Adiong vs. COMELEC

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ADIONG VS.

COMELEC
G . R . N O . 1 0 3 9 5 6 | M A R C H 3 1 , 19 9 2
FACTS

COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2347 pursuant to its powers granted by the Constitution, the Omnibus
Election Code, RA 6646 and 7166 and other election laws.
Section 15(a) of the resolution provides:
Sec. 15. Lawful Election Propaganda. — The following are lawful election propaganda:
(a) Pamphlets, leaflets, cards, decals, stickers, handwritten or printed letters, or other written or printed
materials not more than eight and one-half (8-1/2) inches in width and fourteen (14) inches in length.
Provided, That decals and stickers may be posted only in any of the authorized posting areas provided in
paragraph (f) of Section 21 hereof.
Section 21 (f) of the same resolution provides:
Sec. 21(f). Prohibited forms of election propaganda. — It is unlawful:
(f) To draw, paint, inscribe, post, display or publicly exhibit any election propaganda in any place,
whether public or private, mobile or stationary, except in the COMELEC common posted areas and/or billboards,
at the campaign headquarters of the candidate or political party, organization or coalition, or at the
candidate's own residential house or one of his residential houses, if he has more than one: Provided, that
such posters or election propaganda shall not exceed two (2) feet by three (3) feet in size.
FACTS

• Petitioner Blo Umpar Adiong, a senatorial candidate in 1992 elections, assail the
COMELEC's Resolution insofar as it prohibits the posting of decals and stickers in
"mobile" places like cars and other moving vehicles.
• The posting of decals and stickers on cars and other moving vehicles would be his last
medium to inform the electorate that he is a senatorial candidate in the elections.
• Adiong states that as of February 22, 1992 (the date of the petition), he has not received
any notice from any of the Election Registrars in the entire country as to the location of
the supposed "COMELEC Poster Areas."
Whether or not the COMELEC may prohibit the
posting of decals and stickers on “mobile” places,
public or private, and limit their location or
publication to the authorized posting areas that it
ISSUE fixes.

NO
RULIING

The COMELEC's prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places


whether public or private except in designated areas provided for by the COMELEC
itself is null and void on constitutional grounds.
1.The prohibition unduly infringes on the citizen's fundamental right of free speech
enshrined in the Constitution (Sec. 4, Art. III). There is no public interest substantial
enough to warrant the kind of restriction involved in this case.

II. The questioned prohibition premised on the statute and as couched in the resolution
is void for overbreadth.

III. The constitutional objective to give a rich candidate and a poor candidate equal
opportunity to inform the electorate as regards their candidacies, mandated by Art. II,
Sec. 26 and Article XIII, Sec. 1 in relation to Art. IX (c) Sec. 4 of the Constitution, is
not impaired by posting decals and stickers on cars and other private vehicles.
1.The prohibition unduly infringes on the citizen's fundamental right of free speech
enshrined in the Constitution (Sec. 4, Art. III). There is no public interest substantial
enough to warrant the kind of restriction involved in this case.

• The posting of decals and stickers in mobile places like cars and other moving
vehicles does not endanger any substantial government interest. There is no clear
public interest threatened by such activity so as to justify the curtailment of the
cherished citizen's right of free speech and expression.
• Under the clear and present danger rule not only must the danger be patently clear
and pressingly present but the evil sought to be avoided must be so substantive as to
justify a clamp over one's mouth or a writing instrument.
• A sticker may be furnished by a candidate but once the car owner agrees to have it
placed on his private vehicle, the expression becomes a statement by the owner,
primarily his own and not of anybody else.
II. The questioned prohibition premised on the statute and as couched in the resolution
is void for overbreadth.

• A statute is considered void for overbreadth when "it offends the constitutional
principle that a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities
constitutionally subject to state regulations may not be achieved by means which
sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.“
• Verily, the restriction as to where the decals and stickers should be posted is so
broad that it encompasses even the citizen's private property, which in this case is a
privately-owned vehicle.
• Section 3, Article III of the Bill of Rights provides:
“No person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law.”
III. The constitutional objective to give a rich candidate and a poor candidate equal
opportunity to inform the electorate as regards their candidacies, mandated by Art. II,
Sec. 26 and Article XIII, Sec. 1 in relation to Art. IX (c) Sec. 4 of the Constitution, is
not impaired by posting decals and stickers on cars and other private vehicles.

• Whether the candidate is rich and, therefore, can afford to dole out more decals and
stickers or poor and without the means to spread out the same number of decals and
stickers is not as important as the right of the owner to freely express his choice and
exercise his right of free speech.
Therefore, the portion of Section 15 (a) of Resolution No. 2347 of the
Commission on Elections providing that "decals and stickers may be posted only
in any of the authorized posting areas provided in paragraph (f) of Sec. 21 hereof"
is DECLARED NULL and VOID.

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