Vigil Incidents History
Vigil Incidents History
Vigil Incidents History
FURTHER STATEMENTS AND SERVICE BULLETINS Statement misfires 2006 Statement activations in pressurized aircraft Forum discussion on open door restrictions when Vigil is on board Cutter Service Bulletins
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The NTSB report, the recent incidents, the questionable track record and the lawsuit raises serious doubts about the reliability and exactitude of both models of the Vigil AAD.
Appendix I; NTSB Final Narrative DEN08FA078: The skydiver whose reserve parachute had deployed and became entangled around the airplane's tail was wearing a Vigil AAD.
In September 2006 one of our foreign subsidiaries, Alliance International BVBA, was named in a lawsuit in the Belgian civil courts by a Belgian customer for having allegedly negligently designed manufactured and assembled certain safety devices. These safety devices are not being used in our products, but were sold to a Belgian customer prior to the CLD Acquisition. The cause of the alleged defect is unknown and is being investigated by a court appointed e xpert. The damages claimed of EUR 1.6 million by the Belgian customer are currently unsubstantiated. No court hearing is expected before the third quarter of 2008. No injury has been reported as a consequence of the alleged defect. Although the outcome of this matter is not predictable with assurance, management believes that the amount of any potential damages resulting from this action would not exceed accruals and available indemnification recoverable from LSG pursuant to the CLD acquisition agreements. Text 3.1
*The team was responsible for manufacturing and design at least from the period 2003 -2006
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IPSO YEARLY REPORT page 24, 25 Link to PIA interview of February 2007 < http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=glW9qnFQvG c>
AAD S.A., the manufacturer of the Vigil, states that: - The unit, set in PRO mode, activated at an altitude of 1097 feet as the vertical velocity was over 79 Mph. This should be 840 feet. - There is a 260-foot safety margin incorporated to allow for pressure differentials and body positions, making the unit to activate at 1097 feet. - The unit activated because the unit registered a vertical speed of 79MPH. Airtec, manufacturer of the Cypres AAD contradict this as onboard was a skydiver equipped with an Expert Cypres AAD. Airtec's report to the NTSB mentioned: "The parameters for an activation were not met at any time. That the parameters to justify activation have been met is further questionable as: 1. Several witnesses have stated that the plane leveled out and flew when the reserve parachute appeared. This indicates that the Vigil still activated despite the lack of significant vertical speed. 2. The vertical speed of the plane increased after the reserve parachute appeared. (It was only than the aircraft started to nose dive.) 3. No other devise registered anything near vertical triggering speed (Cypres, L&B).4 4. Activation altitude was 260 feet above the set parameter of 840 feet. This lethal accident took place in 2008. The known incidents of 2010 cast a doubt about the uniqueness of the 2008 accident and formed the proof that it could happen again anytime soon. Several lawsuits have been introduced.5
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Appendix 3, Fig 1.11 Article: Plane Crash: Parachutist Sues for Injuries: Appendix 5 < http://www.lawyersandsettlements.com/articles/10659/plane-crash-parachutist-injured.html >
In response to the incidents in Colorado the Vigil manufacturer, AAD SA published a statement on 10 June 20106. The statement contains two quotes that give reason to serious concern: Vigil statement - 10 June 2010 (appendix 2) Quote 1 The opening of the door alone should not have activated the cutter. Here they clearly admit they dont know the cause of these activations (Fig. 2.1)
Fig 2.1 Quote 2 If you take off with an open door (even partially) nothing will happen because the pressure will be equal to the outside pressure (Fig. 2.2)7
Fig. 2.2 This last statement is since the activation in Belluno, Italy also questionable. Vigil manual modification - 14 June 2010
Vigil restrictions on door openings: < http://www.dropzone.com/cgi-bin/forum/gforum.cgi?post=3876615;search_string=vigil;guest=73836783#3876615 >> 7 Appendix 2
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Fig. 2.3 These statements are against standard operating procedures and are dangerous. The pilot in command should at all times be able to order to open the door for a bail-out, disregarding the AADs. Activation zone Vigils recommendations have consequences for all skydiving situations, disciplines and emergency situations. The activation zone reaches from 150 feet up to 2300 feet. (Tandem activation altitude of 2040 feet plus 260 feet margin = 2300 feet.) Affected disciplines & jumps The door of the aircraft cannot be opened between 150 and 2300 feet in order not to trigger the Vigil. (Fig. 2.4). If a tandem is on board; these recommendations prohibit the following: The release of a wind drift indicator Accuracy jumps (classic and sports) Hop & pops Demonstration jumps Static line operations Jumpmaster leaning out of the door to check the performance of a static line student. Classic progression Bail-out
Bail-out and other emergencies When a Vigil is aboard an emergency bail out is turning into an even more hazardous event. Opening the door between 150 and 2300 feet may involve in a parachute entanglement with the planes controls and tail. This may cause serious injury or death even to people equipped with other brand AADs or no AADs at all.
Appendix 4, AAD Vigil manual page 21, revised and published on 14 June 2010
2000
1500
Feet
1000 VIGIL PRO 500
ARMING
(150 Feet> 32 sec.)
0 1 VIGIL TANDEM VIGIL PRO
Fig. 2.4
*Zone where the aircraft door has to be remained closed upon the risk of a Vigil activation
Burn mark
Fig. 4.1
Fig. 4.2
Fig. 4.3
Fig. 4.4
Fig. 4.5 Two different incidents of structural failure at different places of the cutter show that the design is flawed and dangerous. In service bulletin PSB 5 of 10 October 2009, Vigil states that the bottom separated from the body. This is a serious understatement as actually the cutter had exploded. The photos of that incident (Fig. 4.2) with clear burn marks speak for itself.
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Aircraft and Flight Information Make/Model Tail Number Airport Light Conditions Basic WX Conditions Phase of Flight CESSNA / 206 N2537X N/A Day VMC Descent Uncontrolled
Narrative Type: NTSB FINAL NARRATIVE (6120.4) Surviving skydivers said that as the airplane was climbing to the jump altitude of 10,500 feet agl, the stall warning horn sounded intermittently several times. They paid no particular attention to it because they had heard it on previous flights. When the airplane reached the jump altitude, the pilot signaled for one of the parachutists to open the door. When she did, she told the pilot that the airplane had overshot the drop zone by approximately 1 mile. As the pilot started a right turn back towards the drop zone, the stall warning horn sounded again, then the airplane "rolled off on its right wing" and entered a spin. The skydivers became disoriented and nauseated. Four skydivers managed to bail out safely, but one of them broke her right leg when she struck the right horizontal stabilizer after exiting the airplane. The reserve parachute on the fifth skydiver deployed and became entangled around the tail of the airplane. She sustained fatal injuries. The sixth skydiver was unable to exit the airplane and was found inside, fatally injured. The pilot was seriously injured. Ground witnesses reported hearing the engine RPMs decrease, then saw the airplane spinning. Somewhere between 1,000 and 5,000 feet, the airplane leveled out for a few seconds and witnesses saw a parachute wrapped around the tail. The airplane then spun or dove to the ground. Downloaded data from the onboard GPS and Automated Activation Devices worn by three of the skydivers corroborated these accounts. Narrative Type: NTSB PRELIMINARY NARRATIVE (6120.19) HISTORY OF FLIGHT On April 19, 2008, approximately 1615 central daylight time, a Cessna P206, N2537X, registered to and operated by Freefall Express Skydiving, Inc., and piloted by a commercial pilot, was destroyed when it struck trees and impacted terrain following an in-flight loss of
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AIRCRAFT INFORMATION N2537X, a model P206 (s.n. P206-0037), was manufactured by the Cessna Aircraft Company, and received its FAA airworthiness certificate on December 11, 1964. It was equipped with a Continental IO-520-F-9 engine (s.n. 553089), driving a McCauley 3-blade, all-metal, constant speed propeller (m.n. D3A34C402). According to the aircraft's maintenance records, the last annual inspection of the airframe and 100-hour inspections of the engine and propeller were accomplished on May 18, 2007, at a tachometer time of 3,227.9 hours. At the time of the
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METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION The following Aviation Routine Weather Report (METAR) was recorded at Springfield-Branson Regional Airport (SGF), Springfield, Missouri, at 1552: Wind, 290 degrees at 10 knots; visibility, 10 statute miles (or greater); sky condition, few clouds at 3,500 feet; temperature, 17 degrees C.; dew point, 7 degrees C.; altimeter, 29.94 inches of mercury; remarks, sea level pressure 1038 mb.
FLIGHT RECORDERS The airplane was equipped with a Garmin GPSMAP 195, which was sent to NTSB's Vehicle Recorder Division for download and analysis. According to the GPS Factual Report, 33 user defined waypoints, 8 user defined routes, and 2 tracks were recorded on April 19, 2008. The first tracklog began at 1028:06 (a previous flight) and ended at 1218:02. The second tracklog began at 1256:04 and ended at 1606.45. Approximately 1543:23, Track 02 recorded "groundspeeds above 58 mph with motion on a northerly course" over Mt. Vernon Municipal Airport. "Recorded track data indicate that the aircraft maneuvered in the immediate vicinity of the airport for approximately 18 minutes before turning to a northwesterly course. At 1601:15 recorded groundspeed began to drop below 58 mph and fluctuate between 34 mph and 78 mph. At about 1605:01, tracklog data indicates that the aircraft initiated a right hand turn to the southeast with groundspeeds well below 59 mph. At 1605:28, tracklog data indicates that the aircraft made a sharp right hand turn to the north, followed by another sharp right hand turn to the south one (1) second later. Recorded groundspeed during the next 3-4 seconds varied from 246 mph to 187 mph. Tracklog data indicates that the aircraft traveled on a southeasterly heading for the next 5-seconds at groundspeeds between 18 and 162 mph. At 1606:20, tracklog data indicates that the aircraft course changed 90 degrees in one (1) second, to a southwesterly heading. Five (5) seconds later the airplane changed 90 degrees in three (3) seconds to a
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MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION The pilot submitted a written statement to the effect that he had not regained cognitive skills and could not recall the accident. The statement was recorded by his wife. Neither Lawrence County or the State of Missouri requested autopsies on the two deceased skydivers.
TESTS AND RESEARCH On June 19, 2008, under the supervision of the National Transportation Safety Board, the engine was successfully test run at the facilities of Teledyne Continental Motors, Mobile, Alabama. Full power was achieved and no anomalies were noted. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION N2537X was equipped with a Sportsman STOL (short takeoff and landing) kit, manufactured by Stene Aviation, Polson, Montana. The kit extends the wing leading edge cuff, adding wing area and thus reducing the stall speed and dampening stall characteristics without an attendant increase in drag. According to a company spokesman, stall speed reduction of 8 per cent (forward c.g.) to 10 per cent (aft c.g.) can be expected. According to the Cessna Aircraft Company, the clean configuration stall speed of the Cessna 206 in a wings-level attitude is 69 mph calibrated airspeed (CAS). In a 60-degree bank, the stall speed is 98 mph CAS. With the installation of the Sportsman STOL kit, the stall speeds should have been reduced to 63.48 mph (forward c.g.) and 62.1 mph (aft c.g.) CAS, respectively. In a 60-degree bank, the stall speeds should have been reduced to 90.16 mph (forward c.g.) and 88.2 mph (aft c.g.) CAS, respectively. In addition to the Federal Aviation Administration, parties to the investigation included the Cessna Aircraft Company and Teledyne Continental Motors.
Narrative Type: NTSB PROBABLE CAUSE NARRATIVE The pilot's failure to maintain adequate airspeed, resulting in an inadvertent stall/spin. Contributing factors in this accident were the entanglement of the parachute in the elevator control system, reducing the pilot's ability to regain control.
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