The German Army at Ypres 1914

Prologue

On the face of it, the raising, equipping and training of the reserve corps which made up the bulk of Fourth Army was a feat of organisation of the highest class. The one thing of which there was no shortage in Germany in 1914 was manpower. Just as in other belligerent countries, men flocked to join up – especially to the artillery, because there was a totally erroneous view that service in that arm was intrinsically less dangerous and definitely more interesting than life in the infantry.

Major Franz Rubenbauer Bavarian Reserve Infantry Regiment 16¹

"In order to make best use of surplus manpower, the government decided in August 1914 to call for the training of volunteer formations in every German contingent and what a reaction this call achieved! Thousands responded. They came from every class and walk of life and every trade and profession competed with one another. Just as one hundred years before, it was a case of, ‘the King called and everyone came!’ The result was a national experience of such a profound nature that there can hardly ever have occurred its equal. It was a display of a single, united, determination to defend all that was best: the Fatherland and its freedom! Millions of souls had but one intention; millions of hearts beat as one. That was the spirit of those days.

The recruiting centres could hardly cope with the flood which broke over them. Every barracks, the school buildings and all other available large scale accommodation was filled to overflowing with volunteers. They certainly lacked training, but they burned with the desire to close with the enemy. So the men were there, but an army is not made up of men alone! There were deficiencies of all kinds. The necessary weapons and equipment were only assembled with difficulty; the military training cost an enormous amount of work but, with good will, much was achieved. Systematic peacetime training was out of the question, but this was partly compensated for by the intelligence of those under training, their high quality and their patriotic enthusiasm.

Manning aside, inevitably corners had to be cut in order to have all the new formations ready for deployment within two months of the outbreak of the war, as a glance at the reported difficulties makes abundantly clear. Rubenbauer may have made light of them, but the problems of improvising so many formations when the metaphorical cupboard was bare were enormous. Reserve Infantry Regiment 201, for example, noted that, ‘The companies lacked suitable junior leadership, namely, leutnants and senior and junior NCOs. The available command structure, drawn mainly from the Landwehr and Landsturm, had themselves to be trained before they could train others.’² Much the same point was made by Reserve Infantry Regiment 236, ‘The question of command presented enormous difficulties. The senior retired officers were completely out of date and had no understanding of contemporary armaments or modern command on the battlefield. There were also no trained staffs. To help him to solve the outstanding military and administrative tasks, the only active duty officers the regimental commander [Oberst Wilhelmi] could only call on were Leutnant Rive, of Infantry Regiment 65, as regimental adjutant and Leutnant Heldt, of Infantry Regiment 160, as adjutant of the 2nd Battalion.’³

Lack of equipment was bemoaned by numerous other regiments. ‘Initially, equipping the battalions with uniforms was extremely unsatisfactory. There were particular deficiencies in footwear . . . Very few rifles were available; those on charge had to be passed around between the platoons during training. The helmets and knapsacks for the 1st Battalion were not delivered until the day before deployment into the field, so the men had no opportunity to get used to the weight of their packs during training marches . . . ’ (Reserve Infantry Regiment 204).⁴ ‘Not until 28 September, that is to say one month after the regiment was raised, did the last of the rifles arrive. Bayonets were issued on 1 October. Until then there had been none at all. There was still no personal equipment or wagons and no digging implements. Only about one third of the clothing was field grey, the remainder comprised blue cloth, cotton drill or civilian outfits. There was a complete lack of helmets, groundsheets and coats.’ (Reserve Infantry Regiment 205).⁵

Even where clothing was found, it was often in a very poor state, having been stored unchecked and in unsuitable places for decades. As a stop gap, ‘Men were dressed in items which bore the names and regimental numbers of men who had served more than forty years previously – in 1871 to be precise’ (Reserve Infantry Regiment 212).⁶ These complaints were echoed by Reserve Infantry Regiment 208, raised in Hanover, ‘Only with the greatest difficulty were the battalions clothed and equipped. To begin with there were absolutely no weapons to be had.’⁷ The situation was much the same for Reserve Infantry Regiment 209 in Stettin, ‘There was a lack of clothing and equipment, so we had to exercise with lightweight civilian boots and belts over our civilian jackets. There were no rifles for a long time . . . until the early days of October there were no helmets, knapsacks or digging tools.’⁸ Reserve Infantry Regiment 210 encountered identical problems. ‘By 10 September, when the regiment was meant to be ready to march out of barracks, there were not enough rifles for each man to have one and it was not until the day before we deployed that 400 spades per battalion were made available.’⁹

The deficiencies were not limited to clothing and equipment. Just as serious was the lack of training pamphlets, ammunition and other aids. ‘There was an almost total lack of pamphlets. There was insufficient live ammunition to permit shooting practice . . . even the provision of rifles was only achieved gradually. Elements of the officer corps were overage . . . Altogether only four officers were from the active list’ (Reserve Infantry Regiment 206). Down in Mannheim, Reserve Infantry Regiment 239 discovered that, ‘Difficulties piled on difficulties. Pamphlets, upon which the trainers could have based their instruction, were simply unavailable and could be sourced nowhere. As late as 25 September, that is to say almost a complete month later, forty eight men of 8th Company were still going around in civilian clothes . . . Boots? There were none! Nor were there any caps, rifles, bayonets, ammunition pouches or belts, nothing was available. On 7 September the regiment was still deficient 1,500 rifles. [During training] if one section was practising with the eight available, another had to work on estimating distances with some old soldier. It is true that, between 20 September and 1 October, a few dozen officers of the Landsturm were posted to the regiment, but these old and bold landsturmers had never even seen a Model 98 rifle, let alone handled one’.¹⁰

Unsurprising to note, all these problems and a lack of time to overcome them, meant that the standard of training and equipment of these new formations was abysmal. The history of Reserve Infantry Regiment 214 from Rostock later lamented,

‘It is hardly surprising, as was later to become only too clear, that the training fell short of that desirable as preparation for war. Useless military rituals, which really made no sense in the context of such rushed training, were introduced into the programme by day and night. Who cannot recall all the hours spent practising standing to attention, or learning to salute and other such trivia; or, on the parade ground, repeatedly taking up positions, ‘to repel cavalry attacking from the left flank’. We can only look back with fury at this time when our superiors got worked up when a particular drill movement was not properly executed or when someone, ‘a volunteer, naturally’, found himself in the wrong position. This was training based on peacetime requirements, on the depths of peacetime; something which was interrupted only occasionally for weapon training or route marching. When the troops marched away, despite all the so-called preparation, they were totally unable to operate in the way they should have been able to from the start, quite apart from the fact that events turned out entirely differently from the way we had trained.’

Those officers who were drawn from the active army, or whose service was recent, strained every sinew to overcome deficiencies amongst the leadership, but it was an uphill task, even within the reserve jäger battalions, where it might be imagined the overall high standard of these units would compensate for any difficulties. Reserve Jäger Battalion 16, a unit raised in Freiberg in southeast Saxony, later noted, ‘By dint of constant visiting, the commander kept himself up to date on the state of training. This was very necessary because, for the most part, the company commanders had not seen service for more than a decade, were only used to the old drills and retained only a shadowy memory of those. In one company, close order drill was restricted to a constant repetition of the order, ‘Right incline. Quick march!’ ¹¹

Some idea of the immense effort required to overcome many of these difficulties was later provided by the paymaster of Reserve Infantry Regiment 236, who undertook the duties of quartermaster during these early difficult days.

Zahlmeister Schramm Reserve Infantry Regiment 236 ¹²

"For mobilisation purposes in the event of war, planned reserve formations held their entire requirements of clothing and equipment right down to the smallest item and all in the correct sizes. These stocks were kept carefully in separate company stores; whilst hidden away from unauthorised eyes, in safes, were the mobilisation files, which contained the mobilisation calendar, together with numerous annexes and war stocks of maps. All this meant that the apparatus developed during long serious work in peacetime was guaranteed to work.

"On the other hand nothing at all was ready for the unplanned formations called into life during mobilisation in 1914. To clothe the flood of kriegsfreiwillige who came to the army, there were peacetime uniforms for a proportion, but no wartime field grey clothing. In addition there were no weapons – neither rifles, nor machine guns and no personal equipment, such as knapsacks, bread or ammunition pouches etc. There were also no vehicles, no field kitchens and all the other mobilisation stores necessary to equip the troops. All the necessary instruction pamphlets were also lacking. Reserve Infantry Regiment 236 was hard hit by all these problems.

"When, on 31 August 1914, the three battalions arrived in their new quarters, it was only possible to clothe and equip the former soldiers, who were temporarily concentrated in one company per battalion. The kriegsfreiwillige were given blue peacetime uniforms, but not one item of personal equipment, not even a belt. They had to carry small essential personal items in a ground sheet slung over their shoulders. A large proportion of the men only had personal underclothing and wore unsuitable footwear. In order to get round the most urgent needs, underwear and boots were purchased in the department stores of Cologne.

"The troops did not present a very military impression, underlining how much had to be achieved if they were to meet the terms of the Ministry of War timetable and be ready for action by 10 October. During urgent discussions with the Clothing Stores of VIII Corps, which took place at once, it transpired that their entire stocks had already been issued. The accelerated equipping of unplanned formations to reinforce formations already in the field, together with the demands of reserve formations which were being raised in and around Koblenz – for example, our sister regiment [Reserve Infantry Regiment] 235 – had completely exhausted their holdings . . .

The VIII Corps transport and supply depot was also unable to equip the regiment with the necessary field equipment: vehicles, harnesses, digging implements etc. Its stocks had been laid down precisely and were only available for planned formations. Beyond those [requirements] there was hardly a single vehicle and there was a complete lack of rifles and bayonets. These were not issued until twenty four hours before the regiment deployed to the training area at Ohrdruf.

Reserve Infantry Regiment 209 put much of the blame on poor organisation and the inability of those remaining in charge of such matters in Germany to exert a firm, centralised, grip in this novel situation. ‘It does not seem inappropriate to state that ‘St. Bureaucracy’ and false economy were the biggest unnecessary blocks on progress during the training period. In addition, order and counter-order in all manner of places, ranging from the improvised Corps Headquarters and Quartermasters’ Departments (in peace time locations and in the field), through to the Ministry of War, caused enormous delays and confusion.’¹³ If the situation was bad for those struggling to form, equip and train infantry formations and units, in many ways the position was far worse for the artillery.

Kriegsfreiwillige Kettlitz 7th Battery Reserve Field Artillery Regiment 44 ¹⁴

"On 17 September we went to fetch our horses from Großbeeren. At 2.30 am, thirty four of us from 7th Battery climbed on board a small wagon. It was an awful journey in the dark. The wagon was so narrow that some of us could only stand on one leg, whilst others were forced stand on someone else’s corns. It was a relief to debus. About 4.00 am the horses had been rounded up and each of us was put in charge of two horses, which we were to lead back home. The intention was that we should ride, but when, after considerable effort, we succeeded in mounting, it was no easy thing to maintain our seats, because more than one of these so-called saddle horses had waited for precisely that moment to regain his autonomy.

Very swiftly the fields to our left housed a number of horses whose violent movement had given expression to their wish for freedom; whilst, to the left, a game of hide and seek had been arranged in the woods for those who had dismounted involuntarily. These were moments when the ‘old hands’ unleashed a veritable torrent of abuse against the stupid kriegsfreiwillige but, of necessity, turned their attention to rounding up the strays. A highly amusing hunt ensued, but I cannot remember if we succeeded in rounding up all the ‘rebels’.

Hardly had the novice drivers made their way back to the regiment and dealt with the horses, than an order arrived which caused great consternation in all ranks.

Vizewachtmeister Wolter Reserve Field Artillery Regiment 44¹⁵

In the middle of a day of normal preparation and duty an order suddenly landed on 18 September, stating that the entire regiment was to move the following morning to Jüterbog [training area] for live firing. Immediately the barracks resembled a disturbed ant heap, because we were a long way short of being ready to move and everyone was running and scurrying about in all directions trying to collect equipment and pack it. Later that evening word arrived and was greeted by general rejoicing, that we did not have to move out until 25 [September] and only to Zossen,

It is hard to imagine the scenes had the earlier order been carried out. Even a week later there were major problems when the regiment left barracks on their way to firing camp.

Zahlmeister Schrader 1st Battalion Reserve Field Artillery Regiment 44 ¹⁶

The then regimental commander, Oberst Wuthmann, was close to despair when he observed his regiment on the march, cursing it roundly and graphically. This was not altogether a surprise, because neither man nor horse was used to the duties with which they had been burdened. As far as the kriegsfreiwillige were concerned, ninety percent had never sat on a horse in their entire life. For an old gunner the sight of the regiment on the move conjured up a mixture of melancholy and mirth. It was impossible to know whether to laugh or cry.

It was extremely fortunate that the regiment received a draft of 300 drivers between 26 and 28 September, so the inadequate horse management of the earlier volunteers was not as badly exposed in the field as it might otherwise have been. That said, there were still major difficulties. Horses often fell sick, or even died, as a result of being in the hands of inexperienced drivers in the dreadful conditions of weather and terrain encountered later, as one old Landwehr artillery officer noted.

Leutnant Hans Osman¹⁷

I soon had to come to the sad conclusion that our kriegsfreiwillige, despite the way they conducted themselves under fire, were only that – kriegsfreiwillige. With very few exceptions, it never occurred to them to take care of their horses when it rained. Those meant to be looking after them had tucked themselves away somewhere where they were protected from the weather. The short technical military term for this was that it was a bloody disgrace and the said bloody disgrace brought a violent thunderstorm pouring down on the heads of the entire column. Within seconds the silent bivouac looked like a disturbed antheap. Initially the lads all thought that we were moving off somewhere, but they soon found out what the score was. The unteroffiziers, whose ears were ringing, passed the word on with interest and the ensuing wave of activity raised my spirits a little. Returning to our stacks of straw, having groomed and covered up our horses correctly, I finished by pointing out to our vet that if he had not annexed all of the blankets, I should not have woken from the cold and discovered what was happening – and he, too, might have been able to sleep on undisturbed.

If care of the horses was frequently well below standard, the state of gunnery training, even at the end of the preparatory period, was truly woeful and the regiments departed, to be faced with the task of mastering the necessary skills whilst in contact with the enemy. Not only had time been lacking to work up the gun crews sufficiently, live ammunition had been rationed on average to a mere forty shrapnel and ten high explosive shells per battery. If the situation had not been so serious, it would have been laughable; and a high price was paid in Flanders, as artillery fire arrived in the wrong place, or on friendly troops, or failed altogether.

The situation in Bavaria, however, though still poor, was slightly easier. The Bavarian army, having mobilised a large number of formations at the beginning of the war, declined to find another complete corps. Instead it raised the new 6th Bavarian Reserve Division and, therefore, it did not need to dilute its junior leadership quite as much as was the case within the Prussian formations. There was also more experience in the ranks. Bavarian Reserve Infantry Regiment 17, which was based on Augsburg, but with companies scattered over a fairly wide area, was typical, in that it comprised one third reservists, one third ersatz-reservists, who had completed a minimum of their basic training, and one third kriegsfreiwillige. According to Bavarian Reserve Infantry Regiment 16 (known as the ‘List’ Regiment, after its first commander), ‘The section commanders and other ranks comprised experienced unteroffiziers of the reserve, or the Landwehr, who had received special leadership training’.¹⁸ It is also the case that a significant proportion, but still a minority, of the kriegsfreiwillige were students. Bavarian Reserve Infantry Regiments 20 and 21, which made up 14 Bavarian Reserve Infantry Brigade were raised in Nuremberg and Fürth respectively and included numerous students from the University of Erlangen in their ranks.

However, if the quality of the regiments of 6th Bavarian Reserve Division was good and its leadership as reliable as possible in the circumstances, it shared the same difficulties in obtaining sufficient arms and equipment for the new regiments and in training them properly. As the time for deployment approached, there was one particularly acute shortage. There were no Pickelhauben to be obtained anywhere so, as a short term expedient, the division adopted Landsturm forage caps with grey covers. This was a disastrous decision. Not only were they constantly confused with British soldiers throughout the battles at Ypres, with inevitable consequences, there was at least one extremely serious incident attributable to this stop gap measure.

During the early dawn of 1 November the men of Bavarian Reserve Infantry Regiment 17 captured Wijtschate and were reorganising prior to pushing on, when Bavarian Reserve Infantry Regiment 21 launched a flanking attack on them, with numerous German guns firing in support. The resulting clash led to a battle of such intensity and with such serious casualties, that the Bavarians had to evacuate the village. Eventually they did recapture it some days later but, by then, the chance, however fleeting, of possibly forcing a break through south of Ypres was gone. On such seemingly insignificant decisions campaigns can turn. This was a classic and tragic case of, ‘For want of a battle the kingdom was lost/And all for the want of a horseshoe nail’.

That was all still in the future when the fateful decision was taken to deploy the new formations. Despite all the many and various difficulties they faced, on paper at least, the new formations were regarded as ready for deployment within two months of the outbreak of the war and, at the end of September, the Kaiser appointed two very senior and experienced officers to inspect the various corps during final manoeuvres. When the subsequent reports were written, General der Infanterie Freiherr von Hoiningen gen von Huene, the former commander of XIV Corps, whilst acknowledging the inevitable weaknesses, felt that the new corps would all be equal to the task; that a general willingness to succeed would enable the formations quickly to overcome these deficiencies and that, therefore, they could be regarded as battle ready. His fellow inspector, the Deputy Commander of the Guard Corps, was more guarded and altogether more realistic in his assessment, which he produced on 12 October 1914.

General der Infanterie von Loewenfeld Headquarters Guard Corps ¹⁹

"Everything in the way of training which could be done was done. The infantry, which is still rather cautious in its movements, may be regarded as trained. Within the field artillery, the lack of officers is painfully evident . . . The tactical ability of the commanders, especially at company and battery level, is not good. These appointments have, for the most part, been filled with non-active officers of advanced age. In general they have found it difficult to meet the demands of modern warfare. Furthermore their physical robustness and horsemanship, mounted as they are on mostly untrained and barely broken horses, is in many cases deficient.

One particular fault is their lack of awareness of the risk posed by enemy artillery, even at long range. This manifests itself in a willingness to manoeuvre ineffectually in mass formations only a short distance from the enemy. In addition there is a lack of awareness of cooperation between the arms in the context of the all-arms battle. This applies not only to the artillery, but also to the infantry.

Despite these obvious problems, such was the demand for fresh formations to enable Falkenhayn to pursue his highly ambitious plans on the plains of Flanders, that he decided that there was no choice but to deploy the newly raised troops without delay. Initially the plan had been to despatch one of the corps to East Prussia and the remainder to the western theatre of operations. It is not entirely clear if the intention had originally been to deploy the new corps to quiet sectors of the front, there to accustom themselves to the demands of modern warfare and to relieve active corps for the potentially decisive battle to the north. There is also some slight evidence that thought was given to sending only two of the corps to Flanders, with two others proceeding to the Dutch – Belgian border and one to Armee Abteilung Strantz, down near Metz. However, time was of the utmost importance, so it is probable that no more than lip service was paid to the need to prepare the corps better and, by 8 October, orders were being issued directing four of them to proceed directly to Flanders, there to be thrown straight into the battle.

It is hard to find other examples in history when such inadequately prepared and equipped troops have been sent into battle at its critical point, with the expectation that they would prevail. Not only was their state of individual and collective training lamentable in many cases, their administrative support was either totally lacking, or completely inadequate. To take one small example, Reserve Infantry Regiment 213, raised in the north of Schleswig Holstein, bemoaned the fact that, ‘The field kitchens had not arrived by the time we marched away, so we went to war without them’.²⁰ They might have added that, at a time when collective cooking was the norm and there was no other truly effective means of preparing rations, this was a most serious problem and it was common to all the new formations. Small wonder, therefore, that despite the best efforts of some quartermasters to obtain a supply of large cooking vessels and the wagons to carry them, administrative support and rationing of the new formations failed as soon as it was put to the test and many men went hungry for days at a time: hardly a way of maintaining morale or getting the best out of the attacking troops in the vile conditions which obtained in Flanders that late autumn.

A charitable view of this enormous gamble is that Falkenhayn and his staff may have assessed that the undoubted high morale and determination of these fresh troops would be more than equal to any defence the Allies could mount on their relatively weak left flank. Others in a position to form a judgement on the wisdom of the policy at the time were much more critical.

Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria Diary Entry 20 October 1914 ²¹

The newly raised corps have been formed by bringing together men from the reserves, Landwehr, and kriegsfreiwillige. In my considered opinion the raising of so many new corps was a mistake. It would have been better to have used the available manpower to reinforce existing corps, whose manpower has been subject to attrition. There, working together with experienced soldiers, better performance could have been expected.

Regardless of such reservations, the decision had been taken; the die had been cast and, for better or worse, tens of thousands of men began to be transported to Flanders to take their chances in one of the most critical battles of the entire war. Only time would tell if the risks about to be run were justified, or if patriotism and youthful enthusiasm were in themselves sufficient to overcome entrenched defences and the power of the magazine-fed rifle, the machine gun and the artillery which lay in wait for them.

Notes

1. Solleder History Bavarian Reserve Infantry Regiment 16 p 4.

2. This and the following extracts from regimental diaries and histories, less those annotated separately, are taken from Unruh Langemarck pp 30–35.

3. Mayer History Reserve Infantry Regiment 236 p 82.

4. Schwedt History Reserve Infantry Regiment 205 pp 3- 4.

5. Appel History Reserve Infantry Regiment 205 p 14.

6. Makoben History Reserve Infantry Regiment 212 p 15.

7. Haleck History Reserve Infantry Regiment 208 p 1.

8. Schulz History Reserve Infantry Regiment 209 p 15.

9. Gieraths History Reserve Infantry Regiment 210 p 22.

10. Schatz History Reserve Infantry Regiment 239 p 3.

11. Atzrott History Reserve Jäger Battalion 16 p 14.

12. Mayer op. cit. pp 83–85.

13. Schulz op. cit. p 15.

14. Boesser History Reserve Field Artillery Regiment 44 p 9.

15. ibid. p 11.

16. ibid. p 12.

17. Osman Mit den Kriegsfreiwilligen über die Yser pp 123–124

18. Solleder op. cit. p 7. It is sometimes stated that it was a Bavarian custom to name regiments after their commanders – hence Regiment ‘List’ – but in fact it was a newly introduced security measure, adopted by the Bavarian army to disguise the fact that a new division was being added to the order of battle. The plan was to use only the new regimental numbers after the formations deployed into the field. However, once the deeds of these regiments became known to the wider public, the names were retained as honorific titles.

19. Der Weltkrieg 1914–1918 Vol 5 p 274.

20. Tiessen History Reserve Infantry Regiment 213 p 5.

21. Kronprinz Rupprecht In Treue Fest: Erster Band p 223.

CHAPTER 1

Preliminary Skirmishing

around Ypres October 1914

The early days of October 1914 saw the battles around and to the north of Arras begin to stall, as attempts to push further west failed in the face of increasing French resistance. Already, by 5 October, when Falkenhayn was involved in acrimonious exchanges at Headquarters Sixth Army over the inability of its formations to make better progress, thoughts had turned to how to make better use of the cavalry formations grouped away to the north. It was essential to ensure that they continued to apply pressure and to push out a wide reconnaissance screen, in a final attempt to bring decisive military force to bear on the exposed Allied left flank. Höhere Kavallerie Kommandeure [HKKs = Senior Cavalry Commanders] 1 and 2, comprising Guards, 4th, 7th and 9th Cavalry Divisions, were located on the northern flank of XIV Army Corps, which was currently attempting to get forward through the industrialised area around Lens. During the next few days they would clash with British cavalry northwest of La Bassée in a series of confusing and largely inconclusive engagements.

Despite the presence of all these cavalry formations, such was the demand on their services and, it must be said, inefficiencies in the way they tended to operate, that a further requirement was established for additional cavalry to be deployed on the extreme right flank of the German advance in a screening role. The aim of this deployment was to camouflage the precise movements of the German major formations, in particular the forward deployment of the new reserve formations of Fourth Army, which were scheduled to arrive in the theatre by about mid October. It was also essential to interfere with the freedom of action of the Allies and slow any offensive plans they may have had. In furtherance of this aim, Army Supreme Command ordered HKK 4, commanded by Generalleutnant Freiherr von Hollen, which had begun the campaign by operating forward of Fourth and Fifth Armies in the advance on Sedan and Mezières, to redeploy to the north, where it was to link up with the Bavarian Cavalry Division. 3rd and 6th Cavalry Divisions of HKK 4 detrained in the Mons area; the Bavarian Cavalry Division, which had been operating down near Metz, was transported north to unloading areas near Valenciennes.

Immediately on arrival these forces, augmented by others, such as ‘Landwehr Brigade Schulenburg’, which was located in Douai and could be spared from other commitments, began to deploy in the rough direction of Lille. The defence status of this major urban conurbation was unknown and there was an urgent need for clarification. Because Bavarian Cavalry Division was located closest, on 4 October a strong patrol, commanded by Rittmeister Fürst Wrede of Bavarian Ulanen-Regiment 1, rode forward in a bold move to obtain the necessary information. Arriving after a somewhat adventurous journey during the night, Wrede managed to establish that it did not appear that old fortress of Lille was in a state of defence but that there seemed to be a clear build up of troops in and around the city. Speed was evidently going to be of the first importance.

Even before Wrede’s report became available, the formations of the newly constituted HKK 4 were in the saddle and heading north. At 2.00 pm on 4 October, the advance guard of Bavarian Cavalry Division, Bavarian 5 Cavalry Brigade (Chevaulegers = Light Horse) was forced into dismounted action as it veered westwards near Sainghin and came under fire from Lesquin. This slowed its progress, because it had to press its attack north and south of Merchin, which took some considerable time to complete, especially when enemy infantry, believed to have come from Lille, began to pressurise its right flank. This in turn led to the deployment of Bavarian Jäger Battalion 1, with elements of Bavarian 4 Cavalry Brigade (Uhlans) on its right, with orders to fight forward towards Lezennes. During this operation there was an unusual event involving a troop of Bavarian cavalry, namely a mounted charge.

Hauptmann Graf Ingelheim Bavarian Uhlan Regiment 1¹ 1.

"The approach of a French Hussar squadron was observed from the church steeple in Bersée. The traditional German preference for a charge, rather than dismounted action, prevailed. Exploiting the presence of houses and outbuildings in the area to screen the movement, the squadron, led by the commander, Hauptmann Freiherr von Hirschberg, manoeuvred against the unsuspecting enemy as they advanced along the poplar-lined road from Pont à Marcq to Bersée. Near Molpas the enemy was charged from a distance of two kilometres. Making no attempt to resist, the hussars withdrew and the chase continued over ditches and through fields. Having refused to stand and fight, the hussars bunched up on the road and adjoining fields and spurred their horse in flight back towards Lille.

The Uhlans pressed the pursuit for several kilometres before the commander called a halt, not wishing to be surprised by superior forces. The bodies of a number of hussars lay dead in the fields and several horses and a large quantity of materiel was the reward for this daring horsemanship. It was a promising start to our operations in Flanders. It was achieved without losing a single man and at the cost of one flesh wound from a lance to the arm of an NCO. The squadron then withdrew from the outskirts of Lille to the Farm La Sauvagerie, where they rested until they were required for further action.

The jägers had heard the sound of battle in Bouvines, where they were enjoying a short rest. Its commander, Hauptmann Franz Spiegel, rode to divisional headquarters in Roncin to be briefed and there followed an efficient minor operation. A timely intervention by batteries of the Horse Artillery Battalion, Bavarian Field Artillery Regiment 5², enabled it to bring down a torrent of well directed fire from a flank and, just as night fell, Bavarian Jäger Battalion 1, with 1st, 3rd and 2nd Companies in a first wave and 4th Company, following up echeloned to the left, stormed and took Lezennes. 3rd and 2nd Companies, attacking from west, fixed the defenders (an infantry unit of the French XXI Corps) whilst 1st Company, looping round to the north in an outflanking manoeuvre, completed their defeat and took thirty prisoners. The remainder of the garrison slipped away under cover of darkness.³ At that, the enemy abandoned Lesquin and Bavarian Schwere Reiter-Regiment [Heavy Cavalry] 2 pursued the withdrawing troops throughout the night. Although the enemy had not resisted hard, the swift elimination of this pocket of resistance underlined the high quality of the Bavarian jägers.

Whilst these clashes had been occurring, 6th Cavalry Division, after a long day in the saddle, had reached an area east of Lille, whilst 3rd Cavalry Division was in bivouac near Orchies. Pressing on in the early morning of 5 October, both 6th Cavalry Division and the Bavarians rode in a huge sweep around the built up areas of Lille, Roubaix and Tourcoing and then paused for the night with the Bavarian Cavalry Division at Linselles and 6th Cavalry Division six kilometres to the northwest at Comines, hard up against the River Lys, which there marked the border with Belgium. Down to the southeast of Lille, 3rd Cavalry Division got as far as Baisieux, but not without becoming involved in minor clashes with French troops probing forward from Lille at Faches, on its southern outskirts. Having been checked, the French troops then bore away northeast to a further skirmish with 1st Battalion Bavarian Reserve Infantry Regiment 1, which had been drafted in to improve the dismounted strength of 3rd Cavalry Division, before pulling back into the security of the city.

It is far from easy at this remove of time to disentangle all the movements and actions of the cavalry during this early phase of operations southeast of Ypres. Though the countryside was much less built up than is the case today, nevertheless the urban areas through which the cavalry on both sides was probing and skirmishing slowed and channelled movement and disrupted command and control, which was in any case always precarious in the German cavalry of the period. Generally speaking, though primitive radio communication was available (when it worked) and there was limited access to the civilian telephone network, the only reliable way for headquarters to remain in touch with their subordinate formations was by despatch rider. Inevitably this produced time delays, less than perfect intelligence and a frequently distorted view of the enemy, their locations and intentions.

Advancing from their harbour areas as dawn broke on 6 October, both 6th Cavalry Division and the Bavarian Cavalry Division advanced to the southwest to complete the sweep of the country to the north of Lille, to establish the status of the Lys crossings at Warneton and Deûlémont and, if possible, to take control of them. One of these patrols was conducted by a troop of 5th Squadron Schwere Reiter-Regiment 2.

Vizewachtmeister Grallinger 5th Squadron Schwere Reiter-Regiment 2⁴ 2.

"On 6 October 1914 I received orders from the regimental commander, Major Freiherr von Eyb, to take eight troopers from 5th Squadron and to patrol forward to the canal crossing at Wambréchies to establish if it was occupied by the enemy. During the carrying out of this mission I was wounded in the right cheek. Due to heavy enemy small arms fire from the fort and cemetery area of Wambréchies, I could not get to the canal bridge so, that evening I returned to the regiment and, on orders of Rittmeister Graf Pocei, went for medical treatment. The doctor promptly sent me back to a casualty clearing station.

When Grallinger arrived, he discovered that there were four officers there, all known to him, as well as almost forty other ranks. These figures may not seem great, but they represented quite a drain on the resources of cavalry regiments and are illustrative of how front line strength was swiftly whittled away during these seemingly innocuous duties. The incident also shows that the Allies were equally clear as to the operational importance of these bridges, so it is no surprise to discover that, from early morning, leading elements of both divisions were engaged in skirmishes with the forward Allied screen, which was acting as an outpost line to the defended Deûlémont crossings. It is impossible to say how this would have been resolved ultimately because, just prior to midday, orders arrived from headquarters HKK 4, located in Kortrijk, ordering their withdrawal with all speed to that area.

Apparently there were unconfirmed reports that strong Allied forces were bearing down on Kortrijk from Gent away to the northeast and the cavalry was needed to counter this new threat. Disengaging with relative ease, the main body headed back for Kortrijk and, by that evening, 6th Cavalry Division was concentrated to the east of the town, with 3rd Cavalry Division out to the southeast and the Bavarian Cavalry Division close to the town on its southern side, with its troops deployed between Aalbeke and the town itself. Prior to this redeployment, the cautious Bavarian Cavalry Division commander, Generalleutnant von Stetten, despatched one of his best formations, 1st Bavarian Schwere Reiter-Regiment, with a section of guns and a cyclist company, off in the general direction of Tielt in order to establish the truth of the reports. It did not take long for this regiment to discover that the report was either totally false or very greatly exaggerated so, the following day, 7 October, the great mass of cavalry moved aggressively westwards once more. Not only had the completely unnecessary movement tired already weary riders and horses even more, a valuable position had to be regained and a day of manoeuvre was lost. Nevertheless, brushing aside minor resistance from enemy dismounted cavalry, cyclist units and members of the Belgian gendarmerie, advanced elements of 3rd Cavalry Division got as far as Ypres that day.

Reserve Hauptmann Ottmar Rutz Bavarian Reserve Infantry Regiment 1 ⁵ 3.

"A new day – 7 October – dawned and brought with it a flurry of colourful activity amongst the mounted troops. We were now northeast of Lille, having moved round it in a broad sweep to the east. The place was teeming with cavalry and we kept bumping into the regiments of other cavalry divisions. There were Guards Cavalry, Bavarian Uhlans and Chevaulegers [Light Horse] and the roads were full of horses, riders and wagons. We drew closer to a small town with a great church. It was the well known town of Menen. The whole [3rd] Cavalry Division was drawn up there, together with its heavy baggage train. It was just as though we were on peacetime manoeuvres.

"After a lengthy halt and then numerous hold ups on the road, including the presence of units crossing the line of march, which caused much cursing and swearing, at long last we marched into the little town and along the length of its main street, under the gaze of its curious inhabitants who crowded the streets. We were to see it later in a very changed situation. Without further delay we carried on along a broad main road to Geluwe and Geluveld. It was a demanding, but fascinating, march. The battalion moved along in the centre of the road, whilst the cavalry stuck to bridle paths to the left and right. Sometimes walking, sometimes trotting, they threw up large quantities of dust, which was a constant trial to us. We were accompanied by wagons which carried those of our men who were exhausted or suffering from foot trouble.

Away on the horizon the high Gothic towers of a larger town loomed up: Ypres. Apparently cavalry patrols moving near to it had come under fire, so the cavalry halted and orders for an attack by the battalion were issued. However, infantry foot patrols pushing ahead soon reported that there were no enemy in Ypres.

Profiting from that information and far from unhappy that they were not going to have to fight to enter the town, all the regiments of Bavarian Cavalry Division pressed on boldly into the centre of Ypres, making for the great square in front of the famous mediaeval Cloth Hall. Settling down in the town, thus far totally untouched by the war, the men of 3rd Cavalry Division were about to enjoy an experience unique in the German army on the Western Front. No other German soldiers would ever set foot in the town, except as prisoners of war, so this description of events that day left by a member of 3rd Cavalry Division is probably the only one in existence.

Reserve Hauptmann Ottmar Rutz Bavarian Reserve Infantry Regiment 1⁶ 3.

"A marvellous evening mood spread through the ranks. Marching past magnificent properties, beautiful gardens and chateaux, we approached the walls of the town. Crossing ditches, bridges and the moat, we passed through an ancient gateway and entered this famous old town. We first moved through outer streets containing nothing of great significance, then we came to the broad town square in front of the famous Cloth Hall, the giant tower of which reached way up into the darkening sky. Its rich Gothic ornamentation was set off in a refined way by its brilliant, shining windows. The entire square was enclosed by steep, dark, gable ends.

"The companies halted in the middle of the square and piled their rifles together. Shy, but curious, the inhabitants watched all this unfamiliar military activity, with no concept at all of its seriousness. Up until then the war had been conducted a long way away from where they lived. A search had been underway to find accommodation for our men and soon an excellent place had been located. It was an attractive, well appointed, barracks with a pleasant terrace and commodious rooms. Externally it looked like a chateau; nobody would have taken it for a barracks at all. Meanwhile our men looked around the streets and squares with staring eyes. The shops on the main street were as elegant as those of a large city and we could almost feel the proximity of the sea. After attending to the care of my men, I took a stroll through the streets. The side streets were dark and lonely, built in the friendly style of a Dutch suburb. People were out and about on the main street well into the night. It was difficult to communicate with the inhabitants. Only one or two understood French and hardly any of our Bavarians could speak Plattdeutsch.⁷ I entered some of the well lit shops and benefited by buying things which were very welcome to us, separated as we were from the bulk of our equipment. This included excellent Belgian cigars, which, however, were very expensive and some of the really delicious hard biscuits, which are a speciality of Ypres and similar to others I found later in Kortrijk.

"I found out that on one occasion, about ten to fourteen days previously, a car containing British officers had driven through the town, but we were the first troops to have set foot in Ypres. The people were quite friendly towards me, but they expressed neither sympathy, nor antipathy towards the German advance. Their every third expression was, ‘poor Belgium’. I called at one of the most beautiful houses on the main street to make billeting arrangements for myself and several other officers, but the lady of the house explained that a number of other officers had already occupied the house. Never mind! I wandered over to an equally striking building opposite. Having rung the door bell for a long time, the door was finally answered by a friendly cleric, who welcomed us and offered us dinner at 10.00 pm.

"Until then I wandered the streets. I returned to the main square and absorbed the unique sights. All that which lies in ruins and ashes now, then stood tall and straight, in striking splendour, as though it had been built to last for all eternity. The shining lights in the windows had now been extinguished. Several senior officials of the town and the government had been taken hostage. A finance officer had been forced to deliver up the town funds and was only allowed to move about under secure escort. The sound of the footsteps of our Bavarians could be heard coming from the covered walkways of the Cloth Hall, where a guardroom had been established in a chamber on the ground floor and riders clattered over the square delivering messages to the divisional staff, which was located in an hotel next to the Cloth Hall.

"We occupied the whole of Ypres, which was simple because it was surrounded by walls and a moat and was accessible only by a few main roads which passed through the historic gates. I walked a few steps to St Martin’s cathedral. Its great dark bulk, with the height of its spire lost in the darkness of the night, bore down heavily on the pointed gable ends of the old houses which surrounded it. I was unable, however, to settle down to appreciate the artistry of it, due to a combination of the hustle and bustle and the excitement of a moment in world history that was to occur only on this one occasion. It was, in fact, a peaceful and moving interlude in the life of what the world has come to know by the name of Ypres – and we were there.

"That evening we did not visualise anything of what was to come; nor anymore did the disturbed and curious inhabitants . . . On my way back to my quarters I talked to a number of them. They had no knowledge of British or French troops and absolutely nothing about the war; they had not received any newspapers for months. ‘Where were we marching?’ I had no idea myself. In a bookshop I bought a town plan and a map of the surrounding area. I even paid in cash, rather than leaving a credit note. It was just as though we were still at peace. Back in our quarters the friendly priest talked to us about their hopes for a Flemish state and their political humiliation. He could not speak good German, but was better in French.

He had undergone training at a Jesuit seminary in Austria and had spent a long time in France and Italy, but only a short period in Germany . . . We laid down to rest in good, broad, comfortable French beds. Our departure was sudden and rather like responding to an alarm call. As dawn broke we left the hospitable town and headed down the road towards Vlamertinge. I cast one last glance back at the peaceful scene. As morning fires were lit, the smoke rose comfortingly above the steep gable ends, whilst above them were the towers of the Cloth Hall and the cathedral, the lead roofs and the great gates, which projected a scene right out of the Middle Ages.

Whilst 3rd Cavalry Division had been closing on Ypres, 6th Cavalry Division reached Kemmel and the Bavarian Cavalry Division Dikkebus, four kilometres southwest of Ypres. Pushing forward southwestwards on 8 October into a wide, largely empty space, 6th Cavalry Division got as far as Bailleul. To the north, around Meteren and Flêtre respectively, were the Bavarian Cavalry Division and the 3rd Cavalry Division, with forward elements located at Merris and Strazeele, very close to the important road and railway junction of Hazebrouck. In fact, one platoon sized patrol of 1st Battalion Bavarian Reserve Infantry Regiment 1 actually followed the Bailleul – Hazebrouck railway line right up to Hazebrouck Station, returning unscathed.

According to Rutz,⁸ ‘The daring platoon commander, Leutnant P., managed to force his way to Hazebrouck Station, overwhelming a French outpost, wounding a senior officer and establishing the fact that there were numerous engines under steam and ready to pull military transport trains. With extreme difficulty the platoon managed to slip out through the French lines under cover of darkness and rejoin the battalion about midnight.’ It was, however, obvious that the days of easy movement and coat trailing were rapidly coming to an end. Reports began flowing into Headquarters HKK 4 of strong enemy forces building up at Cassel and around Hazebrouck whilst, off to the east, the complexity of these swirling operations was underlined, when it was discovered that the French 7th Cavalry Division was concentrated around Frélinghien, between Armentières and Deûlémont. Because this position was virtually in rear of the mass of

German cavalry here on the northern flank, this was a matter of considerable concern. Compounding all the general uncertainty, 9 October dawned to thick fog, which virtually ruled out observation from a distance and led to a series of nerve-wracking close range encounters as mounted patrols from both sides groped about for information. One of these patrols, launched with an offensive mission, was mounted by Bavarian 1 Cavalry Brigade.

Reiter Kaspar Fichtner 1st Squadron Bavarian Schwere Reiter-Regiment 2⁹ 4

"On 9 October I was involved in an eight man patrol. Unteroffizier Brüining also took part and it was led by Oberleutnant Henigst. We started out from near Bailleul with orders to ride thirty kilometres to the north and blow up a railway bridge. We were issued with explosives for the task. The Oberleutnant said that we had been given quite a mission. Whether we should be able to carry it out was, however, questionable, because enemy patrols had already been reported in the vicinity. We rode off at 3.00 pm and, to everyone’s delight, the weather was fine. After about half an hour we met up with a Prussian Dragoon patrol, which was approaching from the north. The officer stated that we should not be able to get very far forward, but our Oberleutnant said, ‘Well we shall give it a go anyway!’ We were pleased he did, because he, a daring patrol leader, was very popular with the troopers.

"We carried on through various villages, then for a time we galloped across country, to an isolated farmhouse, whence we could see enemy cycle troops moving along a main road. We observed for some time then a report was despatched. After that we went on, but by then it was night. We rode on through the pitch darkness and came to a farm, which we surrounded, so that nobody could get away, but there were only two women there. We posted sentries. There were enough oats for the horses and we received an excellent meal. Nothing else happened that night. The following day we left and none too early, because there was thick fog. We headed for Cassel, a really pretty little town set on a hill, but it was occupied by the French, so we carried on to another place and had a short rest before riding on. We then bumped into a civilian riding a bicycle along the road, who told our Oberleutnant that there were two enemy infantry companies and a cavalry squadron in the town and that every village in the surrounding area was occupied. He also stated that 200,000 British troops were said to have arrived in Dunkirk [sic!].

"So we did not ride into the town, but went to a nearby estaminet, fed the horses and drank some beer, which was rubbish compared with Bavarian. But we soon had to get going and find out if the villages really were occupied. The Oberleutnant dismounted and, taking two men with him, crept up very close to one through the bushes. The place was occupied and the exits barricaded. The Oberleutnant wrote a report and asked who was willing to ride away with it. Suttner and I volunteered and we were ordered to ride via Godewaersvelde and from there along the line of the railway to Bailleul to deliver the message to divisional headquarters or to a reporting point. Suttner and I rode off at 3.30 pm at a trot, because we had to deliver the message by evening. We were in luck until we reached the railway to Bailleul where we saw an enemy patrol heading our way and rather close. We diverted through Meteren then, fifteen minutes later, we were in Bailleul, but there were no German soldiers to be seen and it was already 7.30 pm.

"We then headed off along the main road towards Dikkebus, thinking that we would certainly meet someone, but we did not get far along it. Coming the other way were two cyclists from the cycle company, who also had a report for division and who insisted that there must be some sort of trace of our troops in Bailleul. We searched the place again, but in vain. We then had to find somewhere to spend the night and all four of us took cover in an empty house outside the town. The next morning the jägers said that divisional headquarters must have advanced, so we took the road to Meteren, but had only gone a short distance when my horse fell. It was pretty well exhausted, so I had to lead it, intending to requisition another horse from a farmer in Meteren. We had not gone more than fifty paces and we were looking at a signpost when a patrol of enemy dragoons rode towards us. They were within 200 metres, so we turned around swiftly and rushed back to the village.

"I was extremely anxious not to be ridden down, so each of us took cover behind one of the trees which was lining the road and opened fire as fast as we could. With his first bullet, Jäger Wagner shot the enemy officer off his horse, but two dragoons rode like the Devil at us across country. Soon both the officer and the dragoons lay dead on the cobbles, two horses had had it and three others were wandering around. We shot them too, because none of them were usable as riding horses and our two horses had run off during all the firing. The second cyclist also rode off during the shooting. We took the officer’s revolver, equipment and map case plus all its contents, then the three of us headed back through Bailleul once more and headed for Dikkebus. About midday we met up with a Prussian patrol who informed us that we needed to turn off right and head towards Estaires.

This we did, arriving at about 3.00 pm in a village where there were about twenty cyclists from Wagner’s company. There we were greeted with great joy, because the second cyclist had reported that we must be either dead or captured. The jägers found me a bicycle in a house and later, although they knew nothing of my horse, some Prussian dragoons returned Suttner’s horse to him. We then set off for Estaires, because the jägers confirmed that the divisional headquarters was located there. We arrived there at 6.00 pm and delivered our report and the captured map case belonging to the enemy officer. Generalleutnant von Stetten spoke to us and said, ‘You have acted with great courage’ and directed that names of all three of us be noted – and that is why on 7 November 1914 we received the Iron Cross.

By around 9.00 am the impression had built up that the enemy was withdrawing in a southerly direction, so orders were issued to Bavarian Cavalry Division to close up on Hazebrouck from the northeast and to 6th Cavalry Division to advance on Vieux Berquin to the east of the Forêt de Nieppe. For its part, 3rd Cavalry Division was directed to move south to the east of 6th Cavalry Division and to concentrate at Le Doulieu, five kilometres north of Estaires, where there were crossings over the Lys. It proved to be far from easy to carry out these orders.

Advancing south during the afternoon, 6th Cavalry Division became aware of a threat from the eastern extremity of the Forêt de Nieppe, which was occupied by the enemy, so it was forced to carry out a hasty attack to secure its right (eastern) flank. In the context of this attack, Bavarian Reserve Jäger Battalion 1, which was providing infantry support to the division, pushed boldly on into the wood and captured La Caudescure. However, concern quickly grew about a build up of enemy on this flank so, as evening drew on, the entire division, including its weary infantry, was withdrawn to the area of Bailleul. The Bavarian Cavalry Division also quickly ran into problems with an entrenched pocket of resistance on high ground near La Bréarde, three kilometres north of Hazebrouck on the road towards Steenvoorde. This forced Bavarian 4 Cavalry Brigade to launch a dismounted attack, whilst its infantry element, Bavarian Jäger Battalion 1, together with troopers of Bavarian Schwere Reiter-Regiment 2, attacked forward from Pradelles towards Borre, immediately east of Hazebrouck.