INTERNAL SECURITY

OPERATIONS
 SCOPE

IN SEARCH OF STRATEGY
CPP/NPA STRATEGIES FOR THE WAR AS A
WHOLE
CPP/NPA CAMPAIGN STRATEGIES
CPP/NPA GUERILLA TACTICS
ASSESSMENT OF AFP COIN STRATEGIES
ASSESSMENT OF AFP ORGANIZATION
MASTER PLAN FOR A GENERAL OFFENSIVE
IN SEARCH OF STRATEGY
CPP/NPA STRATEGY AS A
WHOLE
CPP/NPA STRATEGIES AS A WHOLE

STRATEGY OF PROTRACTED WAR

ESTABLISHMENT OF BASE AREAS

ESTABLISHMENT OF A UNITED
FRONT
 STRATEGY OF PROTRACTED
WAR
 TIME
 PARTY BUILDING
 ESTABLISHING AND CONSOLIDATING
BASE AREAS IN MANY PARTS OF THE
COUNTRY AS POSSIBLE
 ORGANIZING A BROAD AND UNITED
FRONT TO TOTALLY ISOLATE THE
RULING REGIME
 POLITICIZING AND MOBILIZING THE
PEOPLE FOR MASS SUPPORT - PEOPLE’S
WAR
3 STAGES OF PROTRACTED WAR

STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE STAGE

STRATEGIC STALEMATE STAGE

STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE STAGE

 STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE STAGE
 CRUCIAL PERIOD OF PARTY BUILDING, ARMY
BUILDING, BASE BUILDING AND ORGANIZATION
OF UNITED FRONT
 OVERALL STRENGTH IS SMALL
 BASE AREAS ARE SUBJECTIVE TO AFP
OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN

3 SUBSTAGES

 EARLY SUBSTAGE
 ADVANCED SUBSTAGE
 STRATEGIC COUNTER - OFFENSIVE
 STRATEGIC STALEMATE STAGE
• NPA FORCES BECOME CAPABLE OF
MUSTERING LARGER FORMATIONS
( COMPANY OR BATTALION SIZE )
REGULAR MOBILE UNITS

AFP SEARCH AND DESTROY NPA

AFP
CAPTURED TOWN HALL
CONC SURPRISE ATTK ON AFP INSTALLATIONS
DEFENSE IN TOWNS
AMBUSCADES

VITAL GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE FACILITIES

200 -300 MAN -GF
 STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE STAGE
THE CPP/NPA GENERAL MILITARY
BALANCE OF POWER OFFENSIVE

ISNPA
LAUNCHED SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH A
OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN

GENERAL STRIKE, MASSIVE

DEFEND DEMONSTRATIONS,
KEY TOWNS, CITIES, AND
AFP MAJOR INSTALLATIONS
AND SABOTAGE ACTIVITIES
DRAW GOV’T TROOPS AS
NPA POSSIBLE TO MINDANAO AND
IN STRATEGY
THE MAJOR CITIES,
MAJORTHUS FACILITATING
ISLANDS IN VISAYAS

THEMAIN
NPA FINAL TAKE-OVER
TROOPS FM NORTHAND
ANDSEIZURE
SOUTH OF
MANILA - RIZAL COVERAGE IN A PINCER MVMT
OF POLITICAL
WILL SEAT POWERPOWER
IN MANILA
 ESTABLISHMENT OF BASE AREAS
“ENCIRCLEMENT OF THE CITIES FROM THE
COUNTRYSIDE”

 GENERAL STRATEGY:
SET UP AS MANY RURAL BASE AREAS ALL
OVER THE COUNTRY AS POSSIBLE, AND
TO GRADUALLY EXPAND AND
CONSOLIDATE THESE BASE AREAS UNTIL
THEY LINK WITH ONE ANOTHER, THUS
CONTROLLING A VAST PORTION OF THE
COUNTRYSIDE BEFORE FINALLY TAKE
OVER THE CITIES
 GUERILLA BASE OR GUERILLA FRONTS
ARE AREAS IN THE COUNTRYSIDE
CONSISTING OF SEVERAL BRGYS, COVERING
TWO OR MORE TOWNS OR PROVINCES
 GUERILLA ZONES - GUERILLA CONTROL
AND INFLUENCE ARE NOT AS TIGHT AND
PERVASIVE - THE REBELS EXERT INFLUENCE
ON THE BRGY WHILE THEY ARE THERE, BUT
RELINGUISH CONTROL WHEN THEY ARE
GONE.
 WHITE AREAS ARE AREAS SURROUNDING
THE BASE AREAS AND GUERILLA ZONES
THAT HAVE NOT YET BEEN ORGANIZED BY
THE INSURGENTS
 IMPORTANCE OF BASE AREAS

STRATEGY OF PROTRACTED WAR CANNOT

BE SUSTAINED WITHOUT THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF BASE AREAS
INSURGENTS RELY ON IN PERFORMING
THEIR STRATEGIC TASKS AND ACHIEVING
THE OBJECTIVE OF PRESERVING
THEMSELVES AND DESTROYING THEIR
ADVERSARY
HAVING BASE AREA BASICALLY MEANS
HAVING MASS SUPPORT
WITHOUT BASE AREA OR WITHOUT MASS
SUPPORT, GUERILLA FORCE ARE EASILY
REDUCED TO “ROVING REBEL BANDS” AND
SOON BE ANNIHILATED
GUERILLA ARE LIKE FISH, AND THEIR MASS
BASE IS THE WATER THAT SUSTAIN THEM
PRIME IMPORTANCE TO THE OVERALL NPA
STRATEGY
VICTORY AND DEFEAT RELIES GREATLY ON
THEIR ABILITY TO MAINTAIN, STRENGTHEN,
AND INCREASE THEIR BASE AREA
 LOCATION OF TYPICAL BASE AREA
WHITE AREA
ABRA GUERILLA ZONE

BASE AREA

CENTRAL KALINGA
DISTRICT APAYAO
ILOCOS SUR

BASE AREA

WHITE AREA GUERILLA ZONE

MOUNTAIN PROVINCE
 BASE BUILDING PROCESS
ORGANIZATIONAL WORK

BLG SYP POG

PEASANT ORGANIZING GROUP

MASS ORGANIZATION

WOMEN DEFENSE PB/BRC

PTA
KB
BC
SN
YOUTH HEALTH
FARM WKRS ECONOMY ORGAN
SHADOW
SHADOW OF
FISHERMAN EDUCATION POLITICAL
GOVERNMENT
GOVERNMENT
POC POWER
OGTN
 EXPANSION AND CONSOLIDATION OF BASE AREA

POLICY EXPANSION COUPLED WITH

CONSOLIDATION
“TWO STEPS FORWARD AND
ONE STEP BACKWARD”

AIM BOTH WIDEN AND TO DEEPEN

THE “POND” TO ENSURE
SAFETY OF THE “FISH

IF THE POND IS WIDE BUT SHALLOW, THE FISH IS

EASILY CAUGHT
IF THE POND IS DEEP BUT TO NARROW, THE FISH IS
ENDANGERED
 MASS WORK

AFP CIVIC ACTION

MASS WORK INVOLVES A WIDE RANGE OF ACTIVITIES
NPA MASS WORK
ALL DESIGNED TO GAIN THE SINCERE AND
INSURGENT LDRS
WHOLE-HEARTED SUPPORT OF THE LOCAL POPULACE.

STRONGAMONG OTHERS,
TO INCLUDES, RURALCONDUCTING
MS TRANSLATES
SOCIAL
INTO A RICH RESEVOIR OF
MP ANDAND
SINCERE PROPAGANDA,
INVESTIGATION, LOGISTICS TO GF
PERSONALIZED

WIDESPREAD MS
INTEGRATION WITH RURAL FOLK
 SOCIAL INVESTIGATION

PRE-REQUISITE FOR EFFECTIVE MASS WORK

POTENTIAL FRIENDS AND ALLIES
“NO INVESTIGATION, NO RIGHT TO SPEAK”
POOR AND LOWER MIDDLE
CLASS PEASANTS, TEACHERS, MEMBERS OF THE CLERGY,
SMALL GRP MEETING
FARM LABORERS AND WORKERS
TALKING WITH THE RIGHT PEOPLE
POTENTIAL ENEMIES
CONCRETE
MINUTEST
LANDLORDS,PROBLEMS
NEGLECT SOURCESBESETTING
OF
EXPLOITATION
PERSONAL
ANDPEASANTS,
RICH APATHY
OPPRESSION
PROBLEMS
THEY THE
DISCONTENT
INJUSTICE BARRIO
OFUSURERS,
GOV’T
SUFFER
IN THE FOLKS
OFFICIAL
BARRIO
VILLAGE
BULLIES, INFORMERS, RETIRED AFP PERSONNEL,
FAMILIES WITH RELATIVES IN THE AFP AND PEOPLE
KNOWN TO BE CLOSE TO MILITARY
 PROPAGANDA
PLEDGE
WILL NOT GO TO ANY
ONE IMPORTANT ASPECT OF MASS WORK
CHURCH
MASS MEETINGS THAT PREACHES
REVOLUTION
DISCUSSION GRPS
PLEDGE
UG NEWSPAPERS WILL NOT CONTRIBUTE
WIN THECHURCH
TO ANY CHILDREN
THAT
LEAFLETS PREACHES HATE AND
WINREVOLUTION
THE PARENTS
ORD CONVERSATIONS
PLEDGE
MASS MEDIA
WE WILL SUPPORT
WALL-PAINTED SLOGANS PRIESTS
WHO PREACH
LOVE AND PEACE
POSTERS AND SIMPLE DEEDS
 RECRUITMENT

GEOMETRIC PROGRESSION

“EXPAND VIGOROUSLY BUT MAKE

POLICY SURE THAT NO UNDESIRABLE
IS ALLOWED TO COME IN”

LUMPEN
DVENTURER
ENSURE
VOLUNTEERING
MOSTLY
CLASS
NEVER
ELEMENTS
THAT
ORIGIN,
ARE
YOUNG
DONE
NOTO
TURNED
GOV’T
OR
SOCIAL
JOIN
THROUGH
MEN
THOSE
AGENT
ARE
&
DOWN
BG,
WOMEN
W/
SELDOM
COERCION
MOTIVES,
ALLOWED
EXCEPT
PREVIOUS
ANDTAKEN
NOT
IN
OR
WILLINGNESS
TO
CRIMINAL
VERY
MARRIED
FORCE
INFILTRATE
IN SPL
AT ONCE
CASE
RCDS
 OPERATION AGAW ARMAS

RECRUITMENT INTO THE NPA’s CANNOT BE PURSUED

VIGOROUSLY WITHOUT THE CORRESPONDING
CAFGU
INCREASE IN ARMAMENTS

CONFORMS
NOT WITH THE
WELL TRAINED, NPA GENERAL
WELL-LED, POLICY
AND WELL OF
EQUIPPED
“SELF-RELIANCE”
LACK ENOUGH MOTIVATION TO FIGHT
CONSISTENT WITH NPA CAMPAIGN STRATEGY
OFENCOURAGE
RECEIVE LITTLE“WAR OF ANNIHILATION”
THE DIFF NPA CMDRS TO
OR NO PAY FOR SERVICE RENDERED
SEIZE THE INITIATIVE BY CONDUCTING
PURPOSEOF THEMMORE
NUMBER HAVE FREQUENT
RELATIVESRAIDS AND
AND FRIENDS
AMBUSCADES IN THE COUNTRY SIDE AND
AMONG INSURGENTS
INTENSIFYING SPARROW UNIT OPNS
IN THE URBAN CENTERS
 STRUCTURE OF PHIL
SOCIETY
ECONOMIC ELITE
3%

U NAT’L BOURGEOISIE

N
I PETTY BOURGEOISIE

T
E WORKERS
D
F
R PEASANTS
O
N
T
 ECONOMIC ELITE- BIG LANDLORDS, BIG
COMPRADORS, BIG BUREUCRAT CAPITALIST,
AND FOREIGN MONOPOLY CAPITALIST
3 STRATA OF PEASANT CLASS
 POOR PEASANT - NO LAND WHATSOEVER

 MIDDLE PEASANT - MAY OWN LANDS, BUT

THEIR HARVEST ARE JUST ENOUGH TO TIDE
THEM OVER FOR THE NEXT CROP

 RICH PEASANT- POSSESS LANDS OF THEIR,

ARE ABLE TO HIRE EXTRA FARMHANDS,
AND WHOSE HARVEST ARE MORE THAN
ENOUGH FOR THEIR OWN NEEDS
 WINNING THE PEASANTRY

AGRARIAN REFORM PROGRAM

PROBLEMS

ARRANGING
MUTUAL
SETTING
DEFAULT
STRICT ESTABLISHING
IMPROVING
AID
UP
RAISING
CONTROLOF
TEAMS
MARKETING
ON
FAIRER
WITHHOLDING
REDUCTION
WARNING
REDUCTION
OF
ORGOVERNMENT
PRODUCTION
AND
PRODUCTIVITY
CREDIT
PRICES
LABOR
USURIOUS
OFPART COOPERATIVES
OUTRIGHT
OF
INTEREST
LAND
OF UNION
WITH
EXCHANGE
LOANS
THE MM
PRACTICES
THE
RENTS
PUNISHMENT
RATES
CROPS
 ORGANIZING THE WORKERS

INDUSTRIAL
URBAN WORKING
PROLETARIAT
CLASS

ADVANCED CLASS

WORKING
PEASANTRY
CLASSISISTHE
THE MAIN
LEADING
FORCE
FORCE

CPP EXERTS INFLUENCE ON THE WORKERS

AND WIN THEM OVER TO THE CAUSE BY
ORGANIZING TRADE UNIONS OR BY
INFILTRATING AND GAINING CONTROL OF
THE UNION
 ENTICING THE PETTY BOURGEOISIE

BOURGEOIS
PETTY BOURGEOISIE DEMOCRATIC
PEOPLE’S DEMOCRATIC
IS REGARDEDREVOLUTION
REVOLUTION
AS SELF-CENTERED
AND EXTREMELY INDIVIDUALISTIC. THEIR PRIMARY
PREOCCUPATION IS THE BETTERMENT OF THEIR
ONLY UPON THE COMPLETION OF THE BR
INDIVIDUAL STATUS BY CONSTANTLY STRIVING TO CLIMB
AND THE SEIZURE OF POLITICAL POWER
UP THE SOCIAL LADDER. THEIR PRIME CONCERN IS
THEMESELVES AND THEIR IMMEDIATE FAMILIES. HENCE,
NOT MANY OF THEM WOULDREVOLUTION
SOCIALIST BE OPEN TO THE ADVOCACY
OF RADICAL MEANS AS THE SOLUTION TO SOCIAL
PROBLEMS. BUT ALTHOUGH INDIVIDUALISTICS AND
PB C PLAYS THE MOST IMPORTANT ROLE IN THE UF
CONSERVATIVE AS A WHOLE, THE PETTY BOURGEOISIE IS
ALSO AN EDUCATED CLASS AND IS CAPABLE OF DOING
CRITICAL
MIDDLE ANALYSES
SMALL
AND OF THE
WHITE-COLLAR
LOWERS
AND SOCIAL,
INTELLECTUALS
PROFESSIONALS
MEDIA
MEDIUM
TEACHERS
STUDENTS
CLERGY
RANKING
PEOPLE POLITICAL,
INTERPRENEURS
WORKERS
MBRS AND
OF THE AFP
ECONOMIC PROBLEMS BESETTING THE COUNTRY. THIS
MAKES THEM IDEAL TARGETS FOR CPP PROPAGANDA
 ATTRACTING THE NATIONAL BOURGEOISIE

MEDUIM AND LARGE ENTERPRENEURS

DO NOT WANT A CHANGE IN THE STATUS QUO

GOV’T POLICIES

GOV’T
OPEN
RED
ENTRY
SCRAFFING ARMS
TAPE
OF CRONYISM
DEVALUATION
HIGH DECONTROL
INTEREST
INTO
GOV’TPOLICY
AND PRIVATE
HIGH
TWDS
OF
SUBSIDIES RATES
TOPESO
TAXES
MNATL
BUSINESS
INFANT INDTRS
 FUNCTIONS OF THE UNITED FRONTS

PARTY
NDF ACTIVITIES
3 MAGIC WPNS OF THE PW PEOPLES ARMY
ESTABLISHMENT OF CONTACTS WITH THE
UNITED FRONT
INFLUENCIAL PEOPLE SUCH AS GOV’T
OFFICIALS, OPPOSITIONPOLITICIANS,
FUNCTION
WARRIOR HOLDING A SPEAROFINNDF
ONE HAND AND A
MEMBERS OF THE CLERGY,
SHIELD IN THE PROFESSIONALS,
OTHER
FORMS THE NUCLEUS OF THE PROVISIONAL COALITION
WINACADEMICS,
GOVERNMENT THATMEDIAMEN
OVER ALL POSSIBLE ALLIES
WILL AND EVEN
TO TOTALLY
ASSUME ISOLATE
GOVERNMENT
THE RULING REGIME AND TOREVOLUTION
GIVE DIRECTSUCCEED
AND INDIRECT
MEMBERS
FUNCTIONS ONCE THE OF THE AFP
SUPPORT TO THE ARMED STRUGGLE BEING WAGE IN
THE COUNTRYSIDE
 CPP/NPA CAMPAIGN
STRATEGY
PREPARATION FOR THE COUNTER - CAMPAIGN

BASE AREA AMBUSCADES

SUO
ARMS GATHERING
RAIDS

ATTRACT A MAJOR AFP SEARCH AND DESTROY

BATTLE SITES ARE USUALLY CHOOSEN WITHIN
THE CENTRAL SECTION OF THE BASE AREA, BECAUSE
SELECTION
OTHERSTOCKING
AMBUSH
MEDICINES
RECRUITMENTOFPOSITIONS
BATTLE
OF
ELIMINATIONS
SUPPLIES FOOD
AND SITES
ATSUPPORT
OF
STRATEGIC
TRNG
INFORMERS
OF TROOPS
PLACES
IT IS HERE WHERE MASS AND TERRAIN ARE
MOST FAVORABLE
NPA DISPOSITION BEFORE THE ONSET OF AN AFP CAMPAIGN

. .
GUERILLA ZONE .
. . BASE AREA
. .
. . .
. ...
CENTRAL DISTRICT

.
. .
. . . . .
. . .
“SIXTEEN CHARACTER FORMULA”

“WHEN THE ENEMY ADVANCES, WE

RETREAT; WHEN THE ENEMY
CAMPS, WE HARASS; WHEN THE
ENEMY TIRES, WE ATTACK;
WHEN THE ENEMY WITHDRAW,
WE PURSUE.”
 “WHEN THE ENEMY ADVANCES, WE RETREAT”
 WHEN A GOVERNMENT FORCES LAUNCH A MAJOR
A “SEARCH AND DESTROY” CAMPAIGN IN A REBEL
BASE AREA, THEY ARE SAID TO BE ON STRATEGIC
OFFENSIVE, WHILE THE INSURGENT FORCES ARE
CONSIDERED TO BE ON THE STRATEGIC
DEFENSIVE FOR THAT PARTICULAR CAMPAIGN.
AS GOV’T FORCES ADVANCE, THE MOST
FORWARD ELEMENT OF THE REBEL FORCES
AUTHOMATICALLY WITHDRAW TOWARD THE
CENTRAL SECTION OF THEIR BASE, LEAVING
ONLY SMALL CONTAINING FORCES TO HARASS
THE ADVANCING FORCES. STRATEGIC RETREAT
BY THE DISPERSED GUERILLA UNIT IS
CONDUCTED IN ORDER TO PRESERVE THEIR
FORCE AND “AVOID WHEN FULL OF VIGOR” SO AS
TO” STRIKE WHEN HE IS TIRED AND WEARY.”
 ...
... ... ... ...
“A B” “B C”
... ... ... ...

... ... ...

...... ... ... ... ...
...... ... ... ... ...

...

WHEN THE ENEMY ADVANCES, WE RETREAT

 ...
... ... ... ...
“A B” “B C”
... ... ... ...

... ... ...

...... ... ... ... ...
...... ... ... ... ...

WHEN THE ENEMY ADVANCES, WE RETREAT

 ‘WHEN THE ENEMY CAMPS, WE HARASS”

WHEN THE REBEL FORCES

WITHDRAW TO THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF
AN AFP “SEARCH AND DESTROY” CAMPAIGN,
ONE OR MORE SQUADS MAY BE LEFT BEHIND
TO SERVE AS CONTAINING FORCE. THIS
CONTAINING FORCE IS DIVIDED INTO THREE-
MAN GROUPS FOR GREATER SECRECY AND
SPEED. THEIR TASK IS TO SUBJECT THE
ADVANCING TROOPS TO CONSTANT
HARRASMENT
“KILL ONE TO TERRORIZE TEN THOUSAND”
 ...

...
...

HARASSMENT OF HARBOURING AREA

HARASSMENT ON MARCHING COLUMN
HARASSMENT OF COLUMN MOVING UPHILL
“WHEN THE ENEMY TIRES, WE ATTACK”

BY THE TIME THE ADVANCING TROOPS REACH

THE CENTRAL SECTION OF THE BASE AREA, MOST
OF THEIR INITIAL VIGOR AND ENTHUSIASM HAVE
BEEN DISSIPATED BY CONSTANT HARASSMENT.

THE REBEL FORCES ARE THEN READY TO LAUNCH

THE FIRST BATTLE. THE FIRST BATTLE IN A
COUNTER-CAMPAIGN IS OF UTMOST IMPORTANCE
TO THE REBELS. THEY DO ALL THEY CAN TO
ENSURE IMPORTANCE IN THE FIRST MAJOR
ENGAGEMENT
 “WHEN THE ENEMY WITHDRAWS, WE
PURSUE”
WHEN GOV’T FORCES TERMINATE A
“SEARCH AND DESTROY” CAMPAIGN AND BEGIN
TO WITHDRAW FROM THE INSURGENT BASE
AREA, THE AFP UNIT IS CONSIDERED TO BE ON
THE STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE, WHILE THE REBEL
FORCES SHIFT TO STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE FOR
THAT PARTICULAR CAMPAIGN. IT IS DURING
SUCH TIMES THAT GOVERNMENT FORCES ARE
MOST VULNERABLE, FOR MANY OF THE
SOLDIERS ARE THEN TIRED, HOMESICK, AND
BATTLE-WEARY, USUALLY RESULTING IN LACK
SECURITY. GUERILLA REBEL SEIZE THE
OPPURTUNITY TO INTERCEPT AND AMBUSH THE
RELAXING TROOPS ON THEIR WAY HOME
 STRATEGY: ONE IS TO TEN;
TACTICS: TEN IS TO ONE

GUIDING PRINCIPLE:

CONCENTRATE A SUPERIOR FORCE

TO DESTROY ENEMY FORCES ONE
BY ONE
 CAMPAIGNS AND BATTLES OF
QUICK DECISION
ADEQUATE PREPARATIONS
SEIZING THE OPPURTUNE MOMENT
CONCENTRATION OF SUPERIOR FORCES
ENCIRCLING AND OUTFLANKING
QUICKLY
TACTICS CONCLUDE THE BATTLE
FAVOURABLE TERRAIN
STRIKING THE ENEMY WHILE HE IS ON
THE MOVE
STATIONARY BUT NOT YET
CONSOLIDATED HIS POSITIONS
 MOBILE WARFARE

BASICALLY CHARACTERIZED BY THE

ABSENCE OF FIXED BATTLE LINES
INVOLVES CONSTANT MOBILITY OF
REBEL UNITS, BIG OR SMALL
“AVOID THE SOLID, ATTACK THE
HOLLOW”
“FIGHT WHEN YOU CAN WIN, MOVE
AWAY WHEN YOU CAN’T WIN”
 3 IMPORTANT GUERILLA DICTUM

OFFENSIVE
EXTERIOR
QUICK WITHIN
DECISION
LINES OPNS
WITHINTHE
WITH DEFENSIVE
PROTRACTED
INTERIOR LINES
WAR

ALTHOUGH THE WAR AS A WHOLE IS

ADVOCATE
REVERSE OFFENSIVEBY
THE SITUATION CAMPAIGNS
CONVERGINGANDAND
PROTRACTED, GUERILLAS SHOULD STRIVE
BATTLES WITHIN THE
CONCENTRATING INITIALINSTAGE
FORCES ORDEROFTO
THE
FOR QUICK DECISIONS IN EACH CAMPAIGN OR
ENCIRCLE STRATEGIC
ONE OF THEDEFENSIVE
ADVANCING COLUMN
THEY WAGE
 INITIATIVE, FLEXBILITY AND PLANNING

FLEXIBILITY
INITIATIVE
PLANNING

THE
IT IS
VERY
NECESSARY
LIFE OF TO
THE PLAN
ARMY ASAND,
THOROUGHLY
ONCE IT IS
CHANGING
AS POSSIBLE,
LOST, THEFREEDOM
FOR
ARMY THE
IT IS
IS CLOSESITUATION
SHOULD TOBE
OF ACTIONDEFEAT
UNDERSTOOD
OR
THAT FIGHTING
DESTRUCTION
THE ENEMY IS NO JOKE
CPP/NPA GUERILLA TACTICS
 AMBUSH

 REFER TO MILITARY PRINCIPLES AND TECHNIQUES

EMPLOYED BY GUERILLAS IN THE CONDUCT OF WAR
 ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT TACTICAL WEAPONS
OF THE GUERILLAS
 GUERILLAS COMPEL THEIR ADVERSARY TO FIGHT
ON THEIR OWN TERMS , TO FIGHT AT CLOSE RANGE
MAKING ARMS RECOVERY POSSIBLE
 ADVANTAGE OF FAVORABLE TERRAIN
 ELEMENT OF SURPRISE IN THEIR FAVOR
 ALLOWS EVEN A RELATIVELY SMALL GUERILLA
FORCE TO STRIKE AT A MUCH LARGER ENEMY
COLUMN
 TYPES OF AMBUSH

PLANNED
CHANCE AMBUSH
AMBUSH

AFP
TARGET: PERSONNEL
TARGET:
SITE IS OPERATING
METICULOUSLY INSIDE
CHOSEN GUERILLA
AND PREPARED
INITIATED AT THE SPUR OF THE MOMENT AND
BASE AREA GOVERNMENT
SHOULD NOT RIDE
PREPARATION:
 ROUTINE IN VEHICLES
PATROLS AND TROOPS
WITHOUT MUCH PREPARATION
GOV’T
MOVING
TROOPS PATROLS
PROVIDING
ALONG SHOULD
CONDUCTING
COVER
THE AVOID
( DIGGING
“SEARCH
MAIN ROADS MAIN
OFAND ROADS)
FOXHOLE
DESTROY”
ABOARD
TROOPS
VEHICLES
ARRANGINGMOVEMENTS SHOULD BE DONE AT NIGHT
CAMOUFLAGE
TROOPS
PAYDAYS, SHOULD
REINFORCEMENTS
CLEARING FIELDSTAKE
OF CARE
COMING
MARKETDAYS, FIRE NOT
TO
AND TOASSISTANCE
THE DASH
WEEKENDS
RECKLESSLY
OF
STACKING INTO
THE BELENGUERED
OF THE SITE
MEDICINE UNIT BUT
AND SHOULD
ORFOOD
LURED
SUPPLIES
BY SOME
APPROACH
OTHER
LAYING WITH
MEANS
OF LANDCAUTION,
MINES PREFERABLY BY
TAKING INDIRECT ROUTE
 RAIDS
DETAILED INFO REQUIRED BEFORE THE
SUCCESS
CONDUCTOF
FIXED TARGETS: OF RAID:
RAID
BEST TIMEUNIT
ISOLATED TO DESIGNATION
ATTACK BY THE NPA
DETACHMENTS
COMMANDER,
CAFGUTHOROUGH MEN,
ENCAMPMENTS
INCLEMENT ARMS, MORALE
RECONNAISSANCE
WEATHER
CAMP
POLICEMETICULOUS
FORCES LAYOUT
AND PLANNING
THEIR ARMORIES IN
AT DAWN
DAILY
REMOTEROUTINE ACTVS,
TOWNHALLSSECRECY GUARDING SYSTEM
SECURITY FORCE
WEEKENDS
FORTIFICATION
SURPRISE
OF SAWMILLS AND OTHER
ROUTES
FIRMS OPERATING PAYDAYS
OF APPROACHSPEED ANDAREAS
IN BASE WITHDRAWAL
DEADOF
POSSIBLE ROUTE
CORRECT DRUNKS
REINFORCEMENTS
TIMING
WEIGHING
SELECTIONOF OF
POLITICAL
VULNERABLEPROS TARGET
AND CONS
 ATTACK ENEMY OUTPOSTS TO
ANNIHILATE REINFORCEMENTS

NPA DECOY Co. CP

^^^^^ AMBUSH OF AFP
SUCCEEDING REINF
^^^^^

20 MAN
AMBUSH OF AFP
DETACHMENT
INITIAL REINF
^^
^^
^^
^
^^^^^^^
200 MAN NPA
12 MAN NPA MAIN FORCE
ATTACKING FORCE
 ATTACK ENEMY OUTPOSTS TO
ANNIHILATE REINFORCEMENTS

NPA DECOY Co. CP

^^^^^ AMBUSH OF AFP
SUCCEEDING REINF
^^^^^

20 MAN
AMBUSH OF AFP
DETACHMENT
INITIAL REINF
^^
^^
^^
^
^^^^^^^
200 MAN NPA
12 MAN NPA MAIN FORCE
ATTACKING FORCE
 SABOTAGE

RELATIVELY CHEAP AND EASY TO

ACCOMPLISH, NECESSITATING ONLY A
MINIMUM OF MATERIEL AND SUPPORT

SABOTAGE AS GUERILLA WEAPON IS A

“DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD”
REASSESSMENT OF AFP
COUNTER-INSURGENT
STRATEGY
 SEARCH AND DESTROY

FUNDAMENTAL WEAKNESSES

VULNERABILITY
LACK OF COMBAT INTELLIGENCE
CAMPAIGNS OF SHORT DURATION
LACK OF PROPER MASS APPROACH
 ..
SCATTERED DETACHMENTS

. ..

.. .

. .. .. .
 AFP VULNERABILITIES

DEFEAT IN DETAIL

LOSS OF MANEUVERABILITY

DEFENSIVE RATHER THAT

OFFENSIVE
RANGER - TYPE OF OPERATIONS

CAFGUS

HAMLETIZATION
 PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS
IMPORTANT FACTOR TO VICTORY IN ANY
WAR, MORE SO IN A GUERILLA OR
INSURGENTS WAR

 FUNDAMENTAL AIMS:
 TO WIN POPULAR SUPPORT (BOTH
LOCAL AND INTERNATIONAL);
 TO CAUSE DEMORALIZATION WITHIN
THE ENEMY RANKS;
 TO HEIGHTEN THE MORALE OF ONE’S
OWN TROOPS
REASSESSMENT OF THE AFP
ORGANIZATION
LACK OF COMBAT UNITS
ENGAGING THE ENEMY
 “TOP HEAVY” ORGANIZATION
 DO WE HAVE TOO MANY GENERALS WITH NO
DIVISIONS TO COMMAND ?
 DO WE HAVE TOO MANY COLs AND LTCs WITH NO
BDEs AND BNs OR PCMDs TO LEAD ?
 WHAT IS THE RATIO OF PAF OFFICERS TO THE
NUMBER OF OPERATIONAL AVAILABLE AIRCRAFT ?
 WHAT IS THE RATIO OF NAVAL OFFICERS TO THE
NUMBER OR SEAWORTHY SHIPS ?
 DO WE HAVE TOO MANY “DESK-SITTERS” GIVING
ORDERS BUT A MERE HANDFUL OF FIELD CMDRS
ACTUALLY LEADING TROOPS IN THE FIELD ?
 DO WE HAVE A GERIATRIC RANK AND FILE IN THE
AFP? WHAT PERCENTAGE OF AFP PERSONNEL ARE
OVER FORTY ?
 UNITY OF COMMAND
FACTORS

MISUNDERSTANDING
ALLOWING VARIOUS UNITS TO
ONE-ON-ONERIVALRIES
INTER-SERVICE BASIS
OPERATEBETWEEN
IN A SINGLE UNITS
GUERILLA BASE
 TROOP DISCIPLINE

SPEAK POLITELY
ARROGANT, DISRESPECTFUL, AND
PAY FAIRLY FOR WHAT YOU BUY
MAJOR
WHEN ENSIDE
FOUL-MOUNTED BANKSOLDIERS,
ROBBERIES,
THE GARRISON,CARNAPPING
SOLDIERS
DRUNKURDS AND
MASSES“GANITO
DO
GAMBLERS, NOT
CONDUCT SEE
FIRE PALA
RIFLES
PAY FOR ANYTHING
ANG
RETURN EVERYTHING YOU BORROW
KIDNAPPING, DRUG TRAFFICKING,
REBEL GET
THEMESELVES MGA
DRUNK
IN A OR EVEN
INDISCRIMINATELY,
YOU DAMAGE
FEEL ABSOLUTELY
SMUGGLING,SECURE IF HE LEAVES
GUNRUNNING,
TOUCH
SOLDIERS LIQUOR,
DISCIPLINED
HELPING MUH
AND LESS TAKE
ORGANIZED
THEMESELVES MARIJUANA,
TOMANNER
CROPS AND
A DO SUNDALO
NOT
BEAUTIFUL HIT OR SWEAR
DAUGTHER NG
AT PEOPLE
ALONE
GUN-FOR-HIRE AND MANY OTHER MILITARY
GAMBLE, DO CAVORTING INCROPS
IN A
NIGHTCLUBS,
LIVESTOCK, CHILDREN
NOT DAMAGE OR HUSBANDS BEING
COMPANY OF A FULL SQUAD OF MALE NPA
ABUSES
GOBYERNO.
MASSAGE
DO NOT
ENVITED TOPARLORS,
TAKE IBANG-IBA
AND
LIBERTIES
MIL CAMPS BEER JOINTS
WITH TO
NEVER
REBELS CAPTIVES
WOMEN AND
RETURN,
FIRING DO NOT
WEAPONSILL-TREAT
INDISCRIMINATELY
SUSPECTS BEING TORTURED, MUTILATED, AND
DO NOT TAKE ASA MGA
SINGLE NEEDLENPA”
OR PIECE OF THREAD
“SALVAGED”, MASSACRES OF INNOCENT
OBEY ORDERS IN ALL YOUR ACTIONS
CIVILIANS,
TURNHOMES AND KAMALIGS
IN EVERYTHING CAPTUREDBURNED
 “SQUARE PEGS IN ROUND HOLES”

INCORRECT CHOICE OF PERSONNEL

UNFAMILIARITY OF THE STRANGER IN

THE AREA

POLICY OF ASSIGNING NEWLY

COMMISSIONED OFFICERS TO THE FRONTS
MASTER PLAN FOR GENERAL
OFFENSIVE
 OBJECTIVE

SEIZE THE STRATEGIC INITIATIVE

AND ACHIEVE STRATEGIC
VICTORY OVER THE CPP/NPA IN
TWO TO THREE YEARS TIME
 DEFINITION OF TERMS
STRATEGIC VICTORY
A VICTORY THAT HAS A BEARING ON THE WAR AS A WHOLE.
THE WAR SITUATION AS A WHOLE IS COMPOSED OF
PARTS, WHICH ARE THE VAROUS CAMPAIGNS BY THE AFP
AGAINST THE CPP/NPA GUERILLA FRONTS AND THE MAIN
INSURGENTS FORCES IN THESE FRONTS. VICTORIES IN
ONE OR TWO CAMPAIGNS AGAINST ENEMY GUERILLAS
FRONT MAY NOT HAVE A BEARING ON THE INSURGENCY
SITUATION AS A WHOLE; HENCE, SUCH VICTORIES ARE
NOT STRATEGIC. BUT VICTORIES IN MOST, IF NOT ALL,
OF THE CAMPAIGNS WAGED BY THE AFP IN SELECTED
PRIORITY GUERILLA FRONTS NATIONWIDE, WHILE NOT
YET TOTAL OR COMPLETE, WILL CHANGE THE
SITUATION AS A WHOLE IN THE AFP’s FAVOR. SUCH
GENERAL VICTORY IS THE ‘STRATEGIC VICTORY”
REFFERED TO AS THE FUNDAMENTAL OBJECTIVE OF THE
MASTERPLAN.
 STRATEGIC INITIATIVE
MILITARY INITIATIVE IN THE INSURGENCY WAR
AS A WHOLE GAINED THROUGH THE
LAUNCHING OF CAMPAIGN OFFENSIVE
AGAINST SELECTED PRIORITY GUERILLA
FRONTS ALL OVER THE COUNTRY IN AN
ORCHESTRATED AND COORDINATED MANNER

GENERAL STRATEGY
CONCEPTS AND PRINCIPLES THAT ENCOMPASS
THE WAR SITUATION AS A WHOLE, EMPLOYED
BY CONTENDING FORCES TO WIN THE WAR.
GENERAL STRATEGY REFERS TO CONCEPTS
AND PRINCIPLES COVERING THE PHILIPPINE
INSURGENCY WAR SITUATION AS A WHOLE.
 CAMPAIGN STRATEGY

CONCEPTS AND PRINCIPLES COVERING A

PARTIAL SITUATION.. THE INSURGENCY WAR
AS A WHOLE IS MADE UP OF PARTS WHICH ARE
THE VARIOUS CAMPAIGNS BY THE AFP
AGAINST CPP/NPA GUERILLA FRONTS AND THE
ENEMY FORCES IN THESE FRONTS. CONCEPTS
OF OPERATIONS AND PRINCIPLES EMPLOYED
IN INDIVIDUAL CAMPAIGNS ARE REFFERED TO
AS CAMPAIGN STRATEGY
 PROTRACTED WAR

CPP/NPA’s GENERAL STRATEGY AIMED AT

PROCTRACTING OR PROLONGING THE WAR IN
ORDER TO BUY TIME TO BUILD-UP AND
STREGTHEN THE COMMUNIST PARTY, THE
NEW PEOPLE’S ARMY, THE NATIONAL
DEMOCRATIC FRONT, AND TO EXPAND AND
CONSOLIDATE THE CPP/NPA GUERILLA FRONTS
ALL OVER THE COUNTRY
 WAR OF QUICK DECISION

PROPOSED GENERAL STRATEGY FOR THE AFP AIMED

AT THE QUICK TERMINATION OF THE INSURGENCY
WAR USING MAJOR AFP RESOURCES IN A
CONCERTED AND DELIBERATE EFFORT TO DEPRIVE
THE CPP/NPA OF MORE TIME TO FURTHER EXPAND
AND STRENGTHEN ITS FORCES AND GUERILLA
FRONTS. IT IS THE EXACT OPPOSITE OF THE
CPP/NPA GENERAL STRATEGY OF “PROTRACTED
WAR”. IT IS AIMED AT DISMANTLING, IN THE
SHORTEST TIME POSSIBLE, THE MAJOR GUERILLA
FRONTS AND DECISIVELY DEFEATING THE MAIN
ENEMY FORCES IN THESE FRONTS THROUGH
SIMULTANEOUS AND SUSTAINED CAMPAIGNS OF
“GRADUAL CONSTRICTION.”
 GRADUAL CONSTRICTION

PROPOSED AFP CAMPAIGN STRATEGY OF

GRADUALLY CONSTRICTING THE TARGETED
GUERILLA FRONTS BY PROGRESSIVELY
ORGANIZING THE ENEMY-AFFECTED BARANGAYS
“IN REVERSE” STARTING FROM THE OUTSKIRTS
OF THE GUERILLA FRONT AND MOVING SLOWLY
TOWARDS THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF THE GIVEN
FRONT. THIS COUPLED WITH A CONSCIOUS
EFFORT TO SEEK A DECISIVE ENGAGEMENT AT
EVERY OPPURTUNE MOMENT BY
CONCENTRATION OF FORCES AND ENCIRCLING
TACTICS (AREA AMBUSH) WHENEVER THE MAIN
ENEMY FORCE IN A GIVEN FRONT IS LOCATED
 STRATEGIC PRECEPTS
 “WAR OF QUICK DECISION” VS “PROTRACTED WAR”
 PRIORITAZATION OF TARGET GUERILLA FRONTS
 CONCEPT OF ONE-ON-ONE
 SIMULTANEOUS CAMPAIGN OFFENSIVES
COORDINATED NATIONWIDE
 SUSTAINED/PROTRACTED CAMPAIGNS
 CAMPAIGN STRATEGY OF “GRADUAL
CONSTRICTION”
 INVOLVEMENT OF CIVIC AND LOCAL OFFICIALS
 NATIONAL RECONCILIATION
 STRICT OBSERVANCE OF HUMAN RIGTHS
 HARNESSING PEOPLE’S POWER IN THE TOTAL
COUNTERINSURGENCY EFFORT
 CONCEPT OF EXECUTION
 SELECT ONE THIRD OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF
ENEMY GUERILLA FRONTS (THE MOST
STRATEGIC) AND LAUNCH A NATIONALLY
COORDINATED OFFENSIVE AGAINST THESE
PRIORITY TARGETS WHILE CONDUCTING
HOLDING OR CONTAINING ACTION AGAINST THE
REMAINING GUERILLA FRONTS

 ARMED CITY PARTISAN AND UO VS INDIGENOUS

CLANDESTINE INTEL NET/ASSETS IN DEPRESSED
AREAS BACK UP BY URBAN ANTI-TERRORIST
UNITS AS QUICK REACTION FORCES

 UNITED FRONT AGAINST PEACE AND ORDER

COUNCILS SERVING AS THE CORE GROUPS
2 STAGES OF GENERAL OFFENSIVE

PREPARATION

GENERAL OFFENSIVE
 PREPARATION

 PRIORITIZATION OF TARGET GUERILLA

FRONTS
 REALIGNMENT OF FORCES
 REORGANIZATION
 RETRAINING AND REORIENTATION
 INTELLIGENCE
 CMO
 COMBAT OPERATIONS
 COMMUNICATIONS
 POLITICAL EDUCATION
 GETTING RID OF THE “BAGGADE”
 GENERAL OFFENSIVE

 SIMULTANEOUS AND SUSTAINED

CAMPAIGNS OF GRADUAL CONSTRICTION
SHALL BE LAUNCED AGAINST THE
DESIGNATED PRIORITY GUERILLA
FRONTS UNTIL THE TARGETED FRONTS
ARE DISMANTLED AND THE MAIN ENEMY
FORCE IN EACH FRONT DECISIVELY
DEFEATED.

 TRIAD CONCEPT
 SAMPLE OF A TASK UNIT DISPOSITION
IN CAMPAIGNS OF “GRADUAL CONSTRICTIONS” - PHASE 1

TACTICAL CENTER

STRIKE BN

... ...
BASE AREA
SO

...
Ts ... ...
...

GUERILLA ZONE SOT

s
..
... ... ... ..
RE

...
S
ST

O
EC
R

K
IK

RI
ST
E

S
CO

RE
SAMPLE OF A TASK UNIT DISPOSITION
IN CAMPAIGNS OF “GRADUAL CONSTRICTIONS” - PHASE 2

TACTICAL CENTER

STRIKE BN
...
S O
...
Ts
... ...
SOT
s
.. ... ...
... BASE AREA
... ... .. RSCo
...
RSCo

GUERILLA ZONE
SAMPLE OF A TASK UNIT DISPOSITION
IN CAMPAIGNS OF “GRADUAL CONSTRICTIONS” - PHASE 3

TACTICAL CENTER

...
STRIKE BN
. ...
...
SO
... ... .. ...
Ts
... ..
... ... .. RSCo
s
RSCo SOT

BASE AREA

GUERILLA ZONE
SAMPLE OF A TASK UNIT DISPOSITION
IN CAMPAIGNS OF “GRADUAL CONSTRICTIONS” - PHASE 4

... ... . ...

..

BASE AREA

GUERILLA ZONE
VENUS FLY - TRAP
PHASE ONE: REAL - TIME INTELLIGENCE

TACTICAL CENTER

STRIKE BN

RSCo
I
II

II
I

RSCo
VENUS FLY - TRAP
PHASE TWO: MANEUVER AND STRATEGIC
CONCENTRATION OF FORCES

TACTICAL CENTER

STRIKE BN

I RSCo
II

II
I

RSCo
VENUS FLY - TRAP
PHASE THREE: OCCUPATION OF PRE-SELECTED BATTLESITES

TACTICAL CENTER

STRIKE BN

I RSCo
II

II
I

RSCo
VENUS FLY - TRAP
PHASE FOUR - TACTICAL CONCENTRATION OF FORCES
TRIANGLE FORMATION

TS

25
0M

-5
-5

0
M
25

TS
TM LDR

25 - 50 MTS
 GRADUAL CONSTRICTION IS THE ANSWER
TO:

SIXTEEN CHARACTER FORMULA

MOBILE WARFARE
CONCENTRATE SUPERIOR FORCE TO
DESTROY THE ENEMY FORCES ONE BY ONE
CAMPAIGNS OF QUICK DECISION
RAIDS AND AMBUSCADES
ATTACKING OUTPOSTS TO ANNIHILATE
REINFORCEMENTS
INITIATIVE
ENEMY PLANNING
FLEXIBILITY