Chapter2-Part2
Chapter2-Part2
Chapter2-Part2
Solution: We eliminate two of the unknown functions as follows. From (i), we get
(iv) Yt+2 = Ct+2 + It+2 . Replacing It+2 from (iii) we get Yt+2 = Ct+2 + c(Ct+2 − Ct+1 ) =
(1 + c)Ct+2 − cCt+1 . Finally, use (ii) to obtain
Yt+2 − a(1 + c)Yt+1 + acYt = b, t = 0, 1, . . .
The form of the solution depends on the coefficients a, b, c.
The second–order linear difference equation is
xt+2 + a1 xt+1 + a0 xt = bt ,
where a0 and a1 are constants and bt is a given function of t. The associated homogeneous
equation is
xt+2 + a1 xt+1 + a0 xt = 0,
and the associated characteristic equation is
r2 + a1 r + a0 = 0.
Remark 4.9. The method of undetermined coefficients for solving equation (4.2) suppose
that a particular solution has the form of the nonhomogeneous term, bt . The method works
quite well when this term is of the form
bt , tm , cos bt, sin bt
or linear combinations of them. The concrete form of the particular solution depends also
on the roots of the characteristic polynomial. We give the following directions.
(1) If bt = abt , where b is not a root of the characteristic polynomial, then we try x∗t = Cbt .
(2) If bt = abt , where b is a root of the characteristic polynomial of multiplicity p, then
we try with x∗t = Ctp bt .
(3) If bt = bm tm + bm−1 tm−1 + · · · + b0 is a polynomial of degree m, we distinguish two
cases:
(a) If 1 is not a root of the characteristic polynomial, then we try with x∗t = Cm tm +
Cm−1 tm−1 + · · · + C0 .
(b) If 1 is a root of the characteristic polynomial of multiplicity p, then we try with
x∗t = tp (Cm tm + Cm−1 tm−1 + · · · + C0 ).
Finally, substitute x∗t into the equation and determine the coefficients C’s.
Example 4.10. Solve the equation xt+2 − 5xt+1 + 6xt = 4t + t2 + 3.
where
x1,t a11 . . . a1n b1,t
4 −1
Solution: The matrix A = has characteristic polynomial pA (λ) = λ2 −5λ+6,
2 1
with roots λ1 = 3 and λ2 = 2. Thus, the matrix is diagonalizable. It is easy to find the
eigenspaces
S(3) =< (1, 1) >, S(2) =< (1, 2) > .
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We give now an alternative method to compute the solution, assuming as before that the
matrix A is diagonalizable, with eigenvalues λ1 , . . . , λn (possibly repeated) and eigenvectors
u1 , . . . , un . Let C1 , . . . , Cn be arbitrary constants. Then
Xth = C1 λt1 u1 + · · · + Cn λtn un
is the general solution of the homogeneous system. This is easy to check by the very definition
of eigen- values and vectors
AXth = C1 λt1 Au1 + · · · + Cn λtn Aun = C1 λt+1 t+1 h
1 u1 + · · · + Cn λn un = Xt+1 .
We could also have found the point without calculating the inverse and solving instead the
system
x = 4x − y + 1
y = 2x + y − 1.
By the example above we already know the general solution of the homogeneous system.
The general solution of the nonhomogeneous system is then
xt 2 3t − 2t −3t + 2t x0 − 1/2 1/2
= + .
yt 2 3t − 2t+1 − 1 −3t + 2t+1 y0 − 5/2 5/2
5.3. Stability of linear systems. We study here the stability properties of a first order
system Xt+1 = AXt + B where |I − A| = 6 0.
For the √following theorem, recall that for a complex number z = a + bi, the modulus is
|z| = ρ = a2 + b2 .
Theorem 5.5. A necessary and sufficient condition for system Xt+1 = AXt + B to be g.a.s.
is that all roots of the characteristic polynomial pA (λ) (real or complex) have moduli less
than 1. In this case, any trajectory converges to X 0 = (In − A)−1 B as t → ∞.
We can give an idea of the proof of the above theorem in the case where the matrix A is
diagonalizable. As we have shown above, the solution of the nonhomogeneous system in this
case is
Xt = X 0 + P Dt P −1 (X0 − X 0 ),
where t
λ1 0 . . . 0
0 λt2 . . . 0
D= ... .. . . .. ,
. . .
0 0 . . . λtn
and λ1 , . . . , λn are the real roots (possibly repeated) of pA (λ). Since |λj | < 1 for all j, the
diagonal elements of Dt tends to 0 as t goes to ∞, since λtj ≤ |λj |t → 0. Hence
lim Xt = X 0 .
t→∞
1 3
Solution: The matrix of the system is , with characteristic equation λ2 −
1/2 1/2
(3/2)λ−1 = 0. The roots are λ1 = 2 and λ2 = −1/2. The system is not g.a.s. However, there
are initial conditions X0 such that the trajectory converges to the fixed point X 0 = (0, 0).
This can be seen once we find the solution
Xt = P Dt P −1 X0 .
The eigenspaces are S(2) =< (3, 1) > and S(−1/2) =< (2, −1) >, thus
3 2 −1 1/5 2/5
P = , P = .
1 −1 1/5 −3/5
The solution is !
2t 53 (x0 + 2y0 ) + 21−t 15 (x0 − 3y0 )
xt+1
= .
yt+1 2t 51 (x0 + 2y0 ) − 2−t 15 (x0 − 3y0 )
If the initial conditions are linked by the relation x0 + 2y0 = 0, then the solution converges
to (0, 0). For this reason, the line x + 2y = 0 is called the stable manifold. Notice that the
stable manifold is in fact the eigenspace associated to the eigenvalue λ2 = −1/2, since
S(−1/2) =< (2, −1) >= {x + 2y = 0}.
For any other initial condition (x0 , y0 ) ∈
/ S(−1/2), the solution does not converge.
Example 5.8 (Dynamic Cournot adjustment). The purpose of this example is to investigate
under what conditions a given adjustment process converges to the Nash equilibrium of the
Cournot game.
Consider a Cournot duopoly in which two firms produce the same product and face con-
stant marginal costs c1 > 0 and c2 > 0. The market price Pt is a function of the total
quantity of output produced Q = q1 + q2 in the following way
P = α − βQ, α > ci , i = 1, 2, β > 0.
In the Cournot duopoly model each firm chooses qi to maximize profits, taking as given the
production level of the other firm, qj . At time t, firm i’s profit is
πi = q i P − ci q i .
As it is well–known, taking ∂π i /∂qi = 0 we obtain the best response of firm i, which depends
on the output of firm j as follows1
br1 = a1 − q2 /2, br2 = a2 − q1 /2,
1Actually, the best response map is bri = max{ai − qj /2, 0}, since negative quantities are not allowed.
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α − ci
where ai = , i = 1, 2. We suppose that a1 > a2 /2 and that a2 > a1 /2 in order to have
2β
positive quantities in equilibrium, as will be seen below.
The Nash equilibrium of the game, (q1N , q2N ), is a pair of outputs of the firms such that
none firm has incentives to deviate from it unilaterally, that is, it is the best response against
itself. This means that the Nash equilibrium of the static game solves
q1N = br1 (q2N ),
q2N = br2 (q1N ).
In this case
q1N = a1 − q2N /2,
q2N = a2 − q2N /2.
Solving, we have
4 a1
q1N =a2 − ,
3 2
N 4 a2
q2 = a1 − ,
3 2
which are both positive by assumption. As a specific example, suppose for a moment that
α−c
the game is symmetric, with c1 = c2 = c. Then, a1 = a2 = and the Nash equilibrium
2β
is the output
α−c
q1N = ,
3β
α−c
q2N = .
3β
Now we turn to the general asymmetric game and introduce a dynamic component in the
game as follows. Suppose that each firm does not choose its Nash output instantaneously, but
they adjust gradually its output qi towards its best response bri at each time t as indicated
below
q1,t+1 = q1,t + d(br1,t − q1,t ) = q1,t + d(a1 − 12 q2,t − q1,t ),
(
(5.3)
q2,t+1 = q1,t + d(br2,t − q2,t ) = q2,t + d(a2 − 12 q1,t − q2,t ),
where d is a positive constant. The objective is to study whether this tattonement process
converges to the Nash equilibrium.
To simplify notation, let us rename x = q1 and y = q2 . Then, rearranging terms in the
system (5.3) above, it can be rewritten as
xt+1 = (1 − d)xt − d2 yt + da1 ,
(
y = (1 − d)y − d2 x + da2 .
The only solution is precisely the Nash equilibrium,
N N 4 a1 4 a2
(x , y ) = a2 − , a1 − .
3 2 3 2
Under what conditions this progressive adjustment of the produced output does converge to
the Nash equilibrium? According to the theory, it depends on the module of the eigenvalues
being smaller than 1. Let us find the eigenvalues of the system. The matrix of the system is
1 − d − d2
− d2 1 − d
The eigenvalues of the matrix are
d 3d
λ1 = 1 − , λ2 = 1 − ,
2 2
which only depend on d. We have
|λ1 | < 1 iff 0 < d < 4,
|λ2 | < 1 iff 0 < d < 4/3,
therefore |λ1 | < 1 and |λ2 | < 1 iff 0 < d < 4/3. Thus, 0 < d < 4/3 is a necessary and
sufficient condition for convergence to the Nash equilibrium of the one shot game from any
initial condition (g.a.s. system).
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Thus, according to Theorem 6.1, 0 is unstable, but K is l.a.e. iff |1 − r| < 1, or 0 < r < 2.
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