United States v. Milan Confesor Rodriguez Serrate, 534 F.2d 7, 1st Cir. (1976)
United States v. Milan Confesor Rodriguez Serrate, 534 F.2d 7, 1st Cir. (1976)
United States v. Milan Confesor Rodriguez Serrate, 534 F.2d 7, 1st Cir. (1976)
2d 7
41 A.L.R.Fed. 777
Marvin Diaz Ferrer, San Juan, P. R., by appointment of the Court, on brief
for defendant-appellant.
Julio Morales Sanchez, U. S. Atty., and Jose A. Anglada, Asst. U. S.
Atty., San Juan, P. R., on brief for appellee.
Before COFFIN, Chief Judge, McENTEE and CAMPBELL, Circuit
Judges.
McENTEE, Circuit Judge.
Appellant's primary objection on this appeal is that the trial court erred in
permitting the government to introduce into evidence over his objection various
There can be little dispute that Rule 44(a)(2) is the applicable and appropriate
rule in these circumstances. At trial the government introduced copies of the
official documents. Although the rule permits the use of copies it requires that
they be attested to by a person authorized to do so and "accompanied by a final
certification as to the genuineness of the signature and official position of the
attesting person." United States v. Leal, 509 F.2d 122, 126 (9th Cir. 1975). The
final certification must be made by "a diplomatic official of the United States or
(a) diplomatic or consular official of the foreign country assigned or accredited
to the United States." Id. As to the disputed documents here the government
presented a copy of each accompanied by an attestation of its authenticity by
the Dominican official in charge of the records from which it was obtained. In
the case of four documents (Exhibits 2, 3, 6 and 7, see n.2 supra ) the
government also provided final official certification from Mr. H. H. Buzbee,
the United States Consul in the Dominican Republic. Thus, with regard to these
documents the precise terms of Rule 44(a)(2) were complied with and there can
be no dispute as to their admissibility despite the fact that the trial court did not
explicitly admit them in reliance on the rule. In the case of the remaining
documents, however, the last step of final certification was not complied with.
The government contends it was able to bridge this gap by proffering extrinsic
evidence in support of particular documents. For example, with regard to
exhibit 10, see n.2 supra, the government presented testimony from Mr. Andres
Linares, a Dominican official in charge of the demographic records for the area
in which appellant was born. Linares, who had authorized the photocopy of the
portion of the birth registry presented in evidence, testified as to the official
procedure by which the records were kept. The government contends that in
this fashion it followed what was "in essence Rule 44(a)(2) procedure," see
United States v. Leal, supra at 127. However, we do not uphold the evidentiary
validity of the documents in question on this ground.
We note that the final sentence of Rule 44(a)(2) permits a court "for good cause
shown" to admit attested copies without final certification, see n.4 supra, in
recognition of the fact that "in some situations it may be difficult . . . to satisfy
the basic requirements of the rule. . . ." Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 44,
39 F.R.D. 69, 116 (1966). See United States v. Leal, supra at 126. In the
present case appellant was shown all the documents and furnished copies of
them. In addition, the trial court wisely adjourned the trial for an extra day in
order to permit appellant's counsel to examine all the documents in detail. Since
these documents dealt only with the date and location of appellant's birth and
his family origins, facts within his intimate personal knowledge, it would
appear he had more than ample opportunity to ascertain their accuracy.
Furthermore, although he objected to the admissibility of the documents on the
ground of improper certification, appellant "raised no objection directed to the
absence of good cause . . ." as set forth in Rule 44(a)(2). United States v.
Pacheco-Lovio, 463 F.2d 232, 234 (9th Cir. 1972). Under these circumstances
we cannot say that the decision of the trial court to admit the challenged
documents was improper.6
5
Appellant also contends that the court erred in not dismissing Counts III and IV
of the indictment which charged violations of 18 U.S.C. 911 and 1015(c)
respectively. Both counts concern appellant's attempt to enter the United States
as a citizen in January, 1975. On that occasion he presented a false Puerto
Rican birth certificate as evidence of his asserted citizenship status. Appellant
claims that this act does not amount to a false representation of citizenship
within the meaning of the statute.7 However, this claim cannot prevail. He
presented the birth certificate at the International Airport, Isla Verde, Puerto
Rico at a checkpoint where an immigration official was seeking to determine
the nationality of arriving passengers.8 Given this context appellant's act was
sufficient to constitute a violation of 911. Ackerschott v. United States, 139
F.2d 114 (9th Cir. 1943); see Chow Bing Kew v. United States, 248 F.2d 466,
469 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 889, 78 S.Ct. 259, 2 L.Ed.2d 188 (1957);
United States v. Franklin, 188 F.2d 182 (7th Cir. 1951).
Also, we are not persuaded by appellant's claim that the false birth certificate
he presented to the immigration official is not the type of documentary
evidence of citizenship covered by 1015(c).9 There is ample evidence to
indicate that birth certificates are routinely relied on by Puerto Rican officials to
determine alien or citizen status. Consequently, appellant's presentment of the
certificate in support of a claim of citizenship when he knew it to be based on
false information clearly places it among those documents whose use Congress
meant to bar through enactment of this statute. See Dolan v. United States, 133
F. 440 (8th Cir. 1904). Cf. United States v. Bithony, 472 F.2d 16, 22 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 412 U.S. 938, 93 S.Ct. 2771, 37 L.Ed.2d 397 (1973); United States
Affirmed.
The evidence showed that on October 1, 1969, appellant applied for and
obtained a United States passport, stating that he was born in Rio Piedras,
Puerto Rico on October 12, 1936, whereas documents from the Dominican
Republic show him to have been born on November 12, 1935, in that country.
(Count I)
With this passport he sought in 1972 to apply for an immigrant visa for his wife
and children. (Count II). When an investigation revealed he was not a United
States citizen, his passport was taken and he was barred from returning to the
United States. Appellant nevertheless returned to Puerto Rico and in 1973
procured a delayed birth certificate from the Commonwealth based on false
evidence purporting to show he was born in Puerto Rico. He then travelled to
the Dominican Republic. When he returned to Puerto Rico on January 15,
1975, he represented himself to be a United States citizen by birth (Count III),
and proferred to Immigration and Naturalization Service officers the false birth
certificate he had previously procured. (Count IV).
The documents in question were government exhibits 1-3, 5-7, 9 and 10 at trial.
Exhibit 5, the only nonofficial document, is a church baptismal certificate from
appellant's home parish in the Dominican Republic. The other exhibits are as
follows:
A transcribed copy of a death certificate kept by the Civil State Office of the
Dominican Republic recording the death of appellant's father
10
After appellant proferred the false birth certificate to the immigration official in
support of his claim to be a United States citizen the official asked him if the
certificate was his and he responded affirmatively