REVI EW

Brain ngerprinting: a comprehensive tutorial review of detection

of concealed information with event-related brain potentials
Lawrence A. Farwell
Received: 17 March 2011 / Revised: 26 November 2011 / Accepted: 30 January 2012 / Published online: 17 February 2012
Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012
Abstract Brain ngerprinting (BF) detects concealed
information stored in the brain by measuring brainwaves. A
specic EEG event-related potential, a P300-MERMER, is
elicited by stimuli that are signicant in the present con-
text. BF detects P300-MERMER responses to words/
pictures relevant to a crime scene, terrorist training, bomb-
making knowledge, etc. BF detects information by mea-
suring cognitive information processing. BF does not
detect lies, stress, or emotion. BF computes a determination
of information present or information absent and a
statistical condence for each individual determination.
Laboratory and eld tests at the FBI, CIA, US Navy and
elsewhere have resulted in 0% errors: no false positives and
no false negatives. 100% of determinations made were
correct. 3% of results have been indeterminate. BF has
been applied in criminal cases and ruled admissible in
court. Scientic standards for BF tests are discussed.
Meeting the BF scientic standards is necessary for accu-
racy and validity. Alternative techniques that failed to meet
the BF scientic standards produced low accuracy and
susceptibility to countermeasures. BF is highly resistant to
countermeasures. No one has beaten a BF test with coun-
termeasures, despite a $100,000 reward for doing so.
Principles of applying BF in the laboratory and the eld are
discussed.
Keywords Brain ngerprinting P300-MERMER
P300 Event-related potential Detection of concealed
information
Introduction and background
The state of the art prior to brain ngerprinting
Brain ngerprinting is an objective, scientic method to
detect concealed information stored in the brain by mea-
suring electroencephalographic (EEG) brain responses, or
brainwaves, non-invasively by sensors placed on the scalp.
The technique involves presenting words, phrases, or pic-
tures containing salient details about a crime or investi-
gated situation on a computer screen, in a series with other,
irrelevant stimuli. Brain responses to the stimuli are mea-
sured. When the brain processes information in specic
ways, characteristic brainwave patterns can be detected
through computer analysis of the brain responses. When an
individual recognizes something as signicant in the cur-
rent context, he experiences an Aha! response. This
response is characterized by a specic brainwave pattern
known as a P300-MERMER. Brainwave responses are
analyzed to determine whether or not the specic infor-
mation tested is stored in the brain of the subject or not.
Brain ngerprinting computes a determination of infor-
mation presentthe subject knows the critical informa-
tion, or information absenthe does not. The system
also computes a statistical condence for each individual
determination, e.g., information present, 99.9% con-
dence indicates that there is a 99.9% probability that the
subject knows the relevant information tested. If the sta-
tistics computed do not provide a statistical condence
high enough to meet a predetermined criterion for either a
determination of information present or information
absent, then no determination is made: the outcome is
indeterminate.
This tutorial review discusses the science of brain n-
gerprinting in light of the current state of the art in forensic
L. A. Farwell (&)
Brain Fingerprinting Laboratories, Inc., 14220 37th Ave NE,
Seattle, WA 98125, USA
e-mail: [email protected]
1 3
Cogn Neurodyn (2012) 6:115154
DOI 10.1007/s11571-012-9192-2
science, the scientic principles on which the technique is
based, published scientic data, successful eld applica-
tions, applications in the judicial system and legal admis-
sibility in court, scientic methods and standards for brain
ngerprinting tests, correcting misconceptions and avoid-
ing errors in applying the science, and the role of brain
ngerprinting in criminal investigations and security.
Prior to the invention of brain ngerprinting, the state of
the art in forensic science, investigations, and criminal
justice was as follows. The goal is to reconstruct the crime
and accurately identify the perpetrator. This is accom-
plished by connecting features of the crime scene with
features associated with the perpetrator. The crime involves
participants and a crime scene. The participants include
one or more perpetrators, and may include one or more
victims and/or witnesses.
The crime scene has two types of features that may be of
use: permanent features and changes wrought by the crime.
Permanent features pre-exist the crime and persist after the
crime. These include buildings, streets, the lay of the land,
etc. Changes that took place at the time of the crime
include such things as the positioning of the body in the
case of a murder, ngerprints, blood at the crime scene, etc.
The participants in the crime also have permanent and
changed features. Permanent features of the participants
include, for example, DNA and ngerprints. Changed
features of the perpetrator may include, for example,
wounds sustained in the course of the crime. Changes to the
victim wrought by the crime can be considered along with
the crime scene.
The fundamental task of investigations is to establish
accurate and reliable connections between features of the
crime scene and victim on the one hand and features of the
perpetrator and witnesses on the other. The perpetrator may
leave traces of a permanent feature of the perpetrator, such
as DNA or ngerprints, at the crime scene. The perpetrator
may take with him from the crime scene traces of a per-
manent feature of the crime scene, such as an unusual kind
of soil on his shoes. The perpetrator may take with him
from the crime scene traces of changed features of the
crime scene, such as the blood of the victim.
In some cases, investigators may establish a connection
directly between a feature of the crime scene and a per-
manent feature of the perpetrator himself. This can be the
case with DNA and ngerprints. In other cases, investi-
gators may establish a connection between the crime scene
and something associated with the perpetrator. For exam-
ple, the perpetrator may leave behind ber samples at the
crime scene that can be matched to clothing he owns.
The crime scene generally has many features that can be
established with certainty. Every suspect also has many
features that can be established with certainty. When and to
the extent that specic features common to both are
available, forensic science can establish objective, deni-
tive connections between the crime and the perpetrator.
Generally, however, in the past there have been only very
few specic features of the crime scene that can be den-
itively and uniquely matched to features of a particular
suspect.
Generally the most major change that takes place in the
perpetrator and witnesses is something that has not been
directly detectable through forensic science techniques.
The perpetrator and witnesses to a crime virtually always
know that they have observed and/or participated in the
crime. They virtually always know more than a few small
details about what took place and who was involved. The
record stored in the brains of the witness and perpetrator is
often a much more comprehensive account of the crime
than what can be pieced together from connecting a few
specic features of the crime scene with a few specic
features of the perpetrator.
The record stored in the brains of witnesses and perpe-
trators, however, has not been accessible to scientic
scrutiny. The only way to access this record has been
through interrogation and testimony. The record of the
crime stored in the brain of witnesses and revealed through
testimony has the advantage of often providing by far the
most comprehensive account of the crime available. Except
in rare cases where a crime is recorded on video, witness
testimony often provides much more information than is
available through any other means.
Witness testimony, however, has several disadvantages.
Even when the witness is deemed to be truthful, witness
testimony is not a complete and accurate account of the
crime. Witness testimony is a subjective report of the con-
tents of memory. It is well known that human memory is not a
perfect record of events. Memory is known to be limited and
imperfect in a number of ways. It is approximate, sometimes
distorted, selective, and subject to numerous inuences.
Memory is known to be affected by mental or physical ill-
ness, injury, passage of time, drugs, and many other factors.
The two primary disadvantages of witness testimony are
the following: (1) Human memory is imperfect; and (2)
The witness may lie.
In weighing the advantages and disadvantages of wit-
ness testimony, which constitutes subjective reports of the
contents of human memory, every judicial system
throughout history has reached the same three conclusions:
1. The brain is a sufciently accurate recorder of events
that testimony constituting subjective reports of the
contents of memory is universally admitted and
considered as evidence.
2. The brain is a sufciently imperfect recorder of events
that witness testimony is never taken to be absolute
fact. Any proceeding that includes witness testimony
116 Cogn Neurodyn (2012) 6:115154
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must weigh the testimony in light of the well known
limitations of human memory.
3. Any proceeding that includes witness testimony must
consider the veracity of the witness.
The same principles that apply to the subjective reports
of witnesses of the contents of their memory also apply to
suspects, with the added disadvantage that perpetrators
have a greater motivation to lie. Even in the case of con-
fessions, the same limitations that apply to witness testi-
mony apply to testimony by a suspect.
In an attempt to eliminate one of the three major limi-
tations of testimony, investigators have developed psy-
chophysiological methods to attempt to detect deception
(Farwell 1995a, 2013). The fundamental premise of the
various techniques for detection of deception is that lying
produces emotional stress and other psychological effects,
which in turn produce physiological arousal and other
physiological changes. These can be measured through
changes in perspiration, blood pressure, breathing, etc. The
commonly used control question test (CQT) in conven-
tional detection of deception employs direct, relevant
questions regarding participation in the crime, such as Did
you shoot Mr. Jones?
Lykken (1959, 1960) originated a new technique for
discovering more of the details of the record of the crime
stored in the brain. It is known as the guilty knowledge test
(GKT) or concealed information test (CIT) (Iacono 2007,
2008; Iacono and Lykken 1997; Iacono and Patrick 2006;
Verschuere et al. 2011). Rather than asking direct, ultimate
questions about participation or non-participation in the
crime, the subject is asked about a series of alternative
details of the crime, only one of which is correct. For
example, the interrogator may ask, Regarding the murder
weapon, do you know it was a pistol? Do you know it was a
shotgun? Do you know it was a knife?
All subjects are expected to answer No in response to
each question. Asubject who does not knowthe details about
the crime will be telling the truth in every case, and will not
know which item is crime-relevant. A subject who partici-
pated in the crime will recognize the guilty knowledge or
concealed information contained in the correct, relevant
item, and is expected to lie in response to the relevant
question. The theory is that the resulting psychophysiologi-
cal responses will reveal this lie and the subjects possession
of the associated concealed information. As such, the con-
ventional concealed information test is an adjunct to inter-
rogation and testimony. It is a method not of directly
detecting evidence of a crime, but of determining the
veracity of a subject who is testifying regarding the evidence.
Methods for detection of deception or credibility
assessment have met with limited success. They have been
used primarily to guide investigations rather than to
denitively establish the relevant facts. They have not
generally been admissible in court.
Overview of brain ngerprinting science
and technology
In summary, the state of the art in investigations, forensic
science, and criminal justice has been a combination of two
modes of establishing a connection between the crime
scene and the perpetrator:
1. Objective data collection and forensic science: estab-
lishing objective, scientic connections between a few
specic features of the crime scene and a few specic
features of the perpetrator.
2. Interrogation and testimony: obtaining a subjective
account of the contents of memory, and attempting to
determine whether or not the subject is lying.
What is generally the most comprehensive repository of
information about the crime, the record stored in the brains
of participants, has not been available to scientic scrutiny
or objective investigation. There has been no objective,
scientic way to detect the record stored in the brain and
thereby to connect the perpetrator with the crime scene.
Brain ngerprinting addresses this fundamental lack.
Brain ngerprinting was developed to provide an objective,
scientic way to connect the established features of the
crime scene with the record of the crime stored in the brain
of the perpetrator (Farwell 1992a, 1994, 1995a, b, 2010,
Farwell and Donchin 1991). The major benet of brain
ngerprinting is that it brings the record stored in the brains
of participants within the realm of scientic scrutiny and
objective investigation (Farwell and Smith 2001; Iacono
2007, 2008; Iacono and Lykken 1997; Iacono and Patrick
2006).
Brain ngerprinting provides an objective method to
detect features of the crime that are stored in the brain of
the suspect. This is accomplished by measuring the sub-
jects brain response to stimuli in the form of words or
pictures presented briey on a computer screen. During a
brain ngerprinting test, electroencephalograph (EEG)
signals are recorded non-invasively from the scalp. When a
subject recognizes and takes note of something signicant
in the present context, the brain emits an Aha! response.
This involves the ring of neurons in a specic, identiable
pattern known as a P300-MERMER that can be detected by
computer analysis of the EEG signals. When a subject
recognizes a specic feature of the crime scene, such as
the murder weapon, the brain ngerprinting system detects
the Aha! response and its corresponding EEG pattern
(Farwell 1992a, 1995a; Farwell and Donchin 1991; Farwell
and Smith 2001). This reveals that the subject knows the
Cogn Neurodyn (2012) 6:115154 117
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relevant information. If the subject does not possess the
relevant knowledge, the tell-tale brain response is absent.
In a brain ngerprinting test, words or pictures relevant to
a crime, terrorist act, terrorist training, or other investigated
situation are presented on a computer screen, in a series with
other, irrelevant words or pictures. (For brevity, the inves-
tigated situation will generally be referred to herein as the
crime, although other situations can of course also be
investigated.) A subjects brainwave responses to these
stimuli are measured non-invasively using a headband
equipped with EEG sensors. A computer program then
analyzes the data to determine if the crime-relevant infor-
mation is stored in the brain. The specic, measurable brain
response known as the P300-MERMER is emitted by the
brain of a subject who has the details of a crime stored in his
brain, but not by a subject lacking this record in his brain.
The P300 response has been extensively researched and
widely published in scientic journals for more than
30 years. It has gained broad acceptance in the scientic
eld of psychophysiology (Harrington v. State 2001;
Johnson 1988). The discovery of the P300-MERMER has
allowed the results of brain ngerprinting testing to be
more accurate, and has produced a higher statistical con-
dence in the outcomes (Farwell 1994, 2008, 2010; Farwell
and Richardson 2006a, b; Farwell et al. 2011, in press;
Farwell and Smith 2001).
Brainwave (EEG) measurements and event-related
brain potentials (ERPs)
The neurons in the brain re electrically, forming a vast
network of electrical potential conduits. Electroencepha-
lography (EEG) involves the measurement of these pat-
terns of electrical voltage changes that originate in the
brain. These measurements are made non-invasively from
the scalp. When the brain conducts certain tasks, specic
patterns of EEG (or brainwave) activity are produced.
An example of such a specic task is noticing, recognizing,
and processing the information contained in a signicant
stimulus such as a murder weapon presented on a screen in
a brain ngerprinting test. These specic patterns of
brainwave activity are known as event-related brain
potentials, or ERPs. Brain ngerprinting technique uses
event-related brain potentials to determine what informa-
tion is stored in a persons brain. This is based on how the
brain processes specic information such as the features of
a crime that are presented on a computer screen.
At the same time the brain is engaging in the informa-
tion processing of interest in a scientic experiment, the
brain is also engaging in many other activities. The result is
that the brainwaves measured at any time are a mixture of
the relevant (event-related) activity and other brainwave
activity. In order to isolate the activity of interest, the
standard procedure in event-related potential research is to
present a stimulus many times and average the responses
(Donchin et al. 1978, 1986; Farwell and Donchin 1988a;
Miller et al. 1987; Picton 1988). All of the brainwave
activity that is not specically related to processing this
specic stimulus averages out to zero, since its timing is
unrelated to the event of the appearance of the stimulus on
the screen and its processing by the subject. High-fre-
quency noise is also removed using analog and digital l-
ters (Farwell et al. 1993). What is left in the average
response is the event-related potential: the brainwave pat-
tern that is specically related to the event of interest.
Each stimulus presentation and associated response is
referred to as a trial. The larger the number of trials in
each average brainwave response, the more extraneous
brainwave activity is eliminated by the averaging proce-
dure (Farwell and Donchin 1988a). In order to obtain valid
and reliable results, a minimum number of trials is
required. Experimenters usually run several tests, each
containing about 100 trials. Each separate test is referred to
as a block. Successive blocks may use the same stimuli
or different stimuli relevant to the same event.
The P300 is a very well known event-related potential
that is utilized in brain ngerprinting testing. Several
thousand studies have been published in the scientic lit-
erature on the P300 brain response. This response takes
place when the brain recognizes and processes a stimulus
that is signicant in a particular context (Fabiani et al. 1987;
Farwell and Donchin 1988a, 1991; Miller et al. 1987). For
example, the murder weapon is signicant in the context of
a brain ngerprinting test about a specic murder.
The rst event-related potentials discovered were related
to sensory processing of stimuli. These responses are
referred to exogenous event-related potentials or evoked
potentials. They are driven purely by sensory processing.
They have nothing to do with the meaning of the stimulus
or with any cognitive activity the subject may undertake.
Initially, scientists recorded and analyzed only a very
short epoch after the stimulus was presented, under the
assumption that anything later than a few milliseconds did
not have to do with the processing of the stimulus. In early
evoked potential research scientists used evoked potentials
occurring in the rst 100 ms after a stimulus. These were
used primarily to study sensory processing.
In the 1960s, scientists began to look at late potentials
in excess of 100 ms after the stimulus. They discovered
that there were patterns of neural activity reliably mea-
surable from the scalp that manifested cognitive processing
rather than sensory processing. This cognitive processing
was independent of which sense delivered the information
to be processed. In their seminal research on the P300,
Sutton et al. (1965) showed that the response depended not
on the physical characteristics of the stimulus but rather on
118 Cogn Neurodyn (2012) 6:115154
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how that stimulus was processed cognitively. The same
stimulus would result in different brain responses
depending on its signicance in the context of the experi-
ment and on the mental information-processing task per-
formed by the subject. Sutton et al. used auditory stimuli to
elicit these responses. Subsequent research has often uti-
lized visually presented stimuli.
Brain responses that manifest cognitive activity are
referred to as endogenous event-related potentials
(Donchin et al. 1978, 1986; Miller et al. 1987; Gaillard and
Ritter 1983; Picton 1988). Before they could see these
endogenous potentials, scientists had to begin looking in
the time range beyond the rst 100 ms after the stimulus.
The discovery of endogenous event-related potentials
opened the door to a host of potential applications not only
in discovering how the brain works but also in applying
these discoveries to practical situations in the real world.
The P300 is an electrically positive potential that occurs
at 300800 ms after the stimulus (Sutton et al. 1965;
Donchin et al. 1978; Long et al. 2011). The name refers to
the fact that the response is electrically positive (P) and has
a latency of at least 300 ms (300). The P300 occurs when a
subject recognizes a stimulus as signicant in the context in
which it is presented. It may be called an Aha response.
In the early P300 research, the responses were elicited by
very simple stimuli such as clicks or tones. These were
made signicant in context by the experimental instruc-
tions. When the stimulus and the task are simple, the P300
peak occurs at about 300 ms after the stimulus.
As research progressed in the 1970s through the early
1990s, scientists began to use more complex stimuli such as a
word ashed on a computer screen (Fabiani et al. 1987;
Johnson 1988; Farwell 1992a). This had the advantage of
providing the subject with more meaningful information.
This enhanced the ability of event-related potential research
to reveal cognitive brain processes. When the stimulus
becomes more rich and complex, it takes longer for the
subject to discern what the stimulus is and evaluate its sig-
nicance. Thus the response is delayed. As scientists used
more meaningful, rich, and complex stimuli, the P300
latency (elapsed time from the stimulus onset to the brain
response) increased. By the 1990s it was not uncommon to
measure a P300 that peaked 600 or 700 ms after the stimulus.
The name P300 still remained in use, however, because it
was the same response, just delayed by the increased com-
plexity of the cognitive processing taking place.
The discovery of the P300-MERMER
In the initial brain ngerprinting research, Farwell and
Donchin used the P300 event-related brain potential (Far-
well and Donchin 1986, 1988b, 1991; Farwell 1992a).
Later Farwell discovered that the P300 can be considered
to be part of a larger response he called a memory and
encoding related multifaceted electroencephalographic
response or P300-MERMER.
The discovery of the P300-MERMER was one more
step in the ongoing progression from very short latency
evoked potentials to longer and longer latency event-rela-
ted potentials as the stimuli and the processing demanded
by the experimental task become more rich and complex.
In the 1990s when Farwell and FBI scientist Drew Rich-
ardson were conducting the brain ngerprinting research on
FBI agents, P300 latencies of 600 to 700 ms were typically
found in experiments where the stimuli were information
rich and the cognitive processing required was substantial
(Farwell and Richardson 2006a, b; Farwell et al. 2011, in
press). At that time, in such research a new stimulus was
typically presented every 1,0001,500 ms (11.5 s). In the
rst brain ngerprinting study, for example, Farwell and
Donchin (1991) presented a stimulus every 1,500 ms.
In dealing with real-life situations, Farwell and Rich-
ardson (2006b), Farwell et al. (2011, in press) found it
necessary to use longer and more complex stimuli to
accurately communicate the necessary information to the
subject. In order to present realistic stimuli that accurately
represented knowledge unique to FBI agents, they found it
necessary to use stimuli consisting of several words,
sometimes several words of several syllables each. It took
the subjects longer to read the words and evaluate their
signicance than in previous experiments with simpler
stimuli. To give the subjects time to process the stimuli and
respond appropriately, Farwell and Richardson lengthened
the interval between stimuli from 1,500 to 3,000 ms. They
recorded a longer segment of brainwave data in each trial.
Recall that in the 1960s when scientists looked farther out
in time after the stimulus, they found previously unseen
responses such as the P300 (Sutton et al. 1965). The same
thing happened to Farwell and Richardson. They were
looking for the P300 response, and indeed the brain
responses contained a clear P300 peak at about
500800 ms. Surprisingly, however, this positive peak was
followed by a negative peak with a latency as long as
1,200 ms. This unexpected late negative potential consis-
tently followed the positive P300 peak. It was reliably
elicited by the same Aha response that elicited the P300.
This more complex P300-MERMER response included
both the P300 and a late negative peak (the Late Negative
Potential or LNP). Farwell (Farwell 1994, 2010; Farwell
and Smith 2001) called this a memory and encoding related
multifaceted electroencephalographic response (MER-
MER), or P300-MERMER. The P300 is maximal in the
parietal area. The late negative potential (LNP) that con-
stitutes the latter part of the P300-MERMER is parietally
maximal yet also frontally prominent (Farwell 1994,
1995b, 2010).
Cogn Neurodyn (2012) 6:115154 119
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Experimentation (including recording without analog
lters), scalp distribution (the relative amplitude at different
scalp sites), and morphology (the latency and shape of the
waveforms) proved that the LNP was not an artifact of the
signal-detection or noise-reduction procedures or equip-
ment, such as digital and analog lters (Farwell 1994, 1995b;
Farwell et al. in press). The recording equipment is identical
for all scalp sites and all subjects. If the LNP were an artifact
of the equipment, the identical equipment would produce the
same effects in different instances. On the contrary, Farwell
et al. found that the relative latency and amplitude of the
P300 and the LNP are very different for different subjects
and for different scalp sites in the same subject.
Like any new discovery, the P300-MERMER raises
questions both of nomenclature and substance. The clas-
sical P300 is also known by various other names, including
the P3, N2-P3 complex, P3a and P3b, late positive com-
plex, and LPC. There has been considerable discussion as
to whether the P300 is a unitary response or in fact a
constellation of several responses (Johnson 1989; Spencer
et al. 2001). There has also been discussion over whether
the various names refer to the same or slightly different
phenomena (Spencer et al. 2001).
No doubt there will be considerable discussion as to
whether the MERMER or P300-MERMER is a unitary
phenomenon inclusive of the P300 and the late negative
potential (LNP), or whether the late negative potential is a
separate component from the component or components
that make up the P300. The answers to these questions are
empirical, to be settled by further research.
Differences in nomenclature also exist. Over a thousand
published studies have associated the name P300 with a
positive peak. Farwell rst reported the P300-MERMER,
including the positive peak of the P300 and the late neg-
ative potential (LNP), in 1994 (Farwell 1994). By 2001, not
only Farwell and Smith (2001) but also almost all other
researchers brainwave-based in detection of concealed
information were using the full P300-MERMER in data
analysis. Such research now almost always includes both
the positive peak of the P300 and the late negative potential
(LNP) of the P300-MERMER. For example, in the algo-
rithms that use amplitude computations, the amplitude of
the response is typically computed as the sum of the
amplitudes of the positive and negative peaks (that is, the
difference between the highest and lowest points). Some
authors (Soskins et al. 2001; Rosenfeld et al. 2004) how-
ever, have used the name P300 to refer to the entire
P300-MERMER response, including not only the tradi-
tional P300 peak but also the late negative potential (LNP)
of the P300-MERMER. In view of the fact that over a
thousand previous publications have used the term P300
to refer only to the positive peak, such usage is confusing
and ambiguous. Authors may avoid confusion by using the
term P300 to refer to the positive peak alone and P300-
MERMER to refer to the complex consisting of the
positive peak followed by the negative peak (LNP).
Farwell and colleagues (Farwell 1994, 1995b, 2010;
Farwell and Smith 2001) reported additional facets in the
P300-MERMER brainwave response that occur simulta-
neously with the positive and negative peaks. These are
detected through different signal-processing algorithms
than the signal-averaging algorithm typically used to detect
event-related potentials (Farwell 1994; Rapp et al. 1993).
These include an event-related, short-term shift in the
frequency of the EEG signal. The nature of these additional
facets and their relationship to the more readily visible
positive and negative peaks is also an empirical question to
be resolved by further research (see Guntekin and Basar
2010).
The discovery of the P300-MERMER has allowed the
brain ngerprinting results to be more accurate than the
results obtained with the P300 alone. The P300-MERMER
consists of a positive peak followed by a negative peak.
The P300 includes only the positive peak. Thus, the full
P300-MERMER contains more information and more
distinctive features, and can be more reliably and accu-
rately detected by a mathematical signal-detection algo-
rithm than the P300 alone.
In all brain ngerprinting research using either the P300-
MERMER or the P300 alone, there have been no false
negatives and no false positives. 100% of determinations
made have been correct. (See, however, the discussion
below regarding the term 100% accurate.) When Farwell
and colleagues have included the full P300-MERMER in
the data analysis algorithm, there have also been no inde-
terminates. In brain ngerprinting research using the P300
alone, results have been indeterminate in 3% of cases
overall, consisting of 12.5% in one experiment. As dis-
cussed below, an indeterminate response is not an incorrect
response, but rather the determination that insufcient data
are available to make a determination in either direction
with high statistical condence.
Neurodynamics, physiological mechanism, and signal
characteristics of the P300-MERMER
Many important phenomena in science are not easily
described in terms of characteristics and categories that
existed before their discovery. For example, Heisenberg
(Heisenberg 1958), Neils Bohr, and others showed that
elementary particles appear as particles when measured
with apparatus designed to detect particles, and as waves
when measured with apparatus designed to detect waves
(see Farwell and Farwell 1995; Farwell 1999 for a detailed
discussion). Like elementary particles, the characteristics
of the P300-MERMER that are detected depend on how it
120 Cogn Neurodyn (2012) 6:115154
1 3
is measured. Farwell and Smith (2001; see also Farwell
1994) described the process of discovery of the charac-
teristics of the P300-MERMER as reminiscent of the story
of the blind men and the elephant. Touching the trunk, one
may conclude the elephant is like a snake; touching the tail,
one may conclude it is like a rope. Touching the leg, the
tusk, or the abdomen, etc. lead to different impressions.
Originally, the P300 was discovered as an event-related
potential, detected through signal averaging of scalp-
recorded voltage patterns. As discussed above, event-rela-
ted potentials are voltage changes that take place in the time
domain that are measured from the scalp. They manifest
specic information-processing activities in the brain.
Much of the subsequent research has been directed towards
discovering what structures and processes in the brain cre-
ate the event-related potentials recorded at the scalp.
The phenomenon that manifests at the scalp as the P300,
however, is much more complex and multifaceted than a
simple average time-domain pattern at the scalp can reveal
or characterize. Farwell and Smith (2001; see also Farwell
1994) described the phenomenon manifested as the P300-
MERMER and the P300 as a multifaceted electroen-
cephalographic response (MER). The different facets of
the phenomenon, like those of elephants and the electrons,
are discovered through different methods of data acquisi-
tion and analysis.
The P300 phenomenon has been explored through sev-
eral different methodologies. Measurements of EEG elec-
trical voltage patterns made non-invasively at the scalp
have been analyzed in terms of time-domain analysis
through signal averaging, frequency-domain analysis,
relationships between voltage patterns at different areas of
the scalp (e.g., event-related coherence), and various
characteristics of the signal (e.g., dynamical systems/chaos/
fractal analysissee Rapp et al. 1993; Farwell et al. 1993).
Mathematical analysis of multichannel scalp recordings of
EEG has been used to explore the source of these patterns
in the brain (Li et al. 2011).
Intracranial recordings have been analyzed in both the
time and frequency domains, and in some cases have been
analyzed with respect to relationships between sites (e.g.,
coherence). Animal models have allowed for intra-cranial
recordings in all areas of the brain, whereas such record-
ings in humans are restricted to areas of interest during
surgery. Functional imaging (e.g., functional magnetic
resonance imaging, fMRI) and magnetoencephalography
have served to further explore which areas of the brain are
activated during the process.
Through a combination of these techniques, a reason-
ably clear and comprehensive picture of the phenomenon
has emerged. Like elephants and elementary particles,
however, the P300 pattern is not without paradox and even
apparent contradiction. To begin with, signal averaging
makes the event-related potential visible as a pattern in the
time domain, but the same process eliminates any fre-
quency-domain signals that are a part of the phenomenon.
A full characterization of the phenomenon, even at the
scalp, must include both time-domain and frequency-
domain characteristics (Basar-Eroglu et al. 1992).
Intra-cranial recordings have clearly revealed patterns in
several areas of the brain, both in the time and frequency
domains, that respond to the same experimental manipu-
lations and appear at the same time as the P300. Some of
these undoubtedly contribute in large measure to the scalp-
recorded potentials. Clear patterns of activation in some
specic areas, however, appear to be an integral part of the
phenomenon, but due to the physical positioning of the
structures in which they occur, they apparently do not
contribute signicantly to the scalp-recorded potentials.
Lesion studies combined with scalp recording have served
to isolate the structures that contribute to the scalp-recor-
ded potentials, and in some cases to show that deep
structures that are activated in the phenomenon do not
contribute to its manifestation at the surface of the scalp.
To further complicate the picture, the P300 is not a unitary
phenomenon. As discussed above, it is a multifaceted elec-
troencephalographic response. Different facets correspond
to different sub-tasks and modality-specic tasks in the
information-processing of which the scalp recorded poten-
tial is a manifestation. Some of the same structures, and some
different structures, are involved in these various different
sub-tasks. The P300 includes information processing related
to both the novelty and the signicance of the stimulus,
which involve somewhat different neural processes and
structures. Information processing, and the structures
involved, also varies somewhat depending on the modality
(usually auditory or visual) of the stimulus.
Combining the ndings from the various methods of
discovery reveals the following pattern (Baudena et al. 1995;
Huster et al. 2010; Halgren et al.1995; Johnson 1993; Kiss
et al. 1989; Sabeti et al. 2011; Smith et al. 1990; Wang et al.
2005; for a review, see Linden 2005.) Signicance-related
(or target-related) contributions to the response appear to be
generated largely in the parietal cortex and the cingulate.
Novelty-related contributions to the response appear to be
generated mainly in the inferior parietal and prefrontal
regions. Contributions specic to the visual modality appear
to be generated in the inferior temporal and superior parietal
cortex. Contributions specic to the auditory modality
appear to be generated in the superior temporal cortex.
A number of subcortical structures appear to be inte-
grally involved in the phenomenon, but do not contribute
signicantly to the scalp-recorded potentials. Both fre-
quency-domain and time-domain signals, and polarity
reversals indicating a local source, have been recorded in
temporal structures, most signicantly in the hippocampus
Cogn Neurodyn (2012) 6:115154 121
1 3
and the amygdala (Halgren et al. 1986; Sochurkova et al.
2006; Stapleton and Halgren 1987). Initially, temporal
structures were thought to be major contributors to the
scalp-recorded potentials. Lesion studies, along with the
limited degree to which such electrical potentials from such
deep sources are propagated to the scalp, however, have
cast doubt on this conclusion. Lesions of the medial tem-
poral lobe have little effect on the scalp-recorded potentials
(Johnson 1988).
The early research on the phenomenon of interest gen-
erally focused on the positive peak of the P300. In experi-
ments involving meaningful stimuli and relatively long
inter-stimulus intervals such as those applied in detection of
concealed information, the P300-MERMER has a triphasic
shape. The positive P300 peak is preceded by a negative
peak, the N200, and followed by another negative peak, the
LNP. This triphasic negative-positivenegative pattern was
observed at the scalp by Farwell and others (Farwell 1994;
Farwell and Smith 2001) as a dening characteristic of the
P300-MERMER. The same negative-positivenegative
pattern was observed in intracranial recordings in various
structures (Halgren et al. 1998), including the inferior pari-
etal lobe/supramarginal gyrus, superior temporal sulcus
(Halgren et al. 1995), the amygdala and hippocampus
(Halgren et al. 1986; Stapleton and Halgren 1987), dorso-
lateral and orbital frontal cortices, and the anterior cingulate
(Baudena et al. 1995). By nowvirtually all of the researchers
involved in detection of concealed information with brain-
waves include in their computational algorithms both the
positive peak of the P300 and the late negative potential
(LNP) that constitutes the other major facet of the P300-
MERMER. (As discussed above, however, differences in
nomenclature still exist; some have called the entire multi-
faceted P300-MERMER phenomenon P3 or P300.)
One hypothesis that may explain the simultaneous
involvement of numerous cortical and sub-cortical struc-
tures in the P300-MERMER is that this phenomenon
reects phasic activity of the neuromodulatory locus coe-
ruleus-norepinephrine (LCNE) system (Murphy et al.
2011; Nieuwenhuis et al. 2005; Pineda et al. 1989).
The hypothesis is that the properties of the P300 reect
the function of the LCNE system to potentiate the infor-
mation-processing activities undertaken in response to
signicant events. According to this theory, the LCNE
system affects or is affected by each structure in the entire
constellation of structures that are activated in the P300, and
the activation of large pyramidal neurons in the cortex by
the LCNE system is the primary source of scalp-recorded
potentials of the P300. Evidence converges from several
types of studies. The LC responds to experimental manip-
ulations similar to those that produce the P300. Lesion
studies show that normal functioning of the LCNE system
is necessary for the generation of the P300. The projections
of the LC are also consistent with this hypothesis. The LC is
the sole source of NE input to the neocortex and hippo-
campus, and also projects to the amygdala and the thalamus.
The LC receives afferent input from structures known to be
involved in decision making, in signaling novelty, and in
representing task goals and signicance of stimuli, includ-
ing the prefrontal cortex, the anterior cingulate cortex, and
the orbitofrontal cortex. This is consistent with the activa-
tion of the LC in response to stimuli that are evaluated as
novel or signicant in the current context, in accord with the
antecedent conditions for the P300. The timing of the LC
NE responses to events is also consistent with the timing of
the P300 response to similar events.
Brain ngerprinting scientic protocol
Experimental design
Brain ngerprinting tests are conducted according to the
following scientic protocols. In a brain ngerprinting test,
stimuli are presented to the subject in the form of words,
phrases, or pictures on a computer screen. (Auditory
stimuli may also be presented.) Brain responses are mea-
sured non-invasively from the scalp, digitized, and ana-
lyzed to determine the presence or absence of information
stored in the brain. Figure 1 outlines the stages of data
acquisition and analysis in brain ngerprinting.
Three types of stimuli are presented: probes, targets, and
irrelevants. (Farwell and Donchin 1986, 1991; Farwell and
Smith 2001). Probes contain information that is relevant to
the crime or other investigated situation. Probes have three
necessary attributes (Farwell 1994, 1995a, b; Farwell and
Smith 2001; Iacono 2008):
1. Probes contain features of the crime that in the
judgment of the criminal investigator the perpetrators
would have experienced in committing the crime;
2. Probes contain information that the subject has no way
of knowing if he did not participate in the crime; and
3. Probes contain information that the subject claims not
to know or to recognize as signicant for any reason.
For example, if a subject claims not to have been at the
murder scene and not to know what the murder weapon
was, a probe stimulus could be the murder weapon, such as
a knife. Brain ngerprinting experimental protocols ensure
that probes do not contain information that the subject
knows from the news media, interrogations, etc.
The scientic question addressed by a brain nger-
printing test is whether or not the subject is knowledgeable
regarding the crime or investigated situation. Specically,
the critical variable is his recognition of the information
contained in the probes as signicant in the context of the
122 Cogn Neurodyn (2012) 6:115154
1 3
crime (or lack thereof). If, and only if, this is present, it is
predicted that the probes will elicit a P300-MERMER. The
amplitude, morphology and latency will be characteristic
of the individual subjects response to such stimuli when
the subject knows the relevant information.
For a subject who is knowledgeable or information
present, the probes contain information describing known
features of the crime. For a subject who is information
absent, the probes contain information describing plau-
sible features of the crime that are not known to be correct.
To objectively classify the probe responses into one of
these two categories, it is necessary to isolate the critical
variable. To accomplish this, two standards are required: a
standard for the response of this subject to stimuli con-
taining known features of the crime, and a standard for the
response of this subject to stimuli containing plausible but
unknown (or incorrect) features of the crime.
Target stimuli are details about the crime that the
experimenter is certain the subject knows, whether or not
he committed the crime. They may have been previously
revealed through news accounts, interrogation, etc. In any
case, the experimenter tells the subject the target stimuli
and explains their signicance in terms of the crime.
Because they are signicant in the context of the crime for
all subjects, targets elicit an Aha response in all subjects.
Targets elicit a P300-MERMER whether the subject knows
the other salient features of the crime contained in the
probes or not. For example, a target stimulus might be the
name of the victim, which is revealed to the subject in the
course of test instructions (and may be already known from
news reports, etc.).
Irrelevant stimuli contain information that is not rele-
vant to the crime and not relevant to the subject. They
consist of incorrect but plausible crime features. Irrelevant
stimuli are designed to be indistinguishable from correct
crime-relevant features (probes) to someone who does not
know the features of the crime. Since the irrelevant stimuli
are not signicant in context, they do not elicit a P300-
MERMER.
If a probe stimulus is the murder weapon, a knife, then
irrelevant stimuli could be other plausible (but incorrect)
murder weapons such as a pistol, a rie, and a baseball bat.
Thus, the targets and irrelevants both provide standard
responses. Thetargets provide a standardfor thesubjects brain
response to relevant, signicant information about the crime in
question. The irrelevants provide a standard for the subjects
brain responseor rather lack of a responseto irrelevant
information that is plausible as being crime-relevant.
It is vital in any science to isolate the critical variable.
This three-stimulus design accomplishes this purpose.
Targets and irrelevants differ only in whether or not they
contain the critical feature being tested, that is, whether they
contain known crime-relevant information. For an infor-
mation-present subject, probe stimuli are virtually identical
to target stimuli: both contain known features of the crime.
The only difference is which button is pressed when the
stimuli appear. For an information-absent subject, probes
are indistinguishable from irrelevants. The probe responses
are classied as being more similar to targets or irrelevants.
Everything except the critical variable, namely the subjects
recognition of the probes as crime-relevant, is controlled.
The subject is given a list of the targets and instructed to
press a specic button when a target appears and another
button when any other stimulus appears. Since the subject
does not know which of the three types of stimulus will
occur on each trial, he must read and evaluate each stim-
ulus, and demonstrate behaviorally in each trial that he has
done so by pressing the appropriate button.
Table 1 outlines the types of stimuli and predicted brain
responses in brain ngerprinting.
For a subject who knows the relevant details about the
crime, the probes, like the targets, are signicant and rele-
vant. Thus, the probes produce an Aha response when
presented in the context of the crime. This manifests as a
Montage:
Fz, Cz, Pz, EOG
EEG Amplification:
50,000
Analog Filtering:
.1 to 30 Hz
Signal Averaging:
Probes, Targets,
Irrelevants
Bootstrapping
Correlations:
Probe Target vs.
Probe Irrelevant
Determination:
Information Present /
Information Absent;
Statistical Confidence
Digitizing:
100 Hz
Digital Filtering:
0 to 6 Hz
Fig. 1 Stages of data
acquisition and analysis
Cogn Neurodyn (2012) 6:115154 123
1 3
P300-MERMER in the brainwaves that will be virtually iden-
tical to the target response. For a subject who lacks the
knowledge contained in the probes, the probes are indistin-
guishable fromthe irrelevants. Probes donot produce anAha
response or the corresponding P300-MERMER: the probe
response will be virtually identical to the irrelevant response.
The brain ngerprinting computerized data analysis
algorithm computes a mathematical determination as to
whether the probe response is more similar to that of the
targets or that of the irrelevants. The former yields a
determination of information present; the latter, infor-
mation absent. The information that is either present or
absent in the brain of the subject is the information con-
tained in the probes. The brain ngerprinting system also
computes a statistical condence for each individual
determination, e.g., information present, 99.9% con-
dence. If there is insufcient data to reach either an
information present or an information absent deter-
mination with a high statistical condence, the algorithm
returns the outcome of indeterminate.
Since the inclusion of the P300-MERMER in the
brainwave data analysis algorithm, brain ngerprinting
testing has made a denite determination in every case. All
determinations have been correct. There have been no false
negatives, no false positives, and no indeterminates. Error
rate has been 0% in all studies and eld applications.
Accuracy has been 100%. (As discussed below, these are
usually represented as less than 1% and over 99%
respectively.) When brain ngerprinting data analysis has
been conducted using the P300 alone, there have been no
false positives or false negatives, and about 3% of the
results have been indeterminate. All of these were in a
single experiment (Farwell and Donchin 1991), wherein
indeterminates comprised 12.5% of the results.
Note that an indeterminate result is not incorrect. It is
not an error. It is neither a false negative nor a false
positive. Rather, it is a determination that the data analysis
algorithm has insufcient data to make a determination in
either direction with a high statistical condence.
Before conducting a brain ngerprinting test, the subject
is interviewed to nd out what he knows about the crime
from any non-incriminating source such as news reports or
prior interrogations. Any such information is excluded
from the probes. (Such information may be contained in
targets, since the targets are known to contain information
that the subject knows.) The experimenter describes to the
subject the signicance of each probe in the context of the
crime. The experimenter does not tell the subject which
stimulus is the probe and which are similar, irrelevant
stimuli. Only information that the subject denies knowing
is used for probe stimuli.
Also, the experimenter shows the subject a list of all the
stimuli including the probes, without of course identifying
which ones are probes. As an extra precaution, the subject
is asked if any of the stimuli are signicant to him for any
reason at all. Any stimuli that are signicant to the subject
for reasons unrelated to the crime are eliminated. If for
example, a potential probe is the name of a known
accomplice, and coincidentally it is also the name of the
suspects brother-in-law, it is not used.
Things are signicant to a person in context. The context
of the probe stimuli in relation to the crime is established in
the interview prior to the brain ngerprinting test. Imme-
diately before the test, the experimenter describes the sig-
nicance of each probe in the context of the crime. Before
the test, the subject has explicitly stated that he does not
know which stimulus is the probe containing the correct
information.
Under these circumstances, a large P300-MERMER in
response to the probes provides evidence that the subject
recognizes the probes as signicant in the context of the
crime. If the experimenter has followed the proper
Table 1 Types of stimuli and predicted brain responses
Stimulus
type
Relative
frequency
Description Instructions Subjects stimulus evaluation Predicted
brain
response
Target 1/6 Relevant to investigated situation;
known to all subjects
Press left button Relevant, rare for all subjects P300-MERMER
Irrelevant 2/3 Irrelevant Press right button Irrelevant, frequent No P300-MERMER
Probe 1/6 Relevant to investigated situation;
known only to investigators and subjects
who have the specic knowledge tested
Press right button
(treat like
irrelevants)
Informationabsent
subjects:
Irrelevant, frequent
(Indistinguishable
from irrelevants)
No P300-MERMER
Informationpresent
subjects:
Relevant, rare
P300-MERMER
124 Cogn Neurodyn (2012) 6:115154
1 3
protocols, the subject has eliminated all plausible non-
incriminating explanations for this knowledge by his own
account prior to the test. Therefore, an information-present
response can provide evidence that a judge and jury may
reasonably evaluate as being probative regarding the subjects
involvement in the crime. Note, however, that the question of
whether or not the subject participated in the crime is in the
domain of the judge and jury. The brain ngerprinting sci-
entist provides evidence and testimony only regarding whe-
ther the crime-relevant information contained in the specic
probes tested is stored in the brain of the subject.
Electroencephalograph (EEG) data are collected from
midline frontal, central, and parietal scalp sites (Fz, Cz, and
Pz respectively). Electrooculograph (EOG) data are col-
lected from the forehead to monitor artifacts generated by
eye movements. Data are amplied, digitized, ltered, and
analyzed.
Stimuli are presented for a duration of 300 ms at an
inter-stimulus interval of 3,000 ms. A xation point is
presented for 1,000 ms prior to each stimulus presentation.
Figure 2 outlines the timing parameters for stimulus pre-
sentation, data acquisition, and data analysis.
The analysis epoch is 300900 ms post-stimulus for the
P300 analysis, and 3001,800 ms post-stimulus for the
P300-MERMER analysis.
Data analysis
The purpose of data analysis in brain ngerprinting studies
is to determine whether the brain responses to the probe
stimuli are more similar to the responses to the target
stimuli or to the responses to the irrelevant stimuli, and to
provide a statistical condence for this determination. The
determination and statistical condence must be computed
for each individual subject.
If the probe responses are mathematically more similar
to the same subjects responses to target stimuli containing
known features of the crime, the subject is determined to be
information present. If the probe responses are mathe-
matically more similar to the same subjects responses to
irrelevant stimuli containing plausible but unknown (or
incorrect) features of the crime, the subject is determined to
be information absent.
To be valid, the statistical condence for an individual
determination of information present or information
absent must take into account the level of variability in
the individual brain responses that are aggregated in the
average response. Farwell and Donchin (1988b, 1991) and
their colleagues Wasserman and Bockenholt (1989)
applied bootstrapping to compute a statistical condence
for each individual determination that takes this variability
into account. Bootstrapping is described in detail in these
publications. It has now become a standard procedure in
event-related brain potential research. Bootstrapping is a
method to compute probability and statistical condence
regardless of the shape of the distribution of the data. It
also provides a means to re-introduce the variability across
single trials present in the original data, while preserving
the feature of a smooth average that is necessary for
comparing the waveforms of the three types.
The algorithm is as follows. Conduct the following
procedure twice, once using the time epoch characteristic
of the P300-MERMER (typically 3001,800 ms after the
stimulus) and once using the time epoch characteristic of
the P300 alone (typically 300900 ms post-stimulus).
1. Sample randomly with replacement T target trials, P
probe trials, and I irrelevant trials, where T, P, and I
are equal to the total number of trials in the data set of
the respective types. A trial consists of one stimulus
presentation and the associated brain response data.
2. Average the trials by trial type, yielding three average
waveforms: probe, target, and irrelevant. Compare the
average waveforms to determine if the probe average
is more similar to the target average or to the irrelevant
average.
3. Repeat the above procedure 1,000 times. Each iteration
yields a new set of 3 averages containing probe, target,
and irrelevant trials respectively. Keep a tally of the
number of times the probe average is more like the
irrelevant average than like the target average.
4. For each iteration, compare the probe, target, and
irrelevant waveforms according to the following
algorithm: (a) subtract the grand mean of all trials, or
grand average waveform, from each of the 3 averages,
yielding 3 adjusted averages; (b) compute the corre-
lation between the adjusted probe average and the
adjusted irrelevant average; (c) compute the correla-
tion between the adjusted probe average and the
adjusted target average; (d) compare the probe-irrel-
evant correlation with the probe-target correlation: if
the probe-irrelevant correlation is greater, then incre-
ment the information present tally by one; other-
wise, increment the information absent tally by one.
5. Compute the percentage of times that the probe
target correlation is higher than the probeirrelevant
Fig. 2 Timing parameters. Timing of events for each individual trial
in brain ngerprinting
Cogn Neurodyn (2012) 6:115154 125
1 3
correlation. This the percentage of times that the probe
waveformis more similar to the target waveformthan to
the irrelevant waveform. This provides the probability
or statistical condence for an information present
result. 100% minus this gure the provides the proba-
bility that the probe response is more similar to the
irrelevant response, which provides the statistical con-
dence that for an information absent result.
6. Compare the computed statistical condence to a
decision criterion. If the statistical condence for an
information present result is greater than 90%,
classify subject as information present. If the statistical
condence for an information absent response is greater
than 70%, classify the subject as information absent. If
neither criterion is met, no determination is made: the
subject is not classied as either information present or
information absent; this is an indeterminate outcome.
In other words, if the bootstrapping procedure produces a
high statistical condence that the probe response is more
similar to the target response than to the irrelevant response,
then the determination is information present. If the
bootstrapping procedure produces a high statistical con-
dence that the probe response is more similar to the irrelevant
response, then the determination is information absent.
If neither the statistical condence for information pres-
ent nor the condence for information absent is high
enoughtomeet establishedcriteria, the subject is not classied
ineither category, and the result is indeterminate. Typically
a condence of 90% is required for an information present
determination. A lower criterion, typically 70%, is generally
required for an information absent determination.
The outcome of brain ngerprinting data analysis con-
sists of two determinations, each of the form information
present/absent, x% condence, e.g., information present,
99.9% condence. One determination is computed using
the full P300-MERMER, and one using the P300 alone.
This allows us to report one result with the method that
applies the most well established science and is most cer-
tain to meet the standard of general acceptance in the
scientic community, and one with the method that applies
the state of the art and generally produces the highest
statistical condence.
By computing bootstrapped correlation as described
above, the brain ngerprinting data analysis algorithm
takes into account the amplitude, latency, and morphology
(shape and time course) of the brain response. This maxi-
mizes the information extracted from the data and also
controls for individual differences in brain responses from
different subjects.
Before applying the bootstrapping technique on corre-
lations between waveforms, noise in the form of high-fre-
quency activity is eliminated by the use of digital lters.
Farwell et al. (1993) have shown that a specic type of
lters known as optimal digital lters are highly effective
for eliminating this high-frequency noise while preserving
the brainwave pattern of interest in event-related brain
potential research. These lters are optimal in the precise
mathematical denition of the word.
In evaluating the error rate/accuracy of any technique, it is
important to establish ground truth as objectively and cer-
tainly as possible. In any scientic test, ground truth is the
true state of exactly what the test seeks to determine. In a
DNA test, ground truth is not whether the suspect is a rapist
or a murderer; ground truth is whether sample A (putatively
from the subject) matches Sample B (putatively from the
crime scene). In a ngerprint test, ground truth is not whether
the suspect is a burglar, but whether the prints at the crime
scene match the prints on the suspects ngers. The same
principle applies to brain ngerprinting. A brain nger-
printing test detects the presence or absence of specic
information stored in the brain. Ground truth is the true state
of that which is tested. Ground truth is whether or not the
specic information embodied in the probe stimuli is in fact
stored in the specic brain tested. Ground truth is not whether
the suspect is a murderer, or a liar, or whether the experi-
mental subject participated in a knowledge-imparting pro-
cedure consisting of a mock crime, or whether the
experimenter thinks the subject should knowthe information
tested. In evaluating the accuracy of a brain ngerprinting
study, it is important to establish ground truth as objectively
and certainly as possible. When subjects are cooperative (or
eventually become cooperative), this is accomplished by
post-test interviews to determine whether the subject knew
the information tested at the time of the test. In eld cases
with any forensic science, establishing ground truth can be
challenging. In brain ngerprinting eld cases with unco-
operative subjects, ground truth can never be known abso-
lutely. It is established with as much certainty as possible
through indirect means such as testimony, converging evi-
dence, judicial outcome, and confessions.
Brain ngerprinting and other techniques
Advantages and disadvantages of brain ngerprinting
Brain ngerprinting has advantages and disadvantages with
respect to other forensic science and investigative methods.
Compared to previously available scientic methods for
matching features of a crime scene with features of a
suspect, the primary advantage of brain ngerprinting is
that in most crimes very few such features can be found. In
some crimes none are available. The record stored in the
brain of the perpetrator is often a rich source of information
that can be connected to the crime scene. Except in rare
126 Cogn Neurodyn (2012) 6:115154
1 3
cases where the crime has been recorded on video, the
record stored in the brain is generally the most compre-
hensive available record of the crime, even though it is not
perfect.
Brain ngerprinting also has advantages in comparison
to witness testimony. It provides an objective, scientic
way to detect the record of the crime stored in the brain
directly. Witness testimony provides an indirect, subjective
account of this record. Witnesses may lie. The brain never
lies. If the information is stored in the brain, it can be
objectively detected regardless of the honesty or dishonesty
of the subject. Brain ngerprinting thus eliminates one of
the two major disadvantages of witness testimony, that of
deception on the part of the witness.
The primary disadvantage of brain ngerprinting in
comparison to other forensic science methods of connect-
ing features of a perpetrator to features of a crime scene is
the same as the primary disadvantage of witness testimony:
human memory is imperfect and limited. Just as all pro-
ceedings involving witness testimony must weigh the evi-
dence obtained thereby in light of the limitations of human
memory, all proceedings involving brain ngerprinting
evidence must do the same.
Brain ngerprinting and lie detection
Brain ngerprinting and the guilty knowledge test
or concealed information test
Brain ngerprinting has some the same features, and all of the
advantages, of the conventional guilty knowledge test or con-
cealed information test described above. It can be considered a
type of guilty knowledge test (Farwell 2007; Iacono 2007,
2008; Iacono and Lykken 1997; Iacono and Patrick 2006).
Brainngerprintingtakes advantage of thefeatures of theguilty
knowledge test that have made it well accepted in the relevant
scientic community (Iacono 2008). Brain ngerprinting,
however, is fundamentally different from the conventional
guilty knowledge test in several important ways. These dif-
ferences provide signicant advantages over the conventional
guilty knowledge test (Farwell 1994, 1995a, 2007).
Both brain ngerprinting and the conventional guilty
knowledge test are concerned with the relevant features of
the crime that are known to the perpetrator and not to an
innocent suspect. Brain ngerprinting directly detects
information stored in the brain based on information-pro-
cessing brain activity. The conventional guilty knowledge
test questions the subject, detects a stress-related response
in an attempt to detect lies, and makes indirect inferences
about what the subject knows on that basis.
A conventional guilty knowledge test asks two types of
questions, relevant and irrelevant. The data analysis
attempts to determine whether the stress-related response
to the relevant questions is larger than the response to the
irrelevant questions. If so, the subject is found to be
deceptive. The determination of a conventional guilty
knowledge test is deceptive or non-deceptive.
A brain ngerprinting test, as described above, presents
three types of stimuli. Two of these are relevant to the
crime. Targets contain crime-relevant information that is
known to all subjects. Probes contain information that is
known only to the perpetrator and investigators. The
information-processing responses to the probes are classi-
ed as being more similar to the irrelevant responses or to
the target responses. The latter indicates that the probes,
like the targets, contain information that the subject knows
and recognizes as signicant in the context of the crime.
Since brain ngerprinting measures an information-
processing brain response rather than an emotional stress
response, it does not depend on the emotional responses of
the subject. It does not seek to assess the veracity of the
subject. A subject neither lies nor tells the truth during a
brain ngerprinting test. He simply observes the stimuli
and pushes the buttons as instructed. The determination of
a brain ngerprinting test is the same whether the subject
tells the truth or lies about any subject at any time.
The determination of a brain ngerprinting test is infor-
mation present or information absent. An information
present determination means that the subject possesses the
specic knowledge tested. An information absent deter-
mination means that the subject does not possess this infor-
mation. This is entirely independent of whether the subject
tells the truth or lies about this information or anything
else.
Conventional CQT polygraphy and fMRI
Conventional polygraphy involves questioning the subject,
measuring a physiological response, and thereby attempt-
ing to determine if he is lying. A conventional control
question polygraph test (CQT) measures peripheral
responses, usually skin conductance (related to perspira-
tion), cardiovascular activity/blood pressure, and breathing.
Conventional polygraphy measures this peripheral physi-
ological response in an attempt to detect changes consid-
ered to accompany lying (Farwell 2013; Iacono 2007,
2008; Iacono and Lykken 1997; Iacono and Patrick 2006;
National Research Council 2003; Vrij 2008).
Scientists have recently introduced measurements of
cerebral blood ow with functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI) in an attempt to detect lies. Like conven-
tional polygraphy, fMRI does not directly measure lying.
Since lying is not a unitary phenomenon, there is no unique
lie response. The underlying theory of fMRI detection is
similar to the theory of conventional polygraphy. Instead of
measuring stress, however, fMRI measures brain processes
Cogn Neurodyn (2012) 6:115154 127
1 3
putatively connected with conict or other processes
considered to accompany lying.
As discussed above, there are two fundamental ways to
attempt to obtain information regarding a suspects par-
ticipation in a crime: (1) collect objective data linking the
subject to the crime, and (2) question the subject or a
witness about the crime and attempt to discern if he or she
is lying. Conventional CQT polygraphy and fMRI-based
lie detection methods both fall into the latter category.
Their purpose is lie detection. They serve as adjuncts to
interrogation and testimony.
Brain ngerprinting is fundamentally different from lie
detection. Mistakenly classifying brain ngerprinting as a
form of lie detection (e.g., Verschuere et al. 2009; Ro-
senfeld 2005) arises from a fundamental misunderstanding
of the science and technology (Farwell 2013; Farwell and
Makeig 2005; Farwell and Smith 2001). Brain nger-
printing detects information stored in the brain, not lies
(Farwell 1992a, 1994, 1995b, 2013; Farwell and Donchin
1991; Iacono 2008). Like ngerprinting and DNA, brain
ngerprinting is a method to collect objective data linking
the subject to the crime.
Origin of the term brain ngerprinting
Brain ngerprinting is so named based on the following
analogy (Farwell 1994). Fingerprinting establishes an
objective, scientic connection between ngerprints at a
crime scene and the ngers of a suspect. DNA nger-
printing, as it is sometimes called, establishes an objec-
tive, scientic connection between biological samples from
the crime scene and biological samples from the suspect.
Brain ngerprinting was so named because like nger-
printing it detects a match between evidence from the
crime scene and evidence on the person of the suspect. It
establishes an objective, scientic connection between
features of the crime scene and the record stored in the
brain of a suspect.
Principles of applying brain ngerprinting
in the laboratory and the eld
The purpose of brain ngerprinting is to determine whether
or not specic relevant knowledge is stored in the brain of
the subject (Farwell 1994; Farwell and Smith 2001; Iacono
2008).
In eld cases, the relevant knowledge generally is
information that an investigator thinks represent the details
of a crime. Alternatively, it may be information that is
known only to a particular group of people, such as FBI
agents (Farwell and Richardson 2006b; Farwell et al. 2011,
in press), skilled bomb makers (Farwell 2009; Farwell et al.
2011, in press), trainees of an Al-Qaeda training camp, or
members of a terrorist cell. The primary example used
herein will be the case where the relevant knowledge
constitutes information that an investigator believes con-
stitutes salient features of a crime that the perpetrator
experienced in the course of committing the crime. The
relevant knowledge is provided by the criminal investigator
to the brain ngerprinting scientist. The goal of brain n-
gerprinting is to determine whether or not the relevant
knowledge is known to the subject.
Note that brain ngerprinting does not evaluate whether
or not the investigators account of the crime is accurate, or
whether the putatively relevant knowledge actually cor-
rectly represents the crime. Brain ngerprinting does not
detect guilt or innocence. The determination of whether the
subject is guilty is a legal determination that is made by a
judge and/or jury, not by a scientist or a computer.
Brain ngerprinting does not detect whether or not the
subject committed the crime. It only detects whether or not
the subject knows the relevant knowledge contained in the
probes. The prosecution may argue that the best explanation
for an information present determination is that the sub-
ject learned the relevant knowledge while committing the
crime. (In a properly executed brain ngerprinting test,
plausible alternative hypotheses such as the subject being
told the information after the crime have been eliminated
before the test.) The defense may argue that an information
absent determination introduces a reasonable doubt that the
subject is guilty of committing the crime, and provides
support for his claims of innocence. The defense may argue,
for example, that a subject should or would knowthe relevant
knowledge if he had committed the crime.
Brain ngerprinting does not evaluate whether the sub-
ject should, could, or would know the information, and
under what circumstances. It only determines whether or
not the subject actually does know the relevant knowledge.
The interpretation of the results of a brain ngerprinting
test in terms of guilt or innocence, participation or non-
participation in a crime, goes beyond the science and is
outside the realm of expert testimony by a brain nger-
printing scientist.
Brain ngerprinting is similar to other forensic sciences
in this regard. A DNA expert testies that Sample A, which
the investigators say came from the crime scene, matches
Sample B, which the investigators say came from the
subject. Similarly, an expert may testify that two nger-
prints match. He does not testify, report, or attempt to
scientically determine Therefore, the subject committed
the murder. A brain ngerprinting scientist testies
regarding only one specic fact: the subject does or does
not know the specic relevant knowledge tested (Har-
rington v. State 2001). The degree to which this fact is
probative regarding the subjects participation in a crime is
128 Cogn Neurodyn (2012) 6:115154
1 3
outside the realm of science. That is a matter to be debated
by the prosecution and defense and decided by a judge and/
or jury based on their non-scientic, common sense judg-
ment and life experience.
In a laboratory setting, the relevant knowledge is fabri-
cated by the experimenter. One additional step is necessary
before a test can be implemented to test whether or not the
subject knows the relevant knowledge. The experimenter
designs and implements a knowledge-imparting procedure
to impart the relevant knowledge to the subject. The
knowledge-imparting procedure generally constitutes a
training session, a mock crime, or some combination thereof.
The purpose of the knowledge-imparting procedure is to
make certain that the subject knows the relevant knowledge.
The accuracy of a method to detect the relevant knowledge
can only be evaluated when the relevant knowledge is
actually there to be detected. If the knowledge-imparting
procedure fails to impart the knowledge to the subject, then
the knowledge is not there to be detected. No method, no
matter howperfect, can detect knowledge that is not there. As
discussed above in the context of ground truth, in order to
conduct a valid test of a knowledge-detection procedure in a
laboratory study, the experimenter must independently
assess whether the knowledge-imparting procedure actually
succeeded in imparting the knowledge so it was there to be
detected. This is accomplished by post-test interviews.
In a eld case, the brain ngerprinting procedure begins
after the criminal investigator has provided the relevant
knowledge to the scientist. In a laboratory case, the brain
ngerprinting procedure begins after the experimenter has
fabricated the relevant knowledge and successfully imple-
mented the knowledge-imparting procedure.
The relevant knowledge generally comprises 1230 short
phrases or pictures, along with an explanation of the signif-
icance of each in the context of the crime. The investigator
also provides the scientist with a detailed account of which
items in the relevant knowledge are or may be already known
to the subject for any known reason. For example, the
investigator notes any specic features of the crime that have
been published in the newspaper or revealed to the subject in
interrogation or previous legal proceedings.
The relevant knowledge generally contains six to nine or
more items that have never been revealed to the subject.
These will constitute the probe stimuli. If there is an
insufcient number of features that are known only to the
perpetrator and investigators (probes), a brain ngerprint-
ing test cannot be conducted.
Generally there are also six or more items that have
already been revealed to the subject or are commonly
known. These will constitute the target stimuli.
The test requires an equal number of targets and probes.
If there are too few features already known to the subject
for non-incriminating reasons (potential targets), the
experimenter may request additional information about the
crime from the criminal investigator to use for target
stimuli. Alternatively, if there are ample available features
of the crime that are not commonly known and have not
been revealed to the subject (potential probes), the exper-
imenter may elect to inform the subject about some of
these features and use these as targets instead of probes.
Scientic standards for brain ngerprinting tests
The following procedures comprise the scientic standards
for a brain ngerprinting test (Farwell 1992a, 1994, 1995a,
b; Farwell and Donchin 1991; Farwell and Smith 2001).
1. Use equipment and methods for stimulus presentation,
data acquisition, and data recording that are within the
standards for the eld of cognitive psychophysiology
and event-related brain potential research. These
standards are well documented elsewhere (Donchin
et al. 1978, 1986; Fabiani et al. 1987). For example, the
standard procedures Farwell introduced as evidence in
the Harrington case were accepted by the court, the
scientic journals, and the other expert witnesses in the
case (Farwell and Donchin 1991; Farwell and Makeig
2005; Farwell and Smith 2001; Harrington v. State
2001). Use a recording epoch long enough to include
the full P300-MERMER. For pictorial stimuli or
realistic word stimuli, use at least a 1,800 ms recording
epoch. (Shorter epochs may be appropriate for very
simple stimuli.)
2. Use correct electrode placement. The P300 and P300-
MERMER are universally known to be maximal at the
midline parietal scalp site (Fabiani et al. 1987; Farwell
1994), Pz in the standard International 1020 system.
3. Apply brain ngerprinting tests only when there is
sufcient information that is known only to the
perpetrator and investigators. Use a minimum of six
probes and six targets.
4. Obtain the relevant knowledge from the criminal
investigator (or for laboratory studies from the
knowledge-imparting procedure). Use stimuli that
isolate the critical variable. Divide the relevant
knowledge into probe stimuli and target stimuli.
Probe stimuli constitute information that has not been
revealed to the subject. Target stimuli contain
information that has been revealed to the subject
after the crime.
5. If initially there are fewer targets than probes,
create more targets. Ideally, this is done by seeking
additional known information from the investigators.
Note that targets may contain information that
has been publicly disclosed. Alternatively, some
Cogn Neurodyn (2012) 6:115154 129
1 3
potential probe stimuli can be used as targets by
disclosing to the subject the specic items and their
signicance in the context of the crime.
6. For each probe and each target, fabricate several
stimuli of the same type that are unrelated to the
crime. These become the irrelevant stimuli. Use
stimuli that isolate the critical variable. For irrelevant
stimuli, select items that would be equally plausible
for a non-knowledgeable subject. The stimulus ratio
is approximately one-sixth probes, one-sixth targets,
and two-thirds irrelevants.
7. Ascertain that the probes contain information that the
subject has no known way of knowing, other than
participation in the crime. This information is
provided by the investigator for eld studies, and
results from proper information control in laboratory
studies.
8. Make certain that the subject understands the signif-
icance of the probes, and ascertain that the probes
constitute only information that the subject denies
knowing, as follows. Describe the signicance of
each probe to the subject. Show him the probe and
the corresponding irrelevants, without revealing
which is the probe. Ask the subject if he knows
(for any non-crime-related reason) which stimulus in
each group is crime-relevant. Describe the signi-
cance of the probes and targets that will appear in
each test block immediately before the block.
9. If a subject has knowledge of any probes for a reason
unrelated to the crime, eliminate these from the
stimulus set. This provides the subject with an
opportunity to disclose any knowledge of the probes
that he may have for any innocent reason previously
unknown to the scientist. This will prevent any non-
incriminating knowledge from being included in the
test.
10. Ascertain that the subject knows the targets and their
signicance in the context of the crime. Show him a
list of the targets. Describe the signicance of each
target to the subject.
11. Require an overt behavioral task that requires the
subject to recognize and process every stimulus,
specically including the probe stimuli. Detect the
resulting brain responses. Do not depend on detecting
brain responses to assigned tasks that the subject can
covertly avoid doing while performing the necessary
overt responses.
12. Instruct the subjects to press one button in response to
targets, and another button in response to all other
stimuli. Do not instruct the subjects to lie or tell
the truth in response to stimuli. Do not assign
different behavioral responses or mental tasks for
probe and irrelevant stimuli.
13. In order to obtain statistically robust results for each
individual case, present a sufcient number of trials
of each type to obtain adequate signal-to-noise
enhancement through signal averaging. Use robust
signal-processing and noise-reduction techniques,
including appropriate digital lters and artifact-
detection algorithms (Farwell et al. 1993). The
number of trials required will vary depending on
the complexity of the stimuli, and is generally more
for a eld case. In their seminal study, Farwell and
Donchin (1991) used 144 probe trials. In the
Harrington eld case, Farwell used 288 probe trials
(Harrington v. State 2001). In any case, use at least
100 probe trials and an equal number of targets.
Present three to six unique probes in each block.
14. Use appropriate mathematical and statistical proce-
dures to analyze the data (Farwell 1994; Farwell and
Donchin 1991). Do not classify the responses
according to subjective judgments. Use statistical
procedures properly and reasonably. At a minimum,
do not classify subjects in a category where the
statistics applied show that the classication is more
likely than not to be incorrect.
15. Use a mathematical classication algorithm, such as
bootstrapping on correlations, that isolates the critical
variable by classifying the responses to the probe
stimuli as being either more similar to the target
responses or to the irrelevant responses (Farwell and
Donchin 1991; Farwell 1994; Wasserman and Boc-
kenholt 1989). In a forensic setting, conduct two
analyses: one using only the P300 (to be more certain
of meeting the standard of general acceptance in the
scientic community), and one using the P300-
MERMER (to provide the current state of the art).
16. Use a mathematical data-analysis algorithm that takes
into account the variability across single trials, such
as bootstrapping (Farwell 1994; Farwell and Donchin
1991; Wasserman and Bockenholt 1989).
17. Set a specic, reasonable statistical criterion for an
information-present determination and a separate
specic, reasonable statistical criterion for an infor-
mation-absent determination (Farwell 1994; Farwell
and Donchin 1991; Wasserman and Bockenholt
1989). Classify results that do not meet either
criterion as indeterminate. Recognize that indetermi-
nate outcome is not an error, neither a false positive
nor a false negative.
18. Restrict scientic conclusions to a determination as to
whether or not a subject has the specic crime-
relevant knowledge embodied in the probes stored in
his brain (Farwell and Makeig 2005; Farwell and
Smith 2001; Harrington v. State 2001). Recognize
that brain ngerprinting detects only presence or
130 Cogn Neurodyn (2012) 6:115154
1 3
absence of informationnot guilt, honesty, lying, or
any action or non-action. Do not offer scientic
opinions on whether the subject is lying or whether he
committed a crime or other act. Recognize that the
question of guilt or innocence is a legal determination
to be made by a judge and jury, not a scientic
determination to be made by a scientist or computer.
19. Evaluate accuracy based on actual ground truth
(Farwell and Donchin 1991; Farwell et al. 2011, in
press). Ground truth is the true state of what a
scientic test seeks to detect. Brain ngerprinting is a
method to detect information stored in a subjects
brain. Ground truth is whether the specic informa-
tion tested is in fact stored in the subjects brain.
Establish ground truth with certainty through post-
test interviews in laboratory experiments and in eld
experiments wherein subjects are cooperative. Estab-
lish ground truth insofar as possible through second-
ary means in real-life forensic applications with
uncooperative subjects. Recognize that ground truth
what the subject in fact knows, not what the
experimenter thinks the subject should know, not
what the subject has done or not done, and not
whether the subject is guilty, or deceptive.
20. Make scientic determinations based on brain
responses. Do not attempt to make scientic deter-
minations based on overt behavior that can be
manipulated, such as reaction time.
Error rate/accuracy standards for eld applications
In the United States and many other jurisdictions, the error
rate of a scientic technique is critical for admissibility as
scientic evidence in court. The error rate is the percentage
of determinations made that are either false negatives or
false positives. In brain ngerprinting, this is the percent-
age of information present and information absent
determinations that are false positives and false negatives
respectively.
1
In our view, in order to be viable for eld use or any
application with non-trivial consequences, a technique
must have an error rate of less than 1% overall, and less
than 5% in each and every individual study. As discussed
in the section below on common errors in research, failure
to meet the brain ngerprinting scientic standards
generally produces error rates ten times higher than this
standard.
Brain ngerprinting exceeds this standard. In all labora-
tory and eld research and eld applications to date, brain
ngerprinting has had an error rate of less than 1%. In each
individual study, brain ngerprinting has also had an error
rate of less than 1%. In fact, to date brain ngerprinting has
never produced an error, neither a false positive nor a false
negative, in any research or eld applications.
Accuracy is 100% minus the error rate. In reporting
results, it is important to report the error rate directly, or to
report the accuracy rate in such a way that the true error
rate can be computed
2
(see the section entitled Is Brain
Fingerprinting 100% Accurate?).
Brain ngerprinting in criminal cases and in court
In addition to laboratory and eld studies conducted by the
author at the CIA, the FBI, the US Navy, and elsewhere as
well as replications in independent laboratories, brain n-
gerprinting has been applied in real-world criminal cases and
has been ruled admissible in court. According to courtroom
testimony by expert witnesses on both sides of the issue, the
fundamental science underlying brain ngerprinting testing
has been established by hundreds of studies published in the
peer-reviewed scientic literature and is well accepted in the
relevant scientic community (Farwell and Makeig 2005;
Harrington v. State 2001; Iacono 2008).
The James B. Grinder case
On August 5, 1999, Dr. Lawrence Farwell administered a
brain ngerprinting test to murder suspect J. B. Grinder
(Fig. 3). The test was designed to determine if Grinders
brain contained specic details of the rape and murder of
Julie Helton. Drew Richardson, then a scientist in the FBI
Laboratory, was the criminal investigator who developed
the probe stimuli.
The brain ngerprinting test found that the specic
details of the crime were recorded in Grinders brain
(Fig. 4). The result was information present, with a
statistical condence of 99.9%.
Considering the brain ngerprinting test results and
other evidence, Grinder faced an almost certain conviction
and highly probable death sentence. One week after the
brain ngerprinting test, Grinder pled guilty to the rape and
1
Note that an indeterminate outcome is neither a false positive nor a
false negative error. Rather, it is a determination that there was
insufcient data to draw a conclusion with a high statistical
condence in either direction. False negatives and false positives
are errors that provide false evidence, to the detriment of the judicial
process. An indeterminate provides no evidence, and has no legal
impact.
2
Accuracy is correctly reported as 100% minus the error rate. This
allows the reader to compute the true error rate. Reports of
accuracy that confound false positive and false negative errors
with indeterminate outcomes have the effect of hiding the true error
rate, and thus make comparison with correctly reported studies
problematic.
Cogn Neurodyn (2012) 6:115154 131
1 3
murder of Julie Helton in exchange for a sentence of life in
prison without the possibility of being released. He is
currently serving that sentence. In addition, Grinder con-
fessed and later pled guilty to the murders of three other
young women.
The Terry Harrington case
In 1977 John Schweer, a retired police captain, was mur-
dered near the car dealership in Council Bluffs, Iowa where
he was working as a security guard. Terry Harrington was
arrested for the murder. An alleged witness claimed that he
had accompanied Harrington to the crime scene and wit-
nessed Harrington committing the crime.
A jury found Harrington guilty in Iowa District Court in
1978. He was sentenced to life in prison without the pos-
sibility of being released. On April 18 and 25, 2000, Dr.
Lawrence Farwell administered a brain ngerprinting test
to Harrington. The test results demonstrated that Harring-
tons brain did not have a record of certain specic salient
features of the crime. Another test showed that he did
recognize salient details of his alibi. The result was
information absent with respect to the crime, and
information present with respect to the alibi. In both
cases the statistical condence was over 99%.
When Farwell confronted the only alleged witness to the
crime with the brain ngerprinting test results, he recanted
his testimony. He admitted that he had lied in the original
trial, falsely accusing Harrington to avoid being prosecuted
for the murder himself.
In Harrington v. State (2001), Terry Harrington sought
to overturn his murder conviction on several grounds,
including an allegation that newly discovered evidence in
the form of brain ngerprinting entitled him to a new trial
(Erickson 2007; Farwell and Makeig 2005; Roberts 2007).
Standard of review
To obtain relief, the petitioner Harrington had to show that
the newly discovered evidence was unavailable at the ori-
ginal trial, and that the new evidence, if introduced at the
trial, would probably change the verdict. Additionally, in
view of the fact that the proffered evidence consisted of a
novel forensic application of psychophysiological tech-
niques, the court was required to determine whether this
scientic evidence was sufciently reliable to merit
admission into evidence and, if admitted, whether the
weight of the scientic evidence was sufciently compel-
ling to change the verdict.
Fig. 3 Brain ngerprinting test on a serial killer. Dr. Lawrence
Farwell conducts a brain ngerprinting test on serial killer J.
B. Grinder, then a suspect in the murder of Julie Helton. The test
showed that Grinders brain contained a record of certain salient
features of the crime. He then pled guilty and was sentenced to life in
prison (Photo: Brain Fingerprinting Laboratories, Inc.)
Fig. 4 Information present brain response of a serial killer. Brain
response of serial killer J. B. Grinder to information relevant to the
murder of Julie Helton. There is a clear P300-MERMER in response
to the known targets. The P300 is the positive voltage peak at the
upper left. The P300-MERMER contains both the P300 peak and the
late negative potential (LNP) at the lower right. There is no P300-
MERMER in response to the irrelevants. Grinders brain response to
the crime-relevant probes clearly contains a P300-MERMER. This
shows that the record in the brain of J. B. Grinder contains salient
details of the murder. Determination: information present. Statis-
tical condence: 99.9%
132 Cogn Neurodyn (2012) 6:115154
1 3
In the Daubert case (Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharma-
ceuticals, Inc. 1993; Erickson 2007) the US Supreme Court
has held that the standard for admissibility of novel sci-
entic evidence is a showing of reliability based on (1)
whether a theory or technique can be (and has been) tested;
(2) whether it has been subjected to peer review and pub-
lication; (3) whether, in respect to a particular technique,
there is a known or potential rate of error, and whether
there are standards controlling the techniques operation;
and (4) whether the theory or technique enjoys general
acceptance within a relevant scientic community. The
Iowa Supreme Court has not formally endorsed this federal
evidentiary standard, but in Leaf v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co. (1999) it announced that the Iowa courts may
use the Daubert factors in assessing the admissibility of
novel scientic evidence.
Moenssens (2002), Erickson (2007), and Roberts (2007)
discuss the issues involved in admissibility of brain n-
gerprinting in some detail.
The brain ngerprinting assessment of Harrington
In the Harrington case, Farwell developed a series of
probes for the crime scene, and a separate series of probes
for the petitioners alibi, from investigations, witness
interviews, and previously undisclosed police les. Farwell
administered the test to Harrington in May 2000. In
October 2000, he rendered a report to the Iowa District
Court analyzing the P300-MERMER responses. He sup-
plemented the report with a separate analysis based solely
on P300 responses on November 10, 2000. Both analyses
produced a result of information absent regarding the
crime scene probes and information present regarding
the alibi probes, with a high degree of statistical condence
(over 99%). Figure 5 presents Harringtons brain responses
to specic crime-relevant information to which he had not
been exposed prior to the test.
Proceedings in the Iowa District Court
The District Court held a 1-day hearing on the brain n-
gerprinting evidence on November 14, 2000. The court
took preliminary testimony on Farwells credentials, the
efcacy of the test, and the reliability of the underlying
science. The court also examined the test results, subject to
a later determination whether this scientic evidence was
sufciently reliable to be admissible.
At the November 14 session, Dr. Farwell testied and
was cross-examined on the basis of his test reports. Addi-
tionally, two other psychophysiologists with EEG exper-
tise, Dr. William Iacono of the University of Minnesota
and Dr. Emanuel Donchin of the University of Illinois at
Champaign/Urbana, testied on Dr. Farwells credentials,
his test reports and the science underlying the brain n-
gerprinting test. Iacono testied at Harringtons request,
and Donchin was called by the state.
Both experts validated the science underlying brain n-
gerprinting and acknowledged Dr. Farwells credentials.
However, while Iacono validated the forensic application of
P300 science based on his own research, Donchin asserted
that the testers selection and presentation of the specic
probes is the point at which science ends and art begins.
The investigative phase of preparing the brain nger-
printing test discovers the salient features of the crime that are
used as probe stimuli. It depends on the skill and judgment of
the criminal investigator. This is not a scientic process.
The scientic phase of brain ngerprinting testing begins
after the investigation has identied appropriate probes. The
science of brain ngerprinting testing determines how the
subjects brain responded to the probes, providing an
Fig. 5 Information absent brain response of an innocent convict.
Brain response of Terry Harrington to information relevant to the
murder of which he had been convicted. There is a clear P300-
MERMER in response to the known targets. P300 is the positive peak
in the top center. The P300-MERMER is the P300 plus the late
negative potential (LNP) in the lower right. The response to irrelevant
stimuli lacks a P300-MERMER. There is no P300-MERMER in
response to the crime-relevant probes. This shows that Harringtons
brain does not have a record of these specic features of the crime. He
was exonerated and released. Determination: information absent.
Statistical condence: 99.9%
Cogn Neurodyn (2012) 6:115154 133
1 3
objective result: information present or information
absent. This result does not depend on the subjective
judgment of the scientist conducting the test. The test result is
then presented to the trier of fact to assist in the determination
of guilt and innocence. The brain ngerprinting scientist
does not opine on guilt or innocence, or whether the suspect
committed the crime, but only on the presence or absence in
the brain of the suspect of a record of the specic crime-
relevant information contained in the probe stimuli.
Donchin contended that the selection of probes in brain
ngerprinting is the end of science and the beginning of art.
Farwell noted that the selection of probes is a feature of the
skilled investigation and not of the scientic brain nger-
printing testing. Farwell agreed that the selection of probes is
a subjective element depending on the skill and judgment of
the criminal investigator. He asserted, however, that this
subjective element is the kind of evidence that judges and
juries are competent to evaluate. A non-scientist is well
equipped with common sense and life experience to evaluate
all the facts and circumstances of the case and determine
whether a nding that the specic probes in questionreturned
a scientic result of information present or information
absent helps to establish the subjects guilt.
Farwell, Iacono, and Donchin agreed that brain nger-
printing as practiced using the P300 and published by Far-
well and Donchin (1991) in both the laboratory and the real-
life cases was generally accepted in the relevant scientic
community (Harrington v. State 2001). They also agreed that
the additional analysis using the MERMER did not yet have
the same level of acceptance, and was not necessary to reach
the scientic conclusions relevant to the case.
The District Courts ruling
The court determined that brain ngerprinting was new evi-
dence not available at the original trial, and that it was suf-
ciently reliable to merit admission of the evidence (Erickson
2007; Farwell and Makeig 2005; Harrington v. State 2001;
Roberts 2007). However, the court didnot regardits weight as
sufciently compelling in light of the record as a whole as
meeting its exacting standard, and thus it denied a newtrial on
this and the other grounds asserted by Harrington.
The court stated the following:
In the spring of 2000, Harrington was given a test by
Dr. Lawrence Farwell. The test is based on a P300
effect.
The P-300 effect has been recognized for nearly
20 years.
The P-300 effect has been subject to testing and peer
review in the scientic community.
The consensus in the community of psycho-physiolo-
gists is that the P300 effect is valid.
The evidence resulting from Harringtons brain n-
gerprinting test was discovered after the verdict. It is
newly discovered.
The court admitted only the brain ngerprinting evidence
using the P300. The additional analysis using the P300-
MERMER was superuous, and not necessary to establish
the brain ngerprinting results. It reached the same
statistical and scientic conclusions as the P300 analysis,
with essentially the same extremely high statistical con-
dence. At that time, Farwell had not yet published the
P300-MERMER in peer-reviewed journals. It has now
been peer reviewed and published.
Appeal
The Iowa Supreme Court reversed the trial court and granted
Harrington a new trial (Harrington v. State 2003). The
Supreme Court did not reach the brain ngerprinting issue,
and decided the case on other grounds. Due to a constitutional
rights violation, Harrington was accorded a new trial. The
only alleged witness to the crime, Kevin Hughes, had
recanted when Farwell confronted himwith the information
absent results of the brain ngerprinting test on Harrington.
Without its star witness, the state subsequently dismissed the
murder prosecution without prejudice for lack of evidence
due to witness recantations and the passage of time.
Resolution and vindication of Harrington
In his recantation, Hughes stated under oath under ques-
tioning by Farwell that the detectives and prosecutors had
told him he would go to prison for life if he didnt implicate
Harrington. He stated that when he agreed to falsely accuse
Harrington of the murder, they coached him in fabricating
the story to which he later testied in the trial. He stated that
when he said something that contradicted known facts
such as identifying the wrong murder weaponthey cor-
rected him, and he changed his story accordingly.
Harrington sued the prosecutors and the State of Iowa
for framing him. The prosecutors did not deny the accu-
sations brought by Hughes and Harrington. Their defense
was that they enjoyed absolute immunity due to their
professional position. The US Supreme Court agreed to
hear the case. Before the Supreme Court heard the case,
however, the State of Iowa settled with Harrington and
another man falsely convicted of the same crime. The state
paid them a $12 million settlement.
The Jimmy Ray Slaughter case
In 2004, brain ngerprinting testing was offered in support
of the Oklahoma petition for post-conviction relief led by
134 Cogn Neurodyn (2012) 6:115154
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death-row inmate Jimmy Ray Slaughter (Slaughter v. State
2004). The Oklahoma court of nal resort in post-convic-
tion matters declined to order an evidentiary hearing on
numerous issues raised by the petitioner. These included
not only an information-absent result for crime-scene
items returned by a brain ngerprinting test, but also
exculpatory DNA evidence; the sworn testimony of the
original lead investigator on the case in which he stated
that he had come to believe that Slaughter was innocent,
and that others involved in the investigation had falsied
reports and fabricated evidence against Slaughter; and
other exculpatory evidence. Slaughter was subsequently
executed.
The Oklahoma court declined to return the case to the
trial court where it could reach the merits of the brain
ngerprinting challenge, based on procedural grounds and
on the appeal courts view that the petitioners brief af-
davit contained insufcient evidence of the efcacy of the
test and salience of the probes, and that the newly dis-
covered evidence was presented in an untimely manner.
[B]ased on the evidence presented, we nd the brain
ngerprinting evidence is procedurally barred, What we
have are some interesting, indeed startling, claims that are
not backed up with enough information for us to act on
them.
Published research on brain ngerprinting science
and technology
Overview of scientic research
Farwell and colleagues have tested brain ngerprinting
technology in over 200 cases, including over a dozen sci-
entic studies as well as individual forensic cases involving
real-life crimes and other events. Numerous other scientists
have conducted similar research on the P300 brain
response and have replicated Farwells brain ngerprinting
research.
The scientic studies conducted on brain ngerprinting
testing have included both eld/real-life and laboratory
studies. Real-life studies involve using brain ngerprinting
technology to detect information stored in the brain
regarding real-life events that took place in the course of
actual life experience. Laboratory studies involve detecting
information that was acquired by subjects in the course of a
knowledge-imparting procedure such as a mock crime. Of
the approximately 200 cases where the author has tested
brain ngerprinting technology, about half were real-life
situations and half were laboratory experiments.
Brain ngerprinting testing has been used to detect
information stored in the brain regarding two different
types of situation:
1. Specic issue tests detect information regarding a
specic incident or a particular crime.
2. Specic screening or focused screening tests detect
information relevant to a specic type of training or
inside knowledge of a specic eld or organization,
such as FBI agent training or knowledge of bomb
making.
Brain ngerprinting technology detects information
stored in the brain. Therefore brain ngerprinting testing is
not applicable for general screening or interrogation where
the investigators do not know what specic information
they seek to detect. General screening includes most pre-
employment screening and periodic general security
screening of employees.
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) studies
Farwell conducted FBI Experiment 1, the FBI agent
study, (Farwell and Richardson 2006a; Farwell et al.
2011) with Drew Richardson, then a scientist at the FBI
Laboratory. Brain ngerprinting produced 100% accurate
results in detecting FBI-relevant knowledge in 17 FBI
agents and lack of this knowledge in four non-FBI agents.
In this experiment, the information detected was specic
knowledge that is known to FBI agents and not to the
public. The detection of FBI agents indicates that the
system could detect knowledge specic to members of
specic organization such as a terrorist, criminal, or intel-
ligence organization as well as perpetrators of a specic
crime. For example, members of a particular terrorist
organization or terrorist cell share a particular body of
knowledge that is unknown to the public, and the detection
of such knowledge could assist in the identication of a
suspect as a member of such an organization.
Stimuli were words, phrases, and acronyms presented on
a computer screen. Analysis using the P300-MERMER
resulted in correct determinations in every case, with a high
statistical condence in every case. There were no false
positives, no false negatives, and no indeterminates.
Analysis using the P300 alone resulted in the same deter-
minations, with somewhat lower statistical condence in
some cases.
The FBI agent study included the following innovation
that proved useful in making more accurate determinations
in future studies. The scientists used the usual probe and
irrelevant stimuli. Probes consisted of FBI-relevant
knowledge. Irrelevants consisted of irrelevant, unknown
items. In initial pilot studies, they used targets consisting of
irrelevant items that had been disclosed to the subjects.
Some of the stimuli were acronyms wherein the probes
were known to the subjects, and both targets and irrelevants
were random strings of letters.
Cogn Neurodyn (2012) 6:115154 135
1 3
For an FBI-knowledgeable subject, the probes were
easily recognizable combinations of letters, and both tar-
gets and irrelevants were nonsense letter strings. The sub-
jects recognized the probes more quickly than targets and
irrelevants, resulting in shorter latency P300-MERMER
responses only to the probes (see Fig. 6; contrast this with
Fig. 4, wherein probe and target brain responses have
identical time course.). When computing correlations, this
discrepancy in latency between targets and probes reduced
the correlations between these response types. This resulted
in decreased statistical condence in detection of infor-
mation-present pilot subjects.
To correct this, the authors used targets that were FBI-
relevant acronyms (like the probes) in the blocks where
stimuli were acronyms. The only difference between tar-
gets and probes was that the targets had been disclosed to
the subjects immediately before the test. Subjects were
instructed to push a different button for targets. With this
algorithm, targets were more similar to probes for FBI-
knowledgeable subjects. Both were quickly recognizable as
known acronyms. Both resulted in short-latency P300-
MERMER responses. The probe-target correlations were
higher, resulting in higher statistical condence. (For non-
FBI-knowledgeable subjects, all three types of stimuli were
random letter strings, so using FBI-relevant targets made
no difference in latency or correlations.)
Farwell and colleagues generalized the procedure of
using situation-relevant targets in this and subsequent
studies. Brain ngerprinting targets now consist of features
of the crime or investigated situation, like probes. For a
knowledgeable subject, this makes the targets more similar
to the probes than targets that are not relevant to the
investigated situation. The only difference is that targets
have been disclosed to the subject, and the subject pushes a
special button only for targets. This tends to increase the
accuracy of the algorithm for classifying the probes as
being more similar to targets for a knowledgeable subject.
Farwell conducted FBI Experiment 2, the real-life FBI
study, (Farwell and Smith 2001) at the FBI with Sharon
Smith of the FBI Laboratory. Brain ngerprinting tech-
nology correctly detected whether or not subjects who were
FBI agents had participated in specic, real-life events. All
determinations were correct, with a high statistical con-
dence in every case.
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and US Navy studies
Farwell and colleagues studies at the CIA and the US
Navy (Farwell and Richardson 2006a, b; Farwell et al.
2011) showed that brain ngerprinting could accurately
and reliably detect individuals possessing information
regarding both mock crimes and real-life activities,
including some actual major crimes.
In CIA Experiment 1, the picture study, (Farwell and
Richardson 2006a) the information detected was relevant to
a mock espionage scenario enacted by some of the subjects.
The stimuli that elicited the brain responses were relevant
pictures presented on a computer screen. Fifteen subjects
were correctly determined to be information present, and
13 were correctly determined to be information absent. An
example of the stimuli was a picture of the subjects contact
person in the mock espionage scenario.
CIA Experiment 2 was a collaboration between the CIA
and the US Navy (Farwell and Richardson 2006b). In this
experiment words and phrases relevant to knowledge of
military medicine were presented on a computer screen,
Fig. 6 FBI agent brain response to FBI-relevant acronyms. Brain
response of an FBI agent to acronyms known to FBI agents and
random letter sequences. There is a clear P300-MERMER in response
to the known targets. The P300 is the positive voltage peak at the
upper left. The P300-MERMER contains both the P300 peak and the
late negative potential (LNP) at the lower right. There is no P300-
MERMER in response to the irrelevants. The FBI agents brain
response to the FBI-relevant probes, like the target response, clearly
contains a P300-MERMER. This shows that FBI agent knows the
FBI-relevant acronyms. Note, however, that the response to the
probes has a shorter latency than the response to the targets and
irrelevants. This is because only probes, and not targets, were FBI-
relevant acronyms. Subsequent research uses targets that are relevant
to the investigated situation, like probes. Subjects are informed of the
targets, but are not told which stimuli are probes
136 Cogn Neurodyn (2012) 6:115154
1 3
and subjects were determined to be information present
or information absent with respect to knowledge of
military medicine. Brain ngerprinting technology resulted
in the correct determination in every case. Sixteen subjects
were correctly classied as information present, and 14
subjects were correctly classied as information absent.
In CIA Experiment 3, the real-life CIA study, (Far-
well and Richardson 2006b; Farwell et al. 2011) the
information detected was relevant to real-life events,
including a number of felony crimes. This study used
visually presented words and phrases as stimuli. Seventeen
subjects were correctly classied as information present,
and three control subjects were correctly classied as
information absent. An example of the stimuli was the
type of automatic pistol used in one of the crimes.
In the CIAand Navy studies there were no false negatives,
no false positives, and no indeterminates. All determinations
were correct, with a high statistical condence in every case.
Two separate analyses were conducted, one using the P300-
MERMER and one using only the P300. Both analyses
resulted in the same correct determinations. The analysis
using the P300-MERMER produced a somewhat higher
statistical condence for some of the determinations than the
analysis using only the P300 (Farwell et al. 2011).
In the three CIA and Navy experiments, the statistical
condence for the information present results was
99.9% for each of 44 of the 48 individual determinations.
The lowest condence for any information present
determination was 98.8%, well above the 90% criterion for
information present determinations. Information
absent determinations for the real-life experiment were
also at least 99.9% in every case. Information absent
determinations for the Navy and picture studies were lower
on average, but all met the criterion of 70% necessary for
an information absent determination.
Other studies by Farwell and colleagues
Farwell and colleagues more recent studies have focused
on real-life/eld applications. One study successfully
detected knowledge of improvised explosive devices in
bomb makers (Farwell 2009; Farwell et al. 2011).
In other eld studies, Farwell and colleagues (Farwell
2008; Farwell et al. 2011) detected information regarding
real crimes. To ensure that the brain ngerprinting tests
potentially had a major, life-changing impact on subjects
regardless of judicial consequences, they offered a
$100,000 cash reward to any subject who could beat the
test. They also taught subjects countermeasures that been
effective in defeating alternative, non-brain ngerprinting
tests (Mertens and Allen 2008; Rosenfeld et al. 2004).
Brain ngerprinting correctly detected all subjects, with no
false positives, no false negatives, and no indeterminates.
Summary of results of research and eld applications
by Farwell and colleagues
In over 200 test cases by Farwell and colleagues, brain n-
gerprinting resulted on no false positives and no false neg-
atives. Accuracy rate for determinations made was 100%;
error rate was 0%. Determinations made were information
present or information absent with a criterion statistical
condence for each individual determination.
Since the introduction of the P300-MERMER in the data
analysis algorithm, there have been no indeterminates.
In 3% of cases, all of them using the P300 alone prior to
the discovery of the P300-MERMER, the data analysis
algorithm returned a result that insufcient data were
available to make a determination with a strong statistical
condence in either direction. No determination was made:
the result was indeterminate. All of the indeterminates
were in one study (Farwell and Donchin 1991), wherein
they comprised 12.5% or results.
For all brain ngerprinting studies by Farwell and col-
leagues, Grier A (Grier 1971) values are 1.0.
Table 2 outlines the laboratory studies on brain nger-
printing testing conducted by Farwell and colleagues.
Table 3 outlines the eld/real-life studies on brain n-
gerprinting testing conducted by Farwell and colleagues.
Replications of brain ngerprinting science in other,
independent laboratories
Others who have followed similar or comparable scientic
procedures to those of Farwell and colleagues have pub-
lished similar accuracy results in the peer-reviewed liter-
ature. For example, Iacono and colleagues have published
studies reporting similar procedures and similar results to
those achieved by Farwell and colleagues.
Iacono and colleagues (Allen et al. 1992) used P300
event-related potentials to detect learned information in a
three-stimulus experimental design similar to Farwells
technique. The authors achieved 94% accuracy in detecting
learned material as learned, and 96% accuracy in identi-
fying unknown material as unknown. Like Farwell and
colleagues, the authors used an algorithm that included a
method for arriving at one of two different determinations,
a determination that the subject knew the information or a
determination that the subject did not. Also like Farwell
and colleagues, they computed a statistical condence for
whichever determination was achieved for each individual
subject. The authors used a Bayesian algorithm for com-
puting a determination and statistical condence for each
individual subject. Although the mathematical algorithm
was not identical to the bootstrapping algorithm used by
Farwell and colleagues, the results showed a relatively high
level of accuracy.
Cogn Neurodyn (2012) 6:115154 137
1 3
In another study, they (Allen and Iacono 1997) replicated
Farwell and colleagues brain ngerprinting technique, and
compared their Bayesian algorithmwith the bootstrapping of
the brain ngerprinting technique and with a simplied
application of bootstrapping. The authors replicated the high
accuracy of the brain ngerprinting technique. Like Farwell
and colleagues, they reported no false positives using this
method. They also found that increased motivation to beat
the test increased the accuracy of Farwells brain nger-
printing technique. This may be one of the reasons for the
extremely high accuracy achieved by Farwell and colleagues
using brain ngerprinting in eld situations. The authors
Table 2 Brain ngerprinting laboratory studies by Farwell and colleagues
Study
Authors (year)
Type of information detected Type of
study
Number of
subjects
Accuracy rate
(%)
a
Indeterminates
b
Bootstrapping study
Farwell and Donchin (1988b)
Mock crime; bootstrapping
analysis
Specic
issue
4 100 0
Mock espionage study Experiment 1
Farwell and Donchin (1991), Farwell
(1992a)
Mock crime/espionage; word
stimuli
Specic
issue
40 100 5
CIA study 1
Farwell and Richardson (2006a)
Mock espionage; picture
stimuli
Specic
issue
29 100 0
a
Percent correct in all cases wherein a determination was made
b
Number of cases where no determination was made. In all indeterminate cases, analysis was with P300 alone, not P300-MERMER
Table 3 Brain ngerprinting eld/real-life studies by Farwell and colleagues
Study
Authors (year)
Type of information detected Type of
study
Subjects Accuracy
rate (%)
a
Indeterminates
b
Crime detection
Farwell and Donchin (1986)
Real-life minor crimes Specic
issue
8 100 0
Real-life Experiment 2
Farwell and Donchin (1986, 1991),
Farwell (1992a)
Real-life minor crimes Specic
issue
8 100 1
Occupation study
Farwell (1992b)
Occupation-specic knowledge Specic
screening
4 100 0
FBI study 1FBI agents
Farwell and Richardson (2006b),
Farwell et al. (2011)
FBI-relevant knowledge, FBI agents Specic
screening
21 100 0
CIA/US Navy study 2
Farwell and Richardson (2006b),
Farwell et al. (2011)
Expertise in military medicine Specic
screening
30 100 0
CIA study 3: Real-life CIA study
Farwell and Richardson (2006b),
Farwell et al. (2011)
Real-life events (some crimes) Specic
issue
20 100 0
FBI study 2: Real-life
Farwell and Smith (2001)
Real-life events in FBI agents lives Specic
issue
6 100 0
Field tests on suspects
Farwell and Richardson (2006b),
Farwell et al. 2011)
Information on crimes in brains of
suspects
Specic
issue
7 100 0
Brain ngerprinting in
counterterrorism
Farwell (2009), Farwell et al. (2011)
Bomb-making knowledge Specic
screening
20 100 0
Real crime $100,000 reward test
Farwell (2008), Farwell et al. (2011)
Knowledge of actual crimes; $100 k
reward for beating test
Specic
issue
8 100 0
a
Percent correct in all cases wherein a determination was made
b
Number of cases where no determination was made. In all indeterminate cases, analysis was with P300 alone, not P300-MERMER
138 Cogn Neurodyn (2012) 6:115154
1 3
theorized that the basis of this difference was cognitive rather
than emotional: that the difference resulted from increased
cognitive salience of stimuli in the more motivated
condition.
As reported in Iacono and colleagues previous study
(Allen et al. 1992) the Bayesian procedure achieved an
accuracy rate nearly as high as that achieved by Farwell
and colleagues using the brain ngerprinting technique,
although unlike brain ngerprinting the Bayesian proce-
dure returned some false positive/negative errors. The
accuracy rate achieved by the authors using Farwell and
colleagues bootstrapping technique was comparable. The
alternative, simplied bootstrapping procedure achieved a
slightly lower accuracy rate.
Other experimenters detected concealed information
with event-related brain potentials by applying methods
that are in some ways similar to, and in some ways dif-
ferent from, brain ngerprinting. Some studies have used
mock crimes or virtual mock crimes (Abootalebi et al.
2006; Hahm et al. 2009). Some have applied various other
knowledge-imparting procedures (Gamer and Berti 2009;
Lefebvre et al. 2007, 2009; Meijer et al. 2007). Some have
detected recognition of well-known personal information
such as pictures of known individuals (Meijer et al. 2007,
2009). These studies have met some but not all of the brain
ngerprinting scientic standards. Accuracy rates have in
some cases been quite high. Accuracy has varied consid-
erably based on the methods used.
A number of researchers in Japan (Hira and Furumitsu
2002; Miyake et al. 1993; Neshige et al. 1991) used a
variety of procedures applying event-related brain poten-
tials in the detection of concealed information. Results
varied considerably according to the methods applied.
Kakigi and colleagues (Neshige et al. 1991) achieved
similar results to Farwells CIA picture study (Farwell and
Richardson 2006a).
All of these studies serve to further establish the valid-
ity, reliability, and general acceptance in the scientic
community of the fundamental science on which brain
ngerprinting is based.
A number of studies have been conducted attempting to
detect simulated malingering relevant to brain injury and
memory loss. These studies are not directly comparable to
brain ngerprinting, and are not reviewed herein.
Limitations of brain ngerprinting
Is brain ngerprinting 100% accurate?
As described in detail above, brain ngerprinting technique
using the P300-MERMER has resulted in no false posi-
tives, no false negatives, and no indeterminates. All of the
determinations have been correct. Overall including studies
using the P300 alone, there have been 3% indeterminates.
Whether using the P300 alone or the P300-MERMER,
100% of determinations in brain ngerprinting tests by
Farwell and colleagues have been correct. Error rate to date
has been 0%.
Does this mean that brain ngerprinting is 100% accu-
rate? No. In science, there is no such thing as 100%
accurate. There is always a margin of uncertainty, a margin
of error. In reporting on a specic series of laboratory or real-
life cases wherein there were no errors, however, it is correct
to say (and incorrect not to say), In these specic cases,
brain ngerprinting testing produced 100% accurate
results. This is simply a statement of the observed facts.
To state that brain ngerprinting (or any science) is
100% accurate, without qualication or reference to a
specic, existing data set, however, would never be correct.
Such a statement contains an implicit prediction about the
future. A technology that is 100% accurate never makes
an error, now or ever. There is no guarantee that any
technology ever can meet that standard throughout all
future applications. A technology may have produced
100% accurate results in a particular set of tests already
completed, as brain ngerprinting has. Nevertheless, even a
technology such as brain ngerprinting technology that has
achieved this standard in the past cannot be characterized
as 100% accurate without qualication.
In short, neither brain ngerprinting nor any other sci-
ence or technology can be unqualiedly characterized as
100% accurate.
Limits to the applicability of brain ngerprinting testing
The brain of the perpetrator plays a prominent role in every
crime. Perpetrators virtually always know of their partici-
pation in the crime, and often know the features of the
crime in considerable detail.
Nevertheless, brain ngerprinting is not applicable in
every case for every suspect. Probes must contain infor-
mation that, in the judgment of the criminal investigators,
was experienced by the perpetrator in the course of com-
mitting the crime. Probes must contain information that the
subject claims not to know. Consequently, there are some
circumstances where no probes can be developed for a
particular crime for a particular subject. Obviously, in such
cases a brain ngerprinting test cannot be conducted.
If the investigators have no idea what took place in the
perpetration of a crime, for example, when a person simply
disappears and foul play is suspected, they cannot develop
any probes. No brain ngerprinting test can be conducted.
A subject may claim that he was at the crime scene as a
witness and not a perpetrator. In such a case, there would
be no information that the subject claimed not to know.
Cogn Neurodyn (2012) 6:115154 139
1 3
Thus there could be no probes, and a brain ngerprinting
test could not be structured. Similarly, a brain ngerprint-
ing test is not applicable when the subject knows absolutely
everything about the crime that investigators know because
he has been told this information after the crime. This may
occur when a subject has already gone through a trial and
has been convicted of the crime. If there is no information
known to investigators that the subject claims not to know,
there is no material for probe stimuli, and one cannot
structure a brain ngerprinting test.
In some cases, however, such as the Terry Harrington
case (Harrington v. State 2001), it is possible to nd salient
features of the crime to which the subject was never
exposed in the trial or investigation, and which he claims
not to know. Under these circumstances, a brain nger-
printing test can be conducted using these salient features
of the crime as probe stimuli.
Brain ngerprinting and the limitations of human
memory
Human memory is not perfect. It is affected by myriad
factors, including mental and physical illness, trauma,
injury, drugs, aging, passage of time, and many other well
known factors.
The limitations on human memory already gure
prominently in all judicial proceedings that include testi-
mony by witnesses or suspects, whether they involve brain
ngerprinting evidence or not. A witness, even if he is
truthful, does not testify to the absolute truth. He testies
only to the contents of his memory.
To perform their evaluation of witness testimony ade-
quately, judges and juries must already be aware of the
well established limitations on human memory and take
them into account. Judges and juries must apply these exact
same considerations and standards when weighing brain
ngerprinting evidence.
The argument that brain ngerprinting evidence should
not be admitted or considered due to the limitations of
human memory is without merit in any forum that admits
witness testimony of any kind. Witness testimony consti-
tutes a subjective report of the contents of memory. Brain
ngerprinting constitutes objective, scientic evidence of
the contents of memory. In any forum where subjective
reports of the contents of memory are considered, objective
evidence of the contents of human memory warrant at least
the same treatment. For brain ngerprinting, witness tes-
timony, and confessions, the well-known limitations of
human memory go to the weight of the evidence, not to
admissibility or applicability.
When the brain ngerprinting determination is informa-
tion present, the limitations of human memory play a minor
role. Despite these limitations, the technology has shown that
the suspect knows details about a crime that he has previously
claimed not to know and has no reasonable explanation for
knowing other than having participated in the crime.
With brain ngerprinting science, as with all science,
negative ndings must be interpreted with caution. When the
brain ngerprinting determination is information absent,
then the judge and jury must take into account the limitations
on human memory in the same way as they do when
weighing witness testimony. Conducting a brain nger-
printing test on the alibi as well as the crime can help to
minimize the possibility that the subjects lack of knowledge
of the crime was due to a catastrophic memory failure. (Note,
however, that an information present determination with
respect to the alibi does not prove that the alibi is true, only
that the subjects memory of the alibi is intact.)
The effect of the imperfections of human memory and
perception on brain ngerprinting evidence is identical to
the effect of these factors on the testimony of a witness.
The evidence provided by a brain ngerprinting test is
limited to a specic determination as to whether certain
information is stored in the subjects brain or not. (See above
discussion of brain ngerprinting scientic standard 18.) The
brain ngerprinting determination is informationpresent or
informationabsent withrespect tothe specic probe stimuli
provided by the criminal investigators, which in the criminal
investigators judgment are salient features of the crime.
Neither brain ngerprinting science nor any other sci-
ence tells us directly what took place at the crime scene, or
whether a particular individual is guilty of a particular
crime. Like DNA, ngerprints, and every other forensic
science, brain ngerprinting science does not provide a
determination of guilty or innocent, or a determina-
tion that this suspect did or did not do specic actions. The
value of brain ngerprinting science is that it can provide
evidence that the triers of fact use in their decisions
regarding what took place and who was involved. Brain
ngerprinting science does not determine what the facts
are, other than the one fact of presence or absence of
specic information stored in a specic brain. Brain n-
gerprinting expert witnesses testify only to this fact and to
the validity and reliability of the science that establishes
this fact. They do not opine regarding whether or not the
suspect committed the crime; this is to be decided by the
judge and jury.
The role of brain ngerprinting science in judicial pro-
ceedings is to provide evidence that the judge and jury can
utilize in reaching their verdict. This evidence must be
considered along with all other available evidence. Like
other evidence and witness testimony, it must be consid-
ered in light of the known limitations on human memory.
For a forensic scientist, the import of all discussions
about human memory is simply the following: Draw sci-
entic conclusions only regarding what the subject knows
140 Cogn Neurodyn (2012) 6:115154
1 3
at the time of the brain ngerprinting test. This is one of the
brain ngerprinting scientic standards discussed above
(standard 18).
For the trier of fact, memory considerations can be
summarized as follows. The contents of human memory
are revealed subjectively (and not always truthfully) by
witness testimony, and objectively by brain ngerprinting.
In weighing the evidence and extrapolating from facts
regarding the contents of human memory to facts regarding
crimes or guilt, use common sense and take into account
the well known limitations of human memory.
Countermeasures
Brain ngerprinting has proven to be highly resistant to
countermeasures. No one has ever beaten a brain nger-
printing test with countermeasures. Farwell (2008), Farwell
et al. (2011) tested countermeasures in a series of brain
ngerprinting tests on actual crimes. In order to produce
life-changing effects regardless of judicial outcomes, Far-
well offered perpetrators of actual crimes a $100,000 cash
reward for beating the brain ngerprinting test. The per-
petrators were trained in countermeasures that had previ-
ously reduced the accuracy of other techniques, but not of
brain ngerprinting (Rosenfeld et al. 2004; Mertens and
Allen 2008). No one succeeded in beating the brain n-
gerprinting test. Brain ngerprinting accurately detected
the crime-relevant knowledge in all such subjects, with no
false positives, no false negatives, and no indeterminates.
Other countermeasure experiments (Sasaki et al. 2002)
found a simple mental-task distraction countermeasure to
be ineffective.
Rosenfeld et al. (2004) report several different coun-
termeasure experiments and several different data analysis
and statistical methods. In every case, they used funda-
mentally different subject instructions, subject tasks, sta-
tistics, data acquisition procedures, and methods (or lack
thereof) for establishing ground truth than those of brain
ngerprinting. Their methods failed to meet 15 of the 20
brain ngerprinting scientic standards.
As a result of the fundamental differences between their
methods and those of brain ngerprinting, Rosenfeld et al.
did not achieve accuracy rates as high as the accuracy rates
consistently achieved by brain ngerprinting. For some of
Rosenfelds methods in some studies, accuracy was as low
as 54%, no better than chance. All of their methods are
very different from brain ngerprinting. Even their one
method that they correctly characterize as most similar to
brain ngerprinting lacks some of the most essential fea-
tures of brain ngerprinting methods. All of Rosenfelds
(2004) alternative, non-brain ngerprinting methods were
found to be susceptible to countermeasures.
The countermeasure taught in Rosenfeld et al. (2004)
was to perform covert actions such as wiggling the toe in
response to each irrelevant stimulus. This was predicted to
increase the P300 amplitude to irrelevants, thus lessening
the difference between probe and irrelevant brainwave
responses.
Some of the same subjects had slower reaction times to
the stimuli. Reaction times, however, are easily manipu-
lated and therefore not suitable for detection in real-life
situations with real consequences.
Rosenfeld et al. (2008) conducted a second series of
studies that showed that their non-brain ngerprinting
complex trial protocol method is susceptible to coun-
termeasures. Accuracy was 92% without countermeasures
and 83% when subjects practiced Rosenfeld et al.s (2004)
countermeasure described above. As discussed below, the
complex trial protocol has three fundamental characteris-
tics that render it unusable in the eld: high and variable
error rates, failure to isolate the critical variable along with
invalid statistics, and procedures that are ineffective when
used with motivated subjects.
Another non-brain ngerprinting study, Mertens and
Allen (2008), found similar countermeasures to be effec-
tive against their procedure. As discussed below, that
procedure failed to meet the brain ngerprinting scientic
standards, resulting not only in susceptibility to counter-
measures but also in very low accuracy even without
countermeasures.
In discussing countermeasures, it is important to avoid
over generalizing the susceptibility to countermeasures of
non-brain ngerprinting techniques that fail to meet even
the most essential of the brain ngerprinting standards.
Some authors (e.g., Rosenfeld 2005; Rosenfeld et al. 2004,
Mertens and Allen 2008) have mistakenly generalized the
inaccuracy and susceptibility to countermeasures of the
non-brain ngerprinting techniques they studied to apply to
brain ngerprinting, whereas the actual data on studies that
meet the brain ngerprinting scientic standards demon-
strate denitively that this generalization does not apply.
All available actual data have shown that although these
other, non-brain ngerprinting techniques are inaccurate
and susceptible to countermeasures, brain ngerprinting is
highly accurate and highly resistant to countermeasures.
Criticisms of brain ngerprinting
Critics have advanced the following criticisms of brain
ngerprinting.
1. Criticism: Brain ngerprinting is inaccurate.
The relevant facts: Purported support for this criticism
comes solely from citing the inaccuracy of non-brain
Cogn Neurodyn (2012) 6:115154 141
1 3
ngerprinting studies that used alternative techniques and
did not meet the brain ngerprinting scientic standards
outlined above. All studies that have met these scientic
standards have had extremely high accuracy. Brain n-
gerprinting has never produced a false positive or false
negative error.
2. Criticism: Brain ngerprinting could be used to
detect knowledge that was acquired innocently.
The relevant facts: Any forensic science could be used to
detect evidence that arose through innocent means. For
example, a suspect may have left ngerprints at a crime
scene innocently before the crime. Observing common
sense, and specically observing the brain ngerprinting
standards summarized above, will ensure that innocently
acquired information is eliminated in advance from the test
(Farwell 1994; Iacono 2008). The standards require the
experimenter to establish in advance that the probes con-
tain only information that the subject has no known way of
knowing, that the subject denies knowing, and that the
subject states are not signicant to him and are indistin-
guishable from the irrelevant stimuli.
This criticism does not apply to brain ngerprinting, but
only to non-brain ngerprinting methods that fail to meet
the brain ngerprinting scientic standards, particularly
standards 4 and 710.
3. Criticism: Brain ngerprinting detects the contents
of human memory, and human memory is imperfect.
The relevant facts: Human memory is indeed imperfect.
Brain ngerprinting is not the only evidence commonly
admitted in court that depends on human memory, how-
ever. All witness testimony depends critically on human
memory. In every trial involving witness testimony, judges
and juries must already be aware of and take into account
the limitations of human memory. Witness testimony
constitutes a subjective report of the contents of human
memory. Brain ngerprinting is an objective account of the
contents of human memory. In both cases, the trier of fact
must evaluate the facts in light of common sense, life
experience, and the known limitations of human memory.
Such considerations go the weight of the evidence, not to
admissibility. This is discussed in more detail above in the
section entitled Brain ngerprinting and the limitations of
human memory.
For a forensic scientist, the import of all discussions about
human memory can be stated in its entirety in one sentence, as
follows. Observe brain ngerprinting scientic standard # 18:
draw scientic conclusions only regarding what the subject
knows at the time of the brain ngerprinting test.
Critiques of human memory in the context of a discus-
sion of brain ngerprinting (Allen 2008; Allen and Mertens
2009; Meegan 2008) amount to a criticism not of brain
ngerprinting but rather of any non-brain ngerprinting
technique that fails to follow brain ngerprinting scientic
standard #18.
4. Criticism: Brain ngerprinting is art not science,
subjective not objective.
The relevant facts: There are three different processes
involved in the application of brain ngerprinting science
in a judicial case. These are (1) the investigation that
precedes the science; (2) the objective, scientic procedure
of brain ngerprinting; and (3) the legal interpretation that
may follow later.
Before a brain ngerprinting test, a criminal investigator
investigates the crime. He formulates an account of the
features of the crime. These are the probe stimuli to be tested
(and the targets). This criminal investigation is outside the
realmof science. This process is based on the skill, expertise,
and subjective judgment of the criminal investigator. The
criminal investigator provides the scientist with the probe
stimuli that in the criminal investigators judgment represent
the actual events at the time of the crime.
The scientist applies the scientic procedure of brain
ngerprinting to determine objectively whether or not the
subject knows the crime-relevant information contained in
the probes. Brain ngerprinting determines only the pres-
ence or absence of this information stored in the subjects
brain. The brain ngerprinting scientist opines only on the
presence or absence in the subjects brain of the specic
knowledge embodied in the probes that were provided by
the criminal investigator. Here the science ends. The sci-
ence and the scientist do not address the question of
whether the results are probative of the subjects guilt or
innocence. The science does not even address whether the
probes provided by the investigator have anything to do
with the crime, or whether a crime took place.
The judge and/or jury weigh the brain ngerprinting
evidence along with other evidence to reach a non-scientic,
common-sense judgment regarding the suspects participa-
tion in the crime. This process is outside the realmof science.
They may reach a legal determination of guilty or not guilty.
The role of the scientically produced brain ngerprinting
evidence is only to inform the trier of fact, not to render a
scientic conclusion regarding guilt or innocence.
In short, brain ngerprinting is an objective, scientic
process that is preceded by a process outside the realm of
science and followed by another process outside the realm
of science.
Criticisms of brain ngerprinting as being unscientic
result from mistakenly lumping brain ngerprinting with
the preceding and/or subsequent non-scientic processes.
In effect, all such criticisms amount to a criticism not of
brain ngerprinting but of any non-brain ngerprinting
142 Cogn Neurodyn (2012) 6:115154
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technique that fails to observe brain ngerprinting scien-
tic standards, particularly standards 4 and 18.
5. Criticism: Brain ngerprinting does not prove that a
subject is innocent or guilty, and it would go beyond the
science for a brain ngerprinting expert to opine on the
guilt or innocence of a subject based on test results.
The relevant facts: This is a limitation that brain nger-
printing shares with all other forensic sciences. As descri-
bed with reference to the preceding criticism, brain
ngerprinting accurately and objectively detects whether
certain specic information is or is not stored in a subjects
brain. Brain ngerprinting standard procedures do not
allow a brain ngerprinting expert to draw any conclusions
beyond the presence or absence of specic information
stored in the brain. It is up to the court to weigh the pro-
bative value of these scientically established ndings
(Erickson 2007; Harrington v. State 2001; Iacono 2008;
Roberts 2007).
DNA, ngerprints, and all other forensic sciences also
do not prove a subject guilty or innocent. Like brain n-
gerprinting experts, experts in these other forensic sciences
testify only to what the science actually shows. For
example, an expert may testify that DNA putatively from
the crime scene matches DNA putatively from the subject.
As discussed above, it is up to the judge and jury, not the
scientist, to decide if brain ngerprinting evidence, taken
along with all the other evidence, warrants a legal deter-
mination of guilty or not.
This criticism amounts to a criticism not of brain n-
gerprinting but rather of any non-brain ngerprinting
technique that fails to observe brain ngerprinting scien-
tic standard 18.
6. Criticism: Brain ngerprinting is subject to counter-
measures.
The relevant facts: All evidence cited in support of this
contention arises solely from research showing only that
non-brain ngerprinting studies that did not meet the scien-
tic standards for brain ngerprinting were susceptible to
countermeasures. The one study cited as evidence for this
contention (Rosenfeld et al. 2004) purported to be a repli-
cation of Farwell and Donchin (1991), but in fact failed to
meet over half of the brain ngerprinting standards that were
met in the original Farwell and Donchin brain ngerprinting
research and all other brain ngerprinting research.
Farwell (Farwell and Richardson 2006b) offered a
$100,000 reward to any subject who could beat a brain
ngerprinting eld test using the countermeasures that
proved effective against non-brain ngerprinting tests.
Brain ngerprinting correctly detected all subjects prac-
ticing countermeasures. This is discussed in more detail
above in the section entitled Countermeasures.
7. Criticism: A brain ngerprinting test requires that the
investigators have specic information regarding the features
of the investigated situation. Therefore it is not applicable for
general screening when the investigators have no idea what
undesirable activities the subject may have undertaken.
The relevant facts: This is a limitation that brain nger-
printing shares with other evidentiary forensic sciences. To
use evidence to connect a suspect to a crime, there must be
evidence of the crime. Brain ngerprinting is indeed
inapplicable for general screening purposes such as pre-
employment screening wherein the investigators have no
knowledge of what information they are seeking. Brain
ngerprinting can be applied, however, in specic or
focused screening for a specic type of knowledge. For
example, brain ngerprinting has been successfully used to
detect knowledge unique to FBI agents, to US Navy mili-
tary medical experts, and to bomb experts (Farwell and
Richardson 2006b, Farwell 2009; Farwell et al. 2011).
8. Criticism: A 2001 report by the US General
Accounting Ofce (GAO) quoted representatives of several
federal agencies as stating that they did not see a role for
brain ngerprinting in their current operations at that time.
The relevant facts: The GAO report was entitled Fed-
eral Agency Views on the Potential Application of Brain
Fingerprinting. It was essentially a sampling of opinions
of individuals associated with the polygraphy in the federal
government prior to 911. (It was completed before 911
2001 and issued shortly thereafter.) It reported that most
such individuals did not see the need for brain nger-
printing in their pre-911 operations over a decade ago.
The report stated:
Ofcials representing CIA, DOD, Secret Service, and
FBI do not foresee using the brain ngerprinting
technique for their operations because of its limited
application. For example, CIA and DOD ofcials
indicated that their counterintelligence operations and
criminal investigations do not usually lend themselves
to a technique such as brain ngerprinting because use
of the technique requires a unique level of detail and
information that would be known only to the perpe-
trator and the investigators. These ofcials indicated
that they need a tool to screen current and prospective
employees, which as indicated above, involves ques-
tioning a subject about events unknown to the inves-
tigator. Further, a Secret Service ofcial indicated that
the agency has had a high success rate with the poly-
graph as an interrogative and screening tool and
therefore saw limited use for brain ngerprinting.
The report noted, however, that the only two US govern-
ment scientists interviewed who had conducted research on
Cogn Neurodyn (2012) 6:115154 143
1 3
brain ngerprinting both were convinced that it would be
useful in FBI investigations.
The report did not include an account of the peer-
reviewed scientic research on brain ngerprinting or its
successful use as scientic evidence in court. The report
did not discuss the value of brain ngerprinting for other
applications other than general screening, for which it does
not apply as discussed above. The GAO did not evaluate or
opine on the effectiveness, accuracy, or validity of brain
ngerprinting. The report stated:
we did not independently assess the hardware,
software, or other components of the technology nor
did we attempt to determine independently whether
brain ngerprinting is a valid technique.
The report concluded that a number of federal ofcials did
not see an immediate application for brain ngerprinting in
their general screening operations before 911. The report
constituted a reasonably accurate opinion poll of federal
employees associated with the polygraph a decade ago,
before the 911 terrorist attacks. This is not relevant to the
validity, value, accuracy, or current applicability of brain
ngerprinting.
Consequently Senator Grassley, who commissioned the
original GAO report, has asked the GAO to develop a new
report. He asked the GAO to discuss the potential applica-
tions of brain ngerprinting in criminal investigations and
counterterrorism in the post-911 world. He also asked the
GAO to include the views of experts well versed in brain
ngerprinting and MERMER technology, and to include the
successful brain ngerprinting research at the FBI, CIA, and
US Navy. The new report is currently being prepared.
Non-brain ngerprinting research on brainwave-based
concealed information tests
Common errors in research on brainwave-based
concealed information tests
The seminal papers on brain ngerprinting, Farwell and
Donchin (1991), Farwell (1992a, 1994, 1995a, b), and
Farwell and Smith (2001) described the scientic standards
for brain ngerprinting outlined herein. By meeting these
standards, the authors achieved error rates of less than 1%
in every study. In our view, this is the level of accuracy that
is required for eld use. Subsequent experimenters whose
research met the brain ngerprinting standards, such as the
replication of Farwell and Donchins (1991) seminal brain
ngerprinting research by Iacono and colleagues (e.g.,
Allen and Iacono 1997), achieved similar accuracy levels
to those of brain ngerprinting.
Virtually all subsequent researchers adopted some of the
original experimental design introduced in the original brain
ngerprinting studies. Many of the subsequent experiment-
ers, however, did not followthe scientic standards for brain
ngerprinting, and consequently did not achieve results
comparable to those of brain ngerprinting. Methods that
failed to meet the brain ngerprinting standards have gen-
erally produced error rates at least ten times higher than the
error rates necessary for eld useerror rates of over 10%,
and in some cases as high as 50%, no better than chance.
In their seminal research and publications on the subject,
Farwell and Donchin (1986, 1991) made it clear that brain
ngerprinting detects information, not lies, guilt, or
actions. Unfortunately, some commentators and even some
subsequent researchers have mistakenly considered brain
ngerprinting to be a method to detect lies, guilt, or past
actions, rather than information stored in the brain. Many
errors by subsequent commentators and researchers have
resulted from this fundamental misunderstanding. Most of
the criticisms of brain ngerprinting (see above) have
arisen from the mistaken understanding that brain nger-
printing is supposed to detect truthfulness/lies or past
actions, rather than information stored in the brain.
The following is a summary of the most common errors
and the errors that have produced the greatest decrements
in accuracy or validity.
(A) Failure to recognize that brain ngerprinting detects
only the presence or absence of certain specic knowledge
stored in the brain. This fundamental misunderstanding or
misrepresentation of what is detected by the brainwave
measurements is expressed in several ways: Failure to dis-
tinguish between what the experimenter knows, or thinks the
subject should know, and what the subject actually knows;
confounding the knowledge-imparting procedure with the
knowledge-detection procedure; failure to establish ground
truth; failure to distinguish between subjects actions and
knowledge; drawing conclusions that are not warranted by
the data, such as that the subject is innocent or guilty,
rather than that the subject does or does not possess the
specic knowledge tested. (Brain Fingerprinting standards
18 and 19. This error is often combined with failure to meet
other standards, particularly 4, 7, 8, and 9.)
In several studies that reported low accuracy rates, for
example, Rosenfeld et al. (2007), the experimenters con-
founded the knowledge-imparting procedure with the
knowledge-detection procedure. This study failed to meet
13 of the 20 brain ngerprinting standards, numbers 4, 5, 7,
8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, and 19. This resulted in
failure to establish valid ground truth, failure to distinguish
between knowledge and actions, and unwarranted conclu-
sions. The result was very low accuracy rates, ranging from
33% to 62% in different conditions and averaging 51% (no
better than chance) overall.
144 Cogn Neurodyn (2012) 6:115154
1 3
The experimenters implemented a knowledge-imparting
procedure consisting of a mock crime. They tested the
subjects on probe stimuli that the experimenter (but not
necessarily the subject) knew were associated with the
mock crime. They did not conduct post-test interviews to
determine whether or not the knowledge-imparting proce-
dure had been effective in imparting the relevant knowl-
edge to the subjects.
They interpreted the lack of a large P300 to the probes to
indicate that the test had failed to detect information pos-
sessed by the subjects. This result may, however, have been
simply a failure of the knowledge-imparting procedure to
impart the relevant knowledge. No knowledge-detection
procedure, no matter how perfect, can detect knowledge
that the subject does not have. The knowledge-detection
procedure may have correctly detected that the subjects
lacked the relevant knowledge, because the knowledge-
imparting procedure had failed to impart it.
Since ground truth was unknown, true accuracy was
unknown. Confounding the knowledge-imparting proce-
dure with the knowledge-detection procedure produces
results that cannot be meaningfully interpreted.
One study that obtained very low accuracy rates, Mer-
tens et al. (2003), combined this fundamental error with
several other errors. This study failed to meet 10 of the 20
Brain Fingerprinting standards, numbers 4, 5, 8, 9, 10, 11,
12, 13, 18, and 19.
(B) Confounding or confusing lying with knowing the
relevant information. Instructing laboratory subjects to
lie by pushing a specic button. (Brain Fingerprinting
standard #12.) This is generally done in the laboratory
without any real intent or attempt to deceive. Brain n-
gerprinting includes no such instruction. Subjects neither
lie nor tell the truth in a brain ngerprinting test; they
simply observe stimuli and push buttons as instructed.
One fundamental error that Rosenfeld and a number of
other researchers have made is to instruct subjects to lie
in response to probe items in a laboratory experiment (see
Farwell 2011a, b, 2012; Rosenfeld et al. 1987, 1988, 2004;
Rosenfeld 2002). Recall that in brain ngerprinting the
subject is instructed to press one button in response to
targets, and another button in response to all other stimuli.
Rosenfeld et al. also instructed their subjects to press one
button for targets and another for all other stimuli. They
told the subjects, however, that their instructed button
presses meant yes, I recognize the stimulus and no, I
dont recognize the stimulus respectively. They told the
subjects they would be lying when they pressed the
no button as instructed for probes.
Telling subjects to press a button and then telling them
that pressing that button constitutes a lie, however, does not
create a lie. The Rosenfeld studies and other similar labo-
ratory studies involved no intent to deceive and no attempt to
deceive. Subjects did not seriously intend to deceive the
experimenter into believing they did not recognize well
known information by simply pressing the no button as
instructed by the same experimenter. The P300 obviously is
not a lie response. If a large P300 in response to probes is
interpreted as indicating a lie, then a large P300 to targets
logically would indicate the same thing.
In one study Rosenfeld and colleagues (Verschuere et al.
2009) attempted to validate the procedure wherein subjects
are told they will be lying when they press the instructed
button in response to probes. The experimental instructions
emphasized the salience of the probes in the lie condi-
tion, and not in the control condition. The large P300 to the
probes in the lie condition was predictably produced by
the experimental instructions emphasizing their salience,
rather than by the act of pretending to lie. (The lie was
pushing a no button as instructed in response to the
subjects own nameclearly subjects did not actually
intend to deceive the experimenter into believing they did
not recognize their own name.)
Kubo and Nittono (2009) showed that enhanced P300s
in deception conditions are caused not by a deception-
specic process but by increased signicance due to
additional processing.
One reason that there is no lie response is that lying is
not a unitary phenomenon. Many different cognitive and
emotional processes can be involved in a lie. No one set of
cognitive and emotional processes uniquely denes a lie.
Instructing subjects to lie and interpreting a large P300-
MERMER as being due in part to a lie response is
contrary not only to brain ngerprinting standards but also
to logic and common sense. Such a ction unnecessarily
confounds and complicates the phenomenon being mea-
sured and makes the interpretation of results problematic.
(C) Failure to inform subjects of the signicance of the
probes and to describe the signicance of the probes and
targets that will appear in each block immediately before
the block (brain ngerprinting standard 8).
Some experimenters failed to describe the signicance
of the probes in the context of the crime to the subjects.
The brainwave responses depend on the subject recog-
nizing the signicance of the probe stimuli in the context of
the crime. Simply presenting probe stimuli that the
experimenter interprets as being meaningful in the context
of the crime is insufcient to ensure an appropriate brain
response from the subject. For example, Rosenfeld et al.
(2007) had subjects pretend to steal an item from a desk
drawer lined with blue paper. Then they used blue as a
probe, with no indication to the subjects why that might be
signicant. They failed to describe the signicance of the
probes in the context of the crime to the subjects, and also
failed to determine ground truth through post-test inter-
views. The consequence of this and the dozen or so other
Cogn Neurodyn (2012) 6:115154 145
1 3
errors common to all the Rosenfeld studies was detection
rates that were extremely low (33% to 62%, averaging no
better than chance) for this study (see Farwell 2011a, b,
2012).
To ensure that a knowledgeable subject recognizes the
probes as signicant in the context of the investigated sit-
uation, the experimental instructions must explicitly inform
the subject of this signicance. Of course, the instructions
must not inform the subject which is the probe and which
are the similar irrelevants constituting incorrect details with
the same possible signicance.
Failure to follow this procedure tends to markedly
decrease accuracy (Meijer et al. 2009).
(D) Failure to run a sufcient number of trials for ade-
quate signal-to-noise enhancement, or failure to apply
adequate signal-processing and noise-reduction techniques
such as digital lters and artifact detection algorithms
(brain ngerprinting standard #13). This is a very common
error.
All studies with extremely low accuracy rates have
failed to meet this standard, including Mertens and Allen
(2008), Mertens et al. (2003), Miyake et al. (1993),
Rosenfeld et al. (2007), and some conditions of Rosenfeld
et al. (2006) and Rosenfeld et al. (2004). (For discussion
see also Roberts 2007). Each of these studies also failed to
meet at least several other standards.
(E) Teaching subjects countermeasures or instruc-
tions that transparently accentuate the probe stimuli, or that
require the subject to read and attend to the probe stimuli
when motivated subjects otherwise would not do so
(Rosenfeld et al. 1987, 2008 and subsequent complex trial
protocol studies; see discussion below). Such counter-
measures actually increase the salience of the probes and
enhance the responses to the probes, making the test appear
to be more effective and/or resistant to countermeasures.
Motivated subjects who understand how the test works
would not be coerced or tricked into following such
instructions. (See Farwell, 2012 for a review.)
(F) Failure to require an overt behavioral task that
requires the subject to recognize and process every stim-
ulus, specically including the probe stimuli (brain n-
gerprinting standard 11). Studies that fail to meet this
standard are unusable in the eld, where there is no guar-
antee that the subject can be trusted to do what the
experimenter would like him to do except insofar as
required by overt actions.
Rosenfeld and colleagues have published several studies
using a complex trial protocol that fails to meet this and
other standards and consequently is unusable in the eld
(Meixner et al. 2009; Meixner and Rosenfeld 2010;
Meixner and Rosenfeld in press; Rosenfeld et al. 2008,
2009; Winograd and Rosenfeld in press; for a review, see
Farwell 2011a, b; 2012). In addition, all of these studies
failed to meet 17 of the 20 Brain Fingerprinting standards.
This is further discussed below.
(G) Failure to isolate the critical variable, generally
combined with improper and invalid use of statistics.
Failure to establish separate determinations and reasonable
statistical condence criteria for both information-present
and information-absent results. Failure to include an
indeterminate category. Classifying some results in a cat-
egory where there is up to an 89% probability that the
classication is an error. (Brain ngerprinting standards
47, 14, 15, and 17.)
This error and its consequences are illustrated by a series
of experiments conducted by Rosenfeld and colleagues
(see Farwell 2011a, b, 2012; Lui and Rosenfeld 2008;
Johnson and Rosenfeld 1992; Rosenfeld et al. 1987, 1988,
1991, 2004, 2006). All of Rosenfeld and colleagues
studies failed to meet 1217 of the 20 brain ngerprinting
standards, including standards 14, 15, and 17 in every case
(see Farwell 2011a, b, 2012). Although they used some of
the major features of the probe-target-irrelevant stimulus
design introduced by Farwell and Donchin, their methods
were signicantly different (Farwell 2011a, b, 2012; Far-
well and Smith 2001; Rosenfeld 2002). Their subject
instructions, subject tasks, data acquisition procedures, data
analysis procedures, and even stimulus types all failed to
meet the brain ngerprinting standards outlined above.
They conducted a fundamentally different procedure from
brain ngerprinting, and not surprisingly obtained different
and less accurate results. Their methods and results varied
in their various attempts (see Farwell 2011a, b; 2012). In
some cases results were over 80% or 90% accurate
(Johnson and Rosenfeld 1992; Lui and Rosenfeld 2008;
Rosenfeld et al. 1991, 2004, 2006). In some cases Rosen-
feld et al.s results were no better than chance or less than
chance (Rosenfeld et al. 2004, 2006, 2007). None of their
techniques approached the requirement of less than 1%
error rate across all studies and less than 5% error rate in
every individual study that is necessary in our view for a
technique to be viable for eld use.
These studies generally failed to meet the same 14 brain
ngerprinting scientic standards, 36, 810, 1215, and
1719. In some cases they also failed to meet additional
standards. For example, in their rst attempt Rosenfeld
et al. (1987) also measured P300 from the wrong location
on the head (standard #2) and did not require any overt
responses (standard #11). They made their determinations
on the basis of subjective judgment based on looking at the
plots of the waveforms, and did not compute any statistics
on individual subjects (standards 1417) (see Bashore and
Rapp 1993; Rosenfeld 1995). Moreover, they included
instructions to the subject to engage in covert behavior that
introduced a confound that made results uninterpretable. In
their second attempt Rosenfeld et al. (1988) corrected the
146 Cogn Neurodyn (2012) 6:115154
1 3
confound and the scalp location, but repeated all of the
other same errors.
In all of Rosenfeld et al.s subsequent studies (e.g.,
Rosenfeld et al. 2004) they failed to isolate the critical
variable, and failed to properly use the bootstrapping
algorithm introduced by Farwell and Donchin (1988b,
1991). They ignored target responses, and simply attemp-
ted to determine if probe responses were larger than
irrelevant responses. This resulted in invalid statistical
procedures that classied subjects in a category where the
statistics computed had determined that there was up to an
89% probability that the classication was incorrect. This
is discussed below in reference to the complex trial pro-
tocol, which combines this error with numerous others.
Failure to establish separate, reasonable criteria for both
information-present and information-absent determinations
virtually guarantees classication errors. This obviously
reduces accuracy. It also makes results uninterpretable and
difcult to compare to results obtained in studies that have
used statistics properly and reasonably.
The complex trial protocol (Rosenfeld et al. 2008 and
subsequent studies cited above) fails to isolate the critical
variable; it lacks the necessary standard to do so. The
statistical procedures based on (and necessitated by) this
failure are not valid or viable for eld use. In addition, it
fails to meet 17 of the 20 brain ngerprinting scientic
standards, specically standards 36 and 820. It has not
been used in the eld or in any real-world situation with
non-trivial consequences, and is not viable for such use.
The following three fundamental characteristics make the
complex trial protocol fundamentally unusable in the eld
(for details see Farwell 2011a, b, 2012).
First, complex trial protocol published error rates are far
too high for eld use. In our view, to be viable for eld use
a technique must have false positive/negative error rates of
less than 1% overall and less than 5% in each and every
individual study. Complex trial protocol error rates in
published studies average over ten times higher than these
criteria. Even in highly contrived laboratory conditions
with accommodating subjects and no real consequences to
the outcome, published accuracy in some studies is as low
as 53%, no better than chance. Error rates in all published
studies average 15% without countermeasures and 29%
with countermeasures.
Second, the complex trial protocol does not isolate the
critical variable. It lacks a standard for an information-
present response. Without a standard for comparison, it is
impossible to compute valid and meaningful statistics. The
statistics applied are invalid and result in extremely low
statistical condences, on average no better than chance for
information-absent determinations. Targets are simply
meaningless number strings. They are not comparable to
probes and do not provide a standard for an information-
present response. Data analysis ignores target responses,
and simply seeks to determine whether the probe responses
are larger than the irrelevant responses (with larger
variously dened). Bootstrapping computes the probability
that the probe responses are larger than the irrelevant
responses.
3
It classies subjects as information present (or
guilty) if this probability is 90% or greater, and other-
wise classies them as innocent. Thus, the statistics
applied classify subjects as innocent when there is up to
an 89% probability that they are in fact guilty, that is, an
11% probability that the determination is correct. In pub-
lished research subjects have been classied as innocent
when the statistics used returned as high as an 86% prob-
ability that the opposite classication would be correct,
4
or
14% probability that the classication returned by the
procedure is correct. Moreover, in the published data, the
average statistical condence for an innocent classi-
cation is 50%, no better than a coin ip. This is in accord
with the predictions of the statistical model used. This is a
fundamental aw in the statistical procedures, due to the
lack of a standard for an information-present response, that
cannot be corrected by simply changing the criterion.
Setting a higher statistical condence criterion for an
innocent determination will simply increase the already
unacceptably high error rate (see Farwell 2011a, b, 2012
for a detailed explanation). For example, a criterion could
be established that subjects are classied as innocent
when there is a 50% or greater probability that the probe
response is larger than the irrelevant response (that is, a
higher than chance probability that this classication is
correct). Applying this criterion to the actual reported data
results in an error rate of 50% or more (less than chance
accuracy) in the published studies. In other words,
according to both published data and the predictions of the
statistical model used, any criterion that results in greater
than chance statistical condence results in lower than
chance accuracy. Obviously, the procedures that produce
such low statistical condences and high error rates are
unsuitable for eld use, where high statistical condence is
a necessity and errors have real consequences for life and
freedom.
Third, on the stimulus presentations that are included in
the data analysis (probes and irrelevants), the subjects are
3
Note that in brain ngerprinting, both targets and irrelevants
provide standards. Bootstrapping computes the probability that the
probe responses are more similar to the target responses, or more
similar to the irrelevant responses. This results in high statistical
condences for both information-present and information-absent
determinations.
4
For example, in Meixner and Rosenfeld (2010, p. 63, Table 2,
subject 10), GNO condition was classied innocent when there was
an 86% probability that the probe response was larger than the
irrelevant response (i.e., 86% probability that guilty was the correct
classication).
Cogn Neurodyn (2012) 6:115154 147
1 3
not required to distinguish behaviorally between stimulus
types. They simply push a button indicating that something
appeared in a general area on the screen. Probes/irrelevants
occur at totally predictable times that are known to the
subjects. Thus, subjects are not required to read and pro-
cess probe and irrelevant stimuli and prove behaviorally
that they have done so on each trial. Motivated subjects
with something to hide do not read and process these
stimuli, and consequently their brain responses do not
reveal their concealed knowledge. The accuracy of the
complex trial protocol in detecting real-world information
in motivated subjects is 0% (Farwell et al. 2011). A sug-
gested means to coerce a subject into accommodatingly
revealing her concealed knowledge (Rosenfeld et al. 2008)
was to periodically ask the subject to recall what stimuli
she had seen, and threaten to le a false report that the
subject had failed the brainwave test if she did not recall
the stimuli accurately. Such a report would be false, since
in truth she had passed the brainwave test: her brain
responses contained no evidence of any relevant knowl-
edge. Clearly, this would be both unethical and ineffective
in any real-world situation with motivated subjects and real
consequences. Subjects could easily discern that neither
their brain responses nor such a false report would provide
any scientic evidence of their knowledge of the relevant
information, and the false report would carry no weight in
any real-world judicial proceeding.
This method differs from brain ngerprinting in several
other ways. The complex trial protocol has never been
independently replicated. It has never been applied in the
eld or in any real-world situation with non-trivial conse-
quences. It has never been ruled admissible in court, and in
light of the above it appears extremely unlikely that it ever
will be in the future. In our view, any attempt to apply it in
the real world would be scientically, ethically, and legally
untenable.
Reports in the popular press have sometimes mistakenly
considered another method, the brain electrical oscillation
system (BEOS) developed in India by Chanpadi Raman
Mukundan, to be based on the authors original brain n-
gerprinting research. Unlike brain ngerprinting, however,
it is not based on established scientic phenomena and
published data. Like the complex trial protocol, it has not
been independently replicated or published in the peer-
reviewed literature. It purports to distinguish between
knowledge gained while committing a crime and knowl-
edge learned after the fact by an innocent person. No
known mechanism or psychophysiological phenomenon
has been proposed on the basis of which to make this
distinction. Initially it was used in some criminal cases in
India, but it later was ruled inadmissible in court there.
In addition to the complex trial protocol and the BEOS
system, three studies, Miyake et al. (1993), Rosenfeld et al.
(2004), and Mertens and Allen (2008) warrant particular
mention in the context of scientic and methodological
errors. This is because (1) the errors resulted in excep-
tionally low accuracy rates; and (2) although the methods
are fundamentally different from brain ngerprinting and
fail to meet the brain ngerprinting standards, the studies
have been mistakenly considered to reect negatively on
brain ngerprinting (Harrington v. State 2001; Rosenfeld
2005; Mertens and Allen 2008). In fact, the studies show
only that these alternative, non-brain ngerprinting meth-
ods, which fall far short of the brain ngerprinting stan-
dards in fundamental ways, are inaccurate and susceptible
to countermeasures.
A study in Japan by Miyake et al. (1993) failed to meet
18 of the 20 brain ngerprinting scientic standards (all but
numbers 3 and 20). Moreover, the experimenters failed to
implement data collection, artifact rejection, and data
analysis procedures that meet the universal standards met
by other laboratories in the eld of event-related brain
potential research. They measured responses from the
wrong scalp location. These errors resulted in an excep-
tionally low accuracy rate. Only 65% of their determina-
tions were correct.
In a study that has been mistakenly (Rosenfeld 2005,
Mertens and Allen 2008) considered to be similar to brain
ngerprinting, and even purported to be a replication of the
original Farwell and Donchin brain ngerprinting research,
Rosenfeld et al. (2004) failed to meet 15 of the 20 brain
ngerprinting scientic standards, specically numbers
36, 810, 1215, and 1720. They reported a variety of
accuracy rates for different methods and analysis proce-
dures. None of the accuracy rates were as high as the
accuracy rates of brain ngerprinting, and some were as
low as chance (54%) even without countermeasures (see
Farwell 2011a, b, 2012). This study also showed that Ro-
senfelds techniques (but not brain ngerprinting) are
susceptible to countermeasures.
In a third study that has been mistakenly considered to
be similar to brain ngerprinting, Mertens and Allen (2008)
failed to meet standards 8, 13, 18, and 19 and consequently
achieved very low accuracy rates as well as susceptibility
to countermeasures. They used valid statistical procedures
and met several other standards that were not met by the
Rosenfeld et al. (2004) and Miyake et al. (1993) studies.
Nevertheless, failure to meet several vital scientic stan-
dards resulted in a major decrement in accuracy and also in
susceptibility to countermeasures.
The above studies serve to demonstrate that meeting the
scientic standards for brain ngerprinting research out-
lined herein is important in order to obtain valid, accurate,
reliable, and interpretable results. Meeting certain stan-
dards is also necessary for establishing procedures that can
be applied in eld settings. These studies also highlight the
148 Cogn Neurodyn (2012) 6:115154
1 3
fact that the proven inaccuracy and susceptibility to
countermeasures of other, non-brain ngerprinting tech-
niques does not imply that brain ngerprinting shares these
same shortcomings.
Summary
The role of brain ngerprinting in forensic science is to
bring within the realm of scientic scrutiny the record of a
crime, terrorist act, terrorist training, specic crime- or
terrorism-related knowledge or expertise, or other relevant
information stored in the brain of a suspect or other person
of interest, and to develop reliable forensic science evi-
dence based on the accurate detection of such information.
Brain ngerprinting is a scientic technique to detect
concealed information stored in the brain by measuring
event-related potential (ERP) brainwave responses. Brain
ngerprinting laboratory and eld tests at the CIA, the FBI,
the US Navy, and elsewhere have detected the presence or
absence of information regarding the following:
real-life events including felony crimes;
real crimes with substantial consequences, including
judicial outcomes such as the death penalty or life in
prison;
concealed information in real-world cases where sub-
jects were offered a $100,000 reward for beating the
test;
knowledge unique to FBI agents;
knowledge unique to explosives (EOD/IED) experts;
knowledge unique to US Navy medical military
personnel;
pictorially represented knowledge;
mock crimes and mock espionage scenarios;
other laboratory tests and real-world applications.
Brain ngerprinting has been successfully applied in eld
settings, including actual criminal cases wherein the brain
ngerprinting test was ruled admissible in court and/or
contributed to bringing the perpetrator to justice or
exonerating the innocent. Brain ngerprinting helped to
bring a serial killer to justice and to exonerate an innocent
man falsely convicted and imprisoned for murder.
A brain ngerprinting test measures the subjects brain
responses to specic information. The information is
embodied in stimuli consisting of words, phrases, or pic-
tures presented on a computer screen. Some of the stimuli
are probe stimuli. Probes contain information that is rele-
vant to the crime or situation under investigation and that
the subject has no way of knowing outside of having par-
ticipated in the crime. When the subject recognizes the
relevant information contained in the probes as signicant
in the context of the crime, the brain emits an Aha!
response. Brain ngerprinting measures and analyses the
brainwaves and detects the corresponding P300-MERMER
brain response.
Brain ngerprinting computes a determination of
information present (the subject possesses the specic
information tested) or information absent (he does not)
for each individual subject. The brain ngerprinting boot-
strapping algorithm also computes a statistical condence
for each individual determination.
In data analysis, responses to probes are compared with
two standards. Target stimuli provide a standard for the
subjects brain response to known crime-relevant informa-
tion, information which is provided to all subjects. Irrelevant
stimuli provide a standard for the subjects response to
irrelevant information consisting of plausible but incorrect
features of the crime. Data analysis determines whether the
response to the probes is more similar to the response to the
targets or to the response to the irrelevants, and provides a
statistical condence for this determination.
In our view, in order to be viable for eld use, a tech-
nique must have less than 1% error rate overall, and less
than 5% error rate in every individual study. Brain n-
gerprinting exceeds this standard. In over 200 cases
including all eld and laboratory research so far, brain
ngerprinting has not produced a single error, neither a
false negative nor a false positive. Error rate has been 0%.
100% of determinations have been correct. (Note, however,
that this is simply a report of the actual data to date; no
science can be generally characterized as 100% accurate
without qualication or reference to a specic data set.) In
brain ngerprinting using the P300-MERMER, all tests
have resulted in a denite determination with a high sta-
tistical condence. There have been no indeterminates. In
brain ngerprinting using the P300 alone, in less than 3%
of cases, the data analysis algorithm has concluded that
insufcient information is available to make a determina-
tion in either direction with a high statistical condence,
resulting in an indeterminate outcome (not an error).
Brain ngerprinting specic issue tests detect information
regarding a specic event at a particular time and place, such
as a crime or terrorist act. Brain ngerprinting specic
screening tests detect a specic type of knowledge or
expertise, such as knowledge unique to FBI agents, bomb
makers, or Al-Qaeda-trained terrorists. Brain ngerprinting
is not applicable for general screening, when the investiga-
tors have no idea what information is being sought.
Brain ngerprinting is highly resistant to countermea-
sures. Subjects have been taught the same countermeasures
that have proven effective against other, non-brain nger-
printing techniques. Countermeasures had no effect on
brain ngerprinting, despite the $100,000 reward offered
for beating the test with countermeasures and the motiva-
tion to beat the test inherent in real-world applications. All
Cogn Neurodyn (2012) 6:115154 149
1 3
subjects, whether practicing countermeasures or not, have
been correctly detected.
The results of original research by the author and
independent replications in other laboratories show that
accuracy and validity can be reliably attained by following
the established brain ngerprinting scientic standards
outlined herein. Studies that have failed to meet the brain
ngerprinting scientic standards show that such failure
can result in low accuracy, susceptibility to countermea-
sures, and in some cases unreliable results and invalid
procedures.
Studies in the original laboratory and independent rep-
lications elsewhere that meet the brain ngerprinting sci-
entic standards consistently report extremely accurate
results. Studies that fail to meet the brain ngerprinting
standards, particularly certain critical standards, have
resulted in inconsistent and lower accuracy rates, in some
cases no better than chance. In some cases such failure also
produced results that are uninterpretable and/or invalid. We
have outlined herein the most common errors in brain-
wave-based concealed information tests, and the errors that
have produced the greatest decrements in accuracy, reli-
ability, and validity.
This paper reviews all relevant research previously
published in English. In view of the published data, some
caveats are necessary with respect to reliability, accuracy,
practical usefulness in the eld, and generalizations
regarding results. The published results indicate that fol-
lowing the established brain ngerprinting scientic stan-
dards outlined herein is sufcient to ensure accurate,
reliable, and valid results in laboratory studies and eld
applications. However, the available evidence does not
support the notion that any attempt that fails to meet the
established brain ngerprinting scientic standards could
be expected to obtain accurate, reliable, or valid results.
Techniques that fail to meet at least the most essential of
the brain ngerprinting scientic standards have generally
produced error rates at least ten times higher than the error
rates that in our view are necessary for viable eld use. To
be meaningful and practically useful, generalizations about
brainwave-based concealed information tests must distin-
guish between the studies that meet the brain ngerprinting
standards and those that fail to meet the standards. Gen-
eralizations that fail to recognize this distinction are inad-
equate to present a meaningful interpretation of the
available data, and can result in drawing erroneous con-
clusions about brain ngerprinting that in fact apply only to
non-brain ngerprinting tests that fail to meet the stan-
dards. For example, the low accuracy and susceptibility to
countermeasures characteristic of several non-brain n-
gerprinting techniques has sometimes been erroneously
generalized to apply to brain ngerprinting, whereas in fact
the actual data directly contradict this generalization.
In addition to conducting the science according to
established brain ngerprinting standards, it is also vitally
important to restrict the interpretation of brain nger-
printing results to what the science actually shows. Brain
ngerprinting detects the presence or absence of specic
information stored in the brain. It does not detect guilt, lies,
emotions, intentions, or any action, including participation
in a crime.
Prior to a brain ngerprinting test, a criminal investi-
gator develops his account of the crime, based not on
science but on his skill and judgment as an investigator. He
determines that, in his non-scientic judgment, informa-
tion contained in specic probe stimuli is relevant to the
crime.
The brain ngerprinting scientist tests scientically
whether or not this specic information is stored in a
specic subjects brain. Scientic reports of brain nger-
printing results, and testimony by brain ngerprinting
expert witnesses in court, must be conned to an expla-
nation of the science and a report of what the science
actually shows. The only legitimate scientic conclusion to
be reported is that the brain ngerprinting evidence shows,
with a particular statistical condence, that the subject
either does or does not know the information contained in
the probe stimuli in the context of the crime. Any inter-
pretation of the results in terms of the subjects guilt or
innocence goes beyond the science and is outside the
legitimate purview of testimony by a brain ngerprinting
scientist. Brain ngerprinting scientists whose testimony
on brain ngerprinting has been admitted as scientic
evidence in court have adhered closely to this requirement.
As discussed herein, brain ngerprinting science does
not evaluate whether the criminal investigators account of
the crime, and the probe stimuli included therein, accu-
rately represent the crime, or whether the suspect com-
mitted the crime. Brain ngerprinting, and a brain
ngerprinting scientists testimony, do not address what the
suspect should know, could know, or would know about a
crime under what circumstances (e.g., if he is innocent or
guilty). Brain ngerprinting only detects what the subject
actually does know about the crime. It is up to the criminal
investigator to come up with an account of the crime and
the knowledge relevant thereto (the probe stimuli). It is up
to the prosecuting and defense attorneys to debate, and the
judge and jury to decide, what all the evidence, including
the brain ngerprinting evidence, means with respect to
what happened, whether a crime was committed, and if so
what was the crime, who committed it, and who is guilty or
not.
Brain ngerprinting is similar to other forensic sciences
in this regard. DNA testing, for example, concludes only
that Sample A (ostensibly from the crime scene) matches
sample B (ostensibly from the subject). DNA science and
150 Cogn Neurodyn (2012) 6:115154
1 3
DNA expert witnesses do not determine or opine on
whether the subject is guilty of a murder. That is up to the
judge and jury to decide based on all the evidence. Brain
ngerprinting does not present a conclusion regarding the
subjects guilt or innocence of the crime. Like other
forensic sciences, it simply provides evidence that is useful
for the the judge and jury in their determinations regarding
what took place and who is guilty or not.
In weighing the evidence and extrapolating from witness
testimony and scientic evidence to the question of whe-
ther a suspect committed a crime, judges and juries must
use common sense and take into account the well known
limitations of human memory. This consideration applies
equally to witness testimony, which is a subjective (and not
always truthful) account of the contents of memory, and to
brain ngerprinting, which provides an objective, scientic
account of the contents of human memory. Such consid-
erations are evaluated by the judge and jury on the basis of
their common sense and life experience, and are outside the
realm of the scientic testimony of a brain ngerprinting
scientist.
The results of published laboratory research and eld
applications indicate that brain ngerprinting testing con-
sistently provides accurate, reliable, and valid scientic
evidence in the detection of concealed information, pro-
vided that the science is conducted strictly according to the
established brain ngerprinting scientic standards and
interpreted according to these same standards such that the
scientic interpretation stays strictly within the boundaries
of what the science actually demonstrates. Brain nger-
printing evidence, when based on science so conducted and
interpreted, has proven to be of value in real-world crim-
inal justice and national security applications.
Brain ngerprinting has been successfully applied in
real-world cases and ruled admissible as scientic evidence
in court. Scientists in the United States currently continue
to apply it successfully in the eld. The results reviewed
herein suggest that brain ngerprinting provides a new
scientic method to accurately and reliably detect the
presence or absence of concealed information that can
generate useful forensic evidence in real-world applica-
tions in criminal justice and national security.
Acknowledgments The author is grateful to former FBI scientists
Drew Richardson, PhD and Sharon Smith, PhD for their substantial
contributions to some of the research reviewed herein; to attorneys
Thomas Makeig, Mary Kennedy, and Thomas Frerichs for their legal
expertise in obtaining admissibility in court for brain ngerprinting;
to the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) for funding several of
the studies reviewed herein; and to the US Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) and the US Navy for their cooperation and
assistance in conducting research with their personnel in their facil-
ities. The views expressed herein are the views of the author, and do
not necessarily reect the views of any other individual or agency.
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