Constitutional Law Case
Constitutional Law Case
Constitutional Law Case
A.
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL v. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL - G.R. No. 122156 [1997] PHSC 856 (3 February 1997) Facts: Respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government under Proclamation No. 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent MHC. The winning bidder, or the eventual "strategic partner," is to provide management expertise and/or an international marketing/reservation system, and financial support to strengthen the profitability and performance of the Manila Hotel. In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner. Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as the winning bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the necessary contracts, petitioner matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berha and sent a manager's check issued by Philtrust Bank for Thirty-three Million Pesos (P33.000.000.00) as Bid Security to match the bid of the Malaysian Group, Messrs Renong Berhad which respondent GSIS refused to accept. Perhaps apprehensive that respondent GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be hastened by respondent GSIS and consummated with Renong Berhad, petitioner came to this Court on prohibition and mandamus. On 18 October 1995 the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining respondents from perfecting and consummating the sale to the Malaysian firm. Ruling: A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and administration of a nation. It is supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable except by the authority from which it emanates. It has been defined as the fundamental and paramount law of the nation. It prescribes the permanent framework of a system of government, assigns to the different departments their respective powers and duties, and establishes certain fixed principles on which government is founded. The fundamental conception in other words is that it is a supreme law to which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which all private rights must be determined and all public authority administered. Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates any norm of the constitution that law or contract whether promulgated by the legislative or by the executive branch or entered into by private persons for private purposes is null and void and without any force and effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract. Quite apparently, Sec. 10, second par., of Art XII is couched in such a way as not to make it appear that it is non-self-executing but simply for purposes of style. But, certainly, the legislature is not precluded from enacting other further laws to enforce the constitutional provision so long as the contemplated statute squares with the Constitution. Minor details may be left to the legislature without impairing the selfexecuting nature of constitutional provisions. In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact legislation to facilitate the exercise of powers directly granted by the constitution, further the operation of such a provision, prescribe a practice to be used for its enforcement, provide a convenient remedy for the protection of the rights secured or the determination thereof, or place reasonable safeguards around the exercise of the right. The
B.
BASIC PRINCIPLES ON THE FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE STATE, THEIR CHARACTERISTICS, SIMILARITIES AND DISTINCTIONS, AND THEIR LIMITATIONS DUE PROCESS IN GENERAL ARTICLE III, SECTION 1, 1987 CONSTITUTION
C.
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE v. HON. RALPH C. LANTION, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 25, and MARK B. JIMENEZ - G.R. No. 139465. [2000] PHSC 1176 (17 October 2000) Issue: W/N Mark Jimenez is entitled to the due process right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process Ruling: No, he is not entitled to right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process. An extradition proceeding is sui generis. It is not a criminal proceeding which will call into operation all the rights of an accused as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. To begin with, the process of extradition does not involve the determination of the guilt or innocence of an accused. His guilt or innocence will be adjudged in the court of the state where he will be extradited. Hence, as a rule, constitutional rights that are only relevant to determine the guilt or innocence of an accused cannot be invoked by an extraditee especially by one whose extradition papers are still undergoing evaluation. Private respondent would also impress upon the Court the urgency of his right to notice and hearing considering the alleged threat to his liberty "which may be more priceless than life." The supposed threat to private respondents liberty is perceived to come from several provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty and P.D. No. 1069 which allow provisional arrest and temporary detention. To be sure, private respondents plea for due process deserves serious consideration involving as it does his primordial right to liberty. His plea to due process, however, collides with important state interests which cannot also be ignored for they serve the interest of the greater majority. The clash of rights demands a delicate balancing of interests approach which is a "fundamental postulate of constitutional law." The approach requires that we "take conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given situation or type of situation." These interests usually consist in the exercise by an individual of his basic freedoms on the one hand, and the governments promotion of fundamental public interest or policy objectives on the other. In the case at bar, on one end of the balancing pole is the private respondents claim to due process predicated on Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, which provides that "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law . . ." Without a bubble of doubt, procedural due process of law lies at the foundation of a civilized society which accords paramount importance to justice and fairness. It has to be accorded the weight it deserves. Considering that in the case at bar, the extradition proceeding is only at its evaluation stage, the nature of the right being claimed by the private respondent is nebulous and the degree of prejudice he will allegedly suffer is weak, we accord greater weight to the interests espoused by the government thru the petitioner Secretary of Justice. In tilting the balance in favor of the interests of the State, the Court stresses that it is not ruling that the private respondent has no right to due process at all throughout the length and breadth of the extrajudicial proceedings. Procedural due process requires a determination of what process is due, when it is due, and the degree of what is due. Stated otherwise, a prior determination should be made as to whether procedural protections are at all due and when they are due, which in turn depends on the extent to which an individual will be "condemned to suffer grievous loss ." We have explained why an extraditee has no right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process. As aforesaid, P.D. No. 1069 which implements the RP-US Extradition Treaty affords an extraditee sufficient opportunity to meet the evidence against him once the petition is filed in court. The time for the extraditee to know the basis of the request for his extradition is merely moved to the filing in court of the formal petition for extradition. The extraditee's right to know is momentarily withheld during the evaluation stage of the extradition process to accommodate the more compelling interest of the State to prevent escape of potential extraditees which can be precipitated by premature information of the basis of the request for his extradition. No less compelling at that stage of the
The Due Process Clause in Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution embodies a system of rights based on moral principles so deeply imbedded in the traditions and feelings of our people as to be deemed fundamental to a civilized society as conceived by our entire history. The constitutional behest that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law is solemn and inflexible.
Thus, police power concerns government enactments which precisely interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare or the common good. As the assailed Department Order enjoys a presumed validity, it follows that the burden rests upon petitioners to demonstrate that the said order, particularly, its ARB requirement, does not enhance the public welfare or was exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably. A thorough review of the facts and circumstances leading to the issuance of the assailed orders compels us to rule that the Artist Record Book requirement and the questioned Department Order related to its issuance were issued by the Secretary of Labor pursuant to a valid exercise of the police power. Of the hundreds of thousands of workers who left the country for greener pastures in the last few years, women composed slightly close to half of those deployed, constituting 47% between 19871991, exceeding this proportion (58%) by the end of 1991, 6 the year former President Aquino instituted the ban on deployment of performing artists to Japan and other countries as a result of the gruesome death of Filipino entertainer Maricris Sioson. Pursuant to the alarming number of reports that a significant number of Filipina performing artists ended up as prostitutes abroad (many of whom were beaten, drugged and forced into prostitution), and following the deaths of number of these women, the government began instituting measures aimed at deploying only those individuals who met set standards which would qualify them as legitimate performing artists. In spite of these measures, however, a number of our countrymen have nonetheless fallen victim to unscrupulous recruiters, ending up as virtual slaves controlled by foreign crime syndicates and forced into jobs other than those indicated in their employment contracts. Worse, some of our women have been forced into prostitution. In any event, apart from the State's police power, the Constitution itself mandates government to extend the fullest protection to our overseas workers. The basic constitutional statement on labor, embodied in Section 18 of Article II of the Constitution.
10
E.
Facts: The State expropriated the private property of petitionerfor the benefit of a small community which seeks to have its own sports and recreational facility. This has been contested because there is already such a recreational facility only a short distance away, Issue: Whether the taking is valid Ruling: NO, such taking cannot be considered to be for public use. Its expropriation is not valid. In this case, the Court defines what constitutes a genuine necessity for public use. The right to take private property for public purposes necessarily originates from "the necessity" and the taking must be limited to such necessity. The very foundation of the right to exercise eminent
11
DIDIPIO V GUZON (2006) Facts: President Ramos executed an FTAA with AMC over a total land area of 37,000 hectares covering the provinces of Nueva Vizcaya and Quirino. Included in this area is Barangay Dipidio, Kasibu, Nueva Vizcaya. Petitioners filed a demand letter addressed to then DENR Secretary Heherson Alvarez, for the cancellation of the CAMC FTAA for the primary reason that it is unconstitutional Issue: Whether or not mining operators the authority to exercise eminent domain Ruling: Yes. The evolution of mining laws gives positive indication that mining operators who are qualified to own lands were granted the authority to exercise eminent domain for the entry, acquisition, and use of private lands in areas open for mining operations. This grant of authority extant in Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 512 is not expressly repealed by Section 76 of Rep. Act No. 7942; and neither are the former statutes impliedly repealed by the former. These two provisions can stand together even if Section 76 of Rep. Act No. 7942 does not spell out the grant of the privilege to exercise eminent domain which was present in the old law. The taking to be valid must be for public use. Public use as a requirement for the valid exercise of the power of eminent domain is now synonymous with public interest, public benefit, public welfare and public convenience. It includes the broader notion of indirect public benefit or advantage. Public use as traditionally understood as "actual use by the public" has already been abandoned. Mining industry plays a pivotal role in the economic development of the country and is a vital tool in the governments thrust of accelerated recovery. NAPOCOR VS. TIANGCO (2007) Facts: Private property in Rizal was expropriated. There were two basis: the 1984 and 1993 tax declarations. The trial court fixed the value of the property at its 1984 value, while the CA, at its 1993 worth. The filing for the expropriation was made on 1990 Issue: What value should govern? Ruling: Neither of the two determinations is correct. For purposes of just compensation, the respondents should be paid the value of the property as of the time of the filing of the complaint which is deemed to be the time of taking the property. In eminent domain cases, the time of taking is the filing of the complaint, if there was no actual taking prior thereto. Hence, in this case, the value of the property at the time of the filing of the complaint on November 20, 1990 should be considered in determining the just compensation due the respondents. So it is that in National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals, et al., we ruled: Normally, the time of the taking coincides with the filing of the complaint for expropriation. Hence, many rulings of this Court have equated just compensation with the value of the property as of the
12
As early as 1996, the National Power Corporation (NPC) negotiated with the spouses Bongbong to use a portion of the property pf the latter for the construction of a 230 KV LCIP Malitbog-Tabango CETL TWR SITE 1046 for the Leyte-Cebu Interconnection Project. When the spouses Bongbong agreed, NPC occupied a 25,100-sq-m portion of the property. On April 22, 1996, NPC paid the spouses Bongbong the amount of P33,582.00 representing the value of the improvements that were damaged by the construction of the project. The voucher for the payment of easement fee was prepared. However, when NPC offered a check for P163,150.00 (representing 10% of the total market value of the area affected) as payment for the easement fee, Antero refused to accept the amount and demanded that NPC pay the full value of the 25,100-sq-m portion it had occupied. On October 28, 1997, the spouses Bongbong received the P163,150.00 under protest. On October 3, 1997, the spouses Bongbong demanded that the NPC pay P8,748,448.00 which they alleged to be the just and reasonable value for their land and improvements. The refusal of NPC to heed their demands prompted the spouses Bongbong to file a complaint for just compensation before the RTC. On May 21, 1999, the spouses Bongbong filed a Motion to Admit as Supplement to the Amended Complaint the New Reappraisal of Plaintiffs Real Property and Improvements, dated February 8, 1999. In the said Reappraisal, which was issued by the Provincial Appraisal Committee (PAC) of Leyte (Resolution No. 03-99), the lot was valued at P300.00 per sq m. NPC opposed the motion, alleging that the payment of just compensation should be based on the market value of the property at the time of its taking in 1997; pursuant to its charter, it paid only an easement fee. On November 5, 1999, the trial court ruled that the value of the plaintiffs property at the time of taking in 1997 is THREE HUNDRED (P300.00) PESOS per square meter or the total amount of SEVEN MILLION FIVE HUNDRED THIRTY THOUSAND (P7,530,000.00) PESOS.
13
14
15
16
In a long line of cases, we have consistently ruled that where actual taking is made without the benefit of expropriation proceedings and the owner seeks recovery of the possession of the property prior to the filing of expropriation proceedings, it is the value of the property at the time of taking that is controlling for purposes of compensation. As pointed out in Republic v. Lara, the reason for this rule is: The owner of private property should be compensated only for what he actually loses; it is not intended that his compensation shall extend beyond his loss or injury. And what he loses is only the actual value of his property at the time it is taken. This is the only way the compensation to be paid can be truly just; i.e., "just" not only to the individual whose property is taken, "but to the public, which is to pay for it." Thus, the value of petitioners' property must be ascertained as of 1960 when it was actually taken. It is as of that time that the real measure of their loss may fairly be adjudged. The value, once fixed, shall earn interest at the legal rate until full payment is effected, conformably with other principles laid down by case law. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL OIL COMPANY vs. LEONILO A. MAGLASANG and OSCAR S. MAGLASANG On October 25, 1994, PNOC filed a complaint for eminent domain against respondent Oscar S. Maglasang, the registered owner of a 63,333-square meter parcel of land identified as Lot No. 11900. On November 10, 1994, the PNOC filed another expropriation complaint, this time against respondent Leolino A. Maglasang, owner of the 98,206-square meter parcel of land identified as Lot No. 11907. The subject parcels of land are located at Lim-ao, Municipality of Kananga, Leyte and to be used by the PNOC in the construction and operation of the 125MW Geothermal Power Plant Project. The RTC issued writs of possession over Lot No. 11907 and Lot No. 11900 on December 5, 1994 and December 13, 1994, respectively, after PNOC posted the required provisional deposit. The trial court appointed three commissioners to ascertain and make a recommendation on the just compensation for the condemned lots. Atty. Reforzado submitted a Commissioners' Report dated February 18, 1999, attaching therewith the different valuations recommended by the three commissioners. City Assessor Supremo recommended the price of P 1,000.00 per square meter, Clerk of Court Reforzado pegged the value of the lots at P 900.00 per square meter. In his report, Mr. Pongos arrived at the lowest valuation of P 400.00 per square meter for the developed area and P 85.00 for the undeveloped area. Confronted with the commissioners' varying land valuations, the trial court made its own determination of the just compensation taking into account the range of prices recommended in the Commissioners' Report and documentary evidence presented by the parties. Setting the reckoning period for the computation of the just compensation at the time of the filing of the complaints, the trial court pegged the value of the two lots at P 300.00 per square meter. However, in the same decision, the trial court further increased said initial valuation to P 700.00 per square meter to compensate for what it termed as inflation factor and adjustment factor. On January 23, 2002, the CA rendered the herein challenged decision which modified the decision of the trial court insofar as it reduced the just compensation for the subject lots from P 700.00 to P 300.00. What is the precise time the fixing of just compensation should be reckoned? In expropriation proceedings, the value of the land and its character at the time it was taken by the government are the criteria for determining just compensation. This is so because, there are instances when the expropriating agency takes over the property prior to the expropriation suit, in which situation just compensation shall be determined as of the time of taking. The reason for the rule, as pointed out in Republic v. Lara,11 is that
F. 1. 2.
PATRICIO DUMLAO vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS Petitioner Dumlao questions the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 as discriminatory and contrary to the equal protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution. Said Section 4 provides: Sec. 4. Special Disqualification in addition to violation of section 10 of Art. XI I-C of the Constitution and disqualification mentioned in existing laws, which are hereby declared as disqualification for any of the elective officials enumerated in section 1 hereof. Any retired elective provincial city or municipal official who has received payment of the retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the law, and who shall have been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be elected shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he has retired (Emphasis supplied) Petitioner Dumlao alleges that the aforecited provision is directed insidiously against him, and that the classification provided therein is based on "purely arbitrary grounds and, therefore, class legislation." Petitioner Dumlao assails the constitutionality of the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52, quoted earlier, as being contrary to the equal protection clause guaranteed by the Constitution, and seeks to prohibit respondent COMELEC from implementing said provision.
17
7. 8.
ISSUE: Does membership in Congress exempt an accused from statutes and rules which apply to validly incarcerated persons in general? HELD: No. The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation of Section 11, Article VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six months is not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations. What the accused-appellant seeks is not of an emergency nature. Allowing accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meeting for five (5) days or more in a week will virtually make him free man with all the privilege appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellant's status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system. The Constitution guarantees: ". . . nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of laws." This simply means that all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike both in rights enjoyed and responsibilities imposed. 7 The organs of government may not show any undue favoritism or hostility to any person. Neither partiality not prejudice shall be displayed. Does being an elective official result in a substantial distinction that allows different treatment? Is being a Congressman a substantial differentiation which removes the accused-appellant as a prisoner from the same class as all persons validly confined under law? The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison. The duties imposed by the "mandate of the people" are multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts that the duty to legislative ranks highest in the hierarchy of government. The accused-appellant is only one of 250 members of the House of Representatives, not to mention the 24 members of the Senate, charged with the duties of legislation. Congress continues to function well in the physical absence of one or a few of its members. Depending on the exigency of Government that has to be addressed, the President or the Supreme Court can also be deemed the highest for that particular duty. The importance of a function depends on the need to its exercise. Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different classification from those others who are validly restrained by law. We, therefore, find that election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class. Premises considered, we are constrained to rule against the accused-appellant's claim that re-election to public office gives priority to any other right or interest, including the police power of the State. Motion DENIED. [G.R. No. 143076. June 10, 2003] PHILIPPINE RURAL ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES ASSOCIATION, INC. (PHILRECA) vs. THE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, and THE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE Facts: On May 23, 2000, a class suit was filed by petitioners in their own behalf and in behalf of other electric cooperatives organized and existing under P.D. No. 269 who are members of petitioner Philippine Rural Electric Cooperatives Association, Inc. (PHILRECA). Petitioner PHILRECA is an association of 119 electric cooperatives throughout the country. Petitioners Agusan del Norte Electric Cooperative, Inc. (ANECO), Iloilo I Electric Cooperative, Inc. (ILECO I) and Isabela I Electric Cooperative, Inc. (ISELCO I) are non-stock, non-profit electric cooperatives organized and existing under P.D. No. 269, as amended, and registered with the National Electrification Administration (NEA).
3. 4.
SOCIAL EQUITY OTHER CASES INTERNATIONAL vs. QUISUMBING 333 SCRA 13 (2000)
(Andrey Alcomendras) PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ROMEO G. JALOSJOS - G.R. Nos. 132875-76 [2000] PHSC 168 (3 February 2000) FACTS: The accused-appellant, Romeo F. Jaloslos is a full-pledged member of Congress who is now confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape on two counts and acts of lasciviousness on six counts 1 is pending appeal. The accusedappellant filed this motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense. The accused-appellant's "Motion To Be Allowed To Discharge Mandate As Member of House of Representatives" was filed on the grounds that 1. Accused-appellant's reelection being an expression of popular will cannot be rendered inutile by any ruling, giving priority to any right or interest not even the police power of the State. 2. To deprive the electorate of their elected representative amounts to taxation without representation. 3. To bar accused-appellant from performing his duties amounts to his suspension/removal and mocks the renewed mandates entrusted to him by the people. 4. The electorate of the First District of Zamboanga del Norte wants their voice to be heard. 5. A precedent-setting U.S. ruling allowed a detained lawmaker to attend sessions of the U.S. Congress.
6.
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
Held: The petition is bereft of merit. In attempting to strike a distinction between his case and that of Jalosjos, petitioner chiefly points out that former Rep. Romeo Jalosjos (Jalosjos) was already convicted, albeit his conviction was pending appeal, whereas he (petitioner) is a mere detention prisoner. Further, petitioner illustrates that Jalosjos was charged with crimes involving moral turpitude, i.e., two counts of statutory rape and six counts of acts of lasciviousness, whereas he is indicted for coup detat which is regarded as a political offense. The distinctions cited by petitioner were not elemental in the pronouncement in Jalosjos that election to Congress is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement as the functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift one
25
26
27
BENJAMIN V. KHO and ELIZABETH ALINDOGAN v. HON. ROBERTO L. MAKALINTAL and NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION - G.R. No. 94902-0 [1999] PHSC 280 (21 April 1999) Facts: On May 15, 1990, NBI Agent Max B. Salvador applied for the issuance of search warrants by the respondent Judge against Benjamin V. Kho, now petitioner, in his residence at No. 45 Bb. Ramona Tirona St., BF Homes, Phase I, Paranaque. On the same day, Eduardo T. Arugay, another NBI agent, applied with the same court for the issuance of search warrants against the said petitioner in his house at No. 326 McDivitt St., Bgy. Moonwalk, Paranaque. The search warrants were applied for after teams of NBI agents had conducted a personal surveillance and investigation in the two houses referred to on the basis of confidential, information they received that the said places were being used as storage centers for unlicensed firearms and "chopchop" vehicles. Respondent NBI sought for the issuance of search
28
PAPER INDUSTRIES CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, et al v. JUDGE MAXIMIANO C. ASUNCION, Presiding Judge, Branch 104, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City; STATE PROSECUTOR LEO B. DACERA III; and the SPECIAL OPERATIONS UNIT OF THE PNP TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT COMMAND - G.R. No. 122092 [1999] PHSC 357 (19 May 1999)
Facts: On January 25, 1995, Police Chief Inspector Napoleon B. Pascua applied for a search warrant before the said RTC of Quezon City, stating that the management of Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines, located at PICOP compound, Barangay Tabon, Bislig,
29
FRANK UY and UNIFISH PACKING CORPORATION vs BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE and HON. MERCEDES GOZO-DADOLE - G.R. No. 129651. [2000] PHSC 1208 (20 October 2000) Facts: On 30 September 1993, a certain Rodrigo Abos reported to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) that petitioners Unifish Packing Corporation and Uy Chin Ho alias Frank Uy were engaged in activities constituting violations of the National Internal Revenue Code. On 1 October 1993, Nestor N. Labaria, Assistant Chief of the Special Investigation Branch of the BIR, applied for search warrants from Branch 28 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu. The application sought permission to search the premises of Unifish. After hearing the depositions of Labaria and Abos, Judge Mercedes Gozo-Dadole issued the disputed search warrants. The first warrant included the address in the heading as Hernan Cortes St., Cebu City while the body of the warrant stated Uy Chin Ho c/o Unifish Packing Corporation, Hernan Cortes St., Mandaue City. The second warrant had in the heading the address Hernan Cortes St., Mandaue City and in the body Uy Chin Ho alias Frank Uy and Unifish Packing Corporation, Hernan Cortes St., Mandaue City. Both warrants directed the search and seizure of: 1. Multiple sets of Books of Accounts; Ledgers, Journals, Columnar Books, Cash Register Books, Sales Books or Records; Provisional & Official Receipts; 2. Production Record Books/Inventory Lists [,] Stock Cards; 3. Unregistered Delivery Receipts; 4. Unregistered Purchase & Sales Invoices; 5. Sales Records, Job Order; 6. Corporate Financial Records; and 7. Bank Statements/Cancelled Checks Petitioners contend that there are several defects in the subject warrants that command their nullification. They point out inconsistencies in the description of the place to be searched in Search Warrant A-1, as well as inconsistencies in the names of the persons against whom Search Warrants A-1 and A-2 were issued. That two search warrants (Search Warrants A-1 and A-2) were issued for the same crime, for the same place, at a single occasion is cited as another irregularity. Petitioners also dispute the existence of probable cause that would justify the issuance of the warrants. Finally, they claim that the things to be seized were not described with particularity. These defects, according to petitioners, render the objects seized inadmissible in evidence. Held: Inconsistencies in the description of the place to be searched The Constitution requires, for the validity of a search warrant, that there be a particular description of the place to be searched and the persons of things to be seized. The rule is that a description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended and distinguish it from other places in the community. Any designation or description known to the locality that points out the place to the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry leads the officers unerringly to it, satisfies the constitutional requirement. In this case, it was not shown that a street similarly named Hernan Cortes could be found in Cebu City. Nor was it established that the enforcing officers had any difficulty in locating the premises of petitioner corporation. That Search Warrant A-1, therefore, inconsistently identified the city where the premises to be searched is not a defect that would spell the warrants invalidation in this case. Inconsistencies in the description of the persons named in the two warrants These discrepancies are hardly relevant. In Miller v. Sigler , it was held that the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, from which Section 2, Article III of our own Constitution is historically derived, does not require the warrant to name the person who occupies the described premises. Where the search warrant is issued for the search of specifically described premises only and not for the search of a person, the failure to name
30
31
32
33
34
Hon Ne Chan Vs. Honda FACTS - On 14 November 2003, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), through Special Investigator (SI) Glenn Lacaran, applied for search warrants with the RTC against petitioners for alleged violation of Section 168 in relation to Section 170 of Republic Act No. 8293 or the Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines. On the same date, RTC Judge Artemio S. Tipon issued two search warrants. The first warrant, Search Warrant No. 03-4438, was directed against petitioner Hon Ne Chan and John Does, operating under the name and style Dragon Spirit Motorcycle Center, located at No. 192 M.H. del Pilar Street corner 10 Avenue, Grace Park, Caloocan City, Metro Manila. On the other hand, the second search warrant, or Search Warrant No. 03-4439 was issued against petitioner Yunji Zeng and John Does, operating under the name and style Dragon Spirit Motorcycle Center, located at No. 192 E. Delos Santos Avenue, Caloocan City, Metro Manila. On the strength of these search warrants, NBI agents conducted a search of petitioners premises and seized items. On 1 December 2003, petitioners filed with the RTC a Joint Motion to Quash Search Warrants and to Return Illegally Seized Items, averring therein that the search warrants were issued despite the absence of probable cause and that they were in the nature of general search warrants. Respondents filed their Opposition thereto on 7 January 2004 but despite this, the trial court still issued an Order dated 20 February 2004 which quashed both Search Warrants No. 03-4438 and 03-4439 and ordered the NBI to return to petitioners the articles seized. In quashing the search warrants, the trial court held that the return of the twenty-two WAVE CX 110 motorcycle units was proper for they were never specifically mentioned therein. As regards the rest of the items seized by the NBI agents, the trial court decreed that their return to petitioners was justified due to lack of probable cause in the issuance of the search warrants. ISSUE - We are primarily tasked to resolve the questions of: 1) whether probable cause existed in the issuance of the subject search warrants; 2) whether said search warrants were in the nature of general search warrants and therefore null and void; and 3) whether there existed an offense to which the issuance of the search warrants was connected. RULINGS - We affirm the Decision of the Court of Appeals. Thus, the validity of the issuance of a search warrant rests upon the following factors: (1) it must be issued upon probable cause; (2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or any other person; (3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce; and (4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized. In this case, petitioners argue that the requirements enumerated in Rule 126 of the Rules of Court pertaining to the issuance of a search warrant were not fulfilled when Search Warrants No. 03-4438 and 03-4439 were issued by the trial court. First, they contend that no probable cause existed meriting the issuance of the search warrants in that it was stated in the Application for Search Warrant of National Bureau of Investigation Special Investigator (NBI SI) Lacaran that (h)e has information and verily believes that (petitioners) are in possession or has in their control properties which are being sold, retailed, distributed, imported, dealt with or otherwise disposed of, or intended to be used as a means of committing a violation of Section 168 in relation to Section 170 of Republic Act No. 8293 otherwise known as the Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines Said statement, petitioners insist, failed to meet the condition that probable cause must be shown to be within the personal knowledge of the complainant or the witnesses he may produce and not based on mere hearsay. It is settled that in determining probable cause, a judge is duty-bound to personally examine under oath the complainant and the witnesses he may present. Emphasis must be laid on the fact that the oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause. Search warrants are not issued on loose, vague or doubtful basis of fact, or on mere suspicion or belief. In the case at bar, petitioners capitalize on the first paragraph of the Application for Search Warrant executed by NBI SI Lacaran to support their argument that he lacked the personal
Supporting jurisprudence thus outlined the following requisites for a search warrants validity, the absence of even one will cause its downright nullification: (1) it must be issued upon probable cause; (2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or any other person; (3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce; and (4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized.
The instant controversy pertains only to the existence of probable cause, which the trial court found wanting after evaluating the items seized from petitioner. Petitioner does not dispute that the items seized from him, consisting of Pryce LPG tanks of assorted weights, were particularly enumerated in the search warrant. Petitioner is neither assailing the manner by which the trial court conducted the determination of probable cause. The trial court retracted its earlier finding of probable cause because the seized items were incomplete or insufficient to charge petitioner with a criminal offense, thus, negating its previous determination of probable cause. We disagree. In quashing the search warrant, it would appear that the trial court had raised the standard of probable cause to whether there was sufficient cause to hold petitioner for trial. In so doing, the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion.
Probable cause for a search warrant is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discrete and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed and that it was committed by the accused. Probable cause demands more than bare suspicion; it requires less than evidence which would justify conviction. The existence depends to a large degree upon the finding or opinion of the judge conducting the examination. However, the findings of the judge should not disregard the facts before him nor run counter to the clear dictates of reason.ch
35
36
37
Ruling: In Caballes v. Court of Appeals,34 the term "probable cause" was explained to mean [A] reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious mans belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged; or the existence of such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the items, articles or objects sought in connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law is in the place to be searched. The required probable cause that will justify a warrantless search and seizure is not determined by a fixed formula but is resolved according to the facts of the case. When a vehicle is flagged down and subjected to an extensive search, such a warrantless search has been held to be valid as long as the officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe prior to the search that they would find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be searched. In this case, we hold that the police had probable cause to effect the warrantless search of the Gemini car driven by appellant. A confidential informer tipped them off that said car was going to deliver shabu at Marville Subdivision. Pursuing said lead, the Antipolo City police sent a team to Marville Subdivision to monitor said vehicle. The information provided by the informer turned out to be correct as, indeed, the Gemini car was spotted in the place where it was said to be bringing shabu. When they stopped the car, they saw a gun tucked in appellants waist. Appellant did not have any document to support his possession of said firearm which all the more strengthened the polices suspicion. After he was told to step out of the car, they found on the drivers seat plastic sachets containing white powdery substance. These circumstances, taken together, are sufficient to establish probable cause for the warrantless search of the Gemini car and the eventual admission into evidence of the plastic packets against appellant.
INCIDENT
TO
VALID
38
A confidential informant came to the police station and tipped P/Sr. Insp. Jessie Nitullano that a certain Ricardo Bohol is engaged in illegal drug trade in Tondo, Manila. P/Sr. Insp. Nitullano launched then and there a buy-bust entrapment of Bohol. PO2 Ferdinand Estrada was assigned to act as poseur buyer, and he was provided with a marked P100-bill as buy-bust money. PO2 Estrada proceeded to the house of Bohol and told Bohol of their purpose. Bohol asked, How much? to which PO2 Estrada replied, Piso lang (meaning P100 worth of shabu) and handed to the former the marked P100-bill. In turn, Bohol gave PO2 Estrada the shabu. Bohol was arrested and recovered from him the buy-bust money and the shabu. RTC convicted accused for the charges. Since one of the penalties imposed by the trial court is life imprisonment, the cases were forwarded to CA for automatic review.CA denied appeal. Issue:W/N SEARCH AND ARREST WAS ILLEGAL WHEN ACCUSED CLAIMED THAT HE WAS PEACEFULLY SLEEPING WHEN ARRESTED WITHOUT A WARRANT AND NOT INCIDENTAL TO ALAWFUL WARRANTLESS ARREST.HENCE THE SHABU WAS INADMISSIBLE. Ruling: NO. Legal.The arrest of Bohol is legal. The Constitution proscribes unreasonable arrests and provides in the Bill of Rights that no arrest, search and seizure can be made without a valid warrant issued by competent judicial authority. However, it is a settled exception to the rule that an arrest made after an entrapment operation does not require a warrant. Such warrantless arrest is considered reasonable and valid under Rule 113, Section 5(a) of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, which states:Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;x x x In the present case, the arresting officers were justified in arresting Bohol as he had just committed a crime when he sold the shabu to PO2 Estrada. A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment which has repeatedly been accepted to be a valid means of arresting violators of the Dangerous Drugs Law. Considering the legality of Bohols warrantless arrest, the subsequent warrantless search
39
40
G.R. No. 96177 January 27, 1993 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,vs.MARI MUSA y HANTATALU, accused-appellant. Facts: At the trial, the prosecution presented three (3) witnesses, who acted as poseur-buyer in the buy-bust operation made against the appellant. Information received from civilian informer was that this Mari Musa was engaged in selling marijuana in said place. So they proceeded to the house of Mari Musa. Amado Ani was able to buy one newspaper-wrapped dried marijuana for P10.00. The next day, a buy-bust was planned. Convinced that the contents were marijuana, Ani walked back towards his companions and raised his right hand for the raid. The second time, Ani with the NARCOM team returned to Mari Musa's house, the woman, who was later known as Mari Musa's wife, slipped away from the house. Sgt. Belarga frisked Mari Musa but could not find the P20.00 marked money with him. Mari Musa was then asked where the P20.00 was and he told the NARCOM team he has given the money to his wife (who had slipped away). Mari Musa was then placed under arrest and brought to the NARCOM office. In this appeal, the appellant contends that his guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt and impugns the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. The appellant claims that the testimony of Sgt. Ani, the poseur-buyer, is not credible because: (1) prior to the buy-bust operation, neither Sgt. Ani nor the other NARCOM agents were personally known by the appellant or vice-versa; and (2) there was no witness to the alleged giving of the two wrappers of marijuana. Issue: Whether or not a policeman can distinguish between marijuana cigarette from ordinary ones by the type of rolling done on the cigarette sticks from a distance of 10-15 meters to be the basis of his conviction. Ruling: YES. The Court has held that what matters is not an existing familiarity between the buyer and the seller, for quite often, the parties to the transaction may be strangers, but their agreement and the acts constituting the sale and delivery of the marijuana. The place of the commission of the crime of selling prohibited drugs has been held to be not crucial and the presence of other people apart from the buyer and seller will not necessarily prevent the consummation of the illegal sale. People v. Ale does not apply here because the policeman in that case testified that he and his companion were certain that the appellant therein handed marijuana cigarettes to the poseur-buyer based on the appearance of the cigarette sticks. The Court rejected this claim, stating that: This Court cannot give full credit to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses marked as they are with contradictions and tainted with inaccuracies.Bian testified that they were able to tell that the four cigarettes were marijuana cigarettes because according to him, the rolling of ordinary cigarettes are different from those of marijuana cigarettes. (tsn, November 13, 1984, p. 10).It is however, incredible to believe that they could discern the type of rolling done on those cigarettes from the distance where they were observing the alleged sale of more or less 10 to 15 meters. 21 In the case at bar, however, T/Sgt. Belarga did not positively claim that he saw the appellant hand over marijuana to Sgt. Ani. What he said was that there was an exchange of certain articles between the two. Contrary to the contention of the appellant, it was not impossible for T/Sgt. Belarga to have seen, from a distance of 90-100 meters, Sgt. Ani hand to the appellant "something" and for the latter to give
41
42
Facts:From the prosecution evidence, it appears Central Police District, received a phone call from an informant that a blue Kia Pregio van which was being used in the transport of shabu has been seen within the vicinity of Barangay Holy Spirit, Quezon City. Dela Fuente immediately dispatched the three teams to monitor the van. Before reaching Commonwealth Avenue, in front of Andok's Litson Manok, the van hit a seven-year old boy. The van sped away, leaving its young victim behind. A concerned motorist picked up the boy and rushed him to the hospital. Espejon, in the meantime, reported to Dela Fuente that they have spotted the blue Kia van. They followed the van after it sped away and intercepted it at Commonwealth Avenue corner Zuzuarregui Street. The members of the team alighted from their vehicle and approached the van. They introduced themselves as police officers to the driver and passenger of the van. The police noted that Go was on the driver's seat while Que sat on the passenger's seat. Espejon informed Go that he just committed the crime of reckless imprudence and asked for his driver's license. The police peered through the window of the van and noticed several sacks placed on the floor at the back of the van. The sacks have Chinese markings and had a logo which looked like the head of a pig. One of the sacks was open and they noticed that it contained several plastic bags containing white crystalline substance. The police also asked for the identification of Go's
43
(Sharone Clapiz)
ABENES VS. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: Three days prior to the May 11, 1998 national and local elections, the Philippine National Police (PNP) of Pagadian City created a team with a directive to establish and man a checkpoint in Barangay Danlugan at said city, for the purpose of enforcing the Gun Ban. A red Tamaraw FX trying to pass through the check point was stopped by the team and directed to park at the side of the road. As the occupants within the vehicle could not be seen through its tinted windows, a member of the team, knocked on the vehicles window and requested the occupants to step down for a routine inspection. The eight occupants, which included the accused-appellant Rodolfo Abenes who is the Barangay Chairman of Tawagan Norte, Labangan, Zamboanga Del Sur, alighted from the vehicle. At this juncture, SPO1 Requejo and SPO3 Pascua noticed that a holstered firearm was tucked at the right waist of Abenes. The firearm was readily visible to the policemen; it was not covered by the shirt worn by Abenes. Abenes was then asked by SPO3 Pascua whether he had a license and authority to carry the firearm, and whether his possession was exempted from the Gun Ban being enforced by the COMELEC. Accused answered in the affirmative. The policemen then demanded for the pertinent documents to be shown to support Abenes claim. He could not show any. Hence, SPO1 Requejo confiscated Abenes firearm. A certification dated May 18, 1998 from the Firearms and Explosives License Processing Section of the PNP, Pagadian City disclosed that Abenes is not a registered nor a licensed firearm holder. RTC rendered its Decision convicting the petitioner for having been found in possession without license/permit of a Norinco .45 caliber pistol. The petitioner appealed to the CA claiming that the checkpoint was not shown to have been legally set up, and/or that the frisking of the petitioner who was ordered to alight from the Tamaraw FX, along with his companions in the vehicle, violated his constitutional right against unlawful search and seizure; and, that the trial court erred in believing the version of the incident as testified to by the policemen instead of the version presented by the defenses witness which is more consistent with truth and human experience. The CA affirmed the RTC Decision. ISSUES: 1. was the check-point validly established? 2. was the petitioners constitutional right against unlawful search and seizure violated? RULING:
1.
This Court uphold the validity of the checkpoint. The petitioner insists that the prosecution should have produced the mission order constituting the checkpoint, and invokes Aniag, Jr. v. Comelec,15 where the Court purportedly held that firearms seized from a motor vehicle without a warrant are inadmissible because there was no indication that would trigger any suspicion from the policemen nor any other circumstance showing probable cause.
We take judicial notice of the existence of the COMELEC resolution imposing a gun ban during the election period issued pursuant to Section 52(c) in relation to Section 26(q) of the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881). This Court has ruled that not all checkpoints are illegal. Those which are warranted by the exigencies of public order and are conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists are allowed. For, admittedly, routine checkpoints do intrude, to a certain extent, on motorists right to "free passage without interruption," but it cannot be denied that, as a rule, it involves only a brief detention of travelers during which the
44
45
46
(F.)
Bureau of Cutoms and The Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau v. Nelson Ogario and Mark Montelibano GR No. 138081 [2000]
47
H: Yes, the warrantless search and seizure is valid. Thus, the evidence is admissible. petitioner contends that the warrantless search and seizure conducted by the PAF operatives is illegal. Citing People v. Burgos, [9] he maintains that at the time he and his co-accused were stopped by the PAF law enforces, they were unaware that a crime was being committed. Accordingly, the law enforcers were actually engaged in a fishing expedition in violation of his Constitutional right against unlawful search and seizure. Thus, the seized items should not have been admitted in evidence against him. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that under the factual circumstances of the case at bar, there was sufficient probable cause for the PAF surveillance team to stop and search petitioner and his companions. They boarded the parked Air Bus 300 PAL plane at the time when there were no other PAL personnel working therein. They stayed inside the plane for sometime and surprisingly, came out with bulging waists. They then stopped and looked around and made apparent signals. All these acts were sufficient to engender a reasonable suspicion that petitioner and his colleagues were up to something illegal. Moreover, the search and seizure was conducted in connection with the enforcement of customs law when the petitioner and his co-accused were riding a motor vehicle. In addition, the search was conducted at the vicinity
48
It is admitted that the military operatives who raided the Eurocar Sales Office were not armed with a search warrant at that time. 15 The raid was actually precipitated by intelligence reports that said office was being used as headquarters by the RAM. 16 Prior to the raid, there was a surveillance conducted on the premises wherein the surveillance team was fired at by a group of men coming from the Eurocar building. When the military operatives raided the place, the occupants thereof refused to open the door despite the requests for them to do so, thereby compelling the former to break into the office. 17 The Eurocar Sales Office is obviously not a gun store and it is definitely not an armory or arsenal which are the usual depositories for explosives and ammunition. It is primarily and solely engaged in the sale of automobiles. The presence of an unusual quantity of high-powered firearms and explosives could not be justifiably or even colorably explained. In addition, there was general chaos and disorder at that time because of simultaneous and intense firing within the vicinity of the office and in the nearby Camp Aguinaldo which was under attack by rebel forces. 18 The courts in the surrounding areas were obviously closed and, for that matter, the building and houses therein were deserted. Under the foregoing circumstances, it is out considered opinion that the instant case falls under one of the exceptions to the prohibition against a warrantless search. In the first place, the military operatives, taking into account the facts obtaining in this case, had reasonable ground to believe that a crime was being committed. There was consequently more than sufficient probable cause to warrant their action. Furthermore, under the situation then prevailing, the raiding team had no opportunity to apply for and secure a search warrant from the courts. The trial judge himself manifested that on December 5, 1989 when the raid was conducted, his court was closed. 19 Under such urgency and exigency of the moment, a search warrant could lawfully be dispensed with.
(G.) EXIGENCY
PEOPLE V. DE GRACIA July 6, 1994 Facts: The incidents involved in this case took place at the height of the coup d'etat staged in December, 1989 by ultra-rightist elements headed by the Reform the Armed Forces Movement-Soldiers of the Filipino People (RAM-SFP) against the Government. In the course of events, the accused in this case was under surveillance. They were arrested by police operatives in a building. No search warrant was secured by the raiding team because, according to them, at that time there was so much disorder considering that the nearby Camp Aguinaldo was being mopped up by the rebel forces and there was simultaneous firing within the vicinity of the Eurocar office, aside from the fact that the courts were consequently closed. The group was able to confirm later that the owner of Eurocar office is a certain Mr. Gutierrez and that appellant is supposedly a "boy" therein. Issue: Was the search without warrant valid?
The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies as a restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed. If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally be first secured if it is to pass the test of constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private establishment for its own and private purposes, as in the case at bar, and without the intervention of police authorities, the right against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of private individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.
49
3.
CONSTITUTIONALITY CHECKPOINTS
OF
VALMONTE vs. DE VILLA (178 SCRA 211 [1989]; 185 SCRA 665 [1990]) We cannot avoid checkpoints because it is necessary for prevention of crimes. SC stated that in checkpoints, the police can conduct reasonable searches. Even extension searches are allowed provided that there is probable cause. It can tell you to go down or open your compartment. What is probable cause? The court stated if he has the reasonable ground to believe that you are an offender. (Thyrza Marbas) PEOPLE vs. EXALA 221 SCRA 494 (1993) Facts: A search was conducted on a checkpoint, a private jeep boarded by accused stopped for routine inspection. Police asked whether there was a gun, they answered none. The police then tried conducting visual search by beaming a flashlight in the backseat. A bag was seen with the sides bulging. When the police asked what was inside the bag, nobody answered. Instead they turned fidgety. So the bag was ordered open and was found to contain 2 kilos of marijuana. While this is happening, there was no protest. Issue: whether or not the extensive search is justified Held: There was a justification for a more extensive search because when they were asked what was inside the bag nobody answered and instead all of them turned fidgety. (I wasnt able to find the case in the net. Please note that this digest is a copy from my 1st year case digests. Should you find the case in the net, please read it na lang po. Sorry ulit! ) GUANZON vs. DE VILLA 181 SCRA 623 (1990)
Facts: Members of the Metro Manila police flushed all males in the Muslim community in Quiapo. This was about a saturation drive (areal target zoning) conducted by them in connection with anti-drug campaign. They were able to apprehend the small time pushers. Issue: whether or not the saturation drives were unconstitutional Held: The SC did not rule on the constitutionality of the saturation drives. Instead, the case was remanded to the lower court for further reception of evidence. Nevertheless, the SC said that in certain situations police action is necessary. Under Article VII Section 18 of the Constitution, the President as Commander-in-Chief may call out the armed forces to quell lawlessness or violence (not necessarily martial law). Saturation drives are actually a part of police action or measure. Police measure according to the court is not illegal, it is allowed by the Constitution itself. The problem is the manner by which the police action is executed. On the case at hand, there might have been violations but the SC cannot categorize simply because petitioners are not the proper parties. Note: This case recognizes the complementary roles of the PNP and the military in conducting anti-crime campaigns, provided that the peoples rights are not violated in these words: If the military and the police must conduct concerted campaigns to flush out and catch criminal elements, such drives must be consistent with the constitutional and statutory rights of all people affected by such actions. ABENES vs. CA 515 SCRA 690 (2007) Facts: 3 days prior to the May 11, 1998 national and local elections, PNP of Pagadian City created a team composed of seven policemen with a directive to establish and man a checkpoint in Barangay Danlugan at said city, for the purpose of enforcing the Gun Ban which was then being implemented by the COMELEC. The team put up a road block with the marking "COMELEC GUN BAN". A red Tamaraw FX, with the petitioner as one of the occupants, trying to pass through the check point was stopped by the team. Petitioner Abenes who is a Barangay Chairman of Tawagan Norte,
PEOPLE vs. MENDOZA 301 SCRA 66 (1999) PEOPLE vs. BONGCARAWAN 384 SCRA 525 (2002) (I.) AIRPORT SECURITY PEOPLE vs. JOHNSON 348 SCRA 527 (2000) PEOPLE vs. JOHNSON 394 SCRA 478 (2002) PEOPL vs. CANTON 394 SCRA 478 (2002) (J.) JAIL SAFETY PEOPLE vs. CONDE 356 SCRA 625 (2002)
50
PASTRANO vs. CA 281 SCRA 254 (1997) 4. WIRE TAPPING GAANAN vs. IAC 145 SCRA 112 (1986)
Facts: Atty.Laconico and Atty. Gaanan are client and counsel respectively. Laconico called the complainant in the direct assault charge against him in the hope of setting the case amicably. While Laconico was talking to the complainant through the telephone, he asked his lawyer (Gaanan) to listen through an extension telephone. The deal was made and the pay-off settled. During the pay-off, Atty. Gaanan and Laconico made it appear that it was extotrtion, with the presence of NBI agents. The evidence for extortion was statements of Gaanan and Kaconico as well as affidavits regarding the phone conversation. Laconico and Gaanan were charged for violation of RA 4200. Issue: whether or not the extension phone is among those prohibited devices under RA 4200 Held: No. RA 4200 expressly prohibits the tapping of a wire where there is physical interruption or deliberate installation of a device. A telephone extension is not covered by this definition because there is no physical interruption by installing a device. To have an extension is part of the installation. Facts: Two sons of petitioner Pastrano - James Clement G. Pastrano and Clinton Steve G. Pastrano seek assistance from the authority in connection with the death of their brother Clyde. The brothers reported that their father and his common-law wife were keeping unlicensed firearms in their house. They executed a joint affidavit on February 20, 1989 in which they stated that they had personal knowledge of the fact that their father Pedrito Pastrano was keeping three (3) firearms of different calibers in the bedroom of his house. After examining the two brothers, Judge Teodorico M. Durias of the Municipal Trial Court of Oroquieta City (Branch I) issued a search warrant which Capt. Maoza and his men later served at the residence of Pastrano. Issue: whether or not the Search Warrant issued by Judge Teodorico Durias is invalid for failure to comply with the basic requirements of the Constitution and thus, the evidence obtained is inadmissible in court Held: 1. The second ground for the present petition is that the evidence against petitioner was obtained through illegal search. Petitioner cites the constitutional provision that no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. Petitioner contends that Capt. Rodolfo Maoza, who applied for the search warrant, did not have personal knowledge of the facts on which the warrant was based. But the trial court actually examined the two brothers, James Clement G. Pastrano and Clinton G. Steve Pastrano. These two were the ones who reported the matter to Capt. Maoza. They gave information of the illegal possession of firearms by their father, petitioner herein, on the basis of personal knowledge. Their testimonies, not that of Capt. Maoza, formed the basis of the trial courts finding of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant. 2. Petitioner assails the absence of a written deposition showing that the judge had examined the complainant and his witnesses by means of searching questions in writing and under oath as required by Rule 126, 4 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, to wit:
5.
A.
6. REMEDIES IN CASES OF VIOLATION EXCLUSIONARY RULE STONEHILL vs. DIOKNO 20 SCRA 383 (1967)
Facts: The crime alleged is a violation of several laws. Several judges issued various search warrants (amounting to 42 in all) against petitioners herein and /or the corporations of which they were officers, directed to any peace officers, to search the persons above-named and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses, and/or residences, and to seize and take possession of book of accounts, financial records, vouchers, etc., and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions. The materials are alleged to have been the subject of a violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs laws, Internal Revenue (Code), and the Revised Penal Code. Issues:
51
B.
CIVIL ACTION FOR DAMAGES ABERCA vs. VER 160 SCRA 590
Facts: Petitioners brought suit alleging that General Fabian Ver had ordered the Task Force Makabansa of the AFP to conduct "preemptive strikes against known communist terrorists'' underground houses" in Metro Manila. The TFM raided some places using defective warrants; they seized personal belongings of petitioners; they had been interrogated in violation of their right to silence and to counsel; they had been tortured and intimidated. Petitioners asked for payment of damages for violations of their constitutional rights. Issue: Whether Ver, et. al., may be held civilly liable for undertaking invalid search and seizures, or violation of Constitutional rights or liberties of another in general. Held: It may be that Ver, et. al., as members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, were merely responding to their duty, as they claim, to prevent or suppress lawless violence, insurrection, rebellion and subversion in accordance with Proclamation 2054 of President Marcos, despite the lifting of martial law on 27 January 1981, and in pursuance of such objective, to launch pre-emptive strikes against alleged communist terrorist underground houses. But this cannot be construed as a blanket license or a roving commission untramelled by any constitutional restraint, to disregard or transgress upon the rights and liberties of the individual citizen enshrined in and protected by the Constitution. The Constitution remains the supreme law of the land to which all officials, high or low, civilian or military, owe obedience and allegiance at all times. Article 32 of the Civil Code which renders any public officer or employee or any private individual liable in damages for violating the Constitutional rights and liberties of another, as enumerated therein, does not exempt Ver, et. al. from responsibility. Only judges are excluded from liability under the said article, provided their acts or omissions do not constitute a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute. This is not to say that military authorities are restrained from pursuing their assigned task or carrying out their mission with vigor. However, in carrying out this task and mission, constitutional and legal safeguards must be observed, otherwise, the very fabric of our faith will start to unravel. Article 32 clearly speaks of an officer or employee or person directly or indirectly responsible for the violation of the constitutional rights and liberties of another. Thus, it is not the actor alone (i.e. the one directly responsible) who must answer for damages under Article 32; the person indirectly responsible has also to answer for the damages or injury caused to the aggrieved party. By this provision, the principle of accountability of public officials under the Constitution acquires added meaning and assumes a larger dimension. No longer may a superior official relax his vigilance or abdicate his duty to supervise his subordinates, secure in the thought that he does not have to answer for the transgressions committed by the latter against the constitutionally protected rights and liberties of the citizen. Part of the factors that propelled people power in February
Note: This is a really old case, decided by the US Supreme Court (228 U.S. 549 (1913). But to summarize; In the Philippines, we have adopted the doctrine of presidential immunity from American jurisprudence. In the 1905 case of Forbes vs. Chuoco Tiaco, our Supreme Court ruled that the head of the executive department could not be held personally liable for damages resulting from an act performed pursuant to law.
Held: Where the act originally purports to be done in the name and by the authority of the state, a defect in that authority may be cured by the subsequent adoption of the act. The deportation of a Chinaman from the Philippine Islands by the Governor General prior to an act of the legislature authorizing such deportation is to be considered as having been ordered in pursuance of such statute. Sovereign states have inherent power to deport aliens, and Congress is not deprived of this power by the Constitution of the United States. The ground on which the power to deport aliens rests necessitates that it may have to be exercised in a summary manner by executive officers. Congress not being prevented by the Constitution from deporting aliens, the Philippine government cannot be prevented from so doing by the Bill of Rights incorporated in the Act of July 1, 1902. The deportation of aliens in this case by the Philippine government was not a deprivation of liberty without due process of law. The local government of the Philippine Islands has all civil and judicial power necessary to govern the Islands, and this includes the power to deport aliens. The extension by Congress of the Chinese Exclusion and Immigration Laws to the Philippine Islands does not prevent the government of the Islands passing an act removing aliens therefrom. The English rule is that an act of state is not cognizable in any municipal court. It is within the power of the Legislature of the Philippine Islands to declare an act of the executive which is within its power to authorize to be not subject to question or review. Deporting the plaintiffs was not depriving them of liberty without due process of law unless, on other grounds, the local government was acting beyond its powers. But the local
52
(Janissa Delicona)
C.
CRIMINAL CASES UNDER REVISED PENAL CODE 7. REQUIREMENTS FOR ISSUANCE OF WARRANT OF ARREST
LIM VS FELIX (1991)
Facts: Sometime on March 1989, Congressman Espinosa and his security escorts were attacked and killed by a lone assassin.An information for murder was filed against the petitoners. Petitioners filed a verified petition for change of venue. The SC issued an En Banc Resolution authorizing the change of venue from the Regional Trial Court of Masbate to the Regional Trial Court of Makati to avoid a miscarriage of justice. The cases were raffled to Branch 56 presided by respondent Judge Nemesio S. Felix. Judge Felix issued a warrant of arrest. Issue: The primary issue in these consolidated petitions centers on whether or not a judge may issue a warrant of arrest without bail by simply relying on the prosecution's certification and recommendation that a probable cause exists. Ruling: The records of the preliminary investigation conducted by the Municipal Court of Masbate and reviewed by the respondent Fiscal were still in Masbate when the respondent Judge issued the warrants of arrest against the petitioners. There was no basis for the respondent Judge to make his own personal determination regarding the existence of a probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest as mandated by the Constitution. He could not possibly have known what transpired in Masbate as he had nothing but a certification. Significantly, the respondent Judge denied the petitioners' motion for the transmittal of the records on the ground that the mere certification and recommendation of the respondent Fiscal that a probable cause exists is sufficient for him to issue a warrant of arrest. We reiterate the ruling in Soliven v. Makasiar that the Judge does not have to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. The Prosecutor can perform the same functions as a commissioner for the taking of the evidence. However, there should be a report and necessary documents supporting the Fiscal's bare certification. All of these should be before the Judge. The extent of the Judge's personal examination of the report and its annexes depends on the circumstances of each case. We cannot determine before hand how cursory or exhaustive the Judge's examination should be. The Judge has to exercise sound discretion for, after all, the personal determination is vested in the Judge by the Constitution. It can be as brief or as detailed as the circumstances of each case require. To be sure, the Judge must go beyond the Prosecutor's certification and investigation report whenever necessary. He should call for the complainant and witnesses themselves to answer the court's probing questions when the circumstances of the case so require. It is worthy to note that petitioners Vicente Lim, Sr. and Susana Lim presented to the respondent Judge documents of recantation of witnesses whose testimonies were used to establish a prima facie case against them. Although, the general rule is that recantations are not given much weight in the determination of a case and in the granting of a new trial [Tan Ang Bun v. Court of Appeals, et al. G. R. No. L-47747, February 15, 1990, People v. Lao Wan Sing, 46 SCRA 298 (1972)], the respondent Judge before issuing his own warrants of arrest should, at the very least, have gone over the records of the preliminary examination conducted earlier in the light of the evidence now presented by the concerned witnesses in view of the "political undertones" prevailing in the cases. Even the Solicitor General recognized the significance of the recantations of some witnesses when he recommends a reinvestigation of the cases. We reiterate that in making the required personal determination, a Judge is not precluded from relying on the evidence earlier gathered by responsible officers. The extent of the reliance depends on the circumstances of each case and is subject to the Judge's sound discretion. However, the Judge abuses that discretion when having no evidence before him, he issues a warrant of arrest. Indubitably, the respondent Judge committed a grave error when he relied solely on the prosecutor's certification and issued the questioned Order dated July 5, 1990 without having before him any other basis for his personal determination of the existence of a probable cause. COJUANGCO VS SANDIGANBAYAN (1998)
53
54
TALINGDAN VS EDUARTE(2001) FACTS: Atty. Edgar H. Talingdan, a private practitioner, charges respondent Judge Henedino P. Eduarte, RTC-Br. 20, Cauayan, Isabela, with improvidently issuing a warrant of arrest in Crim. Case No. Br. 20-1373 for libel without the requisite preliminary investigation being first conducted by the Office of the Public Prosecutor. Specifically, complainant alleged in his Letter-Complaint that sometime in April 2000 elements of the PNP stormed into his residence to arrest him and his client, Modesto Luzano, on the strength of a Warrant of Arrest dated 12 April 2000 issued by respondent Judge Eduarte in Crim. Case No. Br. 20-1373 entitled "People v. Edgar Talingdan and Modesto Luzano" for the supposed crime of libel. Surprised that such a case existed against him and his client as they had not been previously charged, complainant filed a Very Urgent Motion to Quash and/or Set Aside Warrant of Arrest and Direct Prosecutors Office to Conduct Preliminary Investigation asking that the Warrant of Arrest be set aside for being premature since they had not been previously notified of the charge against them and no preliminary investigation was ever conducted by the public prosecutors office yet, and for being defective since the amount of bail was not specified therein in violation of their constitutional right to bail. Respondent Judge granted the motion and recalled the warrant of arrest in an Order dated 12 May 2000 admitting that he issued the same under the mistaken belief that a preliminary investigation had already been conducted and an information already filed in court. Complainant nonetheless filed this administrative case allegedly to help the Court in purging the Judiciary of those who undermine its dignity and credibility as his faith therein was almost eroded by the unfortunate incident. In his Comments respondent Judge did not deny that he issued the improvident warrant of arrest. He only alleged by way of explanation and exculpation that on 24 March 2000 a complaint for libel was directly filed with the RTC-Br. 19, Cauayan, Isabela, by LeoncioDalin Sr. which was docketed as Crim. Case No. 2881. The case was assigned to his sala after raffle and was re-docketed as Crim. Case No. Br. 20-1373. The records of the case then went to the Criminal Docket Clerk, Ms. Imelda Severino who, under the Check List for Criminal Cases that he had prepared for her, was supposed to verify from the records first whetheran information had already been filed and if there was, to prepare the corresponding warrant of arrest if the accused had not yet been arrested. Thus when he saw the Warrant of Arrest prepared by Ms. Severino in Crim. Case No. Br. 20-1373, he signed the same honestly thinking that she had faithfully complied first with her duty of going over the records of the case. Respondent Judge assured the Court that the incident was a simple mistake on his part and that he had not been actuated by malice, corrupt motive, or improper consideration in its commission. ISSUE: Whether or not the judge acted improvidently in issuing the warrants or arrest against the petitioners? RULING: YES. Enshrined in our Constitution is the rule that "[n]o x xx warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing x xx the persons x xx to be seized." Interpreting the words "personal determination" we said that it does not thereby mean that judges are obliged to conduct the personal examination of the complainant and his witnesses themselves. To require thus would be to unduly laden them with preliminary examinations and investigations of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before them. Rather what is emphasized merely is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself as to the existence of probable cause. To this end he may: (a) personally evaluate the report and the
55
56
8.
BE
MADE
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
OF
DECLARTION
OF
ILLEGAL
PP vs. RODOLFO BIYOC y WENCESLAO G.R. No. 167670 December 7, 2007 FACTS: At 4PM of December 5, 2000, private complainant AAA (as used in the full text of the decision) was in a room on the second floor of the family house taking care of her one-year-old sister. Her father, herein appellant, entered the room and touched her genitals, after which he told her to lie down on the floor. Overcome by fear, AAA did lie down on the floor as told. Appellant at once pulled her short pants down and touched her genitals again, after which he went on top of her and tried to insert his penis into her vagina. Appellant was not able to fully penetrate AAAs vagina, however, as her elder sister BBB (as used by SC) went up the second floor and saw appellant sitting in front of AAA who was lying down, face up. Appellant immediately warned BBB not to tell their mother about what she just saw.5 After BBB left, appellant inserted his penis inside AAAs vagina.
66
(c)
It is obvious that based on the testimonies of the arresting barangay tanod, not one of these circumstances was obtaining at the time petitioner was arrested. By their own admission, petitioner was not committing an offense at the time he alighted from the bus, nor did he appear to be then committing an offense. The tanod did not have probable cause either to justify petitioners warrantless arrest. For the exception in Section 5(a), Rule 113 to operate, this Court has ruled that two (2) elements must be present: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. Here, petitioners act of looking around after getting off the bus was but natural as he was finding his way to his destination. That he purportedly attempted to run away as the tanod approached him is irrelevant and cannot by itself be construed as adequate to charge the tanod with personal knowledge that petitioner had just engaged in, was actually engaging in or was attempting to engage in criminal activity. More importantly, petitioner testified that he did not run away but in fact spoke with the barangay tanod when they approached him. Indeed, the supposed acts of petitioner, even assuming that they appeared dubious, cannot be viewed as sufficient to incite suspicion of criminal activity enough to validate his warrantless arrest. If at all, the search most permissible for the tanod to conduct under the prevailing backdrop of the case was a stop-and-frisk to allay any suspicion they have been harboring based on petitioners behavior. However, a stop-and-frisk situation, following Terry v. Ohio, must precede a warrantless arrest, be limited to the persons outer clothing, and should be grounded upon a genuine reason, in light of the police officers experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him. RULING IN ISSUE no. 2 Accordingly, petitioners waiver of his right to question his arrest notwithstanding, the marijuana leaves allegedly taken during the search cannot be admitted in evidence against him as they were seized during a warrantless
67
9.
IMMUNITY FROM ARREST MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 10. PRIVACY (ART III, SECTION 2)
OPLE vs. TORRES, 293 scra 141 (1998)
FACTS: Senator Ople is challenging the validity of A.O. No. 308 issued by Pres. Ramos entitled Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System. The Order provides for a Population Reference Number (PRN) for every individual through the use of Biometrics Technology and computer
68
69
70
71
III.
Facts: Petitioner Blo Umpar Adiong, a senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections assails the COMELEC's Resolution insofar as it prohibits the posting of decals and stickers in "mobile" places like cars and other moving vehicles. According to him such prohibition is violative of Section 82 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 11(a) of Republic Act No. 6646. In addition, the petitioner believes that with the ban on radio, television and print political advertisements, he, being a neophyte in the field of politics stands to suffer grave and irreparable injury with this prohibition. The posting of decals and stickers on cars and other moving vehicles would be his last medium to inform the electorate that he is a senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections. Issue: Whether or not Comelecs Resolution is unconconstitutional. Ruling: YES. The prohibition unduly infringes on the citizen's fundamental right of free speech enshrined in the Constitution (Sec. 4, Article III). There is no public interest substantial enough to warrant the kind of restriction involved in this case. The posting of decals and stickers in mobile places like cars and other moving vehicles does not endanger any substantial government interest. There is no clear public interest threatened by such activity so as to justify the curtailment of the cherished citizen's right of free speech and expression. Under the clear and present danger rule not only must the danger be patently clear and pressingly present but the evil sought to be avoided must be so substantive as to justify a clamp over one's mouth or a writing instrument to be stilled: The case confronts us again with the duty our system places on the Court to say where the individual's freedom ends and the State's power begins. Choice on that border, now as always delicate, is perhaps more so where the usual presumption supporting legislation is balanced by the preferred place given in our scheme to the great, the indispensable democratic freedom secured by the first Amendment . . . That priority gives these liberties a sanctity and a sanction not permitting dubious intrusions and it is the character of the right, not of the limitation, which determines what standard governs the choice . . . For these reasons any attempt to restrict those liberties must be justified by clear public interest, threatened not doubtfully or remotely, but by clear and present danger. The rational connection between the remedy provided and the evil to be curbed, which in other context might support legislation against attack on due process grounds, will not suffice. These rights rest on firmer foundation. Accordingly, whatever occasion would restrain orderly discussion and persuasion, at appropriate time and place, must have clear support in public danger, actual or impending. Only the greatest abuses, endangering permanent interests, give occasion for permissible limitation. (Thomas V. Collins, 323 US 516 [1945]). (Emphasis supplied) Significantly, the freedom of expression curtailed by the questioned prohibition is not so much that of the candidate or the political party. The regulation strikes at the freedom of an individual to express his preference and, by displaying it on his car, to convince others to agree with him. A sticker may be furnished by a candidate but once the car owner agrees to have it placed on his private vehicle, the expression becomes a statement by the owner, primarily his own and not of anybody else. If, in the National Press Club case, the Court was careful to rule out restrictions on reporting by newspapers or radio and television stations and commentators or columnists as long as these are not correctly paid-for advertisements or purchased opinions with less reason can we sanction the prohibition against a sincere manifestation of support and a proclamation of belief by an individual person who pastes a sticker or decal on his private property. (Vanessa Fermil)
b.
c. d.
e. f.
On its face, EO 420 shows no constitutional infirmity because it even narrowly limits the data that can be collected, recorded and shown compared to the existing ID systems of government entities. EO 420 further provides strict safeguards to protect the confidentiality of the data collected, in contrast to the prior ID systems which are bereft of strict administrative safeguards. Petitioners have not shown how EO 420 will violate their right to privacy. Petitioners cannot show such violation by a mere facial examination of EO 420 because EO 420 narrowly draws the data collection, recording and exhibition while prescribing comprehensive safeguards. Ople v. Torres is not authority to hold that EO 420 violates the right to privacy because in that case the assailed executive issuance, broadly drawn and devoid of safeguards, was annulled solely on the ground that the subject matter required legislation. As then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban noted in his concurring opinion in Ople v. Torres, The voting is decisive only on the need for appropriate legislation, and it is only on this ground that the petition is granted by this Court. EO 420 applies only to government entities that already maintain ID systems and issue ID cards pursuant to their regular functions under existing laws. EO 420 does not grant such government entities any power that they do not already possess under existing laws. In contrast, the assailed executive issuance in Ople v. Torres sought to establish a National Computerized Identification Reference System, a national ID system that did not exist prior to the assailed executive issuance. Obviously, a national ID card system requires legislation because it creates a new national data collection and card issuance system where none existed before.
72
1.
'Clear and present danger' rule- the evil consequence of the comment or utterance must be 'extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high' before the utterance can be punished. The danger to be guarded against is the 'substantive evil' sought to be prevented. 'Dangerous tendency' rule- If the words uttered create a dangerous tendency which the state has a right to prevent, then such words are punishable. It is not necessary that some definite or immediate acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness be advocated. It is sufficient that such acts be advocated in general terms. Nor is it necessary that the language used be reasonably calculated to incite persons to acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness. It is sufficient if the natural tendency and probable effect of the utterance be to bring about the substantive evil which the legislative body seeks to prevent.
2.
The Supreme Court adheres to the clear and present danger rule. The danger must not only be clear but also present. "Present" refers to the time element; the danger must not only be probable but very likely to be inevitable. The evil sought to be avoided must be so substantive as to justify a clamp over one's mouth or a restraint of a writing instrument. Prior restraint carries with it a presumption of invalidity. To justify a restriction, the promotion of a substantial government interest must be clearly shown. The said Comelec Resolution is too broad, since its application is without qualification as to whether the polling is disruptive or not. There is no showing that exit polls or the means to interview voters cause chaos in voting centers. Neither has any evidence been presented proving that the presence of exit poll reporters near an election precinct tends to create disorder or confuse the voters. The absolute ban imposed by the Comelec cannot, therefore, be justified. It does not leave open any alternative channel of communication to gather the type of information obtained through exit polling. On the other hand, there are other valid and reasonable ways and means to achieve the Comelec end of avoiding or minimizing disorder and confusion that may be brought about by exit surveys.
73
Petitioners sought to enjoin the Commission on Elections from enforcing 5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 (Fair Election Act), which provides: xxx Surveys affecting national candidates shall not be published fifteen (15) days before an election and surveys affecting local candidates shall not be published seven (7) days before an election. The term election surveys is defined in 5.1 of the law as follows: Election surveys refer to the measurement of opinions and perceptions of the voters as regards a candidates popularity, qualifications, platforms or a matter of public discussion in relation to the election, including voters preference for candidates or publicly discussed issues during the campaign period (hereafter referred to as Survey). Held: 5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 constitutes an unconstitutional abridgment of freedom of speech, expression, and the press for the following reasons: (1) It imposes a prior restraint on the freedom of expression; (2) It is a direct and total suppression of a category of expression even though such suppression is only for a limited period; and (3) The governmental interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by means other than the suppression of freedom of expression. To be sure, 5.4 lays a prior restraint on freedom of speech, expression, and the press by prohibiting the publication of election survey results affecting candidates within the prescribed periods of fifteen (15) days immediately preceding a national election and seven (7) days before a local election. The grant of power to the COMELEC under Art. IX-C, 4 is limited to ensuring equal opportunity, time, space, and the right to reply as well as uniform and reasonable rates of charges for the use of such media facilities for public information campaigns and forums among candidates. The presumption of no invalidity extends only to exercises of supervisory or regulatory authority on the part of the Comelec for the purpose of securing equal opportunity among candidates for political office, although such supervision or regulation may result in some limitation of the rights of free speech and free press. The OBrien Test: [A] government regulation is sufficiently justified [1] if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; [2] if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; [3] if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and [4] if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms [of speech, expression and press] is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. Under this test, even if a law furthers an important or substantial governmental interest, it should be invalidated if such governmental interest is not unrelated to the suppression of free expression. Moreover, even if the purpose is unrelated to the suppression of free speech, the law should nevertheless be invalidated if the restriction on freedom of expression is greater than is necessary to achieve the governmental purpose in question. Using the OBrien test, section 5.4 should be invalidated. First. It fails to meet criterion [3] of the OBrien test because the asserted governmental interest is not unrelated to the suppression of free expression.
GMA NETWORK vs. MTRCB G.R. No. 148579 FEBRUARY 5, 2007 Facts: Petitioner GMA Network, Inc. operates and manages the UHF television station, EMC Channel 27. On January 7, 2000, respondent MTRCB issued an order of suspension against petitioner for airing "Muro Ami: The Making" without first securing a permit from it as provided in Section 7 of PD 1986. The penalty of suspension was based on Memorandum Circular 9817 dated December 15, 1998 which provided for the penalties for exhibiting a program without a valid permit from the MTRCB. Issues: (1) Whether the MTRCB has the power or authority to review the show "Muro Ami: The Making" prior to its broadcast by television and (2) Whether Memorandum Circular No. 98-17 was enforceable and binding on petitioner. Held: 1. Yes, MTRCB has jurisdiction. Section 3 of PD 1986 empowers the MTRCB to screen, review and examine all motion pictures, television programs including publicity materials. This power of prior review is highlighted in its Rules and Regulations, particularly Section 7 thereof. The only exemptions from the MTRCBs power of review are those expressly mentioned in Section 7,6 such as (1) television programs imprinted or exhibited by the Philippine Government and/or departments and agencies, and (2) newsreels. "Muro Ami: The Making," did not fall under any of the exemptions and was therefore within the power of review of MTRCB. Even if said program is a pubic affairs program, the MTRCB still has jurisdiction. A public affairs program -- described as a variety of news treatment; a cross between pure television news and news-related commentaries, analysis and/or exchange of opinions -- is within the MTRCBs power of review. 2. No, Memorandum Circular No. 98-17 was not enforceable and binding on petitioner. The Administrative Code of 1987, particularly Section 3 thereof, expressly requires each agency to file with the Office of the National Administrative Register (ONAR) of the
74
The totality of the injurious effects of the violation to private and public interest must be calibrated in light of the preferred status accorded by the Constitution and by related international covenants protecting freedom of speech and of the press. There is no showing that the feared violation of the antiwiretapping law clearly endangers the national security of the State. 2. Whether or not the press statements of the Secretary of Justice and the NTC constitute a form of content-based prior restraint. Held: It is not decisive that the press statements made by respondents were not reduced in or followed up with formal orders or circulars. It is sufficient that the press statements were made by respondents while in the exercise of their official functions. Undoubtedly, respondent Gonzales made his statements as Secretary of Justice, while the NTC issued its statement as the regulatory body of media. The concept of an act does not limit itself to acts already converted to a formal order or official circular. The press statements at bar are acts that should be struck down as they constitute impermissible forms of prior restraints on the right to free speech and press. The petition was GRANTED. Note: In this case, the Supreme Court enumerated the Four aspects of freedom of the press, to wit: 1) 2) 3) 4) Freedom from prior restraint; Freedom from punishment subsequent to publication; Freedom of access to information; Freedom of circulation.
OF
TESTS
IN
VARIOUS NATIONAL
EXPRESSION
AND
b. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION & CRITICISM OF OFFICIAL CONDUCT: TEST OF ACTUAL MALICE SOLIVEN vs. MAKASIAR 167 SCRA 393 (1988)
75
The guarantees of freedom of speech and press prohibit a public official or public figure from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with actual malice, i.e., with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. To require critics of official conduct to guarantee the truth of all their factual assertions on pain of libel judgments would lead to self-censorship, since would-be critics would be deterred from voicing out their criticisms even if such were believed to be true, or were in fact true, because of doubt whether it could be proved or because of fear of the expense of having to prove it In the present case, SC deemed private respondent a public figure. A "public figure" is defined as a person who, by his accomplishments, fame, mode of living, or by adopting a profession or calling which gives the public a legitimate interest in his doings, his affairs and his character, has become a public personage. He is, in other words, a celebrity. The FNCLT was an undertaking infused with public interest. As its Executive Director and spokesman, private respondent consequently assumed the status of a public figure. Moreover, If a matter is a subject of public or general interest, it cannot suddenly become less so merely because a private individual is involved or because in some sense the individual did not voluntarily choose to become involved. The publics primary interest is in the event; the public focus is on the conduct of the participant and the content, effect and significance of the conduct, not the participant's prior anonymity or notoriety. On Malice While, generally, malice can be presumed from defamatory words, the privileged character of a communication destroys the presumption of malice. Malice connotes ill will or spite and speaks not in response to duty but merely to injure the reputation of the person defamed, and implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm. It is the essence of the crime of libel. Private respondent failed to substantiate by preponderant evidence that petitioner was animated by a desire to inflict unjustifiable harm on his reputation, or that the articles were written and published without good motives or justifiable ends. Furthermore, to be considered malicious, the libelous statements must be shown to have been written or published with the knowledge that they are false or in reckless disregard of whether they are false or not.[ Even assuming that the contents of the articles are false, mere error, inaccuracy or even falsity alone does not prove actual malice. Petition was granted.
Fair commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged and constitute a valid defense in an action for libel or slander. The doctrine of fair comment means that while in general every discreditable imputation publicly made is deemed false, because every man is presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially proved, and every false imputation is deemed malicious, nevertheless, when the discreditable imputation is directed against a public person in his public capacity, it is not necessarily actionable. In order that such discreditable imputation to a public official may be actionable, it must either be a false allegation of fact or a comment based on a false supposition. If the comment is an expression of opinion, based on established facts, then it is immaterial that the opinion happens to be mistaken, as long as it might reasonably be inferred from the facts. The questioned articles dealt with matters of public interest. The declared objective of the conference, the composition of its members and participants, and the manner by which it was intended to be funded no doubt lend to its activities as being genuinely imbued with public interest. An organization such as the FNCLT aiming to reinvent and reshape the transportation laws of the country and seeking to source its funds for the project from the public at large cannot dissociate itself from the public character of its mission. As such, it cannot but invite close scrutiny by the media obliged to inform
xxx Nananawagan kahapon kay pangulong Corazon Aquino ang 38 mahihirap na pamilya sa Tondo Foreshore Area na umanoy inagawan ng lupa ng kanilang barangay chairman sa pakikipagsabwatan sa ilang pinuno ng
76
Petitioner was able to prove the truth of his charges against the barangay official. His allegation that, through connivance with NHA officials, complainant was able to obtain title to several lots at the Tondo Foreshore Area was based on the letter of NHA Inspector General Hermogenes Fernandez to petitioners counsel. With regard to the other imputations made by petitioner against complainant, it must be noted that what petitioner stated was that various charges (for attempted murder against petitioner, gambling, theft of fighting cocks) had been filed by the residents against their barangay chairman but these had all been dismissed. Petitioner was able to show evidence against these charges. In denouncing the barangay chairman in this case, petitioner and the other residents of the Tondo Foreshore Area were not only acting in their self-interest but engaging in the performance of a civic duty to see to it that public duty is discharged faithfully and well by those on whom such duty is incumbent. The recognition of this right and duty of every citizen in a democracy is inconsistent with any requirement placing on him the burden of proving that he acted with good motives and for justifiable ends. For that matter, even if the defamatory statement is false, no liability can attach if it relates to official conduct, unless the public official concerned proves that the statement was made with actual malice that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. In this case, the prosecution failed to prove not only that the charges made by petitioner were false but also that petitioner made them with knowledge of their falsity or with reckless disregard of whether they were false or not. The decision of the CA was REVERSED and the petitioner was ACQUITTED of the crime charged.
(Kristine Ferrer)
The article is not a privileged communication. A privileged communication may be either absolutely privileged or qualifiedly privileged. Absolutely privileged communications are those which are not actionable even if the author has acted in bad faith. An
77
78
Ruling: The principle of press freedom is invoked by Jurado in justification of these published writings. That invocation is obviously unavailing in light of the basic postulates and the established axioms or norms for the proper exercise of press freedom earlier set forth in this opinion. Jurado next puts in issue this Court's power to cite him for contempt. The issue is quickly disposed of by adverting to the familiar principle reiterated inter alia in Zaldivar v. Gonzales: . . . (T)he Supreme Court has inherent power to punish for contempt, to control in the furtherance of justice the conduct of ministerial officers of the Court including lawyers and all other persons connected in any manner with a case before the Court (In re Kelly, 35 Phil. 944 [1916]; In re Severino Lozano and Anastacio Quevedo, 54 Phil. 801 (1930]; In re Vicente Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567 [1923]; and In re Vicente Sotto, 82 Phil. 595 [1949]). The power to punish for contempt is "necessary for its own protection against improper interference with the due administration of justice," "(i)t is not dependent upon the complaint of any of the parties litigant" (Halili v. Court of Industrial Relations, 136 SCRA 112 [1985]; Andres v. Cabrera, 127 SCRA 802 [1984]; Montalban v. Canonoy, 38 SCRA 1 [1971]; Commissioner of Immigration v. Cloribel, 20 SCRA 1241 [1967]; Herras Teehankee v. Director of Prisons, 76 Phil. 630 [1946]). Contempt is punishable, even if committed without relation to a pending case. Philippine jurisprudence parallels a respectable array of English decisions holding contumacious scurrilous attacks against the courts calculated to bring them into disrepute, even when made after the trial stage or after the end of the proceedings. Jurado would also claim that the Court has no administrative supervision over him as a member of the press or over his work as a journalist, and asks why he is being singled out, and, by being required to submit to a separate administrative proceeding, treated differently than his other colleagues in media who were only asked to explain their reports and comments about wrongdoing in the judiciary to the Ad Hoc Committee. The answer is that upon all that has so far been said, the Court may hold anyone to answer for utterances offensive to its dignity, honor or reputation which tend to put it in
79
IN RE RAMON TULFO AM NO. 90-4-1545-0 APRIL 7, 1990 Facts: In Oct. 13, 1989, Tulfo wrote an article in his column in PDI 'On Target' stating that the Supreme Court rendered an idiotic decision in legalizing checkpoints, and again on Oct. 16, 1989, where he called the Supreme Court stupid and "sangkatutak na mga bobo justices of the Philippine Supreme Court". Tulfo was required to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt. Tulfo said that he was just reacting emotionally because he had been a victim of harassment in the checkpoints, and "idiotic" meant illogical and unwise, and "bobo" was just quoted from other attorneys, and since the case had been decided and terminated, there was not contempts. Lastly, the article does not pose any clear and present danger to the Supreme court. Issue: Whether or Not Tulfo is in contempt. Ruling: Yes. At the time Tulfo wrote the article, the checkpoints case had not yet been decided upon, and the Supreme Court was still acting on an MR filed from the CA. The power to punish is inherent as it is essential for self-preservation. Contempt of court is defiance of the authority, justice and dignity of the courts. It brings disrepute to the court. There are two kinds of publications which can be punished for contempt: a. those whose object is to affect the decision in a pending case. b. those whose object is to bring courts to discredit. Tulfo's article constituted both. It should have been okay to criticize if respectful language was used, but if its object is only to degrade and ridicule, then it is clearly an obstruction of justice. Nothing constructive can be gained from them. Being emotional is no excuse for being insulting. Quoting is not an excuse also, because at the end of his article, Tulfo said, "So you bobo justices, watch out!" Also, he said he was not sorry for having written the articles. Tulfo is found in contempt of court and is gravely censured.
Zaldivar vs. Sandiganbayan February 1, 1989 FACTS: The case stemmed from the resolution of the Supreme Court stopping the respondent from investigating graft cases involving Antique Gov. Enrique Zaldivar. The Court ruled that since the adoption of the 1987 Constitution, respondents powers as Tanodbayan have been superseded by the creation of the Office of the Ombudsman, he however becomes the Special Prosecutor of the State, and can only conduct an investigation and file cases only when so authorized by the Ombudsman. A motion for reconsideration was filed by the respondent wherein he included statements which were unrelated in the Issue raised in the Court. This include: (a)That he had been approached twice by a leading member of the court and he was asked to 'go slow on Zaldivar and 'not to be too hard on him; (b) That he "was approached and asked to refrain from investigating the COA report on illegal disbursements in the Supreme Court because 'it will embarass the Court;" and (c) that in several instances, the undersigned
D.
CONTENT-NEUTRAL RESTRICTIONS 1. REGULATION OF POLITICAL CAMPAIGN OSMEA vs. COMELEC 288 SCRA447 (1998) ABS-CBN vs. COMELEC 323 SCRA 811 (2000) SWS vs. COMELEC 357 SCRA 497 (2001) 2. FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY
NESTLE PHILIPPINES vs. SANCHEZ
80
Subayco vs Sandiganbayan Aug 21, 1986 Facts: During the Martial Law days, one of the biggest protest rallies was blueprinted as a Welga ng Bayan at Escalante, Negros Occidental. It ended in tragedy when Twenty (20) demonstrators were shot dead and twenty-four (24) others were wounded by the military and para-military forces of the Marcos government. Of several persons charged with various counts of murder and frustrated murder, only three (3) were convicted Generoso N. Subayco, Alfredo T. Alcalde and Eleuterio O. Ibaez were convicted by the respondent Sandiganbayan. They now come to this Court insisting on their innocence and pleading to be set free. Ruling: We deny their petition and we warn our military and police authorities that they cannot shoot people who are exercising their right to peacefully assemble and petition the government for redress of grievance. The use of bullets to break up an assembly of people petitioning for redress of grievance cannot but be bewailed. It is bound to happen again for as long as abuses in government abound. Precisely to help put a brake on official abuses, people empowerment was codified in various provisions of the 1987 Constitution. It is high time to remind our officials that under our Constitution power does not come from the barrel of a gun but from the ballots of the people. It thus important to know the unexpurgated will of the people for in a republican government, it is the people who should truly rule. Consequently, the right of the people to assemble peacefully and to petition for redress of grievance should not be abridged by officials momentarily holding the powers of government. The Constitution did not engage in mystical teaching when it proclaimed in solemn tone that "sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them." It should be clear even to those with intellectual deficits that when the sovereign people assemble to petition for redress of grievances, all should listen, especially the government. For in a democracy, it is the people who count; those who are deaf to their grievances are ciphers
Bayan vs Ermita April 25, 2006 Facts: The first petitioners, Bayan, et al. allege that they are citizens and taxpayers of the Philippines and that their rights as organizations and individuals were violated when the rally they participated in on October 6, 2005 was violently dispersed by policemen implementing Batas Pambansa (B.P.) No. 880. Petitioners Bayan, et al., contend that Batas Pambansa No. 880 is clearly a violation of the Constitution and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other human rights treaties of which the Philippines is a signatory. They argue that B.P. No. 880 requires a permit before one can stage a public assembly regardless of the presence or absence of a clear and present danger. It also curtails the choice of venue and is thus repugnant to the freedom of expression clause as the time and place of a public assembly form part of the message for which the expression is sought. Furthermore, it is not content-neutral as it does not apply to mass actions in support of the government. The words "lawful cause," "opinion," "protesting or influencing" suggest the exposition of some cause not espoused by the government. Also, the phrase "maximum tolerance" shows that the law applies to assemblies against the government because they are being tolerated. As a content-based legislation, it cannot pass the strict scrutiny test. Issues: Whether or not B.P. No. 880 is a content-based or contentneutral regulation. Whether or not the Calibrated Preemptive Response (CPR) is constitutional. Ruling: First Issue: It is a content-neutral regulation. A reading of BP 880 is clear that it is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the time, place and manner of the assemblies. This was
Facts: Members of SSS Employees Association (SSSEA) went on strike after the SSS failed to act on the union's demands, which included: implementation of the provisions of the old SSS-SSSEA collective bargaining agreement (CBA) on check-off of union dues; payment of accrued overtime pay, night differential pay and holiday pay; conversion of temporary or contractual employees with six (6) months or more of service into regular and permanent employees and their entitlement to the same salaries, allowances and benefits given to other regular employees of the SSS; and payment of the children's allowance of P30.00, and after the SSS deducted certain amounts from the salaries of the employees and allegedly committed acts of discrimination and unfair labor practices. On June 11, 1987, the SSS filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint for damages with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners. Issue: Whether or not the employees of Social Security System (SSS) have the right to strike? Ruling: No, SSS employees do not have the right to strike. Considering that under the 1987 Constitution "[t]he civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters" [Art. IX(B), Sec. .2(l) see also Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 where the employees in the civil service are denominated as "government employees"] and that the SSS is one such government-controlled corporation with an original charter, having been created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of the civil service [NASECO v. NLRC, G.R. Nos. 69870 & 70295, November 24,1988] and are covered by the Civil Service Commission's memorandum prohibiting strikes. This being the case, the strike staged by the employees of the SSS was illegal. Government employees may, therefore, through their unions or associations, either petition the Congress for the betterment of the
81
Ruling: In order to determine if the HIGC has jurisdiction over the dispute, it is necessary to resolve preliminarily -- on the basis of the allegations in the Complaint -- whether private respondents are members of the SCHA. Petitioners contend that because the Complaint arose from intracorporate relations between the SCHA and its members, the HIGC therefore has no jurisdiction over the dispute. To support their contention that private respondents are members of the association, petitioners cite the SCHAs Articles of Incorporation and By-laws which provide that all landowners of the Sta. Clara Subdivision are automatically members of the SCHA. We are not persuaded. The constitutionally guaranteed freedom of association includes the freedom not to associate. The right to choose with whom one will associate oneself is the very foundation and essence of that partnership. It should be noted that the provision guarantees the right to form an association. It does not include the right to compel others to form or join one. More to the point, private respondents cannot be compelled to become members of the SCHA by the simple expedient of including them in its Articles of Incorporation and By-laws without their express or implied consent. True, it may be to the mutual advantage of lot owners in a subdivision to band themselves together to promote their common welfare. But that is possible only if the owners voluntarily agree, directly or indirectly, to become members of the association. True also, memberships in homeowners associations may be acquired in various ways -- often through deeds of sale, Torrens certificates or other forms of evidence of property ownership. In the present case, however, other than the said Articles of Incorporation and By-laws, there is no showing that private respondents have agreed to be SCHA members.
Padcom vs Ortigas May 9, 2002 Facts: Petitioner Padcom Condominium Corporation (hereafter PADCOM) owns and manages the Padilla Office Condominium Building (PADCOM Building). The land on which the building stands was originally acquired from the Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership (OCLP), by Tierra Development Corporation (TDC) under a Deed of Sale dated 4 September 1974. Among the terms and conditions in the deed of sale was the requirement that the transferee and its successor-in-interest must become members of an association for realty owners and long-term lessees in the area later known as the Ortigas Center. In 1982, respondent Ortigas Center Association, Inc. (hereafter the Association) was organized to advance the interests and promote the general welfare of the real estate owners and long-term lessees of lots in the Ortigas Center. It sought the collection of membership dues in the amount of two thousand seven hundred twenty-four pesos and forty centavos (P2,724.40) per month from PADCOM. The corporate books showed that PADCOM owed the Association P639,961.47, representing membership dues, interests and penalty charges from April 1983 to June 1993. In view of PADCOMs failure and refusal to pay its arrears in monthly dues, including interests and penalties thereon, the Association filed a complaint for collection of sum of money. PADCOM contends that it cannot be compelled to be a member of the Association solely by virtue of the "automatic membership" clause that appears on the title of the property and the Deed of Transfer. In 1975, when it bought the land, the Association was still inexistent. Therefore, the provision on automatic membership was
82
4.
MOVIES CENSORSHIP
Gonzales vs Kalaw Katigbak July 22, 1985
Facts: The principal petitioner is Jose Antonio U. Gonzalez, President of the Malaya Films, a movie production outfit duly registered as a single proprietorship with the Bureau of Domestic Trade. The respondent is the Board of Review for Motion Pictures and Television,
83
5.
RADIO BROADCAST
EASTERN BROADCASTING CORPORATION (DYRE) petitioner, vs. THE HON. JOSE P. DANS, JR., MINISTER OF TRANSPORTATION & COMMUNICATIONS, THE HON. CEFERINO S. CARREON, COMMISSIONER, NATIONAL TELECOM., COMMISSION, ET AL., respondents. This petition was filed to compel the respondents to allow the reopening of Radio Station DYRE which had been summarily closed on grounds of national security. The petitioner contended that it was denied due process when it was closed on the mere allegation that the radio station was used to incite people to sedition. it alleged that no hearing was held and not a bit of proof was submitted to establish a factual basis for the closure. The petitioner was not informed beforehand why administrative action which closed the radio station was taken against it. No action was taken by the respondents to entertain a motion seeking the reconsideration of the closure action. The petitioner also raised the issue of freedom of speech. It appears from the records that the respondents' general charge of "inciting people to commit acts of sedition" arose from the petitioner's shift towards what it stated was the coverage of public events and the airing of programs geared towards public affairs. The case has become moot and academic. However, for the guidance of inferior courts and administrative tribunals exercising quasi-judicial functions, the Court issues the following guidelines: (1) The cardinal primary requirements in administrative proceedings laid down by this Court in Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations (69 Phil. 635) should be followed before a broadcast station may be closed or its operations curtailed. 1 (2) It is necessary to reiterate that while there is no controlling and precise definition of due process, it furnishes an unavoidable standard to which government action must conform in order that any deprivation of life, liberty, or property, in each appropriate case, may be valid (Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association v. City Mayor, 20 SCRA 849). (3) All forms of media, whether print or broadcast, are entitled to the broad protection of the freedom of speech and expression clause. The test for limitations on freedom of expression continues to be the clear and present danger rule that words are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that the lawmaker has a right to prevent. (4) The clear and present danger test, however, does not lend itself to a simplistic and all embracing interpretation applicable to all utterances in all forums. Broadcasting has to be licensed. Airwave frequencies have to be allocated among qualified users. A broadcast corporation cannot simply appropriate a certain frequency without regard for government regulation or for the rights of others.
84
g. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
RICARDO VALMONTE, OSWALDO CARBONELL, DOY DEL CASTILLO, ROLANDO BARTOLOME, LEO OBLIGAR, JUN GUTIERREZ, REYNALDO BAGATSING, JUN "NINOY" ALBA, PERCY LAPID, ROMMEL CORRO and ROLANDO FADUL, petitioners, vs. FELICIANO BELMONTE, JR., respondent. In his comment respondent raises procedural objections to the issuance of a writ of mandamus, among which is that petitioners have failed to exhaust administrative remedies. Respondent claims that actions of the GSIS General Manager are reviewable by the Board of Trustees of the GSIS. Petitioners, however, did not seek relief from the GSIS Board of Trustees. It is therefore asserted that since administrative remedies were not exhausted, then petitioners have no cause of action. ISSUE: Whether or not they are entitled to the documents sought, by virtue of their constitutional right to information. RULING: The pertinent provision under the 1987 Constitution is Art. 111, Sec. 7 which states: The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. An informed citizenry with access to the diverse currents in political, moral and artistic thought and data relative to them, and the free exchange of ideas and discussion of issues thereon, is vital to the democratic government envisioned under our Constitution. The cornerstone of this republican system of government is delegation of power by the people to the State. In this system, governmental agencies and institutions operate within the limits of the authority conferred by the people. Denied access to information on the inner workings of government, the citizenry can become prey to the whims and caprices of those to whom the power had been delegated. The postulate of public office as a public trust, institutionalized in the Constitution (in Art. XI, Sec. 1) to protect the people from abuse of governmental power, would certainly be were empty words if access to such information of public concern is denied, except under limitations prescribed by implementing legislation adopted pursuant to the Constitution. Petitioners are practitioners in media. As such, they have both the right to gather and the obligation to check the accuracy of information the disseminate. For them, the freedom of the press and of speech is not
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
E. ACADEMIC FREEDOM
EPICHARIS T. GARCIA vs.THE FACULTY ADMISSION COMMITTEE G.R. No. L-40779 November 28, 1975 Facts: Respondent admitted Petitioner for studies leading to an M.A. in Theology. When Petitioner wanted to enroll for the same course for the first semester, Respondent told her about the letter he had written her, informing her of the faculty's decision to bar her from re-admission in their school; The reasons stated in said letter do not constitute valid legal ground for expulsion, for they neither present any violation of any of the school's regulation, nor are they indicative of gross misconduct; She prayed for a writ of mandamus for the purpose of allowing her to enroll in the current semester. Her petition included the letter of respondent Father Lambino which started on a happy note that she was given the grade of B+ and B in two theology subjects, but ended in a manner far from satisfactory for her, as shown by this portion thereof: "Now, you will have to forgive me for going into a matter which is not too pleasant. The faculty had a meeting after the summer session and several members are strongly opposed to having you back with us at Loyola School of Theology. In the spirit of honesty may I report this to you as their reason: They felt that your frequent questions and difficulties were not always pertinent and had the effect of slowing down the progress of the class; they felt you could have tried to give the presentation a chance and exerted more effort to understand the point made before immediately thinking of difficulties and problems. The way things are, I would say that the advisability of your completing a program (with all the course work and thesis writing) with us is very questionable. That you have the requisite intellectual ability is not to be doubted. But it would seem to be in your best interests to work with a faculty that is more compatible with your orientation. I regret to have to make this report, but I am only thinking of your welfare." Issue: Whether or not a petition for mandamus is proper? Held: Petitioner cannot compel by mandamus, the respondent to admit her into further studies in the Loyola School of Theology. For respondent has no clear duty to so admit the petitioner. The Loyola School of Theology is a seminary for the priesthood. Petitioner is admittedly and obviously not studying for the priesthood, she being a lay person and a woman. And even assuming ex gratia argumenti that she is qualified to study for the priesthood, there is still no duty on the part of respondent to admit her to said studies, since the school has clearly the discretion to turn down even qualified applicants due to limitations of space, facilities, professors and optimum classroom size and component considerations." There is, as previously noted, the recognition in the Constitution of institutions of higher learning enjoying academic freedom. It is more often identified with the right of a faculty member to pursue his studies in his particular specialty and thereafter to make known or publish the result of his endeavors without fear that retribution would be visited on him in the event that his conclusions are found distasteful or objectionable to the powers that be, whether in the political, economic, or academic establishments. That is only one aspect though. Such a view does not comprehend fully the scope of academic freedom recognized by the Constitution. For it is to be noted that the reference is to the "institutions of higher learning" as the recipients of this boon. It would follow then that the school or college itself is possessed of such a right. It decides for itself its aims and objectives and how best to attain them. It is free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint. It has a wide sphere of autonomy certainly extending to the choice of students. It is the business of a university to provide that atmosphere which is most conducive to speculation, experiment and creation. It is an atmosphere in which there prevail "the four essential freedoms" of a university to determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study." Thus is reinforced the conclusion reached by us that mandamus does not lie in this case.
92
93
94
Manosca vs. Court of Appeals 252 scra 412 Facts: Petitioners own a piece of land consisting of 492 square meters, which was later ascertained by the National Historical Institute to be the birthsite of Felix Y. Manalo, the founder of Iglesia ni Cristo. Consequently, it was declared as a national historical landmark, and the Republic instituted expropriation proceedings. Issue: Would the expropriation constitute an application of funds for the use, benefit or support of a religious entity? Ruling: The attempt to give some religious perspective to the cases deserve little consideration, for what should be significant is the principal objective of, not the casual consequences that might follow from, the exercise of the power. The purpose of setting up a marker is essentially to recognize the distinctive distribution of the late Felix Manalo to the culture of the Philippines, rather than to commemorate his founding and leadership of the Iglesia ni Cristo. The practical reality that the greater benefit may be derived by its members than by most others could well be true but such a peculiar advantage still remains to be merely incidental and secondary in nature. Indeed that only a few would actually benefit from the expropriation of property does not necessarily diminish the essence and character of public use. Austria vs. NLRC 312 SCRA 410 Facts: Austria was a Pastor of the Seventh Day Adventists. After serving the church for 28 years in various capacitites, he was dismissed for alleged misappropriation of denominational funds. He filed a case before the Labor Arbiter praying for reinstatement, backwages and damages. Citing lack of jurisdiciton, the NLRC dismissed his complaint due to the constitutional provision on separation of church and state since the case allegedly involved an ecclesiastical affair into which the state cannot interfere. Issue: Whether or not the case involves an ecclesiastical affair into which the state cannot interfere. Ruling: The case does not concern an ecclesiastical or purely religious affair. An ecclesiastical affair is one that concerns doctrine, creed or form of worship of the church, or the adoption and enforcement within a religious association of regulations for the government of the membership, and the power of excluding from such associations those deemed unworthy of membership. Based on this definition, while this case relates to the church and its religious minister, it does not ipso facto give the case a religious significance. What is involved here is the relationship of the church as an employer and the minister as an employee. It is purely secular and has no relation whatsoever with the practice of faith, worship and the dotrines of the church. In this case, Austria was not expelled from membership of the church but was terminated from employment. The grounds invoked for his dismissal such as misappropriation, breach of trust, serious misconduct, are based on the Labor Code. By this, it is clear that the reason for the dismissal is not religious un nature. Iglesia ni Cristo vs. CA 259 scra 529 Facts: Petitioner has a television program entitled "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo" aired on Channel 2 every Saturday and on Channel 13 every Sunday. The program presents and propagates petitioner's religious beliefs, doctrines and practices often times in comparative studies with other religions. Petitioner submitted to the respondent Board of Review for Moving Pictures and Television the VTR tapes of its TV program Series Nos. 116, 119, 121 and 128. The Board classified the series as "X" or not for public viewing on the ground that they "offend and constitute an attack against other religions which is expressly prohibited by law." On November 28, 1992, it appealed to the Office of the President the classification of its TV Series No. 128 which allowed it through a letter of former Executive Secretary Edelmiro A. Amante, Sr., addressed for Henrietta S. Mendez reversing the decision of the respondent Board. According to the letter the episode in is protected by the constitutional guarantee of free speech and expression and no
95
2. to be excused from work from 10:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. every Friday (Muslim Prayer Day) during the entire calendar year. Issue: Whether or not Muslim employees may be excused from work from 10:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. every Friday (Muslim Prayer Day) during the entire calendar year on the ground of religious freedom. Ruling: Art. III, section 5 of the Constitution contains two aspects: (1) the non-establishment clause; and (2) the free exercise clause. The subject requests are based on the latter and in interpreting this clause (the free exercise clause) embodied in the Constitution, the Court has consistently adhered to the doctrine that: The right to religious profession and worship has a two-fold aspect, viz., freedom to believe and freedom to act on ones beliefs. The first is absolute as long as the belief is confined within the realm of thought. The second is subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the public welfare. The Court recognizes that the observance of Ramadan and the Friday Muslim Prayer Day is integral to the Islamic faith. However, while the observance of Ramadan and allowing the Muslim employees in the Judiciary to hold flexible office hours from 7:30 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. without any break during the month of Ramadan finds support in Section 3 (a) of P.D. No. 291, as amended by P.D. No. 322, there is no such basis to excuse them from work from 10:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. every Friday, the Muslim Prayer Day, during the entire calendar year. To allow the Muslim employees in the Judiciary to be excused from work from 10:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. every Friday (Muslim Prayer Day) during the entire calendar year would mean a diminution of the prescribed government working hours. For then, they would be rendering service twelve (12) hours less than that required by the civil service rules for each month. Further, this would encourage other religious denominations to request for similar treatment. The performance of religious practices, whether by the Muslim employees or those belonging to other religious denominations, should not prejudice the courts and the public. Indeed, the exercise of religious freedom does not exempt anyone from compliance with reasonable requirements of the law, including civil service laws.
96
1. 2. 3.
TAX EXEMPTION
Bishop of Nueva Segovia vs. Provincial Board Facts: Roman Catholic Apostolic Church, represented by the Bishop of Nueva Segovia (BNS), possesses and is the owner of a parcel of land in the municipality of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, all four sides of which face on public streets. On the south side is a part of the church yard, the convent and an adjacent lot used for a vegetable garden, in which there is a stable and a well for the use of the convent. In the center is the remainder of the churchyard and the church. On the north side is an old cemetery with two of its walls still standing, and a portion where formerly stood a tower, the base of which may still be seen. The provincial board required BNS to pay land taxes. BNS paid under protest the land tax on the lot adjoining the convent and the lot which formerly was the cemetery with the portion where the tower stood. Thereafter BNS filed an action for the recovery of the sum paid by it to the provincial board of Ilocos Norte by way of land tax, alleging that the collection of this tax is illegal. Issue: WON the lots in question are exempt from payment of the land taxes. Held: YES! The exemption in favor of the convent in the payment of the land tax (sec. 344 [c] Administrative Code) refers to the home of the priest who presides over the church and who has to take care of himself in order to discharge his duties. It therefore must, in this sense, include not only the land actually occupied by the church, but also the adjacent ground destined to the ordinary incidental uses of man. Except in large cities where the density of the population and the development of commerce require the use of larger tracts of land for buildings, a vegetable garden belongs to a house and, in the case of a
4.
Facts: Petitioner, Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church, seeks the issuance from this court of a writ of prohibition to prevent the respondent Director of Posts from issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the Thirty-third International Eucharistic Congress. Director of Posts announced that he would order the issues of postage stamps commemorating the celebration in the City of Manila of the Thirty-third international Eucharistic Congress, organized by the Roman Catholic Church. It is alleged that this action of the respondent is violative of the provisions of section 23, subsection 3, Article VI, of the Constitution of the Philippines, which provides as follows: No public money or property shall ever be appropriated, applied, or used, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, secretarian, institution, or system of religion, or for the use, benefit, or support of any priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher or dignitary as such, except when such priest,
97
98
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW REVIEW 2-BILL OF RIGHTS Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo B. FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE 1. FLAG SALUTE
EBRALINAG vs. DIVISION Facts: This involves 2 consolidated special civil actions. All the petitioners in these two cases were expelled from their classes by the public school authorities in Cebu for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge as required by Republic Act No. 1265 of July 11, 1955, and by Department Order No. 8 dated July 21, 1955 of the (DECS) making the flag ceremony compulsory in all educational institutions. Jehovah's Witnesses admittedly teach their children not to salute the flag, sing the national anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge for they believe that those are "acts of worship" or "religious devotion" which they "cannot conscientiously give . . . to anyone or anything except God". They feel bound by the Bible's command to "guard ourselves from idols 1 John 5:21". They consider the flag as an image or idol representing the State. They think the action of the local authorities in compelling the flag salute and pledge transcends constitutional limitations on the State's power and invades the sphere of the intellect and spirit which the Constitution protects against official control. Issue: whether the children of Jehovah's Witnesses may be expelled from school for disobedience of R.A. No. 1265 and Department Order No. 8. Held: It is somewhat ironic however, that after the Gerona ruling had received legislative cachet by its incorporation in the Administrative Code of 1987, the present Court believes that the time has come to reexamine it. The idea that one may be compelled to salute the flag, sing the national anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge, during a flag ceremony on pain of being dismissed from one's job or of being expelled from school, is alien to the conscience of the present generation of Filipinos who cut their teeth on the Bill of Rights which guarantees their rights to free speech ** and the free exercise of religious profession and worship (Sec. 5, Article III, 1987 Constitution; Article IV, Section 8, 1973 Constitution; Article III, Section 1[7], 1935 Constitution). Religious freedom is a fundamental right which is entitled to the highest priority and the amplest protection among human rights, for it involves the relationship of man to his Creator. "The right to religious profession and worship has a two-fold aspect, vis., freedom to believe and freedom to act on one's belief. The first is absolute as long as the belief is confined within the realm of thought. The second is subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the public welfare". Expelling or banning the petitioners from Philippine schools will bring about the very situation that this Court had feared in Gerona. Forcing a small religious group, through the iron hand of the law, to participate in a ceremony that violates their religious beliefs, will hardly be conducive to love of country or respect for duly constituted authorities. Moreover, the expulsion of members of Jehovah's Witnesses from the schools where they are enrolled will violate their right as Philippine citizens, under the 1987 Constitution, to receive free education, for it is the duty of the State to "protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality education . . . and to make such education accessible to all" (Sec. 1, Art. XIV). We hold that a similar exemption may be accorded to the Jehovah's Witnesses with regard to the observance of the flag ceremony out of respect for their religious beliefs, however "bizarre" those beliefs may seem to others. Nevertheless, their right not to participate in the flag ceremony does not give them a right to disrupt such patriotic exercises.
3.
VICTORIANO vs. ELIZALDE ROPE WORKERS 59 SCRA 54 (1974) 4. DISQUALIFICATION FROM GOVERNMENT OFFICE PAMIL vs. TELERON 86 SCRA 413 (1978) LOCAL
2. FREEDOM DOCTRINES
TO
PROPAGATE
RELIGIOUS
AMERICAN BIBLE SOCIETY vs. CITY OF MANILA Facts: American Bible Society (ABS) is a foreign, non-stock, non-profit, religious, missionary corporation duly registered and doing business in the Philippines. In the course of its ministry, ABS has been distributing and selling bibles and/or gospel portions thereof. The City of Manila informed ABS that it was conducting the business of general merchandise without providing itself with the necessary Mayor's permit and municipal license and required ABS to secure the corresponding permit and license fees. ABS paid corresponding fees
99
HELD: The voluntary admission of Yabut did not violate his constitutional rights (1) on custodial investigation, and (2) against self-incrimination. In the first place, he was not under custodial investigation. His Affidavit was executed in private and before private individuals. The mantle of protection under Section 12 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution covers only the period "from the time a person is taken into custody for investigation of his possible participation in the commission of a crime or from the time he is singled out as a suspect in the commission of a crime although not yet in custody." Therefore, to fall within the ambit of Section 12, quoted above, there must be an arrest or a deprivation of freedom, with "questions propounded on him by the police authorities for the purpose of eliciting admissions, confessions, or any information."The said constitutional provision does "not apply to spontaneous statements made in a voluntary manner" whereby an individual orally admits to authorship of a crime."What the Constitution proscribes is the compulsory or coercive disclosure of incriminating facts." Moreover, the right against self-incrimination under Section 17 of Article III of the Constitution, which is ordinarily available only in criminal prosecutions, extends to all other government proceedings -- including civil actions, legislative investigations, and administrative proceedings that possess a criminal or penal aspect-- but not to private investigations done by private individuals. Even in such government proceedings, this right may be waived, provided the waiver is certain; unequivocal; and intelligently, understandingly and willingly made. If in these government proceedings waiver is allowed, all the more is it so in private investigations. It is of no moment that no criminal case has yet been filed against Yabut. The filing thereof is entirely up to the appropriate authorities or to the private individuals upon whom damage has been caused. As we shall also explain later, it is not mandatory for CASA -- the plaintiff below -- to implead Yabut in the civil case before the lower court. Under these two constitutional provisions, "[t]he Bill of Rights does not concern itself with the relation between a private individual and another individual. It governs the relationship between the individual and the State." Moreover, the Bill of Rights "is a charter of liberties for the individual and a limitation upon the power of the [S]tate."These rights are guaranteed to preclude the slightest coercion by the State that may lead the accused "to admit something false, not prevent him from freely and voluntarily telling the truth." Yabut is not an accused here. Besides, his mere invocation of the aforesaid rights "does not automatically entitle him to the constitutional protection." When he freely and voluntarily executed his Affidavit, the State was not even involved. Such Affidavit may therefore be admitted without violating his constitutional rights while under custodial investigation and against self-incrimination. PEOPLE vs. ELIZAR TOMAQUIN July 23, 2004 FACTS: The Cebu City Prosecutor filed an Information charging appellant with Murder by killing Jaquelyn Luchavez Tatoy. The appellant was investigated by SPO2 Mario Monilar of the Homicide Section, Ramos Police Station in Cebu City. After being apprised of his constitutional rights, appellant told SPO2 Monilar that he was willing to confess and asked for Atty. Parawan, the barangay captain, to assist him. Appellant gave his statement with the assistance of Atty. Fortunato Parawan. Appellant also repudiated his extrajudicial confession, saying that Atty. Parawan merely asked him to sign a blank sheet of paper and in exchange, Atty. Parawan promised to assist and help him with his expenses.Appellants extrajudicial confession was taken and transcribed entirely in the Cebuano dialect.
FACTS:On November 8, 1982, plaintiff CASA Montessori International opened Current Account No. 0291-0081-01 with defendant BPI[,] with
100
101
102
103
FACTS: In two (2) separate Informations, appellant, together with Mike Regino, was charged with the murder of the Spouses Cesar Ganzon and Priscilla Libas.. Upon information supplied by a certain Mr. Dela Cruz that appellant had wanted to confess to the crimes, SPO2 Gapas set out to look for appellant. He found appellant fishing in Asinan Island and invited the latter for questioning. Appellant expressed his willingness to make a confession in the presence of a lawyer. Appellant was then brought to the police station after which SPO2 Gapas requested Kagawad Arnel Alcantara to provide appellant with a lawyer. The following day, appellant was brought to the house of Atty. Roberto Reyes, the only available lawyer in the municipality. The typewriter at the police station was out of order at that time and Atty. Reyes could not go to the police station as he was suffering from rheumatism. At the house of Atty. Reyes, in the presence of Vice-Mayor Emiliano Marasigan of Culion, two (2) officials of the Sangguniang Barangay, SPO2 Cuizon and an interpreter, SPO2 Gapas proceeded with the custodial investigation of appellant who was assisted by Atty. Reyes. Appellant was expressly advised that he was being investigated for the death of Libas and Ganzon. An interpreter was provided appellant as he was not well versed in Tagalog being a native of Samar. As he is illiterate, appellant affixed only his thumbmark on the statement above his printed name. Bonifacio Abad, the interpreter, and Atty. Reyes, as the assisting counsel, also signed the statement. Atty. Reyes signed again as the notary public who notarized the statement. As Mike Regino was at large, only appellant was arraigned and he pleaded not guilty. Forthwith, joint trial ensued which resulted in the judgment of guilt against appellant as co-principal for two (2) counts of murder, with conspiracy and evident premeditation attending the commission of the felonies. On the basis of appellants extrajudicial confession, the RTC found him guilty of both crimes. The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court. ISSUE: whether appellants extrajudicial confession is admissible in evidence to warrant the verdict of guilt. HELD: The alleged confession is inadmissible and must perforce be discarded. A confession is admissible in evidence if it is satisfactorily shown to have been obtained within the limits imposed by the 1987 Constitution,Sec. 12, Art. III. Republic Act No. 7438, approved on 15 May 1992, has reinforced the constitutional mandate protecting the rights of persons under custodial investigation. The pertinent provisions read: SEC. 2. Rights of Persons Arrested, Detained or under Custodial Investigation; Duties of Public Officers.a. Any person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation shall at all times be assisted by counsel.
104
105
Ruling: Yes. Respondent does not contest petitioners claim on the alleged irregularities which attended her arrest. Nevertheless, such irregularities do not work to nullify petitioners conviction as this Court is neither the proper forum, nor this appeal the correct remedy, to raise this issue. Any irregularity attending the arrest of an accused should be raised in a motion to quash at any time before entering her plea. Petitioners failure to timely raise this objection amounted to a waiver of such irregularity and resulted in her concomitant submission to the trial courts jurisdiction over her person. Indeed, not only did petitioner submit to such jurisdiction, she actively invoked it through her participation during the trial. As for the failure of the NBI agents to inform petitioner of her right to counsel during custodial investigation, this right attains significance only if the person under investigation makes a confession in writing without aid of counsel counsel which is then sought to be admitted against the accused during the trial. In such case, the tainted confession obtained in violation of Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution is inadmissible in evidence against the accused. Here, petitioner merely alleges that following her arrest, she gave a statement to the NBI agents. The records do not contain a copy of this statement thus we have no way of knowing whether such statement amounts to a confession under Section 12(3) in relation to Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution. AQUINO VS. PAISTE 555 SCRA 255 (2008) Facts: Petitioner Juanita Aquino and Elizabeth Garganta went to the house of respondent Teresita Paiste. Petitioner started to convince respondent to buy a gold bar owned by a certain Arnold. Petitioner and Garganta went back to the house of respondent the following day. They met Arnold who showed them the gold bar. Arnold informed her that it was worth PhP 60,000. On the next day, the they returned, this time they told respondent that the price was reduced to PhP 10,000. She agreed to go with them to meet Arnold. Arnold pretended to refuse the PhP 10,000 offer and insisted on PhP 50,000. On petitioner's insistence, the two went to and bought the gold bar for PhP 50,000. On Respondent had the gold bar tested and she was informed that it was fake. Respondent then proceeded to petitioner's house to inform the latter that the gold bar was fake. Respondent brought petitioner to the NBI-NCR in the presence of a certain Atty. Tolentino where petitioner amicably promised respondent they would locate Garganta, and the document they both signed would be disregarded should they locate Garganta. Petitioner ascribes error to the CA when it gave due weight and consideration to the amicable settlement with waiver of right to counsel that she signed in the NBI during the custodial investigation. Issue: Whether the amicable settlement executed in the NBI is admissible as evidence.
106
1.
Miranda rule not applicable to confessions executed before Jan. 17, 1973
PEOPLE VS. RIBADAJO, 143 SCRA 637 (1986)
Facts: On November 18, 1971, prisoners from brigade 3-C succeeded in opening the door of their dormitory and attacked the inmates from dormitory 3-a. Records further show that while the victim Bernardo Cutamora was getting his ration he was sandwiched by the accused who rushed towards the door and stabbed the victim simultaneously whereby the latter sustained multiple stab wounds on the different parts of his body which wounds caused his death. In an investigation conducted by the Investigation Section of the New Bilibid Prisons on November 20, 1971, all the accused executed statements admitting their participation in the slaying of Bernardo Cutamora. Consequently, an Information for Murder was filed. Upon arraignment on July 5, 1973, accused Tobias Ribadajo, Romeo Corpuz, Loreto Rivera and Rodolfo Torres, all with the assistance of counsel de officio, pleaded Guilty. At the presentation of evidence for the defense however, accused Tobias Ribadajo, Romeo Corpuz, and Rodolfo Torres withdrew their pleas of Guilty. Appellants submit that their extrajudicial confessions were extracted by force.On their face, however, the individual confessions do not show any suspicious circumstance casting doubt on their integrity. On the contrary, they are replete with details only appellants could have supplied. Issue: Whether accused is entitled to be informed of their right to silence and to counsel during custodial investigation. Ruling: As to appellants' claim that they have not been informed of their right to silence and to counsel during custodial investigation, suffice it to state that the proscription against the admissibility of confessions obtained from an accused during the period of custodial interrogation, in violation of procedural safeguards, applies to confessions obtained after the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution. No law gives the accused the right to be so informed before the enactment of the 1973 Constitution, even if presented after January 17, 1973. That Constitutional guaranty relative to confessions obtained during custodial investigation does not have any retroactive effect. FILOTEO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN 263 SCRA 222 (1996) Facts: Petitioner Jose D. Filoteo, Jr. was the suspected mastermind of the armed hijacking of a postal delivery van. Along with his co-accused petitioner Filoteo was charged. On separate dates, accused Filoteo, Mateo, Saguindel, Relator and Miravalles, assisted by their respective counsel, pleaded not guilty. Petitioner contends that respondent Court erred in admitting his extrajudicial confession notwithstanding uncontradicted testimony and documentary proof that he was made to sign the same through torture, maltreatment, physical compulsion, threats and intimidation and without the presence and assistance of counsel. Issue: Are the written statements, particularly the extra-judicial confession executed by the accused without the presence of his lawyer, admissible in evidence against him? Ruling: Yes. In the landmark case of Magtoto vs. Manguera, the Court categorically held that provisions of the 1973 Constitution must be prospectively applied. This Court said: We hold that this specific portion of this constitutional mandate has and should be given a prospective and not a retrospective effect. Consequently, a confession obtained from a person under investigation for the commission of an offense, who has not been informed of his right (to silence and) to counsel, is inadmissible in evidence if the same had been obtained after the effectivity of the New Constitution on January 17, 1973. Conversely, such confession is admissible in evidence against the accused, if the same had been obtained before the effectivity of the New Constitution, even if presented after January 17, 1973, and even if he had not been informed of his right to counsel, since no law gave the accused the right to be so informed before that date. Pursuant to the above doctrine, petitioner may not claim the benefits of the Morales and Galit rulings because he executed his extrajudicial confession and his waiver to the right to counsel on May 30, 1982, or before April 26, 1983.
107
108
3.
given
in
FACTS: Petitioners were postal employees charged with Malversation of Public Funds. During a fact-finding investigation conducted relative to missing postage stamps they executed sworn statements without the assistance of counsel and without being warned of their rights. Their written statements were offered by the prosecution in evidence during the trial in the criminal case. ISSUE: Is there a violation of the right to counsel? HELD: No. The rights under Sec. 12 apply only to custodial investigation or questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. The fact finding relative to the missing stamps conducted by the Chief Postal Service Officer is not a custodial investigation but a mere administrative investigation. While an administrative investigation may be akin to a criminal proceeding, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of the respondents capacity to represent himself, no duty rests on the investigator to provide the person being investigated with counsel. REMOLINA vs. CSC 362 SCRA 304 (2001) FACTS: For having secured for his wife a fake Report of Rating with a passing mark in the teachers board examination, petitioner was dismissed from government service for dishonesty. Among the evidence against him was his written statement made during the investigation by the Civil Service Commission admitting his guilt. No counsel assisted him nor was he advised of rights under the Constitution when he signed the statement. ISSUE: Is it admissible? HELD: Yes. While investigations conducted by an administrative body may at times be akin to a criminal proceedings, the fact remains that under existing laws, a party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges or the respondents capacity to represent himself. Under the Civil Service Act, a respondent has the option of engaging the services of counsel or not. The right to counsel is not always imperative in an administrative investigation because such inquiries are conducted merely to determine whether there are facts that merit disciplinary measure against erring public officials. In this case, respondent was not accused of any crime in the investigation conducted by the CSC field office. It was conducted for the purpose of ascertaining whether he should be administratively charged. PEOPLE vs. SALONGA 359 SCRA 310 (2001) FACTS: Accused was an Acting Assistant Cashier of Metrobank. During a spot audit conducted by the Department of Internal Affairs of the bank, he admitted having issued a cashiers check without any legitimate transaction and that he benefited P8,500.00 from the amount of the check. His admissions were reduced into writing and offered in evidence by the prosecution. When he made the admissions, however, there was no lawyer assisting him. ISSUE: Is it admissible? HELD: Yes. The constitutional right to counsel may be invoked only by a person under custodial investigation. Custodial investigation is the stage where the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect taken into custody by the police who carry out an interrogation to elicit incriminating statements. In this case, the bank auditor who questioned accused was not a police officer but a private person. He was not under custodial investigation so that the legal formalities required by the fundamental la do not apply. PEOPLE vs. TIN LAN UY 475 SCRA 248 (2005)
4.
POLICE LINE-UPS
G.R. No. 102786 August 14, 1998 ALEJANDRO B. DE LA TORRE, petitioner, vs.COURT OF APPEALS facts : In the afternoon of April 18, 1989, Alexander Manalo, an electrical engineer of MERALCO assigned to inspect six electric meters installed in the premises of the Cathay Pacific Steel and Smelting Corporation (CAPASSCO), discovered that the said electric meters were missing. He reported the loss to the MERALCO office in Ortigas Avenue, Pasig City. On April 20,1989, Manalo and Felino Olegario, also of MERALCO, gave statements to the Northern Police District at Camp Karingal, Sikatuna Village, Quezon City regarding the loss of the electric meters. They suspected that CAPASSCO employees must have damaged the electric meters while tampering with them and that to conceal the attempt, the employees must have removed the electric meters. They expressed suspicion that MERALCO personnel were involved. Patrolman Edgar Enopia, who was assigned to the case, proceeded to the scene of the crime and inquired from people he saw there if they had seen the electric meters being taken down from the post near the gate of CAPASSCO. According to Enopia, one of those he asked, Danilo Garcia, said he had seen at about 10:00 p.m. on April 11, 1989 four crewmembers in a MERALCO service truck, with the number 522 painted on its side, removing the electric meters. Acting on this lead, Enopia asked MERALCO for the identities of the men, one of whom turned out to be petitioner de la Torre. It appears that MERALCO service truck number 522 had specific crewmembers assigned to it. On July 4, 1989, the crewmembers were taken to the NPD headquarters for investigation. They were included in a line-up of
109
110
111
G.R. No. L-51770 March 20, 1985 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs.FRANCISCO GALIT, FACTS: The prisoner was arrested for killing the victim oil the occasion of a robbery. He had been detained and interrogated almost continuously for five days, to no avail. He consistently maintained his innocence. There was no evidence to link him to the crime. Obviously, something drastic had to be done. A confession was absolutely necessary. So the investigating officers began to maul him and to torture him physically. Still the prisoner insisted on his innocence. His will had to be broken. A confession must be obtained. So they continued to maltreat and beat him. 'They covered his face with a rag and pushed his face into a toilet bowl full of human waste. The prisoner could not take any more. His body could no longer endure the pain inflicted on him and the indignities he had to suffer. His will had been broken. He admitted what the investigating officers wanted him to admit and he signed the confession they prepared. Later, against his will, he posed for pictures as directed by his investigators, purporting it to be a reenactment. The accused then assailed the admissibility of the extra-judicial confession extracted from him through torture, force and intimidation as described earlier, and without the benefit of counsel. ISSUE: w/n there was a valid confession made HELD: No. The alleged confession and the pictures of the supposed re-enactment are inadmissible as evidence because they were obtained in a manner contrary to law. There were no eyewitnesses, no property recovered from the accused, no state witnesses, and not even fingerprints of the accused at the scene of the crime. The only evidence against the accused is his alleged confession. Such a long question followed by a monosyllabic answer does not satisfy the requirements of the law that the accused be informed of his rights under the Constitution and our laws. Instead there should be several short and clear questions and every right explained in simple words in a dialect or language known to the person under investigation. Accused is from Samar and there is no showing that he understands Tagalog. Moreover, at the time of his arrest, accused was not permitted to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or a friend. In fact, his sisters and other relatives did not know that he had been brought to the NBI for investigation and it was only about two weeks after he had executed the salaysay that his relatives were allowed to visit him. His statement does not even contain any waiver of right to counsel and yet during the investigation he was not assisted by one. At the supposed reenactment, again accused was not assisted by counsel of his choice. These constitute gross violations of his rights. NEW RULE ON WAIVER G.R. No. 122142 May 17, 2000 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ,vs. JIMMY OBRERO y CORLA, FACTS: Accused was charged for the murder of NENA BERJUEGA and REMEDIOS HITTA, by stabbing them to death, thereby inflicting upon the said victims mortal stab wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of their death thereafter and robbery of 4 thousand pesos. Accused then executed a confession, assisted by Atty. Bienvenido De los Reyes, a PC Captain of the WPD Headquarters, U.N. Avenue, Manila, which he later on contested for being obtained against his will as evidenced by the fact that he signed the extrajudicial confession five times as a sign that it was involuntarily executed by him. He also claims that Atty. De los Reyes, who assisted him in executing his confession, was not the counsel of his own choice ISSUE: w/n the confession is admissible HELD: No. It is inadmissible. There are two kinds of involuntary or coerced confessions treated in this constitutional provision: (1) those which are the product of third degree methods such as torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, which are dealt with in paragraph 2 of 12, and (2) those which are given without the benefit of Miranda warnings, which are the subject of paragraph 1 of the same 12. There were no clear showing of duress on the part of the accused upon executing the confession since -appellant claims he was made to sign five times is not the same confession but different parts thereof. He signed his name on page 1 to acknowledge that he had been given the Miranda warnings. Then, he signed again as proof that after being
112
113
114
PEOPLE vs. ZALDY MENDOZA y SEVILLA [G.R. No. 143702. September 13, 2001] FACTS: Accused Zaldy Mendoza was found guilty by the trial court of the crime of robbery with homicide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the victim, Hernandez Abatay. Accused argued that the confession he made to PO3 Daniel Tan at the St. Pauls Hospital that he and Marco Aguirre had robbed Abatay is inadmissible in evidence because it was given without the assistance of counsel while under custody. He alleged that PO3 Tan handcuffed him and took him to the St. Pauls Hospital where Abatay was confined. In the presence of Tan and some nurses and the attending physician in the emergency room, Abatay pointed to accused as one of those who had held him up and then stabbed him. Tan then placed accused under arrest and took him to the police station for investigation. ISSUE: WON the confession made was inadmissible? YES. But waived.. HELD: Indeed, the confession is inadmissible in evidence under Article III, Section 12(1) and (3) of the Constitution, because it was given under custodial investigation and was made without the
115
5.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FELICISIMO JARA, et al [G.R. No. L-61356-57. September 30, 1986] FACTS: In the consolidated cases of People vs Felicisimo Jara, et al. (Criminal Case No. 2564) for Robbery with Homicide and People vs. Felicisimo Jara, et al. (Criminal Case No. 2565) for Parricide, the CFI of Palawan found all the accused guilty as charged. The victims were Amparo Vda. De Bantigue and Luisa Jara. It appears that the other two suspects in the killing, appellants Reymundo Vergara and Roberto Bernadas were apprehended. After investigation, they confessed their guilt to the Provincial Commander of the Philippine Constabulary in Palawan and other police investigators. They also positively Identified appellant Felicisimo Jara as the mastermind who had plotted the killing and who promised them a fee of P1,000 each for their participation. Before the City Fiscal and First Assistant Fiscal of Puerto Princesa City, respectively, appellants Vergara and Bernadas subscribed and swore to their extra-judicial statements wherein they narrated their role and that of Felicisimo Jara in the killing. Thereafter, the killing was reenacted before the military authorities and the public, with appellants Vergara and Bernadas participating.
116
HELD: It appears that in giving credence to the confession, the trial court applied the rule in People vs. Castro, where it was stated that the burden of proof to show the involuntariness of a confession rests on the accused. However, the Castro ruling, which is premised on the presumption of regularity of official acts, is no longer controlling in so far as it concerns the application of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution. In People vs. Duero, the Court en banc pronounced that the rights enumerated in Section 20, except the first sentence, were adopted from Miranda vs. Arizona, a case decided by the US Supreme Court on June 13, 1966. This Court then ruled that "inasmuch as the prosecution failed to prove that before Duero made his alleged oral confession he was informed of his rights to remain silent and to have counsel and because there is no proof that he knowingly and intelligently waived those rights, his confession is inadmissible in evidence." In effect, the Court not only abrogated the rule on presumption of regularity of official acts related to admissibility of statements taken during in-custody interrogation but likewise dispelled in doubt as to the full adoption of the Miranda doctrine in this jurisdiction. It is now incumbent upon the prosecution to prove during a trial that prior to questioning, the confessant was warned of his constitutionality protected rights. In Miranda, the Court laid own the rule on admissibility of statements, i. e., that the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. The heavy burden is on the prosecution because the State is responsible for establishing the isolated circumstance under which the interrogation takes place and has the only means of making available corroborated evidence of warnings given during incommunicado interrogation. Precisely, the Miranda doctrine was formulated to counteract the incommunicado police-oriented atmosphere during custodial interrogation and the evils it can bring. Prescinding from these principles, the U.S. Court enumerated the procedural safeguards which must be adhered to as follows: At the outset, if a person in custody is to be subjected to interrogation, he must first be informed in clear and unequivocal terms that he has the right to remain silent. The warning of the right to remain silent must be accompanied by the explanation that anything said can and will be used against the individual in court. This warning is needed in order to
117
118
LITO MARCELO vs. SANDIGANBAYAN Facts: On Februay 10, 1989, Jacinto Merete, a letter carrier in the Makati Central Post Office, disclosed to his chief, Projecto Tumagan, the existence of a group responsible for the pilferage of mail matter in the post office. For this reason, Tumagan sought the aid of the NBI in apprehending the group responsible for mail pilferage in the Makati Post Office. NBI Director Salvador Ranin dispatched NBI agents to Legaspi Village following a report that the group would stage a theft of mail matter on that day At 2:00 p.m., a postal delivery jeep, driven by one Henry Orindai, was parked in front of the Esguerra Building on Adelantado Street. Esguerra Building is located between Adelantado and Amorsolo Streets. Adelantado and Amorsolo Streets are parallel to each other. Pasicolan alighted from the jeep bringing with him a mail bag. Merete stayed inside the jeep. Pasicolan then passed through an alley between Esguerra and Montepino Buildings going towards Amorsolo St. Montepino Building is adjacent to Esguerra Building. The two are separated by the alley. Upon reaching Amorsolo St., Pasicolan gave
119
120
1.
G.R. No. 148571 September 24, 2002 GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Represented by the Philippine Department of Justice, petitioner, vs. HON. GUILLERMO PURGANAN, Presiding Judge Regional Trial Court of Manila and MARC JIMENEZ a.k.a. MARCIO BATACAN CRESPO, respondent Facts: Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, the US Govt, thru diplomatic channels, sent to the Phil. Govt Note Verbale No. 0522 dated June 16, 1999, supplemented by Note Nos. 0597, 0720 and 0809 and accompanied by duly authenticated documents requesting the extradition of Mark B. Jimenez, also known as Mario Batacan Crespo. Upon receipt of the Notes and documents, the secretary of foreign affairs (SFA) transmitted them to the secretary of justice (SOJ) for appropriate action, pursuant to Section 5 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1069, also known as the Extradition Law. Upon learning of the request for his extradition, Jimenez sought and was granted a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) by the RTC of Manila, Branch 25. The SOJ was ordered to furnish private respondent copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers and to grant the latter a reasonable period within which to file a comment and supporting evidence. The Govt. of the USA, represented by the Philippine DOJ, filed with the RTc, the appropriate Petition for Extradition. Before the RTC could act on the Petition, Respondent Jimenez filed before it an "Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion," which prayed that petitioners application for an arrest warrant be set for hearing. In its assailed May 23, 2001 Order, the RTC granted the Motion of Jimenez and set the case for hearing on June 5, 2001. In that hearing, petitioner manifested its reservations on the procedure adopted by the trial court allowing the accused in an extradition case to be heard prior to the issuance of a warrant of arrest. After the hearing, the court a quo required the parties to submit their respective memoranda. In his Memorandum, Jimenez sought an alternative prayer: that in case a warrant should issue, he be allowed to post bail in the amount of P100,000. The alternative prayer of Jimenez was also set for hearing on June 15, 2001. Thereafter, the court below issued its questioned July 3, 2001 Order, directing the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at one million pesos in cash. Hence, this Petition. Issue: WON he (Jimenez) is entitled to bail and to provisional liberty while the extradition proceedings are pending. Held: No. Article III, Section 13 of the Constitution, is worded as follows: Art. III, Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail
121
petitioner,
Facts: An Information filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 75, Olongapo City and docketed as Criminal Case No. 422-94, charged Fitzgerald, an Australian citizen, with Violation of Art. III, Section 5, paragraph (a), subparagraph (5) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7610. After trial and hearing, the RTC rendered a Decision finding the accused Victor Keith Fitzgerald GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt. In Criminal Case No. 419-94 for Rape, the accused is acquitted. Fitzgerald applied for bail, which the RTC denied. Fitzgerald appealed to the CA which affirmed the RTC Decision. Fitzgerald filed a Motion for New Trial and a Supplemental to Accused's Motion for New Trial on the ground that new and material evidence not previously available had surfaced. The CA granted the Motion for New Trial. On December 3, 2000, Fitzgerald filed with the CA a Motion for Early Transmittal of the Records and for the Re-Examination of the Penalty Imposed, and a Motion for Bail. On August 31, 2001, the CA issued the herein assailed Resolution granting Fitzgerald's bail application. Hence, the People filed this Petition to have the August 31, 2001 CA Resolution annulled and set aside. Petitioner argues that the CA erred in granting respondent Fitzgerald's Motion for Bail despite the fact that the latter was charged with a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua and the evidence of his guilt is strong. It also questions the jurisdiction of the CA to act on said Motion, considering that the case had been remanded to the RTC for new trial. Issue: WON the CA erred in granting respondents motion for bail. Held: Yes. The petition is meritorious. The right to bail emenates from of the right to be presumed innocent. It is accorded to a person in the custody of the law who may, by reason of the presumption of innocence he enjoys, be allowed provisional liberty upon filing of a security to guarantee his appearance before any court, as required under specified conditions. Implementing Sec. 13, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, Sections 4 and 5, Rule 114 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure set forth substantive and procedural rules on the disposition of bail applications. Sec. 4 provides that bail is a matter of right to an accused person in custody for an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, but a matter of discretion on the part of the court, concerning one facing an accusation for an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment when the evidence of his guilt is strong. As for an accused already convicted and sentenced to imprisonment term exceeding six years, bail may be denied or revoked based on prosecution evidence as to the existence of any of the circumstances under Sec. 5, paragraphs (a) to (e). It will be recalled that herein respondent was charged with violation of Section 5, par. (a), sub-paragraph (5), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, a crime which carries the maximum penalty of reclusion perpetua. He was later convicted by the RTC for a lesser crime which carried a sentence of imprisonment for an indeterminate term of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum, to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum. These circumstances are not altered when the CA granted a new trial. As already discussed, the CA retained appellate jurisdiction over the case even as it ordered the remand of the original records thereof to the RTC for reception of evidence. In retaining appellate jurisdiction, it set aside only its own September 27, 1999 Decision but left unaltered the May 7, 1996 RTC Decision. The said decision, therefore, remained operative. And under said Decision, respondent stood sentenced to an imprisonment term exceeding six years. Moreover, both the RTC and CA were unanimous in their findings of the existence of strong evidence of the guilt of respondent. These findings were not overturned when the CA granted a new trial. Under Section 6 (b), Rule 121, the grant of a new trial allows for reception of newly-discovered evidence but maintains evidence already presented or on record. And if there has been a finding that evidence is strong and sufficient to bar bail, that too subsists unless, upon another motion and hearing, the prosecution fails to prove that the evidence against
122
123
(a)
To be allowed to go to the Senate to attend all official functions of the Senate (whether at the Senate or elsewhere) particularly when the Senate is in session, and to attend the regular and plenary sessions of the Senate, committee hearings, committee meetings, consultations, investigations and hearings in aid of legislation, caucuses, staff meetings, etc. (b) To be allowed to set up a working area at his place of detention at the Marine Brig, Marine Barracks Manila, Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City, with a personal desktop computer and the appropriate communications equipment (i.e., a telephone line and internet access) in order that he may be able to work there when there are no sessions, meetings or hearings at the Senate or when the Senate is not in session. The costs of setting up the said working area and the related equipment and utility costs can be charged against the budget/allocation of the Office of the accused from the Senate; (c) To be allowed to receive members of his staff at the said working area at his place of detention at the Marine Brig, Marine Barracks Manila, Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City, at reasonable times of the day particularly during working days for purposes of meetings, briefings, consultations and/or coordination, so that the latter may be able to assists (sic) him in the performance and discharge of his duties as a Senator of the Republic; (d) To be allowed to give interviews and to air his comments, reactions and/or opinions to the press or the media regarding the important issues affecting the country and the public while at the Senate or elsewhere in the performance of his duties as Senator to help shape public policy and in the light of the important role of the Senate in maintaining the system of checks and balance between the three (3) co-equal branches of Government; (e) With prior notice to the Honorable Court and to the accused and his custodians, to be allowed to receive, on Tuesdays and Fridays, reporters and other members of the media who may wish to interview him and/or to get his comments, reactions and/or opinion at his place of confinement at the Marine Brig, Marine Barracks Manila, Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City, particularly when there are no sessions, meetings or hearings at the Senate or when the Senate is not in session; and (f) To be allowed to attend the organizational meeting and election of officers of the Senate and related activities scheduled in the
124
3.
COMENDADOR VS. DEVILLA 200SCRA 80 (1991) FACTS: The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 and the private respondents in G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454 are officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines facing prosecution for their alleged participation in the failed coup d' etat that took place on December 1 to 9, 1989. The charges against them are violation of Articles of War (AW) 67 (Mutiny), AW 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman)
125
126
4.
REYNALDO C. VILLASEOR vs. HON. MAXIMO ABANO FACTS: The questions presented in this an original petition for certiorari, took root in Criminal Case 2299 (Court of First Instance of Marinduque) for the murder of Boac police sergeant Alfonso Madla, lodged by the Provincial Fiscal against petitioner. 1 Petitioner, defendant below, was, on motion, admitted to a P60,000.00-bail. The amount of the bond was, on verbal representation of petitioner's wife, reduced to P40,000.00. On May 29, 1964, petitioner posted a property bond, was set at provisional liberty. Before arraignment on the murder charge, however, respondent Provincial Fiscal amended the information. This time he accused petitioner with "Direct Assault Upon an Agent of a Person in Authority with Murder." On August 7, 1964, respondent judge sua sponte( remember something?hehe) cancelled petitioner's bond, ordered his immediate arrest. On petitioner's motion. to reconsider, respondent judge, on September 9, 1964, after hearing, resolved to admit him to bail provided he puts up a cash bond of P60,000.00. On September 15, 1964, on petitioner's motion that the original bond previously given be reinstated, respondent judge resolved to fix "the bond anew in real property in the amount of P60,000.00, but to be posted only by residents of the province of Marinduque actually staying therein" with properties which "must be in the possession and ownership of said residents for five years." On October 1, 1964, petitioner came to this Court on certiorari , with a prayer for preliminary injunction. He seeks to set aside respondent judge's orders of August 7, September 9 and September 15, 1964; to reinstate the bail bond theretofore approved by respondent judge on May 29, 1964, and for other reliefs. RULING: Forefront amongst the three problems is this: Does the P60,000.00-bond fixed by respondent judge transgress the constitutional injunction that "(e)xcessive bail shall not be required"? 4 Petitioner's submission is that he is a mere government employee, earning but a monthly salary of P210.00, and the sole breadwinner of a family of five. To be read with the constitutional precept just adverted to is Section 12, Rule 114, Rules of Court, which provides that "the court may, upon good cause shown, either increase or reduce the amount" of the bail, and that "defendant may be committed to custody unless he gives bail in the increased amount he is called upon to furnish." Along with the court's power to grant bail in bailable cases is its discretion to fix the amount thereof, and, as stated, to increase or reduce the same. The question of whether bail is excessive "lays with the court to determine." In the matter of bail fixing, courts perforce are to be guided at all times by the purpose for which bail is required. The definition of bail in Section 1, Rule 114, Rules of Court, gives this purpose "the security required and given for the release of a person who is in the custody of the law, that he will appear before any court in which his appearance may be required as stipulated in the bail bond or recognizance ." And, in amplification thereof, Section 2 of the same rule states that the condition of the bail is that "defendant shall answer the complaint or information in the court in which it is filed or to which it may be transferred for trial, and after conviction, if the case is appealed to the Court of First Instance upon application supported by an undertaking or bail, that he will, surrender himself in execution of such judgment as the appellate court may render, or that, in case cause, is to be tried anew or remanded for a new trial, he will appear in the court to which it may be remanded and submit himself to the orders and processes thereof."
127
128
129
130
6.
G.R. No. 79269 June 5, 1991 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. PROCORO J. DONATO, in his official capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch XII, Manila; RODOLFO C. SALAS, alias Commander Bilog, respondents. Facts: Private respondent and his co-accused were charged of rebellion on October 2, 1986 for acts committed before and after February 1986. Private respondent filed with a Motion to Quash alleging that: (a) the facts alleged do not constitute an offense; (b) the Court has no jurisdiction over the offense charged; (c) the Court has no jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants; and (d) the criminal action or liability has been extinguished. This was denied. May 9, 1987 Respondent filed a petition for bail, which was opposed that the respondent is not entitled to bail anymore since rebellion became a capital offense under PD 1996, 942 and 1834 amending ART. 135 of RPC. On 5 June 1987 the President issued Executive Order No. 187 repealing, among others, P.D. Nos. 1996, 942 and
131
132
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW REVIEW 2-BILL OF RIGHTS Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo VIII. RIGHT DURING TRIAL 1. DUE PROCESS IN CRIMINAL CASES
G.R. No. 131652 March 9, 1998 BAYANI M. ALONTE, petitioner,vs. HON. MAXIMO A. SAVELLANO JR., NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. G.R. No. 131728 March 9, 1998 BUENAVENTURA CONCEPCION, petitioner,vs. JUDGE MAXIMO SAVELLANO, JR., THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and JUVIELYN Y. PUNONGBAYAN, respondents. FACTS: On 05 December 1996, an information for rape was filed against petitioners Bayani M. Alonte, an incumbent Mayor of Bian, Laguna, and Buenaventura Concepcion predicated on a complaint filed by Juvie-lyn Punongbayan. . On 13 December 1996, Juvie-lyn Punongbayan, through her counsel, and Assistant Chief State Prosecutor ("ACSP") Guiyab, filed a Petition for a Change of Venue to have the case transferred and tried by any of the Regional Trial Courts in Metro Manila. During the pendency of the petition for change of venue, or on 25 June 1997, Juvie-lyn Punongbayan, assisted by her parents and counsel, executed an affidavit of desistance. On 02 September 1997, this Court issued a Resolution granting the petition for change of venue. On 07 October 1997, Juvie-lyn Punongbayan, through Attorney Balbin, submitted to the Manila court a "compliance" where she reiterated "her decision to abide by her Affidavit of Desistance." On 02 November 1997, Alonte voluntarily surrendered himself to Director Santiago Toledo of the National Bureau of Investigation ("NBI"), while Concepcion, in his case, posted the recommended bail of P150,000.00. On 07 November 1997, petitioners were arraigned and both pleaded "not guilty" to the charge. The parties manifested that they were waiving pre-trial. The proceedings forthwith went on. Per Judge Savellano, both parties agreed to proceed with the trial of the case on the merits. According to Alonte, however, Judge Savellano allowed the prosecution to present evidence relative only to the question of the voluntariness and validity of the affidavit of desistance. Thereupon, respondent judge said that "the case was submitted for decision." On 17 December 1997, Attorney Philip Sigfrid A. Fortun, the lead counsel for petitioner Alonte received a notice from the RTC Manila. Branch 53, notifying him of the schedule of promulgation, on 18 December 1997, of the decision on the case. The counsel for accused Concepcion denied having received any notice of the scheduled promulgation. On 18 December 1997, after the case was called, Atty. Sigrid Fortun and Atty. Jose Flaminiano manifested that Alonte could not attend the promulgation of the decision because he was suffering from mild hypertension and was confined at the NBI clinic and that, upon the other hand, petitioner Concepcion and his counsel would appear not to have been notified of the proceedings. The promulgation, nevertheless, of the decision proceeded in absentia; the reading concluded: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the two (2) accused Mayor Bayani Alonte and Buenaventura "Wella" Concepcion guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the heinous crime of RAPE ISSUE: WON The respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when he rendered a Decision in the case a quo without affording the petitioner his Constitutional right to due process of law (Article III, 1, Constitution). HELD: The Court must admit that it is puzzled by the somewhat strange way the case has proceeded below. Per Judge Savellano, after the waiver by the parties of the pre-trial stage, the trial of the case did proceed on the merits but that
vs.
ARIEL
FACTS: Before us on automatic review is a Decision sentencing appellant Ariel Macarang to suffer the penalty of death in each of said criminal cases for qualified rape. Appellant claims that the trial court erred in giving weight and credence to the testimony of private complainant and that appellants guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. Appellee, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, filed its brief, entitled Brief For The Appellee With Recommendation To Remand The Cases To The Court A Quo For Further Proceedings, calling our attention to the fact that the trial court had considered appellant to have waived his right to present his evidence without any showing that the latter was fully aware of the consequences of such waiver. ISSUE: WON appellant was deprived of his right t due process
133
2.
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE
[G.R. No. 115351. March 27, 1998] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. DANIEL MALUENDA alias DONGKOY; GIL BUENO; RAUL MONDAGA alias BOBONG; and RODRIGO LEGARTO, DANIEL MALUENDA and RODRIGO LEGARTO, accused-appellants. FACTS: Conspiracy and/or direct participation in a crime may be proven by circumstantial evidence. However, the comprising circumstances must be duly proven, consistent with each other and lead with moral certainty to only one conclusion: that the accused is guilty. If the totality of such circumstances eliminates beyond reasonable doubt the possibility of innocence, conviction is proper; otherwise, the accused must be acquitted. If said accused, however, took advantage of the effects of the crime and profited thereby, he can be held criminally liable as an accessory. The Case This is an appeal, convicting Raul Mondaga, Rodrigo Legarto and Daniel Maluenda of kidnapping and sentencing them to reclusin perpetua. Warrants of arrest for the four accused were issued by the trial court, but Bueno eluded the authorities and remained at large. At their arraignment and with the assistance of counsel, Legarto, Maluenda and Mondaga pleaded not guilty. After trial in due course, the lower court found the three accused guilty as charged The trial court also noted the following pieces of evidence which proved Legartos participation in the crime: 1. Witness Sanchez testified that she saw Mondaga frequenting Legartos house in Diatagon, and she even saw him and Mondaga riding on his motorcycle. 2. On August 20, 1992, Engineer Resus saw him convey Maluenda and Alex to Andanan, where Maluenda and Alex boarded Engineer Resuss car. 3. He drove the victims car back to Diatagon from Alegria. 4. He delivered Mondagas ransom notes to Dr. Resus. 5. He also delivered the ransom money to the kidnappers. 6. He used P36,000 of the ransom money to pay the balance of the purchase price of his motorcycle. All these allegedly show Legartos participation as a co-principal by indispensable cooperation in the crime. ISSUE: WON Legarto conspiracy and/or direct participation may be proven by circumstantial evidence HELD: A conviction based on circumstantial evidence requires the concurrence of the following elements: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances produces a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.[24] For such a conviction to withstand judicial scrutiny, the prosecution must further show that all the circumstances are inconsistent with the hypothesis that the
134
135
3.
136
4.
Ricardo Rio was convicted of rape and sentenced to reclusion perpetua by the RTC and on appeal to the SC, Rio manifested his intention to withdraw the appeal due to his poverty.
137
5.
Facts: 3 Informations against the appellants Manalili and Reyes were simultaneously filed in the Regional Trial Court of Ilagan, Isabela, Branch 16. The first case charged the two with attempted robbery; the second case, charged them with killing three persons; the third case charged them with the shooting and wounding, but not the killing, of three other persons. The trial court adjudged appellants guilty of the complex crime of attempted robbery with homicide under Article 297 of the Revised Penal Code.
Held:
Appellants were not properly charged with this offense in any of the three Informations filed against them. There was no information charging the special complex crime of attempted robbery with multiple homicide. Thus, to hold appellants liable for this offense, notwithstanding the absence of the proper information, is to violate the explicit guarantee of the Constitution, which provides: (2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable. (Italics supplied.)
The hornbook doctrine in our jurisdiction is that an accused cannot be convicted of an offense, unless it is clearly charged in the complaint or information. Constitutionally, he has a right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. To convict him of an offense other than that charged in the complaint or information would be violative of this constitutional right. Indeed, the accused cannot be convicted of a crime, even if duly proven, unless it is alleged or necessarily included in the information filed against him. We are not unaware of the rule that an information charging more than one offense is fatally defective and may be quashed on the ground of duplicity of offenses. The rationale for this rule was explained in this wise:
138
On February 10, 1998, the Court resolved to grant appellants Urgent Omnibus Motion: (1) to hold in abeyance consideration of his motion for reconsideration pending his medical examination; (2) to allow a supplemental motion for reconsideration after his medical examination; and (3) to submit him (appellant) for examination by a physician of the Supreme Court. Subsequently, or on January 19, 1999, to be precise, appellant was allowed to be brought to the UP-PGH Medical Center, with appropriate escorts, to undergo the necessary neurologic and otolaryngologic evaluation and work-up.
Appellant is mistaken. When the hearings for his petition for bail were conducted, the trial court had already acquired jurisdiction over his person. Settled is the rule that jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired upon his arrest or voluntary appearance. In the case at bar, the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the appellant when he was arrested on 19 March 1997. His arrest, not his arraignment, conferred on the trial court jurisdiction over his person. Arraignment is the formal mode and manner of implementing the constitutional right of an accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The purpose of arraignment is, thus, to apprise the accused of the possible loss of freedom, even of his life, depending on the nature of the crime imputed to him, or at the very least to inform him of why the prosecuting arm of the State is mobilized against him. Admittedly, appellant was arraigned after the case was submitted for decision. The question is: Were appellants rights and interests prejudiced by the fact that he was arraigned only at this stage of the proceedings? We do not think so. Appellants belated arraignment did not prejudice him. This procedural defect was cured when his counsel participated in the trial without raising any objection that his client had yet to be arraigned. In fact, his counsel even crossexamined the prosecution witnesses. His counsels active participation in the hearings is a clear indication that he was fully aware of the charges against him; otherwise, his counsel would have objected and informed the court of this blunder. Moreover, no protest was made when appellant was subsequently arraigned. The parties did not question the procedure undertaken by the trial court. It is only now, after being convicted and sentenced to two death sentences, that appellant cries that his constitutional right has been violated. It is already too late to raise this procedural defect. This Court will not allow it.
Held: The results of medical examinations conducted on appellant indicate that appellant is really a deaf-mute, a mental retardate, whose mental age is only seven (7) years and nine (9) months, and with low IQ of 60 only. Records on hand show that appellant was tried below without the benefit of a sign language expert. The fact that he was helped and assisted by a person who has been known to him since 1983, as noted by the trial court of origin and appearing on page 6 of the transcript of stenographic notes for February 8, 1995, is of no moment, absent any clear showing that appellant was aided by a competent sign language expert able to fully understand and interpret the actions and mutterings of appellant. As held in People v. Crisologo: The absence of an interpreter in sign language who could have conveyed to the accused, a deaf-mute, the full facts of the offense with which he was charged and who could also have communicated the accuseds own version of the circumstances which led to his implication in the crime, deprived the accused of a full and fair trial and a reasonable opportunity to defend himself. Not even the accuseds final plea of not guilty can excuse these inherently unjust circumstances. The absence of a qualified interpreter in sign language and of any other means, whether in writing or otherwise, to inform the accused of the charges against him denied the accused his fundamental right to due process of law. The accuracy and fairness of the factual process by which the guilt or innocence of the accused was determined was not safeguarded. The accused could not be said to have enjoyed the right to be heard by himself and counsel, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him in the proceedings where his life and liberty were at stake. All the foregoing studiedly considered, the court is of the irresistible conclusion that movant richly deserves a re-arraignment and re-trial, to the end that only upon proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt may he be consigned to the lethal injection chamber.
Mupas vs. People Facts: Jun and Gil Mupas were found guilty of frustrated homicide by the Regional Trial Court of Malaoan, La Union. Jun and Gil contended that Rogelio had failed to identify with moral certainty that Gil had been one of those who inflicted the injury on him. They pointed out that Rogelio had failed to categorically state that Gil and Banjo Mupas are one and the same person. After a review of the records of the case, the Court of Appeals concluded that Banjo Mupas and Gil Mupas are one and the same person. The Court of Appeals observed that when Banjo posted a bail bond in the case entitled People of the Philippines v. Jun Mupas and Banjo Mupas, he had made no objection to the caption of the case and he had even signed his name as Gil Mupas. Secondly, when the Information was amended to include Gils alias, Banjo did not interpose any objection to the correction. Lastly, Rogelio had not been able to identify Banjo in court due to the latters absence at the time of his testimony Jun and Gil are now before the Court reiterating their assertion that the prosecution failed to establish Gils identity as one of the perpetrators of the crime and that his defense of denial was duly supported by clear and convincing evidence. Moreover, they asserted that in Juns case, the prosecution had failed to prove intent to kill and as such, he should be convicted only of the crime of physical injuries.
People vs. Pangilinan, 518 SCRA 358, G.R. No. 171020 Facts: Pangilinan was charged with 2 counts of rape. Two Informations were filed charging appellant with rapping his daughter.d He was convicted by the RTC on both counts. The Court of Appeals upheld the two death sentences imposed on appellant but modified the award of damages. Pangilinan assails his conviction because he was not properly arraigned. Since he was arraigned only after the case was submitted for decision, said irregularity, he argues, is a procedural error which is prejudicial to the appellant and is tantamount to denial of his constitutional right to be informed of the accusation against him. He claims that his subsequent arraignment did not cure the defect in the trial proceedings because at the time the petition for bail was heard, the trial court had not yet acquired jurisdiction over his person.
139
Caloocan City Regional Trial Court found SPO1 Aure and SPO1 Ferol guilty of rape, and imposing upon them the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Two separate informations for rape were filed with the RTC charging appellants of rape, thus: In Criminal Case No. C-58617:
People vs. Tabio, 544 SCRA 156 Facts: Tabio was charged with three (3) counts of rape in a single Information, the accusatory portion of which reads as follows: That between June 13, 2002 and June 28, 2002 in [Aurora] the said accused, did then and there, unlawfully, feloniously and willfully, have carnal knowledge of mentally retarded AAA by means of force and intimidation three times all committed while the victim was alone inside their house and during nighttime which was taken advantage of to facilitate the commission of the crime. CONTRARY TO LAW. RTC handed down a decision finding appellant guilty and imposing the penalty of death on three (3) counts of qualified rape. The Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court. The appellate court found appellant guilty of all three (3) counts for simple rape only and not qualified rape.
That on or about the 7th day of November, 1999 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together and mutually helping one another, with lewd design and by means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously lie and have sexual intercourse with one AAA, 45 years old, married, against the latters will and without her consent. In Criminal Case No. C58693: That on or about the 7th day of November, 1999 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together and mutually helping one another, with lewd design and by means of force and intimidation did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously lie and have sexual intercourse with one AAA, 45 years old, against the latters will and without her consent.
Held: The information should have warranted a judgment of guilt only for simple, not qualified rape. We quote with approval the appellate court when it said: Under Article 266-B(10) of the Revised Penal Code, knowledge by the offender of the mental disability, emotional disorder, or physical handicap at the time of the commission of the rape is the qualifying circumstance that sanctions the imposition of the death penalty. Rule 110 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure requires both qualifying and aggravating circumstances to be alleged with specificity in the information. In the case at bench, however, the information merely states that the appellant had carnal knowledge with a mentally retarded complainant. It does not state that appellant knew of the mental disability of the complainant at the time of the commission of the crime. It bears stressing that the rules now require that the qualifying circumstance that sanctions the imposition of the death penalty should be specifically stated in the information. Article 266-B (10) of the Revised Penal Code could not, thus, be applied and the supreme penalty of death could not be validly imposed. Rule 110 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure is clear and unequivocal that both qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be alleged with specificity in the information.
After trial, the RTC rendered a Decision on 5 December 2000 convicting Aure of rape in Criminal Case No. C-58617 and acquitting him of rape in Criminal Case No. C-58693. On the other hand, Ferol was convicted of rape in Criminal Case No. C58693 but was acquitted of rape in Criminal Case No. C-58617. Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision affirming in toto the RTC Decision. Appellants maintain that the foregoing findings and rulings of the RTC are inconsistent with the allegations of conspiracy in the two informations and that the RTC cannot individually and separately convict appellants of rape because the informations in the two cases alleged conspiracy between them in raping AAA. Also, appellant Ferol cannot be convicted in Criminal Case No. C-58693 of rape committed on 8 November 1999 because such fact was not alleged in the informations (what was written was November 7, 1999). Appellants argued that the said finding and ruling of the RTC violated their constitutional rights to be informed of the nature of the case against them, to be presumed innocent of the charges, and to due process.
Held: Although the informations in Criminal Cases No. C58617 and No. C-58693 both alleged that appellants conspired in raping AAA, it does not necessarily follow that the RTC cannot individually and separately convict appellants of rape. The rule is that once a conspiracy is established, the act of one is the act of all, and each of the conspirators is liable for the crimes committed by the other conspirators. It follows then that if the prosecution fails to prove
140
People vs. Gines, 197 SCRA 481 (May 27, 1991) Facts: An Information for libel was filed against Labo, Floresca and Manaois as editor/publisher of the Peoples Bagong Taliba in connection with the publication of the article captioned Inihablang ExJustice. Private complainant filed a motion for postponement on the ground that he has a serious eye ailment that needs immediate medical attention. When the case was set for initial hearing, counsel for defendants failed to appear despite due notice so hearing was reset. Several resetting of the hearings were held at the instance of the private complainant. Court dismissed the case for failure of private complainant to appear.
Issue:
Whether the right of the accused to speedy trial had been violated to entitle them to the dismissal of the case. Held: Right to speedy trial has not been violated and the dismissal of the case is premature and erroneous. The right of the accused to a speedy trial is guaranteed to him by the Constitution but the same shall not be utilized to deprive the State of a reasonable opportunity of fairly indicting criminals. It secures the rights to a defendant but it does not preclude the rights of public justice. The Court is convinced that private complainants absences at the hearings of the case were in good faith and that he had justifiable and meritorious reasons therefore. Said absences are evidently not capricious, oppressive, nor vexatious to the two accused who had waived their appearance at the trial of the case. It should be remembered that the right to a speedy trial is relative, subject to reasonable delays and postponements arising from illness, medical attention, body operations, as in the instant case where it was satisfactorily proven that private complainant had to undergo eye operations, hospitalization and a medical check-up abroad. 8 months after the Information was filed is not such an extended, prolonged or lengthy duration as to cause capricious and vexatious delay. Speedy trial means one that can be had as soon after indictment is filed as the prosecution can with reasonable diligence prepare for trial. While accused persons do have rights, many of them choose to forget that the aggrieved also have the same rights.
People vs. Guevarra, 570 SCRA 288 (October 29, 2008) Facts: RTC Batangas found Guevarra guilty of murder, and imposing upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision affirming with modification the RTC Decision. It held that an additional amount of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages should also imposed on appellant because the qualifying circumstance of treachery attended the killing of Inspector Barte.
Held: We agree with the RTC and the Court of Appeals that the qualifying circumstance of treachery and the special aggravating circumstance of use of an unlicensed firearm attended the killing of Inspector Barte. It is settled that aggravating/qualifying circumstances must be alleged in the information and proven during the trial before they can be appreciated. In the case at bar, treachery was alleged in the information and all its elements were duly established by the prosecution.
(Mae Sam) FRANCISCO GUERRERO vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS Information for Triple Homicide through Reckless Imprudence was filed against petitioner before the Court of First Instance, Caloocan City. The accused being then the pilot of non-commercial Aircraft, without taking the necessary care and precaution to avoid accidents or injuries to persons, maneuver and/or conduct the flight of said aircraft from the airport with four passengers on board, and after several minutes, the engine quitted twice indicating that there was no
6.
(A) SPEEDY TRIAL Compiled by: Thyrza Marbas/Percy Donalvo/Carrie Mae Bangayan
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
7. 8. 9.
OF
10. WHEN PRESENCE OF THE ACCUSED IS A DUTY a. ARRAIGNMENT AND PLEA b. DURING TRIAL FOR IDENTIFICATION
PEOPLE vs. SALAS 143 SCRA 163 (1986) 11. PROMULGATION OF SENTENCE
PEOPLE vs. GALLARDE 325 SCRA 835 (2001) Facts Accused was a suspect in a rape with homicide case. After his arrest, he was asked by a Kagawad to pull down his shorts at the police headquarters and he complied. Photographs of him were also taken after the incident and presented during trial. Issue Are the pictures admissible in evidence? Ruling Yes. The constitutional right of an accused against self-incrimination proscribes the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications and not the inclusion of his body in evidence when it may be material. Purely mechanical acts are not included in the prohibition as the accused does not thereby speak of his guilt, hence the assistance and guiding hand of counsel is not required. The essence of the right against self-incrimination is testimonial compulsion, that is the giving of evidence against himself through a testimonial act. Hence, the taking of pictures of an accused even without the assistance of counsel, being a purely mechanical act, is not a violation of his constitutional right against self-incrimination. PEOPLE vs. YATAR 428 SCRA 504 (2007)
149
IN RE SABIO 504 SCRA 704 (2006) FACTS Among those required to appear by 2 Senate Committees in their inquiry on alleged anomalies in the PHILCOMPSAT, PHC and POTC were directors and officers of Philcomsat Holding Corp. ISSUE Can they refuse to honor the subpoena by invoking their right against self-incrimination? Ruling The right against self-incrimination maybe invoked by the officers of Philcomsat Holding Corp. only when an incriminating question is asked. They cannot refuse to appear since they have no way of knowing in advance the nature or effect of the questions to be asked from them. That this right may possibly be violated or abused is no ground for denying respondent Senate Committees their power of inquiry. The consolation is that when this power is abused, such issue may be presented before the courts. At this juncture, what is important is that respondent Senate Committees have sufficient Rules to guide them when the right against self-incrimination is invoked.
2.
IN WHAT PROCEEDINGS AVAILABLE PASCUAL vs. BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS 28 SCRA 344 (1969)
Facts: This involves a malpractice suit against a doctor for immorality. During the hearing, he was called by the prosecutor to testify, and he refused, invoking the right to self-incrimination. The board overruled him. He was made to take the stand, and made to object only if the question asked is incriminating. Ruling: Where petitioner was the respondent in the malpractice charge filed against him with the Board of Medical Examiners, the said Board cannot compel him to take the witness stand as a witness for the complainants. The principle against self-incrimination is equally applicable to a proceeding that could possibly result in the loss of the privilege to practice the medical profession. He may not be compelled to take the witness stand without his consent. It is because that penalty in such accusation is so severe that it can cause the revocation of the license to practice his profession. In effect, it is also a prohibition of inquiry, like in criminal cases.
150
PEOPLE vs. AYSON 175 SCRA 216 (1989) Facts: Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the Philippine Airlines (PAL), assigned at its Baguio City station. It was alleged that he was involved in irregularities in the sales of plane tickets. PAL management notified him of an investigation to be conducted into the matter. A day before the investigation, he gave handwritten note to his superiors for compromise settlement. Investigation was conducted. However, no compromise agreement was reached much less consummated. He was charged for estafa. Among the evidences offered by the prosecutor were the handwritten note (exhibit k) and the result of the investigation (exhibit a) wherein he admitted his guilt. The defense objected that said document, which appears to be a confession, was taken without the accused being represented by a lawyer. This was sustained by Judge Ayson since it does not appear that the accused was reminded of this constitutional rights to remain silent and to have counsel, and that when he waived the same and gave his statement, it was with the assistance actually of a counsel & also since it does not appear that the accused was assisted by counsel when he made said admission. Issue: When should the right against self-incrimination be applicable? Held: The right against self-incrimination, mentioned in Section 20 (now sec 17 of 1987 consti), Article IV (now art III) of the 1973 Constitution, is accorded to every person who gives evidence, whether
151
W/N the privilege Against Self-Incrimination can be invoke in legislative inquiry? YES. RULING A witness can invoke his right against self-incrimination only when a question tends to elicit an answer that will incriminate him is propounded to him. However, he may offer to answer any question in an executive session. No person can refuse to testify or be placed under oath or affirmation or answer questions before an incriminatory question is asked. His invocation of such right does not by itself excuse him from his duty to give testimony. In such a case, the Committee, by a majority vote of the members present there being a quorum, shall determine whether the right has been properly invoked. If the Committee decides otherwise, it shall resume its investigation and the question or questions previously refused to be answered shall be repeated to the witness. If the latter continues to refuse to answer the question, the Committee may punish him for contempt for contumacious conduct. The same directors and officers contend that the Senate is barred from inquiring into the same issues being litigated before the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan. Suffice it to state that the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation provide that the filing or pendency of any prosecution of criminal or administrative action should not stop or abate any inquiry to carry out a legislative purpose. 3. a. b. USE IMMUNITY vs. TRANSACTIONAL IMMUNITY TRANSACTIONAL IMMUNITY USE AND FRUIT IMMUNITY GALMAN vs. PAMARAN 138 SCRA 274 (1985) (Tin Pia) 4. 5. EXCLUSIONARY RULE EFFECT OF DENIAL OF PRIVILEGES BY COURT CHAVEZ vs. CA 24 SCRA 663 (1968)
IN RE SABIO 504 SCRA 704 (2006) FACTS Chairman Sabio of PCGG refused to appear before the Senate Committee. In his letter to Senator Gordon dated August 18, 2006, he reiterated his earlier position, invoking Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 which provides: No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial legislative or administrative proceeding concerning matters within its official cognizance. ISSUE 1 W/N the contention of Sabio is correct? No. RULING Considering these jurisprudential instructions, we find Section 4(b) directly repugnant with Article VI, Section 21. Section 4(b) exempts the PCGG members and staff from the Congress power of inquiry. This cannot be countenanced. Nowhere in the Constitution is any provision granting such exemption. The Congress power of inquiry, being broad, encompasses everything that concerns the administration of existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes.[22] It even extends to government agencies created by Congress and officers whose positions are within the power of Congress to regulate or even abolish.[23] PCGG belongs to this class.
X. RIGHT TO SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASES HOFER vs. HRET 426 SCRA 383 (2004) DIMAYACYAC vs. CA 430 SCRA 121 (2004) BERNAT vs. SANDIGANBAYAN 428 SCRA 787 (2004) PEOPLE vs. ANONAS 513 SCRA 552 (2007) CABARLES vs. MACEDA 516 SCRA 303 (2007)
REPORT OF JUDICIAL AUDIT 535 SCRA 224 (2007) PEREZ vs. PEOPLE 544 SCRA 532 (2008) (Erwin Vicente)
ENRIQUEZ et al vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN February 15, 2008/G.R. Nos. 174902-06
152
153
XI. Substantive Rights under the due process clause A. What acts cannot be criminalized 1. Mere beliefs and aspirations 2. Debts and Civil Obiligations
Lozano v. Martinez December 18, 1986/ G.R. No. L-63419 Ruling: Among the constitutional objections raised against BP 22, the most serious is the alleged conflict between the statute and the constitutional provision forbidding imprisonment for debt. It is contended that the statute runs counter to the inhibition in the Bill of Rights which states, "No person shall be imprisoned for debt or nonpayment of a poll tax." Petitioners insist that, since the offense under BP 22 is consummated only upon the dishonor or non-payment of the check when it is presented to the drawee bank, the statute is really a "bad debt law" rather than a "bad check law." What it punishes is the non-payment of the check, not the act of issuing it. The statute, it is claimed, is nothing more than a veiled device to coerce payment of a debt under the threat of penal sanction. The reach and scope of this constitutional safeguard have been the subject of judicial definition, both by our Supreme Court and by American State courts. Mr. Justice Malcolm speaking for the Supreme Court in Ganaway vs. Queen, stated: "The 'debt' intended to be covered by the constitutional guaranty has a well-defined meaning. Organic provisions relieving from imprisonment for debt, were intended to prevent commitment of debtors to prison for liabilities arising from actions ex contractu The inhibition was never meant to include damages arising in actions ex delicto, for the reason that damages recoverable therein do not arise from any contract entered into between the parties but are imposed upon the defendant for the wrong he has done and are considered as punishment, nor to fines and penalties imposed by the courts in criminal proceedings as punishments for crime." Agbanlog v. People
154
Facts: Petitioners are the tenants of Berlito P. Taripe on a property located in Dr. A. Santos Ave., Paraaque City. They were arrested for indirect contempt for not complying with the probate court's order directing them to pay their monthly rentals to respondent Bolao. Then, some of the petitioners, together with the other tenants of the property, informed the probate court that they are "freezing" their monthly rentals as they are in a quandary as to whom to pay the rentals. The probate court found petitioners guilty of indirect contempt and ordered them to pay a fine of P30,000.00 each and to undergo imprisonment until they comply with the probate court's order for them to pay rentals. Petitioners were then arrested. They filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus which ordered their temporary release. Issue: WON the order to under imprisonment violates the right to nonimprisonment of debt. Ruling: The trial court's finding of contempt and the order directing the imprisonment of petitioner were unwarranted. In Philippine jurisdiction, Section 20, Article 3 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution expressly provides that no person shall be imprisoned for debt. Debt, as used in the Constitution, refers to civil debt or one not arising from a criminal offense. It means any liability to pay arising out of a contract, express or implied. In the present case, petitioners, as recognized lessees of the estate of the deceased, were ordered by the probate court to pay the rentals to the administratrix. Petitioners did not comply with the order for the principal reason that they were not certain as to the rightful person to whom to pay the rentals because it was a certain Berlito P. Taripe who had originally leased the subject property to them. Clearly, the payment of rentals is covered by the constitutional guarantee against imprisonment.
WRIGHT vs CA (235 SCRA 341 [1994] Facts: The Philippines ratified an extradition treaty with Australia on September 10, 1990 and took effect on October 10, 1990. Wright became subject of the said treaty. He assails the extradition as ex post facto law. ISSUE: Whether or not an extradition treaty may be given retroactive effect. Ruling: Yes. The SC ruled that the extradition treaty is not a penal or criminal statute. "It merely provides for the extradition of persons wanted for prosecution of an offense or a crime which offense or crime was already committed or consummated at the time the treaty was ratified." Hence, it may be given retroactive effect and does not violate the Constitutional provision. SUBIDO v. SANDIGANBAYAN, 266 S 379 (1997) Facts: RA No. 7975 amended PD No. 1606 by, among others, vesting jurisdiction on the SB over national and local officials classified as Grade 27 or higher who are charged with certain criminal offenses regardless of the imposable penalty. The amending law took effect on May 6, 1995. ISSUE: Whether or not said law be applied to accused who committed a crime on June 25, 1992 without violating the prohibition on ex post facto laws. Ruling: Yes. RA No. 7975 is not a penal law. Penal laws or statutes are those acts of the legislature which prohibits certain acts and establish penalties for their violation. RA No. 7975, in further amending PD No. 1606 as regards the SBs jurisdiction, mode of appeal, and other procedural matters, is clearly a procedural law, i.e., one which prescribes rules and forms of procedure for enforcing rights or obtaining redress for their invasion, or those which refer to rules of procedure by which courts applying laws of all kinds can properly administer justice. Likewise, it is a curative or remedial statute, one which cures defects and adds to the means of enforcing existing obligations. As a procedural and curative statute, RA No. 7975 may validly be given retroactive effect, there being no impairment of vested rights.
3. Acts which when done were innocent (Ex Post Facto Law)
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE DECLARATION OF THE PETITIONER'S RIGHTS AND DUTIES UNDER SEC. 8 OF R.A. No. 6132. KAY VILLEGAS KAMI, INC., petitioner. October 22, 1970/G.R. No. L-32485 Facts: This petition for declaratory relief was filed by Kay Villegas Kami, Inc., claiming to be a duly recognized and existing non-stock and non-profit corporation created under the laws of the land, and praying for a determination of the validity of Sec. 8 of R.A. No. 6132 and a declaration of petitioner's rights and duties thereunder. In paragraph 7 of its petition, petitioner avers that it has printed materials designed to propagate its ideology and program of government, which materials include Annex B; and that in paragraph 11 of said petition, petitioner intends to pursue its purposes by supporting delegates to the Constitutional Convention who will propagate its ideology. Issue: WON Sec. 18 of R.A. No. 6132 including Sec. 8(a) thereof is an ex post facto law. Ruling: No. An ex post facto law is one which:. (1) makes criminal an act done before the passage of the law and which was innocent when done, and punishes such an act; (2) aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed;
FAJARDO v. CA, 302 S 503 (1999) Facts: For issuing a bouncing check in 1981, accused was convicted of violation of BP Blg. 22 on May 26, 1988 by the RTC. His appeal to the CA resulted to the affirmance of the conviction on Feb. 27, 1993. He applied for probation but it was denied because under the amendment to PD No. 986 which became effective in 1986, one who has perfected an appeal is not eligible for probation. ISSUE: Whether or not applying a 1986 amendment to a crime committed in 1981 violates the prohibition against ex post facto laws.
155
BILLS OF ATTAINDER
PEOPLE v. FERRER Facts: On March 5, 1970 a criminal complaint for violation of section 4 of the Anti-Subversion Act was filed against the respondent Feliciano Co in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac. The AntiSubversion Law declared the CPP as an organized conspiracy to
156
Caveat: Cases found in Page 17 starting from the topic The Protection against Double Jeopardyand all cases found in page 18 of the syllabusno assigned persons to digest said cases. The Annotations are also not included.
157