Fire and rescue service did not arrive at Manchester Arena bombing until more than two hours later after 'massive' breakdown in communication, public inquiry hears

  • Bomb went off at 10.31pm on May 22 2017, ambulances arrived 20 minutes later 
  • Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service arrived at the arena at 12.49am  
  • Timings were compared to average deployment time for GMFRS of six minutes

By NICOLE CONNER FOR MAILONLINE

Published: | Updated:

A 'massive' breakdown in communications meant the fire and rescue service did not arrive at the Manchester Arena bombing until more than two hours later, the inquiry into the attack has heard. 

The public inquiry was told the length of time it took for firefighters to attend the incident which killed 22 people and injured hundreds was 'unacceptable'.  

Officers from British Transport Police, Greater Manchester Police (GMP) and a paramedic from North West Ambulance Service had entered the City Room foyer just over 20 minutes after the blast.

A 'massive' breakdown in communications meant the fire and rescue service did not arrive at the Manchester Arena bombing until more than two hours later

A 'massive' breakdown in communications meant the fire and rescue service did not arrive at the Manchester Arena bombing until more than two hours later 

This was where Salman Abedi detonated his shrapnel-laden device at 10.31pm on the evening of May 22 2017. 

Paul Greaney QC, counsel to the inquiry, said the first firefighters from Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service (GMFRS) went into Victoria railway station, adjoining the Arena complex, at 12.49am.

He outlined that was two hours and 15 minutes after the first notification to North West Fire Control of an explosion.

It was also two hours and nine minutes after that senior firefighter Andy Berry was first alerted.

It was one hour and 58 minutes after each of the other emergency services involved actually had someone within the City Room.

He also said it was one hour and 10 minutes after the last living casualty had been removed from the foyer.

First firefighters from Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service (GMFRS) went into Victoria railway station, adjoining the Arena complex, at 12.49am (pictured arriving)

First firefighters from Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service (GMFRS) went into Victoria railway station, adjoining the Arena complex, at 12.49am (pictured arriving) 

All these timings were compared to an average deployment time - getting to the scene - for GMFRS of six minutes. 

Station manager Mr Berry was the duty Nilo (national inter-agency liaison officer) on the night of the attack.

His responsibilities were to provide internal tactical advice to incident commanders and external advice to other agencies about resources and capability.

Mr Greaney asked him: 'Is the period that it took GMFRS firefighters to enter the station acceptable to you as a senior firefighter?'

Mr Berry replied: 'No it's not sir.'

Salman Abedi detonated his shrapnel-laden device at 10.31pm on the evening of May 22 2017 killing 22 people

Salman Abedi detonated his shrapnel-laden device at 10.31pm on the evening of May 22 2017 killing 22 people 

Mr Greaney said: 'If firefighters had entered the station at what I would describe as a relevant time, did they have value to bring to the emergency response?'

The witness said: 'Absolutely sir and they wanted to be there.'

The inquiry has heard casualties in the City Room were evacuated on makeshift stretchers by police officers and members of the public.

This is because specialist fire crews with enhanced first aid equipment, trauma dressings, tourniquets and rescue stretchers were never sent.

Mr Greaney went on: 'Are you able to explain for us as simply as possible why the fire and rescue service did not arrive at all until well over two hours after the explosion and why specialist assets never arrived?'

Mr Berry said: 'I would say there was a massive breakdown in communications in the initial stages. 

'The JESIP (Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Principles) principles weren't implemented correctly which led to us not receiving the information I required to be able to do my job effectively and deploy our resources.

'It's a tri-service type incident so between the three main services there was a lack of communication.'

The inquiry heard Mr Berry made seven failed attempts to contact GMP's Force Duty Officer Dale Sexton, the initial commander of the incident, within minutes of being told of the explosion.

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