Su influencia en la “primauté del

Derecho Comunitario
Costa c. Su influencia en la
ENEL “primauté del Derecho
Comunitario
Universidad Central de Venezuela
Facultad de Ciencias Jurídicas y Políticas
Centro de Estudios de Postgrado Lic. Luis Miguel Romero R.
Especialización en Derecho y Políticas Internacionales
Responsabilidad Internacional
Introducción
Antes de comenzar a referirnos directamente a los asuntos de fondo con respecto a la
incidencia que tienen las decisiones judiciales comunitarias en el Derecho interno de los
Estados miembros de la comunidad, es menester explicar brevemente la evolución que ha
tenido la hoy “Unión Europea”, para internalizar el cómo y los porqués el sentido de
supranacionalidad rebosa la esfera política e influye también en el estadio jurídico.

1951
Comunidad 1993 Se
Europea del 1964 Decisión amplían las
1952 1965 Creación
Carbón y 1957 Tratado Costa c. Enel competencias
Comunidad de la Comisión 1993 Tratado
Acero. de Roma, nace (Primacía de la
Europea de y el Consejo de Mastrich
Constitución la CEE Derecho Comunidad
Defensa Europeo
del Tribunal Comunitario) (ambiente,
Europeo de social)
Justicia

Gráfico explicativo de la evolución del Derecho Europeo desde 1951

Con la firma en 1951 del Tratado de la Comunidad Europea del Carbón y el Acero, las
partes acuerdan la creación de una instancia especial para solucionar las controversias
relativas al mero intercambio económico de estos dos rubros minerales. En ese momento
el Tribunal o Corte de Luxemburgo llevaba por nombre: “Tribunal de las Comunidades
Europeas).

No fue hasta 1957, fecha en que se firma el Tratado de Roma que le da nacimiento a la
Comunidad Económica Europea que se amplía la competencia de el referido tribunal. Este
Tratado plantea qué parámetros establecer para resolver controversias, o bien, desde
qué perspectiva acometer una valoración del mismo. Podemos concebir, así, una
aproximación de pura política del Derecho: ¿dota este Tratado a la Unión Europea (en ese
momento Comunidad Económica Europea) de los instrumentos necesarios de acción para
afrontar los actuales retos nacionales e internacionales? O bien, podríamos, pues, referir
el Tratado a la teoría constitucional para, de tal contraste, obtener criterios valorativos.
Para algunos juristas europeos, tal forma de proceder es incitante. Sobre todo, nos obliga
a hacernos una composición de lugar, y a definir qué Unión Europea desean y por qué
razones. Lo cual no es poco, en medio de la confusión reinante. Una tal metodología
adolece, sin embargo, de un inconveniente: si la distancia entre ideal y realidad se
evidencian como demasiado grandes, la crítica o las eventuales propuestas de reforma
amenazan, a falta de puntos concretos de apoyo, caer en el vacío.

Como a continuación se expondrá, las mismas permiten inferir claros parámetros

normativos para el enjuiciamiento del Derecho europeo. Las “tradiciones constitucionales
internas” tienen una doble ventaja: por un lado, no consisten en presupuestos ideales,
sino en normas jurídico – positivas parte integrante del acervo común europeo; por otro,
los parámetros elaborados a partir de las “tradiciones constitucionales internas” son
asimismo de utilidad cuando se trata de amortiguar, por vía de interpretación, las
tensiones entre el Derecho europeo y el Derecho constitucional nacional.

Es precisamente el caso Costa c. Enel el que nos permitirá aclarar, a la luz del Derecho
Europeo, la jerarquía y supremacía que el iusinternacionalista o jurista comunitario le han
sabido dar a las decisiones judiciales del Tribunal de Luxemburgo, creando un gigantesco
debate con los administrativistas o constitucionalistas de cada uno de los Estados que
conforman la comunidad, haciendo a veces incidencia y críticas sobre los principios de
democracia y soberanía nacional.
Narración de los hechos
En 1962, la compañía privada Ente Nazionale per l´Energía eLettrica (por sus siglas ENEL),
fue nacionalizada por un decreto general del Jefe de Gobierno de la República Italiana,
Amintore Fanfani.

Este hecho generó controversias con los directivos y accionistas de la referida empresa, ya
que la nacionalización ocasionaba una disminución de valor de las acciones de la
compañía, por lo que se veían directamente afectados por la decisión guernamental.

Entre estos accionistas se encontraba el abogado Flaminio Costa, quien se niega a cancelar
su servicio eléctrico como reclamo por la inconsulta acción de gobierno. Sin embargo,
basado en el artículo 2 del Tratado de Roma, se dirige a los tribunales italianos para
reclamar la nulidad de la nacionalización por estar en contra del Derecho Comunitario y
por ser esta una medida que distorsionaba el mercado y aumentaba los precios,
disminuyendo el valor de las acciones, actos que estaban limitados por el mismo Tratado.

En febrero de 1963, el Tribunal Italiano se pronuncia, basándose en la teoría dualista

infraconstitucional y expresa: “No se puede alegar primacía de la Ley comunitaria sobre la
doméstica, por lo que éste (tribunal) debe decidir apegado primero a la Ley nacional,
incluso si es contraria al Tratado).

Esta decisión judicial a su vez es contraria al mismo Tratado de Roma, el cual establece en
su artículo 189 (ahora 249):

“Para el cumplimiento de su misión y en las condiciones previstas en el presente Tratado, el Consejo y la Comisión establecen
reglamentos y normas, toman decisiones y formulan recomendaciones o dictámenes. El reglamento tiene un alcance general. Es
obligatorio en todos sus elementos y es directamente aplicable en todo Estado miembro. La norma obliga a todo Estado miembro
destinatario en cuanto al resultado a alcanzar, dejando, no obstante, a las instancias nacionales la competencia en cuanto a la forma y
los medios. La decisión es obligatoria en todos sus elementos para los destinatarios a que se refiere. Las recomendaciones y los
dictámenes no obligan.”

En este sentido, Costa decide dirigirse al Tribunal Europeo de Justicia (Corte de

Luxemburgo), con el fin de solicitar el cumplimiento de la norma comunitaria.

El Tribunal Europeo dicta sentencia en julio de 1964, estableciendo dos principios

jurisprudenciales en la decisión, los cuales hoy son doctrina del Derecho Comunitario:

1) Sobre la supremacía del Derecho Comunitario:

“(…) el Derecho nacido del Tratado no podría, en razón misma de su específica naturaleza, encontrar un límite en cualquier
medida interna sin perder su propio carácter comunitario y sin que resultara removido el fundamento jurídico de la misma
Comunidad. “Al constituir una comunidad de duración ilimitada, dotada de instituciones propias, de personalidad, de
capacidad jurídica, de capacidad de representación nacional y más particularmente de poderes reales nacidos de una
limitación de competencia o de una transferencia de atribuciones de los Estados a la Comunidad, éstos han limitado, aunque
en ámbitos restringidos sus derechos soberanos y han creado, así, un cuerpo de derecho aplicable a sus súbditos y a ellos
mismos (...) (todo esto) tiene por corolario la imposibilidad para los Estados de hacer prevalecer, contra un ordenamiento
 jurídico aceptado por ellos sobre una base de reciprocidad, una medida unilateral ulterior que no puede, en consecuencia,
serle opuesta; que la fuerza ejecutiva del Derecho Comunitario no puede, en efecto, variar de un Estado a otro al amparo de
medidas legislativas internas ulteriores sin poner en peligro la realización de los objetivos del tratado contemplados en el
artículo 5 (2), ni provocar una discriminación prohibida por el artículo 7 (…)”.

2) Sobre la actuación de personas naturales o jurídicas en el Tribunal Comunitario:

“El Tribunal resuelve que en ningún caso el Tratado de Roma especifica que las personas naturales o jurídicas de un Estado
pueden retar directamente al Estado en juicio por decisiones que vayan en contra del Derecho Comunitario, sino que deben
acudir ante la instancia de la Comisión la cual actuará según el caso.”
Análisis jurídico
La primacía del Derecho europeo es ineludible, ya que hoy día la realización de intereses y
la conciliación de conflictos se despliegan cada vez más en marcos supra estatales. Ello
impone ordenaciones jurídicas que trascienden el alcance de los Estados soberanos
tradicionales, y explica la Unión Europea como “comunidad de Derecho”.

El contenido de sus constituciones y su fuerza normativa se ven, a su vez, influidos por el

Derecho comunitario. Las funciones que en la teoría clásica identificaban materialmente a
la Constitución, se cumplen ahora a través de un nuevo entramado jurídico, en el cual el
Derecho comunitario ocupa un lugar por demás relevante. Ello se pone de manifiesto ya
desde una elemental consideración: mientras que la Constitución aspira a regular los
procedimientos y límites en la producción ordinaria del Derecho, le queda extramuros el
Derecho comunitario – un acervo cuantitativa y cualitativamente fundamental del
Ordenamiento, y no sólo se impone a la libertad de configuración del legislador nacional,
sino que tampoco está sujeto a las reglas constitucionales – al menos, de modo semejante
a como lo está el resto del ordenamiento jurídico. Las tareas de los poderes públicos y el
Derecho que rige las conductas de los ciudadanos no derivan ya simplemente de
mandatos o de procesos regulados por la Constitución; normas y procesos comunitarios se
cruzan con ellos en relaciones diversas, desplazando con frecuencia al Derecho propio de
los Estados.

La jurisprudencia del Tribunal de Justicia, mediante su adopción como pauta interpretativa

general del Derecho comunitario, permea, incluso, materias en las que no estaba previsto
que incidiera aquél. En particular, porque cada vez resulta menos nítida la diferencia entre
asuntos de relevancia nacional y relevancia comunitaria. Los diferentes ordenamientos
jurídicos de los Estados miembros cobran unidad a través de la jurisprudencia de
Luxemburgo. Parece irreversible, así, una progresiva unificación de los Derechos
nacionales en la dirección señalada por las instituciones comunitarias y el Tribunal de
Justicia.

Ahora bien, la jurisprudencia comunitaria toma, a su vez, en cuenta los criterios y

principios vigentes en los diversos Estados miembros. El Derecho comunitario es
configurado por la jurisprudencia como Ordenamiento y en torno a “principios generales”;
siendo éstos recogidos precisamente en una interpretación armonizadora de las
“tradiciones constitucionales de los Estados miembros de la Comunidad”

Konrad Hesse constataba ya en 1999 una creciente concordancia, de un lado, entre el

Derecho europeo y el Derecho constitucional nacional, de otro, entre el Derecho
constitucional de los Estados miembros. No temía que las constituciones nacionales
fueran a perder significado en el proceso europeo de integración, en primer lugar, por la
recíproca dependencia de ambos; pero, adicionalmente, porque el principio democrático
sólo está rudimentariamente presente en el orden fundamental de la Unión.
Pero es que, hay que considerar también como rudimentario al menos otro aspecto
importante del Derecho europeo: la teoría constitucional clásica nos dice, que, desde la
Revolución francesa, “el fin de toda asociación política es la realización de los derechos
naturales e imprescriptibles del hombre” (artículo 2, Declaración de Derechos del Hombre
y del Ciudadano, 1789). Nuestras constituciones han satisfecho hasta ahora tal parámetro.

Sin embargo, éste no es el caso del Derecho comunitario. Desde la fundación de la

Comunidad, determinados derechos y libertades han sido concebidos como condiciones
funcionales de una economía libre de mercado y no a la inversa, es decir, que el mercado
esté al servicio de la realización de los derechos. Frente a tal evolución, los tratados de
Niza (2000) y Roma (2004) ciertamente han incluido el reconocimiento de la Carta de
derechos en el Derecho europeo. Sin embargo, no acaba de tener lugar el giro
copernicano, de hacer de los derechos el fin de la Unión y no simplemente un medio para
otros fines.

Cuando cobramos conciencia del déficit democrático y de la pérdida de los derechos, una
conclusión se nos impone: si de lo que se trata es de constituir poder público y un orden
social en Europa conforme a los postulados del imperio del Derecho, la teoría clásica de la
Constitución es portadora de un legado que bien podría inspirar la forja del nuevo
“Derecho común”. El reto consiste, pues, en configurar el Derecho comunitario desde la
experiencia del Derecho constitucional.

En la medida, en que se otorga primacía al Derecho europeo sobre el Derecho

constitucional, no habrá modo de preservar el orden fundamental de los Estados
miembros – en concreto, de Alemania, Francia, Italia o España –, como no sea
proyectando los propios principios constitucionales sobre el Derecho comunitario. En
definitiva, se trata de extraer del postulado de la “homogeneidad constitucional” entre los
Estados miembros y la Unión Europea

Apartándonos entonces de la crítica constitucional de la “primauté” del Derecho

comunitario frente al doméstico, es importante analizar jurídicamente la importancia que
trae como consecuencia de la decisión Costa c. Enel en la normativa europea, a partir de
un punto de vista iusinternacionalista.

Primeramente hay que traer a colación aquellos postulados de Triepel y Anzilotti sobre la
división que existe entre la norma internacional y la interna, conocida como “dualismo”;
en el cual se afirma que el Derecho Internacional (en este caso supranacional) es distinto
al Derecho doméstico por su naturaleza, subjetividad y carácter coercible.

En este sentido, nace la creencia que el Derecho Internacional pudiera ser contrario a la
norma interna de los Estados, sin embargo, al revisar que un Tratado Internacional (fuente
primaria de Derecho Internacional, conjuntamente con la Costumbre) es la manifestación
y perfeccionamiento del consentimiento de un Estado podemos dilucidar que es ilógico
que la norma interna e internacional de un Estado sean contrarias.
Pero el verdadero debate que estaba en juego en el caso de estudio era la ubicación del
Derecho Comunitario dentro de la normativa interna, lo que quiere decir, que se trataba
de interpretar si la norma comunitaria estaba por encima del conjunto normativo interno
o estaba subsumido a éste.

La decisión 6/64 ECR 585 583 del Tribunal de Justicia Europeo nos aclara que en realidad
se deben considerar las normas comunitarias e internas como dos reglas distintas porque
obligan a sujetos diferentes, su práctica forense y redacción es distinta y su coercibilidad
es relativa a asuntos estatales, sin embargo hace énfasis en que se debe considerar la
norma comunitaria como regla máxima, aunado a esto todas las decisiones del Tribunal
europeo, el Consejo y la Comisión (y hoy en día el Parlamento).

Por otra parte, es esta decisión la primera oportunidad que tiene la “comunidad” de
demostrar verdaderamente su incidencia de organismo supranacional al retar una
sentencia definitiva de un Estado soberano.

Otro de los aspectos fundamentales que marca esta jurisprudencia un precedente

importante es en la obligatoriedad del cumplimiento de las normas comunitarias por
parte de los Estados, no pudiendo los particulares asumir un rol protagónico en la petición
de justicia por ante el Tribunal de Luxemburgo.
Referencias
Groppi T: La “primauté” del Derecho Europeo sobre el Derecho Constitucional nacional:
Un punto de vista comparado. Disponible en línea:
http://www.ugr.es/~redce/REDCE5pdf/08.taniagroppi.pdf

Orlandez, U. Evolución del concepto de soberanía en la Unión Europea. Disponible en línea:

http://debate.iteso.mx/numero04/articulos/soberramonnavarro.htm

Real Instituto El Cano. Referencia a la Constitución Europea. Disponible en Línea:

http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/especiales/constitucioneuropea/nuevo/

Del Arenal, C. Relaciones Internacionales. Editorial Tecnos, Madrid, 2005.

Barbé, E. Política Exterior de la Unión Europea.

K. Hesse, El texto constitucional como límite de la interpretación en División de poderes e

Interpretación. Hacia una teoría de la praxis constitucional, Madrid: Ed. Tecnos, 1987.
 Anexo

DECISIÓN COSTA V. ENEL (CASO 6/64 ECR 585 583 – 15 DE JULIO DE 1964)
Fuente: EURLEX, Disponible en línea en: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:61964J0006:EN:HTML

Summary

1 . IN THE CONTEXT OF REQUESTS FOR PRELIMINARY RULINGS, THE COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION EITHER TO APPLY THE TREATY TO A
SPECIFIC CASE OR TO DECIDE UPON THE VALIDITY OF A PROVISION OF DOMESTIC LAW IN RELATION TO THE TREATY, AS IT WOULD BE
POSSIBLE FOR IT TO DO UNDER ARTICLE 169 . NEVERTHELESS, THE COURT HAS POWER TO EXTRACT FROM A QUESTION IMPERFECTLY
FORMULATED BY THE NATIONAL COURT THOSE QUESTIONS WHICH ALONE PERTAIN TO THE INTERPRETATION OF THE TREATY .

2 . ARTICLE 177 IS BASED UPON A CLEAR SEPARATION OF FUNCTIONS BETWEEN NATIONAL COURTS AND THE COURT OF JUSTICE AND
CANNOT EMPOWER THE LATTER EITHER TO INVESTIGATE THE FACTS OF THE CASE OR TO CRITICIZE THE GROUNDS AND PURPOSE OF
THE REQUEST FOR INTERPRETATION .

3 . BY CONTRAST WITH ORDINARY INTERNATIONAL TREATIES, THE EEC TREATY HAS CREATED ITS OWN LEGAL SYSTEM WHICH, ON THE
ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE TREATY, BECAME AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF THE MEMBER STATES AND WHICH THEIR
COURTS ARE BOUND TO APPLY .

BY CREATING A COMMUNITY OF UNLIMITED DURATION, HAVING ITS OWN INSTITUTIONS, ITS OWN PERSONALITY, ITS OWN LEGAL
CAPACITY AND CAPACITY OF REPRESENTATION ON THE INTERNATIONAL PLANE AND, MORE PARTICULARLY, REAL POWERS STEMMING
FROM A LIMITATION OF SOVEREIGNTY OR A TRANSFER OF POWERS FROM THE STATES TO THE COMMUNITY, THE MEMBER STATES
HAVE LIMITED THEIR SOVEREIGN RIGHTS AND HAVE THUS CREATED A BODY OF LAW WHICH BINDS BOTH THEIR NATIONALS AND
THEMSELVES .

THE INTEGRATION INTO THE LAWS OF EACH MEMBER STATE OF PROVISIONS WHICH DERIVE FROM THE COMMUNITY AND MORE
GENERALLY THE TERMS AND THE SPIRIT OF THE TREATY, MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE STATES, AS A COROLLARY, TO ACCORD
PRECEDENCE TO A UNILATERAL AND SUBSEQUENT MEASURE OVER A LEGAL SYSTEM ACCEPTED BY THEM ON A BASIS OF RECIPROCITY .
SUCH A MEASURE CANNOT THEREFORE BE INCONSISTENT WITH THAT LEGAL SYSTEM . THE LAW STEMMING FROM THE TREATY, AN
INDEPENDENT SOURCE OF LAW, COULD NOT BECAUSE OF ITS SPECIAL AND ORIGINAL NATURE, BE OVERRIDDEN BY DOMESTIC LEGAL
PROVISIONS, HOWEVER FRAMED, WITHOUT BEING DEPRIVED OF ITS CHARACTER AS COMMUNITY LAW AND WITHOUT THE LEGAL
BASIS OF THE COMMUNITY ITSELF BEING CALLED INTO QUESTION .

THE TRANSFER BY THE STATES FROM THEIR DOMESTIC LEGAL SYSTEM TO THE COMMUNITY LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE RIGHTS AND
OBLIGATIONS ARISING UNDER THE TREATY CARRIES WITH IT A PERMANENT LIMITATION OF THEIR SOVEREIGN RIGHTS .

4 . THE COMMISSION HAS THE DUTY OF SEEING THAT THE MEMBER STATES RESPECT THOSE OBLIGATIONS WHICH HAVE BEEN IMPOSED
UPON THEM BY THE TREATY AND WHICH BIND THEM AS STATES WITHOUT CREATING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, BUT THIS OBLIGATION ON
THE PART OF THE COMMISSION DOES NOT GIVE INDIVIDUALS THE RIGHT TO ALLEGE, IN COMMUNITY LAW OR UNDER ARTICLE 177,
EITHER FAILURE BY THE STATE CONCERNED TO FULFIL ANY OF ITS OBLIGATIONS OR BREACH OF DUTY ON THE PART OF THE
COMMISSION .

5 . ARTICLE 102 OF THE EEC TREATY CONTAINS NO PROVISIONS WHICH ARE CAPABLE OF CREATING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS WHICH
NATIONAL COURTS MUST PROTECT .

6 . ARTICLE 93 OF THE EEC TREATY CONTAINS NO PROVISIONS WHICH ARE CAPABLE OF CREATING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS WHICH
NATIONAL COURTS MUST PROTECT .

7 . A MEMBER STATE'S OBLIGATION UNDER THE EEC TREATY, WHICH IS NEITHER SUBJECT TO ANY CONDITIONS NOR, AS REGARDS ITS
EXECUTION OR EFFECT, TO THE ADOPTION OF ANY MEASURE EITHER BY THE STATES OR BY THE COMMISSION, IS LEGALLY COMPLETE
AND CONSEQUENTLY CAPABLE OF PRODUCING DIRECT EFFECTS ON THE RELATIONS BETWEEN MEMBER STATES AND INDIVIDUALS .
SUCH AN OBLIGATION BECOMES AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE MEMBER STATES, AND THUS FORMS PART OF
THEIR OWN LAW, AND DIRECTLY CONCERNS THEIR NATIONALS IN WHOSE FAVOUR IT HAS CREATED INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS WHICH
NATIONAL COURTS MUST PROTECT .
8 . ARTICLE 53 OF THE EEC TREATY CONSTITUTES A COMMUNITY RULE CAPABLE OF CREATING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS WHICH NATIONAL
COURTS MUST PROTECT .

9 . ARTICLE 53 OF THE EEC TREATY IS SATISFIED SO LONG AS NO NEW MEASURE SUBJECTS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NATIONALS OF
OTHER MEMBER STATES TO MORE SEVERE RULES THAN THOSE PRESCRIBED FOR NATIONALS OF THE COUNTRY OF ESTABLISHMENT,
WHATEVER THE LEGAL SYSTEM GOVERNING THE UNDERTAKINGS .

10 . ARTICLE 37 ( 2 ) OF THE EEC TREATY CONSTITUTES IN ALL ITS PROVISIONS A RULE OF COMMUNITY LAW CAPABLE OF CREATING
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS WHICH NATIONAL COURTS MUST PROTECT .

11 . THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 37 ( 2 ) OF THE EEC TREATY HAVE AS THEIR OBJECT THE PROHIBITION OF ANY NEW MEASURE
CONTRARY TO THE PRINCIPLES OF ARTICLE 37 ( 1 ), THAT IS ANY MEASURE HAVING AS ITS OBJECT OR EFFECT A NEW DISCRIMINATION
BETWEEN NATIONALS OF MEMBER STATES REGARDING THE CONDITIONS IN WHICH GOODS ARE PROCURED AND MARKETED, BY
MEANS OF MONOPOLIES OR BODIES WICH MUST, FIRST, HAVE AS THEIR OBJECT TRANSACTIONS REGARDING A COMMERCIAL PRODUCT
CAPABLE OF BEING THE SUBJECT OF COMPETITION AND TRADE BETWEEN MEMBER STATES, AND SECONDLY MUST PLAY AN EFFECTIVE
PART IN SUCH TRADE .

IT IS A MATTER FOR THE COURT DEALING WITH THE MAIN ACTION TO ASSESS IN EACH CASE WHETHER THE ECONOMIC ACTIVITY
UNDER REVIEW RELATES TO SUCH A PRODUCT WHICH, BY VIRTUE OF ITS NATURE AND THE TECHNICAL OR INTERNATIONAL
CONDITIONS TO WHICH IT IS SUBJECT, IS CAPABLE OF PLAYING SUCH A PART IN IMPORTS OR EXPORTS BETWEEN NATIONALS OF THE
MEMBER STATES .

Parties

IN CASE 6/64

REFERENCE TO THE COURT UNDER ARTICLE 177 OF THE EEC TREATY BY THE GIUDICE CONCILIATORE, MILAN, FOR A PRELIMINARY
RULING IN THE ACTION PENDING BEFORE THAT COURT BETWEEN

FLAMINIO COSTA AND

ENEL ( ENTE NAZIONALE ENERGIA ELETTRICA ( NATIONAL ELECTRICITY BOARD ), FORMERLY THE EDISON VOLTA UNDERTAKING )

Subject of the case

ON THE INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLES 102, 93, 53 AND 37 OF THE SAID TREATY

Grounds

BY ORDER DATED 16 JANUARY 1964, DULY SENT TO THE COURT, THE GIUDICE CONCILIATORE OF MILAN, ' HAVING REGARD TO ARTICLE
177 OF THE TREATY OF 25 MARCH 1957 ESTABLISHING THE EEC, INCORPORATED INTO ITALIAN LAW BY LAW N . 1203 OF 14 OCTOBER
1957, AND HAVING REGARD TO THE ALLEGATION THAT LAW N . 1643 OF 6 DECEMBER 1962 AND THE PRESIDENTIAL DECREES ISSUED IN
EXECUTION OF THAT LAW...INFRINGE ARTICLES 102, 93, 53 AND 37 OF THE AFOREMENTIONED TREATY ', STAYED THE PROCEEDINGS
AND ORDERED THAT THE FILE BE TRANSMITTED TO THE COURT OF JUSTICE .

ON THE APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 177

ON THE SUBMISSION REGARDING THE WORKING OF THE QUESTION

THE COMPLAINT IS MADE THAT THE INTENTION BEHIND THE QUESTION POSED WAS TO OBTAIN, BY MEANS OF ARTICLE 177, A RULING
ON THE COMPATIBILITY OF A NATIONAL LAW WITH THE TREATY .

BY THE TERMS OF THIS ARTICLE, HOWEVER, NATIONAL COURTS AGAINST WHOSE DECISIONS, AS IN THE PRESENT CASE, THERE IS NO
JUDICIAL REMEDY, MUST REFER THE MATTER TO THE COURT OF JUSTICE SO THAT A PRELIMINARY RULING MAY BE GIVEN UPON THE '
INTERPRETATION OF THE TREATY ' WHENEVER A QUESTION OF INTERPRETATION IS RAISED BEFORE THEM . THIS PROVISION GIVES THE
COURT NO JURISDICTION EITHER TO APPLY THE TREATY TO A SPECIFIC CASE OR TO DECIDE UPON THE VALIDITY OF A PROVISION OF
DOMESTIC LAW IN RELATION TO THE TREATY, AS IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR IT TO DO UNDER ARTICLE 169 .
NEVERTHELESS, THE COURT HAS POWER TO EXTRACT FROM A QUESTION IMPERFECTLY FORMULATED BY THE NATIONAL COURT THOSE
QUESTIONS WHICH ALONE PERTAIN TO THE INTERPRETATION OF THE TREATY . CONSEQUENTLY A DECISION SHOULD BE GIVEN BY THE
COURT NOT UPON THE VALIDITY OF AN ITALIAN LAW IN RELATION TO THE TREATY, BUT ONLY UPON THE INTERPRETATION OF THE
ABOVEMENTIONED ARTICLES IN THE CONTEXT OF THE POINTS OF LAW STATED BY THE GIUDICE CONCILIATORE .

ON THE SUBMISSION THAT AN INTERPRETATION IS NOT NECESSARY

THE COMPLAINT IS MADE THAT THE MILAN COURT HAS REQUESTED AN INTERPRETATION OF THE TREATY WHICH WAS NOT NECESSARY
FOR THE SOLUTION OF THE DISPUTE BEFORE IT .

SINCE, HOWEVER, ARTICLE 177 IS BASED UPON A CLEAR SEPARATION OF FUNCTIONS BETWEEN NATIONAL COURTS AND THE COURT OF
JUSTICE, IT CANNOT EMPOWER THE LATTER EITHER TO INVESTIGATE THE FACTS OF THE CASE OR TO CRITICIZE THE GROUNDS AND
PURPOSE OF THE REQUEST FOR INTERPRETATION .

ON THE SUBMISSION THAT THE COURT WAS OBLIGED TO APPLY THE NATIONAL LAW

THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT SUBMITS THAT THE REQUEST OF THE GIUDICE CONCILIATORE IS ' ABSOLUTELY INADMISSIBLE ', INASMUCH
AS A NATIONAL COURT WHICH IS OBLIGED TO APPLY A NATIONAL LAW CANNOT AVAIL ITSELF OF ARTICLE 177 .

BY CONTRAST WITH ORDINARY INTERNATIONAL TREATIES, THE EEC TREATY HAS CREATED ITS OWN LEGAL SYSTEM WHICH, ON THE
ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE TREATY, BECAME AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF THE MEMBER STATES AND WHICH THEIR
COURTS ARE BOUND TO APPLY .

BY CREATING A COMMUNITY OF UNLIMITED DURATION, HAVING ITS OWN INSTITUTIONS, ITS OWN PERSONALITY, ITS OWN LEGAL
CAPACITY AND CAPACITY OF REPRESENTATION ON THE INTERNATIONAL PLANE AND, MORE PARTICULARLY, REAL POWERS STEMMING
FROM A LIMITATION OF SOVEREIGNTY OR A TRANSFER OF POWERS FROM THE STATES TO THE COMMUNITY, THE MEMBER STATES
HAVE LIMITED THEIR SOVEREIGN RIGHTS, ALBEIT WITHIN LIMITED FIELDS, AND HAVE THUS CREATED A BODY OF LAW WHICH BINDS
BOTH THEIR NATIONALS AND THEMSELVES .

THE INTEGRATION INTO THE LAWS OF EACH MEMBER STATE OF PROVISIONS WHICH DERIVE FROM THE COMMUNITY, AND MORE
GENERALLY THE TERMS AND THE SPIRIT OF THE TREATY, MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE STATES, AS A COROLLARY, TO ACCORD
PRECEDENCE TO A UNILATERAL AND SUBSEQUENT MEASURE OVER A LEGAL SYSTEM ACCEPTED BY THEM ON A BASIS OF RECIPROCITY .
SUCH A MEASURE CANNOT THEREFORE BE INCONSISTENT WITH THAT LEGAL SYSTEM . THE EXECUTIVE FORCE OF COMMUNITY LAW
CANNOT VARY FROM ONE STATE TO ANOTHER IN DEFERENCE TO SUBSEQUENT DOMESTIC LAWS, WITHOUT JEOPARDIZING THE
ATTAINMENT OF THE OBJECTIVES OF THE TREATY SET OUT IN ARTICLE 5 ( 2 ) AND GIVING RISE TO THE DISCRIMINATION PROHIBITED BY
ARTICLE 7 .

THE OBLIGATIONS UNDERTAKEN UNDER THE TREATY ESTABLISHING THE COMMUNITY WOULD NOT BE UNCONDITIONAL, BUT MERELY
CONTINGENT, IF THEY COULD BE CALLED IN QUESTION BY SUBSEQUENT LEGISLATIVE ACTS OF THE SIGNATORIES . WHEREVER THE
TREATY GRANTS THE STATES THE RIGHT TO ACT UNILATERALLY, IT DOES THIS BY CLEAR AND PRECISE PROVISIONS ( FOR EXAMPLE
ARTICLES 15, 93 ( 3 ), 223, 224 AND 225 ). APPLICATIONS, BY MEMBER STATES FOR AUTHORITY TO DEROGATE FROM THE TREATY ARE
SUBJECT TO A SPECIAL AUTHORIZATION PROCEDURE ( FOR EXAMPLE ARTICLES 8 ( 4 ), 17 ( 4 ), 25, 26, 73, THE THIRD SUBPARAGRAPH
OF ARTICLE 93 ( 2 ), AND 226 ) WHICH WOULD LOSE THEIR PURPOSE IF THE MEMBER STATES COULD RENOUNCE THEIR OBLIGATIONS
BY MEANS OF AN ORDINARY LAW .

THE PRECEDENCE OF COMMUNITY LAW IS CONFIRMED BY ARTICLE 189, WHEREBY A REGULATION ' SHALL BE BINDING ' AND ' DIRECTLY
APPLICABLE IN ALL MEMBER STATES '. THIS PROVISION, WHICH IS SUBJECT TO NO RESERVATION, WOULD BE QUITE MEANINGLESS IF A
STATE COULD UNILATERALLY NULLIFY ITS EFFECTS BY MEANS OF A LEGISLATIVE MEASURE WHICH COULD PREVAIL OVER COMMUNITY
LAW .

IT FOLLOWS FROM ALL THESE OBSERVATIONS THAT THE LAW STEMMING FROM THE TREATY, AN INDEPENDENT SOURCE OF LAW,
COULD NOT, BECAUSE OF ITS SPECIAL AND ORIGINAL NATURE, BE OVERRIDDEN BY DOMESTIC LEGAL PROVISIONS, HOWEVER FRAMED,
WITHOUT BEING DEPRIVED OF ITS CHARACTER AS COMMUNITY LAW AND WITHOUT THE LEGAL BASIS OF THE COMMUNITY ITSELF
BEING CALLED INTO QUESTION .

THE TRANSFER BY THE STATES FROM THEIR DOMESTIC LEGAL SYSTEM TO THE COMMUNITY LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE RIGHTS AND
OBLIGATIONS ARISING UNDER THE TREATY CARRIES WITH IT A PERMANENT LIMITATION OF THEIR SOVEREIGN RIGHTS, AGAINST WHICH
A SUBSEQUENT UNILATERAL ACT INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE CONCEPT OF THE COMMUNITY CANNOT PREVAIL . CONSEQUENTLY ARTICLE
177 IS TO BE APPLIED REGARDLESS OF ANY DOMESTIC LAW, WHENEVER QUESTIONS RELATING TO THE INTERPRETATION OF THE
TREATY ARISE .
THE QUESTIONS PUT BY THE GIUDICE CONCILIATORE REGARDING ARTICLES 102, 93, 53, AND 37 ARE DIRECTED FIRST TO ENQUIRING
WHETHER THESE PROVISIONS PRODUCE DIRECT EFFECTS AND CREATE INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS WHICH NATIONAL COURTS MUST PROTECT,
AND, IF SO, WHAT THEIR MEANING IS .

ON THE INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 102

ARTICLE 102 PROVIDES THAT, WHERE ' THERE IS REASON TO FEAR ' THAT A PROVISION LAID DOWN BY LAW MAY CAUSE ' DISTORTION ',
THE MEMBER STATE DESIRING TO PROCEED THEREWITH SHALL ' CONSULT THE COMMISSION '; THE COMMISSION HAS POWER TO
RECOMMEND TO THE MEMBER STATES THE ADOPTION OF SUITABLE MEASURES TO AVOID THE DISTORTION FEARED .

THIS ARTICLE, PLACED IN THE CHAPTER DEVOTED TO THE ' APPROXIMATION OF LAWS ', IS DESIGNED TO PREVENT THE DIFFERENCES
BETWEEN THE LEGISLATION OF THE DIFFERENT NATIONS WITH REGARD TO THE OBJECTIVES OF THE TREATY FROM BECOMING MORE
PRONOUNCED .

BY VIRTUE OF THIS PROVISION, MEMBER STATES HAVE LIMITED THEIR FREEDOM OF INITIATIVE BY AGREEING TO SUBMIT TO AN
APPROPRIATE PROCEDURE OF CONSULTATION . BY BINDING THEMSELVES UNAMBIGUOUSLY TO PRIOR CONSULTATION WITH THE
COMMISSION IN ALL THOSE CASES WHERE THEIR PROJECTED LEGISLATION MIGHT CREATE A RISK, HOWEVER SLIGHT, OF A POSSIBLE
DISTORTION, THE STATES HAVE UNDERTAKEN AN OBLIGATION TO THE COMMUNITY WHICH BINDS THEM AS STATES, BUT WHICH DOES
NOT CREATE INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS WHICH NATIONAL COURTS MUST PROTECT . FOR ITS PART, THE COMMISSION IS BOUND TO ENSURE
RESPECT FOR THE PROVISIONS OF THIS ARTICLE, BUT THIS OBLIGATION DOES NOT GIVE INDIVIDUALS THE RIGHT TO ALLEGE, WITHIN
THE FRAMEWORK OF COMMUNITY LAW AND BY MEANS OF ARTICLE 177 EITHER FAILURE BY THE STATE CONCERNED TO FULFIL ANY OF
ITS OBLIGATIONS OR BREACH OF DUTY ON THE PART OF THE COMMISSION .

ON THE INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 93

UNDER ARTICLE 93 ( 1 ) AND ( 2 ), THE COMMISSION, IN COOPERATION WITH MEMBER STATES, IS TO ' KEEP UNDER CONSTANT REVIEW
ALL SYSTEMS OF AID EXISTING IN THOSE STATES ' WITH A VIEW TO THE ADOPTION OF APPROPRIATE MEASURES REQUIRED BY THE
FUNCTIONING OF THE COMMON MARKET .

BY VIRTUE OF ARTICLE 93 ( 3 ), THE COMMISSION IS TO BE INFORMED, IN SUFFICIENT TIME, OF ANY PLANS TO GRANT OR ALTER AID,
THE MEMBER STATE CONCERNED NOT BEING ENTITLED TO PUT ITS PROPOSED MEASURES INTO EFFECT UNTIL THE COMMUNITY
PROCEDURE, AND, IF NECESSARY, ANY PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COURT OF JUSTICE, HAVE BEEN COMPLETED .

THESE PROVISIONS, CONTAINED IN THE SECTION OF THE TREATY HEADED ' AIDS GRANTED BY STATES ', ARE DESIGNED, ON THE ONE
HAND, TO ELIMINATE PROGRESSIVELY EXISTING AIDS AND, ON THE OTHER HAND, TO PREVENT THE INDIVIDUAL STATES IN THE
CONDUCT OF THEIR INTERNAL AFFAIRS FROM INTRODUCING NEW AIDS ' IN ANY FORM WHATSOEVER ' WHICH ARE LIKELY DIRECTLY OR
INDIRECTLY TO FAVOUR CERTAIN UNDERTAKINGS OR PRODUCTS IN AN APPRECIABLE WAY, AND WHICH THREATEN, EVEN
POTENTIALLY, TO DISTORT COMPETITION . BY VIRTUE OF ARTICLE 92, THE MEMBER STATES HAVE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT SUCH AIDS
ARE INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE COMMON MARKET AND HAVE THUS IMPLICITLY UNDERTAKEN NOT TO CREATE ANY MORE, SAVE AS
OTHERWISE PROVIDED IN THE TREATY; IN ARTICLE 93, ON THE OTHER HAND, THEY HAVE MERELY AGREED TO SUBMIT THEMSELVES TO
APPROPRIATE PROCEDURES FOR THE ABOLITION OF EXISTING AIDS AND THE INTRODUCTION OF NEW ONES .

BY SO EXPRESSLY UNDERTAKING TO INFORM THE COMMISSION ' IN SUFFICIENT TIME ' OF ANY PLANS FOR AID, AND BY ACCEPTING THE
PROCEDURES LAID DOWN IN ARTICLE 93, THE STATES HAVE ENTERED INTO AN OBLIGATION WITH THE COMMUNITY, WHICH BINDS
THEM AS STATES BUT CREATES NO INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS EXCEPT IN THE CASE OF THE FINAL PROVISION OF ARTICLE 93 ( 3 ), WHICH IS
NOT IN QUESTION IN THE PRESENT CASE .

FOR ITS PART, THE COMMISSION IS BOUND TO ENSURE RESPECT FOR THE PROVISIONS OF THIS ARTICLE, AND IS REQUIRED, IN
COOPERATION WITH MEMBER STATES, TO KEEP UNDER CONSTANT REVIEW EXISTING SYSTEMS OF AIDS . THIS OBLIGATION DOES NOT,
HOWEVER, GIVE INDIVIDUALS THE RIGHT TO PLEAD, WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF COMMUNITY LAW AND BY MEANS OF ARTICLE 177,
EITHER FAILURE BY THE STATE CONCERNED TO FULFIL ANY OF ITS OBLIGATIONS OR BREACH OF DUTY ON THE PART OF THE
COMMISSION .

ON THE INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 53

BY ARTICLE 53 THE MEMBER STATES UNDERTAKE NOT TO INTRODUCE ANY NEW RESTRICTIONS ON THE RIGHT OF ESTABLISHMENT IN
THEIR TERRITORIES OF NATIONALS OF OTHER MEMBER STATES, SAVE AS OTHERWISE PROVIDED IN THE TREATY . THE OBLIGATION
THUS ENTERED INTO BY THE STATES SIMPLY AMOUNTS LEGALLY TO A DUTY NOT TO ACT, WHICH IS NEITHER SUBJECT TO ANY
CONDITIONS, NOR, AS REGARDS ITS EXECUTION OR EFFECT, TO THE ADOPTION OF ANY MEASURE EITHER BY THE STATES OR BY THE
COMMISSION . IT IS THEREFORE LEGALLY COMPLETE IN ITSELF AND IS CONSEQUENTLY CAPABLE OF PRODUCING DIRECT EFFECTS ON
THE RELATIONS BETWEEN MEMBER STATES AND INDIVIDUALS . SUCH AN EXPRESS PROHIBITION WHICH CAME INTO FORCE WITH THE
TREATY THROUGHOUT THE COMMUNITY, AND THUS BECAME AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE MEMBER STATES,
FORMS PART OF THE LAW OF THOSE STATES AND DIRECTLY CONCERNS THEIR NATIONALS, IN WHOSE FAVOUR IT HAS CREATED
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS WHICH NATIONAL COURTS MUST PROTECT .

THE INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 53 WHICH IS SOUGHT REQUIRES THAT IT BE CONSIDERED IN THE CONTEXT OF THE CHAPTER
RELATING TO THE RIGHT OF ESTABLISHMENT IN WHICH IT OCCURS . AFTER ENACTING IN ARTICLE 52 THAT ' RESTRICTIONS ON THE
FREEDOM OF ESTABLISHMENT OF NATIONALS OF A MEMBER STATE IN THE TERRITORY OF ANOTHER MEMBER STATE SHALL BE
ABOLISHED BY PROGRESSIVE STAGES ', THIS CHAPTER GOES ON IN ARTICLE 53 TO PROVIDE THAT ' MEMBER STATES SHALL NOT
INTRODUCE ANY NEW RESTRICTIONS ON THE RIGHT OF ESTABLISHMENT IN THEIR TERRITORIES OF NATIONALS OF OTHER MEMBER
STATES '. THE QUESTION IS, THEREFORE, ON WHAT CONDITIONS THE NATIONALS OF OTHER MEMBER STATES HAVE A RIGHT OF
ESTABLISHMENT . THIS IS DEALT WITH BY THE SECOND PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 52, WHERE IT IS STATED THAT FREEDOM OF
ESTABLISHMENT SHALL INCLUDE THE RIGHT TO TAKE UP AND PURSUE ACTIVITIES AS SELF-EMPLOYED PERSONS AND TO SET UP AND
MANAGE UNDERTAKINGS ' UNDER THE CONDITIONS LAID DOWN FOR ITS OWN NATIONALS BY THE LAW OF THE COUNTRY WHERE
SUCH ESTABLISHMENT IS EFFECTED '.

ARTICLE 53 IS THEREFORE SATISFIED SO LONG AS NO NEW MEASURE SUBJECTS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NATIONALS OF OTHER
MEMBER STATES TO MORE SEVERE RULES THAN THOSE PRESCRIBED FOR NATIONALS OF THE COUNTRY OF ESTABLISHMENT,
WHATEVER THE LEGAL SYSTEM GOVERNING THE UNDERTAKING .

ON THE INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 37

ARTICLE 37 ( 1 ) PROVIDES THAT MEMBER STATES SHALL PROGRESSIVELY ADJUST ANY ' STATE MONOPOLIES OF A COMMERCIAL
CHARACTER ' SO AS TO ENSURE THAT NO DISCRIMINATION REGARDING THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH GOODS ARE PROCURED AND
MARKETED EXISTS BETWEEN NATIONALS OF MEMBER STATES . BY ARTICLE 37 ( 2 ), THE MEMBER STATES ARE UNDER AN OBLIGATION
TO REFRAIN FROM INTRODUCING ANY NEW MEASURE WHICH IS CONTRARY TO THE PRINCIPLES LAID DOWN IN ARTICLE 37 ( 1 ).

THUS, MEMBER STATES HAVE UNDERTAKEN A DUAL OBLIGATION : IN THE FIRST PLACE, AN ACTIVE ONE TO ADJUST STATE
MONOPOLIES, IN THE SECOND PLACE, A PASSIVE ONE TO AVOID ANY NEW MEASURES . THE INTERPRETATION REQUESTED IS OF THE
SECOND OBLIGATION TOGETHER WITH ANY ASPECTS OF THE FIRST NECESSARY FOR THIS INTERPRETATION .

ARTICLE 37 ( 2 ) CONTAINS AN ABSOLUTE PROHIBITION : NOT AN OBLIGATION TO DO SOMETHING BUT AN OBLIGATION TO REFRAIN
FROM DOING SOMETHING . THIS OBLIGATION IS NOT ACCOMPANIED BY ANY RESERVATION WHICH MIGHT MAKE ITS
IMPLEMENTATION SUBJECT TO ANY POSITIVE ACT OF NATIONAL LAW . THIS PROHIBITION IS ESSENTIALLY ONE WHICH IS CAPABLE OF
PRODUCING DIRECT EFFECTS ON THE LEGAL RELATIONS BETWEEN MEMBER STATES AND THEIR NATIONALS .

SUCH A CLEARLY EXPRESSED PROHIBITION WHICH CAME INTO FORCE WITH THE TREATY THROUGHOUT THE COMMUNITY, AND SO
BECAME AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE MEMBER STATES, FORMS PART OF THE LAW OF THOSE STATES AND
DIRECTLY CONCERNS THEIR NATIONALS, IN WHOSE FAVOUR IT CREATES INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS WHICH NATIONAL COURTS MUST PROTECT
. BY REASON OF THE COMPLEXITY OF THE WORDING AND THE FACT THAT ARTICLES 37 ( 1 ) AND 37 ( 2 ) OVERLAP, THE
INTERPRETATION REQUESTED MAKES IT NECESSARY TO EXAMINE THEM AS PART OF THE CHAPTER IN WHICH THEY OCCUR . THIS
CHAPTER DEALS WITH THE ' ELIMINATION OF QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTIONS BETWEEN MEMBER STATES '. THE OBJECT OF THE
REFERENCE IN ARTICLE 37 ( 2 ) TO ' THE PRINCIPLES LAID DOWN IN PARAGRAPH ( 1 ) ' IS THUS TO PREVENT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
ANY NEW ' DISCRIMINATION REGARDING THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH GOODS ARE PROCURED AND MARKETED...BETWEEN
NATIONALS OF MEMBER STATES '. HAVING SPECIFIED THE OBJECTIVE IN THIS WAY, ARTICLE 37 ( 1 ) SETS OUT THE WAYS IN WHICH THIS
OBJECTIVE MIGHT BE THWARTED IN ORDER TO PROHIBIT THEM .

THUS, BY THE REFERENCE IN ARTICLE 37 ( 2 ), ANY NEW MONOPOLIES OR BODIES SPECIFIED IN ARTICLE 37 ( 1 ) ARE PROHIBITED IN SO
FAR AS THEY TEND TO INTRODUCE NEW CASES OF DISCRIMINATION REGARDING THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH GOODS ARE
PROCURED AND MARKETED . IT IS THEREFORE A MATTER FOR THE COURT DEALING WITH THE MAIN ACTION FIRST TO EXAMINE
WHETHER THIS OBJECTIVE IS BEING HAMPERED, THAT IS WHETHER ANY NEW DISCRIMINATION BETWEEN NATIONALS OF MEMBER
STATES REGARDING THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH GOODS ARE PROCURED AND MARKETED RESULTS FROM THE DISPUTED MEASURE
ITSELF OR WILL BE THE CONSEQUENCE THEREOF .

THERE REMAIN TO BE CONSIDERED THE MEANS ENVISAGED BY ARTICLE 37 ( 1 ). IT DOES NOT PROHIBIT THE CREATION OF ANY STATE
MONOPOLIES, BUT MERELY THOSE ' OF A COMMERCIAL CHARACTER ', AND THEN ONLY IN SO FAR AS THEY TEND TO INTRODUCE THE
CASES OF DISCRIMINATION REFERRED TO . TO FALL UNDER THIS PROHIBITION THE STATE MONOPOLIES AND BODIES IN QUESTION
MUST, FIRST, HAVE AS THEIR OBJECT TRANSACTIONS REGARDING A COMMERCIAL PRODUCT CAPABLE OF BEING THE SUBJECT OF
COMPETITION AND TRADE BETWEEN MEMBER STATES, AND SECONDLY MUST PLAY AN EFFECTIVE PART IN SUCH TRADE .

IT IS A MATTER FOR THE COURT DEALING WITH THE MAIN ACTION TO ASSESS IN EACH CASE WHETHER THE ECONOMIC ACTIVITY
UNDER REVIEW RELATES TO SUCH A PRODUCT WHICH, BY VIRTUE OF ITS NATURE AND THE TECHNICAL OR INTERNATIONAL
CONDITIONS TO WHICH IT IS SUBJECT, IS CAPABLE OF PLAYING AN EFFECTIVE PART IN IMPORTS OR EXPORTS BETWEEN NATIONALS OF
THE MEMBER STATES .

Decision on costs

THE COSTS INCURRED BY THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY AND THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT, WHICH
HAVE SUBMITTED OBSERVATIONS TO THE COURT, ARE NOT RECOVERABLE AND AS THESE PROCEEDINGS ARE, IN SO FAR AS THE
PARTIES TO THE MAIN ACTION ARE CONCERNED, A STEP IN THE ACTION PENDING BEFORE THE GIUDICE CONCILIATORE, MILAN, THE
DECISION ON COSTS IS A MATTER FOR THAT COURT .

Operative part

THE COURT

RULING UPON THE PLEA OF INADMISSIBILITY BASED ON ARTICLE 177 HEREBY DECLARES :

AS A SUBSEQUENT UNILATERAL MEASURE CANNOT TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER COMMUNITY LAW, THE QUESTIONS PUT BY THE GIUDICE
CONCILIATORE, MILAN, ARE ADMISSIBLE IN SO FAR AS THEY RELATE IN THIS CASE TO THE INTERPRETATION OF PROVISIONS OF THE EEC
TREATY;

AND ALSO RULES :

1 . ARTICLE 102 CONTAINS NO PROVISIONS WHICH ARE CAPABLE OF CREATING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS WHICH NATIONAL COURTS MUST
PROTECT;

2 . THOSE INDIVIDUAL PORTIONS OF ARTICLE 93 TO WHICH THE QUESTION RELATES EQUALLY CONTAIN NO SUCH PROVISIONS;

3 . ARTICLE 53 CONSTITUTES A COMMUNITY RULE CAPABLE OF CREATING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS WHICH NATIONAL COURTS MUST
PROTECT . IT PROHIBITS ANY NEW MEASURE WHICH SUBJECTS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NATIONALS OF OTHER MEMBER STATES TO
MORE SEVERE RULES THAN THOSE PRESCRIBED FOR NATIONALS OF THE COUNTRY OF ESTABLISHMENT, WHATEVER THE LEGAL SYSTEM
GOVERNING THE UNDERTAKINGS .

4 . ARTICLE 37 ( 2 ) IS IN ALL ITS PROVISIONS A RULE OF COMMUNITY LAW CAPABLE OF CREATING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS WHICH
NATIONAL COURTS MUST PROTECT .

IN SO FAR AS THE QUESTION PUT TO THE COURT IS CONCERNED, IT PROHIBITS THE INTRODUCTION OF ANY NEW MEASURE
CONTRARY TO THE PRINCIPLES OF ARTICLE 37 ( 1 ), THAT IS, ANY MEASURE HAVING AS ITS OBJECT OR EFFECT A NEW
DISCRIMINATION BETWEEN NATIONALS OF MEMBER STATES REGARDING THE CONDITIONS IN WHICH GOODS ARE PROCURED AND
MARKETED, BY MEANS OF MONOPOLIES OR BODIES WHICH MUST, FIRST, HAVE AS THEIR OBJECT TRANSACTIONS REGARDING A
COMMERCIAL PRODUCT CAPABLE OF BEING THE SUBJECT OF COMPETITION AND TRADE BETWEEN MEMBER STATES, AND SECONDLY
MUST PLAY AN EFFECTIVE PART IN SUCH TRADE;

AND FURTHER DECLARES :

THE DECISION ON THE COSTS OF THE PRESENT ACTION IS A MATTER FOR THE GUIDICE CONCILIATORE, MILAN .