User:Mjroots/sandbox

I've decided to create a sandbox to work on new articles in peace (hopefully!), rather than having to use the "in use" and "under construction" templates on articles I'm working on. My sandbox can best be thought of as a kind of "junk shed-cum-workshop" where all kinds of stuff is thrown in. Some of it is being worked on, some of it is now redundant, some of it may come in useful someday. Please leave any comments about the content of this sandbox on my talk page.

Subpages

• User:Mjroots/New Belgica (barque)
• User:Mjroots/List of airports in Kent
• User:Mjroots/First flight across the English Channel

New misc article

Huddersfield Corporation Tramways was the operator of a tramway system in Huddersfield, West Yorkshire, United Kingdom. The first line opened in 1882 using horse-drawn tramcars. In 1883, the first steam powered trams started operation. The horse-drawn tram service ended in 1888. In 1901, the first electric tramcars entered service. The steam trams ended in 1902. In 1933, trolleybuses replaced trams on one route, and one by one the other routes were converted until the last trams in Huddersfield ran on 29 June 1940.

Beginnings

In 1877, the London Tramways and General Works Company introduced a bill into Parliament for the construction of tramways within the Borough of Huddersfield. Huddersfield Corporation was asked for their consent, which was withheld as the Corporation wished to retain control of the roads in their area. The bill was nethertheless presented before Parliament, and was defeated when Huddersfield Corporation opposed it. In 1879, the Corporation presented its own bill before Parliament, which passed in 1880. Eleven lines were authorised, these lines originated in central Huddersfield and terminated in Leeds Road North, Bradford Road North, Meltham Road, Buxton Road, Marsden Road, Manchester Road, John William Street, Westgate, Wakefield Road, Newsome and Almondbury respectively.

In 1881, construction of the lines began. The lines were laid to 55.75 using 49 pounds per yard (24 kg/m) rails. This gauge was chosen in order to enable standard gauge railway wagons to run on the tramrails. The only other systems in the United Kingdom to use this gauge were Glasgow Corporation Tramways and Portsmouth Corporation Transport and its sucessor the Portsdown and Horndean Light Railway. The Corporation tried to find a lessee to operate the system without success. Nottingham Tramways Company offered to work the Lockwood to Fartown route, but were not interested in working the other routes. The Corporation therefore decided to operate the system themselves, and therefore they applied for powers to do this under the Huddersfield Improvement Act, 1882. The Board of Trade granted a licence to the Corporation, to be renewed annually with the Board having the power to revoke the licence if a company made a satisfactory offer to work the system. Thus Huddersfield Corporation became the first municipal tramway operator in the United Kingdom.

Tramcars

Steam tram locomotive

Huddersfield Corporation operated the following steam powered tram locomotives. They were used to haul trailer tramcars.

Number	Builder	Notes	History	Photo
1	William Wilkinson, Wigan	Driving wheels 27.5 inches (700 mm) diameter, wheelbase 5.8 inches (0.15 m). Single cylinder 7.24 inches (184 mm) bore by 11 inches (280 mm) stroke.

Steam-hauled trailers

These trailers were hauled by the steam tram locomotives.

Number	Builder	Notes	History	Photo
1	Ashbury Railway Carriage and Iron Company Ltd, Manchester.	This was a single-ended four-wheeled double deck vehicle. It was equipped with Eade's Patent Reverser. Seated 38 people.

References

{{Reflist}}

Sources

• Brook, Roy (1972). The Tramways of Huddersfield. Huddersfield: Roy Brook. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)

Category:Huddersfield Category:Tram Transport in the United Kingdom

New misc article 2

1996 Dutch Dakota disaster

A Dakota of the Dutch Dakota Association
Accident
Date	25 September 1996
Summary	Engine failure
Site	Off Texel, the Netherlands
Aircraft
Aircraft type	Douglas DC-3
Operator	Dutch Dakota Association
Registration	PH-DDA
Flight origin	Texel International Airport, Den Burg
Destination	Schiphol Airport, Amsterdam
Passengers	26
Crew	6
Fatalities	32 (all)
Survivors	0

The 1996 Dutch Dakota disaster was the ditching of a Douglas DC-3C on 26 September 1996 with the loss of all 32 people on board. The historic aircraft, registered as PH-DDA, was owned and operated by the Dutch Dakota Association (DDA).

Aircraft

The aircraft involved in the accident was Douglas DC-3C, construction number 19109. The aircraft had been built as a C-47A-70-DL in 1943. It served with the United States Army Air Force with serial number 42-100646. The aircraft participated in Operation Market Garden, carrying Lieutenant Richard Winters and Easy Company, 506th Infantry Regiment, 101st Airborne Division, United States Army. It was converted to DC-3C standard after the war. In 1946, the aircraft was sold to Aero O/Y and registered as OH-LCB. Aero O/Y became Finnair in 1953. In 1963, OH-LCB was sold to the Finnish Air Force and served with them for twenty years as DO-7.

The aircraft was sold to the DDA in 1984 and registered PH-DDA. A reduced maximum take off weight (MTOW) of 11,895 kilograms (26,224 lb) and maximum landing weight of 11,794 kilograms (26,001 lb) was imposed due to the age of the engines and poor single engine flight characteristics. PH-DDA had flown for a total of 38,388 hours at the time of the accident.

Day of the accident

Penultimate flight

PH-DDA took off from Schiphol Airport, Amsterdam on the morning of 25 September 1996 for a sightseeing flight to Texel. The occupants of the aircraft were the Captain and First Officer, two Technical Observers, two Flight Attendants and 26 passengers. Departure from Schiphol was under Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) due to diminished visibility. During the flight the visibility improved sufficiently to enable continuation under Visual Flight Rules (VFR).

On approach to Texel International Airport, the pilot initiated a go-around due to poor visibilty. The aircraft landed without incident on runway 22 at 10:54 hrs after a second approach. The passengers then spent some time cycling on Texel while the six crew remained with the aircraft. During this time they had a hot meal.

Crash flight

PH-DDA took off from runway 04 at 16:38, for the return flight to Schiphol Airport. Witnesses reported that the take-off was normal. The aircraft was squawking code 0060. As the aircraft flew over the east coast of Texel, a witness observed a flash of flame from the underside of the port engine. Another witness said that the engine was making "a shrieking noise".

Five minutes into the flight, the pilots reported to Texel that they had a problem with one of the engines. Texel advised the pilots to contact the Dutch Naval Air Station at De Kooy. At 14:34:33, PH-DDA became visible on De Kooy's Secondary Surveillance Radar. It was then at an altitude of 800 feet (240 m) and on a heading of 155° gradually turning right until it was on a heading of 175°. At 14:34:32 the crew made contact with De Kooy. They were then at 600 feet (180 m) and requested an emergency landing at De Kooy. The aircraft then turned left to a heading of 110°. The pilot reported that the left engine had been feathered and that the aircraft was at a height of 700 feet (210 m). De Kooy Approach instructed the crew to squawk 4321, passed the QNH and informed them that runway 22 was in use. No response was received from the pilots. The aircraft was turned to a heading of 220° and height decreased to 500 feet (150 m). The airspeed decreased during this time.

At 14:36:52 the pilot confirmed that he was squawking 4321 and asked for a heading. De Kooy Approach requested the aircraft's position and the pilot responded that he was 11 nautical miles (20 km) north east of De Kooy. De Kooy Approach gave them a heading of 240° but the aircraft turned left onto a heading of 180°. The last transmission received from the crew was confirming the heading of 240°.

At 14:37:28 the aircraft turned left, with the rate of turn increasing. The last radar return was received at 14:37:27 and showed the aircraft at a height of 200 feet (61 m). When there was no response to attempts to contact the aircraft, an emergency was declared by De Kooy Approach. At 14:38:08, De Kooy Approach informed the pilot of a KLM ERA helicopter inbound to De Kooy of the incident. That pilot located the wreckage of PH-DDA seven minutes later. The Dakota crashed onto a mudflat between the Afsluitdijk and the island of Texel, some 8 kilometres (5.0 mi) from Den Oever. The water was 1.2 metres (4 ft) deep at the time. A Dutch Navy helicopter was sent to the scene, and airlifted one severely injured passenger to hospital. The rescuee died later that evening. All others on board were presumed to have been killed in the crash.

Investigation

An investigation into the accident was carried out by the Onderzoeksraad Voor Veiligheid (OVV). For the flight, the weight of all on board was estimated at 73 kilograms (161 lb) each. The calculation omitted the Technical Observer, spares and tools carried on board the aircraft. The declared take-off weight was 11,454 kilograms (25,252 lb), within the permitted limits. However, guidelines for General Aviation stated that the flight crew were to be assumed to weigh 82 kilograms (181 lb) each, cabin crew 72 kilograms (159 lb) each, male passengers 83 kilograms (183 lb) each and female passengers 68 kilograms (150 lb) each. Taking into account the tools and spares this would have given a take-off weight of 11,856 kilograms (26,138 lb), which was in excess of the permitted MTOW. The actual take-off weight, using the actual weights of the passengers and crew was 12,155 kilograms (26,797 lb) after fuel burn during taxiing had been allowed for.

PH-DDA was powered by two Pratt & Whitney R-1830-92 engines. The port engine had accumulated a total of 3,940 hours and 1,146 hours since last overhaul. The maximum permitted time before overhaul was 1,500 hours. Each engine drove a Hamilton Standard 23E50-474 3-bladed constant speed propellor. The blades of the propellor had a pitch range of 16° to 88°. The pitch angle of the blade was controlled by the propellor governor, which is driven by the engine. The hydraulic feathering mechanism was powered by an electrically driven oil pump. In the event of an engine shutdown in flight the propellor needs to be feathered in order to prevent the engine windmilling and to reduce drag.

The feathering mechanism for the propellors can be tested in a number of ways. Three of methods are carried out with the engine running. Two of these three methods were periodically carried out by the DDA. A fourth method is carried out without the engine running. This check should be performed at a maximum interval of 30 days. The DDA did not perform this procedure.

The DDA had a policy of using full power on the engines for the first take-off off the day, and a reduced power setting for each subsequent take-off. This was contrary to two Engine Operation Information Letters issued by Pratt & Whitney on 15 January 1951 and on 23 January 1952. The practice of simulated engine failures during training flights also increased the risk of a bearing failure. The port engine had suffered a failure of the No. 11 cylinder in June 1995. Repairs included the replacement of the master piston rod bearings.

The weather at the time of the accident was generally good, with local haze. PH-DDA had crashed onto a sandbank which was dry at low tide and under 1.5 metres (4 ft 11 in) of water at high tide. The aircraft had been severely damaged in the accident, with crushing in a vertical direction. The engines had broken off and the wings and tail were almost broken off. The wreckage was salvaged and removed to the Dutch Navy base at Den Helder. Photographs and video of the recovery operation were made.

The fuselage had been subjected to vertical compression forces, destroying it apart from the roof structure which was intact. The seats had failed under severe downward loading. The cockpit had also been destroyed, with only the floor remaining relatively intact. The tail section had suffered less damage than the forward section. The port wing had suffered severe damage in a rearward and upwards direction, the damage being less at the tip than the root. The port engine had detached in an outwards and downwards direction. The starboard wing was relatively undamaged, apart from a dent and slashes where the starboard engine had broke free. Both main fuel tanks, located in the centre of the wing, had burst open. The starboard auxiliary fuel tank was intact.

It was deduced from the wreckage that the aircraft was intact at the time of the accident. It hit the water with a low forward speed and a high vertical speed. The starboard engine was operating and the port engine was stopped. There was no evidence of any failure in the control surfaces or the connections from the cockpit to them.

Inspection of the port engine revealed that the front bearing had failed. Inspection of the propellor showed that the blades were at an angle of between 50° and 60°. Fully feathered it would have been at an angle of 88°. The propellor was not turning at the time of the accident. The feathering mechanism for the port engine showed no evidence of malfunction.

To assess the flying characterstics of the aircraft, a number of test flights were made by a DC-3 of Air Atlantique where the port engine was shut down in flight. Analysis of radio transmissions during the test flights was carried out by the Air Accident Investigation Branch. Through these it was established that after the port engine had been shut down on PH-DDA, it was flying with the starboard engine at a Maximum Except Take-Off (METO) power setting. It was calculated that the V_MC with an unfeathered propellor would be in the region of 92 knots (170 km/h). Flight below this speed would lead to an increased likelihood of difficulty in controlling the aircraft. With a fully feathered propellor, PH-DDA should have been able to climb in single engine flight with the live engine operating at METO power. With the propellor unfeathered, level flight would not have been sustainable at METO power on the live engine..

In modern airliners, training for dealing with engine failures is done in a flight simulator or during training flights in an aircraft. There were no flight simulators available for the DC-3, so all training had to be done in the air. During training flights, the engine that is simulated to have failed was not shut down, nor was the propellor feathered. Engine re-starts in flight were not practiced. During an emergency, one pilot will fly the plane (the PF) and the other will troubleshoot the situation and carry out the requisite drill with the aid of the relevant checklist (the PNF). If a mayday was declared, standing instructions are to squawk 7700 and inform Air Traffic Control as soon a possible of the nature of the emergency. The PF is responsible for the operation of the aircraft and any decision to divert to an alternate landing place.

Maintenance

PH-DDA was maintained by the Dutch Dakota Association. For commercial aircraft weighing more than 5,700 kilograms (5.6 long tons) the standard applied is known as JAR145. Because PH-DDA was operated by a charitale foundation, it was classed as a non-commercial aircraft and the standard it was operated under was RTL 2093b. The formal permission for the maintenance regime was overseen by the Rijksluchtvaartdienst (RLD). The aircraft was to be maintained according to the most recent standards applicable if the aircraft was in commercial service. The RLD had the authority to impose further conditons on the maintenance and operation of the aircraft, such as specifying that certain spare parts or equipment should be carried on the aircraft.

The DDA believed that its maintenance programme was being agreed by the RLD. The RLD carried out spot checks on the DDAs aircraft and the DDA regularly renewed the Certificate of Airworthiness of its aircraft. In 1977, Hamilton Standard issued a Service Bulletin (SB) , SB657. This was issued because it had been found that a build-up of corrosion on the contacts of the pressure cut-out switch could render the switch inoperative and therefore lead to the propellor becoming unfeathered. The operation of the pressure cut-out switch was to be checked at intervals not exceeding 30 days.

At that time, the RLDs policy was not to make the implemation of such SBs compulsory. In January 1988, the policy was changed to incorporate the implementation of all such SBs into maintenance schedules. The policy was changed again in July 1990 so that such Service Bulletins were only to be incorporated into maintenance schedules if the aircraft's type certificate holder (at that time McDonnell Douglas as successor to the Douglas Aircraft Company) recommended that the SB should be applied.

At the time the SB was issued in 1977, there were no aircraft on the Dutch civil aviation register and it was assumet that the RLD were therefore unaware of Hamilton Standard SB657. It is the aircraft's maintenance organisation which is responsible for the implementation of SBs. When the DDA was formed in 1984, the maintenance regime was created with assistance from McDonnell Douglas. Hamilton Standard SB657 had not been adopted by McDonnell Douglas and the RLD was unaware of its existence. Within the DDA, the existence of Hamilton Standard SB657 was known. It was considered within the DDA that the SB only applied to commercial aircraft and also that is did not apply to PH-DDA because a different type of oil was used in their propellor feathering mechanism. This meant that the operation of the pressure cut-out switch was checked three times in the period March 1996 to September 1996 instead of the seven time it would have been checked if Hamilton Standard SB657 had been incorporated into the maintenance regime.

Air Atlantique, a commercial operator of nine DC-3s in the United Kingdom implemented Hamilton Standard SB657 in their maintenance regime. The main problems found were stuck pistons due to sludge build-up and a larger number of short circuits due to chafed wiring. It was found that a change of oil type had led to a reduction in the number of stuck pistons.

Failure of the engine

The investigation found that the engine failed due to the failure of the front master piston rod bearing. The cause of the failure was not established but it was found that the oil supply line had not become blocked. No evidence of engine damage due to detonation was found. Although it was considered that the engine may have overspeeded during the go-around at Texel during the penultimate flight, no evidence of damage consistent with an overspeed was found. There was no evidence of engine damage due to either overboosting or underboosting. It was noted that front master piston rod bearing had been known to fail in a short time with no previous indications of damage.

Failure of the feathering mechanism

When the wreckage of the aircraft was recovered, it was found that the propellor on the port engine was unfeathered. There was evidence that the propellor had been cycled from feathered to fine pitch and back a number of times. It was determined that a crewmember had operated the feathering button several times during the flight. The investigation determined that there were two failure modes which would lead to a multiple number of feathering cycles. Firstly when the pressure cut-out switch failed to switch off the electrical current as it was designed to do, and secondly due to a short circuit in the wiring associated with the pressure cut-out switch. The investigation ruled out the second mode in the case of PH-DDA and concluded that a stuck piston in the pressure cut-out switch was the cause of the failure. The investigation also found that the failure of the piston in the pressure cut-out switch was an isolated one. The implementation of SB657 may have lead to the discovery of the malfunction of the pressure cut-out switch but the investigation found no grounds to mandate the implementation of SB657.

Investigation findings

The investigation found that had the propellor feathered correctly, the aircraft would have been able to maintain flight and make a successful emergency landing at De Kooy. The flight instrument were not arranged in the optimum way, with the result that easy interpretation of the information presented was unachievable. The flight crew were used to instruments being arranged in the optimum layout. The flight crew were placed under a high workload during the emergency and may have been overwhelmed by the situation. Although the DDA had stated that one of the pilots would be under the age of 60, both pilots operating this flight were over the age of 60. Neither had undergone any training for emergency situations in a simulator because there was no DC-3 simulator in existence to train on. Neither pilot had practiced asymmetric stalls in the DC-3 in flight, their knowledge being theory based. Such practical training was not a requirement of the RLD.

It was found that the accident was not survivable due to the high rate of descent with low forward velocity that the aircraft impacted the water in the Wadden Sea. Although Air-Sea Rescue actions would have made no difference in this case, the actions of the Air-Sea Rescue services were reviewed by the Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties (English: Ministry of Internal Affairs). No "Mayday" or "PAN" call was made, although the flight crew notified air traffic control of their intention to make an emergency landing at De Kooy.

The RLDs supervision of the operation of the aircraft by the DDA was investigated. It was found that apart from the lower MTOW imposed, the aircraft was generally operated under rules applicable to general aviation and not those of commercial aircraft. In 1991 the DDA agreed to impose more stringent regulations in respect of pilots and cabin crew. A requirement was also made that passengers were to be informed of the lower airworthiness of the aircraft by a note on tickets issued for flights. It was concluded that because the DDA was not required to have an Air Operator's Certificate that safety standards had been eroded.

Similar accidents

• On 24 April 1994, DC-3 VH-EDC of Southern Pacific Airmotive had an engine malfunction shortly after take-off from Kingsford-Smith Airport, Sydney, Australia on a charter flight to Norfolk Island. The engine was feathered but airspeed decayed an it was found to be impossible to maintain height. A successful ditching was carried out into Botany Bay. All four crew and 21 passengers safely evacuated the aircraft. The investigation revealed that the propellor was not fully feathered.

• On 19 August 1995, DC-3 C-GZOF of Air North on a ferry flight from Vancouver International Airport to Prince Rupert Airport had a propellor overspeed. An emergency shutdown was initiated but the feather did not completely feather. The increased drag meant that flight could not be sustained. The aircraft crashed by the Fraser River killing one of the three people on board.

References

{{reflist}}

Further reading

• [1] Flight International, 21-28 December 1985 p.43
• "DC-3 Crash" Flight International, 2-8 October 1996 p.11
• "Movie Stars" - says PH-DDA appears in the film A Bridge Too Far
• "DC-3 50th Anniversary - Europe" reprinted from Propliner Aviation Magazine No. 23
• Netherlands Aviation Safety Board [http://www.nlr-atsi.nl/downloads/Douglas_96-71_A-16.pdf

Final Report] 96-71/A-16, December 1997 (in English)

Category:Aviation accidents and incidents in 1996 Category:Aviation accidents and incidents in the Netherlands Category:Accidents and incidents involving the Douglas DC-3 Category:1996 in the Netherlands Category:Texel nl:Dakotaramp

New misc article 3

De Dion-Bouton was a major French manufacturer of railbuses.

Railcars

Type NJ

Three 1935-built type NJ railbuses were transferred from the Valmondois - Marines line in the Île-de-France to the RB in October 1951. They were numbered M1-M3. They were 8.48 metres (27 ft 10 in) long, and seated 32, including five in tip-up seats. Power was from a 85 horsepower (63 kW) 6-cylinder Unic M20 diesel engine. In 1953, M3 was withdrawn from service. Its engine was used in a former Billard type 150 railbus which had been downgraded to a trailer. The former R9 then regained it original number X153. M1 and M2 were scrapped in 1957, their engines being retained as spares sources.

Type NR

The type NR railbus was built in 1936 for service on the metre gauge Réseau Breton. As built, it was 14.85 metres (48 ft 9 in) long, powered by a 150 horsepower (110 kW) CLM 6DV85 two-stroke diesel engine. The railbus seated 42. There were 34 fixed seats and eight tip-up seats. Numbered M1 on the RB, the railbus was rebuilt in 1938. It was fitted with an 180 horsepower (130 kW) Willème F8M 517 diesel engine. The engine was a licence-built copy of a Deutz. The rebuild meant major alterations to the chassis and bodywork, with the railbus being lengthened to 15.15 metres (49 ft 8 in). It now seated 47, with 40 fixed seats and 7 tip-up seats. In March 1940, the railbus was transferred to the Chemins de fer départementaux de la Somme, where it was renumbered M21. The railbus is preserved on the Chemin de Fer de la Baie de Somme.

Type JM4

Type JM4 as preserved of the Chemin de Fer des Côtes-du-Nord

Type OC1

Type OC1 (left) and OC2 (centre) railbuses

The type OC1 railbus was a development of the type NR. Two were delivered to the Chemin de Fer des Côtes-du-Nord in 1939. When that line closed in 1956, the were tranferred to the RB where they were numberex X157 and X158. both were rebuilt in 1963-64. They were 18.53 metres (60 ft 10 in) long. Power was a 180 horsepower (130 kW) Willème F8M 517 diesel engine. X157 is was sold to, and is preserved on, the CFBS. X158 was sold to the Chemins de fer de Corse and is now preserved at Langueux, Côtes-d'Armor.

Type OC2

X202 as preserved on the Chemin de Fer des Côtes-du-Nord

Six type OC2 railbuses were ordered by the RB in 1939. Owing to the war, they were not delivered until 1946. The vehicles were 19.12 metres (62 ft 9 in) long. They seated 59, including eight in tip-up seats. Power was a 180 horsepower (130 kW) Willème F8M 517 diesel engine. The railbuses were numberex X201-X206. When the RB closed in 1967, they were transferred to the Chemin de Fer du Blanc-Argent where X202 and X205 entered service. The other four railbuses were cannibalized to provide spares. X202 has been preserved by the Chemin de Fer des Côtes-du-Nord. X205 remains on the Blanc-Argent.

Hotels and Public houses in Hadlow

Hadlow has had a number of public houses and hotels over the years.

The Albion / Fiddling Monkey / Two Brewers

The Broom

The Brown Jug

The Castle Arms

The Fountain

The Golden Eagle

The Greyhound Hotel

The Harrow

The King's Head

Leavers Manor Hotel

The Oaks

The Prince of Wales

The Rose / Rose & Crown / Rose Revived / Hadlow Bar and Grill, Ashes Lane

The Rose & Crown, Carpenters Lane

The Three Squirrels

New list

The Little Ships of Dunkirk comprise over 100 merchant vessels, pleasure craft and yachts that took part in the Dunkirk evacuation.

Little ships

The following ships were involved in the evacuation of British and French troops from Dunkirk.

Name	Built	Vessel type	Notes
Abdy Beauclerk	1931	Lifeboat	Served at the Aldeburgh lifeboat during the Second World War. On station at Dunkirk from 31 May to 4 June, ferrying evacuees from the beaches to larger ships offshore. Sold out of RNLI servic in 1959. Purchased by Cork Harbour Commisioners and renamed St Ita.
Aberdonia	1935	Motor yacht	Built as a pleasure cruiser for use on the River Thames, made four return trip to Dunkirk. Later requisioned as a tender to HMS Fervant and renamed Navigator. Hit by a crashing German aircraft and damaged. Restored and renamed Aberdonia and in service on the Thames.

References

reflist

Category:World War II merchant ships of the United Kingdom Category:World War II merchant ships of the Netherlands Category:Ships involved in the Dunkirk evacuation

Infobox Windmill

{{Infobox Windmill}} The windmill infobox is intended for use on traditional windmills, not modern wind turbines. It will need to include the following information:-

• mill name= (use where a mill has a name, Black Mill, Smith's Mill etc, may be more than one name or left blank)
• mill location= (use in all cases}
• built= (use for year of building, may be a year, decade or early/mid/late century)
• purpose= (use for function of mill)
• type= (may be Composite, Hollow Post, Horizontal, Open Trestle Post, Paltok, Post with Roundhouse, Smock, Tower, or Trestle)
• storeys= (use for Tower mills, do not count cap; for Smock mills count the smock only; for Post mills count floors in body only)
• base storeys= (use for Smock mills only, may be 0 if mill on on a very low base)
• roundhouse storeys = (may be 1, 2 or 3)
• smock sides= (may be 4, 6, 8, 10 or 12, used for Smock and Trestle mills)
• sail number= (may be 4, 5, 6, 8 or 12, (except in Horizontal mills))
• sail type= (may be Common, Patent, Roller Reefing, Spring, or Spring Patent, not used for Horizontal mills, may be a combination)
• windshaft= (may be wood, wood with cast iron poll end, or cast iron)
• winding= (may be hand, fantail, tailpole, or winch}
• blades= (may be 5, 6, 7 or 8 - only used if winding=fantail)
• power= (may be used for auxiliary power - electric motor, gas engine, oil engine, steam engine - may be more than one in succession, use dates if known and line break for each)
• stones= (use for number of pairs of millstones, may be 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5, may be edge stones)
• stone size= (use for size of millstones if known)
• stone drive= (may be underdrift or overdrift)
• saw type= (use for sawmills, may be circular or reciprocating)
• pump type= (use for drainage mills, may be Appold, Archimedes Screw, plunger, scoopwheel, three-throw)
• scoopwheel dia= (use for diameter of scoopwheel if known)
• lost= (use for date of mill's demolition or destruction)
• notes= (use for any other information, such as building of replica mills on existing bases etc., details of mill removals - original location, date of removal etc)

Templates

{{infobox ship}}

full cite templates

• {{cite book | first = | last = | authorlink = | coauthors = | year = | month = | title = | chapter = | editor = | others = | edition = | pages = | publisher = | location = |isbn= | url = }}</ref>

• {{cite web | url = | first = | last = | origyear = | origmonth = | publisher = | work = | title = | accessdate = 1 January 2009}}</ref>

most often used bits

• {{cite book | first = | last = | year = | month = | title = | pages = | publisher = | location = |isbn= }}</ref>

• {{cite web | url = | publisher = | title = | accessdate = 1 January 2009}}</ref>

• <ref name=Ships>{{cite book | first = and Sawyer, L A| last = Mitchell, W H | year = 1995| month = | title = The Empire Ships| pages = | publisher = Lloyd's of London Press Ltd| location = London, New York, Hamburg, Hong Kong|isbn=1-85044-275-4 }}</ref>

New template 3

Category:Ship navigational boxes Category:Maritime incidents in 2015

Railway diagram

My model railway layout
To fiddle yard Scenic break Loop recently removed Closed line

Railway diagram 2

2024 Talerddig collision
To Shrewsbury Route of Shrewsbury - Aberystwyth train Talerddig passing loop collision site Route of Machynlleth - Shrewsbury train To Dovey Junction

Railway diagram 3

Chemins de Fer d'Anvin à Calais
Calais-Maritime Calais Calais-St-Pierre Calais-Fointinettes CF du Nord to Boulogne Coulogne CF du Nord to Saint-Omer Écluse-Carée Banc-Valois Guînes Andres Balinghem Brêmes Ardres Tramway to Pont d'Ardres Autingues Louches Zoufaques Tournehem-sur-le-Hem Bonningues-Village Bonningues CF du BB to Boulogne Journy Alquines-Boiusson Bouvelinghem Acquin CF du Nord to Boulogne Lumbres CF du Nord to Arques and Saint-Omer Elnes Wavrans Remilly-Wirquin Wirquin Ouve Merck-St-Liévin Hervarre Fauquemberges Renty Assonval CF du ARB to Berck-Plage Rimeux-Gournay Coupelle-Vielle Fruges CF du ARB to Aire-sur-Lys Verchin Équirre Bergeneuse CF du Nord to Saint-Pol and Arras Anvin CF du Nord to Montreuil and Étaples

Main article: Chemins de Fer d'Anvin à Calais

Sources

• Farebrother, Martin J B; Farebrother, Joan S (2008). Tortillards of Artois. Usk: The Oakwood Press. pp. 30, 32. ISBN 978 0 85361 679 5. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |month= (help)

Category:Templates for railway lines of France

Windmills maps

Windmills map 1

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 class=notpageimage| Extant (red) and former (blue) non-drainage windmills in Norfolk. 1 Clippesby, 2 Barton Turf, 3 Belaugh, 4 Belton, 5 Buckenham Ferry, 6 Catfield, 7 Six Mile House Mill, Chedgrave, 8 Chedgrave, 9 Fleggburgh, 10, Fritton, 11 Fritton 12 Fritton, 13 Great Yarmouth, 14 Great Yarmouth, 15 Haddiscoe, 16 Halvergate, 17 Halvergate, 18 Halvergate, 19 Halvergate, 20 Halvergate, 21 Halvergate, 22 Hardley, 23 Hickling, 24 Hickling, 25 Neave's Mill, Horning, 26 Horning, 27 Horning, 28 Horsey, 29 Hoveton, 30 Langley, 31 Limpenhoe, 32 Ludham, 33 Ludham, 34 Ludham, 35 Ludham, 36 Ludham, 37, Ludham, 38 Martham, 39 Mautby, 40 Norton Subcourse 41 Oby, 42 Potter Heigham, 43, Potter Heigham, 44 Reedham, 45 Reedham, 46 Reedham,47 Reedham, 48 Reedham Ferry, 49 Repps, 50 Runham, 51 Runham, 52 Runham, 53 Sea Palling, 54 Sea Palling, 55 Smallburgh, 56 Stalham, 57 Starston, 58 Stokesby, 59 Stokesby, 60 Thurne, 61 Tunstall, 62 Tunstall, 63 Upton, 64 Black Mill, Upton, 65 Waxham, 66 West Somerton.

Windmills map 2

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 class=notpageimage| Extant (red) and former (blue) windmills in Leicesterhamshire. 1 Arnesby, 2 Ashby Folville, 3 Barkestone le Vale, 4 Croxton Kerrial, 5 Gilmorton, 6 Kibworth Harcourt, 7 Long Clawson, 8 Shepshed, 9 Swannington, 10 Ullesthorpe, 11 Waltham on the Wolds, 12 Wymondham

New ship infobox

History
Name	War Burman (1919) Burgondier (1919-26) Azul (1926-36) David Dawson (1936-37) Penteli (1937-39) Brockley Hill (1939-41)
Owner	Lloyd Royal Belge (GB) Ltd (1919-23) Compagnie Maritime Belge SA (1923-26) Buenos Aires Great Southern Railway (1926-35) Kaye, Son & Co Ltd (1935-36) Georgian Steam Navigation Co Ltd (1936-37) J A Coulouthros and N N Embiricos (1937-39) Brockley Hill Steamship Co Ltd (1939-41)
Operator	Lloyd Royal Belge (GB) Ltd (1919-23) Compagnie Maritime Belge SA (1923-26) A Holland & Co Ltd (1926-35) Kaye, Son & Co Ltd (1935-36) Frank S Dawson & Co Ltd (1936-37) J A Coulouthros and N N Embiricos (1937-39) Counties Ship Management (1939-41)
Port of registry	London, United Kingdom (1919-23) Antwerp, Belgium (1923-26 London (1926-37) Andros, Greece (1937-39) London (1939-41)
Builder	Caird & Co, Greenock
Launched	1918
Completed	1919
Out of service	12 June 1941
Identification	United Kingdom Official Number 142712 (1918-23, 1926-37, 1939-41) Code Letters GMVT (1936-37) Code Letters STVR (1937-39) Code Letters GGRN (1939-41)
Fate	Torpedoed and sunk
General characteristics
Type	cargo ship
Tonnage	5,287 GRT
Length	400.1 ft (122.0 m)
Beam	52.3 ft (15.9 m)
Draught	28.5 ft (8.7 m)
Installed power	517 nhp
Propulsion	Triple expansion steam engine

class=notpageimage|

Location where Brockley Hill was sunk.

River diagram

River Bourne mills
File:BSicon uexHSTa.svg River Bourne M26 Maidstone East Line File:BSicon uxAROADu.svg A25 File:BSicon uxAROADu.svg A227 Old Mill File:BSicon ueSTRd.svg File:BSicon uexHSTa.svg File:BSicon ueSTRd.svg Crouch Mill Basted Mill Mill Lane Lower Basted Mill Winfield Mill Winfield Lane Bourne Lane Longmill Long Mill Lane Brook Lane Allens Lane Roughway Paper Mill Roughway Lane Hamptons Mill Hamptons Road File:BSicon uexHSTa.svg File:BSicon ueSTRd.svg File:BSicon ueSTRd.svg File:BSicon uxAROADu.svg File:BSicon ueSTRd.svg A227 File:BSicon ueSTRd.svg Uridge's Mill File:BSicon ueSTRd.svg File:BSicon uexHSTa.svg File:BSicon ueSTRd.svg File:BSicon ueSTRd.svg File:BSicon uxAROADu.svg File:BSicon ueSTRd.svg A227 File:BSicon ueSTRd.svg File:BSicon ueSTRd.svg Fairlawne Sawmill File:BSicon ueSTRd.svg File:BSicon ueSTRd.svg File:BSicon ueSTRd.svg File:BSicon ueSTRd.svg Claygate Pump Puttenden Road Oxonhoath Mill High House Lane Bourne Mill File:BSicon uxAROADu.svg A26 Goldhill Mill Victoria Road Pierce Mill Pierce Mill Lane Little Mill Tonbridge Road File:BSicon ueSTRd.svg File:BSicon ueABZ3lf.svg River Medway

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References

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