Foreign Ballistic Missile Capabilities
Foreign Ballistic Missile Capabilities
Foreign Ballistic Missile Capabilities
Foreign
Ballistic Missile
Capabilities
APRIL 2009
Page
Introduction 1
Summary 26
Endnotes 27
–i–
INTRODUCTION
Ballistic missiles are attractive to many nations because they can be used effectively against
an adversary with a formidable air defense system where an attack with manned aircraft
would be too impractical or costly. Additionally, missiles can be used as a deterrent or as an
instrument of terror. Missiles also offer the advantage of fewer maintenance, training, and
logistical requirements than manned aircraft. Even limited use of these weapons can be
devastating because ballistic missiles can be armed with chemical, biological, or nuclear
warheads.1
Ballistic missile capabilities continue to increase with the proliferation of missile technology.
Over 20 countries have ballistic missile systems and it is likely that missiles will be a threat
in future conflicts involving U.S. forces. Ballistic missiles have been used in several conflicts
over the last 20 years, including the Iran-Iraq war, the Afghan civil war, the war in Yemen,
the 1991 and 2003 Persian Gulf conflicts, and the Russian military action in Chechnya. 2
In order to better understand ballistic missile capabilities, this document addresses ballistic
missile basics, characteristics, proliferation, and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) from
select ballistic missile capable countries.
Ballistic missiles are a means to rapidly and accurately deliver a lethal payload to a target.3
Once its fuel has been consumed, the ballistic missile (or, more commonly, a weapon-
carrying payload that separates from the booster section) follows an elliptical orbit around
the center of the Earth, defined strictly by the combination of velocity/flight angle at
burnout and the Earth’s gravity. By careful control of the missile during its powered flight,
the payload can be very accurately placed at the desired target point. 4
In many short-range ballistic missiles, the entire missile remains intact until the warhead
detonates. In longer-range ballistic missiles, warheads are contained in separating reentry
vehicles (RVs). Some long-range ballistic missiles carry multiple independently targetable
reentry vehicles (MIRVs), which hold up to 10 RVs per missile. RVs reenter the Earth’s
atmosphere at very high velocities, on the order of 4-5 miles per second. 6
–1–
Ballistic missiles are composed of one or more stages. Multiple-stage missiles, which are
configured so that each stage has its own independent propulsion system, are more
efficient for longer range missions.7 Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) typically have
two or three stages with powerful liquid-propellant engines or solid propellant motors that
propel the payload toward the target, as well as a post-boost vehicle (PBV) with a much
smaller propulsion system. Some RVs, defined as maneuvering reentry vehicles (MaRVs),
have independent maneuvering capability.8
MISSILE COMPONENTS
All ballistic missiles are made up of three essential elements: a propulsion system, which
provides the energy necessary to reach the target; a guidance system, which controls
steering of the missile during powered flight and ensures the correct initial conditions for
the ballistic trajectory; and the payload, which destroys the target.9
Propulsion
Rocket propulsion involves combining fuel and an oxidizer in a combustion chamber, in
which chemical reactions produce a high-pressure, high temperature gas. Exhausting that
gas produces a thrust that propels the missile.10
Guidance System
The accuracy of a ballistic missile depends on its ability to achieve an exact velocity and
location in space at the end of its powered flight. Ensuring that this velocity and location are
precisely attained is the job of the guidance and control system. Throughout the powered
phase of flight, the instruments in the inertial navigation system (INS) must continually sense
all the components of the missile’s acceleration. The guidance computer uses these sensed
–2–
accelerations to determine the missile’s “state” (velocity, location, and orientation) and
sends corrective messages to the missile’s steering system to eliminate deviations from the
required flight profile.12
Payload
The function of the ballistic missile payload subsystem is to ensure that the weapon reaches
the target and detonates at the correct time and place.13 Ballistic missile payloads can be
nuclear, conventional, or chemical/biological. Chemical and biological weapons have also
been incorporated into payload systems for short-range ballistic missiles. The effectiveness
of these designs, and their ability to be scaled to longer ranges, is speculative.14
Many countries view ballistic missile systems as cost-effective weapons and symbols of
national power. In addition, they present an asymmetric threat to U.S. airpower. Many
ballistic missiles are armed with weapons of mass destruction.
North Korea has an ambitious ballistic missile development program and has exported missile
technology to other countries, including Iran and Pakistan. On 4 and 5 July 2006, North Korea
flight-tested the Taepo Dong-2 SLV/ICBM for the first time, which failed shortly after launch. At the
same time it successfully flight tested six theater ballistic missiles. These successes demonstrated
the capability to target U.S. forces and allies in South Korea and Japan.16 In April 2009 North
Korea launched the TD-2 for the second time in a failed attempt to orbit a satellite.17
–3–
Iran has an extensive missile development program and has
received support from entities in Russia, China, and North
Korea.18 Beyond the steady growth in its missile and rocket
inventories, Iran has boosted the lethality and effectiveness
of existing systems with accuracy improvements and new
submunition payloads. Iran has publicized exercises featuring
missile launches.19
Russia still has several thousand nuclear warheads deployed on ballistic missiles capable of
reaching the United States, and is expected to retain the largest force of strategic ballistic
missiles outside the United States.21
Since the 1980s, Pakistan has pursued an indigenous ballistic missile development
capability in order to avoid reliance on any foreign entity.24 Pakistan’s goal is to produce
increasingly longer-range missiles.25 Pakistan has development and production facilities for
both solid- and liquid-propellant missiles;26 however, Pakistan likely will continue to require
significant foreign assistance in key technologies for several years. 27
–4–
PROLIFERATION TRENDS
Transfers of technologies, components and raw materials support WMD and missile programs
development, especially across the Middle East and South Asia. Such technology transfers
have lasting consequences. China’s provision of solid-propellant missile technology more
than 15 years ago helped Pakistan develop the Shaheen II medium-range and Abdali
short-range ballistic missiles. Other examples include an agreement between China and
Turkey regarding an SRBM, Beijing’s active marketing of their latest developmental SRBM,
the P12; and Egyptian Scud production from North Korea. 28
–5–
Even though most advanced nations
cooperate against WMD proliferation,
a number of trends beyond direct
government control still fuel proliferation.
They include commercial scientific
advances, the availability of relevant dual-
use studies and information, scientists’
enthusiasm for sharing their research
and the availability of dual-use training and
education.34
Pakistani Ghauri MRBM
LAUNCH TRENDS
Key countries with ballistic missile development programs, including North Korea, Iran,
China, Russia, India, Pakistan, and Syria have conducted several hundred launches of
ballistic missiles over the past decade. This includes short-range, medium-range,
intermediate-range, intercontinental, and submarine-launched ballistic missiles. 35
Very few countries have developed and deployed ICBMs. For several countries ICBM
development has coincided with SLV development because of the commonality of
–6–
required technology. As an example, when North Korea launched a three-stage Taepo
Dong-1 (TD-1) MRBM in 1998, it publicly characterized it as an SLV. 38 Although the small
third stage failed to place a satellite in orbit, the two-stage missile booster apparently
performed successfully.39 The launch demonstrated several key technologies required to
develop an ICBM, including stage separation. The existence of a third stage itself was an
unanticipated development in the North Korean ballistic missile program.40
NORTH KOREA
North Korea launched a TD-2 missile on 5 April 2009 as a space launch vehicle. The launch
failed: stage one of the missile fell into the Sea of Japan and the remaining stages along
with the payload itself landed in the Pacific Ocean.47
IRAN
Iran does not yet have the technical capability to produce an ICBM, but it is believed they
may develop one by 2015.48 Iran has continued research and development on its longer
range ballistic missile programs and has publicly reiterated its commitment to developing
SLVs, which contain most of the key building blocks for an ICBM. 49 Iran launched its Safir
SLV on 17 August 2008 in a failed attempt to orbit its indigenously produced Omid satellite.50
On 2 February 2009 Iran again launched a Safir SLV, successfully inserting the Omid satellite
into orbit.51 This success shows progress in some technologies relevant to ICBMs.52
–7–
CHINA
RUSSIA
Russia views its strategic missile forces, especially its nuclear-armed missiles, as a symbol of
great power status and a key deterrent.56 Although the size of the Russian ICBM force will
continue to decrease because of arms control agreements, aging missiles, and resource
constraints, Russia probably will retain the largest ICBM force outside the United States. 57
–8–
Representative ICBMs
ICBM Characteristics60
Producer Number Warheads Deployment Maximum
Missile Propellant
and / or User of Stages per Missile Mode Range (km)
–9–
SELECT MEDIUM-RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILES (MRBMs)
AND INTERMEDIATE-RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILES (IRBMs)
New MRBM and/or IRBM systems are in development in North Korea, Iran, China, India,
and Pakistan. These are strategic systems, and most will be armed with nonconventional
warheads. Russia no longer produces or retains any MRBM or IRBM systems because they
are banned by the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which entered into
force in 1988. China has been very active in its development of MRBMs. 61
NORTH KOREA
Chinese MRBM / IRBM Range Rings North Korean MRBM / IRBM Range Rings
North Korea has fewer than 50 launchers62 for its indigenously-developed No Dong MRBM,
which uses a scaled-up Scud engine. It can threaten Japan, South Korea, and U.S. bases
in the vicinity of North Korea. It was first flight-tested in 1993.63 Pakistan’s Ghauri and Iran’s
Shahab-3 MRBMs are based on the No Dong.64 North Korea is also developing a new IRBM65
that has not been flight-tested to date, but could be exported to other countries. 66
IRAN
– 10 –
Tehran is developing the new 2,000 km range Ashura MRBM.69 Iran has also indicated it
has a solid-propellant MRBM in development,70 and it may seek to develop additional
longer-range MRBMs and IRBMs. This includes a variant of the North Korean new IRBM which
reportedly has been sold to Iran.71
CHINA
An area of clear investment for China has involved the pursuit of MRBMs, including the
CSS-5, a two-stage, solid-propellant MRBM capable of reaching targets in the Pacific
Theater and most of Asia. 72 China is
acquiring conventional MRBMs to
increase the range to which it can
conduct precision strikes, to include
targeting naval ships, including
aircraft carriers, operating far from
China’s shores. 73 China is developing
an anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM)
based on a variant of the CSS-5
MRBM as a component of its anti-
access strategy. As described in an
Schematic Diagram of the Anti-Ship Ballistic
authoritative 2004 article for the Missile’s use of midcourse and terminal guidance
Second Artillery Corps, the ASBM could to strike an aircraft carrier used in a 2006 article
from the Second Artillery Engineering College.
– 11 –
employ “terminal-sensitive penetrating sub-
munitions” to “destroy the enemy’s carrier-
borne planes, the control tower and other
easily damaged and vital positions.” 74 The
ASBM has a range in excess of 1,500 km, is
armed with a maneuverable warhead, and
when incorporated into a sophisticated
command and control system, is intended
to provide the PLA the capability to attack
ships at sea, including aircraft carriers in the CSS-5
western Pacific Ocean. 75
The PLA has replaced older liquid-fueled nuclear-capable CSS-3 IRBMs with more
advanced solid-fueled CSS-5 MRBMs in Western China. 76 China also has fewer than 50
of the CSS-2 IRBM, which is a single-stage, liquid-propellant, limited mobility system with
a range of 3,000+ km. China also supplied the CSS-2 to Saudi Arabia. 77
RUSSIA
INDIA/PAKISTAN
– 12 –
Representative MRBMs and IRBMs
– 13 –
FOREIGN BALLISTIC MISSILE PROGRAMS
IRAN VIETNAM
Fateh-110 Scud B
Scud B/C SAUDI ARABIA YEMEN UAE PAKISTAN INDIA
CSS-8 CSS-2 Scud B Scud B Hatf 1 Prithvi 1/2
Shahab 3 SS-21 Ghaznavi Dhanush
SRBM Shahab 3 Variant Shaheen I Agni 1 Sources:
Ashura Ghauri Agni 2/3 National Air and Space Intelligence Center, Ballistic and
MRBM/IRBM Shaheen II Sagarika Cruise Missile Threat, 2006
– 15 –
SELECT SHORT-RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILES (SRBMs)
The Russian SS-1c Mod 1, also called the Scud B, has been
exported to more countries than any other type of guided
ballistic missile. It has proven to be an adaptable and versatile
weapon. For example, the Iraqi Scud missiles used during the
1991 Persian Gulf War had been modified to double their
range. North Korea has produced its own version of the Scud
B, as well as the Scud C, an extended-range version of the
Scud B.87
Scud B
Although the Scud was originally designed as a tactical battlefield support weapon, many
countries view it and other SRBM systems as strategic weapons to be used against urban
areas. Iraq used extended-range Scud missiles as strategic weapons during both the Iran-
Iraq war and the 1991 Persian Gulf War. In the future, other countries could modify Scud
missiles to significantly improve their accuracy and use them against high-value military
targets and cities. 88
NORTH KOREA
North Korea has over 500 Scud missiles available for use against targets on the Korean
peninsula,89 including 300 km Scud B and 500 km Scud C SRBMs. 90 North Korea produces
both its own version of the Russian Scud B and the Scud C, an indigenous, extended-range
version of the Scud B.91 In 2005, North Korea tested a new solid-propellant short-range
ballistic missile.92
IRAN
Fateh-110
– 16 –
North Korean SRBM Range Rings Iranian SRBM Range Rings
CHINA
China has deployed a very large force of modern solid propellant SRBMs in the vicinity
of Taiwan. 97 These include the CSS-7 and CSS-6 single-stage, solid-propellant missiles with
ranges of 300 km and 600 km respectively.98 All Chinese SRBMs are mobile and can deploy
throughout the country.99 As of September 2008, China had 1,050-1,150 SRBMs and is
increasing its inventory at a rate of over 100 missiles per year. While China’s first-generation
SRBMs do not possess true precision strike capability, later generations have greater ranges,
improved accuracy, and a wider variety of conventional payloads, including unitary and
submunition warheads.100
RUSSIA
Russian SS-21 and SS-26 SRBMs provide Russian ground forces with a rapid, precision-guided,
theater deep-strike capability.101 Russia continues to maintain a significant number of
SRBMs, particularly SS-21s and Scuds that were retained from deactivated units. Russia fired
SS-21s and Scuds against Chechen forces in the fall of 1999.102 Russia is also offering the
advanced new Iskander-E SRBM for export.103
INDIA
Indian SRBMs include the Prithvi I and Prithvi II, as well as the ship-launched Dhanush. The
Prithvi I is deployed with the Indian Army. 104 The Prithvi II is a modified Prithvi I for use by
India’s Air Force. 105 The Dhanush is a naval version of the Prithvi and is undergoing sea-
based flight tests from an Indian naval surface ship.106 The Indian military is preparing to
field several new or updated SRBMs.107
– 17 –
PAKISTAN
Pakistan has several active SRBM programs, including the Ghaznavi.108 Pakistan is attempting
to market the Hatf I as an inexpensive and easy to operate system.109 Pakistani officials
claim the Shaheen I is capable of carrying a nuclear warhead.110
Ghaznavi Prithvi
SYRIA
Syria has a combined total of several hundred SS-21, Scud B, C, and D SRBMs.111 Syria’s
liquid-propellant ballistic missile program continues to depend on foreign equipment and
assistance, primarily from North Korean entities. 112 Syria also continues to acquire Scud-
related equipment and materials from North Korea and Iran and produces the Scud C with
North Korean assistance. 113 Syria is fielding updated SRBMs to replace older and shorter-
range variants.114
LIBYA
Libya has pledged to eliminate ballistic missiles with ranges greater than 300 km and
payloads greater than 500 kg and to allow immediate inspections and monitoring to verify
these actions.115 Libya has disclosed several dozen facilities, including their deployed
Scud B sites and their secret North Korean-assisted Scud C production line. 116 The Scud C
program has been disbanded, including five completed systems, two partial systems, and
all related equipment.117 The Al Fatah is an indigenously-developed, 200 km range SRBM
which is currently undergoing testing.118
– 18 –
Representative SRBMs
SRBM Characteristics119
Producer Number Deployment Maximum
Missile Propellant
and / or User of Stages Mode Range (km)
– 19 –
SELECT SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED BALLISTIC MISSILES (SLBMs)
CHINA
China has no deployed SLBMs. China has designed a new nuclear-powered ballistic missile
submarine (SSBN) called the Type 094, which will carry the new JL-2 SLBM. 120 The JL-2 SLBM is
a three-stage, solid-propellant missile. This missile is not yet deployed, but it is capable of a
7,200 km range. The JL-2 is expected to be capable of targeting the entire United States.121
The introduction of a new generation SLBM on China’s new ballistic missile submarine will
provide an additional survivable nuclear option.122
The CSS-NX-3 SLBM is a two-stage, solid-propellant missile that is launched from a Xia class
SSBN. China has 12 launch tubes, but this missile is not yet deployed. The CSS-NX-3 is capable
of a 1,600+ km range. 123
RUSSIA
Russia still maintains a substantial force of SSBNs with intercontinental-range missiles. They
are developing new and improved SLBM weapon systems to replace its current inventory
of Cold War vintage systems. 124
– 20 –
INDIA
India, with Russian assistance, is currently developing an SLBM known as the Sagarika.130
The Sagarika could be operational after 2010.131
UNITED KINGDOM
FRANCE
Representative SLBMs
– 21 –
SLBM Characteristics130
Typhoon /
Bulava-30 Russia 3 + PBV Unknown Solid 8,000+
Dolgorukiy
OVERVIEW
Warhead
– 22 –
mechanisms. Nonconventional warheads include weapons of mass destruction (nuclear,
biological, and chemical weapons), as well as nonlethal warheads, a relatively new class
of warhead designed to disable equipment rather than harm personnel. Conventional,
biological, and chemical weapons can be packaged in unitary (single) warheads and in
submunitions (multiple small bomblets that are released at altitude to disperse over a wide
area). 135
PROLIFERATION
The total number of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons in the world is
shrinking as the major powers scale back their inventories through unilateral reductions and
arms control, but other countries and groups still try to acquire these weapons. About a
dozen countries have offensive biological weapons (BW) programs, and the same number
have chemical weapons (CW) programs. That number could grow as new technologies
are developed and the international flow of information, goods, expertise, and technology
continues. Nearly all countries that reportedly have or are seeking nuclear, biological, or
chemical weapons also have ballistic missiles.137
Elements in North Korea, Russia, China, India, Pakistan, and other countries continue to
export weapons technology. The potential for secondary proliferation markets has grown,
and concern about the ability of individual actors like the Pakistani nuclear scientist, A.Q.
Khan, to peddle nuclear technology has grown considerably. 138
– 23 –
COUNTRY INFORMATION
North Korea
On 10 February 2005, North Korea announced for the first time publicly that
it has nuclear arms; they claimed the nuclear weapons development was
for self-defense purposes. In October 2006, North Korea conducted its first
nuclear test.139
North Korea has pursued biological warfare capabilities since the 1960s. It has acquired
dual-use biotechnical equipment, supplies, and reagents that could be used to support
biological weapons efforts. 140 North Korea is enhancing its biological weapons potential
as it builds a legitimate biotechnology infrastructure and is believed to possess a munitions
production infrastructure that would allow agent weaponization. It may have biological
weapons available for use. 141
North Korea has a long-standing chemical weapons program.142 It is not a party to the
Chemical Weapons Convention and continues to acquire dual-use chemicals that could
be weaponized. 143
North Korea’s chemical warfare capabilities include the ability to produce bulk quantities of
nerve, blister, choking, and blood agent using a sizeable, though aging, chemical industry.
It possesses a stockpile of agents and weapons of unknown size, which it could employ by
a variety of delivery means. 144
Iran
In November 2007, the Intelligence Community judged with high confidence
that in Fall 2003 Iran halted its nuclear weapons program, to include weapon
design, weaponization work, and covert uranium conversion-related and
uranium enrichment-related work.145 As of mid-2007 Iran had not restarted
the program.146 Although the Intelligence Community judges that Iran does
not yet have a nuclear weapon, 147 it is currently developing its nuclear infrastructure,
which could produce highly enriched uranium and plutonium for a nuclear weapons
program.148 The Intelligence Community judges with high confidence that Iran will not be
technically capable of producing and reprocessing enough plutonium for a weapon before
about 2015.149
Iran’s biological weapons program began during the Iran/Iraq War, employing limited
amounts of agent against Iraqi troops.150 Iran has a growing biotechnology industry,
significant pharmaceutical experience, and the overall infrastructure that could be used
to support a biological warfare program.151 It is believed that Iran maintains offensive
chemical and biological weapons capabilities in various stages of development,152 is
technically capable of producing at least rudimentary bulk-fill biological warheads for a
variety of delivery systems, including missiles,153 and continues to aggressively seek foreign
technology, training, and expertise to advance its biotechnology industry.154 Iran has
– 24 –
produced blister, blood, and choking agents, and is believed to be conducting research
on nerve agents. 155 Iran also possesses weaponized stockpiles of agents, is capable of
agent delivery, and trains military forces to operate in contaminated environments. 156
China
China’s 2006 Defense White Paper states that: 1) the purpose of China’s
nuclear force is to “deter other countries from using or threatening to
use nuclear weapons against China;” 2) China “upholds the principles
of counterattack in self-defense and limited development of nuclear
weapons;” and, 3) China “has never entered into and will never enter into a
nuclear arms race with any other country.” The document reiterated China’s commitment
to a declaratory policy of “no first use of nuclear weapons at any time and under any
circumstances,” and states China “unconditionally undertakes not to use or threaten to
use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states or nuclear weapon-free zones.”
Doctrinal materials suggest additional missions for China’s nuclear forces include deterring
conventional attacks against China nuclear assets or conventional attacks with WMD-like
effects, reinforcing China’s great power status, and increasing freedom of action by limiting
the extent to which others can coerce China with nuclear threats.157
Russia
Russia maintains a full compliment of nuclear weapons, including a relatively
large stockpile of nonstrategic nuclear warheads. Russia also continues
research and development that could support its chemical and biological
warfare programs.162
India
India is building larger stockpiles of fission weapons and is likely working on
advanced warhead and delivery system designs to increase the effective-
ness of these weapons.163 Additionally, India has the infrastructure to
support biological and some aspects of their chemical warfare programs.164
India had five underground nuclear tests in May 1998165 and is capable of
manufacturing complete sets of components for plutonium-based nuclear weapons. In
the biological arena, India has substantial biotechnical infrastructure and expertise166 and
is conducting biological warfare defense research. 167 India acknowledged a chemical
warfare program in 1997 and opened its facilities to inspection.168 A sizeable chemical
industry could be a source for proliferation and weaponization of dual-use chemicals.169
– 25 –
Syria
Syria possesses a biotechnical infrastructure that is adequate to support
limited biological warfare programs,170 and it is believed that Syria maintains
an offensive biological weapons research and development program.171
Syria is also believed to be pursuing select biological agent development.172
Additionally, Syria has an active chemical weapons program 173 and is
currently making improvements to its chemical infrastructure. Syria has developed CW
warheads for its Scud missiles, 174 and it continues to seek CW related expertise from foreign
sources, including precursor chemicals and key production equipment. 175
In September 2007, Israel bombed a covert nuclear reactor in eastern Syria. North Korea
assisted Syria’s covert nuclear activities, and the reactor, which was damaged beyond
repair, was capable of producing plutonium. In defiance of its international obligations,
Syria did not inform the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) of the construction of
the reactor, and, after it was destroyed, the regime moved quickly to bury evidence of its
existence. The construction of the reactor was a dangerous and potentially destabilizing
development for the region and the world.176
SUMMARY
Overall, the threat posed by ballistic missile delivery systems is likely to continue increasing
while growing more complex over the next decade. Current trends indicate that adversary
ballistic missile systems, with advanced liquid- or solid-propellant propulsion systems, are
becoming more flexible, mobile, survivable, reliable and accurate while also presenting
longer ranges. Prelaunch survivability is also likely to increase as potential adversaries
strengthen their denial and deception measures and increasingly base their missiles on
mobile sea- and land-based platforms. Adversary nations are increasingly adopting
technical and operational countermeasures to defeat missile defenses. For example, China,
Iran and North Korea exercise near simultaneous salvo firings from multiple locations to
defeat these defenses. The availability of weapons of mass destruction for use on ballistic
missiles vastly increases the significance of this threat.177
Viewed from a global perspective, Russia probably will retain the largest force of strategic
ballistic missiles outside the United States. China is capable of producing technologically
advanced ballistic missiles and has sold ballistic missile technology to other countries.
China has an extensive theater missile program and has deployed a large force of ballistic
missiles in the vicinity of Taiwan. North Korea is continuing the development of the Taepo
Dong-2 ICBM and has a new IRBM in development. Any North Korean ballistic missiles may
be exported to other countries in the future. With continued foreign assistance, Iran also
could have an ICBM capable of reaching the United States by 2015. 178
Ballistic missiles, with their relatively low operating costs, their high probability of penetrating
existing defense systems, and their value as a symbol of national power, will continue to be
the offensive weapons of choice for many nations. As such, they are threats that must be
carefully considered in future military planning and operations.179
– 26 –
ENDNOTES
All sources used for this document are unclassified and have been released to the public by
the originating agencies.
1
“Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat,” National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC), NASIC-1031-
0985-06, March 2006, p. 1 (B&CM Threat 2006)
2
B&CM Threat 2006, p. 1
3
“Ballistic Missiles: Delivery Systems For Weapons of Mass Destruction,” DCI Center for Weapons
Intelligence, Nonproliferation, and Arms Control (WINPAC), May 1995, p. 3 (WINPAC 1995)
4
WINPAC 1995, p. 3
5
B&CM Threat 2006, p. 3
6
B&CM Threat 2006, p. 3
7
B&CM Threat 2006, p. 3
8
B&CM Threat 2006, p. 3
9
WINPAC 1995, p. 3
10
WINPAC 1995, p. 5
11
B&CM Threat 2006, p. 3; WINPAC 1995, p. 5
12
WINPAC 1995, p. 16-18
13
WINPAC 1995, p. 21
14
WINPAC 1995, p. 23
15
B&CM Threat 2006, p. 3
16
“Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States,” Director of the Defense
Intelligence Agency Lieutenant General Michael D. Maples Statement for the Record to the House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 18 January 2007, p. 10-11 (Maples 18 Jan 2007)
17
NORAD News Release, “NORAD and USNORTHCOM monitor North Korean Launch,” North American
Aerospace Defense Command, 5 April 2009
18
B&CM Threat 2006, p. 9
19
“Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States,” Statement for the Record,
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, Lieutenant General Michael D. Maples, 27 February 2008, p. 11, 29
(Maples 27 Feb 2008); DoD, Armed Forces Press Article, 9 July 2008
20
Maples, 27 Feb 2008, p. 15
21
B&CM Threat 2006, inside front cover
22
Unclassified National Intelligence Estimate, “Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat
Through 2015,” National Intelligence Council, December 2001, p. 13 (Unclassified NIE 2001)
23
“Proliferation: Threat and Response,” Office of the Secretary of Defense, January 2001 p. 25 (PTR)
24
Unclassified NIE 2001, p. 13
25
PTR, p. 30
26
PTR, p. 28
27
PTR, p. 30
28
Maples, 27 Feb 2008 pp. 28-30
29
Maples, 27 Feb 2008 pp. 28-30
30
Maples, 27 Feb 2008 pp. 28-30
31
Maples, 27 Feb 2008 pp. 28-30
32
B&CM Threat 2006, p. 9
33
B&CM Threat 2006, p. 9
34
Maples, 27 Feb 2008 pp. 28-30
35
MSIC, Response to MDA PR A128-08-0082/2, September 2008 (MISC Sep 2008)
36
MISC Sep 2008
37
MISC Sep 2008
– 27 –
38
PTR p. 11
39
B&CM Threat 2006, p. 9
40
PTR, p. 11
41
“Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States,” Testimony of Director, Defense
Intelligence Agency, Vice Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,
24 February 2004, p. 9 (Jacoby 24 Feb 2004)
42
Maples 18 Jan 2007, p. 11; “Global Intelligence Challenges 2005: Meeting Long-Term Challenges with a
Long-Term Strategy” Testimony of Director of Central Intelligence, Porter J. Goss before the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence, 16 February 2005, p. 5 (Goss 16 Feb 2005); and B&CM 2006 Threat, inside
cover
43
Unclassified NIE 2001, p. 9
44
Unclassified NIE 2001, p. 9
45
B&CM Threat 2006, p. 17; Jacoby 24 Feb 2004, p. 9
46
“Press briefing on the North Korean Missile Launch,” White House Press Secretary, Tony Snow and
National Security Advisor, Steven Hadley, 4 July 2006, p. 1; “Recent Developments in U.S.-Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea (D.P.R.K.) Relations,” Statement of Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian
and Pacific Affairs, Christopher R. Hill before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on
East Asian and Pacific Affairs, 20 July 2006, p. 1
47
NORAD News Release, “NORAD and USNORTHCOM monitor North Korean Launch,” North American
Aerospace Defense Command, 5 April 2009
48
“Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States,” Testimony of Director, Defense
Intelligence Agency, Vice Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,
16 February 2005, p. 11 (Jacoby 16 Feb 2005)
49
“The Worldwide Threat 2004: Challenges in a Changing Global Context,” Testimony of Director of
Central Intelligence, George J. Tenet before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 24 February
2004, p. 10 (Tenet 24 Feb 2004)
50
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 2008 Worldwide Space Launches, 1 October 2008.
51
Spacewarn Bulletin No. 664, 01 March 2009, National Aeronautics and Space Administration.
52
Annual Threat Assessment, Statement before the Committee on Armed Services United States Senate,
Lieutenant General Michael D. Maples, U.S. Army, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, 10 March 2009
53
B&CM Threat 2008, p. 17; Maples 27 Feb 2008, p. 15; “Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of
the People’s Republic of China 2009,” Department of Defense Report to Congress, p. 24 (China Annual
Report 2009)
54
B&CM Threat 2006, p. 17, China Annual Report 2009, p. 24
55
China Annual Report 2009, p. 48
56
“Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States,” Statement for the Record,
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, Vice Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby, 17 March 2005, p. 11 (Jacoby 17
Mar 2005)
57
B&CM Threat 2006, p. 17
58
B&CM Threat 2006, p. 17
59
Unclassified NIE 2001, p. 7
60
China Annual Report 2008, p. 56; Hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee: Annual Threat
Assessment, 27 Feb 2008 (Senate 27 Feb 2008); Jacoby 17 Mar 2005; Maples 27 Feb 2008; B&CM Threat
2006; Senate Armed Services Holds Hearing on the Fiscal Year 2009 Budget for U.S. Pacific Command and
U.S. Forces-Korea, 11 March 2008 (Senate 11 Mar 2008)
61
B&CM Threat 2006, p. 9
62
B&CM Threat 2006, p.10
63
Rumsfeld Report Exsum, p. 7
64
PTR, pp. 30 and 38
65
Maples 18 Jan 2007, p. 11
66
B&CM Threat 2006, pp.9, 10; Maples 18 Jan 2007, p. 11
67
“Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States,” Statement for the Record,
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, Lieutenant General Michael D. Maples, 28 February 2006, p. 12
(Maples 28 Feb 2006); B&CM Threat 2006, p. 9
– 28 –
68
PTR, pp. 36-38; B&CM Threat 2006, p. 15 and “Current and Projected National Security Threats to the
United States,” Testimony of Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, Vice Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby before
the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 16 February 2005 p. 11 (Jacoby 16 Feb 2005)
69
Maples 27 Feb 2008, p. 11
70
B&CM Threat 2006, p. 9
71
PTR, p. 35; “Oral Statement by the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency,” Lieutenant General Michael
D. Maples to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Annual Threat Assessment Hearing, 5 February
2008 (Maples 5 Feb 2008)
72
B&CM Threat 2006, p. 8
73
China Annual Report 2008, p. 24
74
China Annual Report 2009, p. 21
75
China Annual Report 2009, p. 48
76
China Annual Report 2009, p. 29
77
B&CM Threat 2006, p. 10, and China Annual Report 2008, p. 2
78
PTR p. 58; B&CM Threat 2006, p. 9
79
B&CM Threat 2006, p. 9
80
PTR, p. 25
81
PTR, p. 25
82
B&CM Threat 2006, p. 9
83
PTR, p. 30
84
“Attachment A, Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced
Conventional Munitions,” CIA Report to Congress, 1 January through 30 June 2003, p. 10 (Unclassified
Report to Congress, Jan – June 2003)
85
China Annual Report 2008; Senate 27 Feb 2008; Jacoby 17 Mar 2005; Maples 27 Feb 2008; B&CM Threat
2006; Senate 11 Mar 2008
86
B&CM Threat 2006, p. 5
87
B&CM Threat 2006, p. 5
88
B&CM Threat 2006, p. 5
89
PTR, p. 11
90
“An Analysis of the North Korean Missile Program,” Unclassified Appendix to Rumsfeld Commission
Report, 15 July 1998, David Wright, p. 1 (Wright Unclass Appendix to Rumsfeld Report)
91
B&CM Threat 2006, p. 5
92
Maples 28 Feb 2006, p. 5
93
PTR, p. 36; B&CM Threat 2006, p. 4
94
PTR, p. 36
95
Rumsfeld Report Exsum, p. 8
96
Jacoby 17 Mar 2005, p. 11
97
B&CM Threat 2006, p. 5
98
B&CM Threat 2006, pp. 4 and 6, and China Annual Report 2008, p. 56
99
MSIC Response to A128-06-00171, March 2006 and China Annual Report 2006, p. 11
100
China Annual Report 2009, p. 22
101
Unclassified NIE 2001, p. 8
102
PTR, p. 54
103
B&CM Threat 2006, p. 28
104
PTR, p. 24
105
Unclassified NIE 2001, p. 13; PTR, p. 24
106
B&CM Threat 2006, p. 20
107
Jacoby 16 Feb 2005, p. 12
108
B&CM Threat 2006, p. 4
– 29 –
109
Unclassified NIE 2001, p. 13
110
PTR, p. 30
111
PTR, p. 45; B&CM Threat 2006, p. 6
112
Tenet 24 Feb 2004, p. 11
113
PTR, p. 45
114
Jacoby 17 Mar 2005, p. 12
115
“The President’s National Security Strategy to Combat WMD: Libya’s Announcement”, Fact Sheet,
Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, 19 December 2003, p. 1 (Libya Announcement)
116
Tenet 24 Feb 2004, p. 9
117
“The Bush Administration’s Nonproliferation Policy: Successes and Future Challenges,” Testimony of
Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, John R. Bolton, before the House
International Relations Committee, 30 March 2004, p. 4 (Bolton 30 Mar 2004)
118
PTR, pp. 47-48
119
China Annual Report 2008, p. 3; Senate 27 Feb 2008; Jacoby 17 Mar 2005; Maples 27 Feb 2008; B&CM
Threat 2006, p. 6; Senate 11 Mar 2008
120
B&CM Threat 2006, p. 20
121
B&CM Threat 2006, p. 20
122
China Annual Report 2005, p. 29
123
B&CM Threat 2006, p. 23
124
B&CM Threat 2006, p. 20
125
B&CM Threat 2006, p. 23
126
B&CM Threat 2006, p. 23
127
B&CM Threat 2006, p. 23
128
B&CM Threat 2006, p. 20
129
B&CM Threat 2006, p. 23
130
PTR, p. 25
131
Unclassified NIE 2001, p. 13
132
“National Security and Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century,” Secretary of Energy Samuel W. Bodman
and Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, September 2008, p. 9 (Bodman and Gates Sep 2008)
133
Bodman and Gates Sep 2008, p. 9
134
China Annual Report 2008, p. 56; Senate 27 Feb 2008; Jacoby 17 Mar 2005; Maples 27 Feb 2008; B&CM
Threat 2006; Senate 11 Mar 2008
135
B&CM Threat 2006, p. 2
136
B&CM Threat 2006, p. 2
137
“Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons and Missiles: Status and Trends,” Congressional Research
Service, 20 February 2008 (CRS 2008)
138
CRS 2008
139
Maples 18 Jan 2007, p. 9
140
Unclassified Report to Congress, Jan – June 2003, p. 5
141
Tenet 24 Feb 2004, p. 9
142
Unclassified Report to Congress, Jan – June 2003, p. 5
143
Maples 18 Jan 2007, p. 9
144
Unclassified Report to Congress, Jan – June 2003, p. 5
145
Unclassified National Intelligence Estimate, “Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities”, National
Intelligence Council, November 2007, p. 6 (Unclassified NIE 2007)
146
Unclassified NIE 2007, p. 6
147
Unclassified NIE 2001, p. 10
148
Maples 28 Feb 2006, p. 5
149
Unclassified NIE 2007, p. 8
– 30 –
150
PTR, p. 36
151
Maples 18 Jan 2007, p. 10
152
Maples 28 Feb 2006, p. 5
153
“Adherence to and Compliance with Arms, Control, Nonproliferation and Disarmament Agreements
and Commitments,” U. S. Department of State, August 2005, p. 21 (Disarmament Agreements)
154
Disarmament Agreements, p. 21
155
PTR, p. 36
156
PTR, p. 35
157
China Annual Report 2008, p. 26.
158
Maples, 18 Jan 2007
159
PTR, p. 14
160
PTR, p. 15
161
PTR, p. 15
162
Maples 28 Feb 2006, p. 10
163
Maples, 18 Jan 2007, p. 10
164
Attachment A: Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced
Conventional Munitions, “CIA Report to Congress, 1 January – 30 June 1999”, p. 6.
165
PTR, p. 24
166
PTR, p. 24
167
PTR, p. 24
168
PTR, p. 25
169
PTR, p. 24
170
Maples, 18 Jan 2007, p. 10
171
Maples, 28 Feb 2006, p. 10
172
Maples, 18 Jan 2007, p. 10
173
PTR, p. 43
174
Unclassified Report to Congress, Jan – June 2003, p. 6
175
Unclassified NIE 2001, p. 12
176
Statement by the White House Press Secretary, 24 April 2008
177
B&CM Threat 2006, p. 28; Maples 27 Feb 2008, p. 29
178
B&CM Threat 2006, p. 28
179
B&CM Threat 2006, p. 28
All photos are from “Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat,” National Air and Space Intelligence Center,
NASIC-1031-0985-06, March 2006, with the following exceptions:
Noble Prophet 2: National Air and Space Intelligence Center classified website.
Shahab 3: British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), “Iran’s arsenal of missiles,” 10 July 2008, http://news.
bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/7499601.stm, accessed 03 November 2008.
Fateh-110: Washington Times, AP article, “Iran Moves Closer to Nukes Capability,” 25 September 2008,
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/sep/25/tehrans-threat/, accessed 17 October 2008.
M-51 SLBM: British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), “France to reduce nuclear warheads,” 21 March 2008,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7308563.stm, accessed 10 November 2008.
This report contains material copyrighted by others. No claim of copyright is made for any included
works of the United States Government.
– 31 –
MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY