Out of Time Out of Luck Time Bars
Out of Time Out of Luck Time Bars
Out of Time Out of Luck Time Bars
At the same time as CMA was demolishing existing structures, John Holland was following behind, constructing
the new wharf. There was one potential issue in the sequencing, the movement of a ship loader which BHP
planned to keep at the wharf.
What are time bars?
Critically, in the subcontract between John Holland and CMA, there were ‘time bars’ for the providing of crucial
notices under the subcontract.
A time bar is a contractual provision within which an action has to take place. It is essentially a stoppage placed
on the exercise of a claim or judgement after passage of a certain period of time established under the contract.
They are common place in construction contracts and in fact over the past few years are more prevalent with
shorter time limits. Typically, they require a party to serve notice within a strict, specified period after the
occurrence of an event as a pre-condition to claiming time or costs.
Though often perceived as harsh, their roll is essentially to ensure the expeditious passage of information and
certainty within a designated time frame. They help contractors to mitigate their exposure both in terms of time
and costs and to assist in the decision making process of keeping a project on time and on budget.
More specifically, at clauses 10.11 and 10.12, the subcontract contained the detailed notice requirements for the
making of EoT claims by CMA. In particular, those clauses required CMA to serve on John Holland:
written notice of the likelihood of a delay occurring immediately upon becoming aware of the likelihood of that
delay;
written notice of its intention to claim the EoT for the delay within 7 days after the occurrence of the cause of
the delay;
a detailed written claim for an EoT within 14 days after the commencement of the delay; and
further detailed written claims for EoTs every 5 days after the first occurrence of the delay until the delay
ceases.
The Disputes
In the course of undertaking the subcontract works, CMA claimed that it was delayed by a number of factors.
The biggest problem which CMA encountered was that the dolphins were significantly more difficult to demolish
than had been originally thought. They had previously been reinforced which had not been contemplated by the
subcontract. During the demolition process, the fragments from the demolition were of an infinitely more
substantial size and not the small fragments which had been anticipated. The result being that the removal
process of the fragments was much more complicated, time consuming and expensive than had originally been
planned. CMA fell into delay as against the subcontract milestones. CMA claimed for additional work to demolish
the berthing dolphins (variation 79).
In addition, CMA claimed that it was delayed by John Holland’s delay in moving the ship loader located on the
wharf to allow CMA to demolish that part of the wharf and also for delays to access to certain other structures
required to be demolished.
Critically, CMA did not submit notice of delay pursuant to the time bars as contained within the subcontract for
any of the delay issues.
By late 2007, John Holland and CMA were in dispute about John Holland’s failure to pay certain amounts
claimed by CMA. On 10 October 2007, CMA sent a notice of dispute to John Holland under the subcontract and
by December CMA had filed an adjudication application. By March 2008, CMA had commenced proceedings.
CMA’s Claims
Disputes arose as to who should bear the unexpected costs associated with the larger fragment removal and
subsequent delays caused by the demolition of the dolphins.
Though CMA acknowledged that it had given notice of the delays outside of the contractually prescribed periods,
it argued that this had no affect given that the events that caused the delay were either within the control of and/
or known by John Holland, therefore satisfying the initial condition precedent that John Holland should have
awareness of the delay.
John Holland’s Response
John Holland argued that CMA was not entitled to an EoT and was time barred owing to the fact that notices had
been given outside of the strict time period stipulations within the subcontract.
Further, John Holland rejected the EoT claims and considered that the work, the subject of the variation request,
was within the original scope of works.
In addition, John Holland also counter claimed for liquidated damages, and further damages flowing from alleged
CMA breaches of the subcontract.
On examining the evidence, His Honour Justice Allanson held that CMA had not complied with the Notice
requirements, either in terms of the required timing or the requirements of the content of the notices.
In relation to the relocation of the ship loader, CMA had served notice three weeks after the ship loader was
scheduled to be moved and some four months after becoming aware of the delay. The time bar provision within
the contract was 7 days, as a strict precondition to any entitlement to EoT.
In relation to any other remaining delays, there was no evidence that CMA had in fact ever complied with the
requirements under the subcontract.
The Court rejected CMA’s argument stating that John Holland were entitled to rely upon on the strict contractual
position and deny liability for the delay.
Estoppel
CMA pleaded that by a code of conduct between the parties, the parties adopted a convention by which they
did not strictly comply with the notice provisions in the subcontract including in relation to EoTs.
The Court did not agree and stated:
“the evidence does not support the claim, that there was any common assumption between the parties.” 2
2. Length of time of the delay was unknown
CMA argued that their obligation to give notice did not arise because neither they nor John Holland knew and
could not have known the likely length of the delay.
Again, this was rejected by the Court. It stated that there was not a requirement that CMA knew the precise
length of the delays, it was simply required to give an estimate of that length.
John Holland Counter Claims
John Holland claimed by reason of a counterclaim an amount for dredging blast debris from the harbour floor,
the cost of conveying dredge concrete debris to the shore and onshore, disruption to pile driving works as a
result of CMA’s failure to clear debris from the demolition and finally, liquidated damages for failure to reach
completion within the time agreed.
John Holland put its counter claim on a number of alternative basis, namely:
that there was an agreed variation to the terms of the subcontract about the mechanism by which the parties
would share the cost of debris removal and transport;
In relation to the misleading and deceptive conduct claim, John Holland claimed that part of its loss related to
damage sustained to the dredging barge as a consequence of the size of the debris at the sea ffloor, which was
caused by CMA’s misleading or deceptive conduct. The dredging barge had had to be stood down for repair
caused by the debris.
The court did not agree with CMA. The Court held that even in the circumstances where the relevant delay had
been caused by John Holland, CMA were still liable for liquidated damages. In particular, the Court stated,
“The application of the prevention principle must be considered in the context of the particular contract. The
Subcontract between John Holland and CMA directly addressed this question in cl 10.13, providing that if CMA
failed to comply with the notice procedures in clause 10.12 it shall have no entitlement to extension of time and any
principle of law or equity which might render the Date for Practical Completion unenforceable shall not apply. CMA
is precluded from the benefit of an extension of time and is liable for liquidated damages, even where the relevant
delay has been caused by John Holland.”4
The Dispute with BHP
Finally, CMA had argued that any loss which John Holland had sustained ought to be reduced by any agreement
John Holland had come to with BHP in so far as that settlement related to the claims and issues between John
Holland and CMA.
On the facts, the Court found that CMA had not been able to prove that any amount of the settlement between
BHP and John Holland was referrable to any claim between John Holland and CMA. This part of the defence
also failed.
Summary
This case clearly shows the critical need for contractors to comply with any time provisions contained within the
contract. Failure to do so is likely to result in the contractor being barred from bringing what would otherwise have
been valid claims under the contract. The loss of this benefit being catastrophic. It is interesting to note that
administrators were appointed in relation to CMA on 2 August 2013.
This no doubt places a significant administrative burden on contractors. However, the significance of not
complying is far greater than any administrative burden. The case also shows the importance of keeping detailed
records, to ensure that sufficient information is provided pursuant to the terms of the contract.
It is therefore critical that contractors have a full understanding of the terms and conditions at the outset of
entering into the contract. The use of flow charts, setting out procedures to be undertaken at certain steps can be
beneficial internally, but they must be strictly followed. This case clearly demonstrated the willingness of the
Court to uphold a clearly drafted time bar provision even where that effect is “harsh”.
Nadine Emsley is Special Counsel and Managing Solicitor on the Kreisson Construction team and International
Arbitration team.
1 3
At para [375] At para [666]
2 4
At para [381] At para [865]