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KN-23

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Hwasong-11Ga
TypeShort-range ballistic missile
Place of originNorth Korea
Service history
Used byNorth Korea
Russia
WarsRussian invasion of Ukraine
Production history
Designed2018
ManufacturerFebruary 11 Plant
Specifications
Mass3,415 kg (7,529 lb)
Length8.7 m (29 ft) (early)
9.8 m (32 ft) (late)
Diameter1.1 m (3 ft 7 in)[1]
Warhead500 kg (1,100 lb), nuclear and conventional[2]
EngineSolid composite propellant
Operational
range
900 km (560 mi)[3]
Guidance
system
Inertial navigation system (INS), possible satellite navigation
Accuracy35 m[4]
Launch
platform
8×8 wheeled TEL
10×10 wheeled TEL
Tracked launcher
Railway car

KN-23, officially the Hwasong-11Ga 《화성-11가》형 (Hwasong-11 improved),[5][6] is the designation of a North Korean solid-fueled tactical ballistic missile.

Design

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Initial variant

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The KN-23 bears an external resemblance to the Russian Iskander-M and South Korean Hyunmoo-2B short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), being distinguished by its elongated cable raceway, different jet vane actuators and smooth base. Like the Iskander-M, it flies in a quasi-ballistic trajectory, flattening out below an altitude of about 50 km (160,000 ft) where the atmosphere is dense enough so the missile's fins can change course along its flight path.[7][8][9]

It is believed to have a range of some 450 km with a 500 kg warhead, putting all of South Korea within range. It is possible to extend the range out to 690 km with a reduced payload. The warhead can be conventional, likely unitary or submunition, or nuclear. The KN-23's active steering capability could make it accurate to within 100 meters CEP with satellite guidance, or within 200 meters using INS alone. It is launched from a wheeled transporter-erector-launcher (TEL).[7][8][9]

The KN-23 is significantly larger than the Iskander, with it using likely the same 1.1 meter diameter motor as the Pukkuksong-1. The motor is somewhat lengthened, having only one stage, compared to the Pukkuksong-1. The motor has a very different structure, compared to the Iskander. The TEL of the KN-23 has more space for the missile, as it lacks the structure immediately after the cab.[10]

The KN-23 is likely to replace older liquid-fueled North Korean SRBMs, like the Hwasong-5 and Hwasong-6. Being road-mobile and solid-fueled, it can be moved and fired more rapidly, making it more difficult for an opposing force to locate and target before firing. Once launched, the missile's low apogee, short overall flight time, and ability to conduct a terminal "pull-up" maneuver makes it harder to detect and be intercepted by traditional missile defense systems. Its increased accuracy also reduces the number of missiles that would be needed to destroy a single target.[7][8][9]

The KN-23 is likely to feature some form of foreign involvement such as parts, as when compared to the later developed KN-24, the Korean Central News Agency focuses mainly on the deployment of the missile, with little coverage on its research. While the KN-24 are called 'Juche projectiles', it is never mentioned for the KN-23. The focus on the combat-readiness of the system suggests that it had been deployed for a while but not tested, like the Hwasong-10.[11] The KN-23 still bears significant differences from the 9K720 Iskander.[12]

KN-23 warhead section has enough space for up to 1500 kilograms of high explosives compared to 700 kilograms for SCUD-B and 800 kilograms of 9K720 Iskander.[4]

Larger variant

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Artist rendition of a KN-23, larger variant

In the 14 January 2021 parade, a larger version was seen, with an estimated length of 9.8 metres and likely an extra segment in the motor. This version is also fitted to a longer TEL, with an additional two sections.[13] The nose cone is similar in shape to the KN-24.[14]

SLBM variant

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On 19 October 2021, a KN-23-type missile was launched from a submerged Sinpo-class submarine as a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). The missile reportedly traveled 590 km (370 mi) and reached an altitude of 60 km. In order to launch underwater, it was fitted with a gas generator to cold launch out of the submarine's missile tube into the air, before the main motor ignites. Compared to previous North Korean SLBMs like the Pukkuksong-1 and its larger derivatives, the type retains the KN-23's depressed trajectory and manoeuvring flight characteristics to try to evade missile defences.[15][16]

Since it is based on a missile with a shorter range than the Pukkuksong-series, the submarine would need to get closer to its target in order to launch, leaving it more vulnerable to detection and destruction before it can fire. The development of the KN-23 as an SLBM may be more of a political statement than an effort to create a viable weapon, as the test occurred weeks after South Korea tested their own Hyunmoo 4-4 SLBM, both of which are derived from the same Iskander design base.[17][18] On May 7, 2022, another suspected KN-23 type SLBM was test-fired. The missile flew 600 km and attained a apogee of 60 km.[19]

On 25 September 2022, a KN-23 was launched from an underwater silo, under an inland reservoir. Photos showed it launching out of an inland body of water, similar to previous submarine launches. It is likely the missile was fired from a submersible barge containing launch silos. It is unknown whether such a system will be pursued as a serious launch method, or if it was a demonstration of another capability to deter South Korean preemption strategies by adding another potential deployment method.[20]

Smaller variant

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On 16 April 2022, a new SRBM version was tested. It appeared to be a smaller iteration of the KN-23, fired from a wheeled vehicle, mounting four rectangular launch canisters. Two projectiles were fired to an altitude of about 25 km, a range of about 110 km (68 mi), and at a top speed of around Mach 4.0. The missile has similar range compared to the KN-02, and could be a counterpart to the South Korean KTSSM. The launches were accompanied with a statement, associating them with the development of tactical nuclear weapons. If equipped with smaller and lighter tactical nuclear warheads and retaining the KN-23's maneuverability, the missiles could have better survivability against missile defenses, to greater threaten short-range targets.[21] On 17th of May in 2024, North Korea tested Hwasong-11D at range of 300km.[22]

Hwasong-11Da-4.5

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On 19 September 2024, the Hwasong-11Da-4.5 so called for its 4.5 ton warhead, was announced officially by the KCNA. [23][24] Prior to its announcement, the variant was tested in 1 July 2024 with a range of 250 km, but since then, the Missile Administration claimed an official range of 320 km.[24]

According to South Korean military officials, the 1 July launch consisted of two missiles, one travelling 120 km before subsequently exploding in failure, and the other with a range of 600 km.[25]

History

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North Korea first displayed the KN-23 publicly in a military parade on 8 February 2018. The first flight test was on 4 May 2019 near Wonsan, reaching an apogee of 60 km and a range of 240 km (150 mi). The footage was apparently manipulated, and the missiles were probably fired from two different vehicles.[10] Five days later, two more missiles were fired from Kusong. One had a range of 420 km (260 mi) and the other had 270 km (170 mi), both with a 50 km apogee.[7][8]

On 17 May, United States Forces Korea designated the weapon as the KN-23. A third flight test was conducted on 25 July 2019, with two missiles again reaching 50 km in altitude, but demonstrating greater ranges of 430 km (270 mi) and 690 km, before landing in the Sea of Japan. A fourth flight test on 6 August 2019 launched two missiles from North Korea's west coast, overflying the North Korean capital region at an apogee of 37 km out to 450 km.[7][8]

North Korea stated the test of two road-mobile KN-23s on 27 January 2022 was to confirm the power of an air burst conventional warhead. The launch was on a depressed trajectory of 20 km apogee, previously 37-60 km, while traveling 190 km (120 mi), showing that the missile can fly at a lower altitude over short ranges, which would reduce reaction time for missile defenses. Taken together, this suggests that the KN-23 is operational.[26]

Larger variant

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On 25 March 2021, two of the larger missiles were first launched, a variant of the KN-23, that are longer, with a more conical nose. North Korea claimed that the new version flew 600 km (370 mi) and is equipped with a 2,500 kg (5,500 lb) warhead, although South Korean and Japanese analysis initially said they only flew 420-450 km while reaching an altitude of 60 km, and such a large warhead weight is almost certainly exaggerated.[27] It's possible that such a large payload claim could be propaganda, intended to give the impression that North Korea is keeping pace with their adversary's missile advancements, as the South Korean Hyunmoo-4 has a 2,000 kg (4,400 lb) warhead and the larger KN-23 version was proclaimed to have "the world's largest warhead weight."[28]

The next month South Korean Defence Minister Suh Wook revealed they had revised their estimate and agreed with the North Korean statement of a 600 km range, saying the discrepancy resulted from blind spots in radar coverage due to the Earth’s curvature.[29] The new weapon would be able to almost completely cover South Korea from its launch site. If it can perform as claimed by North Korea, the weapon would be a powerful bunker buster weapon.[14] UN Security Council members states suspect the claim of a mass of 2.5 tons may refer to the entire weight of the missile after burnout, rather than just the warhead weight.[30]

Continued testing resulted in a 4.5 ton variant in July 2024, which was then subsequently announced by KCNA on 19 September 2024.[23][24]

Rail launched missile

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On 15 September 2021, two missiles were fired from Yangdok that traveled 800 km (500 mi), to a maximum altitude of 60 km. They appeared to be baseline KN-23 versions. They flew much further than any previous flight of the weapon, and went an even greater distance than the larger variant tested earlier in 2021. Such excess range could indicate it hadn't previously been tested out to its maximum range, or that the design underwent modifications such as a reduced payload or flight profile improvements. The launches were made from a modified railway car rather than the typical road-mobile launcher. The launch railcar used two side-by-side erector/launcher mechanisms like the side-by-side arrangement used in the TEL.[31][32]

The use of a rail-mobile system is unusual for an SRBM, as road-mobile launchers are easier for deploying and hiding relatively small missiles, while railway missiles are restricted to the rail network. Adding railway launchers may be an effort to further increase and diversify the country's SRBM missile force, since modifying existing railcars to fire missiles could be a way to supplement a limited number of launch trucks, or possibly to test the concept before applying it to intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). A rail-borne ICBM would have advantages over one carried by a wheeled TEL, as such large liquid-fueled missiles carried in railway cars would be able to move more places and be kept in a higher readiness state.[33][34]

On 14 January 2022, North Korea again tested railway launched KN-23. Two missiles fired from Uiju and traveled 430 km (270 mi). On 15 January, KCNA released photos of the missile launching test.[35]

Combat use

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The KN-23 was highly likely first used in combat during the Russian invasion of Ukraine. An unknown number of North Korean ballistic missiles were transferred to Russia in October 2023, according to declassified US intelligence. Based on debris left by Russian attacks on Ukrainian targets on 30 December 2023, the ring housing the control vanes have been identified as being characteristic to the KN-23 and KN-24 missiles.[36][37] The barometer on the missile was found to have a Hangul character, and various parts of the missile were stamped with the possible factory name.[1]

According to the Conflict Armament Research, 75% of components in the guidance control system for the KN-23 fired at Kharkiv are based on American parts.[38] They also indicated that some of the missiles were newly produced.[39]

During the Kharkiv strikes of 2 January 2024, Ukrainian authorities noted that the missiles used were of North Korean origin, noting that the shape and design were different than that of Iskander missiles. On 29 April 2024, the UNSC confirmed that the munitions used during the strike were that of KN-23s.[40][41]

On 7 May 2024, Ukrainian sources reported that the KN-23s have a high failure rate. According to these officials, half of the North Korean missiles lost their programmed trajectories and exploded in the air.[42]

Variants

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  • Hwasong-11Ga/Hwasong-11A - Base type, similar in appearance to the Iskander missile.[43]
  • Hwasong-11Da/Hwasong-11C - Larger version, claimed to have a 2.5 ton warhead.[43]
  • Hwasong-11Ra/Hwasong-11D - Smaller version, has reduced range.[43]
  • Hwasong-11Siǔt/Hwasong-11S(화성-11ㅅ) - Underwater-launched version of the Hwasong-11A.[43]

References

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  1. ^ a b "Documenting a North Korean missile in Ukraine". ArcGIS StoryMaps. Conflict Armament Research. 2024-01-19. Retrieved 2024-01-21.
  2. ^ "Report to Congress on North Korea's Nuclear Weapons and Missile Programs". USNI News. U.S. Naval Institute. 26 January 2023.
  3. ^ "【お知らせ：北朝鮮のミサイル等関連情報】".
  4. ^ a b Delory, Stéphane; Bondaz, Antoine; Maire, Christian (2023). "North Korean Short Range Systems: Military consequences of the development of the KN-23, KN-24 and KN-25" (PDF). Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique. Archived (PDF) from the original on 16 January 2023. Retrieved 27 December 2024.
  5. ^ Zwirko, Colin (2023-07-26). "Twitter1". Twitter.
  6. ^ Lewis, Jeffery. "Twitter2". Twitter. Retrieved 2023-04-09.
  7. ^ a b c d e KN-23. Missile Threat, Center for Strategic and International Studies.
  8. ^ a b c d e KN-23. Missile Defense Advocacy.
  9. ^ a b c North Korea’s New Short-Range Missiles: A Technical Evaluation. 38 North. 9 October 2019.
  10. ^ a b "Pukguksong GLBM-2 and GLBM-3". www.b14643.de. Retrieved 2021-10-25.
  11. ^ "A Tale of Two Missiles: Analysis of KCNA Reports on North Korea's KN-23 and KN-24 Short-Range Ballistic Missiles". datayo.org. Archived from the original on 2021-01-15. Retrieved 2021-10-13.
  12. ^ "Preliminary Analysis: KN-23 SRBM". James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. 2019-06-05. Retrieved 2021-10-13.
  13. ^ "Pukguksong GLBM-3". www.b14643.de. Retrieved 2021-10-25.
  14. ^ a b "ONN Korean Peninsula Risk Assessment | March 2021". oneearthfuture.org. Archived from the original on 2022-01-30. Retrieved 2021-10-25.
  15. ^ North Korea’s “New Type Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile”: More Political Than Military Significance. 38 North. 22 October 2021.
  16. ^ Brief on the 19 October 2021 Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile Test of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea[permanent dead link‍]. One Earth Future. 20 October 2021.
  17. ^ North Korea’s “New Type Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile”: More Political Than Military Significance. 38 North. 22 October 2021.
  18. ^ Brief on the 19 October 2021 Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile Test of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea[permanent dead link‍]. One Earth Future. 20 October 2021.
  19. ^ North Korea fires apparent submarine-launched ballistic missile. Kyodo News. 7 May 2022.
  20. ^ “A Strong Military Warning:” Four Key Implications of North Korea’s October 10 Missile Statement. 38 North. 14 October 2022.
  21. ^ North Korea’s New Short-Range Ballistic Missile. 38 North. 25 April 2022.
  22. ^ "North Korea Launches Ballistic Missile Following U.S. Air Force Drills". 22 May 2024.
  23. ^ a b "Newstream". KCNA Watch. Retrieved 2024-09-20.
  24. ^ a b c Reddy, Shreyas (2024-09-19). "North Korea tests 'explosive power' of new ballistic missile | NK News". NK News - North Korea News. Retrieved 2024-09-20.
  25. ^ Daily, The Chosun (2024-07-02). "N. Korea tests new ballistic missile with super-large 4.5-ton warhead". The Chosun Daily. Retrieved 2024-09-20.
  26. ^ Vann H. Van Diepen (31 January 2022). "North Korea's Fifth and Sixth Rounds of January Missile Launches". 38 North. The Henry L. Stimson Center. Retrieved 31 January 2022.
  27. ^ Initial Analysis of North Korea’s March 25 SRBM Launches. 38 North. 30 March 2021.
  28. ^ Missile Deployments on the Korean Peninsula: An Accelerating Arms Race. 38 North. 7 May 2021.
  29. ^ "Seoul says North Korean SRBMs test-launched on 25 March travelled 600 km". Jane's Information Group. 29 April 2021. Archived from the original on 2 May 2021. Retrieved 2 May 2021.
  30. ^ DPRK Military Parade Viewbook 2022. Open Nuclear Network. 21 April 2022.
  31. ^ It’s the Launcher, Not the Missile: Initial Evaluation of North Korea’s Rail-Mobile Missile Launches. 38 North. 17 September 2021.
  32. ^ The First DPRK Missile Launch from a Rail-Mobile Launcher Archived 2022-01-30 at the Wayback Machine. One Earth Future. 17 September 2021.
  33. ^ It’s the Launcher, Not the Missile: Initial Evaluation of North Korea’s Rail-Mobile Missile Launches. 38 North. 17 September 2021.
  34. ^ The First DPRK Missile Launch from a Rail-Mobile Launcher Archived 2022-01-30 at the Wayback Machine. One Earth Future. 17 September 2021.
  35. ^ Shin, Hyonhee. "North Korea tests railway-borne missile in latest launch amid rising tension with U.S." Reuters.
  36. ^ "White House says Russia used missiles from North Korea to strike Ukraine". Retrieved 5 January 2024.
  37. ^ US DoD accuses Russia firing North Korean KN-23 ballistic missiles against Ukraine. Army Recognition. 5 January 2024.
  38. ^ "North Korea used US parts in ballistic missile Russia fired at Ukraine: Report". NK News. 21 February 2024. Archived from the original on 2024-02-22.
  39. ^ "Newly made North Korean missile used in Russian strike on Ukraine: Re…".
  40. ^ "Ukraine shows evidence Russia fired North Korea missile at Kharkiv". Reuters. 6 January 2024. Retrieved 1 May 2024.
  41. ^ Nichols, Michelle (29 April 2024). "Exclusive: UN experts say North Korea missile landed in Ukraine's Kharkiv". Reuters. Retrieved 1 May 2024.
  42. ^ "Exclusive: Ukraine examines N.Korean missile debris amid fears of Moscow-Pyongyang axis". Reuters. 7 May 2024. Retrieved 7 May 2024.
  43. ^ a b c d Brief on 27 July 2023 Parade of the DPRK. Open Nuclear Network. 8 August 2023.
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