Externalities and Public Goods

Chapter 18
Externalities and
Public Goods
Topics to be Discussed
 Externalities
 Ways of Correcting Market Failure
 Externalities and Property Rights
 Common Property Resources
Chapter 18 Slide 2
Topics to be Discussed
 Public Goods
 Private Preferences for Public Goods
Chapter 18 Slide 3
Externalities
 Negative
 Action by one party imposes a cost on
another party
 Positive
 Action by one party benefits another
party
Chapter 18 Slide 4
External Cost
 Scenario
 Steel plant dumping waste in a river
 The entire steel market effluent can be
reduced by lowering output (fixed
proportions production function)
Chapter 18 Slide 5
External Cost
 Scenario
 Marginal External Cost (MEC) is the cost
imposed on fishermen downstream for
each level of production.
 Marginal Social Cost (MSC) is MC plus
MEC.
Chapter 18 Slide 6
External Costs
When there are negative The differences is The profit maximizing firm
externalities, the marginal the marginal external produces at q1 while the
social cost MSC is higher cost MEC. efficient output level is q*.
than the marginal cost.
Price MSC Price
MC MSCI
S = MCI
The industry competitive
output is Q1 while the efficient Aggregate
level is Q*. social cost of
P* negative
externality
P1 P1
MECI
MEC
D
q* q1 Firm output Q* Q1 Industry output
External Cost
 Negative Externalities encourage

inefficient firms to remain in the
industry and create excessive
production in the long run.
Chapter 18 Slide 8
Externalities
 Positive Externalities and Inefficiency

 Externalities can also result in too little
production, as can be shown in an
example of home repair and
landscaping.
Chapter 18 Slide 9
External Benefits
Value When there are positive
MSB externalities (the benefits
of repairs to neighbors),
A self-interested home owner
marginal social benefits
invests q1 in repairs. The
MSB are higher than
efficient level of repairs
marginal benefits D.
q* is higher. The higher price
D P1 discourages repair.
P1 MC
P*
Is research and development

MEB discouraged by positive
externalities?
q1 q* Repair Level
Chapter 18 Slide 10
Ways of Correcting Market Failure
 Assumption: The market failure is

pollution
 Fixed-proportion production technology
 Must reduce output to reduce
emissions
 Use an output tax to reduce output
 Input substitution possible by altering
technology
Chapter 18 Slide 11
The Efficient Level of Emissions
Assume:
1) Competitive market
2) Output and emissions decisions are independent
Dollars
3) Profit maximizing output chosen
per unit
of Emissions MSC
6
At Eo the marginal
Why is this more efficient cost of abating emissions
than zero emissions? is greater than the
marginal social cost.
4
At E1 the marginal
social cost is greater
than the marginal cost of abatement.
The efficient level of

2 emissions is 12 (E*) where
MCA = MSC.
MCA
E0 E* E1
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26
Chapter 18 Level of Emissions Slide 12

 Options for Reducing Emissions to E*

 Emission Standard
 Set a legal limit on emissions at E*
(12)
 Enforced by monetary and criminal
penalties
 Increases the cost of production and
the threshold price to enter the
industry
Chapter 18 Slide 13
Standards and Fees
Dollars
per unit
of Emissions MSC
Standard
Fee
3
MCA
E*
12 Level of Emissions
Chapter 18 Slide 14
 Options for Reducing Emissions to E*

 Emissions Fee
 Charge levied on each unit of
emission
Chapter 18 Slide 15
Standards and Fees
Dollars
per unit
of Emissions MSC
Cost is less than the

fee if emissions were
Fee not reduced.
Total Fee Total MCA

of Abatement E* Abatement Cost
12
Chapter 18 Level of Emissions Slide 16

 Standards Versus Fees

 Assumptions
 Policymakers have asymmetric
information
 Administrative costs require the same
fee or standard for all firms
Chapter 18 Slide 17
The Case for Fees
The impact of a standard of
abatement of 7 for both firms
Fee per is illustrated.
Unit of MCA1 Not efficient because
MCA2 < MCA1.
Emissions MCA2
If a fee of $3 was imposed
6 Firm 1 emissions would fall
The cost minimizing solution From 14 to 8. Firm 2 emissions
would be an abatement of 6 would fall from 14 to 6.
5 MCA1 = MCA2: efficient solution.
for firm 1 and 8 for firm 2 and
MCA1= MCA2 = $3.
4
3.75
3
Firm 1’s Increased
2.50 Abatement Costs
2 Firm 2’s Reduced
Abatement
Costs
1
Level of
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 Emissions
Chapter 18 Slide 18
 Advantages of Fees
 When equal standards must be used,
fees achieve the same emission
abatement at lower cost.
 Fees create an incentive to install
equipment that would reduce emissions
further.
Chapter 18 Slide 19
The Case for Standards
Based on incomplete
Fee per C information fee is $7
Unit of 16 (12.5% reduction).
Marginal
Emissions Emission increases to 11.
Social
14 Cost
ABC is the increase
12 in social cost less the
E
decrease in abatement
10 cost.
A
D
8 B Based on incomplete
information standard is 9
(12.5% decrease).
6 ADE < ABC
4 Marginal Cost
of Abatement
2
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 Level of Emissions
Chapter 18 Slide 20
 Summary: Fees vs. Standards

 Standards are preferred when MSC is
steep and MCA is flat.
 Standards (incomplete information) yield
more certainty on emission levels and
less certainty on the cost of abatement.
Chapter 18 Slide 21
 Summary: Fees vs. Standards

 Fees have certainty on cost and
uncertainty on emissions.
 Preferred policy depends on the nature
of uncertainty and the slopes of the cost
curves.
Chapter 18 Slide 22
 Transferable Emissions Permits

 Permits help develop a competitive
market for externalities.
 Agency determines the level of
emissions and number of permits
 Permits are marketable
 High cost firm will purchase permits
from low cost firms
Chapter 18 Slide 23
 Question
 What factors could limit the efficiency of
this approach?
Chapter 18 Slide 24
The Costs and Benefits
of Reduced Sulfur Dioxide Emissions
 Cost of Reducing Emissions

 Conversion to natural gas from coal and
oil
 Emission control equipment
Chapter 18 Slide 25
The Costs and Benefits
of Reduced Sulfur Dioxide Emissions
 Benefits of Reducing Emissions

 Health
 Reduction in corrosion
 Aesthetic
Chapter 18 Slide 26
Sulfur Dioxide Emissions Reductions
Dollars
per
unit of
60
reduction Observations
•MAC = MSC @ .0275
•.0275 is slightly below actual emission level
•Economic efficiency improved
40
Marginal Social Cost
20
Marginal Abatement Cost

Sulfur dioxide
0 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 concentration (ppm)
Chapter 18 Slide 27
Emissions Trading and Clean Air
 Bubbles
 Firm can adjust pollution controls for
individual sources of pollutants as long
as a total pollutant limit is not exceeded.
 Offsets
 New emissions must be offset by
reducing existing emissions
 2000 offsets since 1979
Chapter 18 Slide 28
 Cost of achieving an 85% reduction in

hydrocarbon emissions for DuPont
 Three Options
 85% reduction at each source plant
(total cost = $105.7 million)
 85% reduction at each plant with internal
trading (total cost = $42.6 million)
 85% reduction at all plants with internal and
external trading
(total cost = $14.6 million)
Chapter 18 Slide 29
 1990 Clean Air Act

 Since 1990, the cost of the permits has
fallen from an expected $300 to below
$100.
 Causes of the drop in permit prices

 More efficient abatement techniques
 Price of low sulfur coal has fallen
Chapter 18 Slide 30
 Recycling
 Households can dispose of glass and
other garbage at very low cost.
 The low cost of disposal creates a
divergence between the private and the
social cost of disposal.
Chapter 18 Slide 31
The Efficient Amount of Recycling
Cost Without market intervention With a refundable deposit,

the level of scrap will be at m1 MC increases and
and m1 > m*. MC = MSC = MCR.
MSC
MCR
MC + per unit refund

MC
0 4 m* m1 8 12 Scrap
Chapter 18 Slide 32
Refundable Deposits
The supply of glass is Sr With refunds Sr increases
the sum of the supply to S’r and S increases to S’.
$ of virgin glass (Sr) and
the supply of recycled S’r
glass (Sr).
Sv
Without refunds the
price of glass is P and
Sr is M1.
S
S’
P
Price falls to P’ and
P’ the amount of
recycled glass
increases to M*.
M1 M* Amount of Glass
Chapter 18 Slide 33
Externalities and Property Rights
 Property Rights
 Legal rules describing what people or
firms may do with their property
 For example
 If residents downstream owned the
river (clean water) they control
upstream emissions.
Chapter 18 Slide 34
 Bargaining and Economic Efficiency

 Economic efficiency can be achieved
without government intervention when
the externality affects relatively few
parties and when property rights are well
specified.
Chapter 18 Slide 35
Profits Under Alternative
Emissions Choices (Daily)
Factory’s Fishermen’s Total

Profit Profit Profit
No filter, not treatment plant 500 100 600
Filter, no treatment plant 300 500 800
No filter, treatment plant 500 200 700
Filter, treatment plant 300 300 600
Chapter 18 Slide 36
 Assumptions
 Factory pays for the filter
 Fishermen pay for the treatment plant
 Efficient Solution
 Buy the filter and do not build the plant
Chapter 18 Slide 37
Bargaining with
Alternative Property Rights
Right to Dump Right to Clean Water
No Cooperation
Profit of factory $500 $300
Profit of fishermen $200 $500
Cooperation
Profit of factory $550 $300
Profit of fishermen $250 $500
Chapter 18 Slide 38
 Conclusion: Coase Theorem

 When parties can bargain without cost
and to their mutual advantage, the
resulting outcome will be efficient,
regardless of how the property rights are
specified.
Chapter 18 Slide 39
 Costly Bargaining --- The Role of

Strategic Behavior
 Bargaining requires clearly defined rules
and property rights.
Chapter 18 Slide 40
 A Legal Solution --- Suing for

Damages
 Fishermen have the right to clean water
 Factory has two options
 No filter, pay damages
 Profit = $100 ($500 - $400)
 Filter, no damages
 Profit = $300 ($500 - $200)
Chapter 18 Slide 41
 A Legal Solution --- Suing for Damages

 Factory has the right to emit effluent
 Fishermen have three options
Put in treatment plant
 Profit = $200
Filter and pay damages
 Profit = $300 ($500 - $200)
No plant, no filter
 Profit = $100
Chapter 18 Slide 42
 Conclusion
 A suit for damages results in an efficient
outcome.
 Question
 How would imperfect information impact
the outcome?
Chapter 18 Slide 43
The Coase Theorem at Work
 Negotiating an Efficient Solution

 1987 --- New York garbage spill (200
tons) littered the New Jersey beaches
The potential cost of litigation resulted
in a solution that was mutually
beneficial to both parties.
Chapter 18 Slide 44
Common Property Resources
 Common Property Resource

 Everyone has free access.
 Likely to be overutilized
 Examples
 Air and water
 Fish and animal populations
 Minerals
Chapter 18 Slide 45
Without control the number
of fish/month is FC where
PC = MB.
Benefits, However, private costs
Costs underestimate true cost.
($ per Marginal Social Cost
The efficient level of
fish) fish/month is F* where
MSC = MB (D)
Private Cost
Demand
F* FC Fish per Month
Chapter 18 Slide 46
 Solution
 Private ownership
 Question
 When would private ownership be
impractical?
Chapter 18 Slide 47
Crawfish Fishing in Lousiana
 Finding the Efficient Crawfish Catch

F = crawfish catch in millions of
pounds/yr
C = cost in dollars/pound
Chapter 18 Slide 48
 Demand
C = 0.401 = 0.0064F
 MSC
C = -5.645 + 0.6509F
 PC
C = -0.357 + 0.0573F
Chapter 18 Slide 49
 Efficient Catch
 9.2 million pounds
D = MSC
Chapter 18 Slide 50
Crawfish as a Common
Property Resource
C
Cost Marginal Social Cost
(dollars/pound)
2.10
Private Cost
0.325
Demand
Crawfish Catch
9.2 11.9 (millions of pounds)
Chapter 18 Slide 51
Public Goods
 Question
 When should government replace firms
as the producer of goods and services?
Chapter 18 Slide 52
Public Goods
 Public Good Characteristics

 Nonrival
 For any given level of production the
marginal cost of providing it to an
additional consumer is zero.
 Nonexclusive
 People cannot be excluded from
consuming the good.
Chapter 18 Slide 53
Public Goods
 Not all government produced goods

are public goods
 Some are rival and nonexclusive
 Education
 Parks
Chapter 18 Slide 54
Efficient Public Good Provision
Benefits When a good is nonrival, the social marginal
(dollars) benefit of consumption (D) , is determined by
vertically summing the individual demand
$7.00 curves for the good.
$5.50 Marginal Cost
D2
$4.00 Efficient output occurs
where MC = MB at 2
units of output. MB is
$1.50 + $4.00 or $5.50.
D
$1.50
D1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Output
Chapter 18 Slide 55
Public Goods
 Public Goods and Market Failure

 How much national defense did you
consume last week?
Chapter 18 Slide 56
Public Goods
 Free Riders
 There is no way to provide some goods
and services without benefiting
everyone.
 Households do not have the incentive to
pay what the item is worth to them.
 Free riders understate the value of a
good or service so that they can enjoy its
benefit without paying for it.
Chapter 18 Slide 57
Public Goods
 Establishing a mosquito abatement

company
 How do you measure output?
 Who do you charge?
 A mosquito meter?
Chapter 18 Slide 58
The Demand for Clean Air
 Clean Air is a public good

 Nonexclusive and nonrival
 What is the price of clean air?
Chapter 18 Slide 59
 Choosing where to live

 Study in Boston correlates housing
prices with the quality of air and other
characteristics of the houses and their
neighborhoods.
Chapter 18 Slide 60
Dollars
High Income
3000
2500
Middle Income
2000
1500 Low Income
1000
500
Nitrogen Oxides
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 (pphm)
Chapter 18 Slide 61
 Findings
 Amount people are willing to pay for clean air
increases substantially as pollution increases.
 Higher income earners are willing to pay more
(the gap between the demand curves widen)
 National Academy of Sciences found that a
10% reduction in auto emissions yielded a
benefit of $2 billion---somewhat greater than
the cost.
Chapter 18 Slide 62
Private Preferences for Public Goods
 Government production of a public

good is advantageous because the
government can assess taxes or fees
to pay for it.
 Determining how much of a public

good to provide when free riders exist
is difficult.
Chapter 18 Slide 63
Determining the Level
of Educational Spending
Willingness
to pay
The efficient level of educational
$
spending is determined by summing the
willingness to pay for education for each
of three citizens.
AW
W1 W2 W3
Educational spending
$0 $600 $1200 $1800 $2400 per pupil
Chapter 18 Slide 64
Determining the Level
of Educational Spending
Willingness
to pay
Will majority rule yield an efficient outcome?
$
•W1 will vote for $600
•W2 and W3 will vote for $1200
The median vote will always win in a majority
rule election.
AW
W1 W2 W3
Educational spending
$0 $600 $1200 $1800 $2400 per pupil
Chapter 18 Slide 65
 Question
 Will the median voter selection always
be efficient?
 Answer
 If two of the three preferred $1200 there
would be overinvestment.
 If two of the three preferred $600 there
would be underinvestment.
Chapter 18 Slide 66
 Majority rule is inefficient because it

weighs each citizen’s preference
equally---the efficient outcome weighs
each citizen’s vote by his or her
strength of preference.
Chapter 18 Slide 67
Summary
 There is an externality when a producer or

a consumer affects the production or
consumption activities of others in a
manner that is not directly reflected in the
market.
 Pollution can be corrected by emission
standards, emissions fees, marketable
emissions permits, or by encouraging
recycling.
Chapter 18 Slide 68
Summary
 Inefficiencies due to market failure

may be eliminated through private
bargaining among the affected
parties.
 Common property resources are not

controlled by a single person and can
be used without a price being paid.
Chapter 18 Slide 69
Summary
 Goods that private markets are not

likely to produce efficiently are either
nonrival or nonexclusive. Public
goods are both.
 A public good is provided efficiently
when the vertical sum of the individual
demands for the public good is equal
to the marginal cost of producing it.
Chapter 18 Slide 70
Summary
 Under majority rule voting, the level of

spending provided will be that
preferred by the median voter---this
need not be the efficient outcome.
Chapter 18 Slide 71
End of Chapter 18
Externalities and
Public Goods

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Chapter 18

 Ways of Correcting Market Failure

 Externalities and Property Rights

 Common Property Resources

 Private Preferences for Public Goods

 Negative Externalities encourage

 Positive Externalities and Inefficiency

Is research and development

 Assumption: The market failure is

The efficient level of

Chapter 18 Level of Emissions Slide 12

 Options for Reducing Emissions to E*

 Options for Reducing Emissions to E*

Cost is less than the

Total Fee Total MCA

Chapter 18 Level of Emissions Slide 16

 Standards Versus Fees

 Summary: Fees vs. Standards

 Summary: Fees vs. Standards

 Transferable Emissions Permits

 Cost of Reducing Emissions

 Benefits of Reducing Emissions

Marginal Social Cost

Marginal Abatement Cost

 Cost of achieving an 85% reduction in

 1990 Clean Air Act

 Causes of the drop in permit prices

Cost Without market intervention With a refundable deposit,

MC + per unit refund

 Bargaining and Economic Efficiency

Factory’s Fishermen’s Total

No filter, not treatment plant 500 100 600

Filter, no treatment plant 300 500 800

No filter, treatment plant 500 200 700

Filter, treatment plant 300 300 600

Right to Dump Right to Clean Water

 Conclusion: Coase Theorem

 Costly Bargaining --- The Role of

 A Legal Solution --- Suing for

 A Legal Solution --- Suing for Damages

 Negotiating an Efficient Solution

 Common Property Resource

F* FC Fish per Month

 Finding the Efficient Crawfish Catch

 Public Good Characteristics

 Not all government produced goods

$5.50 Marginal Cost

 Public Goods and Market Failure

 Establishing a mosquito abatement

 Clean Air is a public good

 What is the price of clean air?

 Choosing where to live

1500 Low Income

 Government production of a public

 Determining how much of a public

 Majority rule is inefficient because it

 There is an externality when a producer or

 Inefficiencies due to market failure