Germany and the Russo-Japanese War

Author(s): Jonathan Steinberg

Source: The American Historical Review , Dec., 1970, Vol. 75, No. 7 (Dec., 1970), pp. 1965-
1986
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the American Historical Association

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 Germany and the Russo-Japanese War

JONATHAN STEINBERG

OVER thirty years ago, a French diplomat called his memoirs of the years 1904
to I906 "Un grand tournant de la politique mondiale,"' and with some justice. Be-
tween January I904 and the Algeciras Conference in the spring of I906 war broke
out between Russia and Japan, the first armed collision between two Great Powers
in nearly thirty years; important new alliances were formed or broached; three
major war scares erupted among the Great Powers in Europe; the Revolution of
I905 took place in Russia; and a large international conference of the Powers was
convened. Recent research has helped to fill in the details of what was already a
densely documented period.2 Many questions, especially about French policy, have
now been answered. Only the position of Germany, in spite of all the new material,
remains puzzling. It is clear that between I904 and I906 Germany's diplomatic
record was appalling. She alienated both belligerents-Russia and Japan, became
involved in war scares with France and Great Britain, and forced on an unwilling
world an international conference at which she found herself isolated. For all her
hectic diplomacy, Germany earned nothing but suspicion. In August I905 the fu-
ture chief of the general staff, Helmuth von Moltke, noted in his diary that "all
the other nations are pretty well united in reviling Germany and spreading the
most terrible, stinking lies about us.... They all assert that we are disturbing the
peace, and nobody seems to see that all Germany wants is to be left in peace."3
Even Baron Friedrich von Holstein, the chief architect of foreign policy from
I890 to I906, admitted the bankruptcy of German diplomacy. "In short," he wrote
to a friend, "in the present atmosphere, it seems to me that the correct and dignified
thing to do would be to act like Russia after the Crimean War (La Russie se re-
cueille) and calmly to withdraw into ourselves....`
A certain amount of German isolation was probably inevitable. In only one
- Mr. Steinberg, whose special interest is modern German history, is the author of Yesterday s De-
terrent: Tirpitz and the Birth of the German Battle Fleet (New York, 1966). Currently a university
lecturer in history and fellow of Trinity Hall, Cambridge, he received the Ph.D. there in 1965 after
having studied with F. H. Hinsley.
1 Maurice Paleologue, Un grand tournant de la politique mondiale 1904-ig06 (Paris, I934).
2 Christopher Andrew, The#ophile Delcasse and the Making of Entente Cordiale (London, I968);
Norman Rich, Friedrich von Holstein: Politics and Diplomacy in the Era of Bismarck and William II
(Cambridge, I965); J. A. White, The Diplomacy of the Russo-Japanese War (Princeton, I964);
George Monger, The End of Isolation: British Foreign Policy I900-I907 (London, 1963); Zara
Steiner, "The Last Years of the Old Foreign Office, I898-I905," Historical journal, VI (I963), 59-
go; Lamar J. R. Cecil, "Coal for the Fleet That Had to Die," AHR, LXIX (I964), 990-I005.
3 Moltke, diary entry for Aug. 22, 1905, in Helmuth von Moltke, Erinnerungen, Briefe, Doku-
mente (Stuttgart, 1922), 336.
4 Holstein to Otto Rose, June I8, I906, The Holstein Papers (hereafter HP), ed. Norman Rich
and M. H. Fisher (Cambridge, 1955-63), IV, no. 986, p. 429.

i965

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I1966 Jonathan Steinberg

generation, Germany had grown to a position of Continental preponderance. The

astounding economic expansion of Bismarck's Empire after I87I, the rapid
growth of the German population, and the reputation of the Prussian military
machine were bound to make the other powers increasingly apprehensive. After
Bismarck's fall, as the consequences of Germany's strength became more evident,
the Continental powers tended to look to alliances, such as the Franco-Russian
Alliance of I894, to redress the balance. Even Great Britain began to cast about for
allies after i899. This response was predictable; European diplomats had always
made such calculations. What was not predictable was the German reaction. Ger-
man diplomacy during the years before the First World War was so erratic and
incalculable that it sometimes seemed as if the object of German statesmen were
to hasten the Empire's isolation. German statesmen demanded that Germany be
considered in every international crisis, even those in which German interests
were trivial. Her diplomacy seemed restless and uncertain.
Norman Rich, in his work on Baron Friedrich von Holstein writes convinc-
ingly of the limitations of German diplomacy and its failure to distinguish between
large and small issues or to construct a coherent set of priorities for foreign policy.5
The record of the Wilhelmstrasse was certainly unimpressive, but it is not the
whole explanation. The diplomacy of Wilhelmine Germany reflected faithfully
a system of government, and it was that system that failed, not only its diplomatic
agencies.

The failure of the system became obvious during the First World War, but
it also occurred, on a smaller scale, during the Russo-Japanese War. The irregular
operations of Wilhelmine government in the years 1904 to I906 accounted for a
good deal of the ineptness of German diplomacy, although this was not apparent
at the time. The myth of German efficiency blinded domestic and foreign observers
to the fact that Germany was badly governed. The military monarchy presented
an image of order and central control, of discipline and Prussian regularity; the
reality was very different. During the Russo-Japanese War, precisely because it was
wartime, some of the most unfortunate weaknesses of the German military mon-
archy were uncovered. These weaknesses in turn led to the sudden changes of
course and random interventions abroad that created the impression of malevo-
lence so deplored by General von Moltke. A crisis involving a risk of war brought
out the worst in the government of the German Empire.

On the eve of the outbreak of war between Russia and Japan, Germany's
diplomatic and military position had been deteriorating gradually, but not alarm-
ingly, for three or four years. The Franco-Russian Alliance had been "reshaped"
in I899 and extended beyond the life of the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria-
Hungary, and Italy. France and Italy had arranged a settlement of colonial
differences in November I902, and there was a perceptible weakening of Italian
5 Rich, Holstein, II, 742-45.

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 Germany and the Russo-Japanese War I967
enthusiasm for the Triple Alliance.6' Germany's relations with Britain were correct
but a little strained. Misunderstandings in both capitals had led to an attempt in
the years I899 to I9OI to arrange an Anglo-German agreement, but each side
believed that the other had been the suitor, and when the negotiations collapsed,
each felt that the other had been less than candid. In German eyes, Britain had
then rushed into an alliance with Japan, an alliance of the very sort she had re-
fused to Germany, and was now, in the spring of I903, moving alarmingly close
to Germany's bitterest foe, the French Republic.7 The German foreign ministry
had some grounds for concern about the deterioration of Germany's international
position but some cause for optimism as well. Russia and Japan seemed to be
heading for a military collision in the Far East. The British were tied to the Japa-
nese, the French to the Russians, the Germans to neither. It was the classic Bis-
marckian position, that of tertius gaudens, in which Germany now found herself.
In July 1903 the Russian ambassador called on Otto von Miihlberg, the deputy state
secretary, to sound out the German position. Miihlberg got the distinct "impression
that in the event of a conflict in the Far East we shall have to cope with formal
Russian requests for help or support." What price to exact for such support was
not yet clear. Bernhard Count Billow, the German chancellor, noted in the margin:
"We shall have to deal with this matter with the greatest care and delicacy. His
Majesty hinted to Tsar Nicholas in Reval and Danzig that in the event of an attack
on Russia in the Orient he would cover the Russian rear."8 On the other hand, as
Bilow wrote to Holstein in January I904, "from the point of view of our internal
policies and to counteract the general dissatisfaction in Germany, it would of course
be a good thing if 'somewhere far away' the nations came to blows."9
If war broke out between Russia and Japan, there would be immediate Euro-
pean complications. The Baltic and North Seas might become the scene of hostili-
ties. In addition, Russian warships would have to pass through the narrow water-
ways between Denmark and Sweden. The Danish attitude toward the belligerents
directly affected Germany, whose seacoasts and fleets were divided by the penin-
sula and islands of the kingdom of Denmark. In November 1903 the Kaiser told
Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz, the state secretary of the Reichsmarineamt, that the
issue of Danish neutrality had been raised in a discussion with the king of Den-
mark and the tsar. If Great Britain joined Japan in the war with Russia, how
would Denmark react? Tirpitz recorded in his notes that the king of Denmark
had been "crushed" by the thought of it.10
6 Andrew, Delcasse', II9-35, I38-46; E. N. Anderson, The First Moroccan Crisis, I904-06 (Chi-
cago, I930), I9-23.
7 The German ambassadors in St. Petersburg and Paris and the charge' daffaires in London were
asked to comment in May I903 on the possibility of an Anglo-French-Russian understanding. See
Die grosse Politik der europaischen Kabinette I87I-I9I4, Sammlung der diplomatischen Akten des
Auswartigen Amtes (hereafter GP), ed. Johannes Lepsius et al. (Berlin, I923-27), XVII, no. 5370,
pp. 570-72, and the replies, nos. 537I-73, pp. 573-80.
8 Biilow, marginal notes on Miihlberg, memorandum, July I5, I903, GP, XIX, pt. i, no. 5924,
Pp. I0-I2.
9 Bulow to Holstein, Jan. i6, 1904, HP, IV, no. 8I8, p. 277.
10 Tirpitz, notes, Nov. 14, I903, in Tirpitz Family Papers (hereafter TFP), file entitled "Entw

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 i968 Jonathan Steinberg

The German government had a direct interest in Danish neutrality and was
determined that the Danes should interpret that neutrality in an acceptable man-
ner. The first point to clarify was the Danish attitude toward the provision of
pilots for belligerent vessels. The ambassador to Denmark, Wilhelm von Schoen,
reported to Berlin that

the Danish government believes that Denmark has a legal obligation to keep the
Sound and the Belts open. When the dues were extinguished on the waterways [by
the Convention of i857], Denmark undertook to provide pilots, for if the Danish
government failed to provide them for warships, one might easily go aground
and thus block the narrow waterways.'1

But these narrow waterways were also vital to the deployment of the German
battle fleet in the North and Baltic Seas. If Germany were at war with England,
she could not permit the Danes to provide pilots for enemy shipping. Admiral
Wilhelm Biuchsel, the chief of the Admiralstab, put the matter bluntly:

The main thing is to find some good excuse for not observing Danish neutrality. We
have to make certain that the Reich chancellor understands this and approves the
navy's attitude. We have to make all the necessary preparations in peacetime.... Our
minister in Copenhagen must also be clear that in the event of a war we shall regard
the provision of pilots to our enemies as incompatible with Danish neutrality.'2

Admiral von Tirpitz, state secretary of the Reichsmarineamt, did not agree with
Admiral Biuchsel, chief of the Admiralstab, and throughout the war the two com-
peting naval administrations corresponded with increasing bad temper about the
issue.'3 It was a uniquely German state of affairs. Three separate naval adminis-
trations, all with direct access to the Kaiser, operated in intense competition: the
Reichsmarineamt (imperial naval office) with ministerial responsibility and par-
liamentary obligations, the Admiralstab der Marine (admiralty staff) modeled
on the position of the general staff as the organ by which the Kaiser's supreme
command functions were to be carried out, and the Marinekabinett (imperial
naval cabinet) responsible for personnel and the secretarial aspects of the Kaiser's
command, but, in fact, by sheer proximity to the Kaiser, as influential as the two
larger bodies.'4

lung der Marine," VIII. The Tirpitz Family Papers, in the family's home at Irschenhausen, near
Munich, Germany, were made available to me through the kindness of the late Korvetten-Kapitan
a. D. Dr. Wolfgang von Tirpitz.
11 Schoen to foreign ministry, Apr. I6, I904, Akten des Admiralstabs der Marine, Abteilung A
(hereafter CU-ADMA), II, Russland I I b, no. 5I. The copies of the German naval archives cited
here and below, unless otherwise indicated, are located in the Seeley Historical Library, Cambridge
University. Other abbreviations for collections of documents located here are as follows: for the
Reichsmarineamt, CU-RMA; for the Marinekabinett, CU-MK.
12 Biichsel, marginal notes on Schoen to foreign ministry, Feb. 25, I905, and on internal memo-
randum, Mar. 23, 1905, CU-ADMA, II, Russland ii b.
13 See Reichsmarineamt to Admiralstab, Apr. I7, I905; draft reply Apr. I8, 1905; Friedrich von
Ingenohl, Seine Exzellenz vorzulegen, May I2, I905: "The RMA apparently thinks it can decide in-
dependently about our interests and the proper conduct of war in matters of international or maritime
law . . ."; Admiralstab to Reichsmarineamt, May I7, I905; Tirpitz to Biichsel, Jan. 6, I906; all in
ibid.
14 For the most complete account of this curious administrative arrangement, see Walther Hu-
batsch, Der Admiralstab und die obersten Marine-Behorden in Deutschland, 1848-I945 (Frankfurt,
1958), 75-85.

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 Germany and the Russo-Japanese War i969

The deployment of ships at sea clearly belonged to the Admiralstab. A German

cruiser squadron was stationed in the Far East, and the Admiralstab was quite
properly concerned about the prospects of war between Russia and Japan"5its
possible consequences for Germany and for the naval balance. In January I904
the Admiralstab alerted the German cruiser squadron in China and issued the
following instructions: "While preserving strict neutrality, you are to observe the
development of events in the north; in the Yangtse, observe the English. Report
immediately any alteration in their position."'6 The Admiralstab also wanted
observers at Russian and Japanese headquarters when war broke out. On Jan-
uary 9, I904, Admiral Freiherr von Senden Bibran, the chief of the Marinekabi-
nett wrote to Count Billow:

In order to obtain more rapid and reliable intelligence about the conduct of the war,
in particular about the effects of modern weapons on modern targets, upon which
important conclusions may well be drawn for our tactics, it would be of great value if
German naval officers could be attached to the headquarters of the belligerent
fleets... 17

Sealed orders were prepared and dispatched to Friedrich Count Alvensleben,

German ambassador in St. Petersburg, and Emmerich Count Arco-Valley, Ger-
man ambassador in Tokyo. If war broke out, Alvensleben and Arco were to
approach the two belligerents and request that German naval observers be per-
mitted to report to their headquarters.18
When news of the daring Japanese attack on Port Arthur on February 8, 1904,
reached Berlin, the navy's plan went into operation. The results were excellent.
For a long time Germany was the only power with observers inside Port Arthur
and with ships on patrol in northern waters. These movements were duly noted
by the other powers in China. As Vice-Admiral von Prittwitz, commander of the
German cruiser squadron in the Far East, reported: "None of the other nations
have sent warships to the theater of war. Our movements are being watched sus-
piciously by the English press."19 In August he warned the Admiralstab that "there
is widespread distrust of Germany out here. Nobody believes that we shall be con-
tent with the leasing of Kiaochow and many think that we shall do in Shantung
what the Russians have done in Manchuria."20
The Japanese certainly shared these suspicions of Germany and they treated
the German naval attache in Tokyo with the utmost caution. In contrast, the
Russians positively embarrassed Kapitan Paul Hintze, the attache in St. Petersburg,
15 Admiralstab to Kaiser, "Hat der Beginn eines Krieges mit Russland im Laufe des Winters
fur Japan Vorteile," zum Immediatvortrag, Dec. 3, I903, German naval archives in Militargeschicht-
liches Forschungsamt-Dokumentenzentrale (hereafter MGFA-DZ), Freiburg im Breisgau, F. 20I7,
PG 65962.
16 Admiralstab to chief of the cruiser squadron, Jan. 7, I904, CU-MK, XXIV. g.
17 Senden to Bulow, Jan. 9, 1904, ibid.
18 Senden to Biichsel, ganz geheim, Jan. 9, I904, ibid; see also Bulow to Senden, Jan. I9, I904;
Alvensleben to foreign ministry, code telegram no. 66, Feb. 8, I904; Arco to foreign ministry, Feb.
7, I904; all in ibid.
19 Prittwitz to Admiralstab, telegram, Feb. 27, I904, ibid., vol. I.
20 Prittwitz to Admiralstab, telegram, Aug. IO, I904, ibid., vol. 2.

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 1970 Jonathan Steinberg

with confidences. Prince Orloff, the tsar's pe

him to write confidential memoranda for His Majesty. "The tsar," Prince Orloff
said, "wants to be as well informed as the Kaiser."2'
Information about Russia's prospects, most of it alarming, poured into Berlin
during 1904. As early as May of that year the able, Russian-speaking observer at
Port Arthur, Korvetten-Kapitan Albert Hopman, reported on the impressive quali-
ties of the Japanese navy:

Having seen these examples of a fanatical spirit of attack and endeavor, and comparing
it with the apathy and indifference of the Russians, I can see only a black future.
One can hardly imagine that the Japanese army has a different spirit. It has the same
blood, the same nerves, as the navy.22

The reports of the Admiralstab to the Kaiser of March 30 and April 20 included
very unfavorable comments on the inefficiency and badly managed operations
of the Russian squadrons, the low morale and poor quality of the commanders,
and the dim prospects of the Russian army.23 This information was important and
ought to have affected German diplomacy. None of it got to the Wilhelmstrasse.
By an order of February Io, I904, renewed the following year, the Kaiser decreed
that attaches and observers were to report "as do independent commanders of My
ships overseas and the reports are to circulate among the military and naval author-
ities only."24 Had more information about Russia's true military situation reached
the chancellor and Holstein earlier, these men might have been more cautious in
their dealings with Russian requests for aid.
Another odd feature of Germany's diplomacy in this early stage of the Russo-
Japanese War is the government's failure to issue the customary declaration of neu-
trality. The terms of such a declaration were drafted in the foreign ministry and
circulated to the relevant authorities on February I7, I904, with the emphatic
direction: "It is not proposed to make this declaration public." There is no obvious
reason why such a decision should have been made. The actual terms of this un-
published declaration conformed to those of the published declarations of the other
Great Powers. The Kaiser Wilhelm Kanal was to be closed to all belligerent
vessels and German ports were to afford warships safe harbor for no more than
twenty-four hours. Article 3 stated that "coaling of belligerent vessels was per-
missible within the terms of international law to that fixed amount that will
permit passage to the nearest port of the belligerent power."25 The decision not to
publish this declaration was an unfortunate one. It allowed Albert Ballin, the gen-
eral director of the Hamburg-Amerika Line, to arrange a large coaling contract
with Russia, which led to one of the most difficult situations for German diplo-

21 Quoted in Hintze to Tirpitz, Dec. 2I, I904, MGFA-DZ, F. 2044, PG 66077.

22 Hopman to Admiralstab, May 4, I904, CU-MK, XXIV. g., vol. 2.
23 Admiralstab, zum Immediatvortrag, Mar. 30, I904; zum Immediatvortrag, Apr. 20, I904;
both in ibid., vol I.
24 Orders of Feb. IO, I904; Feb. 5, I905, ibid.
25 Foreign ministry to Reichsmarineamt, ganz geheim, Feb. 27, I904, CU-ADMA, II, Russland
i i b, vol. I.

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 Germany and the Russo-Japanese War I97I
macy during the entire period. It also gave the Admiralstab another occasion for
interdepartmental agitation. The Admiralstab felt that the foreign ministry was
neglecting matters of great importance. Precedents for a future war with England
were being established by default. "If we continue to hesitate," the Admiralstab
argued, "our area of maneuver in international customs and our choice among
them will shrink further. English influence will be victorious everywhere."26
The foreign ministry refused to support the Russian interpretation of prize
and contraband, although the Russians, in the navy's view, were acting on the
principles that a German government would be bound to adopt in a war with
Britain.27 As Holstein put it in a memorandum late in February I904:

And what could possibly cause Germany to stand by Russia and endanger herself? ...
One can admire the bravery and other great qualities of the Russian Army and Navy.
... But if Germany were to take sides, her world trade would be endangered. If one
tickles the tiger, one must expect him to use his claws.28

The Admiralstab found this caution exasperating and short-sighted. Its feelings
were later summed up by Captain Friedrich Ingenohl in an angry minute: "In
other words, we don't know what we want and we are supposed to be satisfied
with this state of affairs. It is really impossible."29
Ingenohl's criticism had a certain justification, for if the foreign ministry were
right in adopting a cautious attitude toward questions of international law, it was
unwise not to make that position clear to others. In August 1904 some Russian
warships sought shelter in Kiaochow. The proper conduct of the port authorities
ought to have been clear, given the terms of the unpublished declaration of Feb-
ruary I7, but Kiaochow, although a colonial possession, was administered by the
Reichsmarineamt-another oddity of the German governmental structure. The
navy disliked the rule that the warships must be disarmed if they failed to leave
port within twenty-four hours after the restoration of their seaworthiness. At first
the governor of Kiaochow, a naval officer, refused to force the Russian warships to
disarm, and when the Japanese ambassador in Berlin protested, a small interna-
tional crisis ensued.30 Eventually, the navy was compelled by the direct interven-
tion of the Kaiser to accept the position of the foreign ministry that the ships be
disarmed.3' The Law Journal in Britain commented:

The decision of the German government that the ships at Tsingtao must be disarmed
is important as a recognition by a great naval power of a rule which before the present

26 Admiralstab to Reichsmarineamt, ganz geheim, Nov. 5, I904, ibid., vol. 2.

27 There is a voluminous correspondence between the Admiralstab and the Reichsmarineamt on
these questions of international law, as well as drafts for presentation to the Kaiser, in ibid.
28 Holstein, memorandum, Feb. 22, 1904, HP, IV, no. 823, p. 283.
29 Ingenohl, minute on Tirpitz to Biuchsel, ganz geheim, Jan. I3, I906, CU-ADMA, II, Russland
I I b, vol. 3.
30Eickstedt to Hans von Plessen, telegrams, I2:46 A.M., I2:53 P.M., Aug. I3, I904, CU-MK,
XXIV. g., vol. 3; the Japanese ambassador to State Secretary Oswald von Richthofen, telegram, Aug.
I3, 1904; Muhlberg to Eickstedt, telegram, Aug. 14, I904; Eickstedt to Truippel, telegram, 9:45 P.M.,
Aug. I4, I904; all in CU-ADMA, II, Russland iI b, vol. 2.
31 Wilhelm II to governor of Kiaochow, telegram, 3:50 P.M., Aug. I3, 1904, CU-MK, XXIV. g.,
vol. 3.

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 1972 lonathan Steinberg
war could scarcely be said to have been universally accepted but which is founded on
a sound conception of neutrality.32

German relations with Japan were not improved by the incident, and British praise
was little compensation. Admiral Biichsel remarked, "England's interests in these
questions are opposed to ours."33
Another persistent problem of the German government arose from the activities
of military and naval attaches. In Prussian tradition, the Kaiser was supreme war
lord. His relations with officers, in service or retired, was direct and personal;
civilians could not intrude. Under Wilhelm II, who was inclined to high feudal
concepts of loyalty, these relationships became a threat to the control of the Ger-
man foreign ministry over external affairs. Writing in I896, Holstein had warned
Hugo von Radolin:

Internal conditions, especially at Court, are less pleasant. The Cabinets and Aides-de-
Camp are becoming more and more an organised secondary government. The Aides-
de-Camp have actually been assigned to various departments: Count Moltke, Austria
and Germany; Colonel [illegible] Russia; Colonel Arnim, Alsace-Lorraine and England;
Colonel Engelbrecht, Italy; Colonel Scheele, African Colonies, etc.34

One of these influential officers was Colonel Oskar von Chelius, military attache
at the German embassy in Rome-"that ambassador of the future," as the official
ambassador once called him.35 In January 1904 the Kaiser instructed Chelius to
prepare an itinerary for the annual Mediterranean cruise. Chelius carried out his
instructions with diligence, arranging dates, secret service protection, and ports of
call. The only item he neglected was to consult either the ambassador or the
foreign ministry.36 Such an omission would not have been serious under ordinary
circumstances; the Kaiser's many journeys were usually arranged in a similarly
casual manner,37 but the spring of 1904 was a delicate time to arrange a visit to
Italy. The French president, ]Emile Loubet, was expected for a major state visit
April 24 to 28, the very time when the Chelius itinerary put the Kaiser's yacht in
Italian waters. Should the reception given to the French president exceed in
warmth that accorded to the Kaiser, in Billow's view, "it would mean le glas fune-
bre of the German-Italian alliance."38 A tense and thoroughly gratuitous crisis
occurred in German-Italian relations. Germany exerted great pressure on Italy,
but the Italians offered only weak concessions. President Loubet's visit was a tri-

32 Reprinted in London Daily Graphic, Aug. I9, 3904.

33 Biuchsel, zum lImmediatvortrag, Aug. 27, I904, CU-ADMA, II, Russland i I b, vol. I.
34 Holstein to Radolin, Mar. 22, I896, HP, III, no. 536, p. 6oI.
35 Anton Count Monts to Holstein, Mar. i8, I904, ibid., IV, no. 825, p. 285.
36 Chelius to Oberhof- uncd Hausmarschall, August Count zu Eulenburg, Feb. 5, 1904, CU-MK,
XXXVI, vol. 22.
37 The arrangements for this trip were so casual that the chief of the Admiralstab was unaware
of the Kaiser's intention to take Germany's newest and most powerful cruiser as escort. See Biichsel
to Senden, Mar. 9, I904: "I have the honor to reply to Your Excellency's letter of the 7th of this
month. In this letter I learned for the first time of the forthcoming journey of S.M.S. Friedrich
Karl. I have immediately informed the foreign ministry." Ibid. There had been sixteen major pieces
of correspondence during January and February about the cruise, but no one had informed the man
responsible for deployment of the German battle fleet, or the agency responsible for making diplo-
matic preparations, that a large, modern warship would be making the cruise.
38 Billow to Monts, Mar. 6, 1904, GP, XX, pt. i, no. 6389, p. 40.

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 Germany and the Russo-Japanese War 1973

umph.39 The Kaiser and the German foreign ministry were irked, and German-
Italian relations deteriorated. On May 12 Holstein wrote that "to try to bring the
Italians back from their change of course by reasonable arguments or threats is
hopeless. The time is not appropriate for really effective intimidation."40 None of
this unpleasantness in relations between Germany and Italy would have occurred
if, as the ambassador had suggested, the Kaiser's plans had been changed in time.4'
Muddle, not design, had put the Italian government in a very awkward situation.
After all, the Anglo-French colonial agreement, the foundation of the Entente
Cordiale, had been signed on April 8. European statesmen were bound to see the
Kaiser's presence in Italian waters during the visit of the French president as a
warning to Italy and as a reaction to the Anglo-French treaty. Although the inci-
dent should not be exaggerated, it deepened suspicion where it had already taken
root. The Foreign Office in London was only too ready to believe the worst of
Germany, and several years later Eyre Crowe summed up this suspicion in his
famous memorandum of January I907:

Germany's policy always had been, and would be, to try to frustrate any coalition be-
tween two States which might result in damaging Germany's interests and prestige;
and Germany would, if she thought such a coalition was being formed, even if its
actual results had not yet been carried into practical effect, not hesitate to take such
steps as she thought proper to break up the coalition.42

A more significant, and genuinely devious, operation was the attempt to influ-
ence Russian war policy through the naval attache in St. Petersburg, Kapitan Paul
von Hintze. Behind this move was the growing uneasiness of the German navy
about Russia's conduct of the war. In spite of the Kaiser's emphatic declaration-
"That the Russians should lose! I don't even think of it in dreams,"43 evidence con-
tinued to accumulate indicating that Russia would lose and lose badly.44 August
was a particularly bleak month for the Russians. On the tenth Admiral Witgeft's
halfhearted attempt to run the Japanese blockade of Port Arthur failed miserably,
and Russian naval prestige suffered a severe blow. On August 20 General Moresuke
Nogi's Third Army began its land assault on Port Arthur.45 In early September
Billow, who was on holiday in Norderney, sent a telegram to Friedrich Count
Pourtales, deputy state secretary, in Berlin:

When Admiral von Tirpitz returns from holiday, please raise with him-verbally and
in strictest confidence-the issue of the Russian fleet. Find out whether our naval

3' Ibid., nos. 639I-4I9, pp. 42-78; HP, IV, nos. 824-27, pp. 284-88; Anderson, First Moroccan
Crisis, 143-47.
40 Holstein, memorandum, May I2, 1904, GP, XX, pt. i, no. 6416, p. 72.
41 Monts to Bulow, Apr. 6, 1904, HP, IV, no. 926, p. 288 n.3.
42 Crowe, memorandum, FO 37I/257, Jan. I, I907, British Documents on the Origins of the
War 1898-1914, ed. G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley (London, I927-38), III, app. A, p. 400.
43 Wilhelm II, marginal note on Speck von Sternburg to foreign ministry, Aug. 31, 1904, GP,
XIX, pt. ii, no. 6264, p. 537.
44 Alvenslehen to Bulow, Aug. 25, I904, ibid., pt. i, no. 6048, pp. 2I2-I5. Hopman's report on
the events of July and August, which arrived from Port Arthur on Sept. 2, I904, was very damag-
ing. For this and others, see CU-MK, XXIV. g., vols. 2, 3; reports from Trummler (Tokyo), Hintze
(St. Petersburg), Hopman (Port Arthur), and Ritter von Gilgenheimb (Port Arthur), all in CU-
ADMA, II, Russland iI b, vols. I-3.
45 Christopher Martin, The Russo-Japanese War (London, I967), I2I-30.

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 I974 Jonathan Steinberg
attache in St. Petersburg, Hintze, could make it clear to the Russians, entirely on his
own and without arousing suspicion, that the present tactics of the ships locked up in
Port Arthur will be disastrous for the Russian cause. . . . To you and to Excellency
von Tirpitz I need hardly say how useful it would be for us if the war weakened
Japanese naval strength as much as possible.4

On September 15 Pourtales called on Admiral von Tirpitz; later he reported to the

chancellor:

Admiral von Tirpitz replied that he shared the opinion of your Excellency with regard
to the tactics of the Russian warships in East Asia and had already in the summer
given instructions to our naval attache in St. Petersburg, directing him to express
himself with the required caution in leading Russian naval circles in the manner sug-
gested by your Excellency. Kapitin Hintze had already acted on this instruction and it
appeared not entirely impossible that the recent emergence of the Russian fleet from
Port Arthur could be attributed to this.47

Such an undertaking was risky at best, but the fact that Tirpitz had decided to
try it on his own is in some ways less revealing than the absence of surprise or at
least comment by Count Pourtales. By December I904 Hintze himself became
uneasy "in view of the great dangers in communications of this sort."48 Tirpitz
replied sharply:

With the authorization of the Reich chancellor in September of this year, I gave you
certain unequivocal instructions in a given direction in which our interests lay and still
lie. You replied to me by telegram on this and other matters on September 24. An
official authorization for certain undertakings can never be given, and you must face
the real possibility in such affairs of being disavowed later. That lies in the nature of the
activity.49

Once again a military authority had intervened in the conduct of foreign affairs.
That the foreign ministry subsequently resorted to the same doubtful technique
reinforces the general impression that the structure of the Kaiser's Germany en-
couraged, or at least condoned, such undertakings. Here too it can be argued that
not much harm was done, that the intervention was trifling and, apart from the
admiral's utterly unfounded boast, apparently ineffective. By itself it would have
been nothing, but it was not by itself. It was part of a continuous pattern of inde-
pendent naval and military activity abroad.
German business firms also had a tendency to conduct independent foreign
policies, and in June 1904 the Hamburg-Amerika Line (HAPAG) signed a coal-
ing agreement with an agent of the Russian government without consulting the
German foreign ministry. The agreement, covering 338,ooo tons of coal, obliged
HAPAG to supply the needs of a Russian squadron under Admiral Zinovi Rozh-
destvenski, which was to leave for the Far East in the autumn of 1904. The agree-

4G Bulow to Pourtales, Sept. 9, I904, GP, XIX, pt. i, no. 6053, pp. 220-21.
47 Pourtales to Biilow, Sept. I5, 1904, ibid., no. 6054, pp. 22I-22 (italics mine); see also Tirpitz,
note, handwritten, Sept. 26, I904, MGFA-DZ, F. 2044, PG 66077. Both accounts of the meeting on
September I5 are in substantial agreement.
48 Hintze to Tirpitz, Dec. 21, I904, MGFA-DZ, F. 2044, PG 66077.
49 Tirpitz to Hintze, Dec. 27, I904, ibid.

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 Germany and the Russo-Japanese War 1975

ment stated that the coaling would be carried out at points between the east coast
of Denmark and the Chusan Archipelago, sixty miles south of Shanghai. On
September I2, 1904, the London Shipping Gazette published an account of the
contract, and when the Japanese ambassador in Berlin asked the foreign ministry
for an official denial, Count Pourtales replied that since the agreement was private
and commercial, the German government could not intervene. In reality however,
the German government was very much involved and concerned. If it forced
HAPAG to cancel, it would antagonize the Russians and possibly frustrate the
plans for the dispatch of the squadron. The German government could hardly do
so while, at the very same moment, urging the Russian navy to be more aggressive.
On the other hand, the Japanese might well regard the German colliers as belliger-
ent vessels. By well-established custom they would be within their rights to halt or
seize the HAPAG colliers, and a very nasty international incident might result.
Biulow first thought that HAPAG should be forced to find "ways and means" to
get out of its agreement, but Albert Ballin, the general director of the steamship
company, was persuasive and a friend of the Kaiser. On September 23 Ballin
persuaded Billow to change his mind and let the contract stand.50 The decision was
probably the only one the chancellor could have made, but it involved grave risks
and certainly compromised German neutrality for the private gain of a large firm.
German neutrality was compromised in other ways. Prince Henry of Prussia,
the Kaiser's brother, returned to Germany in August I904 from a visit with the
tsar. He brought with him a request for further help for Rozhdestvenski's squad-
ron, for which HAPAG was supplying coal. The tsar asked the Kaiser to afford
protection against the dangers of a sudden ambush by Japanese torpedo boats in
the Baltic or North Seas.51 As always in such matters, the Kaiser acted without
consulting the foreign ministry and ordered the Reichsmarineamt and the minis-
try of the interior to look out for "suspicious Japanese with luggage."52 Harbor
masters were alerted and naval units were put on patrols. Once again, Germany
had made an important move in Russia's direction without either diplomatic prep-
aration or compensation.
By September I904 British observers began to suspect that Germany and Russia
had at the very least arrived at a general agreement. Sir George Clarke, secretary
of the Committee for Imperial Defence, wrote to A. J. Balfour, then prime minister,
that "there is a very close understanding between Russia and Germany."53 The
British government had some reason to feel betrayed. The summer had seen the
signing of an Anglo-German arbitration treaty on July i2 and a cordial visit by

50 Cecil, "Coal for the Fleet," 993-95.

51 See Muhlberg to ministry of the interior, geheim, e'it sehr, Aug. 2I, 1904; Otto von Diede
to naval commands, Baltic and North Sea, ganz geheim, Aug. 23, I904; both in CU-ADMA, II,
Russland II b, vol. 2.
52 Wilhelm II to Reichsmarineamt, Aug. 28, I904; Hintze to Reichsmarineamt, Aug. 29, I904;
Pourtales to Reichsmarineamt, Sept. I0, I3, I904; Eickstedt to foreign ministry, Sept. I3, I904; all
in ibid.
53 Clarke to Balfour, Sept. 7, 1904, quoted in Monger, End of Isolation, i65.

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 1976 Jonathan Steinberg

King Edward VII to the "Kieler Woche."54 When an article in the Times on Sep-
tember 14, entitled "Russia and Germany: A Far Eastern Understanding," sug-
gested that there had been a change, the British ambassador in Berlin, Sir Frank
Lascelles, wrote the Foreign Office that "His Excellency, Baron von Richthofen,
could assure me that there was not one word of truth in the statement and that no
sort of agreement had been entered into between the two countries."55 For others
in the Foreign Office, rumors of a Russo-German agreement fed an already pro-
found suspicion of everything Germany did. A few, such as Sir Francis Bertie, the
British ambassador to Paris, resented the slight improvement in Anglo-German
relations during the summer. In June he wrote a letter to his friend Louis Mallet,
assistant clerk at the Foreign Office: "Your letter of the 2nd breathes distrust of
Germany and you are right. She has never done anything for us but bleed us. She
is false and grasping and our real enemy commercially and politically."56
Neither the coaling agreement nor the assistance promised the Russian fleet
were the results of deceitful diplomacy. They simply happened in that manner
peculiar to Imperial Germany. Yet both were events of considerable significance.
Germany had drifted into an association with Russia without having received the
slightest compensation in return. What such an association might mean became
clear when, during the night of October 21, 1904, the Russian squadron passed
through the Dogger Bank fishing area near Hull. The inexperienced Russian
crews mistook some small British fishing trawlers for the mythical Japanese tor-
pedo boats, fired on them, sank two, damaged two others, and killed several fisher-
men. The British, from the king down, were outraged, and the national excitement
was so intense that war between Russia and Great Britain seemed imminent.57
The tense situation involved the entire European concert. By the terms of the
Franco-Russian Alliance, France would be compelled to assist Russia, her old ally,
against Great Britain, her new ally. Germany had become involved with Russia
and was increasingly regarded as her ally by the British. If Britain attacked Russia,
she might also attack Germany and use the occasion to rid herself of German
mercantile and naval competition. The German government found itself facing the
threat of war for the sake of a power that had so far promised Germany nothing.
Germany's leaders felt they must try to secure an alliance with Russia, and on
October 27 the Kaiser broached the idea in a private letter to the tsar.58 Nicholas,
hard pressed by Russian reverses in the Far East and very shaken by the dangers
of war with Britain, eagerly accepted the German offer.59 On October 30, scarcely
a week after the Dogger Bank incident, Biilow submitted the draft of a Russo-

54 See Anderson, First Moroccan Crisis, I50-5I.

5 Lascelles to the Marquess of Lansdowne, Sept. 22, I904, Foreign Office Confidential Print, in
Seeley Historical Library, Cambridge University, vol. 8533, 2I9/20, p. I77.
56 Quoted in Steiner, "The Last Years," 76.
57 White, Diplomacy of the Russo-Japanese War, I79-83.
58 Wilhelm II to Nicholas II, telegram, in English, Oct. 27, I904, GP, XIX, pt. i, no. 6I i8, pp.
303-04.
59 Nicholas II to Wilhelm II, telegram, in English, Oct. 29, I904, ibid., no. 6II9, p. 305.

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 Germany and the Russo-Japanese War 1977

German defensive alliance to the Kaiser. Germany had, he observed, reached a

moment of "world-historical significance."' But in reality the situation was more
prosaic. Frightened by risks, which her own uncoordinated activities had helped
to create, Germany tried by one daring, diplomatic stroke to alter a set of relation-
ships that had taken years to develop. There was no plan, no preparation, nothing
of the tenacious and careful procedures by which Theophile Delcasse had secured
the agreement with England in April 1904. This was a foreign policy of impulse
and over-reaction.
There was also some question about the value of the alliance. What could or
would Russia do for Germany? Against whom? On October 31, Billow called a
meeting of his senior diplomatic and military advisers, one of the few times during
these eventful months when anything like a coordinated policy was attempted.
The results were not encouraging. According to the notes taken by Kapitin Adolf
von Trotha, the chief of the central department of the Reichsmarineamt who ac-
companied Tirpitz, the meeting was not a success for the chancellor. The state
secretary of the foreign ministry, Baron Oswald von Richthofen, opposed the
idea of an alliance. Both military chiefs, Count Alfred von Schlieffen of the general
staff and Admiral Tirpitz of the navy, were also opposed. Only Holstein, Biilow's
main adviser, spoke in support.6' Tirpitz left the meeting a very worried man and
the following day he wrote to Richthofen urging that the attempt be dropped:

As I said yesterday, not only is the military value of an alliance with Russia virtually
nil for a war at sea, but in my view even for a land war it does not essentially count
for much. For even in the most favorable case, if the Russians decide to give us a few
army corps against France, it seems to me that the value of ioo,ooo, or even 200,000,
men in a war in which millions will confront each other will be small, possibly not even
worth the difficulties for the functioning of our military apparatus that the addition
of Russian elements will inevitably bring. . . . Finally, let us take the case of most
immediate interest to us. Suppose that England declares war on us alone and that
Russia then decides to fight on our side. The alliance between France and Russia with
its provisions directed against us will hamper the freedom of our decisions against
France, while the actual Russian help will be of no consequence. . . . If the alliance
were known, the entire force of English public opinion would turn exclusively against
US. . ..62

Nothing could be more characteristic of Germany's conduct during the Russo-

Japanese War than that the heads of Germany's armed services should reject an
alliance whose proponents saw it as strengthening Germany's defenses. The whole
project had the marks of hasty, ill-considered improvisation. Tirpitz's criticisms
and anxieties were justified.
For the next forty-eight hours, the German government operated under the
impression that war might yet occur.63 On November i the Kaiser wrote to Biulow:
60 Bulow to Wilhelm II, ibid., no. 6I20, p. 306.
61 Trotha, "Sitzung Beim Reichskanzler," Oct. 3I, I904, MGFA-DZ, F. 2044, PG 66077.
62 Tirpitz to Richthofen, Nov. I, I904, ibid.
63 For an account of the naval aspects of the Russo-British crisis, see A. J. Marder, From the
Dreadnought to Scapa Flow (London, I96I), I, iII. For other details of this dramatic period, see
Richard Hough, The Fleet that Had to Die (New York, I958), 46-60.

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 I978 Jonathan Steinberg

"This evening, tonight or early tomorrow,

consequences of which are unforeseeable. God be gracious and spare us. I am very
worried."' By November 3 news reached Berlin that the danger had passed.5
The Royal Navy had been called off, and Admiral Rozhdestvenski's motley squad-
ron was steaming southward unmolested.
During the next few weeks, the German government had another rude sur-
prise. The agitation in Britain, which had reached boiling point about the Russians,
now turned against Germany. There were many in Great Britain who would
have agreed with the First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir John Fisher, who had writ
to his wife late in October: "Things look very serious. It's really the Germans behin
it all. Peace seems assured tonight but one never knows, as that German Empero
scheming all he knows to produce a war between us and Russia."66 Paul Wolff
Count Metternich, the German ambassador in London, confirmed that this view
was widespread:

Germany is presented as the true enemy. The German Emperor is said to have the
intention of waiting until his fleet is large enough to take on England. . . . Germany
is supposed to have given the Russian government friendly signals about the dangers
which threatened the Russian fleet when it emerged from the Baltic . . . in order to
bring about an Anglo-Russian conflict.67

On November i2 the Army and Navy Gazette openly advocated a preventive

war. The naval attache at the German embassy in London, Fregatten-Kapitan Carl
Coerper, alarmed the Kaiser with his highly colored reports of British preparations
for war. The reorganization of the Channel and Home Fleets seemed to under-
line his ominous predictions.68 Early in December the crisis reached a peak. Ad-
miral Felix Bendemann, commander of the German North Sea station, declared
that it was a perfect moment for Great Britain to attack and destroy Germany's
navy in a sudden punitive strike.69 Admiral Biuchsel agreed, and at an audience
with the Kaiser on December 3, he presented his plan for war with Britain. The
first step involved an unannounced invasion of Denmark and seizure of the vital
Danish waterways.70 The Kaiser approved the operations plan and ordered the gen-
eral staff to alert the IX-and X corps in North Germany for a strike against Den-
mark.7" Ships were recalled from overseas stations as unobtrusively as possible.72
64 Wilhelm II to Builow, Nov. I, I904, GP, XIX, pt. i, no. 6IIo, P. 290.
65 Monger, End of Isolation, 174-75; GP, XIX, pt. i, nos. 6I22-24, PP. 309-12.
66 Sir John Fisher to Lady Fisher, Oct. 28, 1904, quoted in Marder, Dreadnought to Scapa Flow,
I, III.
67 Metternich to Biilow, private letter, Nov. I, I904, GP, XIX, pt. i, no. 6iii, P. 292.
68 Coerper to Reichsmarineamt, Nov. I7, I8, I9, 1904; Daily Telegraph article of Nov. 28,
I904, with the Kaiser's comments; Biuchsel, memorandum, Dec. 4, I904; all in CU-ADMA, Eng-
land I a.
," Bendemann, "Gedanken iuber die augenblickliche kritische Lage," ganz geheim, Dec. 3, 1904,
MGFA-DZ, F. 2044, PG 66077.
70 Bischsel, Immediatvortrag, ganz geheim-von Hand zu Hand, Dec. 3, I904, ibid., F. 2OI7,
PG 65964.
71 Biichsel, zum Immediatvortrag, ganz geheim-von Hand zu Hand, Jan. 3I, i9o5, ibid., PG
65965.
72 Richthofen, memorandum, Nov. 30, I904, GP, XIX, pt. ii, no. 6I50, pp. 356-57. Tirpitz op-
posed the recall because it might further provoke Britain. See Holstein, memorandum, Dec. i,

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 Germany and the Russo-Japanese War 1979
On December 5 Holstein wrote in a memorandum that "as a result of some secret
opinions, which have come to my attention in the last few days, I now believe-
which I never have before-in the possibility of a war with England, in which the
attack would come from the English side."73
Characteristically, during this flurry of military planning the generals and ad-
mirals failed to inform the chancellor of the Reich or the foreign ministry about
operations that would have the most profound consequences for Germany's inter-
national relations. This oversight was finally rectified over two months later. On
February 6 Freiherr von Senden Bibran wrote to the chancellor:

His Majesty the Emperor and King has taken the occasion of an audience of the chief
of the Admiralstab der Marine to declare that the latter be directed to keep the Reich
chancellor up to date on the general features of the proposed operations plans of
the navy for war and that an All-Highest Expression of Will in this regard be transmitted
to the Reich chancellor.74

Biilow's reply is astounding. Aside from some minor changes in the wording of
the draft of the order, he was only concerned lest news of orders "for the war"
should become known:

Not only must the All-Highest Cabinet Order proposed to me remain strictly con-
fidential but also all measures necessary must be taken so that nothing can become
known of the issuance of His Majesty's navy with orders for war. The responsibility
for His Majesty's foreign policy obliges me to demand this. In the given political
situation it would lead in my view to incalculable catastrophes if such "operations
plans of the navy for war" were not to be treated with the greatest possible secrecy on
everyone's part....75

When reflecting on this episode of German history, it is difficult to decide

whether the conduct of the military planners or of civilian statesmen is more
extraordinary. The military calmly set about the violation of Denmark's neutrality
as if it were the autumn general staff war games. There was apparently no thought
for the catastrophic consequences that such an action would have on world opinion
or on the other Great Powers, let alone on the Kaiser's relations with his "Onkel
Hans." The statesman responsible, as he himself emphasized, for His Majesty's
foreign policy, never uttered a word on the issue itself, but merely noted that it
would be extremely dangerous if such information became known. This is the very
stuff of which Imperial Germany's ultimate disaster was woven.

In a different part of the Imperial government another sort of crisis began to

develop at the same time. The threat of war put Admiral von Tirpitz in a very
great dilemma. In I898 and I900 two substantial navy laws had been passed by the

I904; Klehmet, memorandum, Dec. 4, I904; both in ibid., nos. 6I5I, 6I52, pp. 357-58. Under pres-
sure, the Admiralstab modified its plans to recall ships from the China and West Indian stations.
See Dick to Biuchsel, Dec. 8, I904, CU-ADMA, II, England ii a.
73 Holstein, memorandum, Dec. 5, I904, GP, XIX, pt. ii, no. 6I53, p. 359.
74 Senden to Billow, ganz geheim, handwritten, Feb. 6, I905, CU-MK, XXXII, vol. 2; see also
accompanying draft of A.K.O. (All-Highest Cabinet Order), Feb. 3, I905, ibid.
75 Bulow to Senden, handwritten, Feb. 9, I905, ibid.

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 1g80 Jonathan Steinberg

Reichstag. In consequence the German navy was expanding annually at the rate
of two battleships, one heavy cruiser, two light cruisers, and two torpedo-boat
divisions, although most of the planned expansion was still on paper.76 Completion
of the naval building program, as amended by the second Flottengesetz of I900,
might be expected in I917, but the war was expected now. Sir John Fisher's redis-
tribution of the British fleets assured Britain an immediate superiority in battle-
ships alone of more than two to one.77 Tirpitz had always argued in his "risk theory"
that there would be a so-called "danger zone" between the point at which the
growth of the German fleet came to the attention of the Royal Navy and the point
at which its growth would assure it genuine deterrent power, that is, the point at
which the risk to the Royal Navy's command of the sea would become just great
enough to cause the Admiralty to exercise caution in considering a battle with the
German navy. The "danger zone" could be traversed by a calm, restrained policy
and a sound set of defensive alliances. But suddenly the theoretical danger had
become actual, and an emergency meeting was held on December 8 at the Reichs-
marineamt to discuss these questions.78 A few days later, Kapitan August von
Heeringen, Tirpitz's choice as his successor and perhaps his most trusted colleague,
submitted a memorandum questioning the whole conception on which Tirpitz's
plans rested:

The expansion of our fleet so far has been carried out on the assumption that we should
be able to keep the peace until it had been completed. It was a reasonable assumption.
. . . In the meantime, as a result of the Russo-Japanese War, all the powers have
moved much nearer to the idea of war. . . . One of our obvious enemies has already
drawn its sword from its sheath and is therefore an incalculable factor.... We simply
cannot spend 200 millions a year for the navy and in this threatening time only have a
battle-ready fleet for a few months of the year.... In every measure we take, we must
ask ourselves not what will happen in the distant future, but what real increase in
power it brings us in the time immediately ahead.79
Tirpitz's reply underlines perfectly the dilemma of German naval expansion:

Since I898 we have done our utmost to drive the fleet program forward; the navy laws,
the highest possible navy estimates, postponement of coastal fortifications, curtailment
of our overseas service, limitation on the number of gunnery practice ships, torpedo,
training, and experimental ships, etc., etc., all prove this. The concentration *of our
resources on one purpose has been fought through against the resistance of the entire
navy. That the program is not finished can only be used against us in a war if it can
be shown that in the years I898 to I904 more could have been achieved.... The idea
that we must subordinate "tomorrow" to "today" is correct only with the greatest
reservations. The danger zone for Germany is not just there today, but will in all
probability also be there tomorrow, and we must reckon with these facts in the develop-
ment of our navy.80

Tirpitz accused Heeringen of claiming that the navy laws were wrong because
they were not completed, but that was not the point. The navy's difficulties arose

76 Tirpitz, Politische Dokumente (Stuttgart, 1924), I, I3-20, app.

77 Marder, Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, I, 42-46.
78 "Protokoll uber die Sitzung am 8. Dezember I904," MGFA-DZ, F. 2046, PG 66o86.
79 Heeringen, "Schlussvotum des Vorsitzenden der R. Kommission," ganz geheim, Dec. 14,
I904, ibid. F. 2044, PG 66077.
80 Tirpitz, handwritten note on Heeringen, memorandum, Dec. 20, 1904, ibid.

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 Germany and the Russo-Japanese War I98I

not because the laws were not yet carried out but because the danger zone was
theoretically infinite. Tirpitz argued that Germany had to build a navy to deter
an attack by Great Britain, the principal naval power, but as long as that power
continued to expand its own fleet, the gap between the two competitors, and thus
the danger zone, would remain forever. If there were no need to deter the principal
naval power, there was no danger zone, but no need for a great fleet either. A crisis
with Great Britain would always find the German navy incomplete.
The problem had a second aspect. When Tirpitz took over as state secretary of
the Reichsmarineamt in June 1897 he had justified the concentration of Germany's
navy at home by pointing to its political potential.8' A great fleet in the North Sea
would make Germany a more attractive ally to the Continental powers, or would
compel Britain to be more responsive to German demands. Events had reversed
Tirpitz's predictions. German naval expansion had forced Britain to abandon her
isolation and to seek allies of her own. In addition, the war in the Far East was
rapidly reducing Russia, one of the Great Powers for whom the fleet's Bundnis-
fdhigkeit had been designed, to a state of impotence, and was pushing France
closer to Britain. The "risk theory" had produced an arms race and a vicious circle
in German foreign policy as well.
The logic of the Tirpitz program demanded an alliance with Russia, and hope-
fully France, but when such an alliance seemed possible, Tirpitz rejected it, for
in a crisis with England it would increase the risk to Germany. Thus even the
foreign political corollary of the "risk theory" involved a vicious circle. The fleet
increased English hostility; that hostility increased the need for an alliance against
England; the alliance with Russia against England would offer no naval protection,
it would merely increase the risk to Germany. Thus the fleet made alliances with
both England and Russia impossible, and there was nothing left for Germany but
diplomatic isolation.
By December it had become clear that Russia was unwilling to enter an alli-
ance with Germany. On December 7, 1904, the tsar informed the Kaiser that the
French, his allies of ten years' standing, would have to be consulted first on the
terms of the treaty.82 The Kaiser and Billow drew back. In view of the recent
Anglo-French entente, they were certain that France would inform Britain at
once of the proposed Russo-German treaty, and British hostility would be further
increased. On December 13 Billow recognized the point Tirpitz had argued on
October 31:

The decisive point is as always whether an agreement, alliance or treaty of any kind
with Russia would increase or decrease the danger threatening us from England....
While an agreement with Russia safeguarding the peace and raising our position in

81 For the complete text in German and English of Tirpitz's initial memorandum, "Allgemeine
Gesichtspunkte bei der Festellung unserer Flotte nach Schiffsklassen und Schiffstypen," see my
Yesterday's Deterrent: Tirpitz and the Birth of the German Battle Fleet (New York, I966), 208-23.
82 Nicholas II to Wilhelm II, Dec. 7, I904; Wilhelm II to Nicholas II, Dec. I2, I904; Bulow to
Alvensleben, Dec. I2, I904; Alvensleben to foreign ministry, Dec. I3, I904; all in GP, XIX, pt. i,
nos. 6I30, 6I3I, 6I35-38, pp. 322-3I. See also Radolin to Holstein, Dec. 8, I904, HP, IV, no. 866,
p. 3I5.

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 1982 Jonathan Steinberg

the world would be a great success for our foreign policy and would be welcomed in
wide and in the best circles as a return to the tradition of Bismarckian policy, a bond
with Russia which would in contrast to this draw England's hostility upon us would
certainly be condemned unanimously by the whole nation, by the German princes
first of all.83

On January 2, 1905, State Secretary Richthofen told Tirpitz about the Russian
answer to the alliance proposal. Tirpitz replied: "On our side greater coolness is
now appropriate. On the other hand it is still in our interest that the Russian fleet
do some damage to the Japanese. I say this in view of the verbal instructions to
Hintze."' Two days later Tirpitz went for a walk with the chancellor. He found
Billow in a bitter mood. The chancellor blamed the Kaiser for antagonizing all of
Europe's sovereigns and even the German princes.85 In the meantime, Hintze
had become nervous again:

When I got back from the South, I found that our embassy here was working for
peace or, at least, for the recall of the II squadron. I was told that the coaling contract
was too risky and might mean war. These policies were in conflict with my instructions,
and I am therefore writing for new orders.86

Tirpitz hastened to reassure him:

The directives that I gave you verbally, according to instructions from the Reich
chancellor, were not concerned with the question of peace or war. They reckoned only
with the fact that a state of war existed and that certain activities of war best corre-
sponded to our interests. The question of peace or war is a political one and outside
my competence.87

Once again a German military intervention was to have serious consequences.

By the winter of 1904 the Russo-Japanese War had become desperately unpopular
in Russia. In November, Count Sergei Witte, who had opposed many of the poli-
cies that led to war, had warned the German banker Franz von Mendelssohn:
"Anyone who urges us to continue this war is no true friend of Russia."88 Yet
Tirpitz and his attache in St. Petersburg were doing just that. No line could be
drawn between politics and military matters, as Tirpitz suggested. To urge the
Russians to "damage" the Japanese fleet in Germany's interest, to encourage the
suicidal undertaking of the second Pacific squadron, and to risk international
complications as a result of the coaling agreement, were more than purely military
matters. In any case, whatever good will Germany may have gained by such
military intervention was nullified by Albert Ballin's sudden decision to try to get
out of the coaling agreement.89 Throughout January, Ballin tried to get the foreign
ministry and the Reichsmarineamt to agree to new arrangements. The Kaiser,
thoroughly alarmed by the dangers of an international incident, told Ballin on
February I, 1905, that, without letting the Russians know, he was to make sure

83 Bilow to Holstein, Dec. I3, I904, HP, IV, no. 867, P. 3I6.
84 Tirpitz, notes, in pencil, Jan. 2, 1905, TFP, "Entwicklung der Marine," VIII, bk. 2.
85 Tirpitz, notes, Jan. 4, I905, ibid.
86' Hintze to Tirpitz, Jan. II, I905, MGFA-DZ, F. 2044, PG 66077.
87 Tirpitz to Hintze, Jan. 23, I905, ibid.
88 Quoted in Biulow, memorandum, Nov. 2, I904, GP, XIX, pt. ii, no. 6I67, p. 388.
89 Metternich to Billow, Dec. 26, I904, in Cecil, "Coal for the Fleet," I002.

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 Germany and the Russo-Japanese War I983

that no German ships, men, or flags proceeded beyond Madagascar.90 The tsar
wired the Kaiser and demanded that Ballin be compelled to honor his agreement.9'
At Biilow's request, the Kaiser withdrew his instruction to Ballin and informed the
tsar that the coaling arrangement was a private matter and that Ballin was "at
liberty to act as he thinks fit of course at his own risk."92
On January 22 tsarist guards had fired on a peaceful demonstration outside the
Winter Palace, and by February the Russian Empire appeared to be facing a
genuinely revolutionary situation. Germany was left with little to show for her
efforts to support Russia. The negotiations for alliance had failed. The Russians
were losing the war badly, and it was not impossible that Imperial Russia might
cease to be an effective Great Power for some time to come. It was not surprising
that Billow and Holstein began to look toward an improvement in relations with
Great Britain. But here the naval building program of Admiral von Tirpitz was
the chief obstacle. In the middle of December however, the German government
had received some encouraging news. Count Metternich, the German ambassador
to London, returned for consultations and presented a long memorandum to the
chancellor in which he assured his government that England had absolutely no
intention of attacking Germany. "England wants no war; with anybody. It wants
quiet and to recover frbm the financial consequences of the Boer War."93 Encour-
aged by Metternich's views, Billow decided to try to restore something like good
relations with Britain. He invited the British ambassador, Sir Frank Lascelles, to
the chancellor's palace on Christmas Eve 1904.
Billow opened the conversation by pressing the point that the Germans really
expected an English attack.94 Lascelles replied that the British could see no justi-
fication for the German fleet except as a force to attack Britain.95 Biilow decided to
apply a little judicious blackmail. With satisfaction he wrote to Holstein:
My remark that we still did not have an alliance with Russia though our relations were
excellent . . . made a great impression on L., though I had thrown it out lightly. Use-
ful though my hint was, I still believe that we should not drill too deep in this direction,
nor slap on the colors too heavily.96

Biilow had miscalculated badly. "A great impression" had been made, but not the
one he imagined. Austen Chamberlain was furious:
I think it is time that we spoke with equal frankness. When has German diplomacy
ever done otherwise than 'lean to Russia'? In what question, where the interests of
England and Russia conflict, have we had, or can we ever expect, the support of German
90 Muhlberg to Heinrich von Tschirschky, Feb. 2, I905, in ibid., 1004.
91 Nicholas II to Wilhelm II, Feb. I 4, I905, GP, XIX, pt. i, no. 6092, p. 27.
92 Wilhelm II to Nicholas II, Feb. I5, I905, ibid., no. 6094, p. 272; Bulow to Wilhelm II, Feb.
14, 1905, ibid., no. 6093, pp. 27I-72.
93Metternich, memorandum, Dec. i8, I904, ibid., no. 6140, pp. 332-40; also reports of military
attache Major Friedrich Count von der Schulenburg, Dec. 14, I904; third secretary of London em-
bassy, Count Eulenburg, Dec. I5, 1904; all in ibid., pt. ii, nos. 6154, 6I55, pp. 359-67.
94 Lascelles to Landsdowne, Dec. 25, 1904, telegram, secret, FO Print, vol. 8533, no. 286, p. 266.
95 Wilhelm II, minute on Bulow to Wilhelm II, Dec. 26, I904, GP, XIX, pt. ii, no. 6I57, p. 37
96 Bulow to Holstein, Dec. 25, 1904, HP, IV, no. 873, pp. 32I-22. The GP account of the
Lascelles-Biulow meeting omits any mention of this phase of the conversation. XIX, pt. ii, no. 6157,
pp. 372-74.

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 1984 lonathan Steinberg

diplomacy? . . . Whatever Count Billow may say, [Germany's] navy is a standing

menace to this country. It has been openly recommended to German patriotism in
the German press for this reason....97

Anglo-German relations continued to deteriorate. The voices of those in Great

Britain who pleaded for conciliation grew fainter. On January 3, 1905, Sir Thomas
Sanderson, permanent undersecretary at the Foreign Office, wrote to Lascelles in
Berlin:

I wish we could make the lunatics here who denounce Germany in such unmeasured
terms and howl for an agreement with Russia understand that the natural effect is to
drive Germany into the Russian camp and encourage the Russians to believe that they
can get all they want at our expense and without coming to any agreement with us.98

The Bilow move was not without support in Britain. It might have been possi-
ble to do something to improve Anglo-German relations, had it not been for an
unfortunate speech by Arthur Lee, civil lord of the Admiralty, on February 2.
"If war should unhappily be declared," he stated, "under existing conditions, the
British Navy would get its blow in first, before the other side had time even to read
in the papers that war had been declared."99 A minister of the crown had openly
threatened Germany with a surprise attack like that on Copenhagen in 1807. The
Kaiser wrote to Tirpitz:

Dear Maestro, You will have read in Wolff the astounding speech of the civil lord of
the Admiralty with its open threat of war against us. I have just had Lascelles here and
made it clear to him in unambiguous terms that this revenge-breathing corsair must be
disavowed and rectified by his government by morning. Otherwise there will break
out such a storm in our press that it can only be met through the speedy introduction
of a colossal new building program, forced on us by "public opinion."'100

The next day Admiral Georg von Miuller called on Tirpitz to discuss "more rapid
creation of a stronger fleet."101 On February io Tirpitz was told by the chancellor
that "the government would approve any sum he wanted, that the state secretary
of the treasury was not alarmed by the sums, etc."102 On February iI Tirpitz had
an audience with the Kaiser to discuss what sort of addition to the navy law of
I900 ought to be introduced in the Reichstag. To Tirpitz's surprise and relief, the
Kaiser was prepared to accept the very modest addition of the six cruisers struck
by the Reichstag from the previous law. The Kaiser said: "I prefer this. I want no
bill which has a politically dangerous point directed against England.'03 A more
dramatic and possibly dangerous gesture was avoided, but only because the Kaiser
and his chiefs of staff were still reckoning with the very real possibility of an
English attack.'04
97 Chamberlain, memorandum, Jan. I4, I905, quoted in Monger, End of Isolation, I77.
98 Sanderson to Lascelles, Jan. 3, I905, quoted in ibid.
99 Quoted in Anderson, First Moroccan Crisis, I8I.
11)0 Wilhelm II to Tirpitz, Feb. 4, I905, MGFA-DZ, F. 2(44, PG 66077; reprinted in Tirpitz,
Politische Dokumente, I, I4.
101 Muller to Tirpitz, ganz vertraulich, Feb. 8, I905, Tirpitz, Politische Dokumente, I, I4.
102 Tirpitz, Feb. I0, 1905, ibid., I7. I have had occasion to compare the documents cited by
Tirpitz with the originals and have found them, without exception, to be accurate and usually com-
plete.
103 Wilhelm II, minute, Feb. II, I905, ibid., I, I8.
104 A.K.O., Feb. 3, I905, CU-MK, XXXII, vol. 2. See also "Denkschrift zum Immediatvortrag

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 Germany and the Russo-Japanese War I985

A year had now passed since the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese

Germany's international position had gravely deteriorated. There w
relations with Russia, in whose interests Germany had compromised he
and run the risk of armed conflict with Japan through the coaling agr
tions with England had become so bad that war was now openly di
tions with Italy had been weakened, and the French, the permane
German eyes, were now immeasurably stronger through the conc
Anglo-French agreement of 1904. It was not a happy prospect and
come, for the French seemed determined to gain a protectorate over t
kingdom of Morocco without even consulting Germany. In this yea
the uncoordinated and restless activity of the German government
had unquestionably contributed to Germany's difficulties.
It was in this difficult situation that Billow and Holstein began
policies that led to the Moroccan Crisis of 1905 and that brought Europe to
the edge of war. Ironically, during this period civilian leadership entirely domi-
nated both the court and the military. The precise objective of the policies of Billow
and Holstein has been much disputed. It may be, as some historians believe, that
they hoped to provoke France into war while her Russian ally was unable to
help.105 They certainly intended to demonstrate to the French that the British
alliance could not protect France in a land war. Whatever their motives, they suc-
ceeded for a time in giving the semblance of central control to German foreign
policy, even if the policy eventually led to an international humiliation at the
Algeciras Conference. Yet even during this period, civilian leadership had to cope
with periodic interventions by the Kaiser and the independence of military planning.

There have been many theories about the causes of Germany's eccentric behavior
before 19I4, ranging from Erich Eyck's work on the "personal regime" of Wilhelm
II to Thorstein Veblen's analysis of the incompatibility of modern technology
and the dynastic state.'06 One simple possibility has often been ignored. As Fried-
rich Stampfer put it, "when the World War began, Germany was economically

iiber den Aufmarsch und die Verwendung S. M. Flotte im Krieg gegen England im Mobilmachungs-
jahre I905," ganz geheinm-von Hand zu Hand, Mar. 2I, I905, MGFA-DZ, F. 20I7, PG 65965.
105 There is much circumstantial evidence to suggest that a decision to take a large risk over
Morocco was inade by Biilow and Holstein. On February I4, I905, the chief of the general staff in-
formed Biuchsel that the troops required to carry out the occupation of Denmark in the original
version of "O.P." (the "Operations Plans") (see p. I978, n. 70) would not now be available "because
in a war with England and France the necessary troops for the occupation of Zeeland could not be
spared without endangering the chances against France." Biichsel, zum Immediatvortrag, Feb. 14,
I905, ibid. We know too from a letter of Holstein to his cousin that Schlieffen was a regular visitor
at Holstein's office. See Helmuth Rogge, Friedrich von Holstein: Lebensbekenntnis in Briefen an eine
Frau (Berlin, I932), I55-56, I87. Norman Rich has assembled an impressive case, based on his
detailed studies of the Holstein Papers, for the possibility of a preventive war. Holstein, II, 696-98. S
also Gordon A. Craig, The Politics of The Prussian Army (Oxford, I955), 283; Gerhard Ritter, The
Schliefen Plan: Critique of a Myth (London, I958), I28; Idem, Staatskunst und Krieghandwerk, II
(Munich, I960), I33; Peter Rassow, "Schlieffen und Holstein," Historische Zeitschrift, CLXXIII
( 952), 30 I-20.
100 Erich Eyck, Das personliche Regiment Wilhelms II (Zurich, I948); Th
Germany and the Industrial Revolution (New York, I9I5).

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1986 Jonathan Steinberg

the strongest, best administered, and worst governed state in Europe.'07 It is easy
to understand why such an argument has not found favor. Germany has for so
long been clothed in a mythical aura of efficiency and discipline that the very idea
of the Imperial government not functioning well has been dismissed. Yet shrewd
observers at the time noticed chaos at the top, and they were right.
The Kaiser's personality has also tended to cover the weakness of the govern-
ment structure. His flamboyance, his interventions, his mercurial disposition, and
his lack of restraint certainly made a bad situation worse, but during the Russo-
Japanese War and the First Moroccan Crisis, the Kaiser played a peripheral part
in affairs. The confusions of German policy simply accumulated and cannot be
blamed on any one individual, no matter how exalted. They arose from the inade-
quacies of an eighteenth-century structure of rule that maintained the fiction of
monarchical absolutism long after such a system could be effectively maintained.
The traditions of Frederick the Great and the continued independence of the
military were inappropriate in the management of a modern industrial, bureau-
cratic state. The result was a paradox of the utmost efficiency in the levels below
and a vacuum at the top. A Hobbesian war of all against all among overlapping
authorities, independent military commands, and powerful personalities at court
took place. Had the Kaiser been as modest as his grandfather these problems
would have arisen.
The implications of the Frederician tradition were not confined to the powers
of supreme command. They led to the separation of command from administra-
tive and personnel functions in the armed services, so that the army and navy had
three equally placed chiefs struggling for influence on royal decisions. The Prus-
sian traditions subordinated civilian to military leaders in prestige, if not always in
practice, and prevented the link between war and diplomacy that had been Bis-
marck's central concern. A structure of government that could be operated only by
a genius, and even under him imperfectly, must have fundamental flaws.
During the Russo-Japanese War, a preview of things to come took place. There
was little coordination but much activity, many plans but no central direction.
The resulting muddle and uncertainty created the impression of menace and de-
sign in the minds of foreign observers, which only added to the store of ill will
which a Great Power accumulated by its very greatness. During the First World
War the failure of central control led to disaster and to military dictatorship as the
one form of rule that could coordinate the Imperial regime. Ironically the Fred-
erician legacy, expressed in the search for the genius-statesman, the one central
figure who could command all, was strengthened in the process. In the calamitous
history of Germany in the twentieth century, her conduct during the Russo-Japa-
nese War stands out as an unfortunate but entirely characteristic episode.

107 Quoted in Theodor Eschenburg, Die improvisierte Demokratie. Gesammelte Aufsatze zur
Weimarer Republik (Munich, I963), 20.

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