2024 INSC 1020 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2024

(Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.1073 of 2023)

PRAKASH AND OTHERS …APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

AND ANOTHER …RESPONDENT(S)

JUDGMENT

B.R. GAVAI, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. This appeal challenges the judgment and order dated

17th October 2022 passed by the learned Single Judge of the

High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Bench at Aurangabad in

Criminal Writ Petition No. 246 of 2021, by which the learned

Single Judge dismissed the Writ Petition preferred by the

present appellants. The Writ Petition had been filed with the

prayer to quash the order dated 24th December 2020 passed

Signature Not Verified

Digitally signed by
DEEPAK SINGH
by the learned Assistant Sessions Judge, Sangamner, District
Date: 2024.12.20
15:04:16 IST
Reason:

Ahmednagar wherein the learned Assistant Sessions Judge

1
had rejected the application preferred by the appellants

seeking discharge from the charges punishable under Sections

306 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 18601, pending against

the appellants before the Court of the Assistant Sessions

Judge, Sangamner2 in Sessions Case No. 75 of 2015.

3. The facts which lead to the present appeal are as under:-

3.1. On 20th March 2015, the Police Station, Ashvi, District

Ahmednagar, received an Accidental Death Report (Khabar) by

one Vikas Bhausaheb Sanap who stated that on the same day

at about 10 a.m. his sister Jyoti Nagre3, aged about 25 years,

had committed suicide by hanging herself from the iron pipe

situated in the bathroom of her paternal house where she had

been residing for the past two years.

3.2. Subsequently, on 25th March 2015, Mrs. Sindhubai

Bhausaheb Sanap (Respondent No.2), mother of the deceased,

lodged a complaint at the said police station. According to the

complaint, the deceased had been married to Prakash,

Appellant No. 1, on 19th November 2009, after which she had

given birth to twin sons. After marriage, disputes arose

1
For short, ‘the IPC’.
2
Hereinafter referred to as the ‘trial court’.
3
Hereinafter referred to as ‘the deceased’.

2
between the deceased and her husband and in-laws from time

to time, with the complainant alleging that the deceased had

been mentally and physically tortured at her matrimonial

house. However, on the intervention of the complainant and

her family, the disputes were patched up and the deceased

was sent back to her matrimonial home. Soon thereafter,

owing to persisting acrimony at her matrimonial home, the

deceased and Appellant No.1 started residing separately, away

from the matrimonial home, in Lonikand, Pune. It was further

alleged that on 8th August 2013, Appellant No.1 had physically

abused the deceased over a demand of Rs.20 lakhs for the

purchase of a new plot of land. After this incident, the

deceased came to reside at her paternal house. Subsequently,

a criminal case being Criminal M.A. No. 175 of 2013 came to

be filed before the Court of Judicial Magistrate, First Class,

Sangamner against the husband and in-laws of the deceased

under Sections 12, 18, 20 and 22 of the Protection of Women

from Domestic Violence Act, 2005. During the pendency of the

criminal case, a mahalokadalat was held in the court in

Sangamner on 17th February 2015, which was attended by the

complainant, the deceased and the present appellants, among

3
others. The complainant (Respondent No.2) alleged that on the

said day, the present appellants told the deceased that they

were not ready to reach a compromise in the matter and

further that she would not be allowed to go back to her

matrimonial house. The deceased was further advised by

Appellant No.1 to re-marry as he would not accept her or her

children at the matrimonial house. Subsequent to this

incident, the deceased would frequently say that she would

commit suicide as her life no longer held any meaning.

Thereafter, on 20th March 2015, the deceased committed

suicide by hanging herself from an iron pipe with the aid of a

saree.

3.3. On the basis of the complaint, a First Information Report4

being Crime No.12 of 2015 was lodged under Sections 306 and

34 of the IPC against Prakash Pandurang Nagare (Appellant

No.1), Pandurang Kundlik Nagare (Appellant No.2), the father-

in-law of the deceased, and Pradip Pandurang Nagare

(Appellant No.3), the brother-in-law of the deceased at the

aforementioned police station.

4
For short, ‘FIR’

4
3.4. Upon completion of the investigation, the chargesheet

came to be filed on 28th September 2015.

3.5. Being aggrieved thereby, the appellants filed an

application under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure, 19735 before the trial court, praying to be

discharged from the said case. The trial court, by its order

dated 24th December 2020, rejected the aforesaid application

on the ground that there was sufficient ground to proceed

against the appellants.

3.6. Being aggrieved further, the appellants preferred a

Criminal Writ Petition before the High Court for setting aside

of the aforesaid order of the trial court. The High Court, vide

the impugned judgment and order, dismissed the writ petition

finding it to be devoid of merit.

3.7. Being aggrieved thereby, this present appeal.

4. This Court while issuing notice on 30th January 2023

had stayed the criminal proceedings bearing Sessions Case

No. 75 of 2015 pending before the trial court, until further

orders.

5
For short, ‘Cr.P.C.’

5
5. We have heard Mr. Niteen V. Gaware, learned counsel

appearing for the appellants and Mr. Aaditya Aniruddha

Pande, learned counsel and Mr. Siddharth Dharmadhikari,

learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent-State

of Maharashtra.

6. Mr. Gaware, learned counsel, submitted that there was a

delay of five days in lodging the FIR. He submitted that

although an Accidental Death Report (Khabar) had been filed

on the day of the incident by the brother of the deceased, there

is not a whisper about any harassment caused by the

appellants to the deceased. It also did not disclose any

involvement of or instigation by the appellants which might

have led the deceased to commit suicide. He further submitted

that the FIR was an afterthought and no satisfactory

explanation has been offered to justify the inordinate delay.

7. Mr. Gaware further submitted that it is not a case of

prosecution that the appellants spoke in such a manner which

would amount to abetment of suicide. He further submitted

that the appellants met the deceased only on the day of the

Mahalokadalat which was held on 17th February 2014 where

Appellant No. 1 is alleged to have told her that he did not wish

6
to cohabitate with the deceased any longer and he did not wish

to settle the proceedings initiated by her. Merely because the

deceased was depressed about her situation, it would not be

enough to convict the appellants, particularly since, prima

facie, the ingredients of Section 306 IPC are not fulfilled.

8. Mr. Gaware submitted that the deceased had been

residing separately from the appellants since 8th August 2013.

In the intervening period between the date of separation and

the date of the incident, the appellants had interacted with the

deceased only on one occasion that is on the date of the

Mahalokadalat which was held on 17th February 2014. He

submitted that the FIR wrongly mentions the date of the

mahalokadalat to be 17th February 2015. It is submitted that

the deceased committed suicide after over a year had passed.

However, the courts below did not consider this aspect or look

into the roznama of court proceedings which clearly showed

the date on which the mahalokadalat had been held.

Therefore, he submitted that in view of the time gap between

the alleged meeting and the date of suicide, there is no

immediate instigation or abetment to commit suicide which

can be attributed to the appellants.

7
9. Mr. Gaware placed reliance on the judgments of this

Court in the cases of Mohit Singhal and Another v. State of

Uttarakhand and Others6, Gurjit Singh v. State of

Punjab7, State of West Bengal v. Indrajit Kundu and

Others8, Madan Mohan Singh v. State of Gujarat and

Another9, Yogesh alias Sachin Jagdish Joshi v. State of

Maharashtra10 and Sanju @ Sanjay Singh Sengar v. State

of M.P.11. He submitted in view of the material placed on

record and the authorities cited, the appeal deserves to be

allowed and the appellants deserve to be discharged of all

charges.

10. Per contra, Mr. Siddharth Dharmadhikari, learned

counsel, submitted that no interference is warranted in the

concurrent findings of the trial court and the High Court. He

submitted that there is sufficient material against the

appellants to proceed against them. He further submitted that

in view of the allegations levelled against the appellants and

the evidence collected by the investigating agency, it is not a

6
(2024) 1 SCC 417 : 2023 INSC 1035
7
(2020) 14 SCC 264 : 2019 INSC 1281
8
(2019) 10 SCC 188 : 2019 INSC 1164
9
(2010) 8 SCC 628 : 2010 INSC 521
10
(2008) 10 SCC 394 : 2008 INSC 534
11
(2002) 5 SCC 371 : 2002 INSC 250

8
fit case to allow this appeal. Mr. Dharmadhikari, therefore,

prayed for the dismissal of this appeal.

11. We have carefully considered the rival submissions and

perused the material placed on record.

12. The relevant provisions of the IPC that fall for

consideration are as under:

“306. Abetment of suicide.- If any person commits

suicide, whoever abets the commission of such
suicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of
either description for a term which may extend to ten
years, and shall also be liable to fine.

107. Abetment of a thing—A person abets the doing

of a thing, who—
First.— Instigates any person to do that thing; or
Secondly.— Engages with one or more other person
or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that
thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in
pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the
doing of that thing; or
Thirdly.— Intentionally aids, by any act or illegal
omission, the doing of that thing.
Explanation 1.— A person who, by wilful
misrepresentation, or by wilful concealment of a
material fact which he is bound to disclose,
voluntarily causes or procures, or attempts to cause
or procure, a thing to be done, is said to instigate the
doing of that thing.
Explanation 2.— Whoever, either prior to or at the
time of the commission of an act, does anything in
order to facilitate the commission of that act, and
thereby facilitates the commission thereof, is said to
aid the doing of that act.”

9
13. Section 306 of the IPC has two basic ingredients-first, an

act of suicide by one person and second, the abetment to the

said act by another person(s). In order to sustain a charge

under Section 306 of the IPC, it must necessarily be proved

that the accused person has contributed to the suicide by the

deceased by some direct or indirect act. To prove such

contribution or involvement, one of the three conditions

outlined in Section 107 of the IPC has to be satisfied.

14. Section 306 read with Section 107 of IPC, has been

interpreted, time and again, and its principles are well-

established. To attract the offence of abetment to suicide, it is

important to establish proof of direct or indirect acts of

instigation or incitement of suicide by the accused, which

must be in close proximity to the commission of suicide by the

deceased. Such instigation or incitement should reveal a clear

mens rea to abet the commission of suicide and should put the

victim in such a position that he/she would have no other

option but to commit suicide.

15. The law on abetment has been crystallised by a plethora

of decisions of this Court. Abetment involves a mental process

of instigating or intentionally aiding another person to do a

10
particular thing. To bring a charge under Section 306 of the

IPC, the act of abetment would require the positive act of

instigating or intentionally aiding another person to commit

suicide. Without such mens rea on the part of the accused

person being apparent from the face of the record, a charge

under the aforesaid Section cannot be sustained. Abetment

also requires an active act, direct or indirect, on the part of the

accused person which left the deceased with no other option

but to commit suicide.

16. This Court in the case of S.S. Chheena v. Vijay Kumar

Mahajan and Another12, had an occasion to consider the

scope of Section 306 of the IPC and the ingredients which are

essential for abetment, as set out in Section 107 of the IPC. It

observed as follows:

“16. The word “suicide” in itself is nowhere defined in

the Penal Code, however its meaning and import is
well known and requires no explanation. “Sui” means
“self” and “cide” means “killing”, thus implying an act
of self-killing. In short, a person committing suicide
must commit it by himself, irrespective of the means
employed by him in achieving his object of killing
himself.
………..
18. In our country, while suicide in itself is not an
offence, considering that the successful offender is

12
(2010) 12 SCC 190 : 2010 INSC 506

11
beyond the reach of law, attempt to suicide is an
offence under Section 309 IPC.
……….
21. The learned counsel for the appellant has placed
reliance on a judgment of this Court in Mahendra
Singh v. State of M.P. [1995 Supp (3) SCC 731 : 1995
SCC (Cri) 1157] In Mahendra Singh [1995 Supp (3)
SCC 731 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 1157] the allegations
levelled were as under: (SCC p. 731, para 1)
“1. … My mother-in-law and husband and
sister-in-law (husband's elder brother's
wife) harassed me. They beat me and
abused me. My husband Mahendra wants
to marry a second time. He has illicit
connections with my sister-in-law. Because
of these reasons and being harassed I
want to die by burning.”
The Court on the aforementioned allegations came to
a definite conclusion that by no stretch the
ingredients of abetment are attracted on the
statement of the deceased. According to the
appellant, the conviction of the appellant under
Section 306 IPC merely on the basis of the
aforementioned allegation of harassment of the
deceased is unsustainable in law.
………..
23. In State of W.B. v. Orilal Jaiswal [(1994) 1 SCC 73
: 1994 SCC (Cri) 107] this Court has cautioned that:
(SCC p. 90, para 17)
“17. … The court should be extremely
careful in assessing the facts and
circumstances of each case and the
evidence adduced in the trial for the
purpose of finding whether the cruelty
meted out to the victim had in fact induced
her to end the life by committing suicide.
If it [appears] to the court that a victim
committing suicide was hypersensitive to
ordinary petulance, discord and
12
 differences in domestic life quite common
to the society to which the victim belonged
and such petulance, discord and
differences were not expected to induce a
similarly circumstanced individual in a
given society to commit suicide, the
conscience of the court should not be
satisfied for basing a finding that the
accused charged of abetting the offence of
suicide should be found guilty.”
24. This Court in Chitresh Kumar Chopra v. State
(Govt. of NCT of Delhi) [(2009) 16 SCC 605 : (2010) 3
SCC (Cri) 367] had an occasion to deal with this
aspect of abetment. The Court dealt with the
dictionary meaning of the words “instigation” and
“goading”. The Court opined that there should be
intention to provoke, incite or encourage the doing of
an act by the latter. Each person's suicidability
pattern is different from the other. Each person has
his own idea of self-esteem and self-respect.
Therefore, it is impossible to lay down any
straitjacket formula in dealing with such cases. Each
case has to be decided on the basis of its own facts
and circumstances.
25. Abetment involves a mental process of
instigating a person or intentionally aiding a person
in doing of a thing. Without a positive act on the part
of the accused to instigate or aid in committing
suicide, conviction cannot be sustained. The
intention of the legislature and the ratio of the cases
decided by this Court is clear that in order to convict
a person under Section 306 IPC there has to be a
clear mens rea to commit the offence. It also requires
an active act or direct act which led the deceased to
commit suicide seeing no option and that act must
have been intended to push the deceased into such a
position that he committed suicide.”

13
17. This Court held that abetment involves the mental

process of instigating a person or intentionally aiding a person

in doing of a thing. Therefore, without a positive act on the

part of the accused to instigate or aid a person in committing

suicide, conviction cannot be sustained. This Court further

observed that the intention of the legislature and the ratio of

the cases decided by this Court is clear that in order to convict

a person under Section 306 of IPC, there has to be a clear

mens rea to commit the offence. Abetment also requires an

active act or direct act which led the deceased to commit

suicide seeing no other option and that act must have been

intended to push the deceased into such a position that he

committed suicide. However, this Court has cautioned that

since each person reacts differently to the same provocation

depending on a variety of factors, it is impossible to lay down

a straightjacket formula to deal with such cases. Therefore,

every such case has to be decided on the basis of its own facts

and circumstances.

18. More recently, in the case of Jayedeepsinh Pravinsinh

Chavda and Others v. State of Gujarat13, this Court has

13
2024 SCC OnLine SC 3679 : 2024 INSC 960

14
relied on S.S. Chheena (supra) to hold that the element of

mens rea cannot simply be presumed or inferred, instead it

must be evident and explicitly discernible. Without this, the

foundational requirement for establishing abetment under the

law, that is deliberate and conspicuous intention to provoke

or contribute to the act of suicide, would remain unfulfilled.

This Court observed as follows:

“18. For a conviction under Section 306 of the IPC, it

is a well-established legal principle that the presence
of clear mens rea—the intention to abet the act—is
essential. Mere harassment, by itself, is not sufficient
to find an accused guilty of abetting suicide. The
prosecution must demonstrate an active or direct
action by the accused that led the deceased to take
his/her own life. The element of mens rea cannot
simply be presumed or inferred; it must be evident
and explicitly discernible. Without this, the
foundational requirement for establishing abetment
under the law is not satisfied, underscoring the
necessity of a deliberate and conspicuous intent to
provoke or contribute to the act of suicide.”

19. It is, therefore, evident that the positive act of instigation

is a crucial element of abetment. While dealing with an issue

of a similar nature, this Court in the case of Ramesh Kumar

v. State of Chhattisgarh,14 laid down the parameters of what

14
(2001) 9 SCC 618 : 2001 INSC 515

15
would be constituted to be an act of instigation. This Court

observed as follows:-

“20. Instigation is to goad, urge forward, provoke,

incite or encourage to do “an act”. To satisfy the
requirement of instigation though it is not necessary
that actual words must be used to that effect or what
constitutes instigation must necessarily and
specifically be suggestive of the consequence. Yet a
reasonable certainty to incite the consequence must
be capable of being spelt out. The present one is not
a case where the accused had by his acts or omission
or by a continued course of conduct created such
circumstances that the deceased was left with no
other option except to commit suicide in which case
an instigation may have been inferred. A word
uttered in the fit of anger or emotion without
intending the consequences to actually follow cannot
be said to be instigation.”

20. It could thus be seen that this Court observed that

instigation is to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite or

encourage to do “an act”. It has been held that in order to

satisfy the requirement of instigation though it is not

necessary that actual words must be used to that effect or

what constitutes instigation must necessarily and specifically

be suggestive of the consequence, however, a reasonable

certainty to incite the consequence must be capable of being

spelt out. Applying the law to the facts of the case, this Court

went on to hold that a word uttered in the fit of anger or

16
emotion without intending the consequences to actually follow

cannot be said to be instigation.

21. Relying on the decision in the case of Ramesh Kumar

(supra), this Court in the case of Ude Singh and Others v.

State of Haryana15 observed as follows:

“16. In cases of alleged abetment of suicide, there

must be a proof of direct or indirect act(s) of
incitement to the commission of suicide. It could
hardly be disputed that the question of cause of a
suicide, particularly in the context of an offence of
abetment of suicide, remains a vexed one, involving
multifaceted and complex attributes of human
behaviour and responses/reactions. In the case of
accusation for abetment of suicide, the court would
be looking for cogent and convincing proof of the
act(s) of incitement to the commission of suicide. In
the case of suicide, mere allegation of harassment of
the deceased by another person would not suffice
unless there be such action on the part of the
accused which compels the person to commit
suicide; and such an offending action ought to be
proximate to the time of occurrence. Whether a
person has abetted in the commission of suicide by
another or not, could only be gathered from the facts
and circumstances of each case.
16.1. For the purpose of finding out if a person has
abetted commission of suicide by another, the
consideration would be if the accused is guilty of the
act of instigation of the act of suicide. As explained
and reiterated by this Court in the decisions above
referred, instigation means to goad, urge forward,
provoke, incite or encourage to do an act. If the
persons who committed suicide had been
hypersensitive and the action of the accused is
otherwise not ordinarily expected to induce a
15
(2019) 17 SCC 301 : 2019 INSC 810

17
similarly circumstanced person to commit suicide, it
may not be safe to hold the accused guilty of
abetment of suicide. But, on the other hand, if the
accused by his acts and by his continuous course of
conduct creates a situation which leads the deceased
perceiving no other option except to commit suicide,
the case may fall within the four corners of Section
306 IPC. If the accused plays an active role in
tarnishing the self-esteem and self-respect of the
victim, which eventually draws the victim to commit
suicide, the accused may be held guilty of abetment
of suicide. The question of mens rea on the part of
the accused in such cases would be examined with
reference to the actual acts and deeds of the accused
and if the acts and deeds are only of such nature
where the accused intended nothing more than
harassment or snap show of anger, a particular case
may fall short of the offence of abetment of suicide.
However, if the accused kept on irritating or annoying
the deceased by words or deeds until the deceased
reacted or was provoked, a particular case may be
that of abetment of suicide. Such being the matter of
delicate analysis of human behaviour, each case is
required to be examined on its own facts, while
taking note of all the surrounding factors having
bearing on the actions and psyche of the accused and
the deceased.
16.2. We may also observe that human mind could
be affected and could react in myriad ways; and
impact of one's action on the mind of another carries
several imponderables. Similar actions are dealt with
differently by different persons; and so far a
particular person's reaction to any other human's
action is concerned, there is no specific theorem or
yardstick to estimate or assess the same. Even in
regard to the factors related with the question of
harassment of a girl, many factors are to be
considered like age, personality, upbringing, rural or
urban set-ups, education, etc. Even the response to
the ill action of eve teasing and its impact on a young
girl could also vary for a variety of factors, including
those of background, self-confidence and upbringing.
18
 Hence, each case is required to be dealt with on its
own facts and circumstances.”

22. It could thus be seen that this Court observed that in

cases of alleged abetment of suicide, there must be a proof of

direct or indirect act(s) of incitement to the commission of

suicide. It has been held that since the cause of suicide

particularly in the context of the offence of abetment of suicide

involves multifaceted and complex attributes of human

behaviour, the court would be looking for cogent and

convincing proof of the act(s) of incitement to the commission

of suicide. This Court further observed that a mere allegation

of harassment of the deceased by another person would not

suffice unless there is such action on the part of the accused

which compels the person to commit suicide. This Court also

emphasised that such an offending action ought to be

proximate to the time of occurrence. It was further clarified

that the question of mens rea on the part of the accused in

such cases would be examined with reference to the actual

acts and deeds of the accused. It was further held that if the

acts and deeds are only of such nature where the accused

intended nothing more than harassment or a snap-show of

19
anger, a particular case may fall short of the offence of

abetment of suicide, however, if the accused kept on irritating

or annoying the deceased by words or deeds until the deceased

reacted or was provoked, a particular case may be that of

abetment of suicide. This Court held that owing to the fact that

the human mind could be affected and could react in myriad

ways and that similar actions are dealt with differently by

different persons, each case is required to be dealt with its own

facts and circumstances.

23. In the case of Sanju @ Sanjay Singh Sengar (supra),

the appellant before this Court was charged with having

abetted the suicide by his brother-in-law (sister’s husband).

The prosecution story was that there were strained relations

between the deceased and his wife who at the material time

was staying with the appellant therein. On 25th July, 1998 the

deceased went to the appellant to bring back his wife. There

was a quarrel between the appellant and the deceased who

came back alone. The deceased told his brothers and other

acquaintances that the appellant had threatened and abused

him by using filthy words. On 27th July, 1998 the deceased

was found dead. The deceased left a suicide note which

20
showed his disturbed state of mind but otherwise he blamed

the appellant for the suicide. The appellant’s petition for

quashing of the charge-sheet filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C.

was dismissed by the High Court which led him to file an

appeal before this Court which came to be allowed. While

taking note of the disturbed state of mind of the deceased as

was evident from the suicide note and the lack of intention on

the part of the accused to abet the commission of suicide by

the deceased, the Court held that there was a time gap of 48

hours between the abusive language being used and the

commission of suicide. As such, owing to the passage of 48

hours, giving the deceased enough time to reflect, there was

no proximate link between the words uttered and the act of

suicide. This Court observed as follows:

“8. In Swamy Prahaladdas v. State of M.P. [1995

Supp (3) SCC 438 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 943] the appellant
was charged for an offence under Section 306 IPC on
the ground that the appellant during the quarrel is
said to have remarked to the deceased “to go and die”.
This Court was of the view that mere words uttered
by the accused to the deceased “to go and die” were
not even prima facie enough to instigate the deceased
to commit suicide.
9. In Mahendra Singh v. State of M.P. [1995 Supp (3)
SCC 731 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 1157] the appellant was
charged for an offence under Section 306 IPC
basically based upon the dying declaration of the

21
deceased, which reads as under: (SCC p. 731, para
1)
“My mother-in-law and husband and
sister-in-law (husband's elder brother's
wife) harassed me. They beat me and
abused me. My husband Mahendra wants
to marry a second time. He has illicit
connections with my sister-in-law.
Because of these reasons and being
harassed I want to die by burning.”
10. This Court, considering the definition of
“abetment” under Section 107 IPC, found that the
charge and conviction of the appellant for an offence
under Section 306 is not sustainable merely on the
allegation of harassment of the deceased. This Court
further held that neither of the ingredients of
abetment are attracted on the statement of the
deceased.
11. In Ramesh Kumar v. State of
Chhattisgarh [(2001) 9 SCC 618] this Court was
considering the charge framed and the conviction for
an offence under Section 306 IPC on the basis of
dying declaration recorded by an Executive
Magistrate, in which she had stated that previously
there had been quarrel between the deceased and her
husband and on the day of occurrence she had a
quarrel with her husband who had said that she
could go wherever she wanted to go and that
thereafter she had poured kerosene on herself and
had set herself on fire. Acquitting the accused this
Court said: (SCC p. 620)
“A word uttered in a fit of anger or emotion
without intending the consequences to
actually follow cannot be said to be
instigation. If it transpires to the court
that a victim committing suicide was
hypersensitive to ordinary petulance,
discord and differences in domestic life
quite common to the society to which the
victim belonged and such petulance,

22
 discord and differences were not expected
to induce a similarly circumstanced
individual in a given society to commit
suicide, the conscience of the court should
not be satisfied for basing a finding that
the accused charged for abetting the
offence of suicide should be found guilty.”
12. Reverting to the facts of the case, both the courts
below have erroneously accepted the prosecution
story that the suicide by the deceased is the direct
result of the quarrel that had taken place on 25-7-
1998 wherein it is alleged that the appellant had
used abusive language and had reportedly told the
deceased “to go and die”. For this, courts relied on a
statement of Shashi Bhushan, brother of the
deceased, made under Section 161 CrPC when
reportedly the deceased, after coming back from the
house of the appellant, told him that the appellant
had humiliated him and abused him with filthy
words. The statement of Shashi Bhushan, recorded
under Section 161 CrPC is annexed as Annexure P-3
to this appeal and going through the statement, we
find that he has not stated that the deceased had told
him that the appellant had asked him “to go and die”.
Even if we accept the prosecution story that the
appellant did tell the deceased “to go and die”,
that itself does not constitute the ingredient of
“instigation”. The word “instigate” denotes
incitement or urging to do some drastic or
inadvisable action or to stimulate or incite.
Presence of mens rea, therefore, is the necessary
concomitant of instigation. It is common
knowledge that the words uttered in a quarrel or
on the spur of the moment cannot be taken to be
uttered with mens rea. It is in a fit of anger and
emotion. Secondly, the alleged abusive words,
said to have been told to the deceased were on 25-
7-1998 ensued by a quarrel. The deceased was
found hanging on 27-7-1998. Assuming that the
deceased had taken the abusive language
seriously, he had enough time in between to think

23
over and reflect and, therefore, it cannot be said
that the abusive language, which had been used
by the appellant on 25-7-1998 drove the deceased
to commit suicide. Suicide by the deceased on 27-
7-1998 is not proximate to the abusive language
uttered by the appellant on 25-7-1998. The fact
that the deceased committed suicide on 27-7-
1998 would itself clearly point out that it is not
the direct result of the quarrel taken place on 25-
7-1998 when it is alleged that the appellant had
used the abusive language and also told the
deceased to go and die. This fact had escaped
notice of the courts below.
………….
14. A plain reading of the suicide note would clearly
show that the deceased was in great stress and
depressed. One plausible reason could be that the
deceased was without any work or avocation and at
the same time indulged in drinking as revealed from
the statement of the wife Smt Neelam Sengar. He was
a frustrated man. Reading of the suicide note will
clearly suggest that such a note is not the handiwork
of a man with a sound mind and sense. Smt Neelam
Sengar, wife of the deceased, made a statement
under Section 161 CrPC before the investigation
officer. She stated that the deceased always indulged
in drinking wine and was not doing any work. She
also stated that on 26-7-1998 her husband came to
them in an inebriated condition and was abusing her
and other members of the family. The prosecution
story, if believed, shows that the quarrel between
the deceased and the appellant had taken place
on 25-7-1998 and if the deceased came back to
the house again on 26-7-1998, it cannot be said
that the suicide by the deceased was the direct
result of the quarrel that had taken place on 25-
7-1998. Viewed from the aforesaid circumstances
independently, we are clearly of the view that the
ingredients of “abetment” are totally absent in
the instant case for an offence under Section 306
IPC. It is in the statement of the wife that the

24
 deceased always remained in a drunken condition. It
is common knowledge that excessive drinking leads
one to debauchery. It clearly appeared, therefore,
that the deceased was a victim of his own conduct
unconnected with the quarrel that had ensued on 25-
7-1998 where the appellant is stated to have used
abusive language. Taking the totality of materials on
record and facts and circumstances of the case into
consideration, it will lead to the irresistible
conclusion that it is the deceased and he alone, and
none else, is responsible for his death.”
(emphasis supplied)

24. It could thus be seen that this Court held that both the

courts below had erroneously accepted the prosecution story

that the suicide by the deceased was the direct result of the

quarrel that had taken place on 25th July 1998 wherein it was

alleged that the appellant therein had used abusive language

and had reportedly told the deceased ‘to go and die’. It was

held that even if one accepts the prosecution story that the

appellant did tell the deceased ‘to go and die’, that itself did

not constitute the ingredient of ‘instigation’. This Court held

that it was common knowledge that the words uttered in a

quarrel or on the spur of the moment could not be taken to be

uttered with mens rea. It has been held further that the alleged

abusive words were said to have been told to the deceased on

25th July 1998 during a quarrel and the deceased was found

25
hanging on 27th July, 1998. This Court held that if the

deceased had taken the abusive language seriously, he had

enough time in between to think over and reflect and therefore,

it could not be said that the abusive language which had been

used by the appellant on 25th July 1998 drove the deceased to

commit suicide on 27th July 1998. It has been held that the

suicide by the deceased was not proximate to the abusive

language used two days prior. Additionally this Court held that

a plain reading of the suicide note made it clear that the

deceased was in great stress and depressed and the suicide

note also clearly suggested that it was not the handiwork of a

man with a sound mind and sense. As such, this Court held

that there was no material to establish that the accused had

abetted the suicide committed by the deceased.

25. Relying on the decision in the case of Sanju @ Sanjay

Singh Sengar (supra), this Court in the case of Gurjit Singh

(supra) set aside the conviction under Section 306 of the IPC

as it was clear from the evidence on record that there was a

time gap of about two months between the last visit of the

deceased to her parents with regard to the illegal demand for

money by the accused-appellant and the date of commission

26
of suicide by the deceased. As such, this Court held that there

was nothing on record to show that there was a proximate

nexus between the commission of suicide and the illegal

demand made by the accused-appellant. This Court observed

as follows:

“36. It could further be seen from the evidence on

record that the time gap between the last visit of
the deceased to her parents with regard to the
illegal demand and the date of commission of
suicide is about two months. As such, there is
nothing on record to show that there was a
proximate nexus between the commission of
suicide and the illegal demand made by the
appellant. In Sanju v. State of M.P. [Sanju v. State
of M.P., (2002) 5 SCC 371 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 1141]
this Court found that there was time gap of 48
hours between the accused telling the deceased
“to go and die” and the deceased “committing
suicide”. As such, this Court held that there was
no material to establish that the accused had
abetted the suicide committed by the deceased.”

(emphasis supplied)

26. Thus, this Court has consistently taken the view that

instigation or incitement on the part of the accused person is

the gravamen of the offence of abetment to suicide. However,

it has been clarified on many occasions that in order to link

the act of instigation to the act of suicide, the two occurrences

must be in close proximity to each other so as to form a nexus

27
or a chain, with the act of suicide by the deceased being a

direct result of the act of instigation by the accused person.

27. This Court in the case of Mohit Singhal (supra)

reiterated that the act of instigation must be of such intensity

and in such close proximity that it intends to push the

deceased to such a position under which the person has no

choice but to commit suicide. This Court held that the incident

which had allegedly driven the deceased to commit suicide had

occurred two weeks prior and even the suicide note had been

written three days prior to the date on which the deceased

committed suicide and further, there was no allegation that

any act had been done by the accused-appellant therein in

close proximity to the date of suicide. This Court observed as

follows:

“11. In the present case, taking the complaint of the

third respondent and the contents of the suicide note
as correct, it is impossible to conclude that the
appellants instigated the deceased to commit suicide
by demanding the payment of the amount borrowed
by the third respondent from her husband by using
abusive language and by assaulting him by a belt for
that purpose. The said incident allegedly
happened more than two weeks before the date of
suicide. There is no allegation that any act was
done by the appellants in close proximity to the
date of suicide. By no stretch of imagination, the
alleged acts of the appellants can amount to

28
 instigation to commit suicide. The deceased has
blamed the third respondent for landing in trouble
due to her bad habits.
12. Therefore, in our considered view, the offence
punishable under Section 306IPC was not made out
against the appellants. Therefore, the continuation of
their prosecution will be nothing but an abuse of the
process of law.”

(emphasis supplied)
28. This Court in the case of Naresh Kumar v. State of

Haryana16, observed as follows:-

“20. This Court in Mariano Anto

Bruno v. State [Mariano Anto Bruno v. State, (2023)
15 SCC 560 : 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1387] , after
referring to the abovereferred decisions rendered in
context of culpability under Section 306IPC observed
as under : (SCC para 45)
“45. … It is also to be borne in mind that
in cases of alleged abetment of suicide,
there must be proof of direct or indirect
acts of incitement to the commission of
suicide. Merely on the allegation of
harassment without there being any
positive action proximate to the time of
occurrence on the part of the accused
which led or compelled the person to
commit suicide, conviction in terms of
Section 306IPC is not sustainable.”
(emphasis supplied)

16
(2024) 3 SCC 573 : 2024 INSC 149

29
29. Having discussed the law on the subject, we now proceed

to consider the facts of the present case in view of the

established principles.

30. As per the version of the complainant, the following facts

have emerged:

i. Appellant No. 1 got married to the deceased on

19th November 2009.

ii. Disputes arose thereafter, and the parties

started residing separately from 8th August

2013 with the deceased residing at her paternal

house with her child.

iii. A mahalokadalat was held at the court in

Sangamner on 17th February 2015 during

which the appellants are alleged to have refused

to cohabitate with the deceased or accept her or

her child at her matrimonial house or settle the

proceedings initiated by the deceased.

iv. On 20th March 2015, the deceased committed

suicide.

31. In the case of Sanju @ Sanjay Singh Sengar (supra),

this Court, under similar circumstances, had quashed the

30
chargesheet under Section 306 of the IPC against the accused-

appellant. A factor that had weighed with the Court in the said

case was that there was a time gap of 48 hours being the

alleged instigation and the commission of suicide. This Court

held that the deceased was a victim of his own conduct,

unconnected with the quarrel that had ensued between him

and the appellant, 48 hours prior to the commission of his

suicide.

32. In the case at hand, taking the allegations in the FIR at

face value, the incident at the mahalokadalat had occurred on

17th February 2015, while the deceased had committed suicide

on 20th March 2015. There is a clear gap of over a month

between the incident at the mahalokadalat and the

commission of suicide. We therefore find that the courts below

have erroneously accepted the prosecution story that the act

of suicide by the deceased was a direct result of the words

uttered by the appellants at the mahalokadalat.

33. We also find that the date of occurrence of the

mahalokadalat is disputed. The appellants have vehemently

argued before the trial court and the High Court that the

mahalokadalat had not been held on the 17th February 2015

31
but instead had been held about a year earlier, and that the

date of the mahalokadalat as mentioned in the FIR and in the

statements of the witnesses, is factually incorrect. If this

submission is to be accepted, the time gap between the two

incidents would widen even further.

34. However, we do not wish to go into that issue. Even if we

take the date of the mahalokadalat to be 17th February 2015

to be the factually correct one, there is enough gap between

the two incidents to render the instigation or incitement by the

appellants, nugatory. The cardinal principle of the subject-

matter at hand is that there must be a close proximity between

the positive act of instigation by the accused person and the

commission of suicide by the victim. The close proximity

should be such as to create a clear nexus between the act of

instigation and the act of suicide. As was held in the case of

Sanju @ Sanjay Singh Sengar (supra), if the deceased had

taken the words of the appellants seriously, a time gap

between the two incidents would have given enough time to

the deceased to think over and reflect on the matter. As such,

a gap of over a month would be sufficient time to dissolve the

nexus or the proximate link between the two acts.

32
35. Apart from that, although an Accidental Death Report

was lodged on the day of the incident by the deceased’s

brother, there is no mention about any involvement of the

appellants in the suicidal death of the deceased. Further, there

is no mention about the incident that had occurred at the

mahalokadalat which had put the deceased in a state of

depression such that she frequently spoke about committing

suicide. These facts are alleged for the first time in the FIR

which was lodged five days after the incident.

36. We are of the considered view that the reasoning given by

the High Court for refusal to discharge the appellants is

completely perfunctory. The High Court observed that there is

no allegation about any harassment or cruelty meted out by

the appellants to the deceased in the Accidental Death Report,

however, held that the allegations in the FIR could not be

overlooked and the Accidental Death Report and the

statements made in the Accidental Death enquiry would be a

matter of trial. The High Court also took note of the disputed

date of the mahalokadalat but held that incorrect mentioning

of the date of the mahalokadalat in the FIR would not be a

33
ground to discharge the appellants, considering the state of

mind of the complainant, the deceased’s mother.

37. We further find that the prosecution has failed to prima

facie establish that the appellants had any intention to

instigate or aid or abet the deceased to commit suicide. No

doubt that a young woman of 25 years has lost her life in an

unfortunate incident. However, in the absence of sufficient

material to show that the appellants had intended by their

words to push the deceased into such a position that she was

left with no other option but to commit suicide, continuation

of criminal proceedings against the appellants would result in

an abuse of process of law and as such, we are inclined to

allow the appeal.

38. In the result, we pass the following order:-

i. The present appeal is allowed.

ii. The impugned judgment and order of the High

Court of Judicature at Bombay, Bench at

Aurangabad passed on 17th October 2022 in

Criminal Writ Petition No. 246 of 2021 and the

order of the Assistant Sessions Judge, Sangamner

34
 dated 24th December, 2020 in Sessions Case No. 75

of 2015 are quashed and set aside; and

iii. The appellants are discharged from Sessions Case

No. 75 of 2015 on the file of Assistant Sessions

Judge, Sangamner. Their bail bonds, if any, shall

stand cancelled.

39. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

..............................J.
(B.R. GAVAI)

..............................J.
(K. V. VISWANATHAN)

NEW DELHI;
DECEMBER 20, 2024.

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