J. Wippel - Metaphysics and Sep Aratio According To Thomas Aquinas

Metaphysics and "Separatio" According to Thomas Aquinas Author(s): John F. Wippel Source: The Review of Metaphysics, Vol.
31, No. 3 (Mar., 1978), pp. 431-470 Published by: Philosophy Education Society Inc. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20127079 . Accessed: 22/01/2014 13:01
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METAPHYSICSAND SEPARATIOACCORDING TO THOMASAQUINAS

JOHN F. WIPPEL
v>< ONSIDERABLE intellectual especially
attention involved
has
been in one's
paid
in recent
years
to
the
processes of being as real
explicit according on Thomas
or existing,
discovery to Thomas
of being, Aquinas. the
Inspired
in large measure
by the work
often
of E. Gilson and also of J.

have stressed referred to as judgment, it is Judgment, of being, a
commentators recent many Maritain, role of the mind's second operation, when argued, it comes to one's is required
of being as existing. discovery if one is not to have an incomplete
notion
notion of being that would be reducible to the level of an essence or quiddity. Only judgment can assure one that one's notion of being
embraces being as existing, as a "that which."1 an est as well as an id quod, an "is" as well
Some attention
judgment sometimes tions or
has also been devoted

form of the by Thomas. commentary
to a particular
second editions
kind of
a particular named separatio
intellect's
5 and 6 of Thomas's
Important on the De Trinitate
operation, of ques
of Boethius
in 1948 and 1955 and the groundbreaking study by L. B. Geiger in 1947,2 all have set the stage for further emphasis on this distinctive
1 On this see, for instance, E. Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers, 2d ed. (Toronto: Pontifical of Mediaeval Institute Studies, 1952), chap. 6, and Existence," pp. 190-215; The Christian ''Knowledge Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas (New York: Random House, 1956), pp. 40-45; J. Maritain, and the Existent Existence J. (New York: Pantheon, 1948), pp. 22-35; Christian (Milwaukee: Bruce, Owens, An Elementary 1963), Metaphysics (Milwaukee: pp. 45-56, 249-58; An Interpretation of Existence Bruce, in and Truth pp. 14-43; 1968), chap. 2, "Grasp of Existence," "Judgment 22 (1970): 139-58. Mediaeval Studies Aquinas," 2 are the 5 and 6 of this commentary As will be seen below, questions most important sources for any study of separatio in Thomas. For an edition see Thomas von Aquin. of these questions In based on Thomas's autograph Librum Boethii et de Trinitate. ed. P. Quaestiones Quinta Sexta, Wyser 1948). For a criti (Fribourg: Soci?t? Philosophique-Louvain: Nauwelaerts, on the Boethian work see Sancti cal edition of Thomas's entire commentary Thomae de Aquino Librum Boethii de Trinitate, ed. B. super Expositio see his in 1959). Decker For Geiger (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1955; reissued et S?paration "Abstraction d'apr?s s. Thomas In de Trinitate, q. 5, a. 3," Revue des sciences philosophiques et th?ologiques 31 (January 1947): 3-40; de S. Thomas d'Aquin, dans la philosophie 2d ed. also, his La participation (Paris: J. Vrin, 1953), pp. 318-21.
432
JOHN F.WIPPEL
it comes to one's discovery when of being, operation type of intellectual or better, that can serve as subject of a science of being of that notion as a or as as material than science of being rather of being being
quantified.
unnoticed years, time, it has
While
in certain been
this new
regions
development
has
remained
At the the
largely
of same
of Thomistic in depth by same nicely
pursued of the investigation on and existence emphasis be
scholarship other writers.3 dovetails the with
for a number
renewed to
will
as existing as referred being seen below, at least one passage in Thomas's commentary the contention that one must 3) reinforces 5, article pass (question or to the mind's second to operation simple apprehension beyond judg discover
on judgment as to which we have
process
required above. For
ment
point,
if one is to grasp being explicitly

is not we
as existing.
here.
This particular
however, In this study as such separatio
our primary concern to concentrate wish as it is involved
insofar
as being, that as being being,
is to
say, of being a metaphysics. For
on questions to relating in one's discovery of being as presupposed for a science of the sake of simplicity with we shall
consider
textual
this issue
evidence
in three
steps:
1) an historical
teaching
review
of the
to
pointing
to a distinctive
respect
separatio in Thomas; 2) an effort (also historical) to determine what is presupposed by Aquinas for the judgment known as separatio to
function, that is to say, the kind of knowledge presupposed that for one's
discovery
of being as being; 3) a more

prior
theoretical
awareness
discussion
of the
of separatio without possibility divine exists. and/or being
immaterial
I 5 and 6 of Thomas's Questions are our richest tate of Boethius 3 For on the De Trini commentary re source with of information
en some of these see R. Schmidt, de la s?paration "L'emploi 58 376-93. de Louvain Revue See (1960): pp. philosophique m?taphysique," treat these earlier treatments of the same. 373-75 for earlier Among "Un ofthat by L.-M. Regis, the importance Schmidt rightly stresses ments, et Recherches de la nature. livre: La philosophie 'Apories'," Etudes Quelques L. Sweeney, in particular 1 (1936): 127-56. See pp. 134-38. Also, Existentialism N.J.: A Metaphysics Cliffs, (Englewood of Authentic nn. 13, 15, 16 for See pp. 307-308, Prentice-Hall, 1965), pp. 307-329. on the topic. Also, J. Owens, in other literature "Metaphysical Separation 34 (1972): 287-306. See p. 302, n. 39 for refer Studies Aquinas," Mediaeval ences to other studies of the same. und Also S. Neumann, Gegenstand von Aquin nach Thomas der theoretischen Methode Wissenschaften auf (M?nster: Aschen super Librum Boethii De Trinitate grund der Expositio 145-51. dorffsche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1965), pp. 72-97,
METAPHYSICS AND SEPARATIO
433
spect to his views on the proper division of and relationship between

the theoretical sciences. This commentary originates from his first
Parisian
(1258-1259, relatively mentary" few lines Thomas's
teaching period and can be dated between

according early work is somewhat taken deeply 5 and from to Weisheipl).4 in Thomas's In any event, career. To refer it is far more serve the as the at
1255 and 1259

it is a therefore, to it as a "com than that. A for in the
for misleading, the De Trinitate reflection on
occasion issue, views the and on
questions nature and title found
personal 6, for his of
divisions in various
development the theoretical catalogues
points of his own
sciences. of his works,
Even
Latin in
early
Expositio
librum Boethii
de Trinitate,
only partly indicates the true nature of
this writing.5 no attempt a complete to provide Here will be made of summary 5 6 of this We limit and shall ourselves commentary. questions to shall some then brief move remarks on to to pertaining a consideration issue 5, question of question as into three article 1, and 3. article specula natural the text
In question tive science philosophy, of Boethius, affirmative.
5, article 1, the is appropriately mathematics, calls "divine This
is raised
5, to whether parts,
divided Thomas His
and what science."6
there, answer,
following of course,
is in the science.
is an appropriate to which on or
division
of speculative
The criterion proposed

based upon the degree
to justify this division is of interest, for it is

is free an object a of theoretical science, from matter and motion. As and motion of theoretical or connec science are and an
speculabile, depends Thomas it, separation phrases same the tion with pertains as such. considered precisely differentiated motion of their according
from matter to object
Therefore, degree
theoretical of freedom
sciences
to the
from matter
objects (speculabilia).7 respective on to apply Thomas then goes this criterion. on matter for their very being speculation depend since they can exist in matter. these only Among
Some
objects introduces
of esse) a
(secundum he
for the 1255-1259 See Wyser, pp. 17-18, dating. "Einleitung," His Life, Thought, and see his Friar Thomas For Weisheipl d'Aquino. Work 1974), pp. 381 and 136-37. (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 5 On this see Wyser, pp. 3-4. "Einleitung," 6 Decker ed., p. 161. (All citations will be from this edition.) 7 "Sic ergo speculabili, See in particular: Ibid., p. 165. 1-15. quod est obiectum se scientiae et per speculativae, competit separatio a materia motu vel applicatio ad ea. Et ideo secundum a materia ordinem remotionis et motu scientiae (12-15). speculativae distinguuntur"
434 subdivision.
also in order
JOHN F.WIPPEL Some depend on matter

to be understood. By
not only for their being, but

these he has in mind those ob
jects of theoretical
matter. qualities, one's such Sensible is necessarily
knowledge
matter involved
whose
insofar in one's
definition
as
includes
sensible
an
matter,
it is subject
to sensible of such
understanding science
object of theoretical
understanding objects, according
science.
of man.
Thus flesh and bones are included in

or natural treats of
Physics to Thomas.8
Other objects of theoretical science (speculabilia) while also de pending on matter for their being, do not depend on sensible matter
in order to be understood or defined, sensible continues Aquinas. is, matter Such is
true of lines and numbers,

mathematics. Common
in short, of the kinds of things studied by

matter, that insofar as
it can be grasped by the senses,

mathematicals. never matter.9 in fact
is not included in the definition of

such mathematicals even apart from can sensible
to Thomas, Yet, according not from matter, exist apart
In contrast with
on matter and motion,
objects of theoretical
Thomas now refers
knowledge
to another
that depend
Some ob
kind.
jects of theoretical
their being (esse). but
knowledge
These
do not even depend upon matter

types, those that are never
for in
are of two
found
in matter
certain
(God and angels),

cases not
and those that are found in matter
in others
goes
act, potency, on to observe "theology" or
the one and the many, that the science "divine
[ens], (substance, quality, being and things of this kind).10 Thomas is called that treats of all of these also "metaphysics," and also "first
science,"
philosophy." Without pausing here to examine in detail his three reasons for these three different titles, let it suffice for us to stress one
8 On Thomas's of common Decker ed., p. 165. 16-21. understanding see L.-M. R?gis, matter "Un livre: La philosophie de la nature," Thus in one passage cited there. from his p. 146, and other references on the Metaphysics it as follows: "Sensibilis Thomas defines commentary calidum et frigi (materia) quidem est, quae concernit qualitates sensibiles, cum rarum concreta et materia et alia densum, huiusmodi, qua quidem dum, sunt naturalia, 1. 5, n. sed ab ea abstrahunt mathematica" (In 8 Met., sensible 9 Decker ed., p. 165. 21-24. 10 vero speculabilia sunt, quae non Ibid., p. 165. 24-28. "Quaedam esse possunt, a materia sive secundum esse, quia sine materia dependent in in in et sint deus sive sint sicut materia, numquam quibusdam ?ngelus, materia et quibusdam non, ut substantia, actus, unum qualitas, ens, potentia, et huiusmodi. et multa 1760).
435
names are three different These for one and the same science, point. as being or being that science whose is being in general.11 subject to our topic. has been made with One respect point important to Thomas According that do not depend there on matter are two either classes to be or types of speculabilia or to be defined. God
(and angels)
might dub including, elsewhere whose
constitute
the first class.

are listed
A whole
host of what
one
"metaphysicals" be it noted, substance and as will be seen below, and holds,
as representative of the second, and being. holds If, as Thomas the subject of a science is that and sub pre
causes
if as he also ject
one investigates in that science, properties ens commune ens is the or ens inquantum a problem in the words, order will immediately of being arises. if one of the Must one
of metaphysics, on matter In other the even
suppose the existence

depend physics? material,"
of the two kinds of speculabilia

knowledge
that do not
meta of "im it, be
is to begin second type so phrase the sense?
"neutrally be
immaterial,"
if one may
sufficient
immaterial the
to begin metaphysics?
Will
knowledge
of this kind of
of reality In short,
immaterial
possible in the first or stronger
without
presupposing and positive
must
one already know that positively immaterial being (God or angelic being) exists in order to discover beings as such or being as being?
Before The leaving sixth question 5, article 1, one more that a whole should point not should be be
objection protests seems its parts. to be a whole But divine science to and mathematics. The of physics respect subjects physics and quantity, mathematics substance (changeable respectively) divided from of being, the subject of divine parts not be contradistinguished science should mathematics.12 science. from
noted.
with and are
divine Therefore, natural science and
Thomas
begins
his reply by conceding
that the subjects
of
reasons for entitling this science Ibid., p. 166. 1-6. On Thomas's see our "The Title 'First Philosophy' "first philosophy" to Thomas according and his Different Justifications for the Same," Review Aquinas of Meta 27 (March 1974): 585-600. On being as being or being in general as physics on the in this same commentary subject of this science see, for instance, De Trinitate, q. 5, a. 1, ad 6 (p. 171. 16-26); q. 5, a. 4 (pp. 194-95, esp., 194. 25-26); on the Meta to Thomas's the "prooemium" Commentary below in the present physics, 12 and further discussion study. Decker ed., p. 162. 18-24.
11
436
physics and mathematics, Still, he counters, of metaphysics. in a special changeable it does For way being and
JOHN F.WIPPEL
quantified other treats modum being, sciences of one con
are parts of being, and that being (ens) itself is the subject of meta
physics. are parts part not follow particular that these science specialem science each
of being
(secundum of the particular
siderando,
being.
distinct
from the way

the subject
in which metaphysics
considers
not a
Therefore,
is really
For it is not a part of being from part of the subject of metaphysics. that standpoint under which being itself is the subject of meta In brief, then, metaphysics has as its subject being in physics.13
general rather than being as restricted being to as the quantitative. changing Thomas's Moreover, it studies changeable rather being or than the as
or as quantified. reply is of interest and motion,
for our
immediate
purposes
because
he is here treating of the second class of things that may be said to be

separate from matter the neutrally immaterial, repre
sented in this instance by being.
He is suggesting
that even changing
or quantified can be studied as it insofar being by our science being is being, that is, from the standpoint At the same time, of being.14 one to of course, this reply rise the Must again gives question: sense of immaterial in the positive the existence presuppose being
(God and/or angels)
in order to study being as being rather than

to discern attempting first turn to question 5, on Boethius's De Trinitate. Before shall the Does mathematics question: in matter?15 of what exists He 1 that mathematics does
as changing or as quantified? merely we answer to this question, Thomas's article In treat, already 3 of this this same article matter suggested commentary Thomas raises and motion, in question
without has
5, article
treat of such things.
But in preparing
to develop this position here
13 Ibid., p. 171. 16-24. 14 This point is important for it shows that even in the discussion of q. 5, a. 1 wherein has directed Thomas the reader's to the different attention kinds of speculabilia to the different theoretical he sciences, corresponding does not reduce the subject of a science to the sum-total of things considered therein. The subject also includes the formal perspective of that science, its distinctive modus considerandi. Thomas's reply to the seventh objection this same point (Decker ed., p. 171. 27-30). on his reinforces For more a see of the oder of A. science Zimmerman, understanding subject Ontologie Die Diskussion ?ber den Gegenstand der Metaphysik im 13. Metaphysik? und H. Jahrhundert E. J. Brill, 1965), pp. 160-65. (Leiden-K?ln: 15 "Utrum mathematica et materia consideratio sit sine motu de his (Decker ed., p. 179). quae sunt in materia"

he introduces some with respect precisions important at the distinctive in arriving involved sciences. key texts It is within this same on separatio. to the subjects general
437
intellec of each context
tual processes of the theoretical that he presents
touching
Thomas begins by observing that one must understand how the intellect in this operation is able to abstract (abstrahere possit) if one is to throw light on this question. Taking his cue from Aristotle's
De anima he notes that according to the Philosopher the operation of
the intellect is twofold. There is one operation whereby it knows what something is, called the understanding of indivisibles (intelli
gentia divides, tions.16 indivisibilium). that is to say, then Thomas There is another by forming comments it composes and whereby and negative affirmative proposi two intellectual that these opera
tions correspond to two factors found in things.

a thing's is directed toward it be certain rank, whether
The first operation

to which
a it enjoys nature, according a complete thing or even an incomplete an as a or has to do The second accident. operation part thing such a thing's in from the union of its principles results with esse, which as or case nature the of composites, the itself, simple accompanies in the case of simple substances.17 Needless to say, this text,
together with
for Thomas
its parallels,
one must have if one existence
strongly
recourse
supports those who

to not judgment, as being existing
insist that
to merely or as real,
apprehension, simple or if one is to grasp 16
is to grasp as such.18
see De anima 3. 6 5. For Aristotle Ibid., pp. 181. 17-182. 430a26-28. 17 "Et hae quidem duae operationes quae sunt in rebus, re duobus, naturam Prima rei, secundum respicit ipsam spondent. quidem operatio sive sit res completa, quam res intellecta aliquem gradum in entibus obtinet, ut pars vel accidens. Secunda vero ut totum aliquod, sive res incompleta, ex esse r?sultat rei, operatio quod quidem congregatione respicit ipsum rei in compositis vel ipsam simplicem naturam rei concomitatur, priricipiorum ut in substantiis Decker ed., p. 182. 5-12. simplicibus." 18 For a helpful survey of recent See the authors cited in n. 1 above. see A. McNicholl, Thomistic of judgment "On Judging," discussions 38 (October This should be supplemented Thomist 1974): 789-824. by recent studies by J. Owens cited above in n. 1 as well as by his "Aquinas on Knowing Review 29 (June 1976): 670-90. Existence," of Metaphysics of the Gilson position on this point see J. M. For a rather critical evaluation A Critical Gilson: (Villanova, of Etienne Study Quinn, The Thomism Villanova 1971), pp. 53-91. Press, University Quinn's Pennsylvania: to be disputed continues and defended. See A. evaluation of Gilson Gilson: A Critical review of The Thomism Maurer, of Etienne Study, by
438
So far, tions, the first often then, known Thomas as has been discussing two and
JOHN F.WIPPEL
intellectual opera While second
is directed
simple apprehension a thing's nature towards
judgment. or essence, the
has to do with
suggesting intellect simple that can
its esse.
one must
Thomas
investigate after Now, judgment,
had initiated this discussion

the this he various brief again ways general turns to in which reference that
by
the to
abstract.
apprehension
and
issue.
Since the truth of the intellect results from its conformity to reality, in its second operation (judgment) it cannot truly abstract (ab strahere) that which is in fact united in reality.19 This is so because
when that Thomas one there abstracts is a according corresponding this with to this second operation he in indicates reality. If I say (separatio) separation man. case of a white
illustrates
the
that he is not white,

the man is indeed Thomas first tinues, reality. on this one This
I assert that there is a separation
in reality.
with
If
the con in In
is erroneous.20 my judgment white, the second of the intellect contrasts operation According indeed abstract in certain to the mind's things cases which although first are
score. can
he operation, not separated not in others.
is true
brief, such is possible when and only when the intelligibility of that which is abstracted does not depend on the other thing with which
L. Kennedy, of review 37 (April 1973): 389-91; John M. Quinn, Thomist M. John A Etienne Gilson: Critical The Thomism Quinn, Study, by of "A Rejoinder John Beach, 49 (Summer New Scholasticism 1975): 369-73; Gilson: A of The Thomism A. Maurer's Review to Armand of Etienne Thomist 38 M. John Critical 1974): 187-91; (January Quinn," Study by at the Thomism of Etienne Look "Another and Beach, Gilson," New see For parallel texts in Thomas 50 (Autumn 1976): 522-28. Scholasticism In 1 Sent., d. 19, q. 5, a. 1, ad 7 (Mandonnet ed., 1: 489): ". . . prima Also, In 1 rei; secunda respicit esse ipsius." operatio respicit quidditatem re a. in duo sint 1: "Cum sol. d. 903): (Mandonnet, 3, Sent., 38, q. 1, esse intellectus. et his duobus eius, rei, duplex operatio respondet quidditas rerum Una quae dicitur a philosophis formatio, qua apprehendit quidditates a in III De indivisibilium dicitur etiam anima, intelligentia. quae Philosopho, esse rei, componendo Alia autem comprehendit affirmationem, quia etiam con a quo cognitionem esse rei ex materia et forma compositae, accipit, ad sub vel accidentis formae ad materiam, in quadam compositione sists
jectum."
est ex hoc quod conformatur intellectus "Et quia veritas rei, patet non potest vere ab intellectus hanc secundam secundum operationem quod rem coniunctum strahere est, quia in abstrahendo signifi quod secundum . . ." (Decker ed., p. 182. caretur esse separatio secundum ipsum esse rei. 12-15). 20 Ibid., p. 182. 16-18.
19
METAPHYSICS AND SEPARATIO 439

it is united in reality.21 In judgment, introduces however, a new one can never truth
fully abstract
At
that which
is united in reality.
element into his theory of
this point Thomas abstraction and separation: Accordingly, through one thing from another which it composes and that by understanding operation,however, by guishes one thing from anything of the other,
the intellect distinguishes its various operations in different ways. the operation Through by one thing from another it distinguishes divides, the one does not exist in the other. the Through it understands which what a thing is, it distin another by knowing what one is without knowing either that it is united to it or separated from it.
is not properly So this distinction called separation but (separatio), It is first. the called but the when abstraction, only correctly only the other, are one in reality (ital. things of which one is known without
ours).22
then, Here, the intellect differentiated and another
within can
the general
context
of the different
ways
in which
one thing from another, Thomas has "distinguish" one kind of operation between to as separatio, referred to as abstraction. referred Abstraction has now taken
to the intellect's first opera meaning, being restricted or judg to the intellect's tion. refers second Separatio operation a or and since it is is often ment, distinguishing operation, dividing on Thomas as a "negative described by commentators judgment." on same in two further to distinguish Thomas this article goes subdivisions of abstraction to two modes taken in this To strict union and narrow sense, of union. of part and whole the abstraction of the
on a narrower
corresponding there corresponds the abstraction of the whole, universal from the particular. To union of form (the accidental form of quantity) matter and its appropriate there abstrac corresponds two tion of the form. Thomas's of these Though development types of abstraction 21 is rather detailed, we shall here content ourselves
Ibid., p. 182-83. The Division and Methods See A. Maurer, 3d ed. of the Sciences, of Mediaeval Institute (Toronto: Pontifical Studies, 1963), p. 30. For direct we will follow Maurer. For the Latin see the Decker translations, ed., unum ab altero aliter et aliter "Sic ergo intellectus p. 183. 23-31: distinguit secundum diversas qua componit operationes; quia secundum operationem, unum ab alio per hoc quod intelligit unum alii non et dividit, distinguit vero qua intelligit, In operatione inesse. quid est unumquodque, distinguit unum ab alio, dum intelligit, de alio, ?eque quid est hoc, nihil intelligendo non ista distinctio Unde quod sit cum eo, neque quod sit ab eo separatum. sed prima tantum. Haec autem distinctio proprie habet nomen separationis, recte dicitur abstractio, sed tune tantum quando ea, quorum unum sine sunt simul secundum altero intelligitur, rem." 22
440
with noting that he then correlates separatio and
JOHN F.WIPPEL
the two types of
abstraction
science.
taken strictly with
his threefold division of theoretical
in the opera We that there are three kinds of distinction conclude There is one through the operation of the intellect tion of the intellect. is properly called separation, and this be joining and dividing which or to divine science metaphysics. longs There things matter; is another the quiddities of the operation by which through are conceived which is the abstraction of form from sensible to mathematics. and this belongs
is the abstrac And there is a third through the same operation which and this belongs to physics from a particular; and tion of a universal to all the sciences in general, science disregards because accidental features and treats of necessary matters.23 In short, therefore, a particular kind of judgment, a negative
judgment
theoretical
or separatio
is here associated with

metaphysics. teaching
the third degree

on the discovery
of
of
that is to say, with science, In an effort to reconstruct Thomas's
esse, separatio,
one to recall the
and the subject of metaphysics,

following points.
it will be helpful for first operation,
First
simple directed
of all, by way of contrast with

its second
the mind's
suggest some role Thomas.24
apprehension, a thing's towards that an existential to play
or judgment is said to be operation esse. to Given is strong reason this, there or a existence of has judgment judgment of being as existing according of existence to
in one's
discovery
Secondly,
if one or a series
of individual
judgments will
is
(are) directed
senses,
to objects
of every
that have originally been grasped

such judgment be concrete,
by the
the subject
material,
and changing, that is, the kind of thing that can be grasped by the senses. If one stops at this point in formulating his notion of being, he will hardly have arrived at a notion of being as being rather than a
23 see the Decker For the Latin Maurer ed., trans., pp. 33-34. invenitur. in intellectus "Sic ergo triplex distinctio p. 186.13-21. operatione et dividentis, intellectus Una secundum operationem quae sepa componentis scientiae divinae sive metaphysicae. ratio dicitur proprie; et haec competit Alia secundum rerum, quae est ab qua formantur quiditates operationem, et Tertia mathematicae. haec stracts formae a materia sensibili; competit a particulari; secundum eandem operationem [quae est abstractio] universalis omnibus scientiis, et est communis et haec competit etiam physicae quia in se et est." est accidens scientia praetermittitur per accipitur quod quod per 24 indicated therein as well as in n. 1. See n. 18 above and the references

notion
441
he will not yet be in a Hence and material. of being as changing a as or to as such. science He of being position develop being being a primitive at what might be termed notion of being, may have arrived as restricted that is, being to the material and changing.25 Thirdly, appeal may seems This metaphysics, of the other abstraction As would tion clues article in order to overcome this restricted notion of being, to a negative be made to be why he asserts the science theoretical of being sciences or to Thomas's
judgment, that separatio
separatio. is characteristic of subject-matters some process our
as being, while can be attained
the by
of
taken apprehension.26 strictly, more to identifying the role of separatio, precisely an article be considerably easier had Thomas devoted a number As this, Lacking of explicit references has been noted, it is a judging from another as such. however, we may to separatio operation
or simple
task
to its function from 3.
take
or ques our
by understanding In short, it is a negative Thomas also judgment. states that in the case of things that can exist separately, separation obtains rather than abstraction.28 when he speaks most Hence, pre cisely, notes without he carefully that
one thing tinguishes found in the other.27
in question 5, one dis whereby that the one is not
it from abstraction. he distinguishes Again, the can matter of quantity, exist substance, intelligible the of consideration substance without Therefore, quantity.
to the order of separation rather than to that of quantity belongs abstraction.29 It will be recalled to Thomas's that according treat 25 For some other contemporary of Thomas who also dis interpreters this "primitive" notion of being and a truly metaphysical tinguish between see H. Renard, "What is St. Thomas' Approach to Metaphysics?" notion, New Scholasticism 30 (January 1956): 73; A. M. Krapiec, forma "Analysis tionis conceptus entis existentialiter Divus Thomas (Piac.) 33 considerati," G. W. Klubertanz, to the Introduction 1956): 341-44; (July-September 2d ed. (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, of Being, Philosophy 1963), en m?taphysique," pp. 45-52; R. W. Schmidt, "L'emploi de la s?paration Revue philosophique de Louvain 58 (1960): 377-80. 26 For helpful remarks on separation role in detaching being from lim see J.-D. Robert, ited determinations "La m?taphysique, science distincte de toute autre discipline selon saint Thomas philosophique, d'Aquin," Divus Thomas (Piac.) 50 (1947): 216-17. 27 See q. 5, a. 3 as cited in n. 22 above. 28 Decker 1. "In his autem quae secundum ed., pp. 185. 31-186. esse possunt esse divisa, magis habet locum separatio quam abstractio." 29 "Substantia intel Ibid., p. 186. 10-12. autem, quae est materia unde considerare substan ligibilis quantitatis, potest esse sine quantitate; tiam sine quantitate ad genus pertinet magis quam abstrac separationis
tionis."
442
ment in question 5, article 1, substance in matter stances is found of that which that is to say, of that rather than positively that the consideration which and
JOHN
F. WIPPEL as not in in
cited being were cases but in certain
others, material conclude material Finally, divine
or neutrally im is negatively one immaterial.30 may Therefore, as such of being rather than as
or quantified to separatio rather than to abstraction. pertains seen that separatio or to to have belongs metaphysics If one bears in mind science. that for Thomas metaphysics we not on matter either for their existence or to be
has as its subject being as being, that it treats of the kind of things
that do depend
defined,
process
then it follows
Thomas's
that for him separatio
is the intellectual
whereby To express and asserts
one attains
to that particular kind of subject matter. in other of terms, understanding separatio
then, it is the process

edges nized that
through which
that by reason
the mind
of which
explicitly
something
acknowl
is recog
nized as being need not be identified with that by which

as material being, or changing being, or being
it is recog
kind.
of a given
One may describe it as a negative judgment in that it denies that that by reason of which something is described as being is to be identi fied with that by reason of which it is being of a given kind, for in
stance, material and matter, spiritual of this by reason changing One being. being, may one distinguishes or quantified it as describe being, or, for that because separatio or separates that intelli
judgment
gibility in virtue of which something is described as being from all lesser and more restrictive intelligibilities that indicate its kind of
one asserts As a result of separatio, that in order therefore, being. or or changing to be real, it need not be material to be for something or quantified. one asserts Thus the negative the immateriality, of being. neutral character,
If one concedes that metaphysics is indeed the science of being as being and that its subject is being in general rather than this or
that particular kind of being,31 then one can understand why Thomas
30 See p. 434 of our text above. 31 For some other texts wherein Thomas distinguishes the metaphysi see In S Sent., d. 27, q. 2, a. 4, sol. 2: ". . . sicut cian's perspective, ens secundum quod est est specialis scientia, quamvis consideret philosophia omnibus commune, quia specialem rationem entis consid?r?t secundum quod a materia non dependet v. 3 [Paris: et motu" Sententiis, super (Scriptum In 1* 1. 1, n. 530: "Dicit autem 'se Met., 1933], pp. 886-87). Lethielleux, cundum quod est ens', quia scientiae aliae, quae sunt de entibus particu sint scientiarum laribus, consid?rant quidem de ente, cum omnia subiecta

links tions with metaphysics separatio of the other characteristic between abstraction and contrasts it with This and the
443
abstrac is why separatio his in
theoretical in the
sciences. strict sense
distinction
to grounding when it comes q. 5, a. 3 is so important a, to one's discovery notion of being. of metaphysical restrictions Thomas's sense involved assertion in a merely primitive of this distinction between notion
or metaphysics It is by appeal to of being. As in the strict
ing to this negative judgment that one frees his notion of being from the
abstraction
to note that he himself it is interesting and separatio, settled on it only after some false starts. Examination of the transcription of an his autograph that in earlier of this discussion shows version he used the the final straction operation. for and language: version he and reserves It is this "Patet clearly the that quod triplex est abstractio . . ,"32 In and ab between separatio distinguishes name for the intellect's second separatio as proper he regards to metaphysics.
In order to highlight
suppose, distinction the sake of the reduce
the importance of separatio

illustration, formation that one were of the notion
for Aquinas,
to reject this to a more
of being
Thus one might first abstract from the refined kind of abstraction. material and changing things, differences between individuating thereby ending with a general or universal concept that still included
reference to sensible matter, common e.g., sensible man, horse, animal. One would
then be on the level of physics or philosophy

then abstract from matter
of nature.
as well,
One might
only
retaining
common intelligible matter

would might arriving another now then have abstract notion reached from
or being insofar as it is quantified.

of mathematics. subject common matter intelligible as being. the Finally, as well,
One
one
thereby
at the
of being As
The difficulty with such a procedure

abstracted notion. such
is that being then becomes

serve as subject of a
it can hardly
ens secundum entia, non tarnen consid?rant quod ens, sed secundum quod est huiusmodi vel linea, vel ignis, aut aliquid huius ens, scilicet vel numerus, In 6Met., 1. 1, n. 1147: "De quolibet enim ente inquantum est ens, modi." to metaphysics to treat considerare." It pertains proprium est metaphysici or without of being in general restriction insofar as it is therefore, precisely being rather than insofar as it is being of a given kind. 32 see pp. 233. 20-24: For Decker's of the same transcription abstrahit. Prima "Patet ergo quod triplex est abstractio, qua intellectus et di secundum secundam qua componit intellectus, operationem quidem Et sic intellectum nihil est aliud hoc non esse in hoc." On vidit. abstrahere see Geiger, et s?paration," "Abstraction the different redactions pp.
15-20.
444
science that is so universal and so transcendental
JOHN F.WIPPEL
that it not only
applies to that which is insofar as it is, but even to the individual If one abstracts from individual differ differences between things.
ences, notion these from in arriving and from quantity at one's sensible matter, can one apply to how such an abstracted notion of being, same to sensible to individual and matter, differences,
quantity?
does Such but not
Perhaps by adding something to the notion of being that

fall under the same. of being and not But notion could only be non-being. be it would seem, univocal, might serve to transcendental sufficiently Hence Thomas's earlier is ordered to a thing's re has been that
an abstract not
as subject
truly analogical of a science
that suggestion esse. Reliance jected Were by one him as
as being.33 of being the mind's second operation on first the mind's solely insufficient by simple
to move
operation as real, or as existing. to grasp being abstraction from the primitive notion
of being
being, from
attained
through
judgment
to a metaphysical
from existence matter, second sensible
notion
as well and
of
as
one would, abstract presumably, common individual from differences, notion of being.34 Hence
from
quantity.
metaphysical 33
But all of these should be included under the resulting

Thomas's appeal to
on Metaphysics attributes such rea In his commentary 1, Thomas non ens: to est est et Parmenides: ens, soning praeter "Quicquid quicquid est non ens, est nihil: ergo quicquid ens est nihil. est praeter Sed ens est unum. In quo patet quod con Ergo quicquid est praeter unum, est nihil. esse una, quia non potest siderabat essendi quae videtur ipsam rationem entis aliquid superveniat per quod diversificetur: intelligi quod ad rationem esse extraneum ab ente. enti, oportet quia illud quod supervenit Quod autem est huiusmodi, est nihil. Unde non videtur quod possit diversificare ens. Sicut etiam videmus quod differentiae advenientes generi diversificant n. 138). Thomas tarnen sunt substantiam eius" (1. quae 9, praeter ipsum, ente quasi una comments: "Sed in hoc decipiebantur, quia utebantur ratione et una natura sicut est natura alicuius generis; hoc enim est impossi ble. Ens enim non est genus, sed multipliciter dicitur de diversis" (n. one to regard being simply as the most abstract of all notions, 139). Were a problem one might well encounter similar to that of Parmenides. One would hardly have safeguarded its analogical character. See the remarks by "La m?taphysique, science Robert, pp. 213-15, distincte," esp. 214, n. p. 29. As Robert the differences which contract observes, being are still included within being, though in a confused way. But specific and are only potentially con individual differences in non-transcendental present a. to refers reader De veritate 1. Robert the the cepts. q. 1, 34 comment bears quotation: "Mais dire cela, c'est dire ?quiva Geiger's lemment que l'?tre ne peut ?tre abstrait ? proprement parler ni de lamati?re ni des r?alit?s tout cela est de l'?tre. Finalement immat?rielles, puisque et avec lui le caract?re c'est donc le caract?re transcendental, analogique transcendentales de s?paration" propre aux donn?es qui exige le jugement (p. 28).

to the negative this time, judgment, cases in certain has shown, himself judgment, of abstraction
445
As he separatio. one can mentally
distinguish
judgment, ratio,
things that are not distinguished

however.
in reality.
Not
so in
therefore,
to a negative to sepa judgment, By appealing one asserts is that that by reason of which something
recognized as being is not to be identified with that by reason of which

or quantified one or of a restricted In short, kind. or in order to be such, not be material, need asserts that being, one or etc. asserts the Therefore legitimacy changing, quantified, as or as as of investigating rather than being changing being it is material quantified. The "separation" first differentiation not so between But "abstraction" the difference and be
terminological is, perhaps,
important.
tween that which is signified by the term "abstraction," the intellect's

is signified and that which the operation, by "separation," or judging is indeed crucial. there intellect's second If, operation, in his career Thomas does not always fore, at later points rigorously in terminology between abstraction and this distinction preserve separatio but uses abstraction more generally so as to apply to both
ways of distinguishing, this does not imply any change in doctrine. For in these later texts he still distinguishes clearly between one operation (simple apprehension) and the other (judgment), and still
connects the latter with metaphysics.35
35 "Ad primum Thus in Summa 1, q. 85, a. 1, ad 1, he writes: theologiae Uno modo, per modum dicendum ergo contingit dupliciter. quod abstrahere et divisionis; sicut cum intelligimus compositionis aliquid non esse in alio, et absolutae vel esse separatum ab eo. Alio modo, per modum simplicis cum nihil de considerando alio. Ab sicut unum, considerationis, intelligimus rem non sunt abstracta, ea quae secundum strahere igitur per intellectum non est absque falsitate. secundum Sed se abstrahendi, primum modum non sunt cundo modo abstrahere intellectum abstracta secundum per quae " of the universal the abstraction After discussing rem, non habet falsitatem. from the particular in the same context, and again in his reply to the second to Thomas also considers the kind of abstraction objection, appropriate that of quantity from sensible qualities (common sensible mat mathematics, ter). He concludes his reply to the second objection by observing: "Quaedam vero sunt quae possunt abstrahi etiam a materia sicut communi, intelligibili et actus, et alia huiusmodi, ens, unum, potentia quae etiam esse possunt Et quia Plato ut patet in substantiis immaterialibus. absque omni materia, non considera vit quod dictum est de duplici modo abstractionis [see our above from his reply to objection 11, omnia quae diximus abstrahi quotation esse secundum rem." Although he does per intellectum, posuit abstracta can no not here name this kind of "abstraction" there be doubt that separatio he is referring to the intellect's judging operation (per modum compositionis et divisionis). Hence his doctrine has not changed.
446 II
If the above with has been an accurate interpretation
JOHN F.WIPPEL
of Thomas's
mind
a second to separatio, historical to be remains respect problem to examined. what does separatio According Aquinas, presuppose? in order to be such, need not be material For one to judge that being, changing, being exists? of or must Must one already know one presuppose scholars concluded separatio, some, on who that positively the existence of some that immaterial entity views to many, of such
as the First Mover of the Physics

contemporary have separatio Thomas grounds to such and
or a spiritual soul? The majority

have studied view. the Thomas's According very on is his therefore
possibility existence
metaphysics,
(or according
on the demonstration
the
of the First Mover of the Physics

of the of a
demonstration
spiritual soul).
Therefore, realized "Is the one as being, existence
If immaterial being does in fact exist,

may of conclude not that in order it need be material.
it can exist.
beings we mean a science If by metaphysics metaphysics? ent from physics, then their existence is absolutely
immaterial
for something to be one As writer it: phrases an absolute for necessity specifically differ
necessary."36
One of the most

must
interesting
defenses
of the view that separatio
on prior knowledge of the existence be grounded of immaterial in Geiger's is found article. After that this being strongly asserting awareness that immaterial presupposes judgment beings actually and after out two texts from Thomas's exist, singling commentary
on theMetaphysics,
itself enjoys a certain there immaterial,
Geiger briefly suggests

mode least is at
that the concept of being

its mode being of being is with the given
of being. Because one immaterial
concept of being
36
initially drawn from the material world.
He sug
30 (April Thomist of Metaphysics," "The Nature See A. Moreno, Vincent he does not emphasize the role of separatio, 1966): 113. Although of those who ground the possibility Smith is a fine illustration of metaphysics on the demonstration of and First Mover at the conclusion of an immaterial his See "Prime and Metaphysical Considerations," Mover, Physical physics. 28 (1954): Association Catholic Philosophical Proceedings of the American Science (Milwaukee: Bruce, 78-94; General 1958), p. 382: "A of Nature ... we do not discover now becomes called metaphysics Science possible our proof that there is an that there is such a subject (being as being) without immaterial and immobile world and without proof that mobile being, hereto is not truly so. While the science fore taken by reason as the only reality, remain distinct disciplines, of nature and metaphysics presup metaphysics condition." poses the science of nature as a material
METAPHYSICS AND SEPARATIO gests that this is the procedure used by Thomas to demonstrate
of the purely immaterial activity of our intellect
447 the
and,
existence
thereby,
the human
the immateriality
soul.37 of the Thomas
of the power of the intellect itself and of

texts he cites leads one back to the histori possi
Consideration cal issue: bility exists? physics, approval phers does
himself on
of metaphysics A first text book
and the very ground separatio awareness that immaterial prior from his on
commentary 181. Here Thomas with 1, lectio 12, number reports Aristotle's criticism of the position of the ancient philoso Thomas notes that in positing they were mistaken them he observes that Against certain text as is incorporeal things, is interesting for our pur or cor that only physical
is taken
being the Meta
of nature.
but corporeal principles. nothing there are not only corporeal but also evident from the De anima.38 This poses, it would realities seem, because
poreal and presumably
exist, Aquinas to what he
does
in denying refer
regards
in passing to the De anima, as a demonstration of the in
corporeal therein.
But
this text of itself does not show that the

or of separatio we Hence in particular must find little support
in general of metaphysics possibility on such a presupposition. be grounded in it for Geiger's contention. Geiger's There Thomas second text is also
taken
from
Thomas's
commentary ancient
on the Metaphysics,
again
this time from book 4, lectio 5, number 593.

finds Aristotle criticizing the philoso
37 et s?paration," "Abstraction Note his comment pp. 24-25. Geiger, on p. 24: "Pour que l'intelligence en toute v?rit? scien le prononcer puisse avant de tifique, faut-il donc qu'elle sache qu'il existe des ?tres immat?riels commencer la m?taphysique? Et S. Thomas Sans aucun doute. le dit ex dans deux textes au moins ..." He then cites two texts from plicitement on the Metaphysics, see below. Thomas's for which For his Commentary from the immateriality of the concept of being, see the following: argument sur les essences "Alors que l'objet des concepts portant est limit? ? cette et donc au contenu du concept?le essence, concept de cheval n'est pas un cheval, mais signifie le cheval?the concept de l'?tre signifie l'?tre et est lui m?me de l'?tre, parce que l'?tre est transcendant ? toute cat?gorie. Le concept est lui-m?me un certain mode de l'?tre, et puisqu'il est immat?riel, c'est un certain ?tre immat?riel qui est donn? avec le concept de l'?tre tir? du monde mat?riel" (p. 25). 38 sed etiam quaedam incor "Quia in rebus non solum sunt corp?rea, Sed ipsi non posuerunt p?rea, ut patet ex libro de Anima. principia nisi In duodecim ..." libros metaphysicorum Aristotelis corp?rea expositio, ed. Cathala-Spiazzi (Turin-Rome: Marietti, 1950). Our citation of this work will be from this edition.
448
phers in light exists. of nature, this time for having that that concerned
JOHN F.WIPPEL
themselves with ex
amining the first principles of demonstration.

of the ancients' Thomas thought observes to treat view only corporeal because of this
This is understandable
and mobile substance
ture were
of the whole
the philosophers of na of nature, and therefore of
being as being as well as of the first principles

with together being. is still another there Nature, or natural This science being, view that is only
that are considered
is false, Thomas because counters, to natural is superior philosophy. one given class (genus) within the
totality of being. But not all being is of this type. (Here one appears to have an instance of separatio, the judgment that not all being is
physical appeals or material.) to the existence In of this support of an immobile judgment, as being Thomas established then in
Book
8 of the Physics.
He
comments
that this immobile being
con is superior to and nobler than mobile the physicist being, which a in And which siders. then, passage upon the expands considerably text of Aristotle, he writes: "And because the consideration of ens commune the first to that science to which pertains the consideration therefore being, science to that concludes different science from from to study this text natural such and it also to consider belongs of ens commune also be philosophy." principles.39 the previous one Hence it
to a longs will pertain Geiger
that
the
negative
39
judgment which grounds the immateriality
of the object of
in particular: See n. 593 of Thomas's Note "Hoc commentary. autem falsum est; quia adhuc est quaedam scientia superior naturali: ipsa enim natura, in se principium motus, idest res naturalis habens in se ipsa est unum aliquod genus entis universalis. Non enim omne ens est huiusmodi; cum probatum esse aliquod ens immobile. sit in octavo Physicorum Hoc autem ens immobile superius est et nobilius ente mobili, de quo consid?r?t Et quia ad illam scientiam pertinet naturalis. consideratio entis communis, ad quam pertinet entis primi, ideo ad aliam scientiam consideratio quam ad naturalem consideratio entis communis." it cannot be as pertinet Although sumed that the Latin text of the Metaphysics com printed with Thomas's we will is always identical with the version on which he commented, mentary cite it and then the corresponding Greek text in order to facilitate comparison statement and Thomas's between Aristotle's of identi affirmation expanded fication of the science of the first being and the science of ens commune: "Sed quoniam est adhuc physico aliquis superior, unum enim aliquod genus est natura entis, ipsius universalis et circa substantiam primam theorizantis, et de his erit perscrutatio" (n. 323, p. 163); knel d'eaTLv etl tov tl y?vo? tov tov ?vto? (ev y?p <?>vctlkov rt? ?vcuT?po) i) 4>vcrt?), KaO?Kov Ka? tov ovcr?av Oe prjTiKov Kai i) irep? ttp?)tt)v irep? tt)v tovtc?v ?v er] cr/c i//t? (1005a33-1005bl).

metaphysics of Physics to be draws its objective the human value from the demonstration
449
of im
material beings effected

8, and
in the philosophy of nature: the First Mover

soul with its agent and possible that
intellect as established
expected, since
in the De anima.
Thomas also affirms
For Geiger
on other
this is only
occasions
should be taught after physics.40 metaphysics As regards the text from Thomas's commentary
on Metaphysics
Jf, one might contend that he here justifies separatio by appealing to the fact that immobile being exists, something that he takes Physics 8 to have established. Moreover, he justifies the existence of the
science same Hence and of ens science he commune to study to justify by asserting the first being that it belongs and to study science to one ens and the commune. first
separatio, being, to the existence of the commune, by appealing in the Physics. and first mover demonstrated immobile to be conclusive this passage of itself does not appear However, one in must that Thomas's and eyes proof ground metaphysics the science of ens separatio lectical. of the Physics. The situation is dia on is commenting Thomas Aristotle's criticism of the earlier to and their restriction of the material. reality philosophers the conclusions on
seems
the
of the
natural
Against this it would only be natural for him to cite a counterfact, the existence of immaterial being as established at the end of the Given this, it is not surprising to find him also arguing that Physics. the science that studies this first and immaterial being, because it
also studies being physics. the fact the need Hence, that immaterial of that follow that in general, that granted being entity could first he is distinct from and higher than case he reasons in this particular from to the distinctive exists of character and the science it commune, in this manner. It was of the because context, of his that ultimate is, of ens
science not
only the refutation
natural
for him of the
to do early
only so here,
proceed because and
naturalists,
in the immediate context, to show that the study of first principles does not belong to them but to the science that studies being in general. Finally, Thomas is here interpreting the text of Aristotle. If inmore independent texts one should find him suggesting a differ purpose
ent procedure, then greater weight should be given to those texts
40 et s?paration," "Abstraction p. 25. Geiger, tion of such passages wherein Thomas recommends metaphysics.
See below studying
for considera physics after
450
when it comes to a determination of Thomas's
JOHN F.WIPPEL
personal thought on
the matter
in question. This final suggestion will be developed below. Perhaps the most forceful text pointing toward the dependence
therefore, is to be of separatio the upon com found in Thomas's
and presumably, of metaphysics of natural conclusions philosophy
mentary on the final lines of chapter 1 of book 6 of Aristotle's Meta physics (and in his commentary on the parallel passage in book ll).41
Here Thomas follows Aristotle's text very closely and raises the ques
tion to which Aristotle himself explicitly adverts. One might well wonder whether first philosophy is universal in that it studies being in
general, genus or whether its consideration nature arises (separate is rather and from directed immobile and a particular of course, question, to a particular The reality).42
in earlier developments naturally 1 of Aristotle's Meta 1 and 2, and book 6, chapter book 4, chapters same difficulty own has caused of this resolution Aristotle's physics. as is well known.43 for his commentators, considerable perplexity
in book 6, In commenting on the solution offered by Aristotle If there is no Thomas repeats his text with slightest modification.
other substance apart immobile from those that exist according be prior to nature and
of which physics treats, then physics will be the first science.

there is some substance, this will to natural
But if
sub
41
See
nn.
(1026a23-32); (1064b6-14). 42 See n. 1169: "Tertio movetur circa praedeter quaedam quaestio et primo movet minata: utrum earn, dicens, quod aliquis potest dubitare, ens universaliter, sit universalis aut eius quasi considerans prima philosophia et naturam unam." sit circa aliquod genus determinatum consideratio For on bk. 11, see n. 2266: ". . . et dicit: from his commentary the parallel Dubitabile est, utrum istam scientiam, quae est circa entia separabilia, opor teat poni universalem scientiam est ens, aut non. ..." entis, inquantum 43 the solutions proposed by J. Owens, The Doctrine See, for instance, in the Aristotelian Institute of (Toronto: Pontifical Metaphysics of Being From Ph. to Platonism Mediaeval 1957); Studies, Merlan, Neoplatonism, 2d ed. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960), chap. 7; A. Mansion, "L'objet de la science philosophique E I," supr?me d'apr?s Aristote, M?taphysique de philosophie (Paris: J. Vrin, grecque offerts ? Mgr. A. Di?s M?langes et m?ta "Philosophie 1956), pp. 151-68; seconde, philosophie premi?re, de Louvain 56 (May 1958): Revue chez Aristote," philosophique physique sur la Le probl?me Essai de l'?tre chez Aristote. 165-221; P. Aubenque, Aristot?licienne Universitaires de France, (Paris: Presses probl?matique erste Philosophie als universale Wissenschaft "Aristoteles' 1962); E. K?nig, von den APXAI," Archiv f?r Geschichte 52 (1970): 225-46. der Philosophie
on Aristotle's 1169-70, commenting Metaphysics on Metaphysics and nn. 2266-67, commenting
6, c. 1 11, c. 7

stance. Therefore, It will the philosophy that considers this kind
451
of sub
stance will be first philosophy.

be universal. it is, then,
And because it is first itwill therefore
as being, to it to study being both what belong as being.44 to being and the attributes which And pertain in a significant addition to Aristotle's Thomas concludes: text, as has been maintained in the beginning of book on the passage in book 11 parallels a justification he offers there for the
for the science of the first being and the science of being in general
are one and the same, 4.45 the Thomas's above very commentary closely. But
concluding statement which he had added to his commentary on book 6. To prove that the science that studies the first being(s)#is the
same as the universal of the the principles One might, science, others.46 well he observes that the first beings are
therefore,
argue
from
Thomas's
commentary
on the passage from Metaphysics 11) that metaphysics Metaphysics

cover being 44 n. as being) presupposes
6 (and the parallel text from (and separatio as required to dis

prior awareness that immaterial
1170. Thomas's final sentence reads: "Et quia est prima, ideo erit et erit eius speculari de ente inquantum est ens, et de eo quod universalis, quid est, et de his quae sunt entis inquantum est ens; eadem enim est scientia ut in principio quarti habitum est." Compare primi entis et entis communis, in the Marietti text: "Et quia prima et de with the Latin version printed ente inquantum est ens, eius utique est speculari, et quod quid est, et quae In both this text and in Thomas's insunt inquantum ens" (p. 294, n. 542). of the same, the expression it is first") paraphrase "quia prima" ("because with which the preceding in the Greek text has rather sentence concludes been joined to the following see 1026a29-32: sentence. For the Greek
ei Kai 8'ecttl Ka0?\ov rt? ovcr?a ovrc?c avTi) ?/a^r/ro?, ?tl ko? 7rpo)Trj' irpoTepa irepl tov Kai <?>L\oorp(?)?a ?vtos bv, r) wpajTr}, toutt)*;
av Kal t? ?crn Ka? Ta vir?pxovTa Also r? bv. eil) de(?p?)crai, see Thomas, In 3 Met.: "Sicut si non essent aliae substantiae priores esset mobilibus substantiis scientia naturalis philosophia corporalibus, prima, ut dicitur infra in sexto" (n. 398). As Thomas himself indicates in this this statement is to be read in the light of Aristotle's paragraph, procedure inMetaphysics 4 and 6. 45 Ibid. For the text see n. 44 above. 46 n. 2267. "Sed de naturali manifestum sub est; quia si naturales et mobiles, sensibiles sunt primae inter entia, stantiae, quae sunt substantiae scientia sit prima inter scientias; oportet quod naturalis quia secundum est ordo scientiarum, ut iam dictum est.?Si ordinem subiectorum, autem est alia natura et substantia substantias naturales, quae sit separa praeter est alteram scientiam bilis et immobilis, necesse ipsius esse, quae sit prior naturali. Et ex eo quod est prima, oportet quod sit universalis. Eadem enim est scientia quae est de primis entibus, et quae est universalis. Nam sunt entia aliorum" (italics mine). prima principia
452
and immobile being exists. Negatively expressed,
JOHN
F. WIPPEL has
Thomas
written that if there is no substance will be the first science. Positively is some immobile substance, then kind of substance will be first, and
universal and the science of being
beyond the physical, then physics phrased, he states that if there the philosophy that studies this because it is first, it will also be
Moreover, if one wonders
as being.
how Aristotle
the universal Thomas physics has 6.
himself justifies the transition from first philosopy

science asserted
to
in this passage (see Metaphysics 6, 1026a30 ff.), on Meta the identity of the two in commenting on Metaphysics 11, he has supplied an
In commenting
added.reason: the first being(s) are the principles of the others. The implication seems to be: in studying the first principle, one studies In sum, therefore, if all being is physical, if there is no all else. immaterial and immobile being in the positive sense, it seems that one
could not reason that being, in order to be, need not be material. In
short, one would not be justified in distinguishing

and changeable being as material one would to arrive be unable than a science of being as by means at a science
being as such from
changing.47
of separatio. Therefore, as being of being rather It should also be noted that
prior knowledge
required. spiritual mentary.
of immaterial and immobile beings appears

of the existence
to be
ground immaterial
of a words, prior knowledge com human soul is not implied by these texts from Thomas's one the view that offer little for Hence support might they on this conclusion than on the existence rather of an separatio In other and immobile being, to evaluate viz., the the First importance (1) Thomas and Unmoved of this text Mover. and its as a
In attempting two points parallel, commentator
should
be recalled.
care. on Aristotle his and is following answer In fact, he presents to Aristotle's this as Aristotle's question. own one assume reflects Thomas's that this Can automatically can texts also be offered from unless further evidence other opinion, where Thomas is clearly expressing his personal views? One's
is here writing text with greatest
hesitation
in replying
in the affirmative will,
of course,
increase
if
47 see Moreno, For such an interpretation of these passages "The Na ture of Metaphysics," T. the Exist and pp. 113-15; O'Brien, Metaphysics ence of God (Washington, D.C.: Thomist Press, 1960), p. 160 (citing In n. 1170); J. Doig, Aquinas on Metaphysics 6 Met., (The Hague: Martinus n. n. "The Relationship J. of p. 1; p. 303, 1; Weisheipl, 243, 1972), Nijhoff, to Modern Medieval Natural Science: The Contribution of Philosophy Thomas Aquinas to its Understanding," 20 (November 1976): Manuscripta 194-96.

one finds The Thomas suggesting sentence, as a different has procedure been already in such noted of the texts.48 above, science
453
(2) has that
been
concluding added by Aquinas the first being studies established these regards two the
to the identity and appeals that studies and the science of book 4. For
as
in the
venience, As mark
in commenting the science under
beginning in reverse order. points will now be considered an re second Thomas makes point, interesting 4. He on the opening of Metaphysics chapter
in general, being the sake of con
observes that the Philosopher

that
(Aristotle)
is there attempting
to show
has ens for its subject. He notes cause se a to with and is that every per respect principle principle we some nature. in this science seek after the first principles But causes and ultimate he continues, Aristotle's of things, repeating examination
text, and refers to book 1 of the Metaphysics

same.49 also be these Therefore, se per principles first and
for support for the

causes But must that
and ultimate principles causes nature. of some
can only be ens. he writes that those "nature" Aristotle, Following as they of the elements insofar who things philosophers investigated are beings were et altissima). of this type (prima seeking principles we in must science this the continues Thomas, Therefore, investigate
principles
he because
of being as being.
"Therefore science every
And
in an addition to Aristotle's
is the subject causes of this
text
concludes:
[ens] being seeks after the proper
In sum, view, a view is the being
here Thomas is surely therefore, as well, to Aristotle that he attributes can this science. One be of subject
science, of its subject."50 his personal stating that certain is, that that ens this or is
48 in this com Thomas whether On the difficult point of determining as he understands is simply exposing Aristotle's it, or thought mentary as an occasio to express his personal he is using the commentary whether in one way at times and in the he proceeds views, or whether metaphysical on Metaphysics: A Historico other at other times, see J. Doig, Aquinas on the the doctrinal (The Commentary Metaphysics Hague: Mar Study of 52 (January tinus Nijhoff, 1972). For our review of the same see Speculum on role as commentator of Thomas's For an examination 1977): 133-35. on the on the commentary in general, but with special emphasis Aristotle see J. Owens, St. Commentator," "Aquinas as Aristotelian Metaphysics, 2 vols. Commemorative Thomas Aquinas 127^-197^: (Toronto: Studies, Pontifical of Mediaeval Institute 1974), 1: pp. 213-38. Studies, 49 on the same. See chaps. 1 and 2 and Thomas's commentary n. 533. ". . . ergo ens est subiec 50In JfMet., See in particular: causas proprias tum huius scientiae, est quaerens scientia quia quaelibet sui subiecti."
454
his personal opinion because of statements in other
JOHN F.WIPPEL
texts as well.51
if it is his view that being is the subject of metaphysics, and a secondly that it is the business of science to investigate the princi ples and causes of its subject, and finally that God (the First Un moved Mover) is such a principle, then itwould seem strange for him But
to suggest that one must first prove the existence of the First Un
moved Mover (or God) in physics before discovering the subject of this science (metaphysics).52 Yet such seems to be implied by his
commentary Metaphysics one must move on Metaphysics 11, as we from have 1 and in the parallel 6, chapter passage seen above. such seems to be And in im
plied by the more traditional
insistence
that, according to Aquinas,

Mover as required should have in physics for meta one begin
a demonstration
of the First
to the discovery of being as being seem It would rather physics.
that
or to separatio Thomas
by discovering
being as such or being
in general
(as achieved by a
to our interpreta of existence and by separation according judgment reason of metaphysics, to the tion), and then, as part of the business ens cause or the of to existence of that is commune, say, principle
God.
If it is difficult to reconcile this procedure with the statements
51 in our n. 11 above. the references See, for instance, given 52 on the Phys sentence Note the concluding of Thomas's commentary communem ics: "Et sic termin?t Philosophus considerationem de rebus na in primo principio totius naturae, turalibus, qui est super omnia Deus bene in saecula. ed. Maggiolo dictus Amen." (Turin-Rome: Marietti, 1954), n. 1172. For a general discussion of the contested in point as to whether 8 is, in fact, God, see A. Pegis, Thomas's view the First Mover of Physics "St. Thomas and the Coherence of the Aristotelian Mediaeval Theology," 35 (1973): 67-117. to some who would Studies For reference deny this see p. 68 and n. 3. J. Paulus, "La th?orie du Premier See especially n.s. 4 (May-June Moteur chez Aristote," Revue de philosophie 1933): 259 94 and 394-424; J. Owens, and the Proof from the 'Physics'," "Aquinas 28 (1966): 119-50. Mediaeval Studies defends this Pegis himself strongly or not Thomas has in fact See, for instance, pp. 97 ff. Whether identity. on the Physics, to the existence reasoned of God in his commentary and if so some surreptitious he has or has not introduced whether metaphysical an issue for us to at is too far-reaching into the argumentation reasoning in this study. We will content ourselves with the observa tempt to resolve tion that in his final sentence therein he does assert that Aristotle's first in which of the whole of nature, the Physics is God. terminates, principle And we would stress the point to which we have already partially adverted, on Metaphysics 6 that the difficult passages from Thomas's commentary and 11 seem to require of immaterial, and separate, prior knowledge immobile being in order to justify metaphysics. Neither prior knowledge of the human soul nor of a sphere soul that moves itself without being unmoved and separate would appear to suffice. absolutely
METAPHYSICS AND SEPARATIO found in his commentary

those standing point, the texts he does not of Aristotle's two do not
455 6 and 11, itmay be that in
onMetaphysics
his personal but his under view, present text. it may And be that on this particular us back to the coincide. of course, This, brings
first point singled out above. For further clarification of this one is well advised to turn to the
Prooemium to Thomas's he is surely any event, same three titles for this commentary in his writing science on the Metaphysics. own name. Again have seen Here, he lists in question in the 5,
that we
article
1 of his commentary
on the De Trinitate
of Boethius,
sciences
that
should
is: theology, metaphysics Here he has already
and first reasoned
philosophy.53 that one of the
direct or rule the others,

entitled "wisdom."
and that it will

to determine
therefore
which
deserve
science
to be
this is,
In an effort
he writes that itwill be the one that ismost intellectual. But the most intellectual science is that which treats of that which is most in telligible. Things may
perspectives, three
be described
of which
as most
here
intelligible
singles out.
from different
First of all,
Thomas
something may be regarded as most intelligible from the viewpoint of the order of understanding Those things (ex ordine intelligendi). from which the intellect derives certitude are more intelligible than
others. be most Since such are the Hence, causes, from intellectual. a knowledge of causes to appears this standpoint the science that
considers the first causes appears to be best qualified to direct the

others.
Secondly,
standpoint ordered
things may be regarded as most

relationship between sense
intelligible from the

and intellect. While
of the
sense knowledge has to do with particulars,

to the universal. Therefore, that
intellectual knowledge
science is most intellectual
is
which
treats of the most universal principles,

53
that is, of being and
See the final paragraph of the prooemium: "Dicitur enim scientia sive theologia, substantias consid?r?t. Meta inquantum praedictas . . . Dic consid?r?t ens et ea quae consequunturipsum p%sica,inquantum itur autem prima philosophia, inquantum primas rerum causas consid?r?t." His reason for entitling this science "first philosophy" it considers (because the first causes of things) differs from that offered in his on the commentary De Trinitate, in q. 5, a. 1: "Dicitur etiam philosophia prima, quantum aliae omnes scientiae ab ea sua principia accipientes earn consequuntur" (p. 166). For our effort to resolve this problem in Thomistic see the interpretation study cited in n. 11 above. divina
456
that which and act. follows From this upon it such as the one and
JOHN F.WIPPEL
the many, potency of the universal,
standpoint, others.
therefore,
the science
that is, the science of being, is the most

to rule or direct the
intellectual and best qualified intelligible from the

to occur. Since
Thirdly,
standpoint and another,
something may be viewed as most

conditions required and for
of the
intellection
a thing is capable of intellection

matter, to one since the intellect
to the degree
its object
that it is free from

be proportioned are most from matter
must
that are most separate things or removed are from most those separate intelligible. things not only in matter from sensible matter abstract which altogether, As examples of being. but also in the order of thought the order But Thomas cites God and the intelligences. chief or mistress question. In his above and effort Therefore, of the One from this per
spective,
most Thomas
the science that treats of God and the intelligences

and hence the others.54 might then raises obvious
is the
wonder
intellectual
whether
or not these different kinds of intelligibles are to be investi

the same science. that are the to show that this is observes three) mentioned sub separate causes of being to one and the
gated by one and the case he first stances (see same class (see science class
universal he
one).
and to genus considers the natural philosopher investigate one to it and the of natural the principles Therefore, belongs body. same substances and ens the separate to investigate both science commune ens so commune is the is because This (see class two). are common and universal substances the separate of which "genus"
causes.55
Moreover, to investigate the Thus itself. that genus
primary it continues, pertains causes proper to a given
In other
terms,
Thomas
has
distinguished
three
classes
of intelli
gible objects and has endeavored

are studied by the science
to show that while all three of these

only one of them, ens commune,
in question,
54 For all of this see the prooemium, p. 1. 55 non diversis, at sed uni scientiae Haec autem triplex consideratio, et sunt universales Nam praedictae substantiae tribui d?bet. separatae causas causae essendi. est considerare autem scientiae Eiusdem primae consid?r?t principia et genus ipsum: sicut naturalis proprias alicuius generis con ad eamdem scientiam Unde naturalis. pertineat oportet quod corporis et ens commune, siderare substantias separatas, quod est genus, cuius sunt communes et universales substantiae causae" (prooemium, pp. praedictae
1-2).

is its subject. As causes that whose causes which themselves. the science's Thomas also
457
is the subject of a science indicates, one investigates rather than those
and properties Knowledge
of the causes
is the end or goal
toward
then, Here, being proposed of meta the science in this paper, the suggestion that one begins in the of achieved its notion with being already subject, general physics one of metaphysics, and then, as part of the business by separatio, that is to say, God of that same genus, seeks for the cause or causes and separate substances. Rather than presuppose the existence of
is directed.56 investigation one has reinforcement for the view
immaterial being in the positive sense (God and separate entities), such knowledge is here held out as the end or goal towards which
the metaphysician's Thomas Finally, strives. investigation makes it clear here that sense issue. Not not only immaterial are those things be said are but As the De
is at only ing in the positive esse et rationem which secundum from matter to be separate as never intellectual in and such God found substances, matter, also he those had which can be without in question noted such matter, 4 of his 5, article as ens commune.57 on
commentary
Trinitate
of Boethius:
. . . in two can exist separate and motion from matter something distinct ways: First, because by its nature the thing that is called sepa as God and the angels and motion, rate in no way can exist in matter are said to be separate and motion. from matter Second, because by tria con ista scientia praedicta "Ex quo apparet, quod quamvis eorum ut subiectum, non tarnen consid?r?t sed ipsum sidered quodlibet in scientia, cuius causas et Hoc enim est subiectum solum ens commune. non autem ipsae causae alicuius generis quaesiti. Nam passiones quaerimus, causarum est finis ad scientiae consideratio alicuius quern generis, cognitio to the rela p. 2). For the same view with respect pertingit" (prooemium, see the a science, and its principles, its subject-genus, tionship between a. c. on De the (192-95). 4, There, Trinitate, too, q. 5, commentary Thomas notes that "divine things" are studied by the philosophers only inso in that Hence of all things. far as they are the principles they are treated common and which has as to all is that which which studies beings discipline est ens (p. 194. 23-26). its subject ens in quantum 57 dicitur huius scientiae sit ens commune, "Quamvis autem subiectum esse et rationem. secundum tarnen tota de his quae sunt separata a materia non solum ilia quae esse et rationem dicuntur, separari Quia secundum esse et intellectuals sicut Deus in materia substantiae, nunquam possunt, Hoc sine materia sed etiam ilia quae possunt esse, sicut ens commune. esse dependerent" secundum si a materia tarnen non contingeret, (pro oemium, p. 2). 56
458
its nature them, It is clear
JOHN F.WIPPEL
but it can exist without it does not exist inmatter and motion, find it with them.58 though we sometimes that it is this second type of immateriality, to ens commune, applies in that same also comments or negative the subject of article from his
immateriality, As Thomas metaphysics. commentary . . .We on the De
neutral
that
Trinitate:
are separate from matter and say that being and substance . . . nature to not it them but because is of their be without motion, and motion, because it is not of their nature to be in matter although . . ,59 and motion sometimes they are in matter
As we have indicated above, it is this kind of immateriality that is achieved by separatio. And in light of Thomas's discussion both in the body of question 5, article 4 of this same commentary and in the
to his commentary prooemium of the same that discovery material being in the positive in order on the Metaphysics, presupposes or stronger to show that prior sense it does awareness actually and the not that exists. seem im
In the prooemium Thomas had appealed

natural philosopher one
to the position of the

same science itself.60 that has he has
and that genus the causes of its subject genus may investigate own attitude to the science with respect As regards Thomas's one might ens commune as its subject, the parallel develop
suggested
and the the causes
there as follows.
causes of its of its subject. subject, But
As natural philosophy
so natural is metaphysics philosophy to does
is to its subject
and its subject not presuppose
58 Maurer trans., p. 45. For the Latin see the Decker ed., p. 195. esse a materia ". . . secundum 12-18: potest quod dupliciter aliquid esse. et motu Uno modo secundum sic, quod de ratione separatum et motu esse ipsius rei, quae separata dicitur, sit quod nullo modo in materia a et motu et Alio modo materia Deus dicuntur sicut separati. possit, angeli et motu, sed possit esse sic, quod non sit de ratione eius quod sit inmateria et motu." in materia inveniatur et motu, sine materia quandoque quamvis in the immediate it is in this second As Thomas goes on to observe context, and act are separate. and potency way that being (ens), substance, 59 For the Latin see the a. 4 5 and (Maurer trans., pp. 48-49). q. 5, dicun Decker ed., p. 199. 4-9: "Ad quintum dicendum quod ens et substantia et motu non per hoc quod de ratione ipsorum sit esse tur separata a materia et motu, sicut de ratione asini est sine ratione esse, sed per hoc sine materia non est esse in materia eorum et motu, quamvis quandoque ratione de quod a ratione, et motu, sicut animal abstrahit sint in materia aliquod quamvis note bring out sit rationale." This text and the one cited in the previous or neutral of the immateriality quite well what we have styled the negative notion of being. 60 See the text cited in n. 55 above.

the existence of the cause of its not subject, but reasons the to the reasons has
459
same. of the
Therefore, cause(s) same.
metaphysics of its subject If, as at times
does
presuppose
existence but
(God and/or appears
separate entity), to be the case, Thomas
to the
identified
the First Mover

prior
of Physics
8 with God, then he could hardly make
a necessary of the existence of this First Mover pre knowledge so To would be for do to have supposition beginning metaphysics.61 the metaphysician of the existence of the presuppose prior knowledge of the
But knowledge of this cause has of his science. subject as the end or goal of the metaphysician's been proposed investigation. one might meet the above On the other contention hand, by
cause
suggesting
the Physics
that Thomas has distinguished

(an immanent and self-moving Then
between the First Mover of

principle of change) and
the First Principle

separate cause
of the Metaphysics
or God).62
(an absolutely
one might argue
immobile and
that accord
of being,
ing to Thomas prior knowledge of this First Mover as established in physics is required if one is to discover being as being. Still, this suggestion will not do. If one insists that according to Thomas one
must reason from the fact that immaterial, immobile, and separate 61 commen sentence of Thomas's See n. 52 above for the concluding on and for the studies by Pegis as well as those by Owens the Physics tary and Paulus. 62 contra gentiles 1. 13 is par As noted by Owens and Pegis, Summa on this One to difficult point. interpret paragraph might well be ticularly immo the primary between taken to imply that Thomas here distinguishes as a sphere soul established 8 and the in Physics bile mover by Aristotle 12: "Sed quia Deus non est pars alicuius inMetaphysics God who is proven ex in sua Metaphysica, moventis ulterius Aristoteles, investigat seipsum, om alium motorem hoc motore separatum seipsum, qui est pars moventis of the "secunda via," the par. "sed nino, qui est Deus" (see in his discussion of this see his "Aquinas and the Proof from For Owens's discussion quia"). comment with Note in particular his concluding the 'Physics'," pp. 132-37. in SCG 1. 13: "Here in the same chapter the inter respect to the treatment as leading in the Physics to a sphere soul and to of the argument pretations of embarrassment God occur side by side, without any feeling being shown by of the same see Pegis, the writer" interpretation (p. 137). For a different of the Aristotelian "St. Thomas and the Coherence pp. 78-86; Theology," that for 108-12. As already noted above (see n. 52), Pegis maintains in the Physics Aristotle in proving the existence of the prime mover Thomas, on the other hand, finds no defi was proving the existence of God. Owens, on the level nite indication that Thomas himself thought that a demonstration can prove God's existence of natural philosophy (p. 149). For his view that rather than pertaining the "first way" of ST 1, q. 2, a. 3 is metaphysical of the Prima Via," see his "The Conclusion of nature to the philosophy 30 (January 1953): 109-21. Modern Schoolman
460 being exists (as implied by the commentary

to an from
JOHN
F. WIPPEL
on Metaphysics
immanent
6 and
to justify 11) in order separatio, appeal reason mover If one must will not suffice.63 and separate exists immobile, being as as than rather material, ing being being mover an to such immanent will appeal rial,
self-moving the fact that immate of consider and avail. immanent,
to the possibility changeable, be of little
Before
upon Thomas physics us
concluding this historical

one final point. recommends
investigation,
There that can be one move
it is incumbent
little from doubt that a study of of learning. This
to consider
frequently enough to metaphysics when
he discusses
the order
fact might be raised against the interpretation just proposed and in support of the claim that for Aquinas both separatio and the very pos
sibility each of metaphysics of these presuppose some the conclusions of Physics. Al
though limitations of space will not permit detailed

passages, general remarks are
consideration
in order.
of
In the
interests of simplification,
eral
one might divide these texts into two gen
on the incapacity of the learner, when 1) those based categories: to learn metaphysics; too young, those of the relationship 2) treating and other intellectual between metaphysics disciplines, especially
physics (natural philosophy).64 One of the finest illustrations of the first is to be found in Thomas's
on book 6 of Aristotle's as Ethics. Aristotle's query commentary a a man or a a boy may become to why mathematician but not wise serves as the occasion for Thomas's reflections.65 of nature philosopher Thomas takes the term "wise man" on Aristotle's sensible to a metaphysician. He are Mathematicals reply. grasped even a boy (puer) has of which things to refer are not abstracted from simply for which considerable Thomas, Aristotle
begins by expanding from by abstraction awareness. sensible time But
natural
principles
things but are acquired As regards is required.
by experience, continues wisdom,
63 on Metaphysics 6 and 11 texts from his commentary Thomas's and separate do imply that if there were no immaterial, immutable, entity, (see nn. 1163,1164,1169,1170, 2266, 2267). physics would be first philosophy if this does indeed reflect Thomas's view rather than his Hence, personal of Aristotle, of an immanent and self-moving interpretation knowledge prin than knowl ciple of change, that is, a sphere soul, will be no more adequate the human soul. edge of 64 on Learning Metaphysics," "St. Thomas On this see G. Klubertanz, 35 see 3-17. Also his of Thomistic "The (1954): Gregorianum Teaching 35 (1954): 187-205. Metaphysics," Gregorianum 65 see Ethics For Aristotle 6. 8. 1142al6 ff.

observes with port
461
do not attain metaphysical truths that young men (iuvenes)66 even though In sup utter them. their minds they may verbally comments that mathematical definitions of this Thomas also
(rationes) pertain to things that can be imagined, whereas those of If young men (iuvenes) wisdom (metaphysics) are purely intelligible. can grasp that which is imaginable, they find it difficult to attain that
which exceeds this level.67
With this background in mind, then, Thomas proposes the fol lowing order for learning. Boys (pueri) should first be instructed in logic, and then inmathematics. They should then study natural things For while natural things do not (natural philosophy presumably). transcend the level of sense and imagination, knowledge of them Then only should they be introduced to does require experience.
moral and the study of divine and last of all, to wisdom science, a and require intel transcend the imagination things which powerful a similar of lect.68 One finds disciplines reported progression by on the Liber de causis.69 in both of in his commentary But Thomas 66 to be assigned to the terms puer On the meanings on Learning see Klubertanz, "St. Thomas usage
and iuvenis Metaphysics,"
in
Thomas's
pp. 5-8.
6 Ethic, 1. 7 (Spiazzi ed., [Turin: Marietti, 1964] nn. 1209 in particular: autem de facili capere possunt "Iuvenes ea quae 10). sensum et imagina sub imaginatione cadunt. Sed ad ilia quae excedunt tionem non attingunt mente, ad exercitatum quia nondum habent intellectum turn propter parvitatem tales considerationes, turn propter pluri temporis,
mas mutationes
67 In Note
ut primo ordo addiscendi "Erit ergo congruus Ibid., n. 1211. totius philo instruantur, quidem pueri logicalibus quia l?gica docet modum sunt in mathematicis Secundo autem instruendi quae nee experi sophiae. entia indigent, nee imaginationem transcendunt. Tertio autem in naturali sensum et imaginationem, tarnen bus; quae etsi non excedunt requirunt et animum quae requirunt experientiam experientiam. Quarto in moralibus a passionibus liberum, ut in primo habitum est. Quinto autem in sapientiali bus et divinis quae transcendunt et requirunt validum intel imaginationem own view and not merely lectum." That this text does reflect Thomas's his an is of the indicated both Aristotle's fact that is it interpretation thought by on and by comparison with Thomas's addition to the text being commented correlation of sense, and intellect with physics, mathematics, imagination, in terms of their respective and divine science in his levels of termination on the De Trinitate, q. 6, a. 2, pass. commentary 69 Here Thomas presents the same learning order as that which the phi themselves had followed: "Et inde est quod philosophorum in losophers tentio ad hoc principaliter erat ut, per omnia quae in rebus considerabant, causarum pervenirent. ad cognitionem Unde scientiam de primis primarum causis ultimo ordinabant, cuius considerationi ultimum tempus suae vitae
68
naturae."
462
these texts the concern appears should to be pedagogical,
JOHN F.WIPPEL
that is to say, with
the gradually developing

no indication that one
capacities of the learning subject.

study metaphysics such as these of metaphysics as attained after natural
There is
philoso
phy because the former depends upon the latter for knowledge
starting essential point. or intrinsic Hence texts dependency as being and surely do not upon
of its
to an point the conclusions
of physics, and especially not with respect to discovery

of metaphysics, on the being one by separatio.
of the subject
Other texts treat of the relationship

physics, hand, other
that obtains between meta

especially natural
disciplines, on the De
philosophy,
on the other.
One of the fullest is to be found in question

he was Trinitate of Boethius, to develop and present his to the ninth he objection,
1 of Thomas's commentary 5, article in hence that same work wherein views writes: on separatio. There,
in replying
is by nature the first of all the sciences, with divine science Although says, respect to us the other sciences come before it. For, as Avicenna sci of this science is that it be learned after the natural the position such as gen ences, which explain many things used by metaphysics, and the like. It should also be learned eration, motion, corruption, because meta to know the separate after mathematics, substances has to know the number and dispositions of the heavenly physics which presupposes astronomy, spheres and this is impossible without such as music, the whole of mathematics. Other sciences, ethics, and to its fullness of perfection.70 the like, contribute a l?gica quae modum tra scientiarum deputarent: primo quidem incipientes esse cuius etiam pueri possunt ad mathematicam dit, secundo procedentes tem tertio ad naturalem capaces, quae propter experientiam philosophiam cuius iuvenis esse pore indiget, quarto autem ad moralem philosophiam divinae ultimo autem scientiae conveniens auditor non potest, insistebant de Aquini Sancti Thomae super quae consid?r?t primas entium causas." de causis expositio, ?d. H. D. Saffrey Soci?t? Philoso Libfum (Fribourg: E. Nauwelaerts, discussion 1954), p. 2. For an interesting phique-Louvain, as to how Thomas would apply the order recommended by the text cited in n. 68 above see Klubertanz, to medieval "St. students, pre-theological n. lists Thomas on Learning Metaphysics," Klubertanz 3) pp. 14-16. 5, (p. or which assign some other texts on the difficulty of learning metaphysics c. 3; SCG 1. 4; In 1 Met., 1. 2, it to last place. Of these see In Isaiam,
n.
70 see Decker 16-17. For the Latin Maurer ed., trans., pp. scientiarum divina sit prima omnium ". . . quamvis scientia 172. 3-11: sunt priores. tarnen quoad nos aliae scientiae Ut enim dicit naturaliter, in principio suae Metaphysicae, Avicenna ordo huius scientiae est, ut addis in quibus sunt multa catur post scientias naturales, determinata, quibus et alia huiusmodi. ista scientia utitur, ut generatio, Simi corruptio, motus liter etiam post mathematicas. Indiget enim haec scientia ad cognitionem numerum et ordines orbium caeles substantiarum cognoscere separatarum sine astrologia, ad quam tota mathematica tium, quod non est possibile prae sunt ad bene esse ipsius, ut m?sica et morales Aliae vero scientiae exigitur. vel aliae huiusmodi."
46.

In another context we have had occasion to comment
463
on this passage find no reason Accord to
and the immediately following

heavy deny of Avicenna usage that this text does represent
lines in some detail and to stress the

Even Thomas's so, we personal view.
therein.71
ing to this text, therefore, divine science (metaphysics) is to be learned after the other sciences, though it is by nature first of all the sciences. Following Avicenna's lead, Thomas notes that it is to be learned after
the natural sciences in which various things and are determined which
this science uses.

generation, whatever
Avicenna
had listed the following

the
illustrations:
things has abbreviated reference first mover.
axiom that alteration, time, place corruption, is moved and an indication of those is moved by another, are moved to first with the mover.72 Thomas which respect Avicenna's place to alteration, After and and omitted listing and time, the axiom therefrom of motion, explicit and the
tions motion poses
he simply men and corruption citing generation our this kind. of For immediate other pur things to note it is important that Thomas does not say that meta of its subject matter knowledge on the philosopher of nature.73 and/or justifies sepa
derives physics ratio by relying after mathematics.
Thomas has also indicated that metaphysics
should be studied
A knowledge of astronomy and hence of mathe one to to at is of arrive the number enable matics knowledge required and of the order of the separate substances and therefore of the heav enly spheres. on mathematics 71 is no indication that metaphysics there depends Again or as for knowledge of its starting point, being being,
on the Relationship "Thomas Aquinas and Avicenna between First A Note on Thomas's Com and the Other Theoretical Sciences: Philosophy on Boethius's De Trinitate, 37 (January q. 5, a. 1, ad 9," Thomist mentary 1973): 133-54. 72 see his Metaphysica For Avicenna 1508, reprod. 1, c. 3 (Venice, am Main: Minerva, Frankfurt "Ordo vero huius sci 1961), fol. 71Rb-71Va: et discipl?nales. entiae est ut discatur naturales Sed post post scientias in ista sunt de Ulis quae naturales, ideo, quia multa de his quae conceduntur iam probata sunt in naturali sicut generatio et corruptio, et alteritas, et locus, et tempus, et quod omne quod movetur ab alio movetur, et quae sunt ea etc. Post discipl?nales ad primum motorem, vero, ideo quia quae moventur est cognitio gubernatoris in hac scientia intentio ultima Dei altissimi, et et ordinum suorum, et cognitio ordinationis cognitio angelorum spiritualium in comparatione ad quam scientiam est perveniri circulorum, impossibile nemo po nisi per cognitionem Ad scientiam vero Astrologiae Astrologiae. test pervenire et Geometriae." nisi per scientiam Arithmeticae 73 the appropriateness of Klubertanz's remark: "This text is as Hence ... for what it does not say as for what it says St. Thomas does interesting not say that metaphysics receives its object from the philosophy of nature" (op. cit., p. 10).
464
in order to justify separatio. Thomas's remarks about
JOHN F.WIPPEL
music, ethics,
and the like obviously do not point to formal or intrinsic dependence of metaphysics upon these disciplines.
Then, in continuing dependency upon Avicenna, Thomas refutes
the charge of circularity that might seem to follow from admitting that metaphysics both proves the principles of the other sciences and yet
borrows trates No some on the points from them. between In his discussion of this he and natural which to prove concen science. natural those relationship is involved circle from first metaphysics because the principles are not
vicious
science
receives
philosophy
used
points which the first philosopher receives from the natural philoso pher. Rather the latter (those points which the first philosopher
takes from the natural philosopher) are proved not by means of other
self-evident principles.
losopher principles gives borrowed
Moreover,
philosophy but therefrom,
the principles which the first phi

are by means proved by means of other self-evident of
to natural
principles.74 Again, there is no indication in this text that first phi losophy derives its starting point or subject from natural philosophy,
or that separatio whether have depends or not upon natural philosophy's circle for proof had been the First of a First
Mover.
wonder One would
Indeed, if such were
implied by this text, then one might well

evaded. Mover in
the charge of a vicious to show that the argument
physics did not itself employ principles derived from and proven in metaphysics and therefore dependent on prior knowledge of being in
or the subject of metaphysics. general In what to be another refutation appears some further then introduces larity, Thomas of the charge of circu
precisions:
the sensible effects on which the demonstrations of natural Moreover, science are based are more evident to us in the beginning. But when we come to know the first causes them, these causes will through reveal to us the reason for the effects, from which they were proved In this way natural science also contributes by a demonstration quia. to divine it is divine science that science, and nevertheless something its principles. That is why Boethius explains places divine science to us.75 it is last relative last, because
of two different For discussion ed., p. 172. 13-20. and for fuller justification this passage might be interpreted ways and Avicenna," of the reading followed here see our "Thomas Aquinas pp. 142-46. 75 ex quibus 4: "Praetera, effectus Ibid., p. 172. 21-173. sensibiles, nos demonstrationes sunt in notiores naturales, procedunt quoad principio, causarum primarum, ex eis sed cum per eos pervenerimus ad cognitionem ex quibus probabantur dem apparebit nobis propter quid illorum effectuum, et sic Et scientia onstratione naturalis tradit scientiae divinae, quia. aliquid
74 Decker in which

Here based us Thomas reasons that the demonstrations and that such that effects one of natural are more can reason science evident
465
are to
on sensible
in the beginning. of the "first causes" so, knowledge natural same One to divine time might science,
suggests means of these effects by the of such causes will reveal contributes former's what some something are principles it is that
effects, He
to knowledge and that, having done reason for the effects. and science, by the latter. contributes effects on at
Thus the
science the
to divine
wonder merely
explained natural science of the
which
its (divine be
covery text could
science's) of the first cause by means interpreted in his
knowledge demonstrations of these way.
sensible
are based, or also the dis It seems that the effects.76 If natural science only con
either
tributes knowledge
the metaphysician would phy's quia the ground demonstration or discovery
of those sensible effects which are then used by

reasoning to the existence of first causes,
there would be no evidence
in this passage for thinking that Thomas

of metaphysics But Mover. is itself assigned on natural if the philoso demonstration philosophy
point starting of the First of first causes
to natural
et tarnen per earn sua principia notificantur. Et inde est quod Boethius ul timo ponit scientiam divinam, quia est ultima quoad nos." Maurer trans., pp. 17-18. 76 As Owens has pointed out, the text states that it is through these of the first causes. sensible effects that one reaches knowledge "The text of natural does not say that the first causes are reached by the demonstrations and his the See Prooffrom the philosophy." "Aquinas 'Physics'," p. 131. to Owens: "In Aristotle, are reached the separate substances According in metaphysics, in a process of reasoning that takes its starting point from the demonstrations of the cosmic motion in natural of the eternity In this peripatetic natural would be philosophy." setting, philosophy of necessary But Thomas here uses the "neutral help to metaphysics. and hence can view substances'," phrasing of'first causes' instead of'separate the argumentation from sensible effects both as leading to first causes and to metaphysics as permitting to contribute natural philosophy something if correct, would Owens's square nicely interpretation, (pp. 131-32). with the view that we have found elsewhere inAquinas, that it is the business of metaphysics to establish the existence of the by metaphysical reasoning of its subject. take this text as im cause(s) or principle(s) Still, one might that one may reason from sensible to a knowledge effects of first plying causes see our in natural itself. For this "Thomas philosophy reading in itself, the text appears and Avicenna," to be p. 147. Viewed Aquinas If one assumes that by "first causes" in this open to either interpretation. discussion Thomas has inmind God, then of course the issue touched on above that is, whether in natural philosophy the First Mover established reappears, in Thomas's Mover of the Meta is to be identified, eyes, with the Unmoved to resolve it seems Without that (God). issue, however, attempting physics to us that neither of this passage forces one to conclude that interpretation Thomas would require a physical demonstration of the First Mover in order for one to begin metaphysics.
466
JOHN F.WIPPEL
by this text, some doubt might remain. Still, even if one interprets it in this way, there is no indication here that metaphysics depends
on natural gin its in order to be of a First Mover demonstration philosophy's own in order to establish its and, therefore, investigations as to neither point, Hence, being. being according reading
starting
should this text be so construed. At most it might imply that in addition to receiving some help from natural philosophy with respect to the items Thomas had earlier itemized, metaphysics might benefit
from the latter when it comes to scientia quia with respect to knowl
edge of the existence of (the) first cause(s). If one interprets it in the first way indicated above, not even this implication will follow from
this passage. In sum, therefore, Thomas's reply to the ninth objec
tion does not imply that metaphysics must receive its subject matter from natural philosophy or that the demonstration of the First Mover
by the being condition is a necessary or for separatio.77 as being latter Thomas writes that for the metaphysician to discover
It is true that in discussing

"metaphysics"
the reasons for entitling this science

it comes "to us after physics among
subjects to be learned; for we have to proceed from sensible things to

77 Klubertanz between the part of metaphysics that deals distinguishes with being and its immediate and that part which treats of God. principles, "With the possible of one point (that there are distinct kinds of exception of nature is not a necessary for the change), the philosophy presupposition" first part. But some conclusions of the philosophy of nature are "necessarily He cites the points listed by Avicenna for the second part. presupposed" for establishing and suggests that they are necessary certain "negative of spiritual substances, such as the immutability, and attributes immensity, of God" (p. 13). For knowledge of separate he also substances eternity that Thomas would of the human in presuppose suggests knowledge tellect and cites In 1 De anima, 1. 1 (Pirotta ed. [Turin: Marietti, 1959] n. 7): "Quia si ad Philosophiam non possumus devenire primam attendamus, in cognitionem et altissimarum divinarum causarum, nisi per ea quae ex vir tute intellectus Si enim natura intellectus possibilis possibilis acquirimus. esset nobis ignota, non possemus scire ordinem substantiarum separatarum, sicut dicit Commentator While acknowl super und?cimo Metaphysicae." are that there Aristotelian in of the edging physical arguments support and with respect to the things immediately axiom of motion moved by the to metaphysics), First Mover list of physics' contributions (see Avicenna's same. to the metaphysi there are also metaphysical for the It is arguments cal argumentation that Thomas turns, continues Klubertanz, except when he is "expounding the Physics" (p. 13). The fact that Thomas did not list these in if he would of Avicenna makes us wonder items his abbreviation particular must borrow them from physics. indeed agree that metaphysics But we are in fullest agreement contention that Thomas does not base with Klubertanz's on the philosophy of nature To determine his metaphysics (p. 17). of the present Thomas's mind on this point is, of course, a major purpose study.

those that are not sensible" on (commentary In question l).78 this science intellectual Hence after is the De Trinitate
467
of
5, article Boethius, question same work that he observes and the other sciences
because
1 of this 6, article after learned physics consideration is the "metaphysics" to the according or resolu the Meta
terminus or trans process tion
of rational physicam of analysis
consideration. because (resolutio).79 it comes
it is called
This
reappears Here physics. because are versal discovered
in the
prooemium that he writes being the process after the and
physics to analysis reference on to his commentary science is called for these just as
this
"metaphysics" transphysicals the more uni
it considers by is discovered
its properties; of resolution less universal.80
But it should also be noted that in question 5, article 1 of the commentary on the De Trinitate he refers to it as "first philosophy"
after their principles from it, follow sciences, deriving same 1 in this article of he names work, 6, Again question as according insofar to it first philosophy for this same reason and, or synthesis, intellectual of composition consideration the process insofar it.81 as the other
(which he has there associated

"principle" natural philosophy).82 of rational consideration These
especially with
(which he discussions
this science)
has associated involve
is the
with the
obviously
difficult issue to which Thomas addressed himself in replying to the ninth objection of question 5, article 1 of the De Trinitate, that is,
the from The thesis) passages knowledge physics being, so different the in which ways metaphysics other sciences and still contribute between of not as resolution with can derive certain to the principles and composition points same.
distinction is also do
importance or state existence be able
of the to
(analysis) (syn to that issue. But these respect must that metaphysics receive imply or Unmoved of the First from Mover discover ,83 its own subject, being as
to
by means
of separatio
78 Maurer See the Decker trans., pp. 8-9. ed., p. 166. 2-4: "quae alio nomine dicitur metaphysica, id est trans physicam, quia post physicam discenda occurrit nobis, quibus ex sensibilibus in insensibilia de ve oportet
nire."
79 Decker ed., p. 212. 22-25. 80 in via resolutionis, "Haec enim transphysica inveniuntur sicut magis communia post minus communia" 2). (p. 81 Decker ed., p. 166. 4-6. 82 Ibid., p. 212. 20-22. 83 For discussion reasons offered by Thomas of the different for enti on the De Trinitate, in the commentary tling this science "first philosophy" on the one hand, and in the commentary on the Metaphysics, on the other,
468
In sum, therefore, in Thomas's mind there were
JOHN F.WIPPEL
strong pedagogi
cal indications suggesting

As
that metaphysics
be studied after physics.
one should move to from the easier the order of learning, regards to the more from concrete from the more the more abstract, difficult, more more to the universal. certain the Moreover, points particular by physics from his have might be of value to particular areas of meta
developed texts drawn
physical investigation.
lyzed above, we must presuppose to begin to reason presupposing
Nonetheless,
with the exception of the difficult

6 and 11 and that ana one or implying immaterial being found such
on Metaphysics commentary not found Thomas stating of positively we On the contrary, of the principles of an Unmoved
the existence
in order a sugges
metaphysics. to the
have
tion countered by his own view that it is the business of metaphysics

existence the existence Mover of its subject. Far from or of God as given we have concluded
to it by physics,
goal of metaphysics
his personal view rather is that it is the task and

to establish the same. Hence
that it is historically defensible to suggest that for Aquinas the pos and, therefore, the possibility of separatio sibility of metaphysics
need Mover not rest in physics. on a prior demonstration texts just Those as his of a First referred Mover his or Unmoved commentary text but to from
onMetaphysics
6 and 11 that point to the opposite should, therefore,

interpretation of Aristotle's
in our opinion, be viewed not as his personal view.
Ill
is an historically defensible of Thomas's interpretation on and the of another subject personal separatio metaphysics, thought more issue remains. the framework and Within of his speculative If the above
is it possible for one to make a grounded metaphysical perspective judgment of separation, to distinguish that by reason of which some thing is described as being from that by reason of which it is described
as being of a given kind, without presupposing prior awareness that
positively
immaterial being exists
in fact?
In considering this of all, one is interested might notion ondly, serve
as subject of being that is restricted according to Thomas
First should be recalled. issue, certain points as being in arriving at a notion of being that a as rather than at a of of being science being to the material it is quite and changeable. Sec one for to study possible
himself,
and composition with respect between resolution and his use of the distinction to the same see n. 53 above and our study cited there and in n. 11.

material
469
in metaphysics, not insofar as it is subject to change, being one what but insofar as it is being.84 when may regard Thirdly, giving as illustrations at times of separatio, Thomas that things dis implies are without matter and motion. At other times he covered thereby tention matter and motion.85 It is our con they can be without awareness of the latter (the negatively is suf immaterial) a notion for him to arrive at a metaphysical notion of being, that that that subject above that human soul, as of the recourse or even science in question. to prior knowledge of a besouled first mover we Finally, of the existence have of a
writes
ficient will
serve
contended spiritual
of the universe
will not of itself be sufficient to prove that being, in order to be such, In short, if one can only justify need not be material and changing.
separation by moving from prior awareness that the kind of being
pointed to by this judgment does in fact exist, appeal to spiritual but changing being will not, of itself, prove that being, in order to be
such, need Given not these be changing. considerations, then, we would invite the reader to
reflect upon the distinctive

kinds
intelligibilities
implied by two different
searches of questions that may be raised. One question for that as or as reason of which be real. may something being by recognized of which Another searches for that by reason is recognized something
as a given kind of being.

two questions and therefore
If one is justified in distinguishing

these two intelligibilities from
these
one an
other, one should then be in position to make this judgment: that by reason ofwhich something is recognized as being need not be identified
with or restricted to that by reason kinds of which it is recognized as being
of a given kind.
can be different
(In fact, to deny this would be to deny that there
a conclusion to our of being, that runs counter of different kinds of being, for instance, experience non-living beings, canine human But to be recog etc.) living beings, beings, beings, as enjoying a given is to be recognized and changing nized as material
n. 1165: "Advertendum est autem, quod licet ad con See In 6Met., ea quae sunt separata secun siderationem primae philosophiae pertineant et motu, non tarnen solum ea; sed etiam de dum esse et rationem a materia sunt entia, Philosophus Nisi forte sensibilibus, perscrutatur. inquantum communia de quibus haec sci dicamus, ut Avicenna dicit, quod huiusmodi entia perscrutatur, dicuntur separata secundum esse, non quia semper sint sicut mathe habent esse inmateria, sine materia; sed quia non de necessitate
matica."
84
85
Trinitate work,
on the De See the texts cited from q. 5, a. 3 of the commentary cited above in nn. 22, 28, and 29; and from q. 5, a. 4 of the same as cited in nn. 58 and 59.
470 kind of being.

need has not be formulated
JOHN F.WIPPEL Therefore, being, in order to be recognized as such,

and changing. or separatio, Here, and one then, should one now
as material recognized a negative judgment
be in position to study being simply as being rather than as non-living

or as material or human and changing. living or canine to Thomas, that one can, according study any kind of being, that this procedure in material suggests metaphysics being, or The fact including is not at
odds with his understanding

science in question.
of the conditions required to ground the
In light of this negative judgment, therefore, itwould seem that in order for being to be realized as such, it need not be realized as
material metaphysical and changing. If, then, one investigations, in the concludes subsequent to the course existence of one's of an
immaterial and/or unchanging

predicating, already existence. achieved by albeit grasped analogically, of the by means to this need
being,
one's
then one will be justified

notion of being of separation of it, a notion and presup
in
judgment
posing an initial discovery

According separation
of being based on a positive
judgment of
is of
that of being the notion view, then, not presuppose knowledge previous
the existence of the human soul or of the First Mover of the Physics and/or of God. This notion is transcendental in this sense that it has been freed from restriction to any given kind of being, including the
material and changeable.86
The Catholic University
of America.
if not all of the authors cited above who find Aquinas grounding on prior knowledge that of metaphysics and of separatio the very possibility our differ with of exists immaterial course, would, position. being positively extreme: to go to the opposite On the other hand, Klubertanz appears of being as being on the to base a knowledge "Hence, it is illusory to attempt its 'is' is freed from Either of immaterial existence demonstrated things. of immate sensible and changing context (prior to the proof of the existence of such when we conclude to the existence rial being, and thus is meaningful as we In in and or immersed first find it 'is' remains change. sensibility being) and to assert and changeable', 'is sensible, material the latter case, 'is'means and changeable' immobile that 'An immaterial, thing is sensible, material to The Philosophy is a contradiction" (Introduction p. 52, n. 28). of Being, of the for one to reason from knowledge In our opinion it may be possible of be immaterial and immobile being to the discovery of positively existence as of but is not the this discovering only way being (against Klubertanz), ing the more here and against with Klubertanz being as being (in agreement traditional view).
86 Most

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Metaphysics and "Separatio" According to Thomas Aquinas Author(s): John F. Wippel Source: The Review of Metaphysics, Vol.

METAPHYSICSAND SEPARATIOACCORDING TO THOMASAQUINAS

v>< ONSIDERABLE intellectual especially

processes of being as real

explicit according on Thomas

of being, Aquinas. the

of E. Gilson and also of J.

of being as existing. discovery if one is not to have an incomplete

has also been devoted

a particular named separatio

Important on the De Trinitate

of Thomistic in depth by same nicely

pursued of the investigation on and existence emphasis be

scholarship other writers.3 dovetails the with

on judgment as to which we have

required above. For

if one is to grasp being explicitly

however, In this study as such separatio

our primary concern to concentrate wish as it is involved

as being, that as being being,

say, of being a metaphysics. For

of being as being; 3) a more

of separatio without possibility divine exists. and/or being

METAPHYSICS AND SEPARATIO

spect to his views on the proper division of and relationship between

teaching period and can be dated between

1255 and 1259

for misleading, the De Trinitate reflection on

occasion issue, views the and on

questions nature and title found

personal 6, for his of

development the theoretical catalogues

points of his own

sciences. of his works,

only partly indicates the true nature of

In question tive science philosophy, of Boethius, affirmative.

5, article 1, the is appropriately mathematics, calls "divine This

divided Thomas His

and what science."6

The criterion proposed

to justify this division is of interest, for it is

from matter to object

JOHN F.WIPPEL Some depend on matter

not only for their being, but

Thus flesh and bones are included in

true of lines and numbers,

in short, of the kinds of things studied by

it can be grasped by the senses,

is not included in the definition of

to Thomas, Yet, according not from matter, exist apart

do not even depend upon matter

(God and angels),

and those that are found in matter

act, potency, on to observe "theology" or

the one and the many, that the science "divine

METAPHYSICS AND SEPARATIO

the first class.

"metaphysicals" be it noted, substance and as will be seen below, and holds,

of metaphysics, on matter In other the even