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THE DOCTRINE OF FILIAL PIETY: A PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS OF THE CONCEALMENT CASE

It is well known that in Confucian ethics, great weight is given to family relations. A good illustration is what may be called the concealment case. In this case, Confucius held that a father and his son should conceal each others misconduct, even if this meant not fullling duties to the state, which they might otherwise be expected to fulll.

The Concealment Case in THE ANALECTS The concealment case is described as follows in The Analects:
The duke of Sheh informed Confucius, saying, Among us here there are those who may be styled upright in their conduct. If their father has stolen a sheep, they will bear witness to the fact. Confucius said, Among us, in our part of the country, those who are upright are different from this. The father conceals (yin) the misconduct of the son, and the son conceals (yin) the misconduct of the father. Uprightness (chih) is to be found in this.1

In this case, Confucius insisted that should the father steal, the son, despite the wrongness of the theft itself, had a duty to conceal the fathers wrongdoing. Why is such concealment taken as the conduct required to be upright?

Why Is the Concealment Case a Problem in Confucianism? The concealment case actually reveals some tensions between important principles and ideals in Confucianism itself. Here, we introduce
LIJUN BI, Ph.D., The Meridian International School (Sydney campus). Specialties: Chinese philosophy, Confucianism, Chinese literature. E-mail: [email protected] FRED DAGOSTINO, professor and chair of the Department of Contemporary Studies, The University of Queensland. Specialties: philosophy of linguistics, philosophy of the social sciences, political philosophy. E-mail: [email protected] Journal of Chinese Philosophy 31:4 (December 2004) 451467 2004 Journal of Chinese Philosophy

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some important aspects of Confucianism that, when brought to bear on the concealment case, contribute to understanding the importance of that case. (1) Ancestor Worship and the FatherSon Relationship For many Western commentators, ancestor worship plays a crucial role in understanding Confucianism. Confucius himself did not actually put particular emphasis on communication with ancestors: The topics the Master did not speak of were prodigies, force, disorder, and gods.2 What Confucius clearly believed in was the continuity and importance of the family, and what he strongly emphasized was the cultivation of virtue by individuals, the regulation of the family and, more generally, the ordering of social relations. Confucius, on the other hand, did regard ancestor worship as a way to fulll those human relationships that have been interrupted by death. Ancestor worship implied that the ancestor was not entirely dead, and that the soul continued to live and watch over the life of his descendants. In Confucianism, ancestor worship was practiced at two levels. One was that of the immediate family where its close lineal ascendants were worshiped; the other was that of the clan, which involved the worship of remote ancestors. These two kinds of ancestor worship served to keep family and clan solidarity alive and enhance the authority of the parents, in particular, the father. The Doctrine of the Mean states explicitly that lial piety is connected with the activities of ancestor worship:
[T]o remember the ancestors, to perform the same rites, and the same music which they performed when living, to reverence what they reverenced, to love what they loved, to serve them after death as they were served during their life, and to serve them though they have disappeared as if they still existed, that is perfect lial piety.3

Accordingly, ancestor worship is merely an extension of paying tribute to ones parents. In identifying the deceased father with a superhuman force deserving of worship, Confucianism solidies the connection between ancestor worship and lial piety. Filial piety involves paying due respect, not only to ones living parents, but also to the deceased and to remote ancestors. Ancestor worship takes place as a natural consequence of paying tribute to ones parents. Considering the concealment case, there is a problem, however. How does the fathers conduct, as a thief, express piety toward his ancestors? And how does the sons conduct, as a concealer, express piety toward his father, himself a potential ancestor? The son does not, when he conceals, behave as he should, given the importance of

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ancestor worship, for he appears not to treat his father as a correlate of Heaven.4 This is one of the tensions within Confucianism itself that the concealment case throws into sharp relief. (2) Ming and fen Confucianism cherishes hierarchy in social relations. Status gives every individual a prescribed set of duties, and society itself is ordered properly when every individual performs ones duties according to the requirements of ones status. The Confucian ideal of government is expressed in the dictum of rectifying names, namely that the ruler is the ruler, the minister is minister, the father is father, and the son is the son.5 In other words, a ruler should behave properly toward his minister, a minister his ruler, a father his son, and a son his father. Embedded in the notion of what is proper is a complex of obligations that vary according to ones status. Confucianism aims at letting every individual take ones place with ones status in a specic social group, performing the allotted duties within that group in such a way that the greatest benet would be brought to the group as a whole. Every individual, without exception, should keep his or her proper place by properly performing duties; otherwise, there would be usurpation and chaos. The proper places and proper duties refer to the proper fen according to the requirements of ming. Ming means name, and fen means duty. There is a close correspondence between a persons ming and ones fen. Every ming contains fen that corresponds to the essence of whatever or whoever is referred to by that ming. Without ming, one will not know ones fen in that relationship, and therefore will not know how to behave.6 The doctrine of ming and fen requires that every individual act according to the requirements of ones status, and that proper role behavior be honored. On this account, the father, as head of his family, should be virtuous and set an example for other family members. Importantly enough, A pious son is to manage the household exactly as his father did for three years after the latters death.7 How could the father set an example to his family with the sort of wrongdoing involved in the concealment case? The father in that case does not act according to the requirements of his status; his fen does not match his ming. As for the son, he should fulll his fathers wishes and observe numerous rites of li towards him; he should be responsible for ritual remembering and honoring the ancestors. The ming and fen of the son require him to honor his father. But how could he honor his father by concealing the fathers wrongdoing? This is another point of tension within Confucianism that is shown in the concealment case.

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(3) Obedience, Remonstration, and Lying Confucianism strongly urges a son to obey his parents. In Chinese orthography, the compound for the term lial piety includes the two characters of hsiao (lial) and shun (obedience). When asked what lial piety is, Confucius says, It is not being disobedient.8 The common impression is that Confucianism endorses the unquestioned authority of the father and the unquestioning obedience of the son. The Li Ki (The Records of Rites) says:
Sons and sons wives, who are lial and reverential, when they receive an order from their parents should not refuse, nor be dilatory, to execute it. When [their parents] give them anything to eat or drink, which they do not like, they will notwithstanding taste it and wait [for their further orders]; when they give them clothes, which are not to their mind, they will put them on, and wait (in the same way). If [their parents] give them anything to do, and then employ another to take their place, although they do not like the arrangement, they will in the meantime give it into his hands and let him do it, doing it again, if it be not done well.9

The Li Ki also explains the important role of parents in correcting the mistakes of sons (and their wives):
When sons and their wives have not been lial and reverential, [the parents] should not be angry and resentful with them, but endeavour to instruct them. If they will not receive instruction, they should then be angry with them. If that anger does no good, they can then drive out the son, and send the wife away, yet not publicly showing why they have so treated them.10

According to Confucianism, only if a son is hsiao and shun can he be considered a true son and a man. He considered that if one could not get the hearts of his parents he could not be considered a man, and that if he could not get to an entire accord with his parents, he could not be considered a son.11 The son is therefore obliged to be obedient to his parents. On the other hand, Confucianism also insists that as far as unrighteous conduct is concerned, a son must by no means keep from remonstrating with his father. Then, what is the sons obligation in the concealment case? Does the remonstration entail the sons disobedience? Does it imply, contrary to the Confucian teaching, that the son should not conceal his fathers wrongdoing? Suppose the father orders the son to lie about his theft, is the son supposed to lie? If the son lies, does it mean the son is a lial son? If the son refuses to lie, does it mean the son is an unlial son? What kind of obedience is called for here? These questions again show the tensions within Confucian ethics, highlighted in the concealment case.

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Filial piety and loyalty are two primary duties in Confucianism, and there could be no conict between them. Of course, a person with different ming might seem to have different or even conicting duties, as seemingly illustrated in the concealment case, where, as a subject, the son, being dutiful to the ruler, should reveal his fathers theft, whereas, as a son, because of the requirements of lial piety, he seems to have the duty to conceal precisely that conduct. How, within Confucianism, are such apparent conicts of duties to be understood? Confucius in fact seems to argue that the duty of piety to the father has priority over the duty of loyalty to the ruler. Indeed, in Confucianism, lial piety is the essential guiding principle, the root of all virtues. On the other hand, loyalty, specically to the ruler, is another extremely important guiding principle based on the idea that piety should extend from the familial sphere to the social sphere. But how could lial piety be the root of virtues if it sometimes requires, as in the concealment case, that the son contravene the virtue loyalty to the ruler? In this case, the son seems to have two roles: being a son, he should, in accordance with lial piety, protect his father from his wrongdoing; being a subject of the ruler, he has the obligation of loyalty to his ruler and should thus report any wrongdoing. The conict is stark here: if the son reports his fathers wrongdoing, he behaves as an unlial son; if he does not report his fathers wrongdoing, he not only seems to have violated his duty of loyalty to the ruler but also lets his father sink into the abyss of unrighteous deeds, thereby behaving as an unlial son. The purported link between lial piety and loyaltythe two primary dutiesseems to come apart. The son, as such, must conceal the fathers wrongdoing and yet it is precisely the loyalty of the son to the father that is supposed to be the foundation of his loyalty to the ruler, which he here seems to betray as a result of his concealment. No matter whether Confucius recognizes or admits it, the concealment case poses a big problem and indicates strong tensions within Confucianism that need to be resolved. Our purpose is to consider whether, and if so how, it is possible to resolve these tensions in order to reveal the profundity of Confucian teaching, especially the doctrine of lial piety as the lynchpin of the Confucian teaching. How Does Confucianism Resolve the Problem within Itself? The concealment case raises problems about how we should understand the Confucian ethical position on the family, a position fraught with tensions that have to be exposed. We need to look at a number

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of aspects of Confucian ethics in order to understand why Confucius recommended that the son put his lial duty above an apparent duty to the state. We need to understand what Confucius actually recommended when he suggested that the son conceal his fathers wrongdoing. (1) Ancestor Worship and the FatherSon Relationship Confucianism gives great attention to human relationships, the fatherson relationship in particular. The fatherson relationship, based on the two general principles of patrilineality and generation that govern the entire kinship structure, is the basic relationship for the maintenance of family continuity. The fatherson solidarity is regulated by the attribution of authority to the father and the demand for lial piety by the son. The fathers authority is absolute and grounds the obligations on the part of the son. The fathers authority, on the other hand, is not conceived as originating from the father himself but as springing from the ancestors and reinforced by them. The fatherson relationship is merely a necessary link in the great family continuum, with ancestors at one end and descendants at the other.12 The fatherson relationship thus leads backward to ancestors and forward to posterity. The father, while alive, acts as the ancestors agent; upon death he becomes one of the ancestors whose inuence remains the most potent factor in guiding the sons life.13 The son is, in effect, under ancestral authority. The Confucian family rests, in turn, on a structured hierarchy with ancestors as the counterpart of Heaven and the father as the earthly ruler of the family. The power of the Confucian father is great. Olga Lang notes that the customs and laws of the Chinese Empire, imbued with the spirit of Confucianism, gave the Chinese father, husband, and head of the family enormous power, comparable to that of the exemplary patriarchy in European civilizationthe pater familias in Republican Rome. In the Confucian tradition, the head of the familygenerally the fatherofciated in all ceremonies such as ancestor worship, marriage, and funerals. He held the title to all family property and he alone could dispose of it, as well as the earnings and savings of all family members. He settled the marriages of his children and signed the marriage contracts.14 A pious son was expected to fulll his fathers wishes and to observe numerous rites of propriety toward him. Moreover, the son was responsible for the rituals of remembering and honoring the ancestors. The Book of Poetry warns, Do not disgrace your great ancestors:This will save your li (proprieties).15 To honor ones father was, to a great extent, to honor

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ones ancestors; to dishonor ones father was, to a great extent, to dishonor ones ancestors. Thus, ancestor worship supplies one of the key reasons for the son to conceal his fathers wrongdoing: to conceal the fathers misconduct was to protect the reputation of the ancestors. If the son were to publicly accuse the father of misconduct, he would disrupt the continuity he, specically, was responsible for maintaining and undermine the structure of the family by usurping the authority of the father, dishonoring his father and humiliating the ancestors. Most important, public accusations would thereby take familial disharmony into the public sphere. Confucius warns, Do not court humiliation. Public accusations would bring humiliation and dishonor ones ancestors, father, and oneself.16 Public accusations are therefore conceived, within the framework of ancestor worship, as visiting the misdeeds of the father upon a whole series of ancestral individuals. Considering the potential chain of bad results, it might well appear that, in conformity with the Confucian teaching, the son should not publicly accuse the father of wrongdoing. This is one basis, perhaps, for the emphasis in Confucianism on the absolute duty of the son to protect his father. (2) Ming and fen The doctrine of ming and fen in Confucianism requires that every individual act according to the requirements of ones status, and proper relationships be generally recognized. Being a son, an individual should recognize his status; he should recognize the kinds of duties and obligations he has toward the family and the head of the family, the father. After all, rst and foremost, the son is the son of his father. The sons status requires that he treat lial piety as having primacy over, and being the grounding of, his loyalty to the state. Confucianism puts emphasis on the doctrine of status and lays heavy stress, in particular, on loyalty between members of the family and to the family as a whole. Every individual in Confucian society, regardless of social position, must behave according to ones own status. In the concealment case, the status of the son requires the son to express his piety toward the father by concealing his misconduct. Confucianism considers lial piety toward ones parents as the most important element in human relationships. No matter how bad the father is, the relationship between father and son cannot be changed. (3) Obedience, Remonstration, and Lie For the social reasons specic to Confucianism, the son should not accuse the father of wrongdoing but must conceal his misdeeds. This teaching in fact supports what would otherwise be considered a

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prompting of simple human nature. When the father misbehaves, the son naturally does not wish this misconduct to be known. Of course, there is still a problem for the son: What is he supposed to do in private? Is he supposed to remonstrate with the father so that the father would not perform that kind of action again? For the father, there is also a problem: How can he be in an authoritative and dominant position with respect to his son if the son knows of his wrongdoing? Confucius argues that the head of a state or family should rule by the persuasive force of moral example, de (te, virtue). This is, in fact, one of his central teachings.17 According to Confucianism, there is a model in imitation of which things are created, and social order is maintained among the masses of people primarily because of the moral example set by their ruler. If the ruler were a good model, the products of imitation would be good and goodness would prevail; if the ruler were a bad model, the resulting products would be bad, and the bad would prevail. The essence of this idea is found in the following famous sayings: The relation between superiors and inferiors, is like that between the wind and the grass. The grass must bend, when the wind blows across it.18 Again, If a ruler loves li, the people will not dare to be irreverent. If he loves righteousness, the people will not dare not to submit to his example. If he loves good faith, the people will not dare not to be sincere.19 Confuciuss assertion When a rulers personal conduct is correct, his government is effective without the issuing of orders; if his personal conduct is not correct, he may issue orders but they will not be followed20shows that he understood the force of example in the social sphere. In this sense, Confucius actually concludes that if a ruler sets an example by being correct, ordinary people will not dare to remain incorrect.21 In the state, the ruler is an exemplar, inuencing the people by the example of his personal conduct and de. The ruler is therefore held personally responsible for the society. Similarly, in the familial sphere, the force of the fathers example is held to be very great. The father rules the family by the attractive force of moral example, te; the ancestors rule the clan by providing moral examples and inspiration, attaining an immortality of honourable deeds.22 The father expresses the solidarity of the family; its honor and integrity depend on his virtue. In Chinese, the character fu, father, means a square, that is, the father teaches his son the rules and measures. Again, in the earliest Chinese dictionary, the Shuo Wen, the character fu means a model, a head of the family who educates.23 The father must set an example for the son as a loving and respectful person before he can reasonably expect his son to love and respect him. Indeed, the father should, in his sons mind, be seen as an exem-

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plary teacher. In Confucianism, if the father is virtuous, the sons will be good and happy; if the father is not virtuous, the whole family will be bad. No matter whether in the social realm or familial realm, Confucianism strongly emphasizes the force of example. In the concealment case, the father behaved badly by stealing a sheep; he was not virtuous and did not set a good example for the son. How could the son honor the father given that the father was not law-abiding, and that the demand for lial piety was itself grounded in the assumption of the fathers honor? What kind of model for familial imitation did the father provide when he stole a sheep? The father certainly could not rule the family through his wrongdoing; nor, according to the Confucian teaching, could the son acknowledge the fathers wrongdoing publicly. Then, what is the son supposed to do? Although a son is bound, in Confucianism, by many conditions in order to be lial, the doctrine of lial piety never implies blind obedience to ones parents. One may and ought to reason with ones parents when their orders conict with righteousness; blind obedience would be deleterious to parents and run counter to the true spirit of lial piety. The doctrine of lial piety requires, when parents fall into error, that the son should reprove them and lead them back to what is right. Mencius permits a lial son to murmur against his parent when the latters fault is great. The reason is that if the son responds to his fathers cruelty with indifference, it would increase the distance and alienation between them. Where the parents fault is great, not to have murmured on account of it would have increased the want of natural affection.24 Mencius defended Kwang Chang who reproved his father by urging him to do what was good. Mencius thought that Kwang Changs actions expressed the duties of a son: urging the father to do the right thing. Based on this consideration, Kwang Chang is not an unlial son.25 Such evidence provides an answer to our question: What, privately, should the son do in response to his fathers wrongdoing? He should remonstrate! Confucius himself endorses this course of action:
In serving his parents, a son may gently remonstrate with them. When he sees that they are not inclined to listen to him, he should resume an attitude of reverence and not abandon his effort to serve them. He may feel worried, but does not complain.26

Remonstration, however, is not without limit:

If a parent has a fault, [the son] should with bated breath, and bland aspect, and gentle voice, admonish him. If the admonition does not take effect, he will be the more reverential and the more lial; and when the father seems pleased, he will repeat the admonition. If he should be displeased with this, rather than allow him to commit an

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offence against any one in the neighbourhood or countryside, [the son] should strongly remonstrate. If the parent be angry and (more) displeased, and beat him till the blood ows, he should not presume to be angry and resentful, but be [still] more reverential and more lial.27 To obey [his parents] commands without angry [complaint]; to remonstrate with them gently without being weary; and not to murmur against them, though they punish him, may be pronounced lial piety.28

Obviously, Confucianism does not require unthinking obedience. Where a case of unrighteous conduct is concerned, a son must by no means keep from remonstrating with his father. Since remonstration is required in the case of unrighteous conduct, when the father is not right, the son cannot always avoid contending with his father. If the son follows the father without arguing with him when the father is not right, it cannot be accounted as lial piety.29 Confucius contends that when a father transgresses, the son should gently remonstrate so as to lead him back to what is right. This remonstration might not, however, be done in excess, certainly not to the extent that the fathers misconduct would be loudly publicized. This means, in particular, that the son must not publicly repudiate the parents action; remonstration should be conducted in private so as not to cause shame to the father. The Li Ki corroborates such a prudent approach by stating: The superior man (chn-tzu) will overlook and not magnify the error of his father and will show his veneration for his excellences.30 Confucius, in this regard, allows a son to remonstrate with the father over his wrongdoing, without publicly parading it. Of course, the distinction between private remonstration and public concealment still leaves an ambiguity. What does public concealment actually require? Is it that the son must not volunteer information about his fathers misdeed, or is it, instead, that the son must, if necessary, lie in order to conceal his fathers misdeed? There is, then, a passive-active distinction, which needs to be sorted out. Within the Confucian framework, the sons concealment could not include actively lying, as this would run counter to central Confucian moral principles. If the son lies to conceal the fact that his father has stolen a sheep, it would certainly protect the father from public shame; lying, however, is not what a chn-tzu should do. Confucius stresses the importance of a mans possessing the quality of genuineness or truth, and denigrates all emptiness and falseness. He esteems the basic stuff and its accompanying quality of uprightness. Confucius says, Riches and honours are what men desire. If it cannot be obtained in the proper way, they should not be held. Poverty and

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meanness are what men dislike. If it cannot be avoided in the proper way, they should not be avoided. If a chn tzu abandons virtue, how can he fulll the requirements of that name?31 Therefore, A chn tzu in everything considers righteousness to be essential. He performs it according to the rules of propriety. He brings it forth in humility; He completes it with sincerity. This is indeed a chn tzu.32 Mencius holds that the individual should lead his life so that, when looking up, he has no occasion for shame before Heaven, and, below, he has no occasion to blush before men.33 Confucianism strongly advocates the way of a gentleman as praiseworthy; the way of the chn-tzu is indeed the way that every individual should pursue. Being a son, he should strive to become a chn-tzu. Therefore, he could not lie about his fathers innocence. Meanwhile, he also could not announce his fathers wrongdoing to ofcials. The fatherson relationship is the more important one and the duties of lial piety are weightier in this situation than the duties of the subject. Still, there is, as it were, a compromise here between lial duties and those of the subject. While the son could not reveal the fathers wrongdoing voluntarily, the son need not actively deny it if questioned directly about it. Concealment in this sense means that the son should keep the fathers misconduct secret, and this misconduct should never be discussed in society. If the son discloses this secret, it will, at least, threaten the fatherson relations and hence threaten harmony in the whole family. (4) Filial Piety and Loyalty In the Confucian account of the concealment case, two primary moral dutieslial piety and loyaltyare in play and are resolved, in effect, by assigning primary, though not exclusive, weight to the duty of lial piety. The son should conceal his fathers wrongdoing, but he should do so passively only. Actually to lie to ofcials about the matter would, on this account, be wrong. The duty of loyalty to the ruler can actually be reconciled with that of piety to the father. Two critical problems, however, still exist in the Confucian account of the sons duties. The rst problem is a considerable one for the son. Since he has seen or learned of his fathers wrongdoing, in concealing it, he actually acts against another important Confucian moral principle, yi (righteousness). Confucius says: With coarse rice to eat, with water to drink, and my bended arm for a pillow;I have still joy in the midst of these things. Riches and honours acquired by unrighteousness are to me as a oating cloud.34 The Classic of Filial Piety also states that, in the face of unrighteousness, it is the duty of the son to argue it out

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before his father, and it is the duty of a minister to argue it out before his ruler. It seems there is a contradiction involved in concealing the fathers misconduct and yet arguing it out for the sake of yi. In Confucianism, the doctrine of lial piety is taken as the fundamental guiding principle, and the fatherson relationship is the root of the harmony of family relationships and indeed of all other human relationships. But in the concealment case, the wrongdoing is the fathers. If the son accuses his father publicly, he would usurp the fathers authority, destroy the basis of the fatherson relationship, undermine the structure of the family, and therefore expose family disharmony in the public sphere. By extension, in the end, such an act would destroy harmony in social relations in general. Obviously, the particular relationship (that of father and son) and the particular circumstance (the father acting wrongly in stealing a sheep) left the son with no other choice but to conceal the fathers misconduct. In other words, in this special circumstance, the doctrine of lial piety requires that protection of the father be the sons absolute duty, despite the fact that such concealment would, in other circumstances, be improper in and of itself. Nevertheless, the lack of ambiguity about the sons duty does not alter the fact that his fathers deed is not an honorable one, and that the son therefore also has a duty, as mentioned earlier, to remonstrate privately with his father. Moreover, according to Mencius, even if the sons admonition makes his father angry, such remonstration is not to be regarded as unlial.35 Indeed, Mencius teaches that it is unlial (among the three unlial things) to encourage parents to engage in unrighteousness by attering assent to their conduct.36 In the concealment case, therefore, the son could neither report the fathers misconduct nor encourage the fathers misconduct. He should keep silent (without lying) to ofcials and thus reach the goal of lial piety. Confucianism always strongly stresses eternal moral principles. But it also pays great attention, according to the twofold doctrine of the standard and the expedient, to particular situations.37 Eternal principles provide the standard for behavior, whereas a special situation such as the fathers committing wrongdoing requires expedient measures. In other words, in theory, the standard of uprightness requires that wrongdoing be reported. But in certain circumstances, expediency is accepted for the specic and justiable purpose of concealing the fathers misconduct in order to preserve the greater value of lial piety. The second critical problem for the son is the conict between lial piety and loyalty. Confucius strongly emphasizes lial piety to parents, regarding lial piety as the root of all virtues. At the same

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time, Confucius also ascribes great importance to loyalty, advocating faithful service to the ruler as the highest career. In traditional Chinese society, lial piety, associated with ancestor worship and duties to parents, has been often identied as the main virtue within the familial sphere; while the other primary virtue of loyaltyloyalty to the ruleris seen as lial piety writ large, extending itself from the familial to social sphere. As Confucianism emphasizes both duties, how does Confucianism understand the conict between these two primary duties? Why is the lial sons concealment not really at odds with loyalty? According to Confucianism, lial piety to parents is one form of familial obligation, while loyalty to the ruler is another form of familial obligation, taken as an extension of lial piety, from the parents to the ruler. Confucianism believes, in effect, that lial piety toward ones parents will be transferred to the political sphere and indeed to the whole of society. As Mencius argues, Treat with reverence the elders in your own family, so that the elders in other families shall be similarly treated; treat with kindness the young in your own family, so that the young in other families shall be similarly treated.38 The Classic of Filial Piety also posits, Filial piety at the outset consists in service to ones parents; in the middle of ones path, in service to his sovereign; and, in the end, in establishing himself as a mature man.39 In Confucian thought, the political realm is not separable from the ethical realm. The doctrine of lial piety, taught within the family circle, learned from the early childhood, is meant to ensure political stability and social harmony. Piety toward ones parents must be transferred and extended as loyalty to the ruler: Filial piety in the service of parents, and obedience in the discharge of orders can be displayed throughout the kingdom, and they will everywhere take effect.40 Filial piety between father and son is politically signicant to the extent that loyalty between the ruler and the ruled is based on it; the principle of lial piety in the family is not opposed to the principle of loyalty in the state. The aim of Confucianism is to establish order in the family so that order may similarly be established in the state. The Classic of Filial Piety manages to make faithful service to the ruler the measure of political loyalty as well as the highest career aim. It says:
The lial piety with which the superior man serves his parents may be transferred as loyalty to the ruler; the fraternal duty with which he serves his elder brother may be transferred as submissive deference to elders; his regulation of his family may be transferred as good government in any ofcial position. Therefore, when his conduct is thus successful in his inner [private] circle, his name will be established [and transmitted] to future generations.41

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A direct transition from the family (chia) to the state (kuo) is presumed in Confucian socio-political thinking. When the family is orderly, then the state is peaceful. The nearest equivalent to the notion of society is a compound of the two words, kuo-chia, or statefamily, in accordance with the rule for forming Chinese abstract terms.42 Confucianism asserts that taking care of family affairs is an active form of participation in politics. In The Analects, when asked why he did not take part in government, Confucius responded by citing a passage from the ancient classic, the Book of Documents, You are lial, you discharge your brotherly duties. The qualities are displayed in government. Thus, the discharge of familial duties also constitutes the exercise of government, such that one need not be in government in order to be involved in the public realm.43 What one does in the connes of ones private home has political signicance in government as well as society as a whole. Tseng Tzu, the chief exponent of the Confucian doctrine of lial piety, says:
The body is that which has been transmitted to us by our parents; dare any one allow himself to be irreverent in the employment of their legacy? If a man in his own house and privacy be not grave, he is not lial; if in serving his ruler, he be not loyal, he is not lial; if in discharging the duties of ofce, he be not reverent, he is not lial; if with friends he be not sincere, he is not lial; if on the eld of battle he be not brave, he is not lial. If he fail in these ve things, the evil (of the disgrace) will reach his parents;dare he but reverently attend to them?44

For the fulllment of the paramount virtue of lial piety, many more attitudes are required as its necessary supplement. The doctrine of lial piety is not only a private and personal morality, but also a political method; it is extended from the familial realm to the social realm, and it ensured social order as well as family harmony. Not surprisingly, therefore, no arguments in Confucianism admit a potential conict of interests between the family and the state as a logical possibility. Confucianism considers the family as the foundation of the state and the state as the enlargement of the family. It believes that harmony begins in the family and spreads to the state as a whole. An unlial son cannot be expected to be loyal to his ruler. Confucian ethics therefore equates disloyalty in serving ones ruler with what is unlial.45 As the two essential duties that stabilize both the traditional political and social system, in theory, there could, really, be no conict between lial piety and loyalty. However, no matter whether Confucius recognizes or admits it, the concealment case does clearly reveal that the two main duties, lial piety to the father and loyalty to the ruler, are not perfectly aligned in practice, and that they actually come into conict in specic cir-

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cumstances. In particular, what is an individual to do when it is hard to satisfy the two obligations at once, as it might seem to be the situation in the concealment case? There are two key points when it comes to resolving such apparent conicts. First, in what direction should it be resolved, that is, profamily or pro-state? Second, by what means should it be resolved? The active-passive distinction shows that Confucian ethics recognizes that the conicts are, in some sense, real. If it were just an illusion or a misunderstanding, there might be no pressure to acknowledge the force of the duties to the state, as these might just be overridden by familial duties. Therefore, the son must not accuse but he also must not lie. The son has duties to the father that are important enough so that an exception to general duties to the ruler could be made when there is a conict between the two primary duties. On the other hand, the duties to the ruler are also important. There is therefore a limit as to how far the son might permissibly go in putting duties to father before duties to the ruler. All such conicts require the son to choose the passive way to solve all kind of conicts, namely, in this case, concealment. The passive-active distinction shows that a conict of duties in the concealment case is indeed recognized within Confucianism itself. This does not mean that concealing the fathers wrongdoing is a virtue; rather, it is the only way for the son to act in face of a dilemma of conicting duties. Confucianism insists that if lial piety is well established in the family, then the family would not produce a member who would act contrary to the interests of the state in the long run, even if he is required to do so in specic cases.
THE MERIDIAN INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL Sydney, Australia THE UNIVERSITY OF QUEENSLAND Brisbane, Australia

Endnotes
1. The Analects, 13:18. In this paper, translations of The Analects, The Works of Mencius, The Li Ki, Classic of Filial Piety, The Doctrine of the Mean, Book of Poetry, and Book of Documents are by James Legge, occasionally with our revisions where appropriate. Following conventional practice, the source is indicated, for example, as The Analects, 13:18, which stands for The Analects, chapter 13, section 18, and The Works of Mencius, as 2A:6, which stands for chapter 2, part 1, section 6. For Legges translation, see Legge, The Chinese Classics (with a translation, critical and exegetical notes, prolegomena, and copious indexes), Volume I and II (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1960, reprinted in 1970); and The Sacred Books of China (The Texts of Confucianism) in The Sacred Books of the East, Volumes III, XXVII, XXVIII, edited

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lijun bi and fred dagostino

2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15.

16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35.

36. 37. 38. 39. 40.

by F. Max Mller, rst published by the Clarendon Press, 1879; reprinted by Motilal Banarsidass, 1966, and Motilal Banarsidass, 1970. The Analects, 7:21. The Doctrine of the Mean, Ch. XIX. Classic of Filial Piety, Ch. IX. The Analects, 12:11. Yutang Lin, My Country and My People (London: Heinemann, rev. ed. 1939), pp. 169170. G. Whitlock, Concealing the Misconduct of Ones Own Father: Confucius and Plato on a Question of Filial Piety, Journal of Chinese Philosophy 21, no. 2 (June 1994): p. 117. The Analects, 2:5. The Li Ki, bk. X, sect. I, 13. The Li Ki, bk. X, sect. I, 14. The Works of Mencius, 4A:28. F.L.K. Hsu, Under the Ancestors Shadow: Chinese Culture and Personality (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1949), p. 237. Hsu, Under the Ancestors Shadow: Chinese Culture and Personality, p. 258. Olga Lang, Chinese Family and Society (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1946), p. 26. Book of Poetry (The Shih King), The Major Odes of the Kingdom, Decade III, Ode 10, in James Legge, The Chinese Classics (with a translation, critical and exegetical notes, prolegomena, and copious indexes), Volume IV (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1960, reprinted in 1970), p. 429. Whitlock, Concealing the Misconduct of Ones Own Father: Confucius and Plato on a Question of Filial Piety, pp. 116118. The Analects, 16:1. The Analects, 12:19. The Analects, 13:4. The Analects, 13:6. The Analects, 12:17. Whitlock, Concealing the Misconduct of Ones Own Father: Confucius and Plato on a Question of Filial Piety, p. 116. Hs Shn, Shuo wn cgueg-tz 3B, 4a., quoted in Tung-tsu Ch, Law and Society in Traditional China (Westport, CT: Hyperion Press, Inc., 1980), p. 20. The Works of Mencius, 6B:3. The Works of Mencius, 4B:30. The Analects, 4:18. The Li Ki, bk. X, sect. I, 15. The Li Ki, bk. XXVII, 18. Classic of Filial Piety, ch. XV. The Li Ki, bk. XXVII, 17. The Analects, 4:5. The Analects, 15:17. The Works of Mencius, 7A:20. The Analects, 7:15. Cheuk-yin Lee, The Dichotomy of Loyalty and Filial Piety in Confucianism: Historical Development and Modern Signicance, in Confucianism and the Modernization of China, edited by Silke Krieger and Rolf Trauzettel (Mainz: v. Hase and Koehler Verlag, c1991), p. 101. J. Legge, The Chinese Classics, Volume II, The Works of Mencius, 4A: 26 (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1960), p. 313. Wing-tsit Chan, Chinese Theory and Practice, with Special Reference to Humanism, in The Chinese Mind: Essentials of Chinese Philosophy and Culture, edited by C.A. Moore (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1967), pp. 2728. The Works of Mencius, 7A:7. Classic of Filial Piety, ch. I. The Li Ki, bk. XXI, sect. I.

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41. 42. 43. 44. 45. Classic of Filial Piety, ch. XIV. Yutang Lin, My Country and My People, p. 164. The Analects, 2:21. The Li Ki, bk. XXI, sect. II. The Li Ki, bk. XXI, sect. II, 11.

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