1 - Chatper 1 - Introduction To The Course Game Theory

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ECON 4283 Game Theory

Lecture 1
Introduction to Game Theory
Course

Spring 2022

Dr. Nisar Ahmad


Textbook

› An Introduction to Game Theory (2009) by Martin Osborne


› The first 3 chapters are available for download on the textbook
webpage (see course website for details)
› Prerequisites: you should be familiar with Principles of
Microeconomics (ECON1211).
› Announcements, slides, & homework will be posted on Moodle
Course key: GTSPRING2022
Dr. Nisar Ahmad
Game Theory 101: The Complete
Textbook
by William Spaniel

Recommended to download kindle


edition 5USD = 2 OMR

YouTube videos are available based on


book

Dr. Nisar Ahmad


 Assessment Plan
Midterm exam 30%,
Final exam 30%
Quizzes 15%
Project 20%
Participation : Attendance 5%
0-5% 5 marks, 5 - 10% 4 marks, 10 - 15% 3 marks, Less then 15% 2 marks
There will be two quizzes in this course.
Quiz 1: Week 7
Midterm: Week 8
Quiz 2: Week 12
Project Deadline: Week 14 (Project topic deadline Week 10)
Project Presentations Week 15
Dr. Nisar Ahmad
Course information

Office Hours: Monday and Wednesday 10:00 am - 11:00 am ›


Email: [email protected]
› Office: 1017B
›,
or by appointment

Dr. Nisar Ahmad


Game Theory used in TV show Golden Balls?
100150 GBP = 50000 OMR

Dr. Nisar Ahmad


Dr. Nisar Ahmad
A Beautiful Mind
Course Outline

• A. Analysis of Static Setting


• Normal Form Games: Chapters 2, 3, 4
• Dominant and dominated strategies
•  Iterative elimination of dominated strategies
•  Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium, Theory and Application
•  Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium, Theory and Application
•  Bayesian Games I: Chapter 9
•  Describing simultaneous move games with imperfect information using ex-
ante normal form games, Bayes-Nash Equilibrium
• B. Analysis of Dynamic Setting
• Extensive Form Games: Chapter 5
•  Describing games with sequential moves
• Backward induction
• Subgame perfect equilibrium and applications
•  Bayesian Games II: Chapter 10

Dr. Nisar Ahmad


What is Game Theory, and Why do we Need It?

• Game Theory is the mathematical study of strategic situations, i.e. where there is more than
one decision-maker, and each decision-maker can affect the outcome.
• Previously in microeconomics, you studied single-person problems.
• For example:
• How much of each good to consume, in order to maximize my utility?
• How much output should a firm produce, in order to maximize profits?
• However, in multi-agent situations, my choice may change your problem.
• We need a method that takes everyone’s choices into account.

• Rational behavior: choose the level that


maximizes utility (or profits, or payoffs).

Dr. Nisar Ahmad


Examples of Strategic Situations

• Business
• Competition between firms: price, quality, location...
• Market segmentation by firm: offer different levels of quality
• Auctions
• Political Science
• Voting Strategically: always vote for your candidate, or vote to
ensure your least preferred candidate loses?
• Sports
• Tennis Serving
• Soccer Penalty Kicks
• Biology
• › Why do animals confront each other, but rarely
fight? (Hawk-Dove game)
• › Why does the peacock have a huge, costly tail?

(Signaling, Handicap Principle)

Dr. Nisar Ahmad


Mathematical Definition of a Strategic (or Normal-Form) Game

• Terminology:
1. The decision-makers are called players.
2. Each player has a set of possible actions. A list of actions (e.g. the
list of what players choose) is called an action profile.
3. Each player has preferences over the outcome of the game. The
outcome is determined by the actions that all players have chosen.
Some outcomes are more desirable than others.

Dr. Nisar Ahmad


• A Strategic game or Normal-Form is a model of
interaction in which each player chooses an
action without knowing what other players
choose
• We can think of this as players choosing their
actions simultaneously.
Game Theory

Static Games Dynamic Games

Static Games with Static Games with Dynamic Games Dynamic Games
complete incomplete with complete with incomplete
information information information Information

Dr. Nisar Ahmad 14


Static or Strategic (or Normal-Form) Game

 We need to specify:
 who the players are
 what they can do
 their preferences over the possible outcomes
 Definition: A strategic game consists of:
1. a set of players
2. for each player, a set of actions
3. for each player, preferences (i.e. a ranking) over all possible action
profiles
 We will usually use payoff functions that represent preferences, instead of using
preferences directly.

Dr. Nisar Ahmad


A 2-Player Static Game: The Prisoner’s Dilemma

o Let’s consider a specific example. Imagine this situation:


o Players: There are two suspects in a crime
o Actions:
o Each suspect can be convicted of a minor offense, but can only be
convicted of a major offense if the other suspect finks (i.e. gives
information to the police).
o Each suspect can choose to be Quiet or Confess (inform).
o Payoffs
o If both stay quiet, each gets 1 month in prison.
o If only one suspect Confess, he goes free while the other suspect gets 12
months prison.
o If both suspects Confess, they both get 8 months.

Dr. Nisar Ahmad


Modeling the Prisoner’s
 Players: Dilemma
The two suspects.
 Actions: Each player’s set of actions is Q, C.
 Preferences: We’ll write down the action profile as: (Suspect 1’s
choice, Suspect 2’s choice).
 Suspect 1’s preferences, from best to worst:
 (F, Q) > (Q, Q) > (F, F ) > (Q, F )
 Suspect 2’s preferences, from best to worst:
 (Q, F ) > (Q, Q) > (F, F ) > (F, Q)

Player 2
Q C
Q -1, -1 -12,0
Player 1
C 0,-12 -8,-8

Dr. Nisar Ahmad


Instead of using preferences directly, we will use a payoff function that
assignsBi-Matrix Form
a utility to each of Prisoner’s Dilemma
outcome: 0 = Free = satisfaction = 4
› Suspect 1:

u1 (C, Q) = 4, u1 (Q, Q) = 3, u1 (C, C ) = 2, u1 (Q, C ) =1 -1 = one month jail = satisfaction = 3


› Suspect 2:

u2 (C, Q) = 1, u2 (Q, Q) = 3, u2 (C, C ) = 2, u2 (Q, C ) = 4 - 8 = 8 months jail = satisfaction = 2


Player 2
Q F -12 = 12 months jail = satisfaction = 1
Q 2,2 0,3
Player 1 3,0 1,1
F
› We can collect the payoff values into a payoff matrix:
› The two rows are the two possible actions of Player 1.
› The two columns are the two possible actions of Player 2.
› In each cell, the first number is the payoff of Player 1; the
second is the payoff of Player 2.
Dr. Nisar Ahmad
Examples of Static games

Joint Student Project


› Players: Two students
› Actions: Each of you can choose to Work hard or Lazy.
› If the other person Works hard, each of you prefers to be lazy.
› Project would be better if both work hard, but not worth the
extra effort.

Player 2
Work hard Lazy
Work hard
Player 1 Lazy

Dr. Nisar Ahmad


Duopoly

Duopoly: Price Competition


› Players: Two firms, producing the same good.
› Actions: Each firm can charge a High price or a Low price.
› Preferences:
if both firms charge a high price, both get profit of 3000.
› If only one firm charges a high price, it loses customers, makes
profit of 1000. Other firm charges low price, gets profit of 4 0 0 0
› If both firms charge low price, both get profit of 2000.

Dr. Nisar Ahmad

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