The Ethics and Metaphysics of Divine Command Theory

Template: Royal A, Font: , Date: 29/04/2015; 3B2 version: 10.0.1465/W Unicode (Dec 22 2011) (APS_OT) Dir: //integrafs1/kcg/2-Pagination/TandF/RCIP_RAPS/ApplicationFiles/9780415881609_text.3d 25 THE ETHICS AND METAPHYSICS OF DIVINE COMMAND THEORY Mariam al-Attar Introduction Divine Command Theory (DCT) is a moral theory with definite metaphysical assumptions. It has never lacked adherents among the followers of the three Abrahamic traditions: Judaism, Christianity and Islam. Different aspects of the theory were emphasized by different authors and thus different labels were given to the same theory. George Hourani called it “theistic subjectivism” emphasizing the fact that it denies anything objective in the acts themselves which would make them good or bad (Hourani 1985: 15). It has also been labeled as “theological voluntarism,” emphasizing the fact that, according to this theory, it is the divine free will—which is not subject to any reason or requirements—that establishes morality and renders any action good or evil by command and prohibition. The central assumption of this view, which we choose to call Divine Command Theory (DCT) is that God is absolutely free to command anything, and that entails both aspects emphasized by those who called it ethical voluntarism and theistic subjectivism. What is sometimes called Modified Divine Command Theory which presupposes the goodness, love or purposefulness of God is not really a Divine Command Theory, since the ultimate basis of morality will then lie in the purposes or in a certain conception of good and bad rather than the commands and the prohibitions themselves. A Divine Command Theory which supports its argument by claiming that God is identical to the property of goodness or rightness is properly speaking incoherent and unintelligible. “A Divine Command Theory worthy of the name says that to be right is to be commanded by God, and to be wrong is to be forbidden by God” (Tuggi 2005: 53). It seems that in Christianity as in Islam, theologians have adhered to the theory in order to preserve God’s free will and omnipotence, since “the view that God’s will is subject to independent standards of right and wrong, good and evil, appears to compromise His omnipotence” (Wainwright 2005: 74). Hence, “the Divine Command Theory has traditionally been associated with a particular conception of God’s nature, one which emphasises His absolute power and freedom, and consequently 315 Template: Royal A, Font: , Date: 29/04/2015; 3B2 version: 10.0.1465/W Unicode (Dec 22 2011) (APS_OT) Dir: //integrafs1/kcg/2-Pagination/TandF/RCIP_RAPS/ApplicationFiles/9780415881609_text.3d M. AL-ATTAR the unknowability of His will by human reason” (Chandler 1985: 238). Nevertheless some hold different views and uphold different versions and interpretations of the theory, and refer to it as a “Modified Divine Command Theory” (Adams 1981). In Christian thought, the most prominent figures who argued for forms of DCT included Augustine (d. 430), John Scotus (d. 1308), William of Ockham (d. 1348), Martin Luther (d. 1546), Karl Barth (d. 1968) Emile Brunner (d. 1966) and finally the contemporary Divine Command Theorists such as Philip Quinn (d. 2004) and Robert Adams. Yet, though one contemporary philosopher holds that “the dominant theory of ethics is not Divine Command Theory. That honour goes to the Theory of Natural Law” (Rachels 2003: 53), others have interpreted Christian ethics, including that of Aquinas—the greatest of the natural law theorists—as endorsing DCT (Quinn 1990: 358). In Islamic ethics the proponents of DCT are generally held to be the Ashʿarites, i. e. those who belonged to the Ashʿarı- school of theology (kala-m) or, more precisely, that field of study which is related to the fundamental principles of the Islamic religion. The school of kala-m, named after Abu al-H . asan al-Ashʿarı (d. 324/935), prevailed in the Sunni Islam context from the eleventh century onward, although many Muslim scholars did not adhere to any of the kala-m schools and some even condemned it altogether. Some contemporary scholars have also interpreted all Ashʿarite thought, including that of al-Juwaynı- (d. 478/1085), Fakhr al-Dı-n al-Ra-zı-(d. 606/1209) and Abu- H . amid al-Ghazalı (d. 505/1111)—the first to articulate the purposes of law theory maqas.id al-sharı-ʿa—as endorsing ethical voluntarism (e.g. Hourani 1985: 140 and Leaman 1999). This chapter focuses on DCT, its criticism and its development. In Islamic thought DCT and other metaethical theories and ethical theories of action are mainly expounded in those books that are traditionally classified under the field of study known as the fundamental principles of law (us.u-l al-fiqh) and the fundamental principles of religion (us.u-l al-dı-n), another name given to theology (kala-m), rather than the books written under philosophy (falsafah). The early Muslim scholars seem to have discussed the judgments of the actions of those people who have not received revelation and the judgments of actions before revelation. In this they must have noticed that if it is possible for human actions to be judged as good or evil apart from revelation then certainly what makes an action good or evil is something other than divine commands. The moral values of actions before the arrival of revelation were affirmed by most of the scholars and jurists, before al-Ashʿarı- (Reinhart 1995: 25). In Islam the issue was: did God command what is good because it is good or did something become good because God commanded it? Long before the advent of Islam, Socrates raised a parallel philosophical question in Plato’s Euthyphro, which has been interpreted as a moral dilemma for a theist. For, if one answers the question by affirming that God commands what is good because it is good, then one undermines God’s free will and omnipotence because it assumes that His will is restricted by a prior standard of good and evil; and if one answers that anything becomes good because God commands it, one undermines God’s goodness and renders His will arbitrary. In Islamic thought the issue was discussed under the title “good and bad or evil” (al-h.usn wal-qubh.). The specific question was whether God or 316 Template: Royal A, Font: , Date: 29/04/2015; 3B2 version: 10.0.1465/W Unicode (Dec 22 2011) (APS_OT) Dir: //integrafs1/kcg/2-Pagination/TandF/RCIP_RAPS/ApplicationFiles/9780415881609_text.3d DIVINE COMMAND THEORY His divine law (sharı-’a) establishes morality or whether it only indicates it (al-sharʿ muthabbit am mubayyin). If divine law establishes morality then no good or evil can be perceived apart from what is commanded or prohibited by God, because no good and evil could have possibly existed before revelation or without revelation. If divine law establishes morality, then the ontological basis of morality fully depends on His absolute will and our knowledge of good and evil is only attainable through revelation. Thus moral ontology and moral epistemology would explicitly depend on divine commands. Al-Ashʿarı- seems to be the first to hold such a position. Before him the prevalent school of kala-m was that of the Muʿtazila. Muʿtazilite scholars held different views about the nature of moral values, yet they all agreed that good and evil are known by reason. Some early Muʿtazilites such as Abu al-Hudhayl al-’Alla-f (d. 227/841) held that the moral values of actions are intrinsic properties of actions, some maintained that it is the state of the agent that determines the quality of the action, and others, mainly late Muʿtazilites such as ‘Abd al-Jabba-r al-Asadaba-dı- (d. 415/1025), maintained that it is rather the state of the action itself which includes the consequences and the circumstances of the action that determines its moral value (al-Attar 2010: 123–35). Al-Ashʿarı-’s DCT Initially, al-Ashʿarı- adhered to the Muʿtazilite school of kala-m. When he was around forty years old, however, he came into disagreement with his Muʿtazilite master Abu ‘Alı- al-Juba-i (d. 303/915) over various matters, including the issue of good and evil (masʾalat al-h.usn wal-qubh.). Other areas of disagreement included the question of whether the Qurʾa-n is created in time (muh.dath) or whether it is eternal (qadı-m), the nature of divine attributes, divine justice, and free will of human beings. Al-Ashʿarı-, according to the Ashʿarite scholar al-Shahrasta-nı- (d. 548/1153), held that “all knowledge is derived by reason (al-’aql), but obligation is established by revelation” (al-Shahrasta-nı-, n.d.: 371). Al-Shahrasta-nı- explains that this was held to deny rational obligation (al-wuju-b al-’aqlı-), not to deny the knowledge occurring by reason. Thus, knowing that something is good is separate from knowing that it is right or obligatory or recommended. In other words, ethical judgments are not grounded in value judgments. Knowledge of ethical judgments is explicitly derived from divine commands and prohibitions; therefore, value judgments will depend on ethical judgments and ethical judgments are divine judgments known from His commands and prohibitions. Therefore, knowledge of what is the case is known by reason, yet knowledge of what ought to be done is derived from divine commands. Al-Ashʿarı- absolutely rejected the early attempts of the Muʿtazilites to establish moral ontology. In that he might have been in a way justified, because the early Muʿtazilites believed that good and evil are objective qualities of things and actions. According to the Baghda-dian theory (a branch of the Muʿtazilites), inflicting pain and injury must be evil by species, and correspondingly, pleasure and benefit must be good by species. Lying can only have the property of evilness and truth telling can only have the property of goodness just as fire can only produce heat and ice cooling. Moral values are causal determinants (maʿa-nı-) that necessitate the goodness or 317 Template: Royal A, Font: , Date: 29/04/2015; 3B2 version: 10.0.1465/W Unicode (Dec 22 2011) (APS_OT) Dir: //integrafs1/kcg/2-Pagination/TandF/RCIP_RAPS/ApplicationFiles/9780415881609_text.3d M. AL-ATTAR badness of actions just as redness or yellowness determine the color of an object. However, the late Baghda-dian and the Bas.ran Muʿtazilites abandoned this theory, and Abu- Ha-shim al-Jubba-ʾı- (d. 321/933), a contemporary of al-Ashʿarı-, introduced a different theory known as the theory of states (al-ah.wa-l), which, according to him, is the notion that it is the state of the agent that determines the moral quality of the action. Thus, if something is perceived with aversion, it is considered evil (qabı-h.), and if it is perceived with attraction then it is considered good (h.asan). Thus the same genus of action such as pain can sometimes be good and sometimes evil depending on whether it is performed for the benefit of the agent or not. For example, the pain of studying hard and the pain experienced when undergoing certain treatments or medications would be considered good, while pain inflicted without any perceived benefit would be considered evil. Such a theory could have also easily been rejected on the ground that it makes moral values subjective by having them dependant on the state of the agent. Both the theory of causal determinants (al-maʿa-nı-) and the theory of states (al-ah.wa-l) were introduced to understand divine attributes, as divine attributes were understood to be maʿa-nı- or ah.wa-l according to the different schools of the Muʿtazilites. In understanding the nature of God and explaining His attributes the Muʿtazilites applied a methodological principle known as “the analogy of the invisible to the visible” (qiya-s al-gha-ʾib ʾala al-sha-hid). The states (ah.wa-l), unlike the determinant causes (maʿa-nı-), were not considered intrinsic properties of actions, but rather conditions, circumstances and consequences that determine the value of an action. Later, ‘Abd al-Jabba-r developed the theory of ah.wa-l and clarified that it is the state of the action rather than the state of the agent that determines the moral quality of the action. None of the above theories were accepted by al-Ashʿarı- or his followers, although the theory as articulated by ‘Abd al-Jabba-r does not seem to have been given enough consideration or criticism by the Ashʿarites. For al-Ashʿarı-, the theory of ah.wa-l would only mean that good and evil are subjective and that both depend on the individual who perceives them with aversion or attraction. Good and evil are certainly not qualified to provide the foundations for moral obligation. Thus, it is only the commandments and the prohibitions of the absolute being who is not subjected to pain and pleasure and who has no desires qualified to establish moral obligation. However, His commands and prohibitions are not related to His will, which is a rather difficult idea to grasp. We are told that some Ashʿarites distinguished between divine creative will and His normative will since He might command something and will the opposite, which seems to be evident from the examples of people who were commanded to believe but in fact they became disbelievers. In order to preserve divine omnipotence some Ashʿarites held that no one becomes a disbeliever against divine will, which certainly implies that God commands what He does not want to happen. The main reason given for the conversion of al-Ashʿarı- is related to the issue of divine will and divine justice. Most of the Muʿtazilites held that the principle of divine justice made it obligatory for God to do for people what was in their best interest. Al-Ashʿarı- is alleged to have asked Abu ʿAlı- al-Jubba-ʾı- about the likely fate of three brothers: a believer, an unbeliever and one who died as a child. Al-Jubba-ʾıanswered that the first would be rewarded, the second punished and the third 318 Template: Royal A, Font: , Date: 29/04/2015; 3B2 version: 10.0.1465/W Unicode (Dec 22 2011) (APS_OT) Dir: //integrafs1/kcg/2-Pagination/TandF/RCIP_RAPS/ApplicationFiles/9780415881609_text.3d DIVINE COMMAND THEORY neither rewarded nor punished. To the objection that God should have allowed the third to live so that he might have been rewarded, al-Jubba-ʾı- replied that God knew that had the child lived he would have become an unbeliever. Al-Ashʿarı- then objected by saying: why in that case did God not make the second brother die as a child in order to save him from Hell? For al-Ashʿarı-, it seems that there is no convincing reason for God to will something over its opposite and no reason for Him to command something rather than the opposite. Al-Ashʿarı- even accepted the abhorrent implication of such position, which is that lying and other conduct that is generally considered wicked would have been good if God had declared them so (Hourani 1985: 123). From the above it is clear that al-Ashʿarı-’s theory was a clear example of a proper Divine Command Theory, as understood today. Criticisms of DCT The Bas.ran Muʿtazilites who belonged to the school of Abu Ha-shim criticized the Ashʿarite view and held that divine commands are not issued to change the facts of good and evil but to guide human conduct. “Law (al-shar’) does not change the facts” (al-Jabba-r n.d., vol. 6: 323). Divine law only indicates and does not establish morality. Any form of speech, whether a command or statement does not change the moral quality of an act: Prohibitions indicate the depravation or corruption (fasa-d) of what is prohibited and His commands indicate the righteousness (s.ala-h.) of what He commands. Both [command and prohibition] indicate the states of actions, not the fact that they necessitate (yu-jiba-ni) the evilness of an action and the goodness of another. (al-Jabba-r n.d., vol. 6: 103) Moreover good and evil cannot be established by commands and prohibitions. Since all Muslims, including the Ashʿarites, believe that God is good although He is neither commanded nor prohibited: Those who say that good and evil are determined by commands and prohibitions would be bound to say that the acts of God are neither good nor evil, because He is neither commanded nor prohibited, which is contrary to what is anonymously accepted, and contradicts the religion. (al-Jabba-r n.d, vol. 6: p. 89) Another criticism raised against DCT is that God is worshiped and thanked for His goodness. So, if He does not command what is good, then why would He deserve thanks and worship, “for how could He deserve thanks and worship for what is not good?” (al-Jabba-r n.d., vol. 6: 108). Also al-Jabba-r stated that all people, regardless of their religion share the basic knowledge of morality. If good and evil were known only through Scripture, then the rational human beings who do not believe in God 319 Template: Royal A, Font: , Date: 29/04/2015; 3B2 version: 10.0.1465/W Unicode (Dec 22 2011) (APS_OT) Dir: //integrafs1/kcg/2-Pagination/TandF/RCIP_RAPS/ApplicationFiles/9780415881609_text.3d M. AL-ATTAR would not have any knowledge of good and evil, which is certainly not the case; hence, good and evil are not only known through revelation, but through human reason. He says: If good and evil are known only through divine commands, then it would necessarily follow that the materialists (al-dahriyya) and others who believe in the pre-eternity of the world would not know or doubt, given their state [as atheists], the evil of injustice and other such evils. This is wrong because it is based on the view that they, despite their maturity of the intellect (kama-l ‘uqu-li-him), do not know that which is clearly observed (al-mudraka-t). (al-Jabba-r n.d., vol. 6: p. 89) One might wonder whether the proponents of DCT in Islam have presented any examples from the Qurʾa-n, which would support their theory. This might be a text that proves that God has commanded things that would have been considered evil if not commanded, or, in other words, a text that indicates certain divine commandments contradicts common morality, and thus would have no rationale behind being commanded. Yet it seems that no textual commandment has ever been perceived as contradicting common morality. Almost all Muslim scholars, whether Ashʿarites or Muʿtazilites, agreed on the view that the lawgiver issues commands and prohibitions for the best benefit of people, although most of the Ashʿarites explicitly rejected the view that God is obliged by virtue of His nature to command what is good for people. They must have been concerned about the divine free will and omnipotence which could have been compromised by holding Him bound to command certain things. Some contemporary divine command theorists coined the term “the immoralities of the patriarchs” which refers to certain incidents where God is perceived to have commanded what would, if not commanded, be perceived as immoral (Quinn 1990: 359). Among those immoralities applied by some philosophers in support of their theory, only the story of Abraham has a parallel in Islam. However, it seems that the story of Abraham or Ibra-hı-m has never been invoked in support of DCT in Islam, not even by the strongest proponents of the theory. ‘Abd al-Jabba-r’s understanding of the story of Ibra-hı-m, as mentioned in the Qurʾa-n (37:101–110) seems to allow for the interpretation that the command to slaughter his son was never issued to Ibra-hı-m but was merely a dream misunderstood by Ibra-hı-m as a divine command. ‘Abd al-Jabba-r says: We have shown that the sacrifice (al-fida-ʾ) does not indicate that slaughter had been commanded … but when Ibra-hı-m strongly suspected that he would be ordered to slaughter, and felt what all fathers would feel, God provided a substitute for what he expected would be a command. If God had really commanded him [to slaughter his son] He would not have eliminated the command, either by prevention, or by prohibition or by sacrifice. (al-Jabba-r n.d., vol. 6: 321) ‘Abd al-Jabba-r, the chief Muʿtazilite figure of the late tenth to early eleventh century, wrote a 20 volume book, Summa on the Principles of Religion (Al-Mughnı-), where he 320 Template: Royal A, Font: , Date: 29/04/2015; 3B2 version: 10.0.1465/W Unicode (Dec 22 2011) (APS_OT) Dir: //integrafs1/kcg/2-Pagination/TandF/RCIP_RAPS/ApplicationFiles/9780415881609_text.3d DIVINE COMMAND THEORY expounded and developed various Muʿtazilite doctrines. He propounded a sophisticated theory of moral action that is mainly teleological in nature, although it incorporated some deontological rules which the Muʿtazilites considered to be necessarily known, like the evilness of lying and injustice. Moral principles, such as the evilness of injustice and the obligation to return a deposit, constitute necessary ethical knowledge and are, according to ‘Abd al-Jabba-r, the basis for rational obligation (taklı-f ‘aqlı-) (al-Jabba-r 1965: 298). He clearly distinguishes between rational obligation and religious obligation (taklı-f sam’ı-). The latter no doubt includes rituals and some dietary rules and only applies to those who know Islam and accept the religion, whereas the former applies to all rational human beings. Moreover, it is on the basis of the first one, i.e. rational obligation, that ‘Abd al-Jabba-r’s ethical theory is established. Both kinds of obligation are considered to be assigned by God, yet ‘Abd al-Jabba-r, like Abu- al-Hudhayl before him, believes in “obedience not directed toward God” that might be practiced by all people regardless of their religious beliefs. Performing rational obligations is considered by him a kind of worship, he stated: Rational worship (al-’iba-da-t al-’aqliya), in order to be properly performed, does not require anything except to be performed in the right way. Approaching the One who has to be worshiped is not a condition for the validity of rational worship, but it is a condition for religious worship (al-’iba-da-t al-shar’iya) [like praying and fasting]. (al-Jabba-r n.d., vol. 4: 329) All rational beings necessarily know the evil of lying and injustice, and the goodness of truth telling, of returning a deposit and of thanking a benefactor. These deontological rules are introduced within a teleological framework as has already been indicated, where good and evil are ultimately perceived as harm and benefit, respectively. The necessary moral knowledge of moral rules was disputed by the late Ashʿarites, yet the teleological framework propounded by the Muʿtazilites was adopted, adapted and further developed by the late Ashʿarite scholars. Harm (mafsada) and benefit (manfaʿa) were the ultimate foundations of moral and legal judgments and it was agreed upon among almost all Muslim jurists that mas.lah.a—which literally means advantage or benefit—is the ultimate foundation and the reason behind all commands and prohibitions. For something to be judged permissible, recommended or obligatory it has first to be good. According to the author of al-Muʾtamad, Abu al-H . usayn al-Bas.ri (d. 436/1044), the reason (‘illa) of its goodness is its being beneficial. However, for a benefit to be good, according to the Bas.ran Mu’tazilites, including Abu al-H . usayn, it should be void of any aspect of evil, such as lying, ignorance, not thanking a benefactor (kufuk niʿma), harming oneself, or harming others (al-Basri n.d.: 315). Thus it is pure benefit that is intrinsically good. Al-manfaʿa is what demands the action and justifies it (al-Basri n.d.: 315). It is an end desired for itself, and thus it is intrinsically good, just as pleasure or happiness is a good in itself, and it has intrinsic, not instrumental, value. Thus it was considered the ultimate purpose of divine law. ‘Abd al-Jabbar investigated the nature of values. For him the value of an action is not inherent in the action as held by some of the Baghda-dian Muʿtazilites, nor by the 321 Template: Royal A, Font: , Date: 29/04/2015; 3B2 version: 10.0.1465/W Unicode (Dec 22 2011) (APS_OT) Dir: //integrafs1/kcg/2-Pagination/TandF/RCIP_RAPS/ApplicationFiles/9780415881609_text.3d M. AL-ATTAR state of the agent, i.e. feeling attraction or repulsion; rather, it is determined by the state of the action considering its circumstances and consequences. Pain and pleasure were familiar concepts in Muʿtazilite kala-m. But instead of introducing something like the hedonistic calculus of Bentham by taking into consideration the extent of the pleasure and the intensity of the pleasure or even discriminating between high and low pleasures as did Mill, he recognized that what might be a source of joy and pleasure to someone might in the same time be the source of pain and sorrow to someone else. Therefore benefit (manfaʿa) can be defined in terms of pleasure, although as seen above it is pleasure without causing harm to oneself or the others and without being polluted with any aspects of evil doing such as lying or being ungrateful or unjust. Divine Purposes Theory (maqa-s.id al-Sharı-ʿa) Until recently it has been believed, by most of the scholars who studied Ashʿarite moral thought, that all of them adhered to DCT in ethics. This was due to their declared position, since they insisted on holding to the Ashʿarite doctrine that the divine law establishes morality and to their occasionalist metaphysical framework. However, this has been disputed in some recently published literature. Their thought has been interpreted as endorsing soft Natural Law Theory, compared to the hard Natural Law Theory of the Muʿtazilites (Emon 2010). Al-Ghaza-lı- (d. 505/1111) held that al-mas.lah.a originally means promoting a benefit (manfaʿa) or preventing a harm (d.arar) (al-Ghaza-lı- 1995: 258). But for al-Ghaza-lı- this is not the true sense of mas.lah.a, because such a conception of mas.lah.a suffers from important weaknesses. First, people might prefer immediate benefit over long term benefit. Second, they might prefer limited over universal benefit. Third, it might lead to a conflict of interests when different groups of people have different benefits. Al-Ghaza-lıoffers an interesting example when he investigates the rightness or wrongness of torturing an individual accused of theft to make him confess. He says that Anas bin Malik accepted torture on the ground of al-mas.lah.a, but al-Ghaza-lı- rejects this vision, not on the basis of rejecting the doctrine of mas.lah.a, but because this sort of mas.lah.a contradicts another one, which is that of the tortured person. Al-Ghaza-lısays: “He might be innocent and not torturing the guilty is better than torturing the innocent” (al-Ghaza-lı- 1995: 260). For him, not torturing a probably innocent man is far more important than returning any stolen thing, since preserving a human’s life and dignity has priority over preserving one’s property. Al-Ghaza-lı- maintained that divine law has purposes and these consist in the preservation of the true mas.lah.a. However, he explains that bringing benefit and repelling harm are human purposes (maqas.id al-khalq). The true mas.lah.a is preserving the purposes of divine law maqas.id al-sharı-’a. He writes, What we mean by mas.lah.a is maintaining the purposes of the law (shar’). The purposes of law concerning human beings are five: preservation of their religion, life, mind, progeny and property. Thus whatever entails preserving these principles (us.u-l) is mas.lah.a and whatever destroys them is corruption (mafsada), and repelling it is mas.lah.a. (al-Ghaza-lı- 1995: 258) 322 Template: Royal A, Font: , Date: 29/04/2015; 3B2 version: 10.0.1465/W Unicode (Dec 22 2011) (APS_OT) Dir: //integrafs1/kcg/2-Pagination/TandF/RCIP_RAPS/ApplicationFiles/9780415881609_text.3d DIVINE COMMAND THEORY Al-Ghaza-lı- interprets all human purposes and intentions in a way that corresponds to the theory of psychological egoism, which is a descriptive theory that interprets human motivations as being egoistic and interprets all human actions in a way that fits the theory. Al-Ghaza-lı- does not acknowledge the moral value of an action that is performed for altruistic reasons. According to him, even when one rescues an animal or a human being from death one does it out of sympathy and compassion, since one imagines oneself in that situation and finds it abhorrent not to be helped (al-Ghaza-lı- 1994: 151). Even the intentions of the one who dies for a cause are considered by al-Ghaza-lı- to be motivated by the desire to be remembered and praised (al-Ghaza-lı- 1994: 154). No moral value can be attached to any action if not performed out of a desire to act in accordance with divine wishes. That, in a way, reminds us of Kant and his categorical imperative where the right action is that which is performed for the right reason, which is to do one’s duty. However, unlike Kant, the late Ashʿarites denied the existence of absolute moral rules. They maintained that lying is not always evil, since sometimes it is good when lying is necessary to save someone’s life. Even the divine rules and commandments according to which we have to act are not absolute deontological rules simply because those are perceived to serve some purposes and those purposes are the universal necessities of human existence or purposes of divine law (maqa-s.id al-sharı-ʿa). Therefore, those latter are the things that have the intrinsic absolute values: life, religion, intellect, progeny and property. In the articulation of the purposes of the divine law the influence of ‘Abd al-Jabba-r may be detected. He stated, “If God had no purpose in assigning an obligation, then the assignment of the obligation would be irrational (qabı-h)” (al-Jabba-r 1965: 407). Further, since He is beyond harm and benefit, His purpose (gharadu-hu) must be for the benefit of the addressee (al-mukallaf) (al-Jabba-r 1965: 410). Divine Command Theory advocated by al-Ashʿarı- and other Ashʿarites scholars implies that “it is fundamentally and ultimately impossible to explain God’s commands in terms of any purpose or end” (Frank 1983: 214). Al-Ghaza-lı- and the late Ashʿarites like Fakhr al-Dı-n al-Ra-zı- maintained that divine regulations and the interests of man lie side by side or exist together, yet they did not admit of a causal relationship between them, that is, they did not say that the interests of man cause divine commands, since that must have been considered blasphemous. The late Ashʿarites were eager not only to establish a normative theory that is based on the sharı-ʿa, but a theory that would provide us with a criterion for what is a true mas.lah.a, or what needs to be preserved in order to safeguard humans’ well-being. The Muʿtazilites established the foundations of a teleological moral theory and the late Ashʿarites developed it into a theory which set the priorities that need to be observed when deriving moral judgments. Conclusion This chapter explored divine command theory in medieval Arabo-Islamic thought. It has been shown that al-Ashʿarı- was most probably the first one to explicitly hold that good and evil are only known through divine commands and prohbitions. The Muʿtazilite ‘Abd al-Jabba-r raised sound criticisms against the Ashʿarite conception of 323 Template: Royal A, Font: , Date: 29/04/2015; 3B2 version: 10.0.1465/W Unicode (Dec 22 2011) (APS_OT) Dir: //integrafs1/kcg/2-Pagination/TandF/RCIP_RAPS/ApplicationFiles/9780415881609_text.3d M. AL-ATTAR good and evil and developed an understanding of moral values and moral judgement that is compatible with a teleological theory in ethics. This teleological aspect was incorporated in the late Ashʿarite theory which can be called Divine Purposes Theory, rather than Divine Command Theory. Further Reading Hourani, G. F. (1971) Islamic Rationalism. The Ethics of ‘Abd al-Jabba-r, Oxford: Clarendon Press. Opwis, F. (2010) Mas.lah.a and the Purposes of Law, Leiden: Brill. Reinhart, K. (1995) Before Revelation: the Boundaries of Muslim Moral Thought, New York: State University of New York. Shihadeh, A. (2006) The Teleological Ethics of Fakhr al-Dı-n al-Ra-zı-, Leiden: Brill. References Adams, R. M. (1981) “A Modified Divine Command Theory of Ethical Wrongness,” in P. Helm (ed.), Divine Command and Morality, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 83–108. al-Attar, M. (2010) Islamic Ethics, Divine Command Theory in Arabo-Islamic Thought, London: Routledge. al-Basri, A. H. (n.d.) al-Muʾtamad fı- Us.u-l al-Fiqh, vol. 2, Khalı-l al-Mays (ed.), Beirut: Da-r al-Kutub al-’Ilmiya. al-Ghaza-lı- (1994) Al-Iqtis.a-d fil-Iʿtiqa-d, Damascus: Al-Hikma. ——. (1995) Al-Mustasfa, vol. 1, Beirut: Dar Sadir. al-Jabba-r (n.d.), Mughnı-, al-Ira-da, vol. 6, part 2, M. M. Qa-sim (ed.), Cairo. ——. (n.d.) Mughnı-, Ruʾyat al-Ba-rı-, vol. 4, M. M. Qa-sim (ed.), Cairo. ——. (1965) Mughnı-, al-Taklı-f, vol. 11, M. ‘A. al-Najja-r & A. al-Najja-r (eds.), Cairo. al-Shahrasta-nı-, M. b.-K. (n.d.) Niha-yat al-Iqda-m fı- ‘Ilm al-Kala-m, A. Jayu-m (ed.), Cairo: Maktabat al-Thaqa-fa al-Dı-niya. Chandler, J. (1985) “Divine Command Theories and the Appeal to Love,” American Philosophical Quarterly 22: 231–9. Collins, J. (2003) “The Zeal of Phinehas: The Bible and the Legitimation of violence,” Journal of Biblical Literature 122, 1: pp. 3–21. Emon, A. M. (2010) Islamic Natural Law Theories, New York: Oxford University Press. Frank, R. M. (1983) “Moral Obligation in Classical Muslim Theology,” Journal of religious ethics 11: 204–223. Hourani, G. F. (1985) Reason and Tradition in Islamic Ethics, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press. Leaman, O. (1999) “Ethics,” in A Brief Introduction to Islamic Philosophy, USA: Blackwell, pp. 108–19. Quinn, P. (1990) “The Recent Revival of Divine Command Ethics,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50: 345–65. Rachels, J. (2003) The Elements of Moral Philosophy, New York: McGraw-Hill. Regional Bureau for Arab States (2003) United Nations Development Programme – The Arab Human Development Report, Amman: National Press. Reinhart, K. (1995) Before Revelation: the Boundaries of Muslim Moral Thought, New York: State University of New York. Tuggi, D. (2005) “Necessity Control and the Divine Command Theory,” Sophia 44, 1: 53–75. Wainwright, W. J. (2005) Religion and Morality, United Kingdom: Ashgate. 324