National Reconciliation in Rwanda:

Experiences and Lessons Learnt

Ezechiel Sentama

Research Project Report

Issue 2022/05 - 28 February 2022
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 National Reconciliation in Rwanda:
Experiences and Lessons Learnt*

Ezechiel Sentama**

* This research paper is part of a series of publications prepared in the framework of the “Dialogue Platform for
Peace and Stability in Libya”. The project aims to establish a platform for dialogue and exchange between Libya’s
main political forces, Libyan and international researchers and key actors in the international community on key
policy issues for Libya’s future.

** Ezechiel Sentama is a native of Rwanda. He is currently employed by Coventry University as Research Fellow
in Peace and Conflict and is based at the Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations where he previously
worked as Assistant Professor and Marie Curie Fellow (2019-2021). He holds a PhD in Peace and Development
Research and has more than 15 years of teaching and research experience in peace and conflict in Rwanda
(University of Rwanda) and in Sweden (Linnaeus University and the University of Gothenburg). His research
experience and publications covered Rwanda, Israel-Palestine, Macedonia, Algeria and Africa’s Great Lakes
region. His research interests include peacebuilding, peace education, transitional justice, and reconciliation.

3
 Table of Contents

Executive Summary   5
Introduction   6
1. Rwanda’s Genocide: The roots of the conflict and the search for national reconciliation   7
1.1. Historical context of the conflict and the genocide in Rwanda   7
1.2. The post-genocide situation and the necessity for national reconciliation    8
2. Mechanisms and processes of national reconciliation in Rwanda    9
2.1. Democratic governance: Government of National Unity    9
2.2. Refugees’ repatriation and reintegration   10
2.3. Military integration   11
2.4. Constitutional and legal reforms, and the policy on national unity and reconciliation   11
2.5. National Unity and Reconciliation Commission    12
2.6. Socio-economic welfare   14
2.7. Gacaca courts: Community-based justice   15
Conclusion   17
Bibliography   20

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 Executive Summary

Rwanda is a country with a troubled history. The pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial periods
have been characterised by power struggles and violence between the Hutu and Tutsi groups. Prior to
colonisation the Tutsi ruled a bonded labour class (the Hutu). Colonial powers further exacerbated the
divisions between the two groups by enhancing Tutsi exploitation of the Hutu. The Hutu revolution, in
1959, pushed the Tutsi out of power and Rwanda achieved its independence, in 1962, as a Republic
under Hutu leadership. These tensions led to a civil war, 1990-1994, between the Hutu government and
Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), and the conflict climaxed with a genocide aimed particularly
at the Tutsi, April-July 1994. The RPF defeated the Hutu government, and, then, put an end to the
genocide.

The victory of the Tutsi-led RPF and its seizure of power, in July 1994, took place in a devastated
country. Rwandan society was deeply divided and traumatised and the country had acquired the status
of a failed state. The reconstruction process aimed at bringing unity, and reconciliation was a pressing,
but difficult, task facing the post-genocide government.

Twenty-seven years have now elapsed since Rwanda, headed by the RPF, embarked on the journey
towards national reconciliation. The process has been driven by the government in consultation with elites
from all walks of life—members of political parties, senior national leaders, academics, businessmen,
development partners, and members of civil society.

To promote national reconciliation, Rwanda privileged home-based processes and mechanisms. These
combined universal and local culture-driven approaches and involved preventive and responsive judicial
and non-judicial responses: community-based Gacaca courts and the National Unity and Reconciliation
Commission have been the core instruments. All the mechanisms adopted were essentially government-
centred and involved mandatory individual and community participation. They were embedded within
facilitating processes involving an inclusive government, military integration, refugee repatriation,
constitutional and legal reforms, and socio-economic welfare programmes.

Although Rwandan society is still in a recovery process, its culture has played an important role in
facilitating the establishment of useful mechanisms, which have set a solid foundation for national
reconciliation. There has been progress towards achieving unity and reconciliation, as a living reality
in the country, and the restoration of human dignity and Rwandan values. However, the process is
still hampered by the persistence of a genocide ideology, ethnic stereotyping, still open psychological
and physical wounds, poverty, and a lack of restitution policy. In particular, the main criticism is that
the process of addressing past injustice has been selective: it has been restricted to the genocide
committed by the defeated government and the crimes committed by the RPF have been neglected.

Drawing on Rwanda’s experience with national reconciliation, the following lessons could be useful for
countries that have experienced massive violent conflicts. Firstly, it is the state’s responsibility to set
the stage and to promote reconciliation. Secondly, successful reconciliation necessitates integrated
efforts on the part of the government and non-state actors, and depends on the use of mechanisms that
are grounded in a given social context, culture, traditions and customs. Thirdly, for adopted initiatives
to be successful, a mechanism for integration and coordination is paramount. Fourthly, successful
reconciliation should be comprehensive and not selective. Finally, it is important to regularly track the
progress of reconciliation in order to revise the mechanisms and processes, or to create new ones,
while addressing persisting challenges.

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 Introduction

Rwanda has had a troubled history in the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial period, a history
in which ethnicity and politics have always been wound tightly together. Hatred and an accompanying
power struggle between the Hutu and Tutsi groups erupted in cyclical episodes of violence and climaxed
in one of the most brutal and devastating genocides in history, April-July 1994. The genocide targeted
mainly the Tutsi people and it is estimated that around one million people were killed.

The genocide also took place amidst a four year-long civil war (1990-1994) between the Hutu government
of Juvénal Habyarimana and the Tutsi Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) led by Paul Kagame. Despite the
Peace Agreement signed between the two warring parties in August 1993, the genocide was triggered
by the assassination of Hutu President Habyarimana. This broke the Peace Accords and reignited the
civil war. The RPF defeated the Hutu government, and then put an end to the genocide.

However, the victory of the Tutsi-led RPF and its seizure of power, in July 1994, took place in a country
that had been devastated. The civil war and genocide had destroyed the socio-economic and political
fabric of Rwanda. People had lost all trust in the government, religious institutions and the media, the
military and police: these institutions were all implicated in the genocide. There was a deeply divided
and traumatised society and a country that had acquired the status of a failed state. The reconstruction
of a traumatised society1 to bring unity and reconciliation was the pressing, but difficult, task of the post-
genocide government.

Twenty-seven years have now elapsed since Rwanda, headed by the RPF, embarked on the journey
towards unity and reconciliation. This background paper aims to provide a contextual analysis of
Rwanda’s experience of national reconciliation by answering four overlapping and interrelated
questions: (1) What does national reconciliation in Rwanda entail and why was it necessary? (2) What
mechanisms have been put in place to promote national reconciliation in Rwanda, why and by whom,
and how have the adopted mechanisms been implemented? (3) What have the achievements and
challenges of the adopted mechanisms been? And (4) what political and social lessons can be drawn
from Rwanda’s experience with national reconciliation?

In addressing the above questions, the first section of the paper, after briefly reviewing the history of
the conflict and genocide, discusses how, in Rwanda, national reconciliation was understood as a
cornerstone for the country’s survival. The second section presents the mechanisms that have been
set in motion by the post-genocide government and how it privileged home-grown processes that
combined universal and culture-based approaches involving mandatory community participation. The
last and concluding section reviews Rwanda’s main achievements and challenges on the path towards
national reconciliation. We suggest that it remains a long, complex, and volatile process. That section
also provides lessons for other countries emerging from conflicts, not least the way that successful
national reconciliation necessitates integrated efforts involving state and non-state actors exploiting the
country’s favourable culture.

Methodologically, the paper relies on document analysis. The process involved a careful examination of
relevant Rwandan documents on national reconciliation (content analysis). Relevant materials included
policy and legal documents, country programmes, strategies and annual reports, evaluation reports, as
well as other research reports not least peer-reviewed publications.

1 NURC (2009). 15 Years of Unity and Reconciliation Process in Rwanda: The ground covered to-date, p. 7.

6
 1. Rwanda’s Genocide: The roots of the conflict and the search for national
reconciliation

1.1. Historical context of the conflict and the genocide in Rwanda

The history of Rwanda involves centuries of commingling of three identity groups: the Hutu-majority
farmers (85%); the Tutsi-minorities, cattle herders/pastoralists (14%); and the small Twa group of hunter-
gatherers and potters (1%).2 However, the conflict has always been between the Tutsi and Hutu with
groups such as the Twa marginalised. Under a monarchical system, the precolonial history of Rwanda
reveals a centuries-long succession of interclan fighting and the expansion of a dominant ruling class
(Tutsi) over a bonded labour class (Hutu).

Colonial powers exacerbated the division and hatred between the Tutsi and Hutu through a “divide
and rule” strategy. Germany colonised Rwanda in 1885, but following World War I the colony became
a Belgian trustee territory. The Belgian colonisers created structural changes in the relations between
Hutu and Tutsi that greatly enhanced Tutsi dominance and their exploitation of the Hutu, which intensified
the Hutu hostility towards the Tutsi. The Belgian administration had given the Tutsi something like
European status and declared them to be intellectually superior to the Hutu. By favouring the Tutsi elite,
the Belgian colonial administration used them as the administrators of their harsh policies, and the Hutu
became increasingly exploited and resentful – not of their colonial masters, but of the Tutsi monarchical
system.

The situation changed in the 1950s when the Tutsi elite fought against their Belgian colonisers and
claimed independence. The Belgians encouraged the Hutu in a policy turnaround and, in 1959, the
Hutu rebelled against the Tutsi monarchy through ‘social revolution’. This culminated in the Tutsi being
pushed out of power. The Tutsi monarchy was abolished and much of the Tutsi elite went into exile.3

Rwanda achieved its independence in 19624 and became a Republic under Hutu leadership. The
successive two Hutu governments maintained the ethnic identity system instituted by the Belgians and
initiated a policy of discrimination against the Tutsi minority who had remained in the country. This was
retaliation for the years of subjugation under Belgian/Tutsi rule. The two Hutu governments marginalised
the Tutsi through a quota system of majority-minority for employment in the public sector and in schools.

In the late 1980s densely-populated Rwanda was faced with an economic crisis coupled with a highly
authoritarian Hutu political system and demands for a multiparty system. The exiled Tutsi and their
descendants had formed the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and, on 1 October 1990, they invaded
Rwanda from Uganda, reviving Hutu memories of past periods of exploitation and subjugation under
Tutsi domination. The Hutu government sought to counteract the Tutsi invasion by intensified ethnic
hostility and propaganda against the Tutsi.

2 Uvin, Peter. (2003). ‘The Gacaca Tribunals in Rwanda’. In IDEA, Reconciliation after Violent Conflict. International Institute for Democracy
and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), Stockholm.
3 Staub, Elvin. (2003). The Psychology of Good and Evil: Why Children, Adults, and Groups Help and Harm Others. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, p. 437.
4 Lambourne, Wendy (2001). ‘Justice and Reconciliation: Post-conflict Peacebuilding in Cambodia and Rwanda’ (pp. 311-337). In Abu-
Nimer Mohammed. Reconciliation, Justice, and Coexistence: Theory & Practice. Lanham, Boulder, New York, Toronto, Oxford: Lexington
Books, p. 322.

7
 After 1992, a succession of cease-fire agreements and peace talks had been undertaken in France and
other involved African countries. This culminated in the Arusha Peace Agreement,5 signed on 4 August
1993, between the Government of Rwanda (GoR) and the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). However,
the Arusha negotiations were an example of conflict resolution gone wrong. This peace process at
the time reflected a successful, almost perfect conflict resolution on paper alone. These Accords were
meant to end the armed conflict and at the same time to crown an internal democratisation process.

While the implementation of the Arusha Peace Accords and the installation of a new government including
members of the RPF and the national opposition was postponed time and again, an assassination took
place. On 6 April 1994, the Hutu president, Juvénal Habyarimana was murdered. This sparked the
genocide and the resumption of the civil war between the RPF and the Rwanda government armed
forces. The genocide claimed more than a million lives,6 mainly Tutsi who were living in the country,
but also Hutu opposition members, as well as those who opposed the genocide or who protected the
Tutsi. The delay of the deployment of the United Nations Assistance Mission to Rwanda (UNAMIR),
as well as the intense ethnic polarization of the post-Arusha era also contributed to the collapse of the
Accords and the genocide. The international community failed to intervene despite evidence of planned
genocide, and the UN cut back its peacekeeping force after ten Belgian peacekeepers were killed.
The civil war resumed and ended with the victory of the RPF, which put an end to the genocide. The
defeated government fled to the former Zaire, Tanzania and other countries, as did roughly two million
Hutu civilians: and about five hundred thousand exiled Tutsi streamed back into Rwanda. The Tutsi-
dominated RPF established a new government on 19 July 1994 under the presidency of Paul Kagame.

1.2. The post-genocide situation and the necessity for national reconciliation

When the Tutsi-led RPF took over, Rwanda had acquired the status of a failed state. The entire
infrastructure of the country, ranging from schools, hospitals, factories and government departments,
had been destroyed or severely looted. The government’s administrative capacity had collapsed as civil
servants had either been killed or had fled into exile. The entire population was displaced, having either
fled to neighbouring countries or having been internally displaced.

Law and order had completely broken down, all national law enforcement agencies and judicial
institutions had ceased to exist, and justice system had come to a standstill. The credibility of the state
itself had been undermined as most institutions (public institutions, the army and police), as well as
much of civil society (churches, NGOs) and the media had been complicit in the genocide.

The country was left with traumatised and desperate citizens. While the Tutsi, who lived in Rwanda had
very painful experiences and felt it was extremely difficult to reconcile, others, who returned from exile
after the genocide also had difficult and painful experiences. They or their parents had left Rwanda
after earlier massacres and they returned now to a devastated country. However, many of them had
understood that the only hope for creating a functioning society lay in reconciliation.7

5 Six documents were an integral part of the Peace Agreement concluded between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda (GoR) and
the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) (Available at: https://ucdpged.uu.se/peaceagreements/fulltext/Rwa%2019930804.pdf ):
1. The N’Sele Ceasefire Agreement of 29 March, as amended in Gbadolite (former Zaire) on 16 September 1991 and at Arusha on
12 July 1992;
2. The Protocol of Agreement on the Rule of Law, signed at Arusha on 18 September 1992;
3. The Protocol of Agreement on Power Sharing within the Framework of a Broad Based Transitional Government, signed at Arusha
respectively on 30 October, 1992 and on 9 January 1993;
4. The Protocol of Agreement on the Repatriation of Refugees and the Resettlement of Displaced Persons, signed at Arusha on 9
June 1993;
5. The Protocol of Agreement on the integration of Armed Forces of the two parties, signed at Arusha on 3 August 1993;
6. The Protocol of Agreement on Miscellaneous Issues and Final Provisions signed at Arusha on 3 August 1993.
6 Ministry of Youth, Culture and Sports and Ibuka Association (2004). Prevent and Banish Genocide forever, through universal active
solidarity. International Conference on Genocide, Intercontinental Hotel, Kigali, 4-6 April.
7 Staub, Elvin (2003). Ibid., p. 437.

8
 The post-genocide government was thus faced with the challenge of reconstructing the country’s socio-
economic and political fabric and bringing about national reconciliation. To deal with the legacies of the
genocide and civil war, in the words of the new government: national unity and reconciliation “was not
an alternative; it was the only option to survival.”8

In fact, for the government the goal of reconciliation has formed part of a national policy for the future
development of the country. To this end, the post-genocide reconstruction process was mainly driven by
two expectations: (1) to create a capable, credible and legitimate state; and (2) to promote a united and
reconciled people. These expectations had actually been formulated and agreed upon during the pre-
genocide 1993 Arusha Peace Accords9 between the Tutsi-led RPF and the Hutu Government. The main
principles of the agreement stressed power-sharing through the formation of a Government of National
Unity, refugee repatriation and reintegration, military integration, the creation of a National Unity and
Reconciliation Commission, as well as policy and legal reforms.

By keeping ‘unity’ and ‘reconciliation’ as inseparable concepts, the national policy on unity and
reconciliation defines unity and reconciliation, as “a consensus practice of citizens who have common
nationality, who share the same culture and have equal rights; citizens characterised by trust, tolerance,
mutual respect, equality, complementarity, truth, and healing of one another’s wounds inflicted by their
dark history, with the objectives of laying a foundation for development in sustainable peace.”10 This
model emphasises the state’s responsibility for creating a culture of rights based upon an inclusive
notion of shared identity.

2. Mechanisms and processes of national reconciliation in Rwanda

Rwanda privileged home-based processes and mechanisms, which combined universal and local
culture-driven approaches, to promote national reconciliation. To this end, Gacaca courts and the
National Unity and Reconciliation Commission have been the core instruments. All the mechanisms
adopted were essentially government-centred and involved mandatory individual and community
participation.

2.1. Democratic governance: Government of National Unity

To exemplify national reconciliation, as one of its overarching priorities, the RPF government named
itself the Government of National Unity when it was formed on 19 July 1994 and claimed that its
compliance with the pre-genocide Arusha Peace Accords (1993) whereby an inclusive government had
to be formed under power sharing and dialogue principles.

a) Power sharing and inclusion

The central idea of the policy of national unity and reconciliation was the slogan ‘One Rwanda for all
Rwandans’.11 The post-genocide RPF-led government argued that, since ethnic disunity had caused
the genocide, the creation of an inclusive Rwandan citizenship as a monolithic identity was the solution
to a long legacy of ethnic hatred and violence. The RPF government also claimed that although RPF

8 NURC (2007). Ingando: Impact Assessment on Unity and Reconciliation of Rwandans, Kigali, p. 10.
9 Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front, Arusha, Tanzania, 1993
(Preamble and Article 2).
10 NURC (2007). National Policy of Unity and Reconciliation, Kigali; NURC (2020). National Policy of Unity and Reconciliation, Revised
version, Kigali, p. 4.
11 Thompson, Susan (2013). Whispering Truth to Power: Everyday Resistance to Reconciliation in Post-genocide Rwanda. Madison, WI: The
University of Wisconsin Press, p. 113.

9
 had won the war, it complied with the 1993 Arusha core principle that ‘the winner does not take all’.
The process has not, however, exactly followed the Arusha Accords’ principle regarding how power was
to be shared. The RPF-dominated government only included political parties that had not taken part in
the genocide. The RPF also created a forum for political parties and requested all parties to function
as part of this RPF-led coalition. Critics stress that this strategy was to maintain “total control over the
political landscape.”12

b) Dialogue and National Dialogue Council

The first step of governance after the genocide was to organise a national dialogue to discuss Rwanda’s
conflict and to agree on the mechanisms for reconstruction. The forums for national dialogue brought
together elites from all walks of life – members of political parties (with different political ideologies),
senior national leaders and individuals from civil society (academics, businessmen, civil society and
development partners…). One of the major recommendations was to create the following structures/
institutions: a National Unity and Reconciliation Commission, Gacaca courts, the National Dialogue
Council (Umushyikirano in Kinyarwanda), and to engage in related legal and policy reforms. In
particular, the National Dialogue Council-Umushyikirano was instituted as a platform for providing
a forum for Rwandans in various social groups to discuss national unity, reconciliation and other
social and development issues affecting the country. Its main objective was to cement the unity and
reconciliation process by transforming conflicts through dialogue and consensus based on four pillars:
history, testimonies, forgiveness, and healing.13

In accordance with the principles of the 2003 Constitution, as amended, the National Dialogue Council
(NDC) is provided for in Article 168 as an annual event that takes place once a year and that is chaired
over by the President of the Republic.14 The constitution established that the NDC must bring together
the President of the Republic, the Cabinet and Parliament, the Governors of provinces, representatives
of various constituencies, and other individuals determined by the President of the Republic. It is thus
one of the forums whereby the President of the Republic meets with all types of Rwandans to exchange
ideas and to debate issues relating to the state of the nation, the state of local government and national
unity.

2.2. Refugees’ repatriation and reintegration

Post the genocide the government had to deal with the urgency of ensuring security and stability by
repatriating, settling, and reintegrating the millions of refugees (new cases and old cases). There were
particularly refugees in neighbouring countries (the former Zaire-now Democratic Republic of Congo,
Burundi, Tanzania, Uganda, and Kenya): but there were also the internally displaced. These acts of
reintegration were in compliance with the 1993 Arusha Peace Accords although, not all refugees have
been repatriated as of 2022. The process involved civic education programmes known as Ingando
(civic (re)-education camps) through which all new-case returnees and internally displaced people had
to go, with the aim of reducing their fears as they returned to their communities.15 The process thus
brought people and communities back together and enabled people to regain hope for a normal life.

12 Reyntjens, Filip (1996). “Rwanda: Genocide and Beyond.” Journal of Refugee Studies, Vol.9, No.3, pp. 241-251.
13 Doreen, “Umushyikirano Concept – A national debt for development”, quoted in NURC (2014). Unity and Reconciliation Process in
Rwanda: 20 years after the 1994 Genocide perpetrated against Tutsi. Kigali, p. 95.
14 Article 168 of the 2003 Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda, as amended to date, stipulates that the NDC should take place at ‘least
once a year’.
15 As detailed later, the Ingando were later expanded to include the representatives of the country’s key constituencies (students, teachers,
public servants, civil society, business…).

10
 2.3. Military integration

The Rwandan military integration model is unique. The former ‘enemy’ combatants were integrated
into the new national army – the Rwanda Defence Forces (RDF), in compliance with the 1993 Arusha
Peace Accords. Military integration was also implemented through the Rwandan traditional concept of
Ingando, civic (re)-education camps or schools dedicated to learning the virtues of unity and patriotism.

This form of problem-solving workshops, implemented by Rwandans themselves, is unlike the traditional
models of military integration in peacebuilding with their focus on (1) forced disarmament usually by
external intervention, under the United Nations’ mandate; (2) demobilization that excludes former
enemy combatants; or (3) mediation-based military integration involving a third party. Military integration
in Rwanda included unity and reconciliation training as a process of re-education. The reconciliatory
pay-offs included the promotion of stability and initial reconciliation between conflicting parties (former
warring combatants).

2.4. Constitutional and legal reforms, and the policy on national unity and reconciliation

In addition to the elaboration of a national policy of unity and reconciliation, constitutional and legal
reforms have been vital for national reconciliation. They provided a favourable institutional and legal
foundation for all national and local initiatives.

a) Constitutional and legal reforms

The post-1994 government was convinced that Rwanda had never had a constitution with values and
principles for creating a united society. The new constitution promulgated on 4 June 2003, commits the
government to complying with the promotion of national unity and reconciliation. For example, it makes
any form of divisions and discrimination among Rwandans illegal (Article 11).16 Another important
innovation, brought in by the 2003 constitution, has to do with the creation of various institutions
responsible for helping in resolving major issues facing the country: e.g., community-based Gacaca
jurisdictions, National Dialogue Council-Umushyikirano, civic education school-Itorero, civic education
camps-Ingando and community work-Umuganda. In all these cases, unity and reconciliation have
been central. In particular, Article 178 of the Constitution created the National Unity and Reconciliation
Commission (NURC) as a mechanism of coordination and integration of all reconciliation efforts at
national and local levels.

Key legal reforms were also effectively implemented. These included: the law punishing discrimination
and sectarianism;17 the Presidential decree for pardon; the abolition of the death penalty;18 the law
encouraging wrongdoers to admit their wrongdoings to repent and to request forgiveness;19 and the law
punishing genocide ideology.20

16 Republic of Rwanda (2003). Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda. Kigali.

17 Republic of Rwanda (2002). Law No. 47/2001 of 18 December 2001 instituting the punishment for offenses of Discrimination and
Sectarianism. Official Gazette. Kigali.
18 Republic of Rwanda (2007). Organic Law No. 31/2007 of 2 July 2007 relating to the abolition of the death penalty. Kigali.
19 Republic of Rwanda (2007). Organic law No. 10/2007 of 1 March 2007 modifying and completing Law No. 16/2004 of 19 June 2004
establishing the organization and competence of the Gacaca Courts which rewards those who confess and penalizes those who failed to
do so. Kigali.
20 Republic of Rwanda (2008). Law No. 18/2008 of 23 July 2008 related to the punishment of the crime of genocide ideology. Official
Gazette. Kigali.

11
 b) Policy on national reconciliation

In August 2007, a national policy on unity and reconciliation was officially publicised. This policy
constitutes an ambitious social engineering project that the RPF-led government believes will forge
a unified Rwandan identity, while fostering reconciliation between survivors of the genocide and its
perpetrators. Through this policy, which always keeps unity and reconciliation inseparable, national
reconciliation is always referred to as ‘National Unity and Reconciliation’, hence the ‘the National Unity
and Reconciliation Policy.’

The policy’s general objective is ‘to build a united Rwanda in which all citizens have equal rights and
are free to corporately participate in the governance and development of their country.’ The specific
objectives of this policy are: (1) to fight any form of division and discrimination; (2) to fight against
genocide ideology; (3) to sensitise Rwandans at all levels, to strive and value their unity; (4) to empower
Rwandans with the capacity to analyse their problems and find adequate solutions; (5) to promote
a culture of peace; and (7) to promote those values in Rwandan culture that contribute to the social
cohesion and to the wellbeing of Rwandans.21

Strategies to achieve these goals include: (a) integrating unity and reconciliation in the action plans
of different institutions; (b) sharing information and engaging in consultative dialogues on unity and
reconciliation regularly; and (c) civic education for all Rwandans, research on reconciliation process
(barometers), partnerships, community consultations, combating poverty and ignorance, psychological
healing, as well as the monitoring and evaluation of reconciliation activities.

It is through this policy that ‘ethnic’ identity labels like Hutu, Tutsi and Twa, as well as any reference
to them, have been officially proscribed. However, many critics and commentators consider this to be
paradoxical as, in 2008, the government convinced the United Nations to officially change the name of
the genocide to ‘the genocide perpetrated against the Tutsi’.

2.5. National Unity and Reconciliation Commission

The mandate to integrate and to coordinate all national and local reconciliation efforts was given to
the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC).22 The NURC, a version of the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission, was created in March 1999 with the intention of operating in a participatory
way to permit Rwandans from all walks of life to shape and influence the ways and means of how unity
and reconciliation is to be achieved and to provide a platform upon which Rwandans air their views on
what has divided them in the past, and on how to build a united and reconciled Rwanda.

The NURC began in a wise manner. It gathered groups of people and asked them what they needed
in order to reconcile. Three advantages or benefits can be identified in this process. First, people
engaged with the idea of reconciliation. Second, they were enabled to help identify what they needed
for reconciliation to take place. Third, by expressing their views and then, ideally, actively engaging with
each other and with the process, they became creators and actors. This is valuable since reconciliation
can only be facilitated. It cannot be created or imposed by others.

The NURC organised several meetings and workshops, conferences, and research on the theme of unity
and reconciliation, and collective symbolic recognitions: e.g., genocide memorials, commemorations
and educational reforms. With regards to civic education, the NURC tapped into community and
solidarity-based cultural institutions of conflict resolution or transformation, namely the Ingando (civic
re/education camps) and Itorero (civic re/education academy) and Ndi Umunyarwanda (Rwandanness).

21 Republic of Rwanda (2020). National Policy of Unity and Reconciliation, Kigali. p. 5-6.
22 The NURC’s mandate ended on 21 November 2021 by a Cabinet decision, which created a Ministry of Unity and Civic Education with
the purpose of continuing and consolidating the NURC’s mandate.

12
 • Ingando referred to a unique moment, in Rwanda’s culture, in which the elders or young people
had to leave their village, go to an isolated place to reflect and discuss fundamental problems of the
community (e.g., famine, conflict...). After the genocide and civil war, the Ingando were revived to
constitute a civic education school dedicated to learning the virtues of unity and patriotism. Beside
their role in refugees and military integration, and before their replacement with Itorero (civil education
school), Ingando continued to be used as a form of problem-solving workshops and a space for
dynamic interactions between people, and as a tool of social cohesion, unity and integration. They
were also expanded to include school and university students, as well as public servants. Ingando
was thus a school that provided an exposure to the daily progress of the country’s life, a space that
created understanding of the relevance of peaceful coexistence and socio-economic integration,
as well as, in the view of survivors, a form of therapy and a place of recovery. Ingando helped
participants: to overcome mutual fear and suspicion, hatred, and the temptation for revenge; to talk
about the history of the divisive conflict; to accept responsibility for any harm done to each other; to
demystify negative perceptions of each other; and to agree on what the future holds for them.

• Itorero is an extended form of Ingando. It was established by the Cabinet meeting of 12 November
2007 as a civic education homegrown initiative inspired by Rwandan culture. Traditionally, Itorero
was a school that was used to instil moral values and the capacity to deal with societal problems. The
process generally culminates in convivial parties; that is, social entertainment activities, whereby
participants perform cultural songs and dances and share food and drinks. More advanced than
Ingando camps, the Itorero is organised at all levels of administration, from the local to the central
levels, as well as in the diaspora. The aim is: to re-introduce the culture of serving the country
without financial reward; increase the levels of awareness on unity and reconciliation; encourage
patriotism, unity and responsibility, which are believed to be attributes that contribute to progress,
social cohesion, peace and reconciliation.

Itorero targets all Rwandans and includes different curricula to suit the various sections of the
population, including children of seven years and above. Children are trained in their villages to help
them grow up to become responsible and productive citizens. The compulsory category are those
aged between 18 and 35 years of age, completing their secondary education. Other categories of the
population desiring to participate are given the opportunity to do so according to their professional
backgrounds and the established service priorities. In comparison with other countries, Rwanda
adopted a blended model (both voluntary and compulsory) for different categories of participants.
With regard to the impact of Itorero in unity and reconciliation, Intore (Itorero graduates) vow to be
exemplary in their respective communities where they are responsible for training others on matters
pertaining to national reconciliation.23

• Ndi Umunyarwanda is another NURC milestone included in Rwandan path toward unity and
reconciliation. It refers to a dialogue-based programme of Ndi Umunyarwanda (literally translated
as ‘I am Rwandan’) to emphasise a ‘shared citizenship’ and ‘unity’ of Rwandans first, before any
references to any ‘ethnic’ identities. The program provides a forum for Rwandans from various social
groups to discuss issues related to national unity, reconciliation and development. By focusing on
a shared citizenship – citizenship as a shared fate – the initiative restores the bond and solidarity
between Rwandans, as there is no plausible alternative to living together.

• Memory preservation is also part of the reconciliation process and is implemented through
genocide memorials and commemorations, as institutional embodiments of collective memory.
Many memorials are housed in churches – sites of many genocidal massacres. A national day of
mourning for the victims of the genocide was also instituted to refresh and foster collective memory.
At the national level, each year a new site is chosen from which bodies are exhumed and given

23 NURC (2009). Itorero Strategic Plan 2009-2012. Kigali, p.13.

13
 a formal burial. The President of the Republic leads the ceremony, which is broadcasted on state
television and radio. The day is also commemorated all over the country at lower administrative
levels. One week in April is consecrated for an intensive week of mourning and parties or celebrations
of any kind are discouraged. Genocide survivors’ associations extend the commemoration activities
up to July 4 when the genocide was officially ended with RPF victory. A common criticism is that
memorials and commemorations are selective as they only consider the Tutsi victims. They do not
include the Hutu victims of the genocide, nor do they include other crimes, notably those allegedly
committed by the RPF.

2.6. Socio-economic welfare

Lasting solutions for unity and reconciliation have included community-based programmes of fast
socio-economic development. The RPF government has had poverty reduction as its second overarching
priority after the fostering of national reconciliation. Therefore, if, as Peter Uvin argues, poverty and
inequality, cumulatively ‘structural violence’, fed into the dynamics of genocide,24 it follows that ‘national
unity and reconciliation’ have, as a necessary foundation, the notion of economic development. The
NURC also recognised that reconciliation cannot be possible without focusing on poverty reduction
strategies.25 New development projects have thus been conceived as opportunities to bring together and
reunite Rwandans at the local level. They refer to social protection actions that promote shared socio-
economic goals. Mechanisms refer to Umuganda (community work) and social protection programmes
targeting the poor.

a) Umuganda (community work)

The Government tapped into traditional forms of collaboration such as Umuganda, a tradition of
voluntary work to achieve a range of societal objectives collectively. The aim was to instil in Rwandans
a spirit of self-reliance with dignity. The principle at the core of this community work was that Rwanda’s
problems are solved by Rwandans themselves through joint efforts. Umuganda is institutionalised and
compulsory for all Rwandans including the President of the Republic and other political leaders, as
well as the security forces. The programme takes place once every month (every last Saturday of the
month) and requires everyone to contribute free labour for around two hours in the morning. It involves
collective action at community level to achieve a range of societal objectives including the rehabilitation
of bridges and water channels, the construction of houses for the poor, schools and health centres and
the protection of the environment. Umuganda bonds families and is a mechanism that solidifies social
cohesion. Through Umuganda, people learned to smile again: friends and foes share a joke, exchange
ideas and eventually transform conflicts constructively.

b) Social Protection Programmes

Vulnerable people including genocide survivors, orphans, people living with disabilities, returnees,
minorities and marginalised people, widows, elderly people, and the poor, have been given special
assistance through different social protection programmes, within the ‘Vision 2020 Umurenge
Programme (VUP).’ The VUP, which started in 2008, involves: (1) direct financial support, which targets
extremely poor people or families without labour capacity or employment opportunities, such as disabled
people, families headed by children, the elderly, street children, and refugees; (2) public works, which
offer employment opportunities to different categories of poor people, who are able to carry out the
job opportunities; (3) credit packages, which provide financial services (micro financial loans) to the
extremely poor people; and (4) support funds to genocide survivors – for rectifying the damage caused

24 See Peter Uvin’s discussion of structural violence in Rwanda in his Aiding Violence: The Development Enterprise in Rwanda. West
Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press, 1998.
25 NURC (2002). Second National Summit on Unity and Reconciliation in Rwanda. Report. October 26-28, Kigali.

14
 by the genocide, the Government of National Unity has set aside 5% of the revenue every year to assist
genocide survivors.

c) Educational reforms

The genocide and civil war resulted in the almost total destruction of the education system. However,
after the genocide, the newly instituted government not only had to react to the educational emergency
prompted by the events of 1994, notably through educational support (support fund) to the vulnerable.
It also had to address the legacies of an educational system that had been based on racial and ethnic
inequality and discrimination since its inception in colonial times.

The post-genocide government faced a massive task: not just reconstruction but also, the construction
of an education system that would be fair, efficient and capable of combating inequality; something that
Rwanda had never previously enjoyed. This approach has necessitated a radical reform of Rwandan
education. The well-known understanding is that just as education can be used as a tool to promote
division and heighten inter-group hatred, it can also cultivate peace, democracy, tolerance and the
rebuilding of social relations.

Under the most difficult of circumstances, the Rwandan government has made massive strides
in educational reform since the genocide. The intentions of the post-1994 education policy were to
correct past educational injustices in a way that promotes national unity and reconciliation by prioritizing
equity of provision and access. There was also a determination to encourage a humanitarian culture
of inclusion and mutual respect in education. One important step was to abolish the classification of
learners and teachers following Hutu, Tutsi or Twa affiliation.26 A new set of values was to be taught: (1)
to highlight the similarities among Rwandans and the policy of inclusiveness; (2) to promote individual
responsibility; (3) to focus on a progressive future; and (4) to ensure the relevance and applicability of
the curriculum to daily life.

2.7. Gacaca courts: Community-based justice

Gacaca courts constituted the second main instrument, besides the NURC, for achieving a unity
and reconciliation policy in Rwanda. Just after the 1994 genocide, around 200,000 genocide suspects
were already incarcerated.27 In an effort to deal with the overcrowded prisons and the backlog of cases
awaiting trials, the government recreated the traditional Gacaca system of justice in 2001. It consisted
of an informal local system of participatory and restorative justice in which people, especially community
elders, used to sit together in the Gacaca (the ‘grass’ or ‘lawn’) and settle their disputes with the aim
of reconciling conflicting parties. Traditionally, when someone did harm to another in the community,
the elders gathered to hear what had happened and to decide on punishment, which functioned as
restitution, allowing the perpetrator to come back into the community.

The purpose of reintroducing Gacaca was to bring together and involve local communities to witness,
identify, corroborate, and deliver justice. Under the official slogan of ‘a reconciliatory justice’, the Gacaca
courts were mandated to prosecute and to try the perpetrators of the crime of genocide and other
crimes against humanity, committed between 1 October 1990 and 31 December 1994. In fact, ‘Gacaca
Law’ states that the Gacaca mechanism has been established “to achieve justice and reconciliation

26 From the Ministry of Education’s Education Sector Policy (1996), the post-1994 formal education system aimed:
• To prepare a citizen who is free from ethnic, regional, religion, and sex discrimination;
• To prepare a citizen who is aware of human rights and responsible to society;
• To promote a culture of peace and emphasise national and universal values such as justice, peace, tolerance, solidarity and
democracy;
• To promote a culture based on genuine Rwandese culture, free from violence; and
• To promote freedom of formulation and expression of opinion.
27 National Service for Gacaca Courts (2012). Report, Kigali.

15
 in Rwanda” and is designed “not only with the aim of providing punishment, but also rebuilding the
Rwandan society.”28 Participation in Gacaca was also made mandatory and individuals were sometimes
fined and/or imprisoned for failure to participate. The mission of Gacaca was to reveal the truth, speed
up trials, eradicate the culture of impunity by punishing genocide perpetrators, release the innocent,
provide reparations, create a rhetorical space for dialogue and promote national reconciliation. The
Gacaca officially operated for 10 years (from 18 June 2002 to 18 June 2012). There were 10,000
courts, and 1,958,634 cases were tried involving about 1,003,227 accused.29 They were presided over
by ordinary citizens called ‘Inyangamugayo’, meaning ‘people with integrity’, elected from community
members, who totalled 260,000 individuals and who were officially called ‘Gacaca judges’30. Haller
views this significant number of elected judges in Gacaca as “perhaps the largest experiment in popular
justice in modern history.”31 Likewise, Clark describes this significant number as “unique among post-
conflict judicial structures around the world in its mass involvement of the population in the delivery
of justice.” 32 However, Gacaca courts have been criticised for having been used as a form of victor’s
justice that was selective: it only prosecuted the genocide crimes committed by the Hutu and passed
over the crimes committed by the victorious Tutsi-dominated RPF.

28 Republic of Rwanda (2001). Organic Law No. 40/2000 of 26 January 2001 setting up Gacaca Jurisdictions, Kigali; Republic of Rwanda
(2004). New Organic Law No 16/2004 of 19 June 2004 establishing the Organization, Competence and Functioning of Gacaca Courts.
Kigali.
29 National Service for Gacaca Courts (2012). Report Summary, p. 34.
30 Idem.
31 Gasanabo, Jean Damascène; Simon, David. J. and Ensign, Margee. M. (2014). Confronting Genocide in Rwanda: Dehumanization,
Denial, and Strategies for Prevention, Kigali: CNLG, p. 378.
32 Clark, Phil. (2010). The Gacaca Courts, Post-Genocide Justice and Reconciliation in Rwanda: Justice without Lawyers. New York:
Cambridge University Press, p. 348.

16
 Conclusion

Rwanda is a unique and complex case where genocide, the civil war and related horrendous crimes
took place concurrently as a result of centuries of animosity and division between the Hutu and the
Tutsi people. Rwandan society is still recovering from this deeply divisive past and rebuilding itself
today. However, there has been progress towards achieving unity and reconciliation in the country, and
restoring human dignity and Rwandan values.

The country’s context, culture and customs have played an important role in facilitating the establishment
of useful mechanisms, which have established a solid foundation for reconciliation. Rwanda’s
experience has emphasised in particular the government’s responsibility in promoting reconciliation.
All the mechanisms adopted were essentially government-centred, with national consultations,
however. They involved mandatory individual and community participation. Homegrown-community
based solutions, which combined local cultural and universal approaches of conflict transformation and
problem-solving, which opened the possibility of dialogue on the community level, have also been key.
Likewise, the adopted mechanisms were backward and forward-looking and with phases that: entailed
(a) responsive; and (b) preventive measures. These mechanisms involved a combination of judicial and
non-judicial processes in a way that was also unique (e.g. Gacaca courts), as well as a mechanism for
the integration (i.e. NURC) of national and local reconciliation efforts. Embedded within a strong political
will, these various mechanisms achieved important victories in the process of national reconciliation in
Rwanda.

Achievements and challenges in national reconciliation in Rwanda

All the mechanisms put in place made unity and reconciliation a living reality in Rwanda. A review of
indicators from the NURC barometer studies shows that levels of reconciliation are extremely high
(over 90%).33 However many observers and commentators consider the statistical progress as perhaps
only indicating political (‘thin’) reconciliation, understood as stability and societal coexistence. If that is
correct then there is still a long way to go regarding the deeper level of (‘thick’) reconciliation involving
the individual and relationship healing.

The adopted mechanisms have laid a solid foundation that paved the way for comprehensive and
sustainable national reconciliation. The establishment of a mechanism for integration and coordination
(NURC) has been particularly useful. For example, in light of the report conducted by the Institute for
Justice and Reconciliation (2005), it came out that “opposite to other reconciliation mechanisms in
Africa and the rest of the world, the NURC has disseminated national reconciliation and policy at the
community level. It has set forth an innovative approach to re-establish and consolidate unity among
Rwandans through dialogue, transitional justice, education, mobilization, sensitization and training. It
also has laid solid foundations in order to institutionalise reconciliation.”34 More importantly, Rwanda
moved from a failed state to a capable and functioning state and civil society. A national and shared
sense of identity and dignity has been restored through programmes favouring the inclusiveness and
dignity of Rwandans, such as the abolition of divisive-and false ethnic identities and the promotion of
Rwandanness (Ndi Umunyarwanda).

33 According to the NURC’s studies on Rwanda Reconciliation Barometer (RRB), reconciliation in Rwanda progressed from 82.3% in 2010
to 92.5% in 2015 and 94.7% in 2020. However, many commentators question whether these figures are reliable and also reflect popular
experiences.
34 Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (2005). Évaluation de l’Impact de la Commission Nationale pour l’Unité et la Réconciliation, p.
64-65.

17
 Despite these achievements, the process of national reconciliation in Rwanda has faced a number of
challenges. There is the persistence of a genocide ideology, ethnic stereotyping,35 still fresh psychological
and physical wounds, and poverty. In addition, although the National Policy on Unity and Reconciliation
emphasises fighting against all forms of injustice and the eradication of a culture of impunity by ensuring
functional rule of law, at the community level, restitution or compensation for the properties looted or
destroyed during the genocide remains a major obstacle to achieving unity and reconciliation. Finally,
there is the main criticism that the process of addressing past injustice has been selective; it has
been restricted to the genocide committed by the defeated government and it has neglected RPF
crimes. Citizens’ resentment over the adopted mechanisms’ inability to address these important issues
hampers national reconciliation.

Lessons learnt

Each conflict is unique and addressing it requires sensitivity to its nature. Therefore, in general, there
are no ‘size fits all’ formula or ‘easy shortcuts’ promoting national reconciliation. However, there are
common experiences that people go through across different cultures and contexts if they have
committed, suffered, and/or witnessed (extreme) violence in conflict situations. No matter what war,
ethnic background or religion has been in play, in the struggle for reconciliation there is much common
ground. Hence, drawing on Rwanda’s experience with national reconciliation, the following interrelated
lessons appear to be useful for countries that have experienced massive violent conflicts:

• It is the state’s responsibility to set the stage and promote national reconciliation. To be
effective, leading by example or ‘walking the talk’ through an inclusive and democratic government
(and military integration in cases of civil wars for example) is paramount. This requires strong political
will on the side of the post-violence (new) government whereby the winner should not take all.

• Successful national reconciliation necessitates integrated efforts involving the state/

government and non-state actors. This must involve a safe space for dialogue between these
actors reflecting the national (top), middle range (elites), and community/local (grassroots) levels.
Rwanda’s experience with national and local summits and the establishment of the National Dialogue
Council (Umushyikirano) suggests that the active engagement of actors from all walks of life from
the top to the grassroots – including state institutions, the private sector, civil society, communities,
and the general public – is vital. These actors need to agree on core national reconciliation goals,
priorities, and implementation mechanisms. One of the best benefits here is a shared vision of the
past and future that is acceptable to all; that is, a shared collective history and future.

• Successful national reconciliation depends on the use of mechanisms that are grounded
in a society’s context, culture, traditions and customs. In Rwanda, for example, the country’s
culture and customs of solidarity and community participation in solving their problems at village
level was a practical approach. Home-grown solutions are thus useful and constitute an alternative
to universal or liberal mechanisms in the promotion of reconciliation. Rwanda’s Gacaca mechanisms
are a lesson for divided societies. In fact, given their decentralised nature, the importance attached
to local and entire community participation, Gacaca courts represent a unique form of restorative
justice. 36

• For adopted initiatives to be successful, a mechanism for integration and coordination

is paramount, as was the case with the NURC in Rwanda. The NURC was not a ‘Truth and
Reconciliation Commission’; instead, it was a mechanism mandated to coordinate, monitor, and
integrate all efforts at national and local levels, aimed at promoting reconciliation. Actors involved in
national reconciliation should thus understand that national reconciliation remains a long, complex,
and dynamic process whose success should involve an inclusive and integrated approach.

35 This is often observed in the commemoration period where some genocide survivors are killed or harassed through hate speech.
36 Clark, Phil. (2010). Ibid., p. 355.

18
 • Successful reconciliation should be comprehensive. Approaches that are selective (e.g.
deliberately considering some injustices to the detriment of others) are a recipe for disaster. All
issues and factors related to conflict and violence should be taken into account and all parties’
voices heard (victims/survivors, perpetrators, witnesses, bystanders). All national efforts must also
resonate and/or concur with popular initiatives and approaches to reconciliation.

• Through research and experience sharing among stakeholders, it is important to regularly track
the progress of reconciliation in order to revise the mechanisms and processes, or to create new
ones, and so address any persisting challenges.

19
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Research Project Report doi:10.2870/846966
Issue 2022/05 ISBN:978-92-9466-185-2
QM-09-22-105-EN-N
28 February 2022