2004-02-18 Stevns Power AHV Accident
2004-02-18 Stevns Power AHV Accident
2004-02-18 Stevns Power AHV Accident
SUMMARY
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. GENERAL BRIEF ACCIDENT DESCRIPTION SEQUENCE OF THE EVENTS SUMMARY OF THE INTERVIEWS ACTIONS REVIEW AND ANALYSIS CONCLUSIONS IMPLEMENTATIONS
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GENERAL
Type of incident: Sinking of subcontracted Anchor Handling tug Date: October, 19th 2003 Time: 17:15 Consequences: Total loss of the Vessel and her crew (11 fatalities) Activity performed: anchors handling Castoro Otto during the execution of the Okono Okpoho field development Project in Nigeria.
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ACTIONS
IMMEDIATE
Immediately after having stopped the wire pulling and visually assessed the situation: The pipe laying operations were stopped in order to participate in emergency salvage operations. The rescue boat of the Castoro Otto, which was already in water, was sent to the scene of the incident. The AHT Maersk Terrier was instructed to locate to the place of the incident and remained at 70 to 80 m from the Stevns Power. The survey vessel STM Inspector was instructed to recover the ROV and go the Stevns Power. One ROV dive was made by Sonsub while the Stevns Power was remaining with the bow load.
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ACTIONS (contd.)
IMMEDIATE
Further ROV dives have been made later on the seabed. There were still no signs of survivors.
The Saipems shore base in Port Harcourt was promptly informed of the incident. At the same time Saipem, Saiboss Nordane, Client Management were informed, along with local authorities.
ACTIONS (contd.)
FURTHER
Under Water Survey Several ROV surveys were the sunken Stevns Power . performed on
A side scan sonar survey has been carried out in order to locate the anchor No. 10 on board. All the relevant ROV diving reports have been recorded and details are included within the ROV diving log.
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CONLUSIONS
Further investigations and information are still required regarding the accident. The information should include the result of further detailed survey of the wreckage, its structure, tanks, equipment, systems etc. along with recent reports regarding the conditions of the vessel. The 3rd part investigations opinion is that the catastrophe was initiated by an exceptional lack of stability of the vessel itself.
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CONLUSIONS (contd.)
Possible causes may include unusual ballast conditions, a crack on the side shell causing leakage into the port stern area of the hull, loss of sealing bulkhead of the propeller etc. No final conclusion can be given pending a detailed analysis on the stability and the structural strength of the Stevns Power is carried out.
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IMPLEMENTATIONS
1. Pending full investigation and final conclusions, we advise the implementation of the following actions: Establish a baseline competency profile key crew positions of vessel, especially for tugs and implement compatible assessment to ensure proficiency. Encourage culture to STOP unsafe work on vessels and continue to reinforce the hazard awareness practice. Require vessels to periodically advise any anomalies regarding their own vessels, or other vessels involved in operations, and to confirm that they are not aware of any anomalies that could affect the operations for which they have been contracted. Establish clear HSE hiring requirements for AHT and ensure that they are implemented prior to mobilization.
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IMPLEMENTATIONS (contd.)
Pending full investigation and final conclusions, we advise the implementation of the following actions: 7. 5. Implement a vessel Seaworthiness Checklist that shall be completed by the Master of each vessel of t he construction spread every 24 hrs. Institute routine daily, and formal monthly, AHT performance reviews with an overall assessment carried out at the end of each project/assignment to the main vessel. Ensure that an appropriate Monthly Vessel Spread Report is performed and distributed every month. Reinforce attention of personnel on the Standard Marine Procedures, in particular for Anchor Handling operations and further clarify roles and responsibilities between Main Vessel and tugs.
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IMPLEMENTATIONS (contd.)
Pending full investigation and final conclusions, we advise the implementation of the following actions: 9. Establish proactive daily radio contact between Main vessel and tugs spread to discuss any safety related issues.
10. Ensure that a safety coordination meetings is held with Masters of each vessel of the construction spread addressing all the risks of the operations at the beginning if each project activity. 11. Feedback outcomes of current investigation to the marine crew
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