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On Whether Aquinas's "Ipsum Esse" Is "Platonism" Author(s): Stephen L. Brock Source: The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 60, No.
2 (Dec., 2006), pp. 269-303 Published by: Philosophy Education Society Inc. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20130777 . Accessed: 10/02/2014 06:28
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ON WHETHER AQUINAS'S IPSUMESSE IS "PLATONISMO

STEPHEN L. BROCK
En September
of 2002, Oxford University Press published a book by

In the preface, de Kenny of all philosophers. The
on Being. entitled Aquinas Anthony Kenny to be one of the greatest clares St. Thomas book's is not to explain this aim, however, show Kenny neither that on the
topic of being, Thomas works entire Thomas's surveys spanning a unified nor even a coherent conception
In fact it is to judgment. "was thoroughly confused."2 career, therein finding of the nature of be there He is one calls factor it "pla a quarter
is complex, of the confusion but ing. His diagnosis out as the gravest that stands and most pervasive.
tonism."
Kenny's of a century, Enrico Berti, ogy.3 Berti is essentially
is not
an
isolated
voice.
Indeed,
for more
than
the eminent has is less been severe
Italian
the same:
raising in his judgments. than Kenny an infection of "platonism."
and student of Aristotle, philosopher similar doubts about Thomas's ontol But his worry
to: Pontifical University of the Holy Cross; Via dei Far Correspondence nesi 82, 00186 Rome, Italy. esse ? 'platonismo'?," version of "Uipsum in Tommaso Revised e I'oggetto delta metafisica, d Aquino ?d. S. L. Brock (Rome: Armando, 2004), 193-220. on Being 2Anthony Kenny, Aquinas (hereafter "AB") (Oxford: Oxford v. University Press, 2002), to the works 3In addition cited in the course of this study, others in which he raises the issue include: Enrico Berti, e neopla "Aristotelismo tonismo nella dottrina tomistica di Dio come ipsum esse," in Enrico Berti, Studi Aristotelici (L'Aquila: Japadre Editore, 1975), 347-52; "Le probl?me de la substantialit? de l'?tre et de l'un dans laM?taphysique," sur la in ?tudes ?d. Pierre Aubenque M?taphysique d'Aristote, (Paris: Vrin, 1979), 89-129 of the article cited in n. 6 below); translation "Il signif?cate del (French tomismo nel pensiero Studium 77 (1981): 59-66; "Originari contempor?neo," et? dell'idea e ultimit? del principio," Giornale di metafisica 7 (1985): 381 e il problema in La metafisica d?lia metaf?sica?," del suo 97; "?berwindung superamento (Padova: Librer?a Gregoriana Editrice, 1985), 9-43, esp. 18-29; "Brentano and Aristotle's Metaphysics," in Whose Aristotle? Whose Aristote ed. Robert W. Sharpies (Aldershot: Ashgate, lianism?, 2001), 135-49.
The Review Metaphysics
of Metaphysics
60 (December
2006):
269-303.
Copyright
2006
by The Review
of
270
The of course, complaint, an source is important now, followers is not
STEPHEN L. BROCK
that simply for Thomas's doctrine have been (neo)platonic of being. For this very stressing
thought some time fact.
of Thomas
was able, as they They often use it to help explain why Thomas concerns to the of Aristotle. But what Berti say, "go beyond" ontology and Kenny is a line of thought that Aristotle it himself, associating out with Plato, and that Thomas lays carefully rejects?and vigorously
joins him in rejecting.

self at crucial points that to me
It is this very line that they find insinuating it

in Thomas's own thought on being. So the prob
lem is not just that the line is mistaken

is). It is also It seems tention.4 insofar
(though they clearly think it
as he adopts is being incoherent. it, Thomas concerns that Berti's have received far too little at even
him. In what I Kenny mentions follows, a much to Berti shall than to Kenny. Berti offers fuller of the pertinent Aristotelian him and this enables analysis doctrines, can in a correspondingly to formulate the issues Here I sharper way. Oddly, refer more address only some of them. I lay these out in sections I and II. My
not
chief aim in the rest of the paper will be to highlight an element

Thomas's
in
that is both very pertinent and, I find, rather ne ontology is and followers alike. This the critics connection that Tho by glected mas maintains the nature of being and the differences between of things.
I Plato: Aristotle is not a single nature. a list of difficulties In book 3 of the
Against Metaphysics, phy needs and and
being
that first philoso presents which he calls "the hardest The 11th difficulty, for knowledge of the truth," is whether the most necessary being one constitute most of things?the and principle the substance to address.
4 I am aware of "Sul problema Antonino Poppi, only two responses: e dell'uno in in san Tommaso dell'ente d?lia sostanzializzazione d'Aquino," del m?di?vale: Classicit? Antonino Bonaventura, Anselmo, pensiero Poppi, delV?lenchos Duns Scoto alia prova Tommaso, (Milano: Vita e pensiero, e Yanalogia "La tradizione aristot?lica 1988), 121-49; and Joseph Moreau, ?d. Ricerche G. Santinello in dell'invisibile: sull'analogia, Metafore entis," In my opinion these do not address the 1984), 93-6. (Brescia: Morcelliana, seems to treat being as a is that Thomas real core of Berti's criticism, which
single essence.
AQUINAS'S
mental
IPSUM ESSE
whether of some they are only attributes the Pythagoreans, he says, finding features indicates
271
other
realities?or
Plato and nature.5 underlying universal and one to be the most the most teristic self One.6 essential. move Aristotle
also
being of things, them as regarded that Plato, with his charac a Being and posited it Ideas of and is, Being of being and one.
and
of ?x0eoi?, isolated these features a One itself existing that separately, calls this the "substantialization" of course,
Berti
Aristotle, them would Among any universal cern the special

out.
are several. this position. His reasons rejects be all of his arguments the possibility that against or common con feature could be a substance.7 Others case of being. Here two points, closely related, stand
insistence that if there are many beings, of them, their essence, cannot be being If it itself. then it would be a genus; and this is impossible. The principles were, a are which of divided from the each other are their by genus species and the genus cannot be predicated of the differ directly differentiae, a genus, So if being were entiae.8 divided differentiae into many by The first is Aristotle's then the substance
species,
which features The
then it could not be predicated

is to say, would these not principles exist. There could could
of the principles dividing it;

not not be beings. be many Distinguishing after all. beings of the be if
differences The second
among
ings.
Whether
also be beings.9 beings must to do also has with the multiplicity point or not being is in the essence of all
things,
3.4.1001a4-33. See also Aristotle, Metaphysics 3.1.996a4-9; 11.2.1060a36-b6. 6 See On exOeoic, see Enrico Berti, "Il 7.1.6.1040bl7-30. Metaphysics e d?lia sostanzialit? dell'essere nella Metafisica dell'uno di Aristo problema tele" (hereafter "PS"), in Enrico Berti, Studi AHstotelici (L'Aquila: Japadre Editore, 1975), 183-4. For the most part I shall leave aside the question of the one, since the issue is Thomas's doctrine of being. 7See 7.13-16.1038bl-41a5. Metaphysics 8 see 3.4.1001a27-bl. If the genus were Metaphysics 3.3.998b20-27; of the differentiae, then the name of the genus would appear more predicable than once in the definition of the species, and the differentiae themselves would be either species or individuals; see Aristotle, Topics 6.6.144a36-b3. 9 "In besides expressing what there is sum, being is not a genus because, that is common it also expresses to all beings, what there is that is diverse, that is, their differences"; Enrico Berti, "L'analogia dell'essere nella tradizione in aristotelico-tomistica" dell'invisibile: Ricerche (hereafter "AE"), Metafore ed. G. Santinello sull'analogia, (Brescia: Morcelliana, 1984), 30 (my transla tion).
272
nonetheless itself?an essence. itself again there Idea From is one single thing whose being must that any essence,
STEPHEN L. BROCK
in being as a be understood single other thing, considered just in essence consists
of being?then this it follows to its own
or according there would
Aristotle, monism
to explain of beings the multiplicity by of being with of a composition of the nature way else," "something own view is that the substance of that is, some nonbeing.11 Aristotle's or in each thing is a being (and also one) per se, not by a combination tried virtue says of something conjoined that "man," "one man," to it. This and "existing is what man" he means are when he
in fact, of Parmenides,
be nothing?that groups Plato with
not be a being.10 would So no is, multiply beings?to being. in order to avoid the thinkers who,
interchangeable
predicates.12 So the basic
is that being is with the platonic position problem as a must For Aristotle, be univocal. treated essence, single being If the multiplicity of things is conceived from the start as diversified.13 common to all for a feature stand solely real, then "being" cannot
for what is distinc Itmust also be able to stand, immediately, things. This is possible tive about each. only because being does not have an on its one that stands or fully autonomous absolute nature, entirely essence own. Being is not just being is always said of a subject whose itself, and its nature varies in function of what it is said of.14
10 to be having as its essence "Being (L'ente) itself, in fact, is a substance a single essence, essence, (l 'esser?) itself; in this way to be is a determinate not a multiplicity of essences. of this substance, Now, namely the essence if the term 'to be' signi is signified by a term is the essence, since that which But then everything itmust have a single signification. fies one sole essence, is a nonbeing"; Berti, PS, 188 (my transla that is not a being by its essence 11In Plato's case, this would be the "Indefinite Dyad." See Enrico Berti, "MU"), Proceedings (hereafter "Multiplicity and Unity of Being in Aristotle" 101 (2001): 206. Berti refers to Metaphysics of the Aristotelian Society after this passage, Aristotle We might note that immediately 14.2.1089al-6. He seems to be explaining remarks that being has many senses (1089a7). no to to need there is nonbeing. appeal why 4.2.1003b22-33. 12Metaphysics 13 "Consequently being and one ought not to be thought of initially as For the same into a plurality of genera. and divided subsequently unitary, is nothing less a single being, which reason, there cannot be a genus, much but one or being, that is, which realizes in itself the essence of one and being; of genera or of beings"; Berti, PS, 190. but there is always just a multiplicity tion).
AQUINAS'S
This,
IPSUM ESSE
273
that for Aristotle, "being" signi insists, does not mean or would be in it would fies nothing signify nothing, by itself. Rather, one It if it from signi thing. only signified nonbeing, distinguishable so is rich.15 it This is fies many why things. Berti
II esse as univocal. with as Berti Thomas
Ipsum
fully Aquinas Ideas. Thomas
platonic general or subsistent versions of separate the existence rejects he does not hold that be of sensible of the essences things. Moreover, He takes the point that being of all things. to the essence ing pertains a that holds He also cannot be "being," by itself, signifies genus.16 agrees In fact, he does not fix on the common predicate things.17 as separate.18 Instead, he isolates ing" (ens) and posit this directly or determination all things are common through which perfection esse. to be outside He holds this the act of being, ings, namely, "be the be the
Now, Aristotle's
recognizes, of criticisms
many
14See Aristotle 10.2.1053b9-21. compares "being" with Metaphysics of that terms like "element" and "principle": these do not signify the essence is an element or a principle, but rather we still ask what the element or which 7.16.1040b 16-19. is:Metaphysics the principle 15See Enrico recenti e Berti, "L'analogia in Aristotele?interpretazioni e sviluppi Da dell'analogia. "AA"), in Origini possibili sviluppi" (hereafter a S. Tommaso, Casetta ed. Giuseppe Parmenide (Roma: Edizioni Vallomb rosa, 1987), 113. 16 it: "Omne ge To cite just one of the many places where he mentions ali nus differentiis Ipsius autem esse non est accipere aliquibus diuiditur. in enim non participant differentie quas differentias; genus nisi per accidens, Non potest au genus participant. quantum species constitute per differentias tem esse aliqua differentia esse, quia non ens nullius est que non particip?t theologiae (hereafter "CT"), pt 1, differentia"; Thomas Aquinas, Compendium iussu doctoris Thomae Aquinatis ch. 13, in Sancti Opera omnia angelici Leonis XIII P.M. edita, vol. 42, cura et studio fratrum praedicatorum (Rome: otherwise 86. Unless Commissio indicated, all references Leonina, 1882?), for works of Thomas are to the Leonine edition. 17 See Thomas Aquinas, Expositio "EP") bk. Peryermeneias (hereafter, 1, lect. 5 (Leonine ed. PI, p. 30,11. 314-30). 18 He is explicit about the fact that just as unum and ens cannot be gen can they be a subsistent Thomas Aquinas, In duo substance: neither era, libros metaphysicorum Aristotelis decim expositio "CM"), ed. (hereafter Cathala and Raymond M. Spiazzi (Turin: Marietti, 1950), bk. Marie-Raymond lect. 3, ?1966. 10,
274
of all things?save subsistens. All others have Thomas have diverse God. way. tioned ipant. also sees esse essence one. esse as This one
L BROCK STEPHEN
is God, diversified determined who is ipsum in things. esse from Him. somehow are They to their esse of
it in various essences. God's The and God esse esse
"modes," Nor is the esse subsists of other in each identical
according possessed by things the very and hence in a pure and separately, is only
which
infinite
things case,
limited is not but there
and it is condi participated, essence to the of the partic according esse esse with in all things, the inhering agent and its exemplar. esse between Thomistic and the
commune, Thus Platonic ov
is rather are clear
its cause?its differences
Berti is not per by Aristotle. Nevertheless, If he had, he suaded that Thomas has fully assimilated the criticism. a single essence not posit whose is constituted would subsistent by esse itself. of one single If esse can be the essence thing, then esse it criticized Even if other things share in it, thereby put single essence. will of conditions, its own intrinsic signification ting it under a variety the same, then so is ens it the same. And if esse is intrinsically remain self is one self, insofar as it, as Aristotle agree essences that itmust As Berti it is ens. insisted The it must of being will diversity be (and as Thomas not be intrinsic seems to to himself
be). understands
a genus. cause it is too bound up with
of things is not ens If for Aristotle
way of placing it, Thomas's in line with Aristotle's really is not tied in the essences each to
esse denial
outside that ens
the is
others, alongside exist. But if the nature marily signifies
intimately its full identity, as a genus is. of ens
of things, this is be too whole essence, thing's one essential to be merely feature are beings The differences too; they from esse, and then if what the nature esse pri of ens
derives
is the essence
of a single added of things.
thing, on.
will be alien to the essences

only will not in the manner embrace the diversity and esse.
of other things.
Itwill belong to things

Its intrinsic signification
of something
It is not that Berti entirely rejects the possibility

between essence If the essence of a thing
of distinguishing
includes potenti to the
ality, then itwill be distinct from the thing's esse, which

actuality. the point we what essence, might esse is is a function of But "to live." For a threshold, is that call the esse a function
is solely its
its essence. itmeans
thing's a living thing, "to be" means to have a certain position. There is For
is strictly proportioned a of it. That is, what
AQUINAS'S
no third
IPSUM ESSE
that
275
consti is com is what is, it is re
is simply "to be," with an independently in which tuted nature What of its own, things "participate."19 mon to the esse of all things is only a proportionality (which element Aristotle lated whatever the esse of a given calls analogy): to the thing as its actuality.20 own talk of analogy, In short, despite Thomas's esse univocal.21 rooted thing
he would not be
be making
uniform, something as to intrinsic it, diversity ing diversity tion with forms of things. the various "pull esse out" from things and posit itself. Kenny puts it vividly:
He would
really see
in its immediate then he
connec could but not esse
If he were, one thing that
is nothing
. . . suggest that esse is thought of as a vast in Aquinas Many passages reservoir of liquid that is given particular shape and form by being cap tured in various receptacles. You and I, and the ants and the planets, are small buckets of this universal fluid; God is the vast, limitless ocean.22
19"Indeed Aristotle could not allow that beings 'participate' in being, un as an essence is proper to them and as ex diverse from that which can that something being for him is not an essence isting by itself, because in or that can exist by itself, but it is originally a multiplicity of es participate sences existing in diverse ways, each [way of existing] cognate with each [es to say, when he affirms that being and one, al sence]. This is what he means vis-?-vis the other, add nothing to the though each has a diverse signification such that to say 'man' or 'one man' or of what they accompany, signification 'existing man' is the same"; Berti, PS, 191. See also Berti, AE, 32. 20 in Aristotle's notion of being, although Berti finds proportionality it is never stated explicitly, "for it is applied to the ontological of all be principles ings (the three elements and the four causes) [Metaphysics 13.4.1070a31-32], to their logical principles and excluded middle) (non-contradiction [An. post. to their fundamental 1.10.76a39], opposition (potency and act) [Metaphysics to the categories of being [Metaphysics and of 9.6.1048a37], 14.6.1093M7-21] the good [Eth. Nie. 1.4.1096b28]"; Berti, AE, 25. Perhaps we can also add 7.16.1040b 16-19; see above, n. 14. Metaphysics 21Thomas's of analogy is another part of the issue. general doctrine Berti also finds "platonism" in the so-called analogy of attribution (see espe exceeds the scope of this paper, but cially Berti, AE and AA). This question below (at n. 84) I offer a few observations in support of the view that Thomas understands "nature" of esse as a proportionality. the common In relation to I think a full defense of Thomas's Berti's criticism, of the analogy conception of being would can be verified that this very proportionality require showing or per prius et pos in diverse and ordered ways, secundum magis et minus terius. Imean, not only the things of which the proportionality is predicated, but also the truth of the proportionality itself, must admit such an order. 22 "It is almost as if esse were a vast expanse Kenny, AB, 123. Similarly, of liquid, portions of which take the shape of the receptacle into which they are poured, so that some esse comes out elephant-shaped, and other esse comes out gadfly-shaped"; Kenny, AB, 72. derstood
276
This
STEPHEN L. BROCK
us to what is perhaps the most part of Berti's brings important esse criticism. In his view, Thomas's is not un-Aristotelian. ipsum just even dearer It is also with to Thomas than incompatible something the wisdom of Aristotle: the transcendence essence of God. If God's
in esse,2S then it is not something to precisely strictly proper to him exclusively.24 It does not belong That very essence is also in diminished in all creatures.25 albeit The terms present, "modes," him. employed to distinguish of conditions God of this from other things seem to indicate versus separate versus infinite finite. participated, They in what God The nature is. diversity diversity, it is in the ocean Thomas's God or in a bucket. essence: only a sub inherent, not do display of water is
consists
diversity versus sistent an essential the same, final of esse.26 instances The serves
whether
conclusion:
It is the separate of esse.27
the draws Kenny is nothing other than the platonic Idea common version of the essence to all the
importance its timeliness:
of the question,
then,
is evident.
Berti
also
ob
is particularly to the existence sensitive of philosophy Contemporary to the point that it has come to repropose the heideggerian differences, the "ontological difference" between conception, replacing beings and a still univoca! of presupposes always concept being?which being and risks subtracting that is, from the differences? being from the beings, on this po with the simple differences In agreement among the beings. 23 es Berti speaks of the "scholastic doctrine of God as a being whose is constituted by being itself; Berti, PS, 186, n. 24. Further on I shall suggest that this is not exactly Thomas's teaching. 24 In this sense "Undoubtedly being is like what Berti says about unity. the principle the pure act, is also one, as we by Aristotle, posited namely have seen, and in this respect it presents affinities with the principle posited now wants to show is that it is not enough to by Plato; but what Aristotle to say but it is necessary qualify it as one, since unity is not its essence, one it is, or in other words, to specify which it is necessary its essence by means it in an exclusive that characterizes of some determination way"; of God, see also Berti, AE, 32-3. Berti, PS, 201. On the transcendence 25 the very idea of "grades" of esse does not im whether Berti wonders "In fact, where there are grades, there seems to be a ply a univocal notion: common essence, in diverse grades, since difference participated, precisely, in grade, rather than being a difference of quality, or in other words of es of quantity. But if there is a single essence, sence, seems to be a difference and so it is univo in diverse grades, then being has an essence, participated no 21. Berti holds that for "when Aristotle, cal, longer analogical"; Berti, AE, the adverb mallon the discussion applies to heterogeneous realities, [more] does not indicate a more intense grade of the same essence, but rather an es sence that possesses in a primary way (proteron, in the common predicate not just chronological)"; the sense of ontological Berti, PS, 203, antecedence, n. 112. He refers toMetaphysics 2.1. sence
AQUINAS'S
IPSUM ESSE
277
sition today are existentialism, method hermeneutics, phenomenology, that it contains in nuce the yet without pluralism, realizing ological of metaphysics, that is, the rational demonstration foundation of the of the Absolute.28 transcendence This is what I propose to examine features Thomas's in the of following pages: the role
played by the distinguishing their differences?in especially that they have a constitutive
things?their
of the beings, but also esse itself. so as to conclude a I have arranged the discussion with consideration of Thomas's of the relation the between understanding nature of esse and the nature of the divinity.
ontology. natures function, only in the specific in the nature of being, and even in the nature of not
and essences, to suggest Iwish
Ill
As would presses though be otiose agreement constituted here the principles through to list texts in which account It of the essence. ex Thomas directly of being. His professed
simply with Aristotle's
26 Tho Kenny, AB, 113 and 121. We might also note that so understood, mas would be perfectly on Plato's in line with the neoplatonic commentary to Porphyry; Pierre Hadot, Porphyre Parmenides that Pierre Hadqt attributes et Victorinus, 2 vol. (Paris: ?tudes Augustiniennes, 1968). In this work, the nature of "to be" (eivai) as an actuality distinct from form (ibid., is conceived as a pure "to be," and the first principle, the One, is presented 1:489-90); above all form, and even as the Idea itself of "to be" (ibid., 1:132; 2:107). Hadot sees a clear influence of this doctrine in the De hebdomadibus of Boet itwould have passed on to the Middle Ages and Thomas hius, through which See also David Bradshaw, (ibid., 1:490-2). "Neoplatonic Origins of the Act of The Review 53 ofMetaphysics Being," (1999): 383^01. 27 "Plato conceived because he con being as having only one meaning ceived it as a genus, that is to say as an universal predicate only expressing what is common to all things, i.e. only a single aspect of things. This was, in for conceiving it as a separate Form, i.e. Idea. And this fact, the condition was also the condition for conceiving being and one as the essence of a sub and one itself (ipsum unum stance, i.e. being itself (ipsum esse subsistens) In conclusion, if primary substance is the essence of being, be subsistens). If being has an essence, it is this essence. ing must be understood univocally. It cannot be many essences. But this is impossible; because we see many are existing and each of them is one. This is the things, and their differences core of Aristotle's criticism of Plato as it is expounded inMetaph. B 4. This rests on the argument criticism ultimately inMetaph. B 3, and the offered view that Being and One cannot be genera"; Berti, MU, 207.
28Berti,AE,30-l.
278
agreement tus essendi one such is itself part of the reason that his own is said to involve him in incoherence. text, from It will his serve commentary to introduce on
STEPHEN L. BROCK
notion of esse at as ac
least However, to the Metaphysics, deserves of the terms of the discus
be recalled.
sion.
some
The and
text
concerns
the passage
in which
Aristotle
says
that
"one" that In that
"being" the substance
explaining the name striking. Aristotle A
no distinct to what reality they are said of, and of a thing is one and a being per se, not per accidens. to remark takes the occasion the first point, Thomas add is taken is any here, later, from actus essendi.29 his This actus tension Thomas to explain between
ens
If there is saying lines
is already rather essendi and what to it.30 substance says some of a that ens
few
is completely the point
oblivious that the
thing is one and a being per se, not per accidens, one and being cannot be predicated of a thing to it." This would added regress. yield an infinite added for saying that esse is something Avicenna sence. Instead, even Thomas says,
Thomas "through He then on
criticizes es
to a thing's
it should not be though the esse of a thing is other than its essence, of an accident; but added on, in the manner thought of as something of the essence. rather, it is as though constituted through the principles is taken from esse itself, signifies this name, ens, which And therefore is taken from essence itself [res].31 the same as the name which So we is not stituted ought not an absolute to think of esse as another nature. ens or as a diverse esse res. It
or autonomous
the principles through some form. So understood, some matter and form, and chiefly be ably esse and essence For of is clearly between the relation very tight. course the essence itself can also be said to be constituted through
is as though con Every These would of an essence. presum
est enim quod hoc nomen homo, imponitur a quidditate, sive a natura hominis; et hoc nomen res imponitur a quidditate tantum; hoc vero nomen ens, imponitur ab actu essendi: et hoc nomen unum, ab ordine vel indivisione"; CM, bk. 4, lect. 2, ?553. 30 Substances "Do Aristotelian On this see Ralph Mclnerny, Exist?," Sa 54 (1999): 325-38. pientia 31 "Esse enim rei quamvis sit aiiud ab eius essentia, non tarnen est intelli sed quasi con ad modum accidentis, gendum quod sit aliquod superadditum essentiae. Et ideo hoc nomen ens quod imponitur ab stituitur per principia idem cum nomine quod imponitur ab ipsa essentia"; CM, ipso esse, significat this paper are mine. of Thomas throughout bk. 4, lect. 2, ?558. Translations
29 "Sciendum
AQUINAS'S
those ders
all.32
IPSUM ESSE
279
same how, I take
in fact won Kenny They are its components. principles. esse and essence can be said to differ at on this account,
it that part of the answer would be that although the esse is the principles "as though" constituted of the essence, these through are not to be understood as its very components. Thomas's constant esse is something It cannot be com is that every simple. teaching posed of matter and form. He must only mean comprising to express to the matter and form portioned not be sufficient this would ever, esse and that pro a thing's essence. How the difference between that it is somehow
essence holds in every case in which Thomas that they differ: essences some are not creatures. of creatures in all For the is, of matter and form, but are simply forms. So there must composed to also be some more both material and difference, general applying immaterial next section creatures. I shall try to bring out such a difference in the of the paper.
The Metaphysics is a rather late work of Thomas's. commentary esse set not at But the way of conceiving forth there is all a novelty for in the De potentia, him. To cite just one example: Thomas criticizes Avicenna in the very of accident. actus we find same way. The esse of a substance is not in the Even if it is not part of the essence, it is the very act In works from every stage of Tho essentiae.33 of the nature similar formulations of esse: actus actualitas such an formae, expression and so on.34 In the esse
genus of the essence, mas's career,
essentiae, Summa
actualitas theologiae,
essentiae, he uses
to distinguish
32 Kenny, AB, 175. 33 "Esse non dicitur accidens si loquamur quod sit in genere accidentis, de esse substantiae?est enim actus essentiae?sed simili per quamdam tudinem: quia non est pars essentiae, sicut nee accidens"; Thomas Aquinas, de potentia dei (hereafter, Quaestiones disputatae "DP"), in S. Thomae vol. 2, ed. M. Pession Quaestiones Aquinatis disputatae, (Turin: Marietti, 1954), q. 5, a. 4, ad 3. 34 Thomas Aquinas, super libros Senten Scriptum See, for example, "In Sent."), tiarum ed. P. Mandonnet and M. Moos (hereafter, (Paris: Lethielleux, 1929-37), bk. 1, d. 4, q. 1, a. 1, ad 2; d. 19, q. 5, a. 1, obj. 1; d. 33, q. De veritate 1, a. 1, ad 1; d. 37, q. 1, a. 2; Quaestiones disputatae (hereafter disputata De spiritu "DV"), q. 10, a. 1, obj. 3 (Leonine ed., vol. 22); Quaestio alibus creaturis Quaestiones (hereafter, "DSC"), in S. Thomae Aquinatis vol. 2, ed. M. Calcaterra and T. S. Centi (Turin: Marietti, disputatae, 1954), q. un., a. 11; Summa theologiae (hereafter "STh"), I, q. 54, a. 1; EP, bk. 1, lect. 5 See also DP, q. 9, a. 5, ad 19. (Leonine ed., vol. 1*1.31,11. 397-403).
280
from action. "An action
STEPHEN L. BROCK
of a power is properly the actuality or an essence."35 of a substance that Thomas would have (virtutis),
as an esse
is the actuality It seems clear then that esse
is always strictly proportioned to our In relation thereof: the contrary. ject, as a function quite one set of texts in which this idea is strik emerges especially theme, uses rather frequently that Thomas in sup ing. It is a line of argument essence esse and in of the thesis that other than God very port things must mention with mainly be distinct. that This will be the focus of the next my chief section. concern I should is not What in presenting this argument, to show the distinction it serves me is the conception of esse
idea
no objection to the to the essence of its sub
whether interests
to be a "real" one. involved in it.
IV to esse. The argument in various appears according Differing I suppose is that in different works. the best known version versions
of the Summa
on God's discussion whether ture does ferentia. divine
theologiae.
(I, q. 3).
It is part of the fifth article in the question

This article comes and of esse after the immediately essence. concerns It that the divine na
simplicity of the God
in God, identity, wants is in a genus. Thomas a a not have formula definition, is, the conception must be perfectly three or ratio
to show
That nature
composed that properly
of genus
and dif the
expresses
that God is not in a genus gives a thing's genus as a species. is related is of The first that the principle as potency to act36 and that in God to the principle of its differentia essence since God's is The is that is second there potential. nothing Thomas His would esse, have and a thing's to be ens-, but ens since ens. genus cannot ens that its essence, signifies be a genus, because cannot interests His genus the differen
simple. to show arguments
tiae would The a genus,
be outside third argument Thomas says,
A non
be a differentia. us. Things that are in or essence of the genus;
is the one share
in the quiddity
35 "Actio enim est sicut esse est actualitas virtutis; proprie actualitas "sicut autem ipsum STh I, q. 54, a. 1. Similarly: vel essentiae"; substantiae est esse est actualitas ita actualitas operativae essentiae, operari quaedam
potentiae seu
36 On this point
virtutis";
DSC,
q. un.,
a.
11.
see CM, bk. 8, lect. 2, ?1697; STh I, q. 76, a. 3, ad 4.
AQUINAS'S
and
IPSUM ESSE
281
of them essentially, in quod quid est. Yet the genus is predicated to esse. The esse of man is not the same as the they differ according nor is the esse of this man same as the esse of that esse of horse, the Hence,
man.
esse and quod quid est, or esse in a genus, for anything differ. But in God they do not differ. So God is not in a and essence, nor definition.37 and He has neither genus, genus, nor differentia, a it has the advantage It is difficult of distin However, argument. guishing creatures immaterial tute their between whose essence essences and esse in a way are not even to the that applies of matter and form?the that the angels consti In its own differentia.38
creatures,
to essence. is proportioned An an note, Thomas says, is the "ratio of its whole gel's essence, esse"; it is so in essence sofar as it is "such" an essence the (talis essentia), specific to its proper In the same article, Thomas ratio."39 esse of creature is deter "the whatsoever any universally to one according to genus mined and species."40 So we are dealing a to to meant all with extend created upon beings. teaching Drawing that it is, "according affirms that related passages from other works, I understand it as follows.41
a genus divided case too, we may
the angels. into species, esse
composed Thomas holds each with
37 in quiddi "Tertio, quia omnia quae sunt in genere uno, communicant tate vel essentia generis, quod praedicatur de eis in eo quod quid est. Differ unt autem secundum esse, non enim idem est esse hominis et equi, nec huius hominis et illius hominis. sunt in genere, dif Et sic oportet quod quaecumque f?rant in eis esse et quod quid est, idest essentia. est quod Unde manifestum deus non est in genere sicut species. Et ex hoc patet quod non habet genus, ?eque differentias; ?eque est definitio ipsius"; STh I, q. 3, a. 5. 38STh is clear about I, q. 50, a. 2, ad 1; I, q. 50, a. 4, c. and ad 1. Thomas even though we cannot reach a the fact that angels have true differentiae, of them: see Thomas Aquinas, De ente et essentia proper understanding (hereafter, "DEE"), ch. 5 (Leonine ed., vol. 43, p. 379,11. 72-6). 39STh I, q. 54, a. 2, ad 2; see I, q. 7, a. 2. 40 "Esse autem cuiuslibet creaturae est determinatum ad unum secun dum genus et speciem"; STh I, q. 54, a. 2. 41 are DEE, ch. 5 (Leonine ed., vol. 43, 378,11. 7-14, The related passages n. In quoted below, Sent, bk. 1, d. 8, q. 4, a. 2, s.c. 2; In Sent., bk. 1, d. 35, 42); q. 1, a. 4; DV, q. 2, a. 11 (quoted below, n. 50); DV q. 27, a. 1, ad 8; DP, q. 7, a. 3; contra gentiles Summa (hereafter, "SCG"), bk. 1, ch. 25 ("Item. Quicquid 14. A ch. p. 1, helpful survey of the various texts, under the head est..."); CT, is found in John F. Wippel, The Metaphysical ing of "The 'Genus' Argument," to Uncreated Being From Finite Being Thought of Thomas Aquinas. (here of for the Medieval and Renaissance after, "MTTA"), Monographs Society 1 (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Philosophy Press, 2000), 157-61.
282
The first
STEPHEN L. BROCK
or es in a genus share in the quiddity step is that things the "what it is," of the genus. This means that the proper ratio sence, of the genus, its intrinsic is the same in each case. content, intelligible The genus is said univocally of its members. The ratio by signified "animal" men. is the same and men when it is said of horses and when it is said of Horses are animals, they do not differ with respect Socrates and Plato do not differ with and
to what
an animal to what
we can note that although the argu respect a point about ment to make is being used in a genus, Thomas things a common to to takes it be also in It clearly applicable species. things to any being whose in common nature has something univocal applies with the nature of some other being. This is explicit in some of the texts.42 parallel The next step differ with respect here. texts But leave It is not and horse both the
a man
is. Likewise, is. Here
is that even to it. How
esse belongs though so? Thomas does and
to all things, they not spell this out of the parallel If man in But
logic of the argument it. little doubt about distinct
some
just that things have have distinct instances of animal.
instances
of esse.
stances
of the nature
of esse, they also have distinct They are not the same animal.
be that these instances of the nature of animal are not the point would on account of animal. In itself, of anything in the very nature distinct one and or according is entirely to its own ratio, the nature of animal the with By same. It is diversified extrinsic between or through association only per accidens, some to its proper differentia. ratio; namely, of esse, the diversity is never diverse instances It is intrinsic. there are Things is something which
something contrast,
or per accidens. association solely through to" esse. For each thing, diverse "according this something is for one is its esse; but what is for another. animals, same for two that is, one tinct The but ratio the ratio then of animal of esse remains does
it from what thing differs the same when said of dis If what be esse two, is were the one:
not.43 not really
things,
they would
but only
being
(ens).44
42 For example: "essentia sua [seil. Dei] non est aliud quam esse eius. Et ex hoc sequitur quod ipse non sit in genere; quia omne quod est in genere oportet quod habeat quiditatem pr?ter esse suum, cum quiditas uel natura ge rationem nature in illis, quorum secundum neris aut speciei non distinguatur in diuersis"; DEE, ch. 5 (Leonine est genus uel species, sed esse est diuersum ed., vol. 43, p. 378,11. 7-14).
AQUINAS'S
In effect, preceding because diversified entia. what
IPSUM ESSE
then, seems to complement this argument which reasoned that God cannot be a genus.45 Ens is not
283
the article's be in a genus it is not
argument, ens cannot
a differ outside solely by something own said of diverse its differs. But things, signification is the esse of whatever it signifies it is said of. So the esse of one When
a genus because its own signification,
be intrinsically diverse from that of other it thing must And, things. must be so just insofar as the thing is an ens; which is to say, in every is in a genus, So if something its essence cannot be its esse, respect. because its essence is not in every respect diverse from the essences in the genus. What it is is partly the same as what the it is not even partly the same ens as the others. Is Thomas urging us to think of esse as something inconceivable, not formulation? This would favor the judgment defying particularly in each thing. What he says is that the esse that it is something diverse of other others things are. But of a man man is not the same as that is not the same as the esse I believe, is thought, to be is to be a horse. for a horse, For a man, to be is to be a For Socrates, man.46 it is to be Socrates. Esse is diverse in each that of a horse, and of that. The basic that the esse of this
43 Kenny does not seem to have grasped this. Speaking of DP, q. 7, a. 3, he says: "everything shares the thin and universal predicate is the [esse]?it . . each thing that is true of each and every item?but. very same predicate has its very own individual instance of that predicate. In the same way, if two peas are as alike as two peas can be, they will share the very same shade of the greenness of the pea on the right of my plate is a green, but nonetheless different entity from the greenness of the pea on the left of my plate"; Kenny, AB, 122. For Thomas, what Kenny says about greenness would be correct; but Thomas is maintaining that esse is not like greenness in this re precisely same not is same Esse the not is the in very spect. predicate?it signification or ratio?in any two cases. The ratio of esse is diverse in diverse things. 44Thus in SCG, bk. 1, ch. 25 ("Item. Quicquid est..."), he gives this sim esse: "alias genus de ple reason why things in a genus must differ secundum 45 This is in fact how Thomas glosses the De potentia version of the argu ment: "nihil ponitur esse suum, sed ratione quidditatis in genere secundum est ei proprium, et distinc suae; quod ex hoc patet, quia esse uniuscuiusque tum ab esse cuiuslibet alterius rei; sed ratio substantiae potest esse commu nis: propter hoc etiam Philosophus dicit, quod ens non est genus. Deus au tem est ipsum suum esse: unde non potest esse in genere"; DP, q. 7, a. 3 (see also In Sent., bk. 1, d. 35, q. 1, a. 4, c). 46 "Esse enim hominis est ad hominis terminatum speciem, quia est re in natura speciei humanae; et simile est de esse equi, vel cuiuslibet ceptan
creaturae"; DP, q. 1, a. 2. pluribus non praedicaretur."
284
case?what according it is, its intrinsic to diverse essential ratio, differs?because
STEPHEN L. BROCK
it is constituted
principles.47 between them. alien a thing's essence and its esse to distinction is not between the nature and which is nothing the act of being a first
If this reading is correct, then the striking thing is that Thomas is

using show essence but horse. the very proportion a distinction between of a horse and some The
or absolute of a horse
"esse." How
It is between
the essence
is the distinction some help and differentia Aristotle
to be understood? by recalling in a relation that Even this the article's argu In and act. to account contains
Perhaps ment. Genus the Metaphysics, for the unity many Thomas on tiae. some
is afforded stand
argues of a true definition. what it defines
of potency is the only way the definition
though
words, is presupposing The
is nonetheless
its own,
independently genus has esse this means
that the genus of its various only
one, and a being, per se48 of a thing does not exist in act and of their differen species with and according to
in conjunction
differentia.49 What in a man, the act of being an animal as the act of being a man, and of being rational. is that proper to men. But the nature is the Such is
very same thing an act of being is of course not proper to men. of being an animal ever the differentia and of animal More same
of animal
to horses. in a horse, And the act It also belongs is the same as the act of being a horse, and of what of a horse is. So it is at least clear that the nature of being an animal common and univocal that feature. the same. quite be quite the feature will in As Thomas the De veri says are never
an act
no generally, as an act of being 47 Thomas
one esse and an between says that this is how we distinguish other: by identifying the distinct natures that they are the esse of. ("Life," for it that is of such a nature as to move the esse of something example, means an mean a. not intrinsic not is does 9. that there ad This See 2, DP, q. 7, self.) one esse and another; rather, we get at the intrinsic diver diversity between in the same in their proper subjects. As he explains sity through the diversity we forms a of different kinds of in the it is that similar way distinguish place, the matter proper to each (as soul is defined as the act things: by identifying of a physical organic body). Clearly the forms of different kinds of things are intrinsically diverse. 8.6.1045a8-b24. 7.12.1037b8-38a35; 48Metaphysics 49 existentibus est enim aliquid esse in actu nisi omnibus "Impossibile non esse in actu quin esse enim animal substantiale potest designatur: quibus "Ex sit animal rationale vel irrationale"; SCG, bk. 1, ch. 24. More succinctly: genere enim habetur quid est res, non autem rem esse; nam per differentias res in proprio esse"; CT, pt. 1, ch. 13. constituitur specificas
AQUINAS'S
t?te, man knowledge scientem).50 It might
IPSUM ESSE
is not the same is not the as being man same as being (hominem knowledgeable esse),
285
and (esse
(homo)
(scientia) seem as
a thing's act of being other is nothing though or its distinguishing But this cannot be right ratio. than its differentia even act is not identical of the because being either, though thing's to the genus.51 determined its genus, it is nonetheless with according For again, definition the genus is predicated the thing's of it in quod est. It is part of the whose principles
essence, through expressing for example, act of being, Man's is constituted. the thing's act of being but also an act of being an animal. is not only an act of being rational, To identify his act of being with It is an act of being a rational animal. would thus lead be defined So the esse as an animal to absurdity. being a rational It would animal.52 either with mean
his differentia could
that man
with
of a thing cannot be identified a function It is somehow its differentia. still remains. if esse form?it It is similar to the one
of both.
its genus or But a serious He
question asked how, matter
is constituted can be
the essence, which ask how, We can likewise also constituted by these same principles. a thing's esse is to be understood in terms of its genus and differentia, and
by the principles said to differ from
by Kenny. posed of the essence?the
is if
50 "Illa enim eamdem rationem sunt in diversis, sunt eis quae secundum sive quidditatis, sed sunt discreta rationem substantiae communia secundum esse. Quidquid autem est in Deo, hoc est suum proprium esse; si secundum in eo est idem quod esse, ita scientia est idem quod esse cut enim essentia in eo; unde, cum esse quod est proprium unius rei non possit alteri scientem est ut creatura pertingat ad eamdem rationem ha communicari, impossibile est quod ad idem esse perve bendi aliquid quod habet Deus, sicut impossibile niat. Similiter etiam esset in nobis: si enim in Socrate non differret homo et esset quod homo univoce diceretur de eo et Pla hominem esse, impossibile tone, quibus est esse diversum"; DV, q. 2, a. 11.
51 See
52 to a common the esse of an individual belonging For similar reasons, its "principle of individuation." species cannot be identified with Although diverse from that of others, this di the esse of one individual is intrinsically and results from diversity in the constitution of the esses versity presupposes For simplicity's subject, that is, diversity either in form or at least inmatter. here on the diversity of esse in things of a common genus sake I concentrate to that differ in species, but the discussion would apply, mutatis mutandis, distinct individuals of a common species. On Thomas's not regarding esse as see Lawrence Dewan, in creatures, "The Indi the principle of individuation to Thomas Aquinas," The Thomist vidual as a Mode of Being According 63 (1999): 403-24.
above,
n.
40.
286
it differs from essence. the thing's whole itself. Genus and differentia is the formula expressing For are
STEPHEN L. BROCK
the same can be said of thing's of its
the essence definition,

essence.
which
the parts of the the understanding
be that
answer would I suggested that a plausible question, matter is not strictly of and composed form, as the es sence a is. Rather, the esse would be something simple, though with to matter to the constitution both the and form. The dif proportioned To Kenny's the esse ference then would the esse or has be that whereas the essence is composite, to our question, will is simple. The answer I believe, to this. However, it will also differ to be similar in an impor to this difference will formulate it. help Considering answer cannot
parts, turn out
tant way. The
the esse of a creature is quite be that while is of The distinc genus and differentia. composed simple, a not differentia is tion between and distinction be genus properly or a essence. tween components in the This is clearest parts of thing's its essence case essences are said to be incomposite of angels, whose the essences of pure forms. The only substantial composition is that of their essence and their substantial esse.33 But not realities, in them even the
essence
differentia. and
of a corporeal is properly substance of genus and composed For a corporeal substance has only one substantial form; not only of its differentia this simple form is a principle but also of
of it. It is not in virtue of his matter all the genera that are predicable or even a body. He or a living organism, is an animal, alone that a man in virtue of the composition of his matter and his one is all of these form?the words, same the whole form in virtue of which he is rational.54 underlies the genus In other both and its the constitution of a thing's essence A sign of this is that both per se of the thing
genus and differentia
its differentia. are predicated This is what
as a whole.55
But they signify its essence

or rationes. genus
according
and differentia
to distinct
properly
intelligibilities
compose: the
53See STh I q. 50 a. 2 ad 3. 54See ed., vol. 43, p. 373,11. 223-36); STh I, q. 76, a. DEE,'ch. 2'(Leonine a. c. a. ad & ad 1; DSC, q. un., a. 1, ad 24; Thomas Aquinas, De sub 6, 3, 4; 4; stantiis separatis "DSS"), ch. 5 (Leonine ed., vol. 40, p. D-50, 11. (hereafter of matter and form, there is a cer It is true that in things composed 88-124). differentia and and between tain correspondence matter, and between genus is not a strict identity. On this see DEE, ch. 2 form; but the correspondence (Leonine ed., vol. 43, p. 372,11. 135-207); In Sent, bk. 2, d. 3, q. 1, a. 5; CM, bk. 10, lect. 10, ?2115-16. 55See DEE, ch. 2 (Leonine ed., vol. 43, p. 371,11. 96-104); CM, bk. 8, lect. 2, ?1697; CM, bk. 10, lect. 10, ?2114.
AQUINAS'S
whole telligible tinction essential
IPSUM ESSE
ratio of the thing, its definition.56 that the thing essentially way They are distinct instantiates. The
287
in dis
dimensions reflects
our mind's and
is by comparing distinction. However, breaks down its essential we
contrasting not lose
at a thing's essence, of getting which a It it with other is logical things.57 of the fact is indeed that the ratio which
should
into genus and formula. Genus
sight differentia and
differentia
a dimension est. Each captures quid sences of things?created lend themselves things?really of understanding. The distinction between and genus of creatures the understanding names of the various meanings derstanding it is a deficient and names, none of them all of them of what he of God consists is not that we like can give to God. of a multiplicity of rationes we give in virtue his can
a thing's definition, are predicated in quod of what the thing is. The es to this way differentia among Our best in the un
the distinction
even
understanding. Although names that are true of him expresses
only him many of his
because true
essence, Nor do
adequately
or represents
essence. even
None of them quite captures together.58 is. What he is does not have distinct "dimensions." his essence
a dimension The ra
tio that expresses
Proof of this, Thomas simple. tical with his esse. No esse yields and differentia. This then seems to be how
cannot be a definition; itmust be utterly is arguing, is that God's essence is iden a ratio that breaks down into genus from its es that its
a creature's
esse
differs
to the present The essence is such sence, according argument. can be analyzed ratio into parts. It is composed of a number pler tinct rationes. Even when the essence dimensions. There intelligible that belongs also to other kinds of things, the genus; and there dimension that puts the thing in contrast with those termining the differentia.59 Of course the thing cannot have one of these without rationes. no member the other. The of Both differentia the genus are essential is not would in the ratio
of sim
is nothing but form, it has dis is an indeterminate dimension is a de others, dimen
sions distinct erwise
to it. Still, they are quite of the genus; oth be without that differentia.
56See DEE, ch. 2 (Leonine ed., vol. 43, p. 372,11. 207-17). 57See STh I, q. 87, a. 1 (near the end of the corpus). 58See STh I, q. 13, a. 1; a. 2, ad 1 and ad 3; a. 4. 59 as indeterminate On genus and differentia see DEE, and determining, ch. 2 (Leonine ed., vol. 43, p. 373,11. 223-42); STh I, q. 50, a. 2, ad 1.
288
And the genus The ratio is not in the ratio of
STEPHEN L. BROCK
the differentia, for the reasons
given by Aristotle.
of a thing's esse cannot in this way. be analyzed To be the ratio of its esse is a function have seen, of its genus sure, in this differs and differentia it from the ratio of the divine esse, (and esse of a man is an act which is not such a function). The substantial as we of "being a man," which though we can also use "being rational" or into is to say, less "being a rational animal." But al to refer to it, such complete expressions an not to break it down this is animal," "being esse does not have a generic Man's di differentia.60 common to all animals, it proper an joined with to man. Even
as
and genus mension that is univocally
that makes dimension other, differentiating this in such a when we call it "being an animal," we must understand to man.61 is proper If something is in a ge that what it signifies way as same of ratio of what it is is the the nus, then part exactly part of some other But the ratio of its being the ratio of what things are. what it is is entirely proper In short, the essence to it. in a genus instantiates many esse its is simpler. And yet it or the differentia are, namely, Once more, the esse of the constitution presup essence. of something but the ratio of
dimensions, intelligible in the way is not simpler that the genus by being one of those very dimensions. poses Its own other and is proportioned ratio is a function the
to the whole
of that of the essence, of the essence?of all
because
actuality we can say that the esse is the act proportioned to the I think gether.62 essence. In the the the intelli the various of dimensions of esse, unity gible dimensions of the essence are as it were perfectly fused, more
than
it is nothing to its dimensions
60 A sign that being an animal and being rational are not related as genus in common: and differentia is that they have an element "being." Yet they do not express two distinct acts of being, as being a man and being white do. act of being. Both signify a man's one substantial 61 to above (p. 285), it is not that things differ according As discussed esse in the same way that they differ according to their . . . differentiae. the differen Man's act of being rational, and a horse's act of being whatever tia of a horse is, are both acts of being an animal. Only, what being an animal in the two cases is not entirely the same. Yet there is an analogy be signifies the tween them, such as to allow for the same expression. By contrast, cannot be termed "rational" even by analogy. The horse is horse's differentia even between act of being rational and a man's not rational. However, of a horse is, there is still some the differentia horse's act of being whatever to which both are called acts of being. analogy, according
AQUINAS'S
IPSUM ESSE
289
than in the essence itself. It is more formal.63 This does not perfectly mean more but rather, more concentrated. The esse is the general, Nor is it a mere further specification, "point" of the essence. just one more dimension. It is expressed It is more like the event, by a verb. the exercise, of the essence. a remark by Gilbert Ryle (Kenny cites the effect that existing is something like breathing, only quieter.64) or to
V God is his act One thing that emerges in the of being. very clearly I is that in distinguishing the essence just examined, believe, from its act of being, Thomas is not thinking of the act of be to which no qualifying
can be added. The predicate act of being of a man is qualified essence or to the the form according of man. It is an act of being a man. Ifwe need confirmation of this, we consider another from the Summa in which may passage theologiae,
argument of a thing ing as something
62 In the if Thomas's does not in judgment of John Wippel, argument volve apetitio a real distinction principii?that is, if it does not presuppose esse and essence between in things that are in a genus or a species?then "as it first appears in the argument, esse may signify nothing more than a particu lar actually existing member of a generic or specific class, that is, a particular concrete existent"; Wippel, MTTA, 161. Yet "Thomas himself would not allow for real distinction a universal between content and a particular intelligible of the same" (ibid.). But on the interpretation instantiation that I am propos in the argument is simply the actuality of a ing, what esse initially signifies thing's essence. A certain property of it is then isolated, namely, that its ratio contains nothing univocally common. From this it is concluded that in a to a genus, esse and essence cannot be identical, since the ra thing belonging tio of the essence does contain something univocally common. That the con crete existent cannot be identical with its esse would follow by the same rea the argument does seem to assume that soning. As for the "real distinction," both essence and esse are real. Neither is a negation or a relation of reason; each is a perfection of the thing. Does the argument show that they are dis tinct perfections? considered Might they be one simple perfection, merely to distinct rationes, like genus and differentia in an angel? Cer according shows that the ratio of the essence is neither tainly the argument identical with nor part of the ratio of the esse. What I am is that it also as suggesting sumes, as basis for the premise of the diversity of esse in diverse things, that the ratio of a thing's esse is determinate, and that it is a function of the deter minate ratio of the thing's essence. This means that the ratio of the esse is not part of the ratio of the essence, and that they are not related as indeter minate and determining. The overall result, I believe, is that they cannot be of the same perfection. rationes 63 Esse is "maxime formale": STh I, q. 7, a. 1. 64 Kenny, AB, 59.
290
Thomas offers a truly (ens). fundamental formulation
STEPHEN L. BROCK
of the principal mean
ing of "a being"
Since "a being" properly bespeaks something's being in act, and act to which that according is properly has order to potency, something called "a being" unreservedly to which is that according it (simpliciter) is first set off from what ismerely in potency. But this is the substantial esse of each thing. And hence each is called "a being" unreservedly in function of its substantial esse.6b in the full sense, means of something. For Socrates, or ceasing to be a man beginning So esse, esse It is true that ing to be simply. mean the same as the statement that Socrates says other than the substantial nothing to be is the same as to be a man. His is the same the statement as his beginning or ceas is" does not "Socrates is a man." The first says
"Socrates
second be that
is in act, "set off from what is merely that he actually has human nature. But statements substantial to him. are true esse.66 in virtue This of one does is added
in potency"; the the point would and the same that no act, fur
the two is Socrates'
which
not mean will
ther esse ondary sage
can be added esse, constituted
But what
according
to some
accident.
sec be a merely Thus the pas
continues: in function of acts added on, something is said to be in a way (secun dum quid), as "to be white" signifies to be in a way; for to be white does not take away being in potency to a thing that simply, since it accrues
already exists in act.67
Besides stantial
a thing's substantial act of being, and the eventual additional form,
which acts
it has of being
its sub through that it acquires
65 "Cum ens dicat aliquid proprie esse in actu, actus autem proprie or dinem habeat ad potentiam; secundum hoc simpliciter aliquid dicitur ens, se ab eo quod est in potentia tantum. Hoc au cundum quod primo discernitur tem est esse substantiale rei uniuscuiusque; unde per suum esse substantiale ens simpliciter"; STh I, q. 5, a. 1, ad 1. As Thomas indi dicitur unumquodque esse of a thing is nothing other than cates a few pages later, the substantial the esse that it has in virtue of its substantial form: "Prima perfectio ignis in esse quod habet per suam formam substantialem"; consistit STh I, q. 6, a. 3. 66Thus Thomas both and connects the "existential" and distinguishes senses of the verb "est"; see EP, bk. 1, lect. 5 (Leonine ed., vol. 1*1, copulative p. 31,11. 382-407). 67 "Per actus cut esse album esse in potentia
I, q. 5, a. 1, ad 1.
autem superadditos, dicitur aliquid esse secundum quid, si esse secundum quid; non enim esse album aufert significat cum adveniat rei iam praeexistenti in actu"; STh simpliciter,
AQUINAS'S
through thing. some There
IPSUM ESSE
accidental is no such form. at least is quite clear that Thomas does not think
291
in the is no other act of being form, there an not as is constituted act of that being thing of
according
to some
Now, Kenny the esse of creatures ing has esse
corresponding God, esse. esse.
be as something created Every unqualifiable.68 a esse can a be and its by predicate qualified form, through of the esse of Thomas But when to its form. speaks indeed esse seem to introduce an unqualifiable no esse sine additione?ipsum purum, mean to that God's esse admits expressions is, without being any kind of thing?with
says, he does Kenny God is esse tantum,
takes such Kenny God just at all.69 predicate out form.
I think he is right. But in my opin thinks this is absurd.70 Kenny ion, it is not what Thomas means. on account of is not in a genus, that God the argument Certainly esse with his essence, does not imply that his esse is esse is not qualified his that It according only implies unqualifiable.71 from it. It will be an esse that is totally un distinct to some principle In other with his esse. is identical in God conditional. Everything the identity of his essence is identical that God's does not suppose the argument words, or the itself. It with identity by only supposes "esse," taken abstractly such esse is. the esse of God?whatever of God with of the essence Whereas being means man is other than God and knowledge being man, is not other than being God. in fact grants that Kenny itself?not sheer "being is other than
knowledgeable, This is a crucial that God
point. is "an" esse
if Thomas itself," but
only his
68See Kenny, AB, 151-2. 69"There is one can be attached, where type of being where no predicate just is, full stop. This type of being is unique to God"; Kenny, AB, something 191. 70See Kenny, AB, 110-12. 71 Clearly his esse is not a "substantial" esse, in the sense of the esse of in the genus of substance; and even less is it an "additional" esse. something et ac habet ex essentialibus principiis "Quidquid autem creatura perfectionis hoc totum deus habet per unum suum esse simul coniunctis, cidentalibus simplex"; DV, q. 21, a. 5. (See also STh I-II, q. 18, a. 1.) "Substantial" signifies a particular mode of esse. But rather than to say that God has no mode of esse (cf. Kenny, AB, 112), Thomas "Ea says that he has a universal mode: non esse esse a ente secundum universa quae participant, participant primo sed particulariter lem modum essendi, secundum quod est in primo principio, essendi modum qui convenit vel huic gen secundum quendam determinatum eri vel huic speciei"; DSS, ch. 8 (Leonine ed., vol. 40, p. D-50,11. 199-204). On what this means, compare with the text quoted below, n. 89.
292
itself?then being, tonism is making being gle subsistent. own he may itself, avoid
STEPHEN L. BROCK
What platonism.72 yields pla a a essence or sin by itself, single
taken
at least shows in speaking confusion Still, Kenny judges, Thomas as of God simply is his own being does not esse.73 That God ipsum some entitle us to say that he is "being itself." Here Kenny introduces from Frege. considerations But as far as Thomas is con sophisticated it seems to me that we ought cerned, more This is that he writes elementary. not have and Latin does definite to consider in Latin. indefinite articles. The one something much
or est homo, may mean Socrates either that Socrates is a man, phrase, or simply that Socrates is man. that Socrates is the man, The context will determine which is intended. So when Thomas meaning writes, Deus means tation?a est esse, should we ipsum "God is being itself? Such platonizing one. That take simply a translation God is his it for granted an is already well that he
esse may I think this
interpre not justify out to be
saying that he is "esse itself." But it certainly does justify saying that
He much is "an" esse closer Aside take has?or Thomas Summa this form does as note itself, "a" very act of being. to what Thomas has in mind.74 the grammatical fact that Thomas form. Earlier is per turns
from of rather says he the
we at least should considerations, is very far from denying that God in the question suam on God's simplicity, later in the
is?a
that God
essentiam
says that God maxime not mean that God can
est forma be defined.
God
We may it is in itself, in its quiddity.76 as in contra Thomas it the Summa puts but, exists; in Himself, cannot God subsists grasp the esse "by which ity?quale ever, that sists" to us. sit?is the word esse unknown esse, of God to us, as His essence
forma; Of course simplex.73 Nor can we grasp his grasp the truth that a we gentiles, whose qual is."77 It is clear, how
in. The
If it is not unknown
what God "con by itself, does not express a way unknown in some way, is "qualified" God does know his to God, this is because
72 "When Aquinas tells us Kenny, AB, 145-7. He quotes Peter Geach: est he not that is Deus that God is wisdom itself, ipsa sapientia, meaning the noun 'wisdom' is a proper name; for the Platonists God is that of which are wrong in thinking that there is such an object, and Aquinas says they are of God' are But we can take it to mean that 'God' and 'the wisdom wrong. in "Form and Existence," two names of the same thing"; Peter Geach, ed. Mac A Critical Collection Anthony Kenny (London: of Essays, Aquinas: millan, 1969), 39. 73 Kenny, AB, 146.
AQUINAS'S
essence. form
IPSUM ESSE
to Thomas, the divine not of course (though esse. This essence a species is an
293
intelligible of a genus); in
According and a species is his own
deed, it is that through which God himself

himself very
is "specified."78 And God

esse.79
is not a formless
may help to note that Thomas employs a very similar expression, an angel: "Subtracta ergo materia, to describe et "ipsa forma subsistens," adhuc remanet comparatio p?sito quod ipsa forma subsist?t non in materia, formae ad ipsum esse ut potentiae ad actum. Et talis compositio intelligenda est in angelis. Et hoc est quod a quibusdam dicitur, quod ang?lus est com positus ex quo est et quod est, vel ex esse et quod est, ut Boetius dicit, nam quod est est ipsa forma subsistens; ipsum autem esse est quo substantia est, sicut cursus est quo currens currit"; STh I, q. 50, a. 2, ad 3. And a little later: "cum ?ngelus sit ipsa forma subsistens, ut ex dictis patet, impossibile est . . . eius sit substantia Sed si ipsa forma subsist?t in suo quod corruptibilis esse, sicut est in angelis, ut dictum est, non potest amittere esse"; STh I, q. 50, a. 5. Obviously Thomas does not mean that an angel is "form itself' subsist as nature of the angel were nothing other than the absolute the ing, though nature of "form." An angel is a form itself, subsisting; indeed, one among a genus. The created subsistent forms constitute Thus Thomas also many. form: "[AJngelus autem, cum sit says that an angel is "a certain" subsistent est quaedam et per hoc intelligibilis forma subsistens, immaterialis, actu"; STh I, q. 56, a. 1. Naturally God is not "a certain" subsistent esse, one among There can only be one. So we can say that he is "the" subsistent esse many. itself. But there is no warrant for saying that he is simply esse itself, subsist 75STh I, q. 3, a. 2; STh I, q. 13, a. 12, obj. 2. The divine form is called dei tas: STh I, q. 3, a. 3. 76 This is because we can know God to the extent that his creatures rep resent him, and "quaelibet creatura intantum eum repraesentat, et est ei simi lis, inquantum perfectionem aliquam habet, non tarnen ita quod repraesentet eum sicut aliquid eiusdem speciei vel generis, sed sicut excellens principium, a cuius forma effectus deficiunt, cuius tarnen aliqualem similitudinem effec tus consequuntur"; STh I, q. 13, a. 2 (emphasis added). 77SCG,bk. l,ch. 12. 78 "per inam formam intellectualis intelligibilem specificatur operatio, in actu. Et haec est species principalis quae facit intellectum intellecti, quae in Deo nihil est aliud quam essentia sua, in qua omnes species rerum compre henduntur. Unde non oportet quod ipsum intelligere divinum, vel potius ipse per aliud quam per essentiam Deus, specificetur suam"; STh I, q. 14, a. 5, ad 3. See also STh I, q. 14, a. 4. 79 There is no need to interpret esse sine additione as esse sine forma. It signifies an esse to which nothing is added. What is "added" is always dis tinct from what it is added to. The esse of God would be an esse that is identi cal with its form. Nor is this a purely equivocal use of the term "form"; the term still retains something of the meaning of "formal cause." Agent and ma terial causes, Thomas says, are always distinct from what they are causes of, but a thing can be its own form, "as is clear in the case of all immaterial "three per things"; STh I, q. 39, a. 2, ad 5. He is speaking of the expression sons of one essence," as referred to the Blessed Trinity. In this expression, he says, "essence" is signified in the role of a form, in habitudine formae.
ing.
74It
294
God is a subsistent examined his esse, between esse
STEPHEN L. BROCK
The point of form, identical with his essence. above was that if he, or his essence, is also can be then he cannot be in a genus. There him and anything proper else?least to him, and of all some everything in is wholly
the argument identical with nothing univocal
"esse." His thing called esse. him is his proper At also the same the principle is. This any way there cannot
is outside all genera, he is time, to be sure, if God of all genera, and of absolutely in that everything follows from the fact that he is his own esse and that than one subsistent that is an esse itself.80 For
be more
it therefore results that all things other than God are not their esse, but share in esse; and so it is necessary that all things, which are diversified to a diverse participation in esse, in such a way that they are according more or less perfectly,81 be caused by a first being (ens) which is in a most perfect way.82 Moreover, if God is the principle, is no genus common like him. An agent's agent, to God and effect the of all that is, then al all things must it. Just inso
there though be in some way
is always
the rest, like
80 On there not being more than one, see STh I, q. 11, a. 3, c. (the second together with I, q. 4, a. 2. argument), 81 how Thomas conceives the "grades" of Space prevents considering "more esse, but we may at least note that he is alert to the question whether or less" does not imply univocity (see above, n. 25). For example: "[M]agis et et minus sed ea ex quibus magis minus nunquam univocationem auferunt; auferre: et differentiam causatur, possunt speciei facer?, et univocationem hoc contingit quando magis et minus causantur non ex diversa participatione sicut ang?lus est homine unius naturae, sed ex gradu diversarum naturarum; In Sent, bk. 1, d. 35, q. 1, a. 4, ad 3. Again: "[M]agis et minus, intellectualior"; et remissione unius formae, non di secundum quod causantur ex intensione ex formis diversorum Sed secundum versificant quod causantur speciem. sicut si dicamus quod ignis est perfectior speciem, graduum, sic diversificant aere"; STh I, q. 50, a. 4, ad 2. 82 "Relinquitur ergo quod omnia alia a Deo non sint suum esse, sed par secundum diver est igitur omnia, quae diversificantur ticipant esse. Necesse vel minus perfecte, causari ab sam participationem essendi, ut sint perfectius a. 1. In article Tho uno primo ente, quod perfectissime STh this q. 44, est"; I, he does specify that mas does not specify that God is "his" esse. However, the other things are not "their" esse. And in other places where he employs same sort of argument, his premise is explicitly that God is "his" esse. See STh I, q. 61, a. 1; DV, q. 21, a. 5; SCG, bk. 2, ch. 15 ("Item. Quod per essen de quodlibet 3, q. 8, a. un.; DSS, ch. 9 tiam..."); CT, pt. 1, ch. 15; Quaestiones vol. p. D-50,11. 102-18). 40, (Leonine ed.,
AQUINAS'S
IPSUM ESSE
creatures of esse.83 are assimilated
295
to God,
Thomas far as they are beings, says, as to the first and universal principle
take care to remember is that if creatures, inso But what we must from resemble also differ insofar far as they are beings, him, God, they as they are beings. diverse in creatures (ens) itself is something Being itwould be like a genus, univocal; and in the final and God. Otherwise as Aristotle's be really dis show, no being would analysis, arguments tinct from God. in the says God, Thomas things have with an in univocal. agreement They con place, something nor even generic stitute neither unity. specific They are only "accord some esse to in the way that itself is common to all." As is ing analogy, indicated this is very genus, by sequence?species, analogy?Thomas likenesses that same are never of pro we a can in It is this that of "the" way portion, speak proportionality.84 nature of esse running all things, as a unit: there is a common through using "analogy" proportionality. feature is itself common But analogical community is such that the common in each case. Esse is diverse, intrinsically diverse, to things in such a way in them. Ev that it is also diversified to which is somehow in act, ery esse will be that according something from what divided somehow is in potency. But what being in act con sists same will in is also way, also And one If all Him tive for diverse for each characteristic is saying Thomas that in this thing. a creature to God that renders similar the term in the Aristotelian sense: a likeness The
any be a characteristic
conversely, from creature things are
even those
that distinguishes it from him.85 that factor the nature of distinguishes of other creatures it similar to God. renders the insofar as they are beings, is also each like to it, that is, according to its distinc in form." Every created form, in common with the creature "There and is not
like God
to what is proper according form. Likeness is "communication instance form. do not that of a horse, Not something, communicate will
divine God said cation only
something of course, in its definition; or in genus. in species either to God ratio on account
have
to be a likeness in form according
of the creature
of a communi but is a
to the same according an to namely, analogy;
of genus and species, in the way in which God
83 gTh I q 4 a 3
84See Metaphysics 5.6.1016b31-1017a3; 85See STh I, q. 4, a. 3, ad 1.
cf. 5.9.1018al3.
296
and the others being (ens) essentially, we a to be a being As saw, for horse, in its being-a-horse horse participates if a horse, insofar as it is a being, sofar as it is a horse.
STEPHEN L. BROCK
[are beings] by participation."86 means to be a horse; and the in virtue of its form. it is also then thus, like him in And
is like God,
This brings us to the last point that Iwish

mas's ences, concern to see the very forms as being like God. They I about Thomas's says much, believe, conception to nature the of God. and its relation about ing,
to highlight
their form."
it: Tho
differ This of be
of things, and even are all "contained in His
of the nature
VI The are in God. In the Summa
differences
of things
theologiae,
the likeness of all things to God is treated in the third article of the
to God's which follows dedicated immediately perfection, on The of essence the divine the upon simplicity. identity question of his role in the understanding and esse in God plays an important on as in God's the second article perfection, Thus, though perfection. to show that all the seeks to establish the basis for the third, Thomas question of things are in God; and the second perfections is esse that he gives turns on the fact that God
se.87
itself
of the two arguments that subsists per contains in in
The himself
first conclusion "the whole
that follows
from To
this
is that God
perfection
of esse."
illustrate
this, Thomas
creaturae ad Deum propter communican similitudo eandem rationem generis et speciei, sed secundum et alia per par tantum; prout scilicet Deus est ens per essentiam, analogiam STh I, q. 4, a. 3, ad 3. Iwould suggest that the analogy here, ticipationem"; resides in the fact that both in God and in other things, the proportionality, there is something they are beings. (It is important that "a "through which" see STh I, q. 44, a. 1, ad being" is said properly both of God and of creatures: in form," because all of them are beings, precisely, 1.) This is an "agreement " . . . ipsa forma, per quam est a. 4: STh their forms. q. I, 5, (See through a ens.") God is being because his form is his esse; the others are beings be in their esse. cause, in virtue of their forms, they participate (Here it is cru We have al with "per accidens." cial not to confuse "per participationem" but through things are beings, not per accidens, ready seen that for Thomas, the This would also be a case in which of their essences.) the principles et posterius common proportionality is verified, not equally, but per prius in relation to its imitations. (see above, n. 21). The priority is that of a model their forms and their In creatures, there exists a strong affinity between have their esse through their forms; this affinity resembles, with esse?they form and esse in God. out equaling, the perfect identity that obtains between
86 "Non dicitur esse tiam in forma secundum
AQUINAS'S
vites us
IPSUM ESSE
a subsistent
297
in and any of
to imagine conditioned
heat, a pure heat, a heat not received a in Such a heat could not be lacking by subject. be heat at the It would virtus?of heat. the perfection?the
maximum
esse of God In the same way, the subsistent is at degree. the virtus, In the words of esse. of the maximum of the perfection, esse a in "it all in itself, pseudo-Dionysius, precontains (praeaccipit) But if God contains the entire perfec uniform way (uniformiter)."88 tion of esse, Thomas the perfections of esse." Things contain then he must all of absolutely continues, to in things. For all perfections the "pertain perfection are perfect just insofar as they have esse in some way.
as though esse itself is the this last assertion sound may Now, But this is not what Thomas means. He also rec only true perfection. a text in the In distinct from other esse.89 perfections, parallel ognizes Summa dom But crates ing wise thereof. in God, also contra of Socrates the wisdom is wise. gentiles, is not his he gives esse. of wisdom.90 The wis the example It is not even his act of being wise. is a perfection, because it, So through
of Socrates His wisdom
is constituted. This is what
to which his act of be according to his being wise; It "pertains" it is a principle to stress: Iwish if the entire perfection of esse is
is a form,
all the various forms of things must then, for that very reason, esse of be in him. Every perfection is tied to some form. two of the objections in the article are par In this respect, raised
is that the perfections The first of things are ticularly significant.91 even stronger, God is simple. and diverse, whereas The second, many are of things is that the species and perfected by their differences,
87 In this text Thomas says simply, "Deus est ipsum esse per se subsis I speak of "an" esse itself, in line with the foregoing tens." considerations. is indicated by the version of the same argument given That this is acceptable 88 from ps.-Dionysius, With the quotation it is clear that Thomas recog nizes the platonic for the notion of a perfection that is found background both in a received or participated mode, inwhich its perfection is limited, and in a subsistent mode, in which it is maximally see also perfect; DP, q. 6, a. 6. in the sense this by itself does not make him guilty of platonism, However, criticized by Berti and Kenny. That involves treating the perfection, taken ab of the thing in which it is found subsisting, in such a solutely, as constitutive to the ratio of way that the thing's essence would be determined according that perfection. See below, VIL 89 Thus see DP, q. 6, a. 6: "cum esse et reliquae perfectiones et formae in in corporibus re veniantur per hoc quod sunt in materia quasi particulariter, ceptae, oportet praeexistere quae non aliquam substantiam incorpoream, sed cum quadam universali essendi particulariter, perfectionem plenitudine in se habeat" (emphasis added). 90 ... "). SCG, bk. 1, ch. 28 ("Omnis enim nobilitas 91STh a. 2. land I, q. 4, 2, obj.
in SCG, bk. 1, ch. 28: "... Sed rei quae est suum esse ..."
298
these mas are opposites; answers both that opposites cannot exist
STEPHEN L. BROCK
in the same He subject. does not Tho at all
very briefly. objections together, in things are diverse the perfections and differences and are asserts He that items which and diverse op simply opposed. in themselves to in God as one, without detriment "preexist" posed his simplicity. Thus pseudo-Dionysius likens God to the sun, which deny even
and qualities of sensible all the substances precontains things unifor a in We almost call this the thomistic coin virtus. miter, might single in mind that they are not op cidentia oppositorum?though bearing are Not all perfections of God, predicable just as posite predicates. are predicable not all sensible of the sun.92 The many perfec qualities in God as in their effects that preexist opposite all the power for all perfections, but accord first cause. He possesses a to him.93 "quality" that is proper ing to a nature and tions are diverse and The veloped thesis a little how that the differences of things are in God is further de I, q. 14, a. 6. Here Thomas later, in Summa theologiae knows than himself. that God other explains things Everything of his own nature. He God knows, he knows by way of his knowledge no knowledge For this reason, Thomas tells from outside. receives us, some eral way, thinkers held that God insofar as they other things in a very gen only knows are beings. know the na He would as principium es himself by knowing But he would this. It would not know the a merely mean proper con God
namely, ture of being entis), (naturam the principle of esse. sendi, natures fused must of things. and general, also To whatever know explain there Thomas and each
rejects
so very
thing this, Thomas is of perfection
imperfect, in its distinction returns to
of things. knowledge from the others. the fact that God that
contains in which
in creatures.
"Not only
in God in in fact holds that created species, although existing a "higher" way than they exist in the creatures "more themselves, belong truly" to the creatures: STh I, q. 18, a. 4, ad 3. For example, God is the idea, of horses, and this idea is is a more perfect being the productive exemplar, "is a horse" than a physical and material horse; but a "true" horse, that which in the proper sense, is a physical one. 93 In De ente et essentia sit esse it thus: "[Deus], quamuis he explains et non nobilitates. ei deficiant relique perfectiones tantum, oportet quod ... ; sed ha Immo habet omnes perfectiones que sunt in omnibus generibus unum eo in omnibus bet eas modo excellentiori sunt, sed in aliis rebus, quia conueniunt sibi habent. Et hoc est, quia omnes ille perfectiones diuersitatem esse suum simplex; sicut si aliquis per unam qualitatem posset ef secundum in illa una qualitate omnes qualitates omnium qualitatum, ficere operationes esse suo omnes in ita Deus habet"; DEE, ch. 5 (Le perfectiones ipso haberet, onine ed., vol. 43, p. 378,11. 30-43).
92 Thomas
AQUINAS'S
creatures the other, which fection." others The other features such each
IPSUM ESSE
esse, namely creatures which
299
to perfection; but also pertains are distinguished from each . . .And every form, through species, essence acts is a certain compares under per to all it."
communicate,
through as life and
thing Thomas
understanding in its proper is constituted then act" explains to the that God's
as a "perfect essence of God
essence, gives of how the "sixfold" contains the example of himself, God can know the In this way, through his knowledge natures of each thing is con For "the proper nature of things. proper some as in in stituted it the divine perfection. shares way according But God would way mas in which says, This known mined if He did not know perfectly, can be shared by others." Moreover, perfection know the nature of esse, "neither would he perfectly not know Himself His all the modes of esse." is very all The nature striking. are its modes known. natures of things. mere extrinsic natures We of esse These In other cannot are be every Tho if He
possesses besides." and more
"imperfect "whatever there To illustrate
contained
is of perfection the idea, Thomas the "threefold."
in any
did not know
last affirmation perfectly unless
deter
according natures of things
to the various
"liquid" of esse. the full understanding things are "essential" sified
are by no means the various Grasping of esse
the words, for the receptacles is required the essences for of
of things say:
itself.
by things alien the forms of things are perfections, tion of esse. So we are very Even far from if there a very
to esse, indissociable to its own nature?least
might from
it.94 Esse
is not diver
pertaining
of all by nonbeings. All to the directly perfec essen
tially uniform. this constitutes presses
a conception is an abstract
as something and common notion of it.
of esse
only imperfect knowledge the common in every verified proportionality of esse "the actuality of an essence." The various modes
of esse, It only ex instance of esse: cannot be
94 "Ens alio modo se habet ad ea et alio modo quae sub ente continentur, suas. Species aliud genus ad species animal vel quodlibet enim addit supra genus, ut homo supra animal, differentiam aliquam quae est extra essentiam tantum Animal enim nominat naturam in qua rationale generis. sensibilem, non continetur; sub ente, non addunt aliquid supra sed ea quae continentur ens quod sit extra essentiam eius; unde non oportet quod illud quod est causa in quantum est animal, sit causa rationalis animalis in quantum huiusmodi. Oportet autem illud quod est causa entis in quantum est ens, esse causam omnium differentiarum entis"; DP, q. 3, a. 16, ad 4.
300
deduced cannot from it, because be so deduced.95 the various forms
STEPHEN L. BROCK
and essences of things
VII
God thing as Now we of esse. the gravest of the problems the Idea transcendence. To are to say some in a position raised by Berti, the one re to Aristotle, according It is intrinsically diverse
about
is not something uniform. seems to recognize and multiple. Thomas this. But how then can he the assertion of pseudo-Dionysius, a single to which adopt according esse a in all in himself uniform If all entity, God, "precontains way?" esse itself is contained be understood in a single form as something or nature, uniform, attributed nature the divine, univocal? must And not esse is this in if esse
the divine garding the nature of esse
recall:
it is somehow then when univocal, not amount to attributing the divine some way? The answer would which be affirmative, is certainly
to a creature, will to itself the creature, if Thomas were
I think,
the divine with
nature, the nature of esse clear We natures
it seems manner. proper himself
uniform, in a separate and subsistent But way. existing that Thomas does not conceive the divine form in this just heard him then
that thought identical simply
have of
things, or the nature of esse. the divine see that
that if God did not know the saying not know he would either perfectly In saying is also distin this, Thomas and the nature of esse. the divine of esse na it is a difference esse) this between and
between guishing can we How ture self? (which One
nature there
is identical consideration
with
the divine that shows
the nature
difference
is precisely that the perfection of God clearly, The perfection of esse itself does lutely all perfections. are The forms of too, perfections. perfections things not contained in the perfection of esse. To be sure, they perfection reducible of esse; they to it, nor "derivatives" fects or results, but as principles. to the principles of an essence. subsist by itself, in separation but remain distinct from
I think,
particularly contains abso not and contain these all are
to the pertain it. They are neither to it, not as ef of it. For they pertain esse is constituted Every according is why the other the nature perfections of esse cannot If of things.
This from
95 "Ratio enim in diversis, non est sufficiens entis, cum sit diversificata rerum cognitionem"; In Sent, bk. 1, Prologus, ad specialem q. 1, a. 2.
AQUINAS'S
God contains
IPSUM ESSE
301
of esse, he must all the perfection also contain all other if God contains all forms. And all perfections, then it is perfections, cannot be simply obvious that his own nature identified with any one even with of them?not that of esse. concept of although remains distinct esse, somehow from em
the absolute Likewise, the entire perfection bracing cepts of other perfections. not succeed
of esse,96 For this reason,
the con does is,
according
in determining the divine or essence. to its quiddity
nature
the concept as it is in itself,
of esse
that
is something uncircumscribed, in itself in The divine essence containing a supereminent can or whatever be understood way signified by a cre ated intellect. And this cannot in any way be represented through a cre ated species, because form is determined to every created according some ratio, whether or of virtue, or of esse itself, or some of wisdom, thing of this sort.97 So in the same way in which the divine form transcends all other
it also transcends the nature of esse itself. The entire perfec forms, esse it tion of esse is inferior to the perfection In other words, of God. to God as imperfect self must be related act to perfect act. The nature as in its cause, but it does not in the divine nature, of esse is included constitute At esse. the the divine same nature.98 nature is identical with the divine time, the divine not even the divine esse can be identified with the
Consequently,
97 "Divina essentia est continens in se supere aliquod incircumscriptum, minenter quidquid potest significari vel intelligi ab intellectu creato. Et hoc millo modo per aliquam speciem creatam repraesentari potest, quia omnis forma creata est determinata secundum vel aliquam rationem, vel sapientiae, STh I, q. 12, a. 2 (emphasis esse, vel aliquid huiusmodi"; virtutis, vel ipsius name God via a concept that is so rep "Does Ipsum esse subsistens added). rich that it expresses the totality of all perfections? resentationally Obviously not. If it did (a) we would be enjoying the beatific vision, and (b) one divine name would "Esse ut Actus Intensivus," in Being suffice"; Ralph Mclnerny, and Predication, Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy, vol. 16 of America Press, 1986), 234. (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University 98 in a very interesting Recently, article, Franco Ferrari has sought to show that in the Republic, "the relation that binds the idea of the good to be to the point of a true and proper identification, since the ing is not pushed is not in itself but possesses ipsum being (Esse ayaO?v subsistens), \iakioxa this characteristic insofar as it is cause thereof; Franco Ferrari, "La causalit? del bene nella Repubblica di Platone," Elenchos 22.1 (2001): 37 (my transla here is that notwithstanding his use of the ex tion). What I am suggesting a true and neither does Thomas make pression "ipsum esse subsistens," of God with "esse itself." proper identification
96SeeSThI-II,q.2,a.
5, ad
2.
302
absolute this point God nature of esse. By way of conclusion, a little better.
STEPHEN L. BROCK
I shall try to explain
has
all the perfection This means contains of a horse. that He a as as to all the power to well necessary repre produce horse, sent it. He is not only its sufficient active principle, but also its perfect He is the Idea of a horse. But of course this is an Idea in exemplar. not platonic, the thomistic, not of God?is the essence essence fections But tween of a horse. of all other now, his esse sense. That the essence then of this Idea? is, the essence of what it is the Idea of?the not also contain the per be to him.
If it were,
it could
things. holds Thomas and the other cannot
that
in God
there
is no
distinction
If the nature
of God can
perfections be identified
that can be attributed with any
with it be identified tion, neither is not a synthesis. tions. For his nature ratio. Everything in him in its very is his proper
the mere
particular perfec of all perfec even in It is absolutely simple, esse. This means that his esse synthesis but of
itself contains, also all the other
of esse, ratio, not only all the perfection of things.99 It contains the perfection perfections a nature of of horse. of and the and life, understanding, nature In short, the esse of God is an esse whose goes beyond nature of esse. That
the
mere scribed
according
an esse, but it is not circum is, it is certainly to the precise of esse, the ratio that distin ratio
99 of the This is the explanation that Thomas gives of the non-univocity rerum names said in common of God and creatures: perfectiones, "[0]mnes in Deo praeexistunt unite. quae sunt in rebus creatis divisim et multipliciter, de creatura dicitur, Sic igitur, cum aliquod nomen ad perfectionem pertinens ut distinctam secundum rationem definitionis illam perfectionem significat ali ab alus, puta cum hoc nomen sapiens de homine dicitur, significamus a esse et et ab essentia distinctam ab hominis, quam perfectionem potentia Sed cum hoc nomen de Deo dicimus, non ipsius, et ab omnibus huiusmodi. ab essentia vel potentia vel esse ip intendimus aliquid distinctum significare cir sius. Et sic, cum hoc nomen sapiens de homine dicitur, quodammodo non autem cum dicitur de Deo, rem significatam, et comprehendit cumscribit et excedentem ut incomprehensam, nominis sed relinquit rem significatam a. even is clearer STh 5. As I, q. 13, regards esse, perhaps significationem"; on De divinis nominibus: from his commentary this passage "[I]psum esse ad creaturas, quia ad omnia se exten creatum non est finitum si comparetur esse et ex praec invenitur deficiens ad tarnen si increatum, comparetur dit; rationis determinationem divinae mentis, habens"; Tho propriae ogitatione nominibus mas Aquinas, De divinis In librum Beati Dionysii expositio, ch. 13, lect. 3, ?989, ed. C. Pera (Turin: Marietti, 1950), 368. The finitude of created esse does not derive solely from what receives it; it also has an intrin to that of the proper ratio of esse (see above, n. 97), according sic finitude, esse in the God of it is distinct from other perfections. which By contrast, the ratio of esse. cludes, but also exceeds,
ESSE AQUINAS'SIPSUM
esse from guishes nature the whole esse?all the forms. God in which then he the is also Idea other perfections. of esse, but also The all divine esse includes of not the principles the nature
303
only of
Is St. Thomas's only mistic in the sense
In a sense, of esse? yes; but the Idea of a horse.100 It is a tho
Idea. Its essence is not the essence of that Idea, not a platonic not it is the Idea. If it were, God would be the Idea of any of which thing whatsoever, because apart from him there could be absolutely
nothing.
Pontifical
University
of theHoly Cross, Rome
100 If esse can be properly predicated of God, whereas horse cannot, this is only because the ratio of esse does not positively exclude real identity with all other perfections, as the ratio of horse does. But the divine essence is not to either ratio. Thomas determined is explicit about the fact that according esse is not predicated of God in such a way as to signify what he is; see In
Sent, bk. 1, d. 8, q. 1, a. 1, ad 4.

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On Whether Aquinas's "Ipsum Esse" Is "Platonism" Author(s): Stephen L. Brock Source: The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 60, No.

ON WHETHER AQUINAS'S IPSUMESSE IS "PLATONISMO

of 2002, Oxford University Press published a book by

Kenny's of a century, Enrico Berti, ogy.3 Berti is essentially

the eminent has is less been severe

raising in his judgments. than Kenny an infection of "platonism."

The Review Metaphysics

thought some time fact.

joins him in rejecting.

It is this very line that they find insinuating it

lem is not just that the line is mistaken

(though they clearly think it

chief aim in the rest of the paper will be to highlight an element

I Plato: Aristotle is not a single nature. a list of difficulties In book 3 of the

Against Metaphysics, phy needs and and

Aristotle, them would Among any universal cern the special

then it could not be predicated

of the principles dividing it;

differences The second

of being?then this it follows to its own

or according there would

be nothing?that groups Plato with

predicates.12 So the basic

II esse as univocal. with as Berti Thomas

fully Aquinas Ideas. Thomas

it in various essences. God's The and God esse esse

"modes," Nor is the esse subsists of other in each identical

limited is not but there

commune, Thus Platonic ov

is rather are clear

its cause?its differences

a genus. cause it is too bound up with

of things is not ens If for Aristotle

outside that ens

others, alongside exist. But if the nature marily signifies

intimately its full identity, as a genus is. of ens

of a single added of things.

will be alien to the essences

Itwill belong to things

It is not that Berti entirely rejects the possibility

ality, then itwill be distinct from the thing's esse, which

its essence. itmeans

is strictly proportioned a of it. That is, what

in its immediate then he

connec could but not esse

If he were, one thing that

It is the separate of esse.27

importance its timeliness:

and essences, to suggest Iwish

simply with Aristotle's

least However, to the Metaphysics, deserves of the terms of the discus

"one" that In that

"being" the substance

explaining the name striking. Aristotle A

If there is saying lines

is completely the point

oblivious that the

Thomas "through He then on

is as though con Every These would of an essence. presum