Neo Realism
Neo Realism
Neo Realism
Andreas Bieler
Any military commander, who is honest with himself, or with those he speaks to, will
admit that he has made mistakes in the application of military power. He has killed
people, unnecessarily, his own troops or other troops, through mistakes, through errors
of judgement, a 100, or 1000, or tens of 1000, may be even 100000, but he has not
destroyed nations (Robert S. McNamara in The Fog of War).
This lecture deals with one of the dominant approaches in International Relations theory:
(neo-) realism. The lecture is divided into three parts. Part I will focus on the historical
emergence and key concepts of (neo-) realism. Part II will look at the empirical
application of neo-realism by John Mearsheimer to European security after the Cold War,
before Part III presents a range of theoretical criticisms of (neo-) realism. Most
importantly, the latter will make the point that neo-realism is unable to explain structural
change in world order.
1. (Neo-) Realism:
Historically, realism emerged in response to liberal approaches. When the latters hope
for a peaceful international order based on co-operation between democratic states
organized through the League of Nations fell apart as a result of the rise of aggressive
fascism in the 1920s and 1930s, the international situation characterized by war and the
struggle for survival was ripe for a new theoretical approach. The two key interventions
were The Twenty Years Crisis by E.H. Carr in 1939 and Politics among Nations by Hans
Morgenthau in 1948.
Realism, also referred to as classical realism (see Jacobs 2014, Lebow 2013)
emphasizes the reality of power. Conflicts between states are considered to be
inevitable in an anarchic international system due to scarcity of economic resources
(Carr) or as a result of evil human nature (Morgenthau). The liberal idea that every
international conflict is unnecessary or immoral is regarded by realists as an attempt to
enshrine an existing economic and political order, which is favourable to currently
dominant states. Kenneth Waltz further developed realism in his book Theory of
International Politics (1979), setting out a neo-realist or structural realism (see
Mearsheimer 2013, Schrnig 2014). In the following, key assumptions of realist
approaches in general will be outlined, before looking at the differences between realism
and neo-realism.
Three core (neo-) realist assumptions can be identified. First, states are
considered to be the main actors, operating in a rational, utility-maximising way. Neorealists acknowledge that there are other actors such as international organizations or
transnational corporations. Nevertheless, these other types of actors would have no
impact on actual developments in the international system and can, therefore, be
disregarded. Second, the international system is characterized by anarchy, i.e. the
absence of an over-arching, ordering power. As a result, the national interest is the
maximization of power in order to ensure the states survival. For neo-realists the
particular domestic set-up of states is, thereby, unimportant. Whether states are
Moreover, there are three further, secondary assumptions, which can be derived
from the three core assumptions. First, neo-realists argue that war is the normal state of
international affairs. A peaceful order can only be accomplished temporarily through a
balance of power, be it bipolar as during the Cold War, be it multipolar as after the
Congress of Vienna in 1815 in Europe. Second, international regimes are simply a
reflection of the underlying power structure and, consequently, have no independent
the run-up to open conflict. Neo-realists, by contrast, would stress the systemic
distribution of power resources at the global level and here the importance of securing
control over access to oil for the USA in competition with other powers such as China
and Russia. Moreover, they might analyse the regional distribution of power and the
threat a strong Iraq with access to chemical weapons may pose for neighbouring
countries such as Iran and Saudi Arabia, undermining stability within the regional
system.
More recent developments in neo-realist theory include the distinction between
offensive and defensive realism. As for offensive realism, John Mearsheimer argues that
the international systems is characterised by (1) anarchy; (2) the fact that states have
offensive military capabilities; and (3) uncertainty about other states actions; (4) survival
is the primary goal of great powers; (5) great powers are rational actors (Mearsheimer
2001: 30-2). When the five assumptions are married together, they create powerful
incentives for great powers to think and act offensively with regard to each other
(Mearsheimer 2001: 32). In other words, there is a constant struggle between states over
dominance, since maximising power ensures maximum security. If states have the
chance, they will attack in order to use their advantage. This unrelenting pursuit of
power means that great powers are inclined to look for opportunities to alter the
distribution of world power in their favor. They will seize these opportunities if they have
the necessary capability (Mearsheimer 2001: 3). Unsurprisingly, offensive realism
focuses mainly on great powers in its analyses, as only great powers are in a position to
move first in the international power struggle. Applied to the current situation at the
international level with China becoming increasingly a global power in its own right,
offensive realism suggests that the US should counteract growing Chinese strength now
through a pre-emptory strike, as long as this is still possible.
Defensive realists such as Waltz (1979) also argue that states seek power to
maximize their security. Since a balance of power ensures peaceful stability, however,
states will focus on maintaining a balance of power. Acquiring ever larger amounts of
power is not an objective in itself. Matthew Rendall (2006) examines four European
crises between 1814 and 1848. On all four occasions, he concludes, the dominant state
chose not to go to war, although hegemony may have been possible as a result. In short,
states may pursue opportunistic expansions, but they are unlikely to attempt to achieve
hegemony at all costs. In their analysis, defensive realists, in addition to the distribution
of power capabilities, also pay attention to the potential importance of shared values by
states, supporting a peaceful balance of power, as well as the importance of unit-level
factors, i.e. the specific characteristics of individual states. While this does not falsify
Mearsheimers theory per se, it contradicts one of its underlying assumptions: that states
are prepared to take big risks in the pursuit of regional dominance (Rendall 2006: 540).
Think points
produce similar results (Mearsheimer 1990: 32). Finally, mass armies are considered to
be ripe for hyper-nationalism increasing the danger of war. The second scenario is a
continuation of the existing ownership patters of nuclear weapons. This too is considered
dangerously unstable, first because Germany may try to go nuclear in order to balance
other powers such as the UK and France. Moreover, the vast area free of nuclear
deterrence would be prone to warfare, potentially fuelled by mass armies gripped with
hyper-nationalist sentiments. By contrast, the third scenario, a well-managed
proliferation could produce an order nearly as stable as the current order (Mearsheimer
1990: 37). Germany could be allowed to acquire nuclear weapons and other states in
Europe should be provided with security guarantees by one of the nuclear powers. In
other words, a managed multipolar balance of power would be established. Finally, the
fourth scenario, a non-managed proliferation of nuclear weapons, would again be more
dangerous, as nuclear powers may try to prevent others from going nuclear. Moreover,
small nuclear powers may be unable to maintain and secure their nuclear arsenal and their
political elites may not be able to perceive the futility of nuclear war. A wider spread of
nuclear weapons, ultimately, would increase the likelihood of terrorists getting their
hands on such weapons.
Nevertheless, while this assessment is clearly logical within the neo-realist
theoretical framework, is it really convincing? What may Mearsheimer overlook in his
analysis of post-Cold War Europe? We will return to this question when discussing
liberal IR theory in the next lecture and its application to the same question.
Think points
Arguably, Mearsheimers concerns were not borne out in post-Cold War Europe.
Which factors has he overlooked?
Are you convinced by the idea that nuclear weapons can be a positive force of
peace?
The Fog of War - Eleven Lessons from the Life of Robert S. McNamara
See also the excellent poem The Fog of IR Theory: Robert S. McNamara and Rule No.11
by Jamie Jordan in relation to this documentary.
3. Theoretical criticisms:
Despite its conceptual simplicity and logical coherence, neo-realism has come under
severe criticisms over the years. First, in order to carry out their enquiries, neo-realists
have an ahistoric assumption of a frozen set of actors, be they states, i.e. functionally
similar, utility-maximizing actors trying to ensure security, be they individuals,
attempting to maximize power (Ashley 1984). As a result, actors changing behaviour
cannot be analysed. In a way, even the possibility that an actor could change its
behavioural rationale in the first place cannot be incorporated into the analysis. Second,
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Textbook chapters
Donnelly, Jack (2013) Realism, in Scott Burchill et al (eds.) Theories of International
Relations (fifth edition). Basingstoke: Palgrave. Chapter 2.
Jacobs, Andreas (2014) Realism, in Manuela Spindler and Siegfried Schieder (eds.)
Theories of International Relations. Abingdon/New York: Routledge. Chapter 2.
Lebow, Richard Ned (2013) Classical Realism, in Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki and Steve
Smith (2010) International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity. Oxford: Oxford
University Press. Chapters 3.
Mearsheimer, John J. (2013) Structural Realism, in Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki and Steve
Smith (2010) International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity. Oxford: Oxford
University Press. Chapters 4.
Schrnig, Niklas (2014) Neorealism, in Manuela Spindler and Siegfried Schieder (eds.)
Theories of International Relations. Abingdon/New York: Routledge. Chapter 3.
Also referenced
Ashley, Richard K. (1984) The Poverty of Neorealism, International Organization,
Vol.38/2: 225-86.
Carr, E.H. (1939/2001) The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939 (reissued with new
introduction and edited by Michael Cox). Basingstoke: Palgrave.
Cox, Robert W. (1981) Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International
Relations Theory, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol.10/2: 126-55.
Mearsheimer, John J. (1990) Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold
War, International Security, Vol.15/1: 5-56.
Mearsheimer, John J. (2001) The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: Norton.
Morgenthau, Hans (1948/1993) Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and
Peace. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Rendall, Matthew (2006) Defensive Realism and the Concert of Europe, Review of
International Studies, 32(3): 523-40.
Waltz, Kenneth N. (1979) Theory of International Politics. New York: McGraw-Hill.
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