12) there is no migration, (13) there is
no mutation, (14) there is no selection. Of course, also in the domain of physics
we could find hundreds of examples. Let us consider as an emblematic case the
system of the universe proposed, within General Relativity, by Karl Schwarz-
child (1916). Here the properties at issues are: (1) the mass of a body, (2) its
being spherical, (3) its being non-rotating (4) its being the only one body in
a universes otherwise void. Another simpler physical system is given by two
interacting bodies, where the properties are: (1) the two masses of the bodies,
(2) their two velocities, (3) their being totally rigid, (4) their being spherical and
elastic, (5) their being isolated from external perturbations.
Pondering on these examples, it is easy to concede that among the properties
identifying a system some (let us call them invariant properties) do not change
in space and time (for example, sphericity, rigidity, survivorship’s genotype
independence, random mating, predators eat only one species of preys, etc.) and
some (let us call them variant properties) change in space and in time (for
example, population size, mass, velocity, etc.).5
—————————
5 Here we could content ourselves of this rough division, even if much more could be said (Bo-
niolo, 2002).
However, what has been said above allows us to speak in the terms of state
of a system. By “state s of a system S” we mean the empirical instantiation of
the properties identifying a system in a given space and at a given time, that is,
s = {p1, …, pr },, where any pi is the instantiation of the corresponding property
Pi in a given space and time (if Pj is an invariant property, pj=Pj).
At this point we could define a process occurring in a system S. We could
say that a process W starting at an initial time t i and ending at a final time tf, is
given by the variations in that period of time of the instantiations of the variant
properties. That is,
W = {pi1, …, pi r}{pf1, …, pf r},
where {pi1, …, pi r} are the instantiations of the properties {P1, …, Pr} at ti and
{pf1, …, pf r} are the instantiations of the same properties at tf.
Let us add two remarks. First, we could easily accept the idea, almost uni-
versally shared by the contemporary philosophers of science, that any represen-
tation of a system S is theory-laden. This means that the properties (and their
meaning) identifying it depend on the particular theoretical perspective chosen.
A representation of a system describing a falling body is totally different (also
in terms of identifying properties) if we consider Aristotelian physics or Newto-
nian physics. A system describing two interacting bodies is totally different
(also in terms of identifying properties) if we consider Classical Mechanics or
Special Relativity. A quite radical and paradigmatic example of theory-
dependency concerns neutrons and protons. They have to be considered as two
different systems in a theoretical context emphasizing the electromagnetic inter-
actions, but they have to be regarded as two (quantum) states of the same sys-
tem (the nucleon) if we move to a theoretical context emphasizing the strong
interactions.
Second, since we have defined a process as a change over time of a set of
properties, it follows that in a same system we can have several processes, each
one due to a change over time of a different set of properties. Thus when we say
that a system is changing over time, we are affirming that there are one or more
processes occurring.
At this point, we could begin recalling the two precise meanings of robust-
ness (of course both of them related to processes—i.e. robust processes—and
thus extensively related to systems, i.e. robust systems).
3.1. Robustness and complexity

To enter the matter, it is worth differentiating among robust processes, stable
processes and homeostatic processes.
Stability has been studied since the 19th century especially when celestial
motions have been the topic of interest of the French physicist, mathematician
and philosopher Henri J. Poincaré and the dynamical systems theory was devel-
oped by the Russian mathematician Aleksandr M. Lyapunov (see Wiggins,

1990). Since then we have a precise idea of what stability is and how it can be
applied to natural systems.6
A process W is said to be stable with respect to a property Pj, if it exists an
instantiation of Pj, called equilibrium instantiation (pe) such that given |pj(ti)-
pe|< (with >0; pj(ti) is the instantiation of Pj at the initial time ti), then it
exists a >0 small enough that |pj(t) - pe|<, for any t>ti (pj(t) is the
instantiation of Pj at any time t).
That is, a process is stable if it has the “capacity” to maintain its output val-
ues within a certain interval notwithstanding limited variation to its input val-
ues. This means that if a process is given by {pi1, …, pi j , …, pir}→{pf1, …, pf j,
…, pf r}, it will be stable if, given the perturbed version {p’i1, …, p’i j , …, p’i
f f f e i i e f f
r}→{p’ 1, …, p’ j, …, p’ r}, we have p ∈ |p’ j-p j| <’ and p ∈ |p’ j-p j| <’.
A typical example of stable process concerns human thermoregulation. We

know that there is an equilibrium instantiation around 37ºC of the property ‘tem-
perature’. If, due to some reasons, at a certain initial time there is a discordance
between the temperature of the body and the equilibrium temperature and if such
a discordance is within a certain range (that is, if the  is physiologically accepta-
ble: approximately not less than 15ºC and not more than 45ºC), then the differ-
ence between the temperature measured at any successive time and the equilibri-
um temperature will remain (of course ceteris paribus) within a certain range ().
Coming to homeostasis, it regards systems where there are mechanisms
which evaluate the initial perturbations and counteract such that to bring again
the system at the initial state (or closer to it). That is, in the systems there should
be sensors to detect the perturbations to be regulated, effectors to modify those
perturbations, and negative feedbacks connecting sensors and effectors. Of
course, a process can be stable without being homeostatic but it cannot be ho-
meostatic without being stable. For example, the thermoregulation is a stable
process since it is a homeostatic process.
With regard to robustness, it, in the field of dynamical systems theory,
should be considered as synonym of structural stability. That is,
a process is structurally stable (robust) whenever the behaviour of its trajecto-
ries in space and time is unaffected by small perturbations.
Hence, given W={pi1, …, pir}→{pf1, …, pf r} and the perturbed W’= {p’i1,
…, p’i r}→{p’f1, …, p’f r}, if we have that W is almost equal (within a contextu-
alised acceptable difference) to W’ then the process is structurally stable (ro-
bust). Note that structural stability (whose investigation begun with the 1937
pioneer work of the Russian mathematicians Aleksandr A. Andronov and Lev
—————————
6 Actually there is also a discussion on possible different meanings of “stability”; see, e.g.,
(Orians, 1975); (Pimm, 1984); (Grimm, Wissel, 1997).

S. Pontryagin), differently from stability, does not concern initial perturbations

but perturbations of the process itself. Thus whenever there are complex sys-
tems whose dynamics has to be studied, dynamical systems theory can be
applied. Moreover, whenever it can be applied we have a precise notion of ro-
bustness (structural stability). Needless to say, it does not matter if the system is
physical (as it happens with celestial orbits) or biological (as it happens with
Waddington’s landscape (see Huang, 2012))—or with stem cells (see Furusawa,
Kaneko, 2012).
Unfortunately, especially in the biological sciences this precise and technical
meaning of ‘robustness’ does not cover all the cases in which it is used to dis-
cuss particular forms of stability under perturbations (see Jen, 2003) or
(Nikolov et al., 2007). As said, however, we leave out the more intuitive and
non-technical uses, but we wish to dwell upon another quite precise and tech-
nical one.
3.2. Robustness and functionality
In the field of systems biology, following Hiroaki Kitano (2004a; 2004b;
2009), robustness is the capability of a biological system to preserve a particular
function over perturbations. It might seem not a great definition, indeed, at least
for two classes of scholars: not so good for the mathematicians who are not able
to mathematize it into a well-formed theory; not so good for those philosophers
who have discussed what a function in biology is (see Wouters, 2005; Germain
et al., 2014). Anyway, let us proceed.
We know that any time we have a perturbation we have a change in the state
of a system, that is, we have a process W from the initial state si to the final state
sf. Thus we can conclude that
if the initial state si allowed S for carrying the function F and the final state
sf allows S for carrying the same function F, then the process W is robust.
This way of stating the matter, on the one hand, catches Kitano’s account of
robustness to cancer and, on the other hand, catches also the idea of robustness
underlying graph theory that is widely used in systems biology.
Concerning Kitano’s approach, cancer can be viewed as a biological system
composed of tumour cells which is stable against perturbations such as anti-
cancer therapies and immunological responses, that is, cancer is a robust system
(i.e., a system in which there are robust processes). Indeed, in order to maintain
its functions, cancer exploits two different mechanisms: functional redundancy
and feedback-control system. Focusing on the second cancer can be considered
a robust system that is also homeostatic. In fact, tumour cells over-express
MDM2, “which causes degradation of p53, effectively blocking apoptosis. The
MDM2-p53 interaction functions as a negative feedback loop to maintain opti-
mal levels of p53, and also certain dynamics (pulsed or oscillatory) of p53 ex-
pression levels—instead of sustained expression—after serious DNA damage”
(Kitano, 2004b, 228). This is relevant for cancer research since by studying
tumours in terms of robust systems we could adapt and develop anticancer ther-
apies. This means that if tumours are robust against a certain class of chemicals
(which could be thought of as perturbations), they may be not robust against
others (which could count as therapies).Concerning graph theory, whose long
story begun with Leonhard Euler, continued with Paul Erdős and Alfréd Rényi,
and nowadays with Albert-László Barabási, we should recall that robustness has
to do with the possibility of removing (of course within certain limits) nodes
and edges but preserving the connection among the other nodes, and thus the
functionality of the original structure. This is particularly relevant when we deal
with scale-free networks which are graphs whose degree distribution follows
a power law and which are widely used in biology to represent biological nets
concerning molecule-molecule interactions, gene expression, etc. Here the ca-
pacity to maintain the functionality of the original structure even when nodes
and edges have been deleted is described in terms of “resistance to attacks,” that
is, in terms of robustness. Only if these attacks address hubs, that are the high-
est-degree nodes, the functionality of the original structure, and therefore the
robustness, could be lost.
To illustrate the point we could mention the p53 network. P53 is a tumour
suppressor, discovered in 1979, encoded by the p53 gene located on the short
arm of human 17 chromosome (we focus here on human p53). This protein is
a central node in a complex signalling pathway that evolved to detect a variety
of cytotoxic and genotoxic stresses which could compromise genomic stability
and promote neoplastic transformation. Once activated by a stress signal such as
DNA damage, hypoxia, unscheduled oncogene expression, viral infection, or
ribonucleotide depletion, p53 exerts its role of “guardian of the genome” and
mediates a series of cellular outcomes that can vary from cell cycle arrest to
DNA-repair, senescence and apoptosis, depending on the cellular context. The
p53 pathway is altered to some degree in all human cancers. It was shown
(Dartnell et al., 2005) that the p53 protein-network is robust against random loss
of nodes, while it is vulnerable to direct attack against its hubs. When a scale-
free network such as this is attacked, its diameter increases (at each deletion of
nodes) until a threshold, when the network disintegrates into isolated subsets.
This demonstrates that this biological network is robust against mutational per-
turbations, i.e. random mutations generally occurring, whereas, such a feature is
lost whenever there are attacks against its hubs.
4. CONCLUSION
Sometimes a conceptual review of a term widely used seems to be necessary,

as we think it is the case with “robustness.” To achieve this result, and thus to
predispose a proper semantic platform where its different meanings can be in-
serted, we have differentiated the robustness of the scientific representations
from the scientific representations of robustness.
The former deals with methodological or epistemological features of the

scientific representations (empirical robustness, inter-representational empirical
robustness, inter-representational robustness). Scrutinizing and expanding this,
we have shown that beneath the concept of robustness various issues belonging
to philosophy of science are resting (see Table 1.).
ROBUSTNESS OF SCIENTIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES

REPRESENTATIONS
Confirmation
Empirical robustness empirical Corroboration
robustness Justification
Inter-representational robustness Underdetermination
Inter-representational inferential Deductive structure of scientific
robustness representation
Table 1. Summary of types of robustness of scientific representations and the philosophical
The latter deals with the way in which we represent the empirical world. In
this case we have shown that beyond informal (but totally legitimate) manners
of using robustness to indicate any situation in which something persists not-
withstanding perturbations, there are at least two usages that are pretty precise.
The first has to do with the (physical, biological, chemical, etc.) application of
the dynamical systems theory, in which the notion of robustness (structural sta-
bility) is mathematically precise. The second has to do with the permanence of
the function of a biological system under perturbations and with the precise
features of a network in graph theory.
To conclude, our mapping of the term “robustness” should have shown its
relevance both for philosophy of science and science itself.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
We would like to thank Fridolin Gross and Marco Nathan for their com-
ments on a preliminary draft of this paper.
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ABOUT THE AUTHORS:

Giovanni Boniolo — Chair of Philosophy of Science and Medical Humanities,
Dipartimento di Scienze Biomediche e Chirurgico Specialistiche, Università di Ferrara,
Via Fossato di Mortara, 64a, 44121Ferrara, Italy
Mattia Andreoletti — MSc, Dipartimento di Scienze della Salute, University of
Milano, Italy; Department of Experimental Oncology, European Institute of Oncology
(IEO), Milano, Italy
Federico Boem — PhD, Dipartimento di Oncologia ed Emato-oncologia, Universi-
ty of Milano, [email protected] Italy
Emanuele Ratti — PhD, Center for Theology, Science and Human Flourishing
University of Notre Dame, 130 Malloy Hall, 46556 Notre Dame, Indiana, USA
No. 3/2017
Martha C. Beck
NEUROSCIENCE, ANCIENT WISDOM AND THE ISUD:

IS THERE ANYTHING NEW UNDER THE SUN?
ABSTRACT
This paper links the claims of neuroscientist Antonio Damasio to the civilization of
the Ancient Greeks. Although Damasio’s book, Looking for Spinoza: Joy, Sorrow and
the Feeling Brain, makes the argument for the connection between Spinoza and neuro-
science, he says that he prefers Aristotle’s model of human flourishing, but he does not
describe Aristotle’s model. I explain Aristotle’s model and connect neuroscience to
Aristotle and to the educational system underlying Greek mythology, Hesiod, Homer,
tragedy and other aspects of Greek culture, including the role of the arts, religious ritu-
als and the institutions of Greek democracy.
Keywords: neuroscience, wisdom, Spinoza, Aristotle, neural mapping, brain, mind,
homeostasis, happiness, salvation, God, spiritual experiences, spiritual leaders, intellec-
tual love of God, archetypal psychology, Jung.
INTRODUCTION
This paper focuses on the nature and implications of discoveries in the neu-
rosciences as explained by Antonio Damasio in his book, Looking for Spinoza:
Joy, Sorrow and the Feeling Brain. Damasio explains why new research in the
neurosciences has led to the rejection of the psyche as a “blank slate.” Damasio
rejects the long-assumed gaps between mind and body, facts and values, nature
and culture, science and the arts. Instead, each of these is now understood as
one interdependent part of an integrated whole: an integrated psyche in an inte-
grated society. Damasio calls for “a new breed of investigations aimed at testing
hypotheses based on integrated knowledge from any and all of these disciplines
and neurobiology”1 and says “we need to factor in ideas from anthropology,
—————————
1 Damasio, A. R. 2003. Looking for Spinoza: Joy, Sorrow and the Feeling Brain. Orlando, Fla:
Harcourt, 160.
174 Martha C. Beck
sociology, psychoanalysis, and evolutionary psychology, as well as findings

from studies in the fields of ethics, law and religion”2 This paper responds to
Damasio’s request and confirms the mission of ISUD, as I will show.
After explaining Damasio’s position, this paper describes his view of the
goal of human life: homeostasis, the integration of feelings, actions and
thoughts into a complete way of living. Damasio uses religious terms, “the life
of the spirit” and “salvation” to describe the best life. He explains two paths to
“salvation:” one based on the world’s institutionalized religious traditions and
the other the philosophical path, based on “the intellectual love of God,” follow-
ing the model of Benedictus Spinoza. I argue that the world’s wisdom traditions
give a more comprehensive model both for what the flourishing life is and for
a better method of education for achieving it than Damasio or Spinoza provide.
Damasio tells the story of Spinoza and seeks out the places he lived in exactly
the way millions of lovers of Confucius, Muhammad, Jesus, Buddha, Socrates
and others have sought to emulate their models of wisdom, or homeostasis. The
stories of these men demonstrate that human flourishing demands a much more
complex activity of balancing, compromise and continual self-examination and
examination of others than Damasio or Spinoza describe. Using Ancient Greek
culture as my model, Damasio is blinded by his love of Apollo. He ignores the
psychological and cultural realities symbolized by the other Olympian deities.
DAMASIO’S POSITION: THE NEUROBIOLOGICAL FOUNDATION

OF HUMAN LIFE
After an extensive description of the empirical data he used to arrive at his

conclusions, Damasio says,
“In order for the brain to coordinate the myriad body functions on which life
depends, it needs to have maps in which the states of varied body systems
are represented moment by moment. The success of this operation depends
on this massive mapping. It is critical to know what is going on in different
body sectors so that certain functions can be slowed down, halted, or called
into action, and so that appropriate corrections in the governance of the or-
ganism’s life can be made.”3
Some “maps” are called “body-state” maps while others are called “neural
maps.”
Body-state maps
—————————
2 Ibid., 159–160.
3 Ibid., 176.
Neuroscience, Ancient Wisdom and the ISUD: Is There Anything New under the Sun? 175
“can provide only limited assistance without conscious feelings. The maps
work for problems of a certain degree of complexity and no more; when the
problem gets too complicated—when it requires a mixture of automated re-
sponses and reasoning on accumulated knowledge—unconscious maps no
longer help and feelings come in handy.”4 So, “feelings probably arose as
a by-product of the brain’s involvement in the management of life.”5
To meet that need, neural maps evolved in the brain, “Neural maps that are crit-
ical for the governance of life turn out to be a necessary basis for the mental
states we call feelings.”6
Damasio’s position is a rejection of the “blank slate” view of the human psy-
che, “The brain does not begin its day as a tabula rasa. The brain is imbued at
the start of life with knowledge regarding how the organism should be managed
[...] the brain brings along innate knowledge and automated know-how […]
there is nothing free or random about drives and emotions.”7
Damasio makes a clear distinction between emotions, what he calls the “nat-
ural wisdom” wired into our brains, and feelings, our self-conscious awareness
that we are experiencing various emotions.
“When the consequences of such natural wisdom are mapped back in the
central nervous system, subcortically and cortically, the result is feelings, the
foundational component of our minds […] feelings can guide a deliberate
endeavor of self-preservation and assist with making choices regarding the
manner in which self-preservation should take place. Feelings open the door
for some measure of willful control of the automated emotions.”8
Damasio explains the evolutionary process by which the physical structure of

the brain—the machinery—eventually evolved into a mind-body unity. The
mental processes emerged from the activity of the physical organism to produce
a more complex living human organism.
“First came the machinery for producing reactions to an object or event […]
the machinery of emotion. Second came the machinery for producing a brain
map and then a mental image, an idea, for the reactions and for the resulting
state of the organism—the machinery of feeling […] Eventually, in a fruitful
combination with past memories, imagination, and reasoning, feelings led to
the emergence of foresight and the possibility of creating novel, non-
stereotypical responses.”9
—————————
4 Ibid., 177.
5 Ibid., 176.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid., 205.
8 Ibid., 79.
9 Ibid., 80.
176 Martha C. Beck
Higher-order thinking leads to an idea of a self, “the machinery of feeling is

itself a contributor to the processes of consciousness, namely to the creation of
the self, without which nothing can be known.”10
Damasio explains further,
“Events in the body are represented as ideas in the mind. There are represen-
tational ‘correspondences,’ and they go in one direction—from body to mind
[…] our mind is made up of images, representations, or thoughts of our own
parts of our own body in spontaneous action or in the process of modifica-
tions caused by objects in the environment.”11
From there, the mind begins to reflect upon these contents, “once you form an
idea of a certain object, you can form an idea of the idea, and an idea of the idea
of the idea and so forth.”12
This is the activity of the mind. Mind is rooted in body but goes beyond it,
“The notion of ‘ideas of ideas’ is important […] [because] it opens the way for
representing relationships and creating symbols … it opens a way for creating
an idea of self.”13 Besides consciousness, we also possess the power of memory.
Combined with the idea of self, we possess autobiographical memories.
THE NEUROBIOLOGICAL FOUNDATION OF HUMAN CULTURE
Once we have become conscious of ourselves as cut historical beings, with

an identity that persists over time, we can begin to think about more than our
own mind-body, psycho-neuro-mental system. We can think about human emo-
tions in general. Damasio agrees with Aristotle, Spinoza, Hume, Adam Smith
and some contemporary philosophers that some emotions can be said to be ra-
tional, with this distinction,
“In this context the term rational does not denote explicit logical reasoning
but rather an association with actions or outcomes that are beneficial to the
organism exhibiting emotions. The recalled emotional signals are not ration-
al in and of themselves, but they promote outcomes that could have been de-
rived rationally.”14
Aristotle calls such emotions “according to reason” (kata logos) but not yet
“united with reason” (meta logos). Damasio claims that it can be proven empiri-
—————————
10 Ibid., 110.
11 Ibid., 212–214.
12 Ibid., 214.
13 Ibid., 215.
14 Ibid., 150.
cally that cooperative behavior leads to a better state of the organism, “In a re-
cent study, cooperativity also led to the activation of regions involved in the
release of dopamine and in pleasure behavior, suggesting, well, that virtue is its
own reward.”15
Damasio concludes, “that all humans are created such that they tend to pre-
serve their life and seek well-being, that their happiness comes from the suc-
cessful endeavor to do so, and that the foundation of virtue rests on these
facts.”16 He goes on, “the biological reality of self-preservation leads to virtue
because in our inalienable need to maintain ourselves we must, of necessity,
help preserve other selves. If we fail to do so we perish and are thus violating
the foundational principle, and relinquishing the virtue that lies in self-
preservation.”17 The foundational principle that we must help preserve others in
order to preserve ourselves links the individual to all aspects of culture, “The
secondary foundation of virtue then is the reality of a social structure and the
presence of other living organisms in a complex system of interdependence with
our own organism.”18
Damasio concludes, “the mandate for self-preservation […] contains the
foundation for a system of ethical behaviors and that foundation is neurobiolog-
ical. The foundation is the result of a discovery based on the observation of
human nature rather than the revelation of a prophet.”19 Damasio points out that
other species behave in ways that seem ethical, “they exhibit sympathy, attach-
ments, embarrassment”20 and so on. So, “even in the realm of ethics there are
forerunners and descent.”21 But, “human ethical behavior has a degree of elabo-
ration and complexity that makes it distinctly human […]a part of our biologi-
cal/psychological makeup has nonhuman beginnings”22 but also “our deep un-
derstanding of the human condition confers upon us a unique dignity.”23
Besides rejecting the split between body/brain and mind, therefore, neurosci-
ence leads to a biologically-based rejection of a split between facts and values,
nature and culture. Although individual human beings and human culture admit
“of evolutionary variation, gender, and personal development,”24 some basic
patterns of individual and collective behavior are universal and biologically-
based, the result of evolution. For example, there is a biologically-based reason
to abide by the Golden Rule,
—————————
15 Ibid., 151.
16 Ibid., 171.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid., 160.
21 Ibid., 161.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
178 Martha C. Beck
“The injunction is unequivocal. An action that might be personally beneficial

but would harm others is not good because harming others always haunts
and eventually harms the individual who causes the harm. Consequently,
such actions are evil […] It is reasonable to hypothesize that the tendency to
seek social agreement has itself been incorporated in biological mandates, at
least in part, due to the evolutionary success of populations whose brains ex-
pressed cooperative behaviors to a high degree […] our brains are wired to
cooperate with others.”25
This cooperation occurs when we recognize our biological need to respect

the needs of others and the way those mutual needs are “expressed as social
conventions and rules of ethical behavior. Those conventions and rules and the
institutions that enforce them—religion, justice, and sociopolitical organiza-
tions—become mechanisms for exerting homeostasis at the level of the social
group.”26 Intellectual activities, such as those Damasio engages in, are another
part of the development of human flourishing, “activities such as science and
technology assist the mechanisms of social homeostasis.”27 Those activities and
discoveries, in turn, are incorporated into the culture through the legal system,
“The constitution that governs a democratic state, the laws that are consonant
with the constitution, and application of those laws in a judicial system also are
homeostasis devices.”28 At the international level, “the fledgling, twentieth-
century development of worldwide bodies of social coordination such as the
World Health Organization”29 are also “homeostasis devices.”30
THE NATURAL QUEST FOR MEANING
Unlike traditional biological explanations of human nature, Damasio says

that all of the “unscientific” religions and philosophies, the “mythologies” of
the past, have a biological foundation. Our yearning to understand the meaning
of life is, “a deep trait of the human mind. It is rooted in human brain design
and the genetic pool.”31 Humans have “deep traits that drive us with great curi-
osity toward a systematic exploration of our own being and of the world around
it.”32 These same traits “impel us to construct explanations for the objects and
situations in that world.”33 Our quest for meaning leads to ideas about the best
—————————
25 Ibid., 172–173.
26 Ibid., 166.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid., 169.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid., 269.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
human life. He defines, “any project for human salvation [as] any project capa-
ble of turning a life examined into a life contented.”34 Damasio uses the word
“God” when discussing our notions of meaning in life, but his understanding of
the meaning of the word differs from the way it is usually used in institutional-
ized religions, “a person’s actions should not be aimed at pleasing God, but
rather at acting in conformity with the nature of God. When you do so, some
kind of happiness results and some kind of salvation is achieved.”35
Damasio describes and defends Benedictus Spinoza’s particular path to sal-
vation, “to render life meaningful and to make human society tolerable […] His
route is through the use of reason and feeling. Reason lets us see the way, while
feeling is the enforcer of our determination to see.”36 Spinoza claims that our
ability to liberate ourselves from negative emotions requires that we develop
a clear and distinct idea of all basic human emotions. We then understand why
negative emotions lead to unhappiness and human bondage while emotions
directly connected to reason lead to the true meaning of freedom, the experience
of joy, the feeling associated with homeostasis, “it is up to the individual to live
in such a manner that the perfection of joy can be achieved frequently and thus
render life worth living.”37 Further, as Damasio says, “Spinoza recommends the
mental rehearsing of negative emotional stimuli as a way to build a tolerance for
negative emotions and gradually acquire a knack for generating positive ones.
This is, in effect, Spinoza as mental immunologist developing a vaccine capable
of creating anti-passion antibodies.”38 Damasio likes Spinoza’s view, he says,
“because the process is grounded in nature” and therefore, “Spinoza’s solution
is immediately compatible with the view of the universe that science has been
constructing for the last four hundred years.”39
Recent research shows that we can break old neural maps, replace one set of
connections with another, and create completely new maps, through the power
of our ideas. Damasio likes Spinoza’s method because Spinoza asks us to use
the power of our minds to recognize bad maps, those connected to negative
emotions, break them down and replace them with maps that lead to joy,
“Spinoza’s solution hinges on the mind’s power over the emotional process,
which in turn depends on a discovery of the causes of negative emotions,
and on knowledge of the mechanics of emotion […] Today, the new under-
standing of the machinery of emotion and feeling makes Spinoza’s goal all
the more achievable.”40
—————————
34 Ibid., 271.
35 Ibid., 273.
36 Ibid., 277.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid., 275.
39 Ibid., 277–278.
40 Ibid., 275.
180 Martha C. Beck
Damasio explains his vision of a life of joy, or “a life of the spirit.” First,
“spiritual experiences, religious or otherwise, are mental processes. They are
biological processes of the highest level of complexity […] I assimilate the
notion of spiritual to an intense experience of harmony, to the sense that the
organism is functioning with the greatest possible perfection.”41 Next, spiritual
experiences should include “the desire to act toward others with kindness and
generosity”42 because biological research has shown that “cooperative human
behavior engages pleasure/reward systems in the brain” and that “violations of
social norms cause guilt or shame or grief, all of which are variants of unhealthy
sorrow.”43 Further, “spiritual experiences are humanly nourishing […] joy and
its variants lead to great functional perfection”44
When faced with the realities of human life, its vulnerability and the constant
threat or experience of pain and suffering, most people experience the transition
from negative to positive emotions in the context of institutionalized religion,
“a deeply felt religious faith or a protective insulation against sorrow of any
kind.”45 In the face of suffering, human beings “have the power to evoke spir-
itual experiences. Prayer and rituals, in the context of a religious narrative are
meant to produce spiritual experience […] Ceremonial rites and shared assem-
bly do create a range of spiritual experience.”46 Religion-based communities
provide an atmosphere of mutual concern and empathy. They provide sympathy
in times of grief and needed emotional and financial support when people find
themselves alone and isolated or unable to provide for themselves.
Damasio identifies more with Spinoza’s spiritual life, which is founded upon
“the intellectual love of God, amor intellectualis Dei.”47 In Damasio’s case,
spiritual experiences are triggered by, “The contemplation of nature, the reflec-
tion on scientific discovery, and the experience of great art.”48 The philosophi-
cal road to salvation rejects any literal interpretation of sacred scriptures, but
sees them as sources “of valuable knowledge regarding human conduct and
civil organization.”49 Both kinds of spiritual life require, “a virtuous life in
a virtuous civitas, obedient to the rules of a democratic state and mindful of
God’s nature.”50 Damasio concludes, “the spiritual is an index of the organizing
scheme behind a life that is well-balanced, well-tempered, and well-intended.”51
After explaining how the insights of Spinoza fit with cutting-edge research in
—————————
41 Ibid., 284.
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid., 285.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid., 283.
46 Ibid., 285–286.
47 Ibid., 276.
48 Ibid., 285.
49 Ibid., 274.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid., 285.
neurobiology, Damasio ultimately rejects Spinoza’s model as too “ascetic” in

our “Western high-tech life.” He prefers Aristotle’s model because, “Aristotle
insisted that the contented life is a virtuous and happy life […] health, wealth,
love, and friendship are part of that contentment.”52
DAMASIO’S VIEW AND THE WORLD’S ANCIENT WISDOM TRADITIONS
To someone who studies the world’s wisdom traditions, Damasio’s suppos-

edly “new” understanding of human life is not at all new. This section will
briefly describe the many comparisons between Damasio’s views and analogous
aspects of Confucianism, Buddhism, Christianity and Islam. These examples
are based on prominent spiritual leaders who founded the traditions they are
associated with and the number of people today who are aware of and influ-
enced by these wisdom traditions. There are many more possible examples. In
all these examples, the goal of life is homeostasis.
Homeostasis requires integrity in many respects: a) the individual integration
of emotions, actions and thoughts, of brain and mind; b) the integration of bio-
logical well-being and cultural flourishing; c) the integration of the most sophis-
ticated developments in science and technology to create cultural spaces and
goods and services that reinforce the cultural worldview; d) the use of the arts to
create and reinforce a view of wisdom and the best life as the ultimate meaning
and purpose in life; and e) a system of education that uses stories as continual
reminders of the culture’s archetypes of wise human beings. The stories inspire
people to want to live wisely and describe many types of situations that people
everywhere have to confront. Each tradition stimulates the imagination and
thought by telling stories about how these leaders lived. Those who identify
with these traditions learn first by imitation and then link the imitation of behav-
ior to reasons why that way of life is best, going from observations to ideas,
then to ideas about ideas.
In each case, the spiritual genius acts according to the Golden Rule, without
citing a universal rule as the reason for the action. Instead, the spiritual leader
acts on the emotion of compassion, the “feeling” necessary before someone will
actually be willing and able to act according to the Golden Rule. The leader’s
strength of character shows that he has internalized the desire to do what is best
and has the experience and intellectual capacity to be able to identify and then
make the best choice in a given situation. In each case, personal flourishing is
inseparable from social and political flourishing. In each case, the importance of
laws and institutions, social, religious and political, is emphasized, often be-
cause the spiritual leaders identify the corruption of leaders and institutions and
the negative effect of that corruption on all citizens.
—————————
52 Ibid., 278.
182 Martha C. Beck
There are many examples of the spiritual leaders exhibiting the “classical,”
or “traditional” virtues and resisting the related vices. All of them—Jesus, Mu-
hammad, Buddha, and Confucius were: a) self-controlled in relation to the sen-
sual drives of hunger, thirst and sex; b) generous and empathetic towards others
because they broke down traditional divisions between people based on gender,
ethnicity, other social or cultural divides and class; and c) even-tempered in
situations where most people would become angry. They never took revenge for
evils committed against them.
As their virtues became more and more obvious, they attracted friends. They
were careful not to abuse the honor given to them and, on the contrary, were
very humble about their own strength of character. They were righteous without
being self-righteous. They were sensitive to the characters of each of their “dis-
ciples,” and engaged in meaningful conversations with them. They did not de-
mand or even want hero-worship. They wanted those who recognized their
quality of character to imitate and assimilate their way of life, so it would be
passed on to future generations. At their death beds, they worried about whether
their ways of living were understood and would be carried on after they were
gone. They did not fear their own death, but the death of the kind of life they
loved and wanted others to live, so that all human beings could flourish.
Because they did not abuse the kind of spiritual power they had over people,
they were very critical of the way authorities in every sector of society abused
their power. They refused to blindly obey any authorities, particularly religious
and political authorities. They exercised courage in the face of possible and
actual persecution by those authorities. They demanded that leaders exercise
their power for the well-being of those over whom they ruled. They condemned
leaders who used their power to gain more power, for themselves, their families
and friends, and their social class.
They condemned greed because they knew the great harm it causes, both
within a nation and between nations. They condemned the unjust distribution of
resources, whether wealth or honor or power. They questioned the way punish-
ments were determined and advocated forgiveness and rehabilitation rather than
punitive punishments. They all engaged in spiritual practices to maintain the
feeling of compassion as they made all their daily decisions, including in some
cases the establishment of social institutions and laws. Their ways of life were
models that transcended the huge variations we recognize between cultures on
first sight. They represent common patterns underneath the appearance of dif-
ference. They represent a universal standard for human well-being, Damasio’s
“homeostasis.” They wanted most of all to have been successful teachers so that
some students would understand and embody the ways of living they dedicated
themselves to. Only then could this way of life be passed down from one gener-
ation to the next. The legacy they wanted to leave behind was not about them
personally, but about a particular way of life and why it would always be the
best way to promote homeostasis.
I think Damasio would agree with my argument, although it is unfortunate

that he does not seem to be familiar enough with these traditions to have a sec-
tion of his book pointing this out. His book shows how long-established the
huge divide has been between the sciences and the humanities, body and mind,
nature and culture. Without being aware of it, Damasio’s description of Spino-
za’s life presents Spinoza as one more example of an archetype of wisdom.
Even this brief overview of the common patterns should make clear that
Damasio is correct. Our minds are the product of a long evolutionary process.
Our neural maps begin with the regulation of basic physical needs and then
develop to a complex set of neural maps that are formed and reformed by our
ideas. There is a basic underlying pattern in those maps because they have their
roots in the human condition. There is a universal standard for homeostasis. Ho-
meostasis is achieved through certain behaviors, called virtues, and undermined
by other behaviors, called vices. Our characters should include the integration
of feelings, actions and thoughts, in a unified system of neural mapping. The
meaning of life, above all, is to live according to our nature as rational, social and
political creatures and to promote the flourishing of others. The world’s wisdom
traditions evolved in different parts of the globe because the “wise” could identify
those patterns, live the flourishing life, and set up a system of education that ena-
bled the patterns to be passed down to future generations.
Again, although Damasio does not seem to be aware of this, his claims con-
cur with the tradition of archetypal psychology, officially “established” by Carl
Jung in the mid-20th century. Jung noticed patterns in the world’s mythological
traditions. Jung focused on reoccurring patterns in the mythology of each tradi-
tion. He explained how those patterns represented a way to educate the human
psyche. This method of education tries to educate our deepest drives, those we
share with the animals: sex, pleasure, fear and our aggressive responses to de-
sires or fears. The educational process motivates people to transform raw emo-
tions into feelings by linking them to consciousness and thought in order to live
wisely. Using Jung’s terms, the myths “educate” these drives by bringing them
from the repressed unconscious into consciousness. Damasio would describe
the process as the transformational change from the “machinery of emotion” to
the “machinery” of feeling, a new network of neural maps. Once transformed
into feelings, we can then examine, form, and reform our neural maps in ways
that follow the kinds of behaviors Damasio describes, which also follow the
patterns described by the classical virtues. Jung defines a wise person as “indi-
viduated.” Such a person integrates emotions with feelings, thoughts, sensation,
and intuition into a way of living, following the patterns described above. This,
also, confirms the accuracy of Damasio’s position: these patterns in the underly-
ing structure of the world’s different cultural traditions have emerged biologi-
cally, through a slow process of natural selection which ends with our brains
being wired to cooperate and to create complex social, economic and political
cultural networks and internal neural maps.
184 Martha C. Beck
DAMASIO, SPINOZA AND ANCIENT GREEK CULTURE
As a student of Ancient Greek culture, Damasio made a few points that

expose some of the flaws in his view. Damasio says he prefers Aristotle over
Spinoza in the end, because Aristotle’s view includes “health, wealth, love,
friendship” and a generally less ascetic way of life. I would agree. Many of the
world’s wise leaders had more complex lives than Spinoza, but not as complex
as Aristotle’s “complete life.” For Aristotle, human flourishing involved partic-
ipating in all aspects of life: marriage, family, ruling and being ruled, having all
sorts of friends and relationships, etc. In every aspect of life one could achieve
the highest level of excellence or come short to some degree and in some way.
All aspects of Ancient Greek culture and social life were organized to edu-
cate as many citizens as possible to be as engaged in all aspects of life as possi-
ble, culminating in citizen engagement in political life. Citizens attended the
theater with the hope that they would learn the lessons about flourishing being
taught by the playwrights. Citizens were supposed to engage in public debate
about political affairs, about what decisions were being made in the Assembly
and what cases were being tried in court, so they could eventually take their
turns as voters in the Assembly and on juries. Citizens were encouraged to or-
ganize private gatherings of “symposia” where they would talk with their
friends about serious questions in life and get many opinions, so they could
continually rethink their views. This list goes on and on. The more complex
a life is, they thought, the more complete it is, and the higher the level of flour-
ishing. People were encouraged to achieve the highest levels of excellence as
spouses, parents, friends, professionals, leaders and citizens.
This idea of the goal led to a different method of education. The Greeks
would not agree with Spinoza’s or Damasio’s view of the way to educate for
wisdom. To put it in Damasio’s terms: an emotion is linked to a clear and dis-
tinct idea, which transforms it from the “machinery of emotion” (one type of
neural network) to the “machinery of feeling” (another neural network) which
enables the feeling to be examined and controlled by thought. Both Damasio
and Spinoza use reason to argue that irrational behavior is more likely to lead to
sorrow and behavior that conforms to the demands of reason is most likely, at
least over time, to lead to joy. The Greeks would say that their system of educa-
tion uses the power of Apollo to develop a view of the wise person as a follower
of Apollo. Both of them have ignored the powers represented by the other elev-
en Olympian deities. The Greek system of education does not think that
the power of Apollo on its own will lead to wisdom and “salvation,” or homeo-
stasis.
Instead, the Greek system of education uses emotion to educate emotion. It
shows the negative effects of irrational emotions through drama and narrative,
through vivid stories of mistakes in reasoning driven by irrational feelings. The
stories and vivid characters try to trigger fear and horror and emotional trauma
in audiences. They want observers to think, “I don’t want to make that mistake,
but I know I could.” Both methods “remind” people of how irrational they could
be and try to create “anti-passion anti-bodies,” a kind of “immunology,” so that if
people are tempted to feel, think and do something irrational, they will be inocu-
lated well enough to avoid acting irrationally. The Greeks used images of people
acting impulsively on emotions to trigger feelings that would lead to a more effec-
tive drug against doing the wrong thing. They knew that reason on its own can too
easily get split off from feelings and used to justify the wrong choices.
The educational method is called “catharsis,” a purgation of pity and fear.
The stories are archetypal, representing types of characters in types of situations
that human beings get into based on the human condition. These are particularly
difficult moments, moments that tap into our deepest drives, whether positive or
negative: the desire for pleasure, wealth, glory and power or the fear of death,
humiliation or social ostracism of oneself or one’s loved ones. The main charac-
ter has many positive character-traits and uses Apollonian reasoning to justify
the wrong choice. This choice leads to self-destruction and the destruction of
families and their societies for generations to come.
Citizens were familiar with many such stories which together made clear that
life is very complex. They knew that efforts to simplify a situation always led to
the wrong choice and that justifying a choice based on some moral principle
never works. Instead, each situation requires the modification of a principle or
the principle that is invoked depends on the person applying it. In some cases, it
is better to lie and wrong to tell the truth. In some cases, it is better to forgive an
injustice while in other cases it is better to take it to court. In some cases, those
with authority are right and in other cases they are wrong. Sometimes citizens
criticize authority figures because the authorities are wrong. In other cases, cor-
rupt citizens criticize just leaders. The goal of finding the best choice among the
alternatives is very difficult. Aristotle calls this the “golden mean” between two
extremes.
Each virtue has two corresponding vices, one of excess and one of defect.
For example, self-control involves neither too much nor too little in relation to
eating, drinking and sex. The extremes are self-indulgence and self-denial. Nei-
ther extreme is natural. The mean is what promotes our biological, social and
spiritual well-being. In relation to anger, too much or too little are detrimental.
Too much anger leads to unnecessary animosity and the desire for revenge.
Taking revenge leads to a counter-reaction of more revenge. Too little anger
leads to holding a grudge and stifles the flourishing of those who cannot get
angry when it is the most appropriate response. Repressed anger leads to physi-
ological problems and to defective neural maps. Courage is the mean in relation
to situations involving fear. The extremes are being rash, taking unnecessary
risks, and being a coward, running from necessary risks. Each extreme leads to
more extreme reactions. The list of virtues and vices is long, all of them based
on the human condition.
186 Martha C. Beck
Aristotle’s works, particularly his ethical and political works, are similar to
Spinoza’s Ethics. Both works consist of definitions of the virtues and vices.
Both claim that a flourishing human being is virtuous, regardless of how others
respond to one’s actions. Aristotle also knew that virtue is not a logos, a set of
definitions. Rather, it is an ergon, a way of life. He knew that most people
would rather talk about virtue than actually live a virtuous life. It makes sense,
therefore, that the characters in Greek tragedy are shown in specific situation
where they are making choices and giving good reasons for making the wrong
choice. Audience members can then identify with them, which means their
“neural maps” that control feelings will become activated. The characters are
actually living out the virtues and vices and situations that Aristotle simply de-
fines and describes. Not even Aristotle thought that definitions and theories
alone, the realm of Apollonian reasoning, was the best way to educate most
people. The Greeks knew that educating the citizens in a democracy to be able
to govern themselves and each other well requires the kind of public readings of
Homer and tragic dramas the Greeks established.
CONCLUSION: THE VALUE OF ISUD’S MISSION
In spite of his excessive reliance on Apollo to save us, Damasio has done
great things to link the sciences, particularly biology and psychology, to culture
and the life of the mind. He has incorporated the notion of spirituality and even
of God into a model for a respectable and even a necessary part of an accurate
scientific worldview. As a member of the International Society for Universal
Dialogue, His view confirms our mission. ISUD was organized around the view
that it is possible and necessary to develop holistic worldviews. Further, the
world’s ancient wisdom traditions can be incorporated into the most compre-
hensive and most accurate understanding of the world today, based on recent
developments in the sciences, social sciences and humanities. All the academic
disciplines can be and need to be included in any legitimate understanding of
our universe and human nature and history.
Finally, the best way to create comprehensive views is through dialogues be-
tween people who have studied worldviews that claim to be universal. Through
such study and conversation, we can figure out which aspects of any view are
too provincial or have been refuted by recent discoveries. We can adapt what is
best from the past and incorporate it into a more accurate, comprehensive, and
systematic view of the universe, our place in it, and the meaning of life. This
activity in and of itself is an important part of the meaning of life for members
of ISUD. We recognize our common understanding of our common purpose
and encourage each other in our various pursuits. I have introduced Damasio
and his view of the neurosciences at this conference because I thought many of
you would be interested in finding out his view so that you can either do further
research on Damasio or on the philosophical implications of discoveries in the

neurosciences. Then you can decide whether and how to incorporate those dis-
coveries into your own ever-evolving positions.
REFERENCES
Aristotle. 1984. Metaphysics. In: The Complete Works of Aristotle, Barnes, J. (Ed.), Ross, W. D.
(Trans.), vol. 2 of the Bollingen series. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1552–1728.
_____. 1984. Nicomachean Ethics. Ross, W. D. (Trans), Urmson, J. O. (rev). In: The Complete
Works of Aristotle, Barnes, J. (Ed.). Ross, W. D. (Trans), vol. 2 of the Bollingen series.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1729–1867.
_____. 1984. Poetics. Bywater, I. (Trans). In: The Complete Works of Aristotle Barnes, J. (Ed.).
Ross, W. D. (Trans), vol. 2 of the Bollingen series. Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2316–2340.
______. 1984. Politics. Jowett, B. (Trans). In: The Complete Works of Aristotle, Barnes, J. (Ed.),
Ross, W. D. (Trans), vol. 2 of the Bollingen series. Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1986–2129.
Confucius, Soothill, W. E. 1995. The Analects. New York: Dover Publications.
Damasio, A. 2003. Looking for Spinoza: Joy, Sorrow and the Feeling Brain. Orlando: Harcourt.
Edwin, A. 1993. Bhagavadgita. New York, NY: Dover Publications,
Huston, S. 1991. The World’s Religions: Our Great Wisdom Traditions. San Francisco: Harper
San Francisco.
Jeffery, A. 2000. The Koran: Selected Suras. Mineola, NY: Dover Publications.
Laszlo, E. 2002. The Systems View of the World: A Holistic Vision for Our Time. Cresskill, NJ:
Hampton Press.
Müller, M. 2000. Wisdom of the Buddha: The Unabridged Dhammapada. Mineola, N.Y.: Dover
Publications.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR — PhD, Professor of Philosophy at Lyon College, 2300

Highland Rd, Batesville, AR 72501, USA. She received her PhD, specializing in ancient
Greek philosophy, from Bryn Mawr College. She has taught at the University of St.
Thomas, the College of St. Catherine, Prague (summer school), and at an Islamic State
University in Bandung, Indonesia, Spring 2012 (Fulbright Teaching Fellowship). She
has published 11 books and over 40 articles in journals around the world. She has a You
Tube channel, “M. Beck Ph. D. Philosophy” that contains 76 videos and 6 Playlists,
focused on, “The Legacy of Ancient Greek Civilization in the Era of Globalization.”
E-mail: Beck, Martha C. <[email protected]>
No. 3/2017
Maria Kli
THE ETHICAL AND POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF MICHEL

FOUCAULT’S ANCIENT TECHNOLOGY
OF THE CARE OF THE SELF
ABSTRACT
The ethical constitution of the subject in Michel Foucault’s work relies on the way truth
is perceived, and on the way the knowledge of truth is produced. Foucault understands
subjectivity as constituted socio-historically by means of particular techniques, which
he refers to as “Technologies of the Self.” The main focus of this paper is to present the
way in which two different kinds of approaching the truth, the modern scientific and the
ancient Greek one, develop different kinds of technologies as ways of forming the sub-
jectivity. It is maintained that the ancient technology of the care of the self can be espe-
cially meaningful in contemporary society from an ethical and political perspectives.
Keywords: subject, care of the self, technologies of the self, ancient Greek philoso-
phy, spirituality, ethics, science, politics, freedom.
INTRODUCTION
In Michel Foucault’s political thought the ethical constitution of the subject

is tightly connected to the way of understanding truth, as well as to the ways the
knowledge of truth is accessed by the subject. His research on the modern sys-
tems of objective knowledge indicates that this kind of knowledge was inter-
twined with disciplinary mechanisms, and it was developed on the basis of the
political claim for social control. In Foucault’s latter work,1 the focus of atten-
tion is shifted from the effect of the social processes on the subject to the
subject as self-constituting, through technologies which are offered socio-
historically, and which he calls technologies of the self. According to this per-
—————————
1 In reference to the series of lectures at Dartmouth in the 1980, see: Foucault, M. 1993:
“About the Beginning of the Hermeneutics of the Self: Two Lectures at Dartmouth.” Political
Theory, 21, 2, 198–227.
190 Maria Kli
spective, the subjects are shaped by technologies which affect their ethical con-
stitution by means of their active participation in specific practices, as well as
through processes which they do not actually control.
This paper is oriented towards a model of knowledge that transcends the cur-
rent subject’s and society’s claims for control,2 in search of an ethical-political
strategy of freedom, which can be understood in political as well as psychologi-
cal terms. Serving this purpose, the paper is focused on Foucault’s concept of
the ancient Greek technology of the care of the self (ἐπιμέλεια ἑαυτοῦ). Ac-
cording to this ancient spiritual and philosophical approach to knowledge, truth
is not something that comes to the subject cognitively, without any inner ethical
preconditions. This means that truth is something that has to be discovered with
the person’s essential ontological and existential transformation. It is, thus,
maintained that the particular technology of the care of the self, in respect to the
conditions of the modern and contemporary era, which will be briefly discussed
in the first two sections, has a political and ethical dimension with possible cru-
cial consequences for the subject.
MODERNITY’S CONSTITUTION OF TRUTH ACCORDING TO FOUCAULT:

FROM CHRISTIANITY TO SCIENTIFIC DISCIPLINES
In the Foucauldian genealogy of knowledge it is evident that the develop-

ment of the scientific fields is tied to the mechanisms of power, but they
themselves also comprise the agents of power by forming the criteria of
the social perception of right and wrong. Foucault’s nominalistic approach
of scientific knowledge indicates that the scientific subjects are not given, but
they are constructed though researches, evaluations and selections of terms,
carried out by authorized institutions which themselves can guarantee their va-
lidity.3
The modern times inherited by the Christian technologies of the self a theo-
retical way of approaching the truth, which, as Foucault argued, is related to the
emergence of the separation of the ancient pair of philosophy as a way of look-
ing into the self, and spirituality as a special way of self-modification. There-
fore, the Christian technologies, by maintaining in a specific way the first of the
—————————
2 Even though Foucault’s intention was not exactly that; he did not actually believe that sub-
jects could totally escape power. In Foucault’s thought, power relations contrast to the states of
domination. This means that while power relations are extremely widespread among individuals,
and display a mobility, by allowing modifications by various participants, domination is very
fixed and stable, and it is therefore hard to reverse them. Liberation, thus, is understood by Fou-
cault as that which creates the way for new power relations, and “which must be controlled by
practices of freedom.” Foucault, M. 1997. “The Ethics of the Concern for the Self as a Practice of
Freedom.” Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth I. New York: The New Press, 282–284.
3 See Cutting, G. 1989. “The Archaeology of Knowledge.” In: Michel Foucault’s Archaeology
of Scientific Reason. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 227–260.

The Ethical and Political Significance of Michel Foucault’s Ancient Technology … 191
two ancient terms, perceive truth as something that can be detected conceptual-
ly. In the Christian technologies, truth is believed to be something that can be
reached through the exhaustive analyzing of thoughts, by the selection and
suppressive dismiss of those which would be judged as “evil.” Moreover, it
involves obedience and mediation4 of the spiritual father as prerequisites.5 Con-
cerning the analogies with the modern era, it would thus not be overstatement to
state that, in this aspect, the passage from Christianity to modernity is not
formed as a rupture but as continuity.
In modernity, knowledge is constituted as an objective field which shapes
the truth about the human being, while it is applied to a whole mechanics of
power. The main concern of the human sciences has been the question of what
kind of human actions and behavior can be considered as normal or not, and
how can the human being be shaped through the social institutions.6 Through
the use of norms7 and normalising judgements8 the normalising knowledge is
diffused in the society.9 Knowledge in the 18th and 19th centuries is produced
in the context of discipline, surveillance and restriction which shape the new
forms of social control of that era,10 through the scientific construction of the
subject.11 The condition of mediation, inherited by the Christian pastoral power,
would be also a guiding one in the macro-politics of the modern theory of social
contract, since the political act would be conceived as something which has to
be carried out by representatives, excluding thereby the role of the direct active
will, discourse and participation of the people. Modernity would then bestow to
the post-industrial era the biopolitical management of life by a group of ex-
perts12 charged with the administration of the conditions of the life of both the
individual and the population.
—————————
4 For the Christian technologies of the self as the methods of control, see: Foucault, M. 1999.
“Pastoral Power and Political Reason.” In Religion and Culture. Carrette, J. R. (Ed.). New York:
Rutledge, 135–153.
5 Foucault speaks of the societies of confession to refer to our societies. Confession has been
for centuries a method of producing truth. Insofar we consider it as the ability of freedom to speak
freely of everything, we never wander if it is indeed so. See, Foucault, M. 1978. The History of
Sexuality I. New York: Pantheon Books, 58.
6 Foucault, M. 1995. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. New York: Vintage
Books, 138.
7 The norm is something that circulates “between the disciplinary and the regulatory,” see rela-
tively, Foucault, M. 2003. Society Must Be Defended. New York: Picador, 252–253.
8 Foucault, M. 2003, op. cit., 182–184.
9 This way it constructs the kinds of subjects or groups, which can be accepted as normal or
healthy, and the ones which should be expelled, marginalized or made to comply. See, Foucault,
M. 2003, op. cit., 253–254.
10 Foucault, M. 1995, op. cit., 296, 305.
11 Ibid., 192.
12 For the paradigm of medical authority, see Foucault, M. 2003, op. cit., 252 and: Clarke, A.
E., Mamo, L., Fishman, J, Shim, J K., Fosket, J. R. 2003. “Biomedicalization: Technoscientific
Transformations of Health, Illness, and U.S. Biomedicine.” American Sociological Review, 68,
161–194.
192 Maria Kli
THE HOMO-AECONOMICUS OF NEO-LIBERALISM OR

THE “POSITIVE” TECHNOLOGIES OF CAPITALISM
The production of docile bodies, in the political anatomy of power registra-

tion, rendered their forces increased in economic terms of utility but decreased
in terms of political obedience. The reversed course of energy and the power
that might result from it turns into the relation of strict subjection,13 according to
Foucault’s genealogic approach to power and the subject. This relation has been
also deployed by the neo-liberal capitalism. According to the Foucauldian inter-
pretation of the neo-liberal analysis of the Chicago School of Economics, late
capitalism’s particularity can be described as productivity rather than suppres-
sion, since it manages to maintain itself throughout time by way of innovation
and technological progress.14 It must, therefore, be analyzed by positive terms,
taking into account the chance that it gives to people to participate into individ-
ual and collective experiences, and the new forms of knowledge and practice it
promotes as well.15
In this socio-political ground, some of the most fundamental categories that
appeal to contemporary society are basically financial, even if they do not appear
as such, since absorption in the plane of economy can be observed in any inter-
subjective relation and personal action. According to the neo-liberal analysis, the
homo aeconomicus is not the passive object of the discipline mechanisms any-
more, but the active agent of continuous economic activity.16 Seemingly not pro-
ductive activities, through which personal capacities are cultivated, are also per-
ceived as the forms of production and investment in the self.17 So, capitalism is
formed not as an outer condition but, most importantly, as an automatized mental
function and body coordination, which interferes and is simultaneously being
shaped by the interaction with new technological applications and functional ser-
vices.18 It is, therefore, applied to the core of the individual’s self as an ego-
grasping psychological and noetic structure, which aims at the capitalization of all
kinds of experiences and affects, in terms of self-maximization and profit. The
Big-brother effect, as an expanded kind of panopticism in the contemporary so-
—————————
13 About the contrast between this analysis and the Marxist analysis of labor as a condition of
alienation, cf. Foucault, M. 1995, op. cit., 138.
14 Foucault follows Shumpeter’s analysis on this topic. Cf. Foucault, M. 2008. The Birth of Bi-
opolitics. New York & Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 229–233; Shumpeter, J. A. 1982. Histo-
ry of Economic Analysis. London–Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1982.
15 Lemke, Th. 2010: “Foucault’s Hypothesis: From the Critique of the Juridico-Discursive
Concept of Power to an Analytics of Government.” Parrhesia 9, 31–43.

16 Foucault, M. 2008, op. cit., 223.
17 Read, J. 2009: “A Genealogy of Homo-Economicus: Neo-liberalism and the Production of
Subjectivity.” Foucault Studies, 6, 25–36; Adamson, M. 2009. “The Human Capital Strategy.”
Ephemera, 9, 4, 271–284.
18 Lianos, M. 2001: “Safety, Deviance and Control: The Postindustrial Transition from Values
to Results.” Sciences Sociales et Entreprises, 1, 1, 114–137.

cieties of control19 is thus accompanied by the capitalistic ethic of the self, which
forms the individual’s ego-centered attitude and everyday practice.
Thus, the meeting point of a confrontational and supplementary balance be-
tween the techniques of coercion and the subject’s techniques of self-formation
is called, in Foucauldian terms, governmentality.20 This term points to the fact
that power’s effectiveness consists in the clandestine splice of the techniques of
coercion (power) and the techniques of the self (subjectification).21 It is a pre-
modern general term, which contains a micro-political significance, and, hence
is wider than the contemporary concept of government which is focused only on
the state’s role or the large-scale politics.22
A possible way out of this contemporary matrix of outer and inner control—
which is being preserved by the individual’s micro-political hunting for power
and advantage over others—could be the re-invention of a conception of truth
that would possibly lead us to freedom. If this ego-based structure of the self is
the foundation of the capitalistic ethics, the weaponry23 of a revolutionary aspi-
ration has to start from the conscious existential and mental shift of the subject;
since the subject, as already mentioned, is the core target of today’s control
techniques, which develop along with techniques that administrate the biopoliti-
cal fate of human populations.24
THE ANCIENT TECHNOLOGIES OF THE SELF AND THE ONTOLOGY

OF TRANSFORMATION
At the seminar The Hermeneutics of the Self, Foucault presents the subject as
self-constituting. Through his study of the ancient history of sexuality,25 he dis-
covers that the ancient techniques of the self-permit the subjects, often through
self-restraint, to affect or modify specific functions of their body, mind and
—————————
19 After the model of the discipline society Foucault described the biopolitical model of con-
trols. Many theorists have advocated that in the post-industrial societies of our times, Foucault’s
model of discipline societies is obsolete and should be replaced by a model of society which can
be characterized by an expanded form of controls. Nevertheless various forms of old disciplines
and new controls still interact. Gilles Deleuze has offered the term “societies of control.” Cf.
Deleuze, G. 1992. “Postscript on the Societies of Control.” October 59, 3–7. Lianos, M. 2003:
“Social Control after Foucault.” Surveillance & Society, 1, 3, 412–430.
20 See Lemke, Th. 2010, op. cit.
21 Foucault, M. 1993, op. cit., 204.
22 Lemke, Th. 2007: “An Indigestible Meal? Foucault, Governmentality and State Theory.”
Distinktion 15, 43–65.

23 See the term “war machines” in: Deleuze, G. 1995. “Interview by Antonio Negri—Control
and Becoming.” In: Negotiations 1972–1990. New York: Columbia University Press, 169–176.
24 See for example, in reference to the biopolitical financial strategy relating to the nature
preservation, Sullivan, S. 2013. “Banking Nature? The Spectacular Financialisation of Environ-

mental Conservation.” Antipode 45, 1, 198–217.
25 Foucault is focused increasingly on the ancient past, insofar he searches for practices which
are less as possible influenced by the scientific knowledge and the complicated normalizing sys-
tems which form the modern knowledge of the subject. Foucault, M. 1993, op. cit., 203.
194 Maria Kli
conduct, in order to achieve to attain some kind of perfection, bliss, virtue or

uncommon powers and eventually transform themselves.26 The truth about the
self and the world, in the context of the ancient technologies, is not something
that exists independently or comes from an outer source to the subject, but
something that has to be discovered by the subject through its actual ontological
transformation.27
In the Foucauldian ontology of transformation the subject is considered as
self-constituting but not out of nothingness. Since Foucault is not interested in
questions of origins, he sees the subjectivity as shaping something that already
exists; it is not (as in the Platonic or Cartesian thought) substance, but a form
that is not primordially identical to itself, as it is undergoing constant changes.28
In this way the subject is not considered as what is but as what is not, and is
thus founded upon a relatively ontological rupture among her/his body as seem-
ingly unchangeable, and, her/his self29 as potentiality. This approach is con-
sistent with the description of the quantum sub-atomic level, in the contempo-
rary physics, as constantly under change and creation,30 remaining, whatsoever,
unified within wholeness.
The perception of the subject as such is Foucauldian and not Greek. Howev-
er, a Greek reference could be maintained if related to the Greek theatrical per-
sona as a symbol of unity in duality. The significance of the term is echo
through, meaning “speaking through the mask,” as the person who wore it was
simultaneously his/her self and another. The mask keeps the two persons united,
opening new possibilities in new worlds of experience.31 This is actually
a central characteristic of the Dionysian worship, as a worship that gives rise to
transformation as it took place in the Greek rituals such as the Eleusinian and
the Kabirian, and whose artistic expression was the birth of the theatre. Diony-
sus’s role is to cause, in this life, in the outer and inner realm, or field, of the
subject, the multiple forms of the Other to emerge.32 The Greek Polis accepted
and integrated this dynamic aspect of the Dionysian form by constituting offi-
cially repertories as a technology of “controllable” ritual mania, which would
serve as a psychic healing for the society’s members. Hence, the theatre would
evolve as a result of this constitution and as a living actualization of the imagi-
native power, by abolishing the limits that create a split between the two worlds.
—————————
26 Ibid., 203.
27 Ibid., 209.
28 Foucault, M. 1997, op. cit., 290.
29 Kelly, M. G. E., op. cit., 2013.
30 Schiller, Ch. 2015: “Motion of Matter- Beyond Classical Physics” and “The Quantum De-
scription of Matter and Its Motion.” Motion Mountain- The Adventure of Physics, vol. IV: The
Quantum of Change, 71–110; http://motionmountain.net/motionmountain-volume4.pdf
31 See Tsatsoulis, D. 2012: “Reading the Identity of Dramatis Personae through the Semantics
of Possible Worlds.” Γράμμα: Περιοδικό θεωρίας και κριτικής 20, 221–235.

32 Vernant, J. P. 1990. Mythe et religion en Grèce ancienne. Éditions du Seuil, 103.
The acceptance of Dionysus would also represent an honoring position for the
social Other in the center of the Polis.33
What the subject is, depends to a degree on specific socio-historical
practices, since what we consider we are affects who we really are. These
practices by repetition form habits which in their turn create continuity for the
subjectivity,34 as a way of relating to the self as an ethical subject. For the
Greeks what is right or wrong does not stem primarily from the rules, but main-
ly from the character, the ēthos (ήθος), which is connected to the dimension of
the self.
Foucault points to the Greek word “ēthopoiein” (ηθοποιείν)35 (the for-
mation of ēthos) which is understood as a kind of knowledge useful for the hu-
man being. In the epicurean texts this kind of knowledge appears with the term
phusiologia (φυσιολογία).36 What distinguishes meaningful knowledge from
pointless knowledge, is not the direction of focus of each one (inner self/outer
world), but the particular way in which it functions.37 Among these two ways of
knowledge, the latter is “ornamental,”38 whereas, the other refers to the cultiva-
tion of the self as the subject’s purpose of life.39 What does phusiologia serve, is
the paraskeuē (παρασκευή). This term refers to the activity of preparing the
subject in order to be “sufficiently armed for whatever circumstance of life may
arise.” Under this preparation, the person can maintain one’s own stability and
balance, no matter what are the challenges or the impulses raised by the external
world.40 This ability enables the subject to succeed one’s self-transformation
into a free subject, “who finds within himself the possibility and means of his
permanent and perfectly tranquil delight.”41
—————————
33 Ibid., 102.
34 See, Kelly, M. G. E. 2013, op. cit.
35 The meaning of the word in modern Greek is acting.
36 The fundamental purpose of phusiologia is that it teaches a person to live according to the
principles of nature (φύσις). Foucault, M. 2005. The Hermeneutics of the Subject—Lectures at the
Collège de France 1981–82. New York–Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 238.
37 Foucault, M. 2005, op. cit., 237.
38 For Epicurus the pointless knowledge is the general cultural knowledge of a free man known
as paideia (παιδεία) which – though it is a positive notion for the Greek culture—for Epicurus in
fact serves to boaster people to display themselves using the words in order to be admired by the
masses.
39 Foucault, M. 2005, op. cit., 238.
40 Ibid., 240.
41 Ibid., 241.
196 Maria Kli
THE CARE OF THE SELF AND TRUTH AS SELF-CONSTITUTION
The ἐπιμέλεια ἑαυτοῦ emerges as a way of the subject to constitute the

truth by its own means,42 and represents the ancient, Hellenistic and Roman
approach of philosophy43 as a way of life.44 Foucault refers to the ἐπιμέλεια
ἑαυτοῦ as philosophy and to the γνώθι σ’ αυτόν as spirituality; the two terms,
in the ancient pagan spirituality, were nearly identical and indissoluble. Philos-
ophy is defined by Foucault, as a way of thinking, which implicates the sub-
ject’s ability to reach the truth. Moreover, it could be described as a mindful
attitude which requires from the person to be constantly, or as much as possible,
conscious of one’s state of mind and present condition. On the other hand, spir-
ituality is defined as “the subject’s attainment of a certain mode of being and the
transformations that the subject must carry out on its self to attain this mode of
being.”45 It is specifically described as a set of researches, practices, methods
and experiences, which may consist in purifications, mental and bodily exercis-
es, ascetic practices and renunciations, as well as conversion of perception,
sense and existence; these are all understood not as a kind of knowledge as
such, but as techniques of accessing the truth, or of strengthening the condition
of the mind and body, in order to be able to access the truth.46
There are some main specific characteristics which can be detected, in
regard to both philosophy and spirituality as described by Foucault. Firstly,
spirituality is an active process of ontological transformation, therefore, is not
something which can be attained merely cognitively. In this sense, the active
ontological transformation of the subject is a prerequisite for the attainment of
truth, since its previous condition does not appear as capable of approaching
it.47
Second, the subject’s conversion through spirituality may take multiple
forms. It can be succeeded by the power of love as an exalting movement of the
subject or as a movement of enlightenment, through which truth comes to the
subject. Truth may also come to the subject through askēsis (άσκησις), an ex-
tensive, strenuous practice or exercise. Love and askēsis correspond to two dif-
—————————
42 Foucault, M. 1993, op. cit., 210.
43 This estimation is in the heart of the Pythagorean, Cynic, Stoic and Epicurean Schools.
Foucault, 2005, 8–9.
44 See, Hadot, P. 1995. Philosophy as a Way of Life: Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to
Foucault, Blackwell Publishing.

45 See, Foucault, M. 1997, op. cit., 294. Note that Foucault doubts that he can maintain this def-
inition for long. According to Jeremy Carette, the term “spirituality” is used by Hadot as well as
by Foucault in the context of the Alexandrian period. See, Carrette, J. R. 2013. “Rapture and
Transformation: Foucault’s Concept of Spirituality Reconsidered.” Foucault Studies 15, 52–71,
Hadot, P. 2012. Éloge de la Philosophie antique. Broché; Foucault, M. 2005, op. cit., 10.
46 Foucault, 2005, op. cit., 15.
47 Ibid., 15.
ferent ways of Western spirituality, through which the subject’s transformation

becomes the means for reaching the truth.48
Finally, there are healing qualities which can be attributed to the spiritual
process of passing from ignorance to enlightening knowledge. The, not directly
visible but perceived, consequence of the shift in the core of the subject, con-
sists in the ability to fill one’s heart with fulfilment, bliss and calmness. The
truth’s value, in this respect, is a healing one for the passions of the heart, and it
could never be offered unless the subject was prepared for it and ready to accept
it.49 For Hadot,50 spirituality understood by him as wisdom, is regarded by all
ancient schools as a condition of total serenity of the mind/psyche and philoso-
phy as therapeutic of anxiety and human misfortune.
*
In the ἐπιμέλεια ἑαυτοῦ, philosophy is meant as “an effort for conscious
living.” If Socrates believes that there is not transmittable knowledge, this sug-
gests that he cannot communicate his ideas from his mind to the mind of anoth-
er,51 in form of a fixed answer to a problem. The meaning of Greek philosophy
entails that, in order for a concept to be perceptible in depth, it should be ap-
proached as a lived experience, since the way to the truth for each singularity is
a personal one.52 According to Hadot, through the Socratic dialectic discourse,
the challenge for the participant is that he is driven to question his way of life,
by turning the attention to his inner condition, to his present, to the quality and
truthfulness of his actions. By the end of the discourse the participant has to
decide whether he is going to live consciously or not. In this dialectical game,
the existential foundations of the person as well as one’s values are seriously
challenged.53
Socrates himself is indifferent towards most of the human occupations. This
attitude of him is provoking to the Athenian people, who are mostly outgoing
preoccupied with political affairs. In this case, Socrates brings the singular con-
sciousness in confrontation with the social status quo. His advice is to look into
—————————
48 Ibid., 16.
49 Ibid., 16. The critique of this whole approach came from the Gnostics for whom all spiritual
experience is deduced to knowledge (γνώσις). The overemphasizing of this activity eventually
would involve domination.
50 Hadot, P. 2002. What Is the Ancient Philosophy?. Cambridge, Mass.–London: The Belknap
Press of Harvard University Press. About Hadot and Foucault, see Hadot, P. 1995. Philosophy as
a Way of Life: Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to Foucault. Blackwell, 208, 211 και Cremonesi,
L. 2015: “Pierre Hadot and Michel Foucault on Spiritual Exercises: Transforming the Self, Trans-
forming the Present.” In: Foucault and the History of Our Present. Fuggle, S., Y. Lanci, M. Taz-
zioli (Eds.). Hampshire–New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 195–209.
51 Hadot, P. 2014. Éloge de Socrate. Broché. Generally for the figure of Socrates see Hadot, P.
1995, op. cit., 147–178.

52 Davidson, A. I. 1991. “Spiritual Exercises and Ancient Philosophy: An Introduction to Pierre
Hadot.” Critical Inquiry 16, 3, 475–482.

53 Hadot, P. 2014, op. cit.
198 Maria Kli
their selves in a conscious way of life. Such an incitement can be really revolu-
tionary, insofar Socrates does not reject the outside in defense of some kind of
esoteric isolation. Socrates is an original offspring of the democratic society and
he is thrown into the world. Under this understanding, philosophy is not a sys-
tem of knowledge but a spiritual exercise, which is constantly tested through
life (βίος).54 The lack that the Socratic method highlights as ignorance, is the
one which leads to the awakening of consciousness, as a tendency for truthful-
ness and authenticity, which demands in each moment unforeseeable creativi-
ty55 and imposes the overcoming of mechanical repetition.
THE ETHICAL DIMENSION OF THE CARE OF THE SELF
Furthermore, there is a certain ethical dimension in the technology of the

concern of the self; this dimension is related to our capability of being mindful
and changing our psychological inclinations. In short, it could be seen that the
care of the self may be translated as a healing of the ego grasping of the mind.
The care of the self as, according to Foucault, a practice in freedom does not
indicate an individualistic attitude as it was perceived by the Christian technol-
ogies which by rejecting the self, required self-humiliation,56 or as it would be
interpreted by collective impersonal political perspectives which tend to ignore
singularities.57 On the contrary, the position maintained hereby holds that in the
contemporary era the success of any revolutionary attempt would be more likely
to succeed, if it was supported by willing subjects who, under the intention to
establish new constitutional structures in social and political life, have primarily
taken over the project of the re-formation of their self in a spiritual and philo-
sophical way.
The aforementioned position would be better comprehended under an analy-
sis concerning the dangers of the use of power in relation to psychological ego-
driven tendencies. The dual danger for any revolutionary subject is, on the one
hand, slavery, and on the other hand, the abuse of power, and the enforcement
of one’s imaginative desires on someone else. The model of the tyrant is not
only a political structure, but primordially a psychological one. It is the model
of psychic totalitarianism and intolerance of the Other; it obeys to a force of
resignation towards the passions, and, traditionally, according to Foucault, is
contrasted with a power of a good government. The latter condition can be
compared to the ruler who first of all imposes the restrictions upon himself.58
—————————
54 According to Hadot, it is a new way of life, active thought, living consciousness. Ibid.
55 Nehamas, A. 2000. The Art of Living: Socratic Reflections from Plato to Foucault. Berke-
ley–Los Angeles–London: University of California Press.
56 Foucault, M. 1993, op. cit.
57 This term is used here to refer to subjects or small-scale groups.
58 Foucault, M. 1997, op. cit., 288.
This would be a precondition for someone to be rendered capable of acceptance

and receptiveness.
For the Greeks freedom equals non-slavery. Both terms can be interpreted
politically as well as psychologically, as states of mind. The slave in ancient
Greece is considered as unethical, since this person is manipulative and not
conscious of one’s actions. In that sense, ethics is a political virtue. On the other
hand, being free means that someone is not a slave of one’s own self and de-
sires; the latter presupposes that this person establishes an archē (αρχή), one
develops a reason towards her/his passions, and constitutes the government of
her/his self.59
The main reasons for the pretensions of domination, desire for control, and,
in general, the mistreatment of others is ignorance and fear. The spiritual work
on the self does not imply just some transcending high values, which have to be
attained in order to progress. Most importantly, and as a foundation of this, the
subject with its conscious will is summoned to a relation of awareness with the
processes of the unconscious psychic mechanisms which “reside” in itself and
tend to overpower it.60
Moreover, the technology of the concern for the self corresponds to the eth-
ics of philosophical bios that succeeds to face the fear of death. This task had
a very important position in the Greek spirituality, as it is evident also through
the ritual initiations.61 This overcoming helps the subject to detach its self from
the psychological ego-grasping62—as a cause of mistaken perception—and its
domination, which causes the subject to be in a constant instinctive struggle for
survival. Of course, there cannot be any progress in the spiritual path, unless the
subject has a correct understanding of the nature of the self. Spirituality63—as
a project of study, exercise and growth of virtues on the practical level, medita-
tive techniques and intuitive abilities—gives a kind of power to someone which
can only be used for the sake of other beings.64 This is another way of putting
Foucault’s remark that “freedom has to be exercised ethically.”
—————————
59 Foucault, M. 1997, op. cit., 286–287.
60 Before the era of industrialization in the 19th century what is now psychoanalysis and psy-
chotherapy, was a part of the methods of spiritual and religious traditions. See Safran, J. D. 2003.
“Introduction.” In Psychoanalysis and Buddhism: An Unfolding Dialogue. Safran, J. D. (Ed.).
Boston: Wisdom Publications, 1–34.
61 See, Burkert, W. 1985. Greek Religion: Archaic and Classical, Blackwell Publishing & Har-
vard University Press, 276–278; Rohde, E. 2001. “The Eleusinian Mysteries.” Psyche: The Cult
of Souls and the Belief in Immortality among the Greeks. Oxon: Routledge, 217–235.
62 Cf. Engler, J. 2003. “Being Somebody and Being Nobody: A Reexamination of the Under-
standing of self in Psychoanalysis and Buddhism.” In Psychoanalysis and Buddhism: An Unfold-

ing Dialogue, 35–79.
63 I am referring to the term as it is used broadly today and unified with philosophy.
64 This is a central condition of all practice, as well as of the attainment of enlightenment in the
Buddhist tradition.
200 Maria Kli
POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CARE

OF THE SELF
Consequently, the care of the self entails the care of the others, and is, thus,
indissolubly tied to the care of the political community. The care of the self is
the field where the care of others can grow, but also the others are always the
test for the care of the self. For the person who has taken over the task of the
care of the self, the social field is a field of testing oneself as the pretensions of
domination on others are abandoned by the conscience of responsibility towards
them.
The political meaning and purpose of the ἐπιμέλεια ἑαυτοῦ, according
to Foucault, is given by Socrates in the Platonic dialogues of Alcibiades and
Apology. In the first dialogue which is also entitled (by Plato or by the Alexan-
drians) On Human Nature, Socrates appears to approach, for the one and only
time, Alcibiades and encourages him, if he wants to involve in the political
affairs, and be a leader, as he wishes to, first to take care of himself. Even
though Alcibiades has the best social virtues, he is ignorant; his ignorance con-
sists in that he does not know his self. Therefore, his education is not adequate
to be a ruler.65
Accordingly, self-awareness seems to be a precondition of political life. If
someone wants to involve in politics, he is expected to know the nature of its
subject, that is, the human beings and the way that is considered best to consti-
tute their social affairs, meaning the way they relate to each other. Ignorance is
understood in respect to the self, the psyche, and the spiritual matters. Accord-
ing to the Socratic ideals and Plato, it is impossible for someone who does not
live a philosophical bios, to practice the political tehnē, since one cannot know
the best action that is to be taken for the benefit of others. So, the purpose of the
care of the self is spiritual and ethical: it refers to the possibility of knowing
what is best for the self and for the others. Furthermore, the ethical imperative is
simultaneously a political imperative: the care of the self can serve as a method
of rendering someone a political subject. It is, therefore, required that the two
terms remain connected, and this brings in the spotlight a matter which contem-
porary politics do not let much space for: the matter of the ethical subject. Af-
fecting the micro-political field can be proven to affect the sphere of the large-
scale politics. Moreover, awareness or mindfulness implemented in an ethical
context can create the forms of resistance towards the isolating and automatiz-
ing modes of control.
The ancient Greek philosophy can be comprehended as an attempt of repro-
gramming the mind, in the sense in which Spinoza conceived this term; as
a method of freeing oneself from the sad passions through the reinforcement of
—————————
65 Foucault, M. 2005, op. cit., 31–37.
the passions of joy, which can lead to the psychic perfection,66 as well as
through active dispositions that can result from the complete awareness of the
causes, meaning the natural consequences of our actions.67 Spinoza speaks of
the common ability of rejoicing and sharing with others a kind of perfectibility.
This means that he prompts us to conceive and fulfil the vision of a community
of human beings in search for their divine nature, since in the Spinozian panthe-
ism this suggestion refers to the awareness of unification, under which the spirit
coheres with the whole nature. This divine nature is not related in a hierarchical
manner to the humane, but takes the content of possibility or potentiality which,
in accordance with the Buddhist or the Pythagorean philosophy, reveals itself in
the moment in which the mind is purified, that is, untangled from the obscurity
of the sad passions.
CONCLUSION
To sum up, the care of the others is innate in the care of the self, since the
latter is the ontological and ethical precondition of the former. As Foucault
maintains, a political community, whose citizens would take on the proper care
of their selves would be a community that could flourish harmoniously, and its
permanency would be based on this care.68 In this potentiality lies the political
significance of the ἐπιμέλεια ἑαυτοῦ; the whole ethical purpose of it is, short-
ly, to render the subject capable of putting consciously into practice its free-
dom.69 If, as Giles Deleuze, following Foucault, puts it, we are the mechanisms
through which we act and function, the attempt of taking the charge of the tech-
nologies of the production of subjectivity,70 as Michael Hardt and Antonio
Negri suggest, can take the form of a political and ethical resistance to the con-
temporary biopolitical mechanisms of social control. Foucault himself visual-
ised the human life, in the way of the Greeks, as a piece of art. The transfor-
mation of the subject’s being is a part of a formation of the aesthetics of exist-
ence. He believes that it is a worthy task in life to render the self beautiful
through acts that can be recognised as beautiful.
—————————
66 Spinoza, B. 2002. Ethics. In: Complete Works. Morgan, M. L. (Ed.). Indianapolis–
Cambridge: Hackett, part III, proposition 11, 285.

67 Grossman, N. 2010. Healing the Mind: The Philosophy of Spinoza Adapted for a New Age,
Cranbury–London–Canada: Associated University Presses, 63–211.

68 Foucault, M. 1997, op. cit., 287.
69 Ibid., 284.
70 This refers to material, social, cognitive, emotional technologies of producing the subjectivi-
ty that Hardt and Negri refer to under the general term of biopolitical production. Hardt, Michael
& Negri, Antonio. 2009. “Introduction.” Commonwealth. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belk-
nap Press of Harvard University Press, vii-xiv.
202 Maria Kli
ABOUT THE AUTHOR — PhD, Political Philosophy, National and Kapodistrian

University of Athens. She is a researcher, member of the ISUD since 2014. Co-editor
of: 2013. Notions and Terms of Cornelius Castoriadis (with G. N. Politis, K. Katsi-
farea). Vivliopelagos: Athens. Currently she investigates the various Western and East-
ern technologies of the self in a cultural, socio-political, ethical and psychological con-
text. She has recently embarked on the postgraduate program of the School of Buddhist
Studies, Philosophy and Comparative Religions at the University of Nalanda, Nalanda
University, Rajgir, Nalanda 803116, India (affiliation).
No. 3/2017
Mikhail A. Pronin
DIALOGUE AS A KNOT:
THE FIRST IDEAS OF DIALOGUE ONTOLOGY
ABSTRACT
The paper proposes an idea of explicating the invariant universal structure of dia-
logue through the mathematics of knots and braids, which is relevant, both for the de-
velopment of particular models of communication and/or dialogue, and for constructing
a general theory of dialogue, or the theory of utterances. The possibility of modeling
dialogue with the help of the mathematics of braids and knots—categories, entities and
their attributes—is shown by use of some well-known examples such as parts of the
sentence in grammar. Entities and their attributes can be considered as knots, either
right or false. The idea is to visualize the chains of these entities: to formalize them not
to keep in mind, neither in the text, but to work with them graphically.
Nodes, as final structures, and braids that generate them, allow to reveal paradigmat-
ic anomies, conflicts, logical and ethical disagreements, etc., and vice versa: “synonim-
ies,” mutual understanding, unanimity, in a fundamentally new format of perception and
understanding of the context of genesis (braids) and results (knots) of dialogue.
The visualization of verbal utterance on the basis of the knot and braid mathematics
is a significant step towards formalizing the theories of dialogue, both in general theo-
retical and purely practical plans. The latter is analyzed by the example of the person’s
inner dialogue with herself/himself in making decisions: rational and/or irrational (emo-
tional), which allows conducting a specific work with clients of psychotherapy, coach-
ing, management consulting, mediation, etc.
Keywords: dialogue, braid, knot, logic, ontology, visualization.
WHY A KNOT?
Dialogue knots are, on the one hand, a heuristically useful metaphor and
symbol of the complexity—like the Gordian knot, and on the other, it is a meta-
phor for evil. This tool and its methodology solve complex epistemological
questions of ontological understanding of the nature of a complex object, pro-
cess or phenomenon. In this situation, the overall solution is more productive.
204 Mikhail A. Pronin
The structure of a complex object, interdisciplinary, is non-material: What

can be more intangible than human values and ideals? It is not reasonable to
expect a request from the vital areas of concern to mathematicians on mathe-
matical modeling of “entangled” object.
Elementary knots are met in the theory of William Thomson (Lord Kelvin);
also, we can move from an object with a simple configuration to very intricate
ones—with opaque setting. One can find a lot of similarities with dialogue in
the value systems and ideals. A topological, sculptural consideration will help to
form comparative approaches and angles.
The algebraic theory of braids offered by Emil Artin, 1947,1 will hopefully
allow visualizing the ontological foundation of braids and ideals as knots.
Great discoveries can be expected from the use of the geometric designs of
the German mathematician Kurt Reidenmeister, 19482 to the structure of dia-
logues—and the transition from considering them in space to the study of their
projections on a plane: values, norms, morals, customs, etc. His compatriot
Wolfgang Haken, 1961, 19623 has developed an algorithm that allows determin-
ing whether or not one can untie the knot.
Some knots are false, as it is by magicians. The false knots do not connect
people in dialogue when it tends to agree on something common and important
for them; they are just a trick in a small talk.
The arithmetic of knots—the main corresponding theorem was proved in
1949 by Horst Shubert demonstrating the factor decomposition of a node—
finds valuable applications in physics, biology and so forth. The more so, this
mathematics of knots and braids allows, in our opinion, to minimize even ethi-
cal conflicts through decomposition to the certain factors that might be seen as
“simple multipliers.”
The productivity of the tool offered by intuitions requires verification. As it
was shown by Wolfgang Haken, sometimes to untangle the knot one first needs
to confuse it further. This paper falls unwittingly into the channel of such
a statement.
KNOTS: A BIT OF HISTORY
A Russian scholar Alexei B. Sosinsky provides an interesting introduction to

the theory of knots applied to the Russian language (2005).4 It may be valuable,
too, for scientists working in natural scientists, using minimal mathematical
—————————
1 Artin, E. 1947. “Theory of Braids.” Annals of Mathematics, 48, 2, 101–126.
2 Reidemeister, K. 1984. Knot Theory. Newn York: Chelsea Publ. Co.
3 Haken, W. 1961. “Theorie der Normalflächen.” Acta Mathematica. 105. 245–375; Haken, W.
1962. “Über das Homőomorphieproblem der 3-Mannigfaltigkeiten.” Mathematische Zeitschrift,

80, 89–120.
4 Sosinsky, A. B. 2005. Knots. Chronology of One Mathematical Theory (in Russian).
Мoscow: MCMSО.
Dialogue as a Knot: The First Ideas for Dialogue Ontology 205
tools. Sosinsky does not consider the theory of fundamental groups—as too
abstract or technically complicated mathematics—though it is the most efficient
instrument at an initial stage of the theory of knots. The first success of this
theory belongs to mathematicians of a German School Egbert van Kampen,
Herbert Seyfert, Max W. Dehn. It also came due to the Danish mathematician
Carl August Nielsen and the American mathematician James Waddell
Alexander.
But in Alexandre-Théophile Vandermonde’s view at the end of the 18th cen-
tury and Johann Carl Friedrich Gauß’s view at the beginning of the 19th centu-
ry, mathematics was long ignoring knots as its subject. Up to the middle of the
eighties of the 20th century, the theory of knots remained only one of the
branches of topology—rather developed but satisfying just a narrow circle of
experts, American and German. Today the situation has changed—the mathe-
matical theory of knots is found interesting by a more wide range of experts:
biologists, physicists, chemists, “virtualistic” specialists and so forth.
It is evident that material knots were used everywhere since prehistoric
times, for they appeared prior to the invention of axe, bow and arrows, or
a wheel. Knots served people in the millennia, e.g., “The clove hitch” was found
on a door in a tomb of Egyptian Pharaoh Tutankhamun. The reef knot was
“used” by an ancient Roman god Mercury, the patron of trade. It decorated his
truncheon and was called “nodus Hercules”—as this ancient hero carried
a lion skin whose with forepaws tied in the same way.
Many special knots are connected with one of the leading technological in-
ventions of antiquity—the block. The polyspast is well known—a rope lever of
Archimedes uniting two great inventions—wheel and a rope—which is applied
to the rising of freights.
It is reasonable to mention esthetic and magic aspects, too. Knots as the ele-
ments of decoration of buildings, ships, weapon etc. find the broadest applica-
tion from olden days. Knots can be found in patterns and ornaments everywhere
in the world—from the Neolithic ages up to now.
Seamen were the most consecutive inventors and users of knots, having to
deal with ropes more than all people. The best of the knots stayed in centuries:
many modern reference books contain up to several hundred various knots.
Someone John Smith famous for the story about the Indian princess Pocahontas
was one of the original authors of texts about knots. In 1627 he published the
sea dictionary describing several knots. A century later knots become the sub-
ject of description in the corresponding detailed article in the Encyclopaedia by
Denis Diderot and Jean Le Rond D’Alembert.
Sosinsky finishes his review on “an easy note”—on the knots in an arsenal
of the conjurer which are easily untied. Some of such focuses are available to
the beginning wizard5 (see also Jearl Walker’s paper, 1985). 6
—————————
5 Prasolov, V. V., A. B. Sosinsky. 1997. Knots, Gearings, Braids and Three-dimensional
Varieties (in Russian). Moscow: MTsNMO.

TO CREATION OF ONTOLOGY OF DIALOGUE THROUGH KNOTS

AND BRAIDS
The knot is better understood when presented in physical space—in 3D

space—that is sculptural. It will help to keep up with logic and the description
of the approach which is offered here to be applied to the analysis and explica-
tion of dialogue.
The basic principles which have been the basis for the proposed approach
are formulated in the following initial statements:
The world consists of a set of realities: the reality is, though, a universal that
cannot be “shown” actually, e.g., it is impossible “to show” physical reality
instead of or alongside with concrete things. Things are in reality; they can be
developed in reality or generate reality.
The human being, as well as the world, also consists of realities, partly stay-
ing in relations of “generating–generated.” In the Soviet School of Virtualistics,
or virtual psychology, guided by Nikolai A. Nosov (1952–2002) such a rela-
tionship is called virtual. The school started with publishing a paper of Nikolai
Nosov and Oleg Genisaretsky Virtual Psychological States in Activity of a Per-
son-operator.”7 They describe certain virtual psychological states (events) in the
activity of an operator (a pilot), and introduce the concept of virtual reality
through its attributive signs: generated, actual, autonomous and interactive.
The human being and fragments of its “internal space” are generated reali-
ties.
The internal human being called the “Homo virtualis,” is set by the realities
of corporality, consciousness, personality, will and the like—as a philosophical
and anthropological concept. These realities, or objectives, are characterized as
a hierarchy of layers enclosing each other. Each of them consists of a set of
realities, which includes a set of ontologies.
The listed paradigmatic settings are significant for the understanding of the
ontology of internal space (reality) of the human being, whatever we called it:
psychological, spiritual, subjective, subject, anthropological, human and so
forth. This is the space in which the word is generated: language and the speech,
and content of dialogue in them.8
In speech the objects of internal space are being manifested. These objects
are synthetic, the different part of the central (head and spinal cord) and periph-
eral nervous systems are responsible for their formation. Besides, consciousness
6
Walker, J. 1985. “Cat’s Cradles and Other Topologies Armed with a Two-Meter Loop of
Flexible String.” Scientific American, vol. 252, 138–143.
7 Nosov, N. A., O. I. Genisaretsky. 1986. ”Virtual States in the Activity of the Person Opera-
tor” (in Russian). Trudy GosNIIGA. Aviation Ergonomics and Training of Aircrew, 253, 147–155.
8 See more details in: Pronin, M. A. 2013. “Virtualistics as a Philosophical and
Anthropological Turn in the Human Sciences.” In: Philosophy: Theory and Practice. Moscow:
IPh of RAS, 158–165.
is a reality generated not by brain but by the whole organism—I’d say

person—all the body in particular. To reduce consciousness to the brain would
be a reductionism; the existence of the brain is necessary, but not a sufficient
condition for consciousness—resuscitation medicine witness to that. But we
omit the discussion of the nature of consciousness.
***
Below we present and analyze several examples which make clear the of-
fered approach to the parsing and modelling of the ontology of dialogue.
Language, speech, and word as a second signaling system, purely human,
have a complex structure generated by the crossing of the signified, signifier,
and significance, or meaning (Ferdinand de Saussure). Significance, or mean-
ing, is the very knot, elementary and simple, we are looking for. In this paper, it
is more important to point out the key moments for raising and developing the
primary idea into some valuable approach than to discuss the ratio of language
and speech: so far we will take these subtle linguistic questions in brackets.
Let us add that many general, universal, invariant moments can be illustrated
through “methodological” optics. For instance, it is well known that not only
European, but also Eastern philosophers operate with the categories of essence,
quality and movement. Researchers point out that these categories descripting
the world correspond to the parts of speech—to a noun, an adjective and
a verb—not only in Aristotle’s position.9 We offer the following understanding:
these parts of speech can be taken as the braids which form knots and/or “gear-
ings,” “overlappings:” false knots. The above-stated structures (and similar to
them) may be considered the tops of the mathematical hyper count, on the one
hand, and on the other, as the braids of which an ideal object—in a narrow
sense, an image—is formed in internal space of a human.
Let us increase dimension, or, a degree of space discretization taking one
more step further.
An uttering (statement) making the complete sense is called a sentence.
The structure of a simple sentence is well-known: subject, copula, and predi-
cate. Further there can be added object (direct or indirect); attribute; adverbial
modifier (of place, time and mode of action). The offered logic is obvious:
structural elements of a sentence can also be considered as braids from which
“the complete sense is knotted.” This approach allows visualizing such com-
plete sense of the statement which can be analyzed further within different
logics on validity or falsehood.
—————————
9 Lysenko, V., M. Hulin. 2007. Classical Indian Philosophy in the Perspective of Cultural
Studies: Sketching a New Approach. Classical Indian Philosophy Reinterpreted. New Delhi L
Decent Books, , 2007, 139–150; Lyssenko,V., M. Hulin. 2007. The Difficult Task of Hitting the
Mean—Aristotle’s Mean and Buddha’s Middle Path. Classical Indian Philosophy Reinterpreted.
New Delhi: Decent Books, 61–82.
Logic of decision-making is multidimensional and contradictory. On the one

hand, a person makes rational decisions: formal and logical. But there are re-
strictions of such decisions: 1 (one) worker builds a house in 1000 days; but in
how many days will 1000 workers build a house? The formal value “in 1 day”
won’t be maintained by “life logic:” 1000 workers on the construction site are
not appropriate. There is something rationally correct, but not true and relevant;
an emotional criterion always modifies the rational choice.
The third criterion is experience, or practice, in a sense the corporeality of
a person: whether the body takes this or that choice—or not. When all three
criteria are coordinated with each other, we can claim that the decision is made
indeed: “intuition” prompts it to us. Perhaps, such understanding of intuition
makes its nature no less mysterious, but more visible. These three criteria/rules
are weaved into a braid. A person can get confused with operating it.
For simplicity, we take two criteria: for example, rational and emotional. It
isn’t difficult to see that there are the following spaces—knots: (+/+) and (–/–),
(+/–) and (–/+). E.g., a person made something and understands that this is well
done: rational (+); and he/she feels good of making it well—emotional (+). On
the contrary, (–/–): a person understands that he/she arrived badly and feels
poorly because of it. It is an ethical standard: to know good from bad, and feel
it. Such situation can be seen as a knot.
There are many mixed cases, and braids show it. The corrupt official
knows/understands that it is bad to take bribes, but he feels well from it! Such
a situation (–/+) is gearing, overlapping, or false knot; in ordinary language it is
worded as inconsistency/confusion/entanglement. And it can happen or be im-
agined that a certain person feels sick from his/her good deed (–/+)…
A separate subject: are similar entanglements in the choice realized?
It is necessary to emphasise that the offered approach allows, at least, pass-
ing from disputes and emotional showdowns and “clearings of a situation” to
visualization, and by doing so, to detached, disinterested, and objective discus-
sion. The pragmatic criterion of simplification and clarity allows refusing theo-
retically best, but complicated and tangled instances, for the sake of keeping
good and straightforward ones.
Now, is the dialogue space better observed through the methodological op-
tics of braids and knots? Will not we arrive with three trees—braids— into the
jungle?
***
Let us take an emotional, sensual criterion, which also is multidimensional,

but its dimensions are final and can be estimated.
In the Linguistic-psychological dictionary “Sense Organs, Emotions and
Adjectives of Russian” of Mariya G. Kolbeneva and Yury I. Alexandrov it is
stated in its abstract:
“… the results of classification of 15918 adjectives of Russian are presented,

concerning their belonging to groups, connected and not connected with per-
ceptions received from various sense organs. For 7616 adjectives connected
with feelings, their relation to different types of perception is specified:
sight, hearing, sense of smell, taste and skin feelings. The adjectives con-
nected only with one type of perception, and also those which are connected
with two and three types of perception are allocated.”10
The dictionary also contains some data on emotionality (the manifestation of
feeling pleasant/unpleasant). These are 475 adjectives connected with the speci-
fied feelings. For these 475 adjectives, the age at which, according to answers,
people began to understand these adjectives is also specified (subjective age of
understanding). Data of the statistical analysis are provided, from which conclu-
sions are drawn that the adjectives describing smells and flavour are estimated
as giving more intensive emotions than the adjectives describing acoustical and
visual impressions.
“Also, the results of the analysis revealed links between types of perception,
intensity and signs of emotions, time of estimation and age of understanding
of adjectives. In the research conducted, material with the assistance of 474
people participating […] is used.” 11
It is possible to examine a similar work in English: that by Jeanette Altarriba
et al., 1999.12
The age of understanding of adjectives is the age of the generation of knots
of dialogues (!), but not entanglements. At what age does a man begin to distin-
guish “I want,” “I can” and “I must”? At what age he/she is capable of operating
consciously and arbitrarily the choice between “I want—I can—I owe/am
obliged”? There are answers to these questions, but their consideration is not
a subject of the present paper. What is important here is something bigger than
these modalities, and these are ontological realities—braids—which are filled
every time with the contents specific of this or that type of reality. Let us con-
sider some extra-linguistic examples to show it.
The classification of threats and damage from the evil intention can also be
defined by three criteria: the type of purpose (the reality of consciousness signi-
fied by a noun); the type of a malefactor (the irrational reality of values, emo-
tions, qualities signified by an adjective); the type of action (the reality of
corporality, anthropological reality signified by a verb).
—————————
10 Kolbeneva, M. G., Y. I. Alexandrov. 2010. “Sense Organs, Emotions and Adjectives of
Russian.” (In Russian). In: Linguo-psychological Dictionary. Moscow: Yasyk slavyanskih kultur, 2.
11 Ibid., 2.
12 Altarriba, J., L. M. Bauer, C. Benvenuto. 1999. “Concreteness, Context Availability and
Imageability Ratings and Word Associations for Abstract, Concrete, and Emotional Words.”
Behavior Research Methods, Instruments & Computers, 31, 4, 578–602.
Another example: approaches to the identification of a person consist of

a system of the same three components: 1) document, passport, admission (real-
ity of consciousness, objective reality); 2) “password” (irrational reality, values,
emotions and so forth—showing that the person belongs to the group);
3) fingerprints (the reality of corporality, anthropological signs).
***
The short and not exhaustive summary demonstrates that the transition from
the traditional studying of dialogue to the consideration of the nature of dia-
logue through the topology of knots and braids will help to visualize dialogue; it
will facilitate a search for inconsistencies and gaps in logics and discourses on
dialogue. For this purpose it is required to transfer to principally other “space,”
where the ontology of internal reality is set—a microcosm called human where
dialogue space is one of the most available to research and discussion. Such
a project requires a cross-disciplinary group of colleagues interested in untan-
gling the culture knots.
Now it seems useful to formulate several universal subjects, questions and
problems which require a universal decision—a sort of a plan for a further work.
THE CREATION OF AN ONTOLOGY OF DIALOGUE SPACE —

A UNIVERSAL AGENDA OF RESEARCH
This plan is focused on certain problems of understanding and rationaliza-

tion of the internal “world” of a human being in dialogue with itself, whatever
we call this space: ideal, psychological, anthropological, spiritual, subjective,
and so forth.
Here come the questions that provide ways to practical applications, e.g., in
psychology, psychotherapy, coaching, management consulting, mediation, etc.
Progress in these spheres is important not only for the theory of dialogue but
first of all for the humanities and humans in general.
The agenda for the development of ontology of dialogue is as follows:
How to set multiple hierarchies of ontologies in the space inaccessible to in-
ternal observation: introspections, reflections and so forth?
How to define the ontological status of interdependent realities or objects
which stay in the interactive relations of mutual generation/correction?
How to set synthetic, generated, temporary, autonomous, actual ontologies?
How to build dynamic ontological schemes with a variable centre of coordi-
nates?
Vyacheslav S. Styopin proposes how to build ontology in the scheme of ra-
tionality of theoretical knowledge:13 what differs a human on the place of an
object, the tool and the subject of research?
—————————
13 Styopin, V. S. 2000. Theoretical Knowledge (in Russian). Moscow: Academical Project.
How to specify ontologies of the non-distinction in errorneous phenomena?

How to pass from the mathematical formulae of braids to the mathematics of
knots in dialogue?
How to construct a program of the development of an ontology of psycholo-
gy and all the humanities in general—within the frame of developing an ontolo-
gy of philosophical anthropology?
How to deal with inadequate epistemologies?
How to build an ontology of “a-ethicognosis”—ethics denials—in the soci-
ology of modern medicine in the area of idiopathic pathologies?
How to build a modern history of a new medicine on a new ontological
base?
REFERENCES
Altarriba, J., L. M. Bauer, C. Benvenuto. 1999. “Concreteness, Context Availability and Imagea-
bility Ratings and Word Associations for Abstract, Concrete, and Emotion Words.” Behavior
Research Methods, Instruments & Computers, 31, 4, 578–602.
Artin, E. 1947. “Theory of Braids.” Annals of Mathematics, 48, 2, 101–126.
Haken, W. 1961. “Theorie der Normalflächen.” Acta Mathematica, 105, 245–375. Haken W.
1962. “Über das homőomorphieproblem der 3-Mannigfaltigkeiten.” Mathematische Zeit-
schrift, 80, 89–120.
Pronin, M. A. 2013. Virtualistics as a Philosophical and Anthropological Turn in the Humanities.
Philosophy: Theory and Practice. Moscow: IPh RAS, 158–165.
Prasolov, V. V., A. B. Sosinsky. 1997. Knots, Gearings, Braids and Three-dimensional Varieties
(in Russian). Moscow: MTsNMO.
Reidemeister, K. 1948. Knot Theory. New York: Chelsea Publ. Co.
Kolbeneva, M. G., Y. I. Alexandrov. 2010. Sensory Organs, Emotions and Adjectives in the
Russian language: Linguo-psychological Dictionary (in Russian). Moscow: Yasyk slavyan-
skih kultur.
Lysenko, V., M. Hulin. 2007. Classical Indian Philosophy in the Perspective of Cultural Studies:
Sketching a New Approach. Classical Indian Philosophy Reintepreted. New Delhi: Decent
Books, 139–150.
_____. 2007. The Difficult Task of Hitting the Mean—Aristotle’s Mean and Buddha’s Middle
Path. Classical Indian Philosophy Reintepreted. New Delhi: Decent Books, 61–82.
Nosov, N. A., O. I. Genisaretskiy. 1986. “Virtual States in Operator’ Activities” (in Russian).
Trudy GosNIIGA, Aviation Ergonomics and Flight Crew Training, 147–155.
Sosinsky, A. B. 2005. Knots. Chronology of One Mathematical Theory (in Russian). Мoscow:
MCMSО.
Styopin, V. S. 2000. Theoretical Knowledge (in Russian). Moscow: Academical Project.
Walker, J. 1985. “Cat’s Cradles and Other Topologies Armed with a Two-Meter Loop of Flexible
String.” Scientific American, 252, 138–143.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR — PhD in medicine, senior researcher, head of the re-
search group “Virtualistics,” Institute of Philosophy, Russian Academy of Sciences,
12/1 Goncharnaya Str., Moscow, 109240 Russia.
No. 3/2017
Anna Ivanova
THE TRUSTWORTHINESS OF SCIENCE.

TOWARD AN AXIOLOGICAL NOTION
OF SCIENTIFIC OBJECTIVITY
ABSTRACT
Discussions on the trustworthiness of science concern scientific objectivity. Scien-

tific products, methods, and institutions are objective in three different senses. In each
case, the notion of objectivity is applied to the outcomes of the scientific enterprise.
This interpretation neglects the human side of objectivity. The trust in science is rational
only when it is not grounded in an impersonal view of knowledge. Since trust is a value
that connects people, society places its credence not in a system of propositions,
a methodology, a tradition, or even—an institution, but rather in the living people that
practice science today.
Keywords: scientific objectivity, epistemic values, trustworthiness of science.
THE TRUSTWORTHINESS OF SCIENCE
One of the consequences of scientific progress and its presence in everyday

life is the increased role of trust in processes of decision-making. In most of our
life choices, from healthcare and product consumption, to social reforms and
political solutions, we rely heavily on the informed judgements of other indi-
viduals rather than on our own. We trust the experts of science whenever the
cognitive evaluation of the relevant facts is straitened by the complexity of the
problem, the differentiation of expertize or sometimes, just the abundance of
available information. In these occasions, our judgements are based on
knowledge that is so exterior to our own experience and out of our cognitive
command that its epistemic merit lays entirely on the trustworthiness of its
source.
Among all eligible sources of knowledge, science certainly takes the greatest
share today. The leading paradigm in discussions about the trustworthiness of
214 Anna Ivanova
science is focused on scientific objectivity. Science is regarded as objective

because of its orientation to facts rather than to values (Dupre, 2007, 27). Sci-
entific products, methods, and institutions are called objective in three corre-
sponding senses. Scientific products—the empirical and theoretical claims of
scientific knowledge—are objective since they allegedly describe the world as
“seen” from an impersonal standpoint labelled as the “view from nowhere”
(Nagel, 1986). Scientific methods are objective in the sense that they embody
the principles of rationality and empiricism and scientific institutions are inten-
tionally designed to minimize the risk of bias or subjective influence on the
acceptance and dissemination of knowledge.
In each case, the notion of objectivity is applied to the outcomes of the scien-
tific enterprise. In the next part, I will try to explain that this interpretation of
the notion is misleading, because it neglects the human side of objectivity. I will
argue that the trust people have in science and expertize is rational only as far as
it is not grounded in an impersonal view of science. Since trust is a value that
connects people, society places its credence not in a system of propositions,
a methodology, a tradition, or even—an institution, but rather in the living peo-
ple that practice science today. People trust the experts not simply because they
are competent on the problem but also because they have the virtue of being
objective.
This notion of objectivity makes an axiological turn toward earlier meanings
in the context of moral philosophy, the philosophy of aesthetics and of law.
Objectivity here is a virtue a person must possess in order to be trustworthy of
delivering knowledge, of making a right decision or a fair judgment. The of-
fered interpretation of the notion is similar1 to the virtue account of objectivity
developed by Moira Howes (2015) in which “… an objective reasoner is one we
can trust to manage her perspectives, beliefs, emotions, biases and responses to
evidence in an intellectually virtuous manner” (Howes, 2015, 173). The argu-
ments presented below regard the lack of credence of what I call external objec-
tivism of science as a source of rational trust.
THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF THE NOTION OF OBJECTIVITY
In order to explicate the exact meaning of the term “objective” one has to
travel across discourses with designations from metaphysics, epistemology, and
ethics. As Lorraine Daston points out: “We slide effortlessly from statements
about ‘objective truth’ of a scientific claim, to those about ‘objective’ proce-
dures that guarantee a finding, to those about the ‘objective manner’ that quali-
fies a researcher” (Daston, 1992, 597).
—————————
1 Though it puts more stress on the personal rather than the social dimension.
The Trustworthiness of Science. Toward an Axiological Notion of Scientific Objectivity 215
The multiplicity of meanings has given reason to Ian Hacking to urge us to

stop asking questions about objectivity as a concept and stick to what he calls
“ground-level questions”, such as: “Can we trust medical research when it is
funded by pharmaceutical companies?” (Hacking, 2015, 20). These questions,
according to Hacking do not require abstract concept of objectivity for their
resolution. His claim comes as a logical result from an understanding of objec-
tivity that focuses on theories, methods, and practices multiplying the use of the
notion in a number of contexts. However, giving up on a unified account will
sacrifice the value of objectivity. Why ask if studies on the safety of medicines,
that are financed by pharmaceutical companies, are trustworthy, if there is no
ideal against which to test these practices. The fact that there are no universal
standards of objectivity does not imply that there is nothing universal about
objectivity at all. Instead of giving up the idea of a unified account, we should
look for the continuity of the historical evolution and the similarities of different
contexts. This would allow to shed light on the question why being objective is
valuable and should deserve public trust.
In their investigation of the history of the notion Lorraine Daston and Peter
Galison (Daston, Galison, 2007) reveal three aspects that were dominant in
different historical periods:
1. Ontological objectivity (according to which something is objective in the
sense that it represents a mind-independent object);
2. Mechanical objectivity (according to which something is objective when
represents while being free of human intervention);
3. Aperspectival objectivity (according to which something is objective
when it lacks individual “idiosyncrasies”) (Daston, 1992, 598).
The dominant understanding of the twentieth and the twenty first century is
that of aperspectival objectivity, the so-called “view from nowhere”. All other
kinds still exist in different usages but are dependent upon it. The definition of
objectivity here is entirely negative. The idea of aperspectival or centerless
knowledge is explicated as a prohibition on personal interest. It is closely relat-
ed to the ideal of value free science and is usually contrasted to subjectivity as
a designation for personal interests and attitudes that should be suppressed and
limited in a scientific investigation. Daston reveals that aperspectival objectivity
first appeared in moral and aesthetic philosophy and was not associated with
natural science until the middle of the nineteenth century (Daston, 1992, 599).
Its development is the prerequisite of the understanding of objective knowledge
today.
In the analysis of the external objectivism, I will try to show how this
deviation from the original usage fails to account for the trustworthiness of
objectivity.
216 Anna Ivanova
THE OBJECTIVITY OF SCIENTIFIC PRODUCTS
The objectivity of scientific products regards the representation of the world

and is related to issues of scientific realism (see Longino, 1983, 85). A product
of science such as a theory is objective in the sense of fact-oriented. However,
what is fact-oriented is not necessarily true. If a theory is only objective when it
describes the world correctly then a number of false theories from the history of
science will be deprived of their objectivity. This would remove from science
all conceptions that were developed by honest mistake. The definition should
therefore admit that a theory be objective and false at the same time.
Furthermore, objectivity is not just an attribute of something that represents
an object: offensive, malicious, or manipulative statements may be about facts
as well. It is easy to claim that someone is cruel and state this to be about facts.
Because of these cases, factual orientation was analyzed in terms of linguistic
content. A theory is objective when it contains only fact statements and does not
contain any value terms and judgements either in its content or in its presuppo-
sitions. This way, instead of looking for the presence of certain positive charac-
teristics of knowledge and the scientific practices associated with it, the focus is
on the absence of certain qualities.
Placing objectivity in the external characteristics of scientific products may
often result in undermining of the trustworthiness of scientific products. When
the norm of objectivity is placed upon language, the fact that a theory is objec-
tive will not induce a lot of rational trust. Language pattern may mask a number
of value presuppositions and biases in a theory’s content. Even if there are no
value presuppositions, the fact that there may be the value implications is suffi-
cient to bring the question about the motives of the person who makes the value
claim. The personal interest may be absent in the language and still be present
in the result of investigation. There is no rational reason to trust a statement
merely because of it propositional structure. Objectification in speech manner
induces trust only by psychological association as we ascribe this way of talking
to scientific discourse, but it has nothing to do with proof or justification. It is
not conclusive evidence that some statement is a result of good scientific inves-
tigation. Finally, a reason to view with suspicion such an account is the occa-
sional lack of clear borderline between the factual and evaluative terms and
statements (cf. Putnam, 1981).
THE OBJECTIVITY OF SCIENTIFIC METHODS
However, the debate about value free science is not really about language
but about the methods of verification of scientific hypotheses. The dualism be-
tween fact and value judgements starts with Hume’s famous law, stating that
one cannot infer an “ought” from an “is” statement (Hume, 1777 (1748)). For
science, the reverse is also true, no moral reason can justify a statement about
facts. Theories which are accepted are based on empirical confirmation, not on
value commitments or personal interests. Therefore, a theory is objective not
simply because it contains only factual propositions but because it is corrobo-
rated or justified only by statements of facts. The fact-value distinction is radi-
calized by logical positivism to the extent that it deprived any value claim of its
cognitive meaning and tied all value judgements to individual preferences and
attitudes making them in this way intrinsically subjective (cf. Carnap, 1959, 61).
This conception raises a number of questions. An important one regards the
criteria to distinguish an “is-claim” from an “ought-claim.” Judgements found-
ing that distinction need to be objective as well. Hilary Putnam in his criticism
against the fact-value dichotomy states that: “the distinction is at the very least
hopelessly fuzzy, because factual statements themselves and the practices of the
scientific inquiry upon which we rely to decide what is and what is not a fact,
presuppose values” (Putnam, 1981, 128). The values that Putnam has in mind
are the epistemic values of coherence, plausibility, reasonableness, simplicity,
and beauty. Putnam calls these “standards of rational acceptance” (Putnam,
1981, 128).
There is great reluctance to perceive the epistemic standards of rational ac-
ceptance as values, because values are continuously associated with subjectivi-
ty. The problem, however, does not concern as much the fact that they are sub-
jective but rather that subjectivity in this tradition stands for contingency and
unreliability. While scientists may admit that there are values in science, they
may still argue that these belong a special kind of values because they are not
subjective. Epistemic values embody the universal principles of rationality.2
Putnam’s standards of rational acceptance are regarded not as values but as
descriptions of the methodological principles that guide scientific practice. Sci-
ence is objective in the sense that its methodological norms are such. This does
not suggest that there is one universal scientific method as opposed to the mun-
dane inquiries into life’s problems. Furthermore, the rationality of scientific
knowledge is too rich and cannot be reduced to a set of “rigid methodological
rules” (Bouzov, 2010, 249). The appropriate method of a particular situation is
always context-dependent—it ranges from one case to another. Which method
is objectively good is a matter of scientist’s choice. The choice is guided by two
requirements for the objectivity of methodology:
a. the conformity to certain rational standards that guarantee obtaining the
correct results,
b. “the extent to which it provides means of assessing hypotheses and theo-
ries in an unbiased and unprejudiced manner” (Longino, 1983, 86).
The first condition regards methodology as a set of procedural norms de-
signed with respect to the general goals of collection of data and accurate repre-
—————————
2 For the methodological conception of rationality as the core of science see (Bouzov, 2010).
218 Anna Ivanova
sentation of findings in science to ensure their reliability and communicability.

The second condition regards the relation between data and hypotheses in the
choice of proper or accurate methods for verification. There may be a legitimate
method, available and correct, of gathering data. However, it is the job of the
scientist to choose the method that will minimize bias in collecting the data to
support or refute working hypotheses. Any list of methodological rules, while
generally conforming to the principles of rationality, may be misused by both
mistake and intention on any level of scientific investigation. This issue is ad-
dressed by appropriate scientific practices on the level of community. The insti-
tution of science is intentionally designed to bring out criticism and mutual con-
trol in order to limit such occurrences.
THE OBJECTIVITY OF INSTITUTIONAL PRACTICES
The thesis that scientific objectivity is in the intersubjective control of scien-

tific practice is laid down by Karl Popper (1935/2002) and advocated in a modi-
fied version by Helen Longino (1983). According to this thesis, science is ob-
jective in the sense that it has the right institutional structure to guarantee the
exclusion of all extrinsic interests. The norms regarding propositions, methods,
and experiments can be explained in accordance with the demand for communi-
cability, openness to criticism and possibility for the replication of results.
Scientific knowledge is public, important experiments are replicated, there are
strict procedures for the dissemination of results and the organization is merito-
cratic. Longino repeatedly emphasizes that scientific knowledge is the product
of the collective coordinated efforts of many individuals (Longino, 1983, 95).
Similarly, Moira Howes regards objectivity to be a collective, rather than indi-
vidual virtue (2015). Objectivity is not the sum of individual efforts; theories
are retested, reformulated, and modified in the practice of mutual criticism.
Their acceptance also depends on group validation practices.
Adding collective criticism to scientific methodology, Longino argues that
objectivity is “a characteristic of a community’s practice of science, rather than
of an individual’s” (Longino, 1983, 98). The community’s practices, however,
strongly depend on the virtues of its members. The confidence that the norms of
the community function effectively to preserve objectivity, would crack, if the
norms themselves were just formally established and were not moral commit-
ments of individual scientists. In addition, there is the question about the ac-
ceptance of these selected norms. It is by the good will and the initiative of the
scientists that they are established in the first place. This is even more evident
considering how much of these norms function without any formal support but
solely based on mutual agreement (see Sztompka, 2007). The scientists them-
selves seem to recognize objectivity to be a virtue of their colleagues every time
they act upon trust—citing colleagues’ works, using the results of an experi-
ment that has not been replicated etc. According to Barber “[t]rust within
science depends on the continuing and effective fulfilment of both the cognitive
and the moral norms that govern the actions of scientists” (Barber, 1987, 127).
At the center of these moral norms lays the commitment to truth and the persis-
tency in its attainment.
CONCLUSIONS
The history of the notion of objectivity shows that any understanding that is
exterior to human personality falls apart in the multiplicity of contexts of the
rational behavior and practices of knowledge. Also, the analysis of the contem-
porary norms of objectivity for theories, methods and institutional practices
shows that when objectivity is understood in the terms of epistemic outcomes
instead of epistemic agents, it cannot induce rational trust. The expression that
science is value free or the opposite that it is value laden is quite an unfortunate
way of stating the matter since it presupposes that there may in fact exist human
enterprise devoid of values and that such enterprise gets somehow “polluted”
with them. However, the structure of human activity is always in accordance
with some goal that serves as a measure of success. The goal of science is truth
and scientists are trustworthy because they value truth and are persistent in its
pursuit. In each period of scientific history, science is as much objective as its
makers are. It is true that in order to trust science it is necessary to believe that
the ultimate goal of science is attainable in principle, that the theories developed
so far are referentially correct, that scientific methods are suited to produce such
theories and that the institutional structure is organized to bring us closer to that
goal. But these beliefs are still insufficient to trust science in its tremendous
impact on human life were it not the trust people have in scientists and the ethos
that they submit to.
REFERENCES
Barber, B. 1987. “Trust in Science.” Minerva, 25, 1, 123–134.

Bouzov, V. 2010. “Scientific Rationality as Normative System.” Logos&Episteme, 1–2, 247–256.
Carnap, R. 1959. “The Elimination of Metaphysics Through Logical Analysis of Language.” In:
Logical Positivism. Ayer, A. (Ed.). New York: The Free Press, 60–82.
Daston, L. 1992. “Objectivity and the Escape from Perspective.” Social Studies of Science, 22, 4,
597–618.
Daston, L., P. Galison. 2007. Objectivity. Cambridge (MA): MIT Press.
Dupré, J. 2007. “Fact and Value.” In: Value-Free Science? Ideals and Illusions. Kincaid, H.,
J. Dupré, and A. Wylie (Eds.), Oxford University Press, 27–41.
Hacking, I. 2015. “Let’s Not Talk About Objectivity.” In: Objectivity in Science. New Perspec-
tives from Science and Technology Studies. Padovani, F., J. Y. Tsou (Еds.). Springer, 19–33.
220 Anna Ivanova
Howes, M. 2015. “Objectivity, Intellectual Virtue, and Community.” In: Objectivity in Science.
New Perspectives from Science and Technology Studies. Padovani, F., et al. (Eds.). Boston
Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science 310, 173–189.
Hume, D. 1777 (1748). An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding.
Longino, H. E. 1983. “Scientific Objectivity and the Logic of Science.” Inquiry: An Interdiscipli-
nary Journal of Philosophy, 26, 1, 85–106.
Nagel, T. 1986. The View From Nowhere. New York: Oxford University Press.
Popper, K. 2002. The Logic of Scientific Discovery. London–New York: Routledge.
Putnam, H. 1981. Reason, Truth and History. Cambridge University Press.
Sztompka, P. 2007. “Trust in Science. Robert K. Merton’s Inspirations.” Journal of Classical
Sociology, 7, 2, 211–220.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR — PhD, Faculty of Philosophy, St. Cyril and St. Methodi-
us University, 5003 Veliko Turnovo, Bulgaria 2 T. Turnovski str., Bulgaria.
No. 3/2017
Artur Ravilevich Karimov
JOHN LOCKE ON COGNITIVE VIRTUES
ABSTRACT
In this paper we interpret and examine critically John Locke’s ideas on cognitive
(intellectual) virtues and values presented in his The Conduct of the Understanding
(1697). We believe that the cognitive subject’s virtues discussed by Locke are universal.
We believe that knowledge and understanding must and can be guided by the pursuit of
truth. But this concerns only the motivation component of knowledge, and not its suc-
cess which is ultimately determined by the epistemic environment.
Keywords: epistemology, intellectual virtue, cognitive value, knowledge, John
Locke.
INTRODUCTION
Recent epistemology includes two rival approaches to cognition. The first

approach continues the classical project of epistemology, started in the 17th
century. This project may be characterized by the following features: the value
of truth and objectivity, the epistemic normativity and exclusion of ethical, cul-
tural and political aspects of cognition. Also, the method of traditional episte-
mology mostly concerns idealized situations. This epistemology separates the
cognitive subject from the object of cognition. The subject is considered to be
individual. In the case of the collective (group) subject the group itself it is not
the agent which researches, perceives or believes, but it is so that every individ-
ual member of the group believes, perceives etc. This thesis is represented by
Ernst Sosa, Duncan Pritchard, Laura Zagzebski, Paul Boghossian, Jennifer
Lackey and others (cf. Boghossian, 2006).
The second approach emphasizes the social aspect of knowledge, especially
political and cultural aspects. In modern epistemology it is postulated in social
epistemology (Fuller, 1998; 2002). The most radical version of social episte-
mology is social constructivism, proposed mainly by sociology of knowledge
222 Artur Ravilevich Karimov
(Bloor, 1991). It inevitably leads to relativism (Goodman, 1978; Feyerabend,

1993).
We stand for the classical project in epistemology, accepting Karl R. Popper
for whom relativism is the biggest disease of modern philosophy. According to
relativism, all types of knowledge acquisition, say tea-leaves fortune-telling and
hard science, are on par as concerns their epistemic status. We believe, on the
contrary, that certain types of knowledge acquisition are more valuable than
others.
To find a support for this idea we explore a classical epistemological text—
John Locke’s The Conduct of the Understanding.1 This treatise, published post-
humously, was very popular in its time, but now is rarely addressed by philoso-
phers. Locke puts forward in it the idea that the human mind needs guidance in
its cognition and understanding. He answers the question what makes the cogni-
tive subject good. Traditional logic cannot answer this question because it con-
cerns itself only with the forms of cognition. Locke investigates that what mod-
ern virtue epistemology calls the virtues and vices of intellectual character. Ac-
cording to Locke, the cognitive subject must be able to manage its own
thoughts, and develop the will to acquire knowledge, along with such traits as
perseverance and self-examination. He contributes to the discussion of preju-
dice, bias and other intellectual vice, such as haste, laziness and “jumping
around.” He also analyzes some cases of the lack of knowledge. We believe that
the virtues of the cognitive subject which Locke discusses can be universal. We
present a critical interpretation of Locke’s approach to the virtues of the cogni-
tive subject. We believe that knowledge and understanding can and must be
guided by the pursuit of truth. But this guidance concerns only the motivation
component of cognition and not the success component.
VALUES OF COGNITION ACCORDING TO LOCKE’S

OF THE CONDUCT OF THE UNDERSTANDING
Let us consider an imaginary case when a brilliant mathematician devotes all

her life counting blades of grass on her lawn. According to most ethical theo-
ries, this will be morally neutral. But most people would say it is wrong in some
sense. One would say she could have done it better. That it was the wrong way
to exercise her cognitive powers. In other words, she exercised a bad judgment,
her knowledge is worthless, she violated her epistemic duties, and she is epis-
temically guilty. Now, the above mentioned categories are all axiological—bad,
worthless, duty, guilty. They concern values, but not ethical values. We agreed
that she did nothing wrong ethically (assuming we are not utilitarians). So what
—————————
1 Locke, J. 2015 (1697). The Conduct of the Understanding; http://www.earlymoderntexts.
com/assets/pdfs/locke1706.pdf
John Locke on Cognitive Virtues 223
type of values? These are cognitive, or epistemic, values. Locke gives an exam-
ple of a businessman who is very apt with what concerns the matters of trade
but utters completely nonsensical ideas when he speaks about religion.
In modern day we can witness the renaissance of virtue theories in ethics and
epistemology (Karimov, 2014). According to virtue theory, what makes a per-
son good is the virtues that he/she obtains. Aristotle was the first who intro-
duced the concept of intellectual virtue, alongside with the ethical virtues. The
intellectual virtues according to Aristotle include: intellectual responsibility,
perseverance, open-mindedness, empathy, integrity, intellectual courage, confi-
dence in reason, love of truth, intellectual humility, imaginativeness, curiosity,
fair-mindedness, and autonomy. The notion of intellectual virtue is the focus for
virtue epistemology. Virtue epistemology is the study of the good traits of intel-
lectual character (Zagzebski, 1994). In this paper we address the conceptual
grounds of the modern virtue epistemology in Locke’s works.
In the The Conduct of the Understanding Locke states that understanding is
the basis for all action. But understanding is besmirched by misuse and errors.
Locke indicates three most common misuses. Firstly, some people seldom rea-
son at all. Indeed, what Locke probably implies here is that using your own
mind requires intellectual effort, which itself must rely on intellectual cour-
age—the will to defy existing thoughts and ideas, and on overcoming intellec-
tual laziness, the lack of interest to a new knowledge. Secondly, some people
put passion in the place of reason, and decide that it shall govern their actions
and arguments when it suits their mood, interest, or party. This idea would be
welcomed by modern-day social epistemologists, with one reservation: Locke
would disagree that we cannot overcome the partisan interests. On the contrary,
the pursuit of knowledge often resists the current views which dominate in soci-
ety and are legalized by power institutions. A good example would be Galileo
Galilei who was laying foundations for new science in spite of dominant reli-
gious views, for which he later suffered and was charged with the accusation of
heresy. And thirdly, there is lack what one might call large, sound, roundabout
sense. The appeal to common sense is usually ridiculed in philosophical de-
bates, but common sense is good as it serves the purpose of restraining our
wildest and far-fetched ideas. Logic was serving for a long time as a guide of
reason. Locke quotes Bacon to issue his concern with logic as follows:
“They says he who attributed some much to Logic perceived very well and
truly that it was not safe to trust the understanding to itself without the guard
of any rules. But the remedy reached not the evil but became a part of it. For
the Logic which took place though it might done well enough in civil affairs
and the Arts which consisted in talk and opinion, yet comes very far short of
the subtilty in the real performances of nature and catching at what it cannot
reach has served to confirm and establish errors rather than to open a way to
truth. And therefore a little after he says. That it is absolutely necessary that
a better and perfecter use and employment of the mind and understanding
should be introduced” (Locke, 2000, 155).2
Contrary to Aristotle’s Refutation of Sophists, Locke is not interested in the

tricks our opponents might use in deceiving us, but rather in the ways we can
lead ourselves into error.
Moreover, Locke makes a distinction between faculties and powers and ex-
ercise of those faculties and powers. He speaks of the importance of practice
and habit of exercising these powers. Like a good musician may be a bad danc-
er, so a good dancer can make for a bad musician, if they did not practice this
skill.
Locke lays a foundation for evidentialism, by stressing the importance of
grounds for opinions: “Men would be intolerable to themselves and contempti-
ble to others they should imbrace opinions without any ground and hold what
they could give noe manner of reason for, true or false solid or sandy” (Locke,
2000, 60). Unfortunately, most people base their opinions on uncertain and non-
solid foundations: “the founders or leaders of my party are good men and there-
for their tenets are true. It is the opinion of a sect that is erroneous therefore it is
false. It hath been long received in the world therefor it is true, or it is new and
therefor false” (Locke, 2000, 159–160).
Locke advances mathematics as the paradigm of knowledge. Mathematics
forces the mind to find rigorous proof and think clearly. Also, mathematics
teaches us to follow through a long chain of arguments. But as the same time
Locke understands that some problems cannot be solved by the demonstration
of the kind typical of mathematics:
“Where a truth is made out by one demonstration there needs noe farther en-
quiry but in probabilitieys where there wants demonstration to establish truth
beyond doubt, there is not enough to trace one argument to its source, but all
the arguments after having been soe examind on both sides must be laid in
balance one against another and upon the whole the understanding determin
its assent” (Locke, 2000, 168).
Along with examining the intellectual virtues, Locke also exposes some ma-
jor intellectual vices. The first intellectual vice is prejudice: “If he can’t give
patient hearing much less examine and weigh the arguments on the other side,
does he not plainly confesse tis prejudice governs him” (Locke, 2000, 175).
This is easy to accept but much harder to apply, since everyone thinks of others
except himself as prejudiced: “For he must not be in love with any opinion, or
—————————
2 All the quotations from The Conduct of the Understanding are from: Schuurman, P. J. 2000.
(Ed., general introduction, historical and philosophical notes and critical apparatus). John Locke.
Of the Conduct of the Understanding. Doctoral dissertation, defended 10 April 2000 University of
Keele.
wish it to be true till he knows it to be soe and then he will not need to wish it”
(Locke, 2000, 177). Locke broadly criticize this vice under different names;
prejudice, bias, partiality. All these lead to dogmatism which Locke sees as
a primary obstacle in obtaining knowledge. That is why he so much praises
such a virtue as “indifferency” (impartiality).
Another intellectual vice is an obsession with arguments:
“hunting after argument to make good one side of a question and wholly to
neglect and refuse those which favor the other side […] collecting arguments
pro and con allowing them to talk copiously without being steady and settled
in their own judgment” (Locke, 2000, 183).
Arguments are necessary, but one should not seek arguments for the sake of
arguments. In that case no one can reach a firm opinion about anything, since
there will always be pro and con arguments for everything.
Some vices are opposites of virtues but other vices are extremes of some
moderate virtues. Such vices are: wandering (smattering)/giving yourself to
only one subject; anticipation/ resignation. As for the latter, Locke writes: “men
give themselves up to the first anticipations of their mind and are very tenacious
of the opinions that first possess them [“prostituering of mind”] […] “resigna-
tion contrary excess—those who always resign their judgment to the last man
they heard or read” (“chameleon”) (Locke, 2000, 204). Other extremes are:
multiplying artificial and scholastic distinctions/aptness to jumble things to-
gether wherein can be found any likeness, intellectual cowardice—“those who
think they do not have legs”/intellectual rashness—“those who think they have
wings and can always fly whenever they want” (Locke, 2000, 225).
Locke emphasizes the importance of using clear language and avoiding met-
aphors wherever possible. He warns:
“But it is one thing to think right and another thing to know the right way to
lay our thoughts before others with advantage and clearnesse be they right or
wrong. Well chosen similes metaphors and allegories with method and order
doe this the best of any thing, because being taken from objects already
known and familiar to the understanding they are conceived as fast as spo-
ken. And the correspondence being concluded the thing they are brought to
explain and elucidate is thought to be understood too. Thus phansy passes
for knowledge, and what is prettily said is mistaken for solid […] Figured
and metaphorical expressions doe well to illustrate more abstruse and unfa-
miliar Ideas which the mind is not yet thoroughly accustomed to, but then
they must be made use of to illustrate Ideas that we already have, not to paint
to us those which we yet have not. Such borrowed and allusive Ideas may
follow real and solid truth to set it off when found but must by no means be
set in its place and taken for it. If all our search has yet reached noe farther
than simile and metaphor we may assure our selves we rather phansy than
know and are not yet penetrated into the inside and reality of the thing be it
what it will, but content ourselves with what our imaginations not things
themselves furnishes us with” (Locke, 2000, 216).
CONCLUSION
We summarize Locke’s main intellectual virtues and vices according to

Of the Conduct of the Understanding in the table:
Virtues Vices
Always searching for solid foundations for opin- Carelessness about foundations for
ions opinions
Indifference Prejudice
Perseverance Haste
Considering arguments pro and con, having your Neglecting con arguments, hunting
opinion arguments
Mean Intellectual cowardice, Intellectual
rashness
Mean Multiplying distinctions, “jumbling
things together”
Mean Wandering between subjects
Mean Holding for first anticipation, resig-
nation
This is not the full list, but we hope that it gives a picture of Locke’s view on
the virtues of knowledge. In conclusion we would like to offer an idea about the
place of his treatise in today epistemology. Locke was interested in the proper-
ties of the cognitive subject, and, in consequence, in the process of knowledge
acquisition. According to him, the cognitive subject must have some virtues to
be successful in attaining knowledge and truth. However, exercising intellectual
virtues is not sufficient, because it only concerns the motivation component of
knowledge but not the success component. The success of cognition and under-
standing is ultimately determined by the epistemic environment. By the epis-
temic environment we understand the social factors which promote or hinder
our understanding, such as the level of critical discussion or propaganda in soci-
ety. But even so, the importance of intellectual virtues increases in modern
society which often creates an epistemically hostile environment for the cogni-
tive subject. The cognitive subject can contribute to the success of cognition
only if it is intellectually virtuous.
REFERENCES
Boghossian, Paul. 2006. Fear of Knowledge: Against Relativism and Constructivism. Oxford:
Clarendon Press.
Fuller, Steve. 1998. Social Epistemology. Indiana University Press.
Bloor, David. 1991 (1976). Knowledge and Social Imagery. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press.
Goodman, Nelson. 1978. Ways of Worldmaking. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co.
Feyerabend, Paul. 1993 (1975). Against Method. New York: Verso.
Karimov, Artur. 2015. “Virtue Epistemology as Answer to Skeptical Challenge.” Dialogue and
Universalism, XXV, 2, 203–212.
Locke, John. 2015 (1697). The Conduct of the Understanding; http://www.earlymoderntexts.
com/assets/pdfs/locke1706.pdf
Schuurman, Paul John (Ed., general introduction, historical and philosophical notes and critical
apparatus). John Locke. Of the Conduct of the Understanding. Doctoral dissertation, defend-
ed 10 April 2000 University of Keele.
Zagzebski, Linda. 1996. Virtues of the Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR — PhD, Associate Professor, Kazan Federal University,

Kremlyovskaya str., 18, Kazan, Tatarstan, Russia, 420000 (affiliation).
5. The Digital Revolution and the post-human
6. The benefits and threats of technicization and science
7. The status and roles of knowledge in the contemporary world
8. Religion, philosophy, and society
9. Art and morality in the contemporary world
10. Nationalism, populism and the challenge to universalism
11. Globalization, anti-globalization or glocalization
12. Cultural diversity and universal harmony
13. Cosmopolitanism and transnationalism
14. Ecology and environmental justice
15. Gender issues in family, workplace, and cultural contexts
This call is directed to philosophers and scholars from different disciplines who
are interested in discussing the above themes. The International Society for Universal
Dialogue is a member of the International Federation of Philosophical Societies
(FISP).
Please send abstracts of papers (around 300-500 words) or proposals for panels
(including a description of the theme of the panel as well as abstracts for each paper)
in Microsoft Word format as an attachment of email to Professor Emilya Tajsina at
[email protected]. The body of the email must include contact information
(email address, mailing address, phone number, affiliation institute) of the author(s).
The presentation of each paper should be 20 minutes maximum. A panel should in-
clude at least 3 presentations for a total time of 90 minutes.
The deadline for submission of abstracts and proposals is 10 October, 2017. Ab-
stracts and proposals will be evaluated through an anonymous peer review process.
Notice of acceptance will arrive by 1 December, 2017. The deadline for submission
of full papers is 15 March, 2018. Abstract and papers received after the deadline may
still be considered if spaces are available
The congress registration fee is 60 euros (or equivalent) plus 20 euros (or equiva-
lent) biannual dues for ISUD membership. Both registration fee and membership dues
will be payable at the congress venue. Waiver for either or both the fees and dues is
possible for scholars from developing regions.
Dialogue and Universalism: Journal of the International Society for Universal
Dialogue will publish selected papers presented at the congress.
Information of accommodation and transportation will soon be available on the
ISUD official website at www.worldialogue.org. For additional information about
the ISUD 12th World Congress please contact Professor Keqian Xu at
[email protected] or Professor Victor J. Krebs at [email protected]
We look forward to meet with you in Lima and continue the tradition and legacy
of the International Society for Universal Dialogue.
Professor Charles Brown (Chair of ISUD)

Professor Keqian Xu (Vice Chair of ISUD and the Congress Organizer)
Professor Victor J. Krebs (Site Coordinator of the 12th World Congress of ISUD)
Call for Papers
The International Society for Universal Dialogue
ISUD XII World Congress
PHILOSOPHY IN AN AGE OF CRISIS:
CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS
July 10–15, 2018
Lima, Peru
www.worldialogue.org
The International Society for Universal Dialogue (ISUD) will hold its 12th World
Congress in Lima, Peru from 10 July until 15 July, 2018. The hosting institution is the
Pontifical Catholic University of Peru (Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú,
PUCP).
The goal of this World Congress is to promote dialogue concerning various crucial
philosophical issues in today’s world and to explore the role of philosophy in our
complicated times. The world we live in today faces many urgent issues that require
sustained and productive cross-cultural dialogue. The ideals of global peace and secu-
rity remain elusive while a sense of uncertainty pervades the dominant institutions of
contemporary life. Traditional human values underlying our social and political insti-
tutions are continually transformed by new developments in information technology,
digitalization, artificial intelligence, and the drive for economic efficiency. Although
the globalization of trade and technology has brought people together as never before,
our differing outlooks, habits, and ideologies continue to separate us.
As philosophers, we must neither shut ourselves in ivory towers nor indulge our-
selves with armchair philosophy. We must face the issues that define our moment in
history. Our times demand that we, as philosophers, work to foster intellectual in-
sight, imagination, social responsibility, and justice. Therefore, the International So-
ciety for Universal Dialogue issues a call for papers and proposals for panels for the
12th World Congress of ISUD on the general theme of “Philosophy in an Age of
Crisis: Challenges and Prospects”, with the following sub-themes:
1. Philosophic innovation in a Promethean era
2. The ivory tower and social involvement
3. Cross-cultural dialogue and the building of common humanity
4. Learning to be human in an age of crisis and uncertainty
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Vol. XXVII No. 3/2017

IDEALS AND VALUES IN RELIGION AND MYTH

 Gernot Bőhme (Germany) — philosopher, Institut für Praxis der Philosophie

Leszek Kuźnicki, Eugeniusz Kabatc, Andrew Targowski

EXECUTIVE EDITORIAL BOARD

EDITOR-IN-CHIEF: MAŁGORZATA CZARNOCKA

ENGLISH LANGUAGE EDITOR: Jack Hutchens

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VALUES AND IDEALS. THEORY AND PRAXIS

Edited by Małgorzata Czarnocka and Emily Tajsin

Editorial — Values and Ideals. Theory and Praxis ............................................... 5

IDEALS AND VALUES IN RELIGION AND MYTH

IDEALS AND VALUES IN ART

VALUES AND IDEALS IN SCIENCE AND VALUE OF SCIENCE

Martha C. Beck — Neuroscience, Ancient Wisdom and the ISUD:

VALUES AND IDEALS. THEORY AND PRAXIS

This is the fourth of a series of issues of Dialogue and Universalism featuring

This Dialogue and Universalism issue includes papers on basic cultural

However, nowadays spirit is predominantly regarded as an anachronistic and

ON THREE PHILOSOPHICAL PREMISES OF RELIGIOUS

My contention is to adumbrate three general premises leading to religious tolerance.

prophets like Moses, Jesus or Mohammed. However, they differ considerably in

Openness to other existential systems (also to absence of faith, which is

Marshall Steven Lewis

EXPERIMENTAL AND APPLIED RELIGIOUS STUDIES

Religion is a technology—a set of socio-cultural tools for aligning attitudes,

One proposed strategy for reducing religious intolerance is the deployment

DOES RELIGIOUS EDUCATION REDUCE RELIGIOUS INTOLERANCE?

Regarding educational strategy, many (perhaps most) non-confessional reli-

PROPOSED WAY FORWARD

What might it look like to progress a coordinated effort to continually im-

— Learning objectives, behavioural objectives and other intended educa-

HYPOTHESES: HOW MIGHT RELIGIOUS EDUCATION REDUCE

The experimental approach described above requires hypotheses for testing,

INCREASING EMPATHY FOR THE RELIGIOUS OTHER

social behaviour,7 and decreased prejudice.8 While many religious education

DECREASING RELIGIOUS EXCLUSIVISM

My second proposed strategy is to foster a decrease in religious exclusivism

REFRAME RELIGION FUNCTIONALLY

“The general function of religious traditions is to educate the emotions of indi-

PERSONAL, CRITICAL AND CREATIVE ENGAGEMENT WITH

of major religious traditions, 167–h313.

own worldview is obviously and uniquely correct or better—and therefore ex-

PRACTICE A FORM OF PERSONAL RELIGIOUS CONSTRUCTIVISM

A functional approach to religion can be explored creatively by prompting

How might educational initiatives based on the above strategies compare to

CHALLENGES AND OBJECTIONS

The research question at hand is straight-forward: How should we design—

CONCLUSION: RELIGIOUS EDUCATION AS A FORM

ABOUT THE AUTHOR — PhD candidate in Religious Studies at the University of

HUMANIZING AND DIGNIFYING CULTURES: