Artificial Intelligence in the Cyber Domain: Offense and Defense
Abstract
:1. Introduction
- To present the impact of AI techniques on cybersecurity: we provide a brief overview of AI and discuss the impact of AI in the cyber domain.
- Applications of AI for cybersecurity: we conduct a survey of the applications of AI for cybersecurity, which covers a wide-range cyber attack types.
- Discussion on the potential security threats from adversarial uses of AI technologies: we investigate various potential threats and attacks may arise through the use of AI systems.
- Challenges and future directions: We discuss the potential research challenges and open research directions of AI in cybersecurity.
2. Research Methodology
- Papers which had titles belonging to subjects outside the scope of this research.
- Books, patent documents, technical reports, citations.
- Papers which were not written in English.
3. The impact of AI on Cybersecurity
3.1. The Positive Uses of AI
- AI can discover new and sophisticated changes in attack flexibility: Conventional technology is focused on the past and relies heavily on known attackers and attacks, leaving room for blind spots when detecting unusual events in new attacks. The limitations of old defense technology are now being addressed through intelligent technology. For example, privileged activity in an intranet can be monitored, and any significant mutation in privileged access operations can denote a potential internal threat. If the detection is successful, the machine will reinforce the validity of the actions and become more sensitive to detecting similar patterns in the future. With a larger amount of data and more examples, the machine can learn and adapt better to detect anomalous, faster, and more accurate operations. This is especially useful while cyber-attacks are becoming more sophisticated, and hackers are making new and innovative approaches.
- AI can handle the volume of data: AI can enhance network security by developing autonomous security systems to detect attacks and respond to breaches. The volume of security alerts that appear daily can be very overwhelming for security groups. Automatically detecting and responding to threats has helped to reduce the work of network security experts and can assist in detecting threats more effectively than other methods. When a large amount of security data is created and transmitted over the network every day, network security experts will gradually have difficulty tracking and identifying attack factors quickly and reliably. This is where AI can help, by expanding the monitoring and detection of suspicious activities. This can help network security personnel react to situations that they have not encountered before, replacing the time-consuming analysis of people.
- An AI security system can learn over time to respond better to threats: AI helps detect threats based on application behavior and a whole network’s activity. Over time, AI security system learns about the regular network of traffic and behavior, and makes a baseline of what is normal. From there, any deviations from the norm can be spotted to detect attacks.
3.2. Drawbacks and Limitations of Using AI
- Data sets: Creating an AI system demands a considerable number of input samples, and obtaining and processing the samples can take a long time and a lot of resources.
- Resource requirements: Building and maintaining the fundamental system needs an immense amount of resources, including memory, data, and computing power. What is more, skilled resources necessary to implement this technology require a significant cost.
- False alarms: Frequent false alarms are an issue for end-users, disrupting business by potentially delaying any necessary response and generally affecting efficiency. The process of fine-tuning is a trade-off between reducing false alarms and maintaining the security level.
- Attacks on the AI-based system: Attackers can use various attack techniques that target AI systems, such as adversarial inputs, data poisoning, and model stealing.
4. AI Methodology for Cybersecurity
4.1. Learning Algorithms
- Supervised learning: This type requires a training process with a large and representative set of data that has been previously labeled. These learning algorithms are frequently used as a classification mechanism or a regression mechanism.
- Unsupervised learning: In contrast to supervised learning, unsupervised learning algorithms use unlabeled training datasets. These approaches are often used to cluster data, reduce dimensionality, or estimate density.
- Reinforcement learning: Reinforcement learning is a type of learning algorithm that learns the best actions based on rewards or punishment. Reinforcement learning is useful for situations where data is limited or not given.
4.2. Machine Learning Methods
4.3. Deep Learning Methods
4.4. Bio-Inspired Computation Methods
5. AI-Based Approaches for Defending Against Cyberspace Attacks
5.1. Malware Identification
5.2. Intrusion Detection
5.3. Phishing and SPAM Detection
5.4. Other: Counter APTs and Identify DGAs
5.4.1. Countering an Advanced, Persistent Threat
5.4.2. Identifying Domain Names Generated by DGAs
6. The Nefarious Use of AI
6.1. AI and Autonomy Intelligent Threats
6.1.1. AI-Powered Malware
6.1.2. AI Used in Social Engineering Attacks
6.2. AI as a Tool for Attacking AI Models
- Adversarial inputs: This is a technique where malicious actors design the inputs to make models predict erroneously in order to evade detection. Recent studies demonstrated how to generate adversarial malware samples to avoid detection. The authors of [68,69] crafted adversarial examples to attack the Android malware detection model. Meanwhile, scholars in [70] presented a generative adversarial network (GAN) based algorithm called MalGAN to craft adversarial samples, which was capable of bypassing black-box machine learning-based detection models. Another approach by Anderson et al. [71] adopted GAN to create adversarial domain names to avoid the detection of domain generation algorithms. The authors in [72] investigated adversarial generated methods to avoid detection by DL models. Meanwhile, in [73], the authors presented a framework based on reinforcement learning for attacking static portable executable (PE) anti-malware engines.
- Poisoning training data: In this kind of attack, the malicious actors could pollute the training data from which the algorithm was learning in such a way that reduced the detection capabilities of the system. Different domains are vulnerable to poisoning attacks; for example, network intrusion, spam filtering, or malware analysis [74,75].
- Model extraction attacks: These techniques are used to reconstruct the detection models or recover training data via black-box examination [76]. On this occasion, the attacker learns how ML algorithms work by reversing techniques. From this knowledge, the malicious actors know what the detector engines are looking for and how to avoid it.
7. Challenges and Open Research Directions
7.1. Challenges
7.2. Open Research Directions
8. Discussion
9. Conclusions
Author Contributions
Funding
Acknowledgments
Conflicts of Interest
Abbreviations
AI | Artificial intelligence |
ML | Machine learning |
DL | Deep learning |
DT | Decision trees |
SVM | Support vector machines |
KNN | K-nearest neighbor |
RF | Random forest |
AR | Association rule algorithms |
EL | Ensemble learning |
PCA | Principal component analysis |
FNN | Feedforward neural networks |
CNNs | Convolutional neural networks |
RNN | Recurrent neural networks |
DBNs | Deep belief networks |
SAE | Stacked autoencoders |
GANs | Generative adversarial networks |
RBMs | Restricted Boltzmann machines |
EDLNs | Ensemble of deep learning networks |
GA | Genetic algorithms |
ES | Evolution strategies |
ACO | Ant colony optimization |
PSO | Particle swarm optimization |
AIS | Artificial immune systems (AIS) |
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References | Year | Focus | Tech. | Features | Dataset | Validation Metrics |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
[9] | 2017 | PC malware | SVM,RF Logistic regression | MAP’s feature sets | RIPE | DR: 99% FPR: 5% |
[10] | 2017 | PC malware | BAM, MLP | N-gram, Windows API calls | Self collection: 52,185 samples | ACC: 98.6% FPR: 2% |
[11] | 2017 | PC malware | KNN, SVM | OpCode graph | Self collection: 22,200 samples | ACC, FPR |
[13] | 2017 | Android malware | CNN | Opcode sequence | GNOME, McAfee Labs | ACC: 98%/80%/87%, F-score: 97%/78%/86% |
[19] | 2017 | Android malware | ANF, PSO | Permissions, API Calls | Self collection: 500 samples | ACC: 89% |
[21] | 2017 | Botnet | C4.5, GA | Multi features | ISOT, ISCX | DR: 99.46%/95.58% FPR: 0.57%/ 2.24% |
[12] | 2018 | PC malware | AutoEncoder, RBM | Windows API calls | Self collection: 20,000 samples | ACC: 98.2% |
[14] | 2018 | Android malware | SVM, DT | Significant permissions | Self collection: 54,694 samples | ACC: 93.67% FPR: 4.85% |
[15] | 2018 | Android malware | Rotation Forest | Permissions, APIs, system events | Self collection: 2,030 smaples | ACC: 88.26% |
[16] | 2018 | Android malware | ANN | API call | Malgenome, Drebin, Maldozer | F1-Score: 96.33% FPR: 3.19% |
[18] | 2018 | Android malware | PSO, RF, J48, KNN, MLP, AdaBoost | Permissions | Self collection: 8500 samples | TPR: 95.6% FPR: 0.32% |
[17] | 2019 | Android malware | DAE, CNN | Permissions, filtered intents, API calls, hardware features, code related patterns | Self collection: 23000 samples | ACC: 98.5%/98.6% FPR: 1.67%/1.82% |
[20] | 2019 | Android malware | PSO, Bayesnet, Naïve Bayes, SMO, DT, RT, RF J48, MLP | Permissions | UCI, KEEL, Contagiodump, Wang’s repository | ACC: 79.4%/47.6%/ 82.9%/94.1%/ 100%/77.9% |
[22] | 2019 | Android malware | SVM, ANN | App Components, Permissions | Self collection: 44,000 samples | ACC: 95.2%/96.6% |
ACC: Accuracy | CNN: Convolutional neural network |
FPR: False positive rate | ANF: Adaptive neural fuzzy |
DR: Detection rate | GA: Genetic Algorithm |
RF: Random forest | RBMs: Restricted Boltzmann machines |
SVM: Support vector machine | DT: Decision tree |
MLP: multilayer perceptron | GP: Genetic programming |
BAM: binary associative memory | DT: decision tree |
KNN: k-nearest neighbors | DAE: Deep auto-encoder |
References | Year | Focus | Tech. | Anomaly Types | Dataset | Validation Metrics |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
[23] | 2017 | intrusion detection | SVM, K-means | DoS, Probe, U2R, R2L | KDD’99 | ACC: 95.75%, FPR: 1.87% |
[25] | 2017 | intrusion detection | NN with random weights | DoS, Probe, R2L, U2R | NSL-KDD | ACC: 84.12% |
[28] | 2017 | intrusion detection | ACO, DT | DoS, Probe, R2L, U2R | NSL-KDD | ACC: 65%, FPR: 0% |
[30] | 2017 | intrusion detection | PSO, KNN | DoS, Probe, R2L, U2R | KDD’99 | ACC: - Dos: 99.91% - Probe: 94.41% - U2L: 99.77% - R2L: 99.73% |
[24] | 2018 | intrusion detection | LS-SVM | DoS, Probe, U2R, and R2L | KDD’99 | ACC: Over 99.6% |
[26] | 2018 | intrusion detection | DAE, RF | DoS, Probe, R2L, U2R | KDD’99, NSL-KDD | Average ACC: 85.42% - 97.85% |
[27] | 2018 | Anomaly detection | Fuzzy logic, GA | DoS, DDoS, Flash crowd | University dataset | ACC: 96.53%, FPR: 0.56% |
[31] | 2018 | Intrusion detection | PSO, FLN | DoS, Probe, R2L, U2R | KDD’99 | ACC: - Dos: 98.37% - Probe: 90.77% - U2L: 93.63% - R2L: 63.64% |
[33] | 2018 | Anomaly detection | CSO, K-means | DoS, Probe, R2L, U2R | UCI-ML, NSL-KDD | ACC: 97.77%, FPR: 1.297% |
[34] | 2018 | Intrusion detection & classification | ABC, AFS | DoS, Probe, R2L, U2R, Fuzzers, Analysis, Exploits, Generic, Worms, RA, Shellcode, Backdoors | NSL-KDD, UNSW-NB15 | ACC: 97.5%, FPR: 0.01% |
[32] | 2019 | anomaly detection | PSO, SVM, K-means, AFS | DoS,Probe, R2L, U2R, RA, RI, CI | KDD’99, Gas Pipeline | ACC: 95% |
[35] | 2019 | Anomaly detection | GWO, CNN | DoS, Probe, U2R, R2L | DARPA’98, KDD’99 | ACC: 97.92%/98.42% FPR: 3.6%/2.22% |
[36] | 2019 | anomaly &misuse detection | Spark ML, LSTM | DSoS, DoS, Botnet, Brute Force SSH | ISCX-UNB | ACC: 97.29% FPR: 0.71% |
[37] | 2019 | Anomaly detection | FA, C4.5, Bayesian Networks | DoS, Probe, U2R, R2L | KDD’99 | DoS(ACC: 99.98%, FPR: 0.01%) Probe(ACC: 93.92%, FPR: 0.01%), R2L(ACC: 98.73%, FPR: 0%), U2R(ACC: 68.97%, FPR: 0%) |
[38] | 2019 | Intrusion dectection | Tabu search, ABC, SVM | DoS, Probe, U2R, R2L | KDD’99 | ACC: 94.53%, FPR: 7.028% |
ACC: Accuracy FPR: False positive rate SVM: Support vector machine DT: Decision tree NN: Neural Network CNN: Convolutional neural network KNN: K-nearest neighbors LS-SVM: Least squares support vector machines DAE: Deep Auto-Encoder FLN: Fast learning network RF: Random forest ACO: Ant colony optimization PSO: Particle swarm optimization | GA: Genetic Algorithms CSO: Cuckoo Search Optimization ABC: Artificial bee colony AFS: Artificial fish swarm FA: Firefly algorithm GWO: Grey wolf optimization Dos: Denial of Service R2L: Remote to local U2R: User to Root RI:Response Injection RA: Reconnaissance Attacks CI: Command Injection |
Reference | Year | Focus | Tech. | Features | Dataset | Validation Metrics |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
[44] | 2016 | Spam detection | Naive Bayes, SVM | 99 features | DATAMALL | Not provide |
[45] | 2017 | Spam classification | CSO, SVM | 101 features | Ling-spam corpus | ACC: 87%/88% |
[39] | 2018 | Mail phishing detection | NN, RL | 50 features | Self collection: 9900 samples | ACC: 98.6%, FPR: 1.8% |
[40] | 2018 | Website phishing detection | RF, SVM, NN, logistic regression, naïve Bayes | 19 features | Phishtank, Openphish, Alexa, Payment gateway, Top banking website | ACC: 99.09% |
[41] | 2018 | Website phishing detection | NN | 30 features | UCI repository phishing dataset | ACC: 97.71%, FPR: 1.7%. |
[46] | 2018 | Spam message detection | PSO, DE, DT DB index, SVM, | 13 features | Self collection: 200,000 samples | Not provide |
[47] | 2018 | Spammer detection | LFA, FCM | 21 features | Self collections: 14,235 samples | ACC: 97.98% |
[42] | 2019 | Website phishing detection | Naive Bayes, KNN, Adaboost, K-star, SMO, RF, DT | 104 features | Self collection: 73,575 samples | ACC: 97.98% |
[43] | 2019 | Website phishing detection | GBDT, XGBoost, LightGBM | 20 features | Self collection: - 1st: 49,947 samples - 2nd: 53,103 samples | ACC: 97.30%/98.60% FPR: 1.61%/1.24% |
[48] | 2019 | spam detection | GA, RWN | 140 features | Spam Assassin, LingSpam, CSDMC2010 | ACC: 96.7%/93%/90.8% |
ACC: Accuracy FPR: False positive rate SVM: Support vector machine DT: Decision tree NN: Neural Network KNN: K-nearest neighbors RF: Random forest | GDBT: Gradient Boosting Decision Tree RWN: Random Weight Network FCM: Fuzzy C-Means PSO: Particle swarm op timization GA: Genetic Algorithms CSO: Cuckoo Search Optimization LFA: Levy Flight Firefly Algorithm |
References | Year | Focus Area | Tech. | Features | Dataset | Validation Metrics |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
[49] | 2017 | APTs detection | DT | API calls | Self collection: 130 samples | ACC: 84.7% |
[50] | 2017 | APTs detection | GT, DP, CART, SVM | Log events | Self collection | ACC: 98.5%, FPR: 2.4% |
[51] | 2017 | nation-states APTs detection | DNN | Raw text | Self collection: 3200 samples | ACC: 94.6% |
[54] | 2017 | DGA domains detection | RNN | Letter combinations | Self collection: over 2.9 million samples | ACC: 97.3% |
[52] | 2018 | APTs detection | SOFM, DT, Bayesian network, SVM, NN | Machine activity metrics | Self collection: 1188 samples | ACC: 93.76% |
[53] | 2018 | APTs detection and prediction | DT, KNN, SVM, EL | Network traffic | Self collection, university live traffic | ACC: 84.8%, FPR: 4.5% |
[55] | 2018 | DGA domains detection | RNN | Characters | Self collection: 2.3 million samples | FPR: <=1% |
[56] | 2018 | DGA domains detection | RNN, CNN | Strings | Self collection: 2 million samples | ACC: 97–98% |
[57] | 2018 | DGA botnet detection | LSTM | Characters | Alexa, OSINT | F1:98.45% |
[59] | 2019 | DGA detection | Ensemble classifier | words | Self collection: 1 million samples | ACC: 67.98%/89.91%/91.48% |
[58] | 2019 | DGA, DNS covert chanel detection | TF-IDF | Strings | Self collection: 1 million samples | ACC: 99.92% |
ACC: Accuracy FPR: False positive rate SVM: Support vector machine DT:Decision tree GP: Genetic programming DT: decision tree CART: Classification and regression trees DBG-Model: Dynamic Bayesian game model DNN: Deep neural network | NN: Neural Networks KNN: k-nearest neighbors EL: Ensemble learning RNN: Recurrent neural network CNN: Convolutional neural network TF - IDF: term frequency - inverse document frequency LSTM: Long Short-Term Memory network SOFM: Self Organising Feature Map SVM: Support Vector Machines |
References | Year | Focus | Tech. | Innovation Point | Main Idea |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
[71] | 2016 | Adversarial attacks | GAN | New attack model | create adversarial domain names to avoid the detection of domain generation algorithms |
[76] | 2016 | Stealing model | AE | model extraction attacks | extract target ML models by the machine learning prediction APIs |
[66] | 2016 | Social engineering attacks | RNN | New attack model | Automated spear phishing campaign generator for social network |
[63] | 2017 | Compromise computer | Encoding DNAs | Encoding malware to DNAs | compromise the computer by encoding malware in a DNA sequence |
[68] | 2017 | Adversarial attacks | AE | New attack algorithm | adversarial attacks against deep learning based Android malware classification |
[69] | 2017 | Adversarial attacks | AE | New attack algorithm | use the adversarial examples method to conduct new malware variants for malware detectors |
[70] | 2017 | Adversarial attacks | GAN | New attack model | present a GAN based algorithm to craft malware that capable to bypass black-box machine learning-based detection models |
[61] | 2018 | Malware creation | DNN | AI-powered malware | Leverage deep neural network enhance malware, make it more evasive and high targeting |
[62] | 2018 | Malware creation | GAN | AI-powered malware | avoid detection by simulating the behaviors of legitimate applications |
[64] | 2018 | Malware creation | ACO | SI-based malware | use ACO algorithms to create a prototype malware that have a decentralize behavior |
[73] | 2018 | Adversarial attacks | AL | New attack method | a generic black-box for attacking static portable executable machine learning malware models |
[72] | 2018 | Adversarial attacks | AM | New attack algorithm | adversarial generated methods to attack neural network-based malware detection |
[74] | 2018 | Poisoning attack | EPD | New poisoning data method | present a novel poisoning approach that attack against machine learning algorithms used in IDSs |
[75] | 2018 | Poisoning attack | AM | Analysis poisoning data method | present three kind of poisoning attacks on machine learning-based mobile malware detection |
[67] | 2018 | Social engineering attacks | LSTM | New attack model | introduced a machine learning method to manipulate users into clicking on deceptive URLs |
[65] | 2019 | Malware creation | ANN | next generation malware | fuse swarm base intelligence, neural network to form a new kind of malware |
GAN: Generative adversarial network AE: Adversarial Examples SI: Swarm Intelligent ANN: Artificial Neural Network RL: Reinforcement learning AMB: Adversarial Malware Binaries | EPD: Edge pattern detection RNN: Recurrent neural network DNN: Deep neural network ACO: Ant colony optimization AM: Adversarial machine learning LSTM: Long short term memory |
Content | References | ||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Year | [7] | [8] | [6] | [3] | [4] | [5] | [2] | This Survey | |
2018 | 2018 | 2018 | 2018 | 2018 | 2019 | 2019 | 2019 | ||
AI methods | Machine learning | x | x | x | x | x | x | ||
Deep learning | x | x | x | x | x | x | |||
Bio-inspire computing | x | x | |||||||
Defense applications | Malware detection | x | x | x | x | x | x | x | x |
Intrusion detection | x | x | x | x | x | x | x | ||
Phishing detection | x | x | x | x | x | x | |||
Spam identification | x | x | x | x | x | ||||
APTs detection | x | x | x | x | |||||
DGAs detection | x | x | x | x | |||||
Malicous use of AI | Ai-powerd malware | x | x | ||||||
Attack against AI | x | x | x | x | |||||
Social engineering attacks | x | x |
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Truong, T.C.; Diep, Q.B.; Zelinka, I. Artificial Intelligence in the Cyber Domain: Offense and Defense. Symmetry 2020, 12, 410. https://doi.org/10.3390/sym12030410
Truong TC, Diep QB, Zelinka I. Artificial Intelligence in the Cyber Domain: Offense and Defense. Symmetry. 2020; 12(3):410. https://doi.org/10.3390/sym12030410
Chicago/Turabian StyleTruong, Thanh Cong, Quoc Bao Diep, and Ivan Zelinka. 2020. "Artificial Intelligence in the Cyber Domain: Offense and Defense" Symmetry 12, no. 3: 410. https://doi.org/10.3390/sym12030410
APA StyleTruong, T. C., Diep, Q. B., & Zelinka, I. (2020). Artificial Intelligence in the Cyber Domain: Offense and Defense. Symmetry, 12(3), 410. https://doi.org/10.3390/sym12030410