Executive

Union Executive & State Executive

President

● Republic
● Indirect election (Art 54- 55)
● Electoral college
● Article 71- SC decides disputes relating to Presidential election.
● President and Vice-President Election Act, 1952
● Term - 5 years
● Article 58 - Qualification for election as president
● Office of profit.
● Article 59- Conditions of office.
● Article 62- time of holding election
● Impeachment: Borrowed from US Constitution
● Violation of the Constitution.
● Presidential privilege: Article 361
Vice- President

Normal function is to preside over Council of States

Vice- President can act as President during vacancies or absence of president.

Election of Vice- President: Art 66

Council of Ministers (Art 74-75)/Art 163
Article 74 & 75

Generally worded- regulated by practices and conventions.

“Shall be a council of ministers”- Mandatory

Collective Responsibility

U.N. Rao vs. Indira Gandhi 1971 (5 judge bench)

There is nothing in the Constitution and in particular in Art. 75(3) which renders the respondent functioning as
Prime Minister contrary to the Constitution. The Indian Constitution establishes a Parliamentary system of
Government with a Cabinet, and not a Presidential form. Article 75(3) brings into existence responsible
Government, that is, the Council of Ministers must enjoy the confidence of the House of the People. In the context,
it can only mean that Art. 75(3) applies when the House of the People does not stand dissolved or prorogued, for,
when it is dissolved, the Council of Ministers cannot naturally enjoy the confidence of the House. But such
dissolution of the House does not require that the Prime Minister and other ministers must resign, or cease to hold
office or must be dismissed by the President, because, Art. 74(1). is mandatory and the President cannot exercise
his executive power without the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers, with the Prime Minister at the head.
It will be noticed that article 74(1) is mandatory in form. We are unable to agree with the appellant that in
the context the word "shall" should be read as "may". Article 52 is mandatory. In other words ’there shall be a
President of India’. So is article 74(1). The Constituent Assembly did not choose the Presidential system of
Government. If we were to give effect to this contention of the appellant we would be changing the whole
concept of the Executive. It would mean that the President need not have. a Prime Minister and Ministers to
aid and advise in the exercise of his functions. As there would be no ’Council of Ministers’ nobod y would be
responsible to the House of the People.

With the aid of advisers he would be able to rule the country at least till he is impeached under Article, 61. It
seems to us that we must read the word "shall" as meaning "shall’ and not "may". If Article 74(1) is read in
this manner the rest of the provisions dealing with the Executive must be read in harmony with. Indeed they
fall into place. Under Article 75(1) the President appoints the Prime Minister and appoints the other Ministers
on the advice of the Prime Minister, and under art. 75(2) they hold office during the pleasure of the President
Rai Sahib Ram Jawaya Kapur And Ors. vs The State Of Punjab on 12 April, 1955

In India, as in, England, the executive has to act subject to the control of the legislature; but in what way is this
control exercisable by the legislature ? Under article 53(1) of our Constitution, the executive power of the Union
is vested in the President but under article 75 there is to be a Council of Ministers with the Prime Minister at the
head to aid and advise the President in the exercise of his functions. The President has thus been made a formal
or constitutional head of the executive and the real executive powers are vested in the Ministers or the Cabinet.

The same provisions obtain in regard to the Government of States-, the Governor or the Rajpramukh, as the
case may be, occupies the position of the head of the executive in the State but it is virtually the Council of
Ministers in each State that carries on the executive Government. In the Indian Constitution, therefore, we have
the same system of parliamentary executive as in England and the Council of Ministers consisting, as it does, of
the members of the legislature is, like the British Cabinet, "a hyphen which joins, a buckle which fastens the
legislative part of the State to the executive part". The Cabinet enjoying, as it does, a majority in the legislature
concentrates in itself the virtual control of both legislative and executive functions; and as the Ministers
constituting the Cabinet are presumably agreed on fundamentals and act on the principle of collective
responsibility, the most important questions of policy are all formulated by them."
Shamsher Singh & Anr vs State Of Punjab 1974

The appellant Shamsher Singh was a Subordinate Judge on probation. His services were terminated by the
Government of Punjab in the name of Governor of Punjab by an order which did not give any reasons for
the termination.
The appellants placed reliance that satisfaction for making an order under Article 311 is the personal satisfaction
of the President or the Governor. The State, on the other hand, contended that the Governor exercises powers of
appointment and removal conferred on him by or under the Constitution like executive powers of the State
Government only on the aid and advice of his council of Ministers and not personally.
The President as well as the Governor is the constitutional head or formal head. The President as well as the
Governor exercises his powers and functions conferred on him by or under the Constitution on the aid and advice
of his council of Ministers save in spheres where the Governor is required by or under the Constitution to exercise
his functions in his discretion.
Appointment of Prime Minister

Art 75- Appointed by the President

President enjoys higher level of discretion- Primarily based on Constitutional Convention

Collective Responsibility- PM should have support and confidence of the Lok Sabha

Can be a member of either Lok Sabha or Rajya Sabha

Deviation from the British Parliamentary convention

Appointment of Ministers

Minister to be a member of the house.

6 months time period- 75(5)

S.R. Chaudhary vs. State of Punjab 2001- can a minister be re-appointed after every 6 months

Court rejected such a literal reading.

Collective responsibility
Judicial Function

Article 72/161 (Governor)

Not a sovereign prerogative but Constitutional provision.

Kehar Singh v. Union of India

To what area does the President’s power to scrutinise evidence extend in exercising his power to pardon ?

- President can go into the merits of the case

- Does President exercise personal discretion ? (Maru Ram v. Union of India )
- Is personal hearing required to be given ? (Kehar Singh v. Union of India )
- Is this power subject to any norm ?
- Is exercise of this power subject to any judicial review? (G. Krishna Goud v. State of A.P./ Maru Ram v.
Union of India )
Delay and Death Penalty

A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Triveniben v. State of Gujarat considered
the question, and held that only executive delay, and not judicial delay, may be considered as
relevant in an Article 21 challenge.
If, therefore, there is inordinate delay in execution, the condemned prisoner is entitled to come to the
court requesting to examine whether, it is just and fair to allow the sentence of death to be executed.
Undue long delay in execution of the sentence of death will entitle the condemned person to
approach this Court under Article 32 but this Court will only examine the nature of delay caused and
circumstances ensued after sentence was finally confirmed by the judicial process and will have no
jurisdiction to re-open the conclusions reached by the Court while finally maintaining the sentence of
death… No fixed period of delay could be held to make the sentence of death inexecutable
 Shatrughan Chauhan v. UOI, (2014) 3
SCC 1,
● Whether the delay caused in disposing off the mercy petition amounts as a violation of Article 21 of the death convicts?
● Whether the failure/delay on part of the Executive to dispose of the mercy petition filed under Article72/161 of the Constitution within a
reasonable time can act as a sufficient ground for commuting death sentence into life imprisonment
Court held:

that undue long delay in execution of sentence of death will entitle the condemned prisoner to approach this Court under Article 32. However, this Court
will only examine the circumstances surrounding the delay that has occurred and those that have ensued after sentence was finally confirmed by the
judicial process.
Accordingly, if there is undue, unexplained and inordinate delay in execution due to pendency of mercy petitions or the executive as well as the
constitutional authorities have failed to take note of/consider the relevant aspects, this Court is well within its powers under Article 32 to hear the
grievance of the convict and commute the death sentence into life imprisonment on this ground alone however, only after satisfying that the delay
was not caused at the instance of the accused himself…” … Therefore, in the light of the aforesaid elaborate discussion, we are of the cogent view
that undue, inordinate and unreasonable delay in execution of death sentence does certainly attribute to torture which indeed is in violation of
Article 21 and thereby entails as the ground for commutation of sentence. However, the nature of delay i.e. whether it is undue or unreasonable
must be appreciated based on the facts of individual cases and no exhaustive guidelines can be framed in this regard.”
Inordinate delay of more than 11 years in disposal of mercy petitions, the sentence of death imposed upon the petitioners
herein is liable to be commuted to life imprisonment as it is violative of Article 21 of the Constitution in addition to various
International Conventions, Universal Declarations, to which India is a signatory.

It is, therefore, indisputable that the delay ensued in the given petitions is inordinate and unreasonable and the same was not
caused at the instance of the petitioners. Accordingly, the unreasonable delay caused qualifies as the supervening circumstance,
which warrants for commutation of sentence of death into life imprisonment as stipulated in Shatrughan Chauhan (supra),

Exorbitant delay in disposal of mercy petition renders the process of execution of death sentence arbitrary, whimsical and
capricious and, therefore, inexecutable. Furthermore, such imprisonment, occasioned by inordinate delay in disposal of mercy
petitions, is beyond the sentence accorded by the court and to that extent is extra-legal and excessive. Therefore, the apex
constitutional authorities must exercise the power under Article 72/161 within the bounds of constitutional discipline and
should dispose of the mercy petitions filed before them in an expeditious manner.
Power to promulgate Ordinance

Article 123/ 213

The Indian Constitution, in Article 123, authorizes the executive to promulgate ordinances if
certain conditions are satisfied.

● Ordinances may be promulgated only if at least one House of Parliament is not in

session.
● President is satisfied that “immediate action” is necessary.
RC Cooper v. Union of India 1970: Supreme Court in RC Cooper vs. Union of India (1970)
discussed the question whether the President’s decision to promulgate ordinance could be
challenged on the grounds that ‘immediate action’ was not required, and the ordinance had been
issued primarily to bypass debate and discussion in the legislature?

Justice Ray, in his minority opinion expressed: “satisfaction of the President is subjective” and
the only way in which the exercise of power by the President can be challenged in by
establishing “ bad faith malafide and corrupt move”.

38th Constitutional Amendment 1975 - Added Article 123 (4)

44th CA Act, 1978, - deleted the above provision

A.K. Roy v. Union of India 1982- No conclusive decision

T. Venkata Reddy v. State of A.P. 1985:Since ordinance making is a legislative power, hence cannot be
challenged on malafide, corrupt motives.

However, SC judgments in S.R. Bommai and State of Rajasthan v. Union of India held that subjective discretion
of the Governor is is open to the Court for Judicial review. (Article 356)

Ordinances cannot be void from commencement will only cease to operate.

D.C. Wadhwa vs. State of Bihar 1987

The general power of the Governor to re-promulgate the ordinance was examined by the court as
several ordinances had been re-promulgated over thirty times. The immediate challenge was to
the three ordinances that were kept alive for a period of 10-14 years.

court ruled that the mechanical re-promulgation of the ordinances for a period of one to fourteen
years without going to the legislation was a colourable exercise of power by the executive and
ruled that re-promulgation of ordinances was unconstitutional.

that there may be times when the parliament cannot deal with the promulgated ordinances
because of a shortage of time. Therefore the court gave two exceptions to this rule in which re-
promulgation can be allowed; firstly, if the legislature cannot take it up due to existing legislative
business; secondly, if the government feels that an emergent situation has emerged and re-
promulgation is necessary to deal with it.
Krishna Kumar Singh v State of Bihar 2017

In 1989, the Bihar government passed the Bihar Non-Government Sanskrit Schools (Taking Over of
Management and Control) Ordinance. The Ordinance provided for the taking over of 429 Sanskrit
schools in the state of Bihar. The services of teachers and other employees of the school were to
stand transferred to the state government. The first Ordinance was followed by a succession of
Ordinances. None of the ordinances were placed before the state legislature.

Three Issues:

Whether Article 213 of the Constitution confers a mandatory obligation on the Executive to table an
ordinance before the Legislature?

Whether re-promulgation of an ordinance is permissible as per the Constitution?

Whether an act through an ordinance remains valid even after the ordinance ceases to operate?
A seven-judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court held that re-promulgation of
ordinances is a fraud on the Constitution and a subversion of democratic legislative
processes. The majority Judgment, authored by Justice DY Chandrachud, held that
the requirement of placing the ordinance before the Legislature is mandatory; Justice
Madan B Lokur observed that it is directory; Justice Thakur, the Chief Justice of India
as he was then, in his separate concurring opinion, preferred to leave the ‘question of
interpretation of Articles 123 (2) and 213(2) in so far as the obligation of the
Government to place the ordinance before the Parliament/legislature open.
The satisfaction of the President under Article 123 and of the Governor under Article 213 is not immune from
judicial review particularly after the amendment brought about by the forty-fourth amendment to the
Constitution by the deletion of clause 4 in both the articles. The test is whether the satisfaction is based on
some relevant material. The court in the exercise of its power of judicial review will not determine the
sufficiency or adequacy of the material. The court will scrutinise whether the satisfaction in a particular case
constitutes a fraud on power or was actuated by an oblique motive. Judicial review in other words would
enquire into whether there was no satisfaction at all.

The requirement of laying an Ordinance before Parliament or the state legislature is a mandatory
constitutional obligation cast upon the government. Laying of the ordinance before the legislature is
mandatory because the legislature has to determine: (a) The need for, validity of and expediency to
promulgate an ordinance; (b) Whether the Ordinance ought to be approved or disapproved; (c) Whether an
Act incorporating the provisions of the ordinance should be enacted (with or without amendments);

The failure to comply with the requirement of laying an ordinance before the legislature is a serious
constitutional infraction and abuse of the constitutional process; (viii) Re-promulgation of ordinances is a
fraud on the Constitution and a sub-version of democratic legislative processes, as laid down in the judgment
of the Constitution Bench in D C Wadhwa;
 Emergency Provisions
- Emergency arising from threat to the security of India
- Breakdown of Constitutional machinery in a state.
- Financial emergency.

Proclamation of Emergency: Article 352

Significant changes after 44th CA act, 1978

“Internal disturbance’ substituted to ‘armed rebellion’.

(3)- Decision of Union Cabinet

(4)- Parliament must be convened within a month to consider proclamation of emergency

(6)-passed by both house 2/3rd majority.

(5)- remains in force for 6 months [previously no time line was prescribed]

Lok sabha can revoke the proclamation.

(9)- different proclamation for different grounds.

Justiciability of President’s discretion

Bhut Nath v. State of West Bengal 1974 : Courts refused to consider this as a justiciable issue.

38th CA 1975- excluded judicial review (deleted after 44th CA 1978)

Position has been clarified in subsequent judgments.

Article 353- Effect of Proclamation

- Article 250 /251
- Federal fabric undergoes complete change
- Center entitled to give directions to state as to the manner in which executive power is to be
exercised.

Article 355
Failure of Const. Machinery in a State-
356&357
- On receipt of a report from Governor or otherwise.
- Two months unless approved by the Parliament
- 6 months period generally
- Max period is 3 years
- 44th CA introduced restraint on power of Parliament. 356(5)

Position of the Governor - Acts in a dual Capacity under the Constitution.

- Governor makes his report to the President in his discretion without advice of council of ministers.
- Art 163 (1)
- After proclamation, power to dissolve assembly is with the President
“Cannot be carried out in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution”

- No party in assembly has a majority to form a govt.

- Govt loses its majority due to defections.
- Govt has majorities but functions in a manner subversive to the Constitution.
- Security of the state may be threatened and law and order issues.
- SG not complying with the order of the CG.
Justiciability of the Proclamation
Initially Courts rejected to scrutinise the Promulgation of Emergency
- Rao Birinder Singh v. India, AIR 1968
•In State of Haryana the imposition of President's Rule was declared on 21 November 1967 and
the legislative Assembly was dissolved
•the petitioner contended
(i)that the petitioner commanded majority in the legislative Assembly
(ii) that the satisfaction of the President while issuing the proclamation in fact means the
satisfaction of the Union Home Minister which must be based upon some facts and
circumstances,
(iii) that the report of the Governor makes it clear that in fact the government could be carried on
according to the constitution because the petitioner had continued to have majority in the
legislative Assembly
•The court held that the President while exercising under Article 356 did not act on behalf of the executive of the
Union but in a constitutional capacity and therefore, the exercise of power by the President was not amenable to the
jurisdiction of the court
•This court can not even enquire into, in view of sub-article (2) of Article 74, whether any advice whatsoever was
tendered by any Minister in connection with the issue of the impuned proclamation under Article 356
•The court had no jurisdiction to require disclosure of material forming basis of the satisfaction of the President.
Bijayananda Vs. President of India(1974)(Orissa)
•President proclamation of 3rd March 1973 in Orissa state was examined by Orissa High Court
•It was alleged in this case that, when the Chief Minister tendered resignation of her Council of Ministers, the
Governor should have called the leader of the opposition party to form the ministry, the Court said that without
testing its strength Governor's decision not to call the leader of opposition party to form the ministry and to
recommend for President' Rule
•While rejecting the challenge of imposition the division bench of the Orissa High Court ruled that the Presidential
proclamation is not justifiable on the following grounds :-
(i) The wide source of information as contemplated by the expression 'otherwise' gives ample indication that the
President's satisfaction is not justiciable.
(ii) The satisfaction and the basis of the satisfaction are both subjective and are not subject to judicial review.
(iii) In view of the provisions under Article 74(2) and Article 361(1) the Court is not in a position to test the grounds
of satisfaction.
(iv) The provisions for parliamentary approval for continuance of the proclamation beyond two months from the date
of proclamation gives clear indication that for a period of two months it can not be questioned either by Parliament or
by courts, the fact that its continuance after two months has been subjected to Parliamentary approval gives a further
indication that it is not justiciable in court
State of Rajasthan Vs. Union of India(1977)(SC)

● In the Parliamentary elections of March 1977 the ruling Congress party

suffered a massive defeat
● Nine Congress Ruled State where Congress defeated were Bihar, U.P.,
H.P., M.P., Haryana, Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan and West Bengal
● On 17 April 1977, the Union Home Minister wrote letters to the Chief
Ministers of nine states asking them to advise their Governors to
dissolve the respective Assemblies and seek fresh mandate.
● 7 Judges Bench Case
● Court held that the defeat of the ruling party in itself, without anything
more, support the inference that the government of the state cannot be
carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution
The court rejected the contention that judicial review of Presidential proclamation was totally barred
•Bhagwati and Gupta J.J. held that, "merely because a question of political complexion, that by itself
is no ground why the court should shrink from performing its duty under the constitution if it raises
an issue of the Constitutional determination... merely because a question has a political colour, the
court cannot fold its hand in despair and declare "judicial hand off".
The court ruled, "the satisfaction of the President is subjective and cannot be tested by reference to
any objective test it can not be a fit case for judicial determination. The court cannot go into the
correctness or adequacy of the facts and the circumstances on which the satisfaction of the Central
Government is based, but if the satisfaction is malafide or is based on wholly extraneous and
irrelevant grounds, the court would have jurisdiction to examine it.”
The satisfaction of the President has to be, in the scheme of the Constitution, based on the aid and
advice of the cabinet
S.R. Bommai and Others Vs. Union of India(1990)(Karnatka)

•In state of Karnataka, the then ruling party came in minority due to defection caused by the party member
•Governor made a report to the President of India to impose the President's rule in the State
•The imposition of President's rule in Karnataka on 29 April 1989 and the dissolution of the Legislative
Assembly based on the Governor's report and on "other information" was challenged before the Karnataka
High Court.
•The Court held that the Proclamation made under Art. 356 of the Constitution is justiciable
•The Courts could look into the materials or the reasons disclosed for issuing the proclamation, to find out
whether those materials or reasons were wholly extraneous to the formation of the satisfaction and had no
rational nexus at all to the satisfaction reached under Article 356 of the Constitution
•On the essentials of the report of the Governor, the court stated that the Governor's report envisaged under
Article 356(1) has to necessarily contain the facts reflecting the situation which has arisen in the state and the
inferences drawn and conclusions reached by him on those facts.
However, Court held that Governor’s reprt was based on relevant facts and floor ttest was not
mandatory/compulory.
Sunder Lal Patwa Vs. Union of India(1993)(MP)

•After the demolition of the Babri Masjid at Ayodhya on 6th December 1992, the President rule was
imposed in U.P., M.P., H.P. and Rajasthan
•The imposition of President's Rule in M.P., H.P. and Rajasthan were challenged in the respective
High Courts
•The M.P. High court departed from the earlier decisions held that the presidential proclamation can
be challenged in court of law
•The Presidential proclamation is open to judicial review on the ground of irrationality, illegality,
impropriety or malafide or in short, on the ground of abuse of power.
•The court in the instant case pointed out that sudden outbreak of riot resulting in failure on the part
of State government to maintain public order does not justify the President's rule in the state
•The power can be used only in an extreme difficult situation viz. where there is an actual and
imminent break down of the constitutional machinery, as distinguished from failure to observe a
particular provision of the constitution or worsening of law and order situation.
S.R. Bommai Vs. Union of India(1994)(SC)

● Resulted from the Appeal of the decisions of the State High Courts.
● Nine Judges Bench Case
● On 21 April 1989, the President issued a proclamation under Article 356 dismissing the
Bommai Government
● The President issued a proclamation under Article 356(1) dismissing the government of
Meghalaya and Nagaland and dissolving the legislative Assembly
● Proclamation in MP, HP and Rajasthan of 1992 were in review before SC.
● Proclamation of Karnatka, Meghalaya and Nagaland unconstitutional.
● Proclamation of MP, HP and Rajasthan valid
● Overruled both judgments of the High Court.
•Court Observed:
● President exercises power under Art 356 on the advice of Council of Ministers.
● Whether State CM/CoM have lost majority has to be decided on the floor of the House and not
in Governor’s chamber. Karnataka HC was wrong in saying that floor test not compulsory.
● Governor should explore the possibility of installing an alternative Ministry when the erstwhile
Ministry loses control.
● Presidential proclamation dissolving a state legislative Assembly is subject to judicial review
and justiciable on the ground: whether it was issued on any material or not, whether the
material was relevant or not, whether there was malafide exercise of power, wholly based on
extraneous and irrelevant ground.
● There should be material before the President indicating that Govt could not be carried out in
accordance to the Constitution.
● Burden lies on the government of India to prove that relevant material existed (to justify the
issue of proclamation)
● If the court strikes down the proclamation it has power to restore the dismissed state
government to office.
● A state Government pursuing anti-secular politics is liable to action under Article 356
● The state assembly cannot be dissolved before parliamentary approval for the imposition of
Article 356 and the President can only suspend the assembly.
● Serious allegations of corruption against the state ministry and financial instability are not
grounds for the imposition of Article 356.
● The power under Article 356 is to be used only in case of exigencies. It is an exceptional
power.
● Art 74(2) does not bar the Court from calling upon CoM to disclose to the Court the material
upon which the President had formed the requisite satisfaction. The material on the basis of
which advice was tendered does not become part of the advice.
Rameshwar Prasad vs Union of India(2006)(SC)

•In 2005 Bihar Legislative election held. No party in Majority

•On March 23, 2005 legislative Assembly dissolved before its first meeting
•Whether the proclamation dissolving the Assembly of Bihar is illegal and unconstitutional
•The Court held that the dissolution of the State assembly and the proclamation of President’s rule
was unconstitutional and declared that it had the power to restore a dissolved assembly in an
appropriate case
Nabam Rebia v Deputy Speaker 2016

In November 2015, a constitutional crisis arose in Arunachal Pradesh when 21 Congress MLAs
rebelled against Chief Minister Nabam Tuki. On November 19th 2015, 13 members of the Assembly
—11 BJP MLAs and 2 Independent MLAs—sent a letter to the Governor to communicate their
displeasure with the Speaker and the Government. Furthermore, 21 Congress MLAs also refused to
attend party meetings citing mismanagement by the Chief Minister. They alleged that the Chief
Minister had grossly misused funds and indulged in wasteful expenditure.

The Governor acting without the advice of the Chief Minister, advanced the Assembly session from
January 14th 2016 to December 16th 2015 and listed the removal of the Speaker on the legislative
agenda. On December 15th 2015, the Speaker, Nabam Rebia, preemptively disqualified the rebel
MLAs on the grounds of defection before the Assembly could meet. On December 16th, 2015, the
resolution to remove Speaker Nabam Rebia was adopted.

Challenged before Guhwati High Court

Governor’s decision to advance the Assembly session constitutional?

could the Speaker disqualify MLAs while a motion for his removal was pending before the House?

Speaker Rebia argued that even if the Governor has discretion, it should be understood as ‘constitutional’
discretion. Whereas the Deputy Speaker submitted that the Governor’s discretion was absolute and beyond
judicial review. The Court confirmed that the Governor does not enjoy broad discretionary powers and is
always subject to constitutional standards.

The Court considered whether the Governor must exercise this power at his discretion or in consultation
with the Council of Ministers. The Court concluded that the Governor’s discretion did not extend to the
powers conferred under Article 174. Hence, he could not summon the House, determine its legislative
agenda or address the legislative assembly without consultation.

On January 6th 2016, while the matter was being argued before the Court, the Union government dismissed
the ruling State government and imposed President’s rule. For the first time in its history, the Court
effectively nullified the President’s rule and restored the previous State government with Nabam Tuki as
Chief Minister. However, Chief Minister Tuki was soon voted out of power in a floor test and the Court’s
decision was reversed through political means.