The Myth of Intelligentzia Vs Bureaucracy in 1978

University of Glasgow
Intelligentsia versus Bureaucracy? The Revival of a Myth in Poland

Author(s): Maria Hirszowicz
Source: Soviet Studies, Vol. 30, No. 3 (Jul., 1978), pp. 336-361
Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.
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SOVIE!T
STUDIES,
vol.
XXX,
no.
3, July 1978,
pp.
336-361
INTELLIGENTSIA VERSUS BUREAUCRACY?
THE REVIVAL OF A MYTH IN POLAND
By
MARIA HIRSZOWICZ
THERE is a marked revival of the
concept
of
intelligentsia
in studies on
Eastern
Europe. Many
writers are inclined to believe that it would be
the
intelligentsia
that
might
act as a radical force
against
the
party
bureaucracy.
As Frank Parkin
put
it in his
penetrating analysis:
In socialist
society
the
key antagonisms occurring
at the social level
are those between the
party
and the state
bureaucracy
on the one
hand and the
intelligentsia
on the other. The
power
of the former
rests
upon
their control of the
political
and administrative
apparatus
of the
state,
giving
them effective
leadership
to socialised
property.
The social
power
of the latter
group
inheres in its conmmand of the
skills, knowledge
and
general
attributes which are held to be of
central
importance
for the
development
of
productive
and scientific
forces in modern industrial
society.
And
introducing
the
concept
of the differentiation and
polarization
of
elites,
the author concludes:
Seen from this
angle, equilibrium
could be restored
by
the accession
to
political power
of the
intelligentsia
and the
displacement
of the
apparatchiki.1
Zbigniew Byrski opposed
Soviet technocrats to the humane intel-
ligentsia,
i.e. social
scientists, writers,
film
workers,
teachers and
educators:
Regardless
of their material situation their
profession requires
a
strong
flow of fresh air into the
suffocating
climate of the totalitarian
state.
...
The
present system
makes it
impossible
for them to follow
their
calling.2
F.
Parkin, 'System
Contradiction and Political
Transformation',
Archives
Europeennes
de
Sociologie,
tome
XIII, 1972,
p.
51.
For a discussion of Parkin's thesis
see also D.
Lane,
The Socialist Industrial State
(1976), pp. 92-96.
2
Zbigniew Byrski,
'The Communist "Middle Class" in USSR and Poland',
Survey,
Autumn
1969.
See also H. H.
Ticktin,
'Political Economy
of the Soviet
Intellectual', Critique,
no. 2.
337
A similar view was
expressed by
an
anonymous
writer in the Polish
emigre
Kultura,
who commented:
The creative
intelligentsia
in the broad sense of the word face on
the one hand the destructive force of the totalitarian
tendency
and on
the other hand have the
knowledge
and intellectual
training
which
allow them to
interpret
their difficulties in
general
social
categories.3
In contrast to these
opinions
the Russian dissidents who
speak
about the Communist
intelligentsia
seem to be full of criticism and
doubt. Amalrik declared that the Soviet
intelligentsia
is 'on the whole
even more
unpleasant
a
phenomenon
than the
regime
that
gave
it birth'.4
Solzhenitsyn
contends that the old
pre-revolutionary
Russian intel-
ligentsia
has been
replaced by
the 'obrazovanshchina'-translated as 'the
smatterers'--moulded
throughout
the
processes
of
annihilation,
disintegration, corruption,
and
finally rapid expansion
and reconstruc-
tion of the educated strata. Hfe
explains:
The modern
intelligentsia
is in no
respect
alienated from the modern
state: those who feel that
way,
either in their
private thought
or
among
their immediate circle of
friends,
with a sense of
constriction,
depres-
sion and
resignation,
are not
only maintaining
the state
by
their
daily
activities as members of the
intelligentsia,
but are
accepting
and
fulfilling
an even more terrible condition laid down
by
the state:
participation
with their soul in the
common,
compulsory
lie.5
Another
dissident, Maximov,
formulated his thesis about homo
sovieticus-a man who is
docile, amoral, anti-social, anti-democratic,
an
opportunist mainly
concerned with
organizing
his own life without
much
regard
to his fellow citizens.6
Kuperman
in turn
explains:
... the Soviet
Intelligent
is a
semi-intelligent.
He has no intrinsic
values;
his
spiritual
culture is
popular culture,
his
spiritual
education
is
popular
education.... The truth is that the Soviet
intelligentsia
long ago
ceased to exist. The remnants of the Russian
intelligentsia
were
processed by
the Great
Intelligent
of all
times-Joseph
Stalin.
Only inteligenty
of the new mould were left.7
A similar verdict was
passed
a few
years ago by
a Polish
sociologist,
Alexander
Gella,
in
respect
of the Polish
intelligentsia,
in an extensive
3
'Polityczna opozycja
w
Polsce',
Kultura
(Paris), 1974,
no.
11/326, p.
6.
4
A.
Amalrik,
'An
open
letter to
Kuznetsov', Survey,
no.
74-75, Winter-Spring
1970,
p. 97-
5
A.
Solzhenitsyn (ed.),
From Under the Rubble
(1974), P. 243.
6
An interview with Maximov (in Polish), Trybuna (London), 1977,
no. 21, p.
12.
7
Yuri
Kuperman,
'No Places! The
Jewish
Outsider in the
USSR',
Soviet
Jewish
Affairs,
vol.
3,
no. 2
(1973),
p.
I9.
study8
which referred to the destruction of the old
intelligentsia
and the
emergence
of a mass
society
in which the
intelligentsia
as a
homogeneous
stratum has
practically disappeared.
The
disagreements
are serious
enough
to arouse the interest of
anyone
who wishes to understand the
present
social and
political
scene
in Eastern
Europe.
In our
study
we do not intend to
go beyond analysing
the Polish
intelligentsia;
but even that limited
approach
should make
it
possible
to test the value of the
'intelligentsia
versus
bureaucracy'
hypothesis.
After
all,
educated Poles have the
reputation
of
being
much
more
independent,
more individualistic and more rebellious than
similar
groups
in other East
European
countries.
Thus,
if the 'intel-
ligentsia
versus
bureaucracy' hypothesis
were
true,
the role of the
Polish
intelligentsia
should be considerable.
I.
Intelligentsia---the changing meaning of
a
concept9
Following
the controversies about the definition of
'intelligentsia'
one should bear in mind the
ambiguities
which enter
any concept
related to social stratification in a
process
of
change.
Social structures
change
and so do social evaluations of
them,
while the labels and names
retain a certain
rigidity accounting
for
subsequent conceptual
confusions.
A
survey
of the
history
of Polish
society
in the last
Ioo
years
reveals the
shifts and transformations in the delineation of the
group
referred to as
'intelligentsia',
on both the structural and the
conceptual
level.
a) Intelligentsia
as a
specific
social stratum
Referring
to the
intelligentsia
in
ninreteenth-century
Poland one
has to
distinguish
two different themes that
go through
the
history
of
the
concept.
On the one
hand,
the term
designated
those who because
of their education and
ideology
carried out
special
social and national
functions,
while on the other it
pointed
to a
relatively homogeneous
status
group.
As far as the first
aspect
is
concerned,
A. Gella writes:10
The
spiritual
leaders of the
intelligentsia
never
fought
for their own
group
interest and never formulated an
ideology
of their stratum. At
the same time
they produced
leaders for all other class
movements,
parties
and
ideologies.
However,
it should be
emphasised
that those
who
symbolised
the most characteristics of the
intelligentsia
of
8
A.
Gella,
'The Life and Death of the Old Polish
Intelligentsia',
Slavic
Review,
March 1971.
9
For a definition
compare Zygmunt Lemlpicki,
'Oblicze duchowe wieku XIX',
Kultura i
Wychowanie I,
vol. I
(1933), p. 67;
R.
Michels, 'Intellectuals', Encyclopaedia
of
the Social
Sciences,
vol.
8;
and K. Mannheim, 'The Problem of
Intelligentsia',
in
Essays
on the
Sociology of
Culture
(I966).
"o .A. Gella
(ed.),
The
Intelligentsia
and the Intellectuals
(i 976), p. I5.
See also A.
Gella,
'The Life and Death of the Old Polish
Intelligentsia'.
338
INTELLIGENTSIA
Russia and Poland were to be found
principally
on the left in the
service of social
progress,
revolution or national
independence.
The
public image
of the Polish
intelligentsia
in the nineteenth
century
was
certainly
reinforced
by
the limited numbers of those who
constituted it: in the
I87os
there were about
5,700
members of the
intelligentsia
in
Warsaw,
in i882 some
I2,ooo.
And the nucleus of
that
intelligentsia
was even
smaller;
it consisted of
writers,
journalists,
poets,
historians,
i.e. those who tried to make a
living
in
literature,
journalism
or
teaching.
As S. Kieniewicz
put
it:11
That
community, ideologically
differentiated,
supplied ideologists
and leaders to all
political camps,
from the extreme conservative
wing
to the
working-class parties.
There
was, however, something
in
common that united the
writers,
irrespective
of the differences of
opinions:
the conviction of the
superiority
of their own social
group,
of its mission in relation to the nation....
Opposing
the world of
philistines
on which he was
dependent
for his
subsistence,
the
inteligent aspired
in his ideas to the role of the activator and leader
of
large
masses of the nation.
It was
exactly
the
feeling
of mission and of
responsibility
for national
survival that became
part
of the tradition of the Polish
intelligentsia.
The
deeply ingrained
drive for national
independence
that
permeated
the Polish
gentry
and
brought
about the successive
desperate uprisings
was
preserved among
the
intelligentsia,
which became the
leading
force
in the
fight
for national
identity by cultivating
and
developing
the
cultural
heritage
as the
only
national link in
partitioned
Poland. These
were functions which went
beyond
the
'professionalism'
which
developed
at that time in the
West,
and
they
became
incorporated
in the
self-image
of the
nineteenth-century intelligentsia.
The
great
and real contribution of the
intelligentsia
consisted in
creating
the cultural forms and institutions which were later
directly
incorporated
in the
system
of the Polish State. There were
schools,
libraries,
scientific
associations,
universities and
archives,
journals
and
publishing
houses,
theatres and
museums,
operas
and
philharmonic
orchestras;
there was a national
literature,
Polish science and
arts,
there were
political parties,
educational and social
movements,
there
were close contacts with intellectual life in the West and direct ties
among
artists,
writers and academic teachers that cut across the
frontiers of the
partitioned
areas.12
The character of the Polish
intelligentsia
was
determined, however,
11 S.
Kieniewicz,
Historia Polski
I875-I9I8 (PWN, 1969),
pp.
318-19.
12
B.
Suchodolski,
'Kultura okresu
niewoli', Literatura, 24
November
1977.
YS. B UREA UCRAC Y?
339
not
only by
its
calling
and
by
its national functions but also
by
its
social
origin,
by
its cultural affiliation with the
past
and
by
its
marginal
position
in a
post-feudal
society.l3
In
nineteenth-century
Poland the
emergence
of the
'intelligentsia'
was
directly
associated with the
migration
of the Polish
gentry
to towns
and their
entry
into new
occupations. Subject
to massive
dispossession
as a result of successive
uprisings,
tsarist
policies
and
pressure
of
economic
circumstances,
they protected
their status
by clinging
to
non-manual
jobs
and
filling
the ranks of
professionals.
In a
study
of
the social
composition
of the Polish intellectuals in the nineteenth and
early
twentieth
centuries, J.
Szczepaiiski
offered the
following
estimate
of their
origin:14
Gentry 57'1%
Intelligentsia 23 o0%
Bourgeoisie 9'2%
Petty bourgeoisie 6'2%
Peasantry 4'1
%
The
origin
in the Polish
gentry
and the
prestige
attached to it made
the Polish
intelligentsia
status-conscious,
accounted for its
jealously
guarded
code of conduct and
generated
a
great
deal of
snobbery.
Peasants, workers, merchants, Jews,
were
regarded
as
inferior,
and
status
symbols
manifested themselves in
etiquette,
in the
proliferation
of
titles,
in
dignified garments
and in
emphasis
on those social skills and
arts which were
part
of
upbringing.
Some of these features have been
analysed
in a series of
fascinating
studies
by
Jozef Chalasiiski.l5
The fear of social
degradation, rejection
of and lack of ties with the alternative culture of the
peasantry
and
urban lower
classes,
desperate clinging
to the feudal sense of
respect-
ability, were-according
to Chalasiriski-the
ingredients
of the sub-
culture of the rank-and-file
intelligentsia
in Poland. The focal institution
around which the entire life of the
intelligentsia
clustered
was,
according
to
Chalasifiski,
the 'social circle'
(or 'society').
Without a
position
in
'society'
there was no status of the member
of the
intelligentsia-that position
was
part
of the
customary
definition
of the
inteligent
. . .
Inteligent
as a social
type
combines
(i)
a social
13
See A.
Hertz,
'The Case of an Eastern
European Intelligentsia', Journal of
Central
European Affairs,
vol.
1I
(195).
See also St.
Brzozowski, Legenda miodej
Polski
(Lwow,
19 I).
14
J. Szczepaiski, 'Materialy
do
charakterystyki
ludzi swiata
naukowego
w XIX i
poczatkach
XX
w.',
in
Odmiany
czasu
terazniejszego (KiW, 1971),
pp.
50-5I.
15
Spoleczna genealogia inteligencji polskiej (1946); PrzeszloSc
i
przysztosc inteligencji
polskiej (1958);
'Kultura i osobowosc w
nowoczesnym spoleczefistwie',
Kultura i
spoleczenstwo, 1970,
no.
i; 'Droga
do
wiedzy:
autonomiczna osobowosc i
problem
narodu',
Kultura i
spoleczenrstwo, I971,
no. I.
INTELLIGENTSIA
340
position
of the member of a
higher
social and cultural stratum with
(2)
an intellectual
culture,
but a culture of
laymen
and not
profession-
als,
the
style
of which was
shaped by
values useless from the utilitarian
point
of
view,
but characteristic for the
past
culture of the court and
aristocracy.16
b)
Intelligentsia
in a
changing society
In the interwar
period
stratification became more
complicated::
there was a
rapid
increase in the number of
people
in non-manual
occupations,
the boundaries between members of the
intelligentsia
and
the rest of
society
became blurred and the influx of members of national
minorities and of those of 'lower class'
origin
into the
profession
affected
the
homogeneity
of the
intelligentsia. According
to
Janusz Zarnowski,
the number of
people engaged
in white-collar
occupations
in the
years
1921-39
was as follows:17
The 'real' white-collar
employees
intelligentsia
in subordinate
functions-
1921
2I0,000
315,000
1931
250,000
460,000
1939
300,000
500,000
It is
interesting
that Zarnowski had to draw the line between the
'real'
intelligentsia
and others in non-manual
occupations-a
distinction
that was
hardly
relevant in the nineteenth
century
because of the more
homogeneous
social
background
of the
group.
The
composition
of the
student
body
in the interwar
years,
of whom about one-third
belonged
to the 'lower
classes',
i.e. the workers and lower
functionaries,
the
peasants
and the
petty bourgeoisie,'8
marked the
passing
of social homo-
geneity
as a feature of the Polish
intelligentsia.
In the
professions
there was a considerable
proportion
of minorities:
Jews
made
up 21.5%
of Poland's
professional
classes
(as
compared
with
9'8%
of
Jews
in the total
population
and
27%
of
Jews
in the urban
population),
with the
proportions ranging
from
56% among
doctors and
33'5% among lawyers
to
i'8%
in
public
service.19
In
consequence,
one could
speak
in a
way
about a
partial overlapping
of two different
systems
of stratification-one based on status charac-
teristics and social distances attached to different status
groups
and
the other determined
primarily by
class and
occupational
differences..
81
J. Chalasifiski, Spoleczna genealogia inteligencji polskiej, pp. 22, 41, 47.
17
J. Zarnowski, Spoleczenstwo drugiej Rzeczypospolitej, I9I8-I939 (PWN, I973)p
pp. 197-8.
18
Ibid.,
p.
206.
19 C. S.
Heller,
On the
Edge of Destruction
(I977),
p. io6.
VS. B UREA UCRAC Y?
341
The
concept
of
intelligentsia acquired
henceforth some
degree
of
ambiguity.
On the one
hand,
it
designated
the 'classic' Polish intel-
ligentsia
as a distinctive social and cultural
stratum, and,
on the other
hand,
it was used in a broader sense to denote all those who held a
diploma
from an institution of
higher learning
or
simply
held non-
manual
jobs.
The
gap
between those in non-manual and in manual
occupations
manifested itself in
living
standards,
consumption patterns
and social
aspirations.
The
average earnings
of non-manual workers
with
primary, secondary
and
higher
education were
respectively 319,
395
and 686
zloty (monthly earnings
for men
only)
as
compared
with the
average
income of the manual worker of about
170 zloty,
while
many
peasants
lived below subsistence level.20
c)
Intelligentsia
as a
category
related to
occupational
structure
After the Second World War the situation
changed again.
The
prewar
intelligentsia
was decimated
by
war and its after-effects. The remainder
became a
minority among
the hundreds of thousands of
people
in white-
collar
jobs.21
According
to most
estimates,
there were about
Ioo,ooo
people
in
Poland
immediately
after the war who would be
regarded
as
intelligentsia
in the broad sense of the word. In
1974
there were
671,000 employees
with
diplomas
of
higher
education and
2,445,000 employees
with full
secondary
education.22 The difference between the workers and
peasants
on the one hand and
people
in lower-rank white-collar
positions
on the
other
considerably
decreased,
and in
many
cases the status distinctions
and status distances became almost
negligible.
At the same time the
differentiations
among
white-collar
employees
became
quite
considerable
in terms of the
prestige
of
higher
education. No wonder that in these
circumstances there is a marked
tendency
to
apply
the
concept
of
'intelligentsia'
to holders of
higher
education
diplomas
and to
people
in
positions
of
power
and
importance regarded
as
equivalent
to a
high
professional standing.
Jan Szczepaniski,
who initiated a series of studies in the stratification
of Communist
Poland,
tailored his definition of
intelligentsia
to the
new structures:23
The
intelligentsia
is defined in a
society... by
those activities
which are carried out
by professionally
trained
people.
Our definition
20
J. ;arnowski, op.
cit.,
p. I99.
See also M.
Kalecki,
'Porownanie dochodow
robotnik6w i
pracownik6w umyslowych
z okresu
przedwojennego',
Kultura i
spole-
czenstwo, 1964,
no.
I.
21
For an estimate of the war losses of Polish
culture,
see
J. Szczepanski,
'The Polish
Intelligentsia',
World
Politics, I962,
no.
3.
22
Rocznik
Statystyczny, 1975,
Table
10/89, p. 57.
23
Szczepanski, Odmiany
czasu
terazniejszego, p. 98.
INTELLIGENTS.IA
:342
runs as follows: the
intelligentsia
is an
aggregate
of various
professional
categories
and it consists of
people
who are
engaged
in cultural
activities,
who
organize
work and social
cooperation
and who
carry
out
jobs
which
require
theoretical
knowledge. Taking
such a
definition as a
starting point,
we can exclude from the
intelligentsia
all those
groups
who
carry
out non-manual activities but from the
point
of view of other criteria are not different from manual workers.
Jerzy J.
Wiatr
goes
further
by linking
the
concept
of
intelligentsia
with
positions
of
high prestige and/or power.
He refers to the
intelligentsia
as not
only
the intellectuals and
professionals,
but also
higher-level
managers
of
economic,
political
and cultural life. He
argues
that the
common features of these
groups
are :24
i) higher
level of
income,
which
results in a similar
style
of
life;
2) higher prestige
of their
professional
functions;
3)
the
non-anonymous
character of their
activities,
which
makes them known in their
occupational capacities
to the wider
public.
The
visibility
of the
intelligentsia
is thus added to its characteristics.
At the same
time,
to
distinguish
the cultural and scientific
elite,
wider
use is made of the term 'creative
intelligentsia'
as an
equivalent
of the
Western
concept
of
'intellectuals',
as
opposed
to the rank-and-file
intelligentsia;
but here
again
the term has
acquired
a taint of formalism
by being applied
to
professional
writers, artists,
research workers and
senior
journalists irrespective
of the value of their actual
performance,
in
short,
to those whose
occupations
are
bureaucratically
classified as
creative.25
d)
The 'true'
intelligentsia
In
spite
of the
withering away
of the status
system
on which the
concept
of the
intelligentsia
was
originally
based,
the
past
has
survived,
it
seems,
in more than one
respect;
not
only
has the
designation
of
intelligentsia
remained,
but
many
cultural traits and collective
images
of the old
intelligentsia
have been
preserved
and,
surprisingly,
have
generated
a
tendency
to draw a line between 'the true
intelligentsia'
as
opposed
to the
'pseudo-intelligentsia' generated by
the Communist
order.
The
nineteenth-century concept
of the
intelligentsia
was thus
revived,
securing
the
preservation
of a
myth deeply
embedded in the national
24
J. J. Wiatr, Spoleczen'stwo (PWN, 1973),
p.
283.
25
J. Szczepafiski
writes: 'The set of vocational
categories
I call the
Intelligentsia
can be divided into three
groups:
the creators of cultural values
(scholars, artists,
philosophers, composers, moralists, ideologists, etc.);
leaders and
organizers
of
social,
civil and work life
(politicians, engineers, lawyers, managers, army
and
police officers,
civil
servants, etc.); experts, professionals,
teachers and all those who
apply
scientific
knowledge
to the solution of
practical (vocational) problems' (Polish Sociological
Bulletin, 1961,
no.
1-2, p. 38).
D
VS. B UREA UCRACY?
343
344
INTELLIGENTSIA
tradition of
many
East
European
countries. The
components
of this old
concept, though
not included in
sociological
definitions,
affect the
contemporary understanding
of the
concept
of
intelligentsia
and
explain
the
disparity
between the
purely
structural distinctions and the cultural
meanings
attached to them.
Alexander
Gella,
who
presented
'The life and death of the Polish
intelligentsia'
in a brilliant
essay published
in
I971, attempted
five
years
later to define the
intelligentsia
as follows:26
The
intelligentsia
stratum
develops
in a
given
nation when the
educated members of the establishment are unable to face and solve
the nation's
growing problem.
In
response,
the
intelligentsia appears
as a new element of the social
structure,
as a stratum
placed
between the
'power
establishment' on the one hand and all other classes on the
other.... The
spiritual
case for the formation of this stratum is the
accepted calling: struggle
for fundamental
socio-political change
and
help
to liberate the lower classes of
your
nation from their eco-
nomic and cultural
poverty and/or socio-political oppression.
From what has been said it follows that the evaluation of the 'intel-
ligentsia
versus
bureaucracy' hypothesis depends primarily
on how we
define
intelligentsia.
Once we describe the
intelligentsia
as a
group
of a
particular
social
calling
it is obvious that we
expect
it to be
opposed
to
the bureaucratic
establishment;
vice
versa,
the
pseudo-intelligentsia
or
obrazovanshchina is characterized
by
a conformist attitude to their
political
masters.
On the other
hand,
by focusing
our attention on the educated
strata,
i.e. on
intelligentsia
in the broad sense of the
word,
we leave the
question
of further
specifications
and
qualifications
to
scholarly analysis.
Will
the educated strata turn into new mandarins and become the new
ruling
class,
as
Machajski predicted
in his attack on the
intelligentsia?
Do
they already
constitute,
or will
they develop
as,
a new social base for
intellectual dissent? Or-which seems most
likely-can
we discern and
expect
differentiations
among
the educated
strata,
with
many options
and
possibilities
inherent in the social
sub-systems
to which
they belong
and in the social values
they
are
prepared
to follow?
2. The new
intelligentsia
and the totalitarian order
At the close of the Second World War the Polish
intelligentsia
was
far from
accepting
the
programme
voiced
by
the
Russian-sponsored
government.
Yet in the first
years
the role of the
prewar intelligentsia
in
the economic and social reconstruction was enormous. This was made
possible by
the
fairly
moderate Communist
programme
of social and
26
Gella
(ed.),
The
Intelligentsia
and the
Intellectuals, p. 25.
political
reform in the
years I944-47
which was based on the
principle
of
alliance of the
government
with the so-called
'working intelligentsia',
as well as
by
the
relatively
limited
scope
of state interference.
On the other
hand,
in
spite
of
political slogans
about the broad front
of national
unity,
the Communists were
prepared
to reduce the role of
the
to the absolute minimum.27 The Communist
eminence
grise Jakub
Berman in a
speech
delivered at the conference of
the Communist
intelligentsia
in
1947 presented
the
intelligentsia
as a
group
torn between the feudal
past
and the demands of social
progress,
split
between their
loyalty
to the
prewar ruling
classes and to the common
people
with whom
they
had so far been unable to find a common
langu-
age.
That was a
stereotype forged by
the Communist
Party
on the eve of
the transition to a
complete
Stalinist
regime,
a
stereotype
that
implied
tougher
measures in the future.28
It was indeed with the
progress
of Stalinization in Poland that the
gap
between the old
intelligentsia
and the
party-state apparatus
widened
dramatically
to an extent that would
fully
confirm the
'bureaucracy
versus
intelligentsia' hypothesis.
Poland was to become a
replica
of the
Stalinist state. For the
the new
policy
meant a
witch-hunt,
accusations fabricated
against
'saboteurs' and 'wreckers'
among engineers
and other
specialists, purges among
the
teaching
staff
at the universities where the eminent
professors
were
deprived
of their
jobs,
crusades in offices in the name of increased alertness
against
'class
enemies',
the
instigation
of children
against
their
parents, persecution
of
believers and
banning
from educational institutions of
many young
people
of 'alien' class
origin.
However,
if the old
intelligentsia
felt
estranged
a new
intelligentsia
was
rapidly produced by
the
party-controlled
schools and universities.
Young
people
were
processed through
a
system
of education which
proved quite
effective in
inculcating
new orientations and attitudes
among many
of them. Whereas on the eve of full Stalinization the
Communist cells
(PPR)
at the universities
comprised only
a few
individuals,
in the
following
few
years
the number of
party
members
among
students and
teaching
staff
rapidly
increased while the
youth
mass
organization
controlled the rank-and-file students
among
whom
new cadres of
political
activists
emerged.
The
principle
of cultural
discontinuity
was the essence of educational
processes.
Polish
history
was
virtually rewritten,
prewar
books
banned,
most of the
distinguished
historians,
writers and scientists of the
past
were declared
ideological
enemies.
27
See Czeslaw
Milosz, Zniewolony umysl (Paris, 1953).
28
J. Berman, 'Zagadnienia pracy partynej
wsr6d
inteligencji',
Nowe
Drogi, I947,
no. 2
(March), p. 142.
VS. B UREA UCRA C Y?
345
This
policy
was facilitated
by
the mass recruitment of
young people
of
working-class
and
peasant origin,
their
processing through fully
party-controlled
educational
institutions,
and massive
propaganda
combined with
political
terror.
Moreover,
the
policy
of cultural discon-
tinuity
could
easily
feed on the mass of
graduates
with technical
education who added to the new
intelligentsia
a
growing proportion
of
people specialized
but little
equipped
to deal with social
problems.
Judging by
the numbers and
increasing political
zeal of the
youth
organization
activists and
young party
members,
the
appeal
of the new
persuasion
seemed to increase from one
year
to another. The
party
as
a
ruling
institution had a lot to offer to
every
individual who was
prepared
to commit himself to the
implementation
of Communist
policies.
There was in the first
place
an enormous demand for
qualified
personnel
and
leading
cadres at
every organizational
level in all sectors of
the national
economy.
Almost
everybody
from
among
the faithful
qualified,
since
ideological requirements
were more
important
than
academic record. In
addition,
the continual
purges
that were
taking
place
at that time enhanced the chances for
organizational
careers even
more,
since
young graduates
with their unblemished curricula vitae
compared favourably
with the Communists of the older
generation,
whose
complicated
life stories were
open
to
political conjectures.
In
many
memoirs of
young
members of the
intelligentsia referring
to
the
years 1949-55
the same stories
appear
of
people
who in their twenties
were
appointed factory
directors,
chief
engineers, party
secretaries and
editors of
important newspapers.
The
youth organization
and the
party
were,
for
many
of
them,
secure channels of
political, professional
and
social
mobility, provided they
were
prepared
to
adopt
the new ethos that
implied:
a)
unreserved
loyalty
to,
and faith
in,
the
party leadership;
b) rejection
of
any personal
or
group loyalties
which
might
conflict with
the interests of the
party;
c)
readiness to
adjust personal plans
to the whim of the
party
bosses;
d)
abdication of one's critical
faculty
and humble submission to official
ideology.
The renunciations connected with these
requirements might
seem
high
in terms of intellectual
independence,9 job stability
and
personal
life,
but so were the rewards. There was the
feeling
of
belonging
to the
elite,
the taste of
power,
the
joy
of
participation
in a chosen
group
that
was
arbitrarily reshaping society,
the
privilege
of
prying
into other
29
See
J. Chalasifiski, 'Drogi
i bezdroza
socjalizmu
w nauce
polskiej',
Kultura i
spoleczenstwo, January-March 1957.
346
INTELLIGENTSIA
people's
lives,
the
exhilarating experience
of
acting beyond
the law and
beyond
the social rules that limited the freedom of
ordinary
citizens.
The formation of the
party intelligentsia
in the
period
of 'revolution
from above' has not been
fully explored. Retrospective
studies in Poland
are
mostly
distorted
by
the
attempts
of those who
participated
in
political
activities under Stalin to
present
themselves as victims and
objects
of
manipulation
rather than
fully
motivated activists of the movement. One
general
conclusion
seems, however,
fully justified:
a
growing proportion
of
young graduates
was absorbed
by
the
ruling
institutions.
3. Professionalization of
the bureaucrats and bureaucratization
of
the
professionals
The
collapse
of the Stalinist
regime
in Poland and the Polish October
of
1956
are associated in
public opinion
with rebellion of the intellectuals.
This is true with
regard
to the 'thaw'
immediately
after Stalin's
death,
but the so-called 'October movement' was much wider in
scope:
it
encompassed
the workers' riots in
Poznan,
the
spontaneous mushrooming
of workers' councils all over
Poland,
the
disbanding
of collective farms
by peasants,
the formation of clubs of the
young intelligentsia
in
provincial
towns,
the
campaign by parents
to reintroduce
religious
teaching
at
schools,
acts of
revenge against unpopular
directors and
many
other events that were
hardly registered
in written sources
available to the
public.
When Gomulka came to
power
he did his best to
bring
the situation
under
control,
the militant
weekly Poprostu
led
by young
intellectual
rebels
being
the first direct victim of the offensive launched
against
'revisionism'. Further
steps
aimed at reinforcement of the
party
and
state
grip
on
society
followed,
but the reaction of both
party
and non-
party intelligentsia
was
surprisingly
mild. The contrast between
totalitarian control of the Stalinist
type
and the new
regime
seemed so
enormous that the educated strata
appeared quite
satisfied with what
had been achieved.
In a small
survey
of the
political
attitudes of different
groups
of intel-
ligentsia
after October
I956,
A. Borucki
presented
the
following figures:30
Attitudes Totals
N
%/
Positive Io6
58
Undecided
50
28
Negative
26
14
Total I82 o00
30
See A.
Borucki, Kariery
zawodowe i
postawy spoleczne inteligencji
w
PRL, r945-
I959 (Ossolineum, x967),
p. I62.
VS. B UREA UCRA CY?
347
An
ideology
of
political
realism became the common denominator of
many
otherwise
divergent
views. The Polish
intelligentsia
concentrated
its efforts on the
programme
of
modernization, rationalization,
seculari-
zation and
Westernization,
which became to some extent the aims of
official
policy
and found
unqualified support among
the educated strata
of all
generations
both within the
party
and outside it. The return of
many
eminent scholars to the universities and academic institutions
marked a tremendous
change
in
comparison
with
previous
years.
New
possibilities
were
open
to the
graduates; rigid ideological requirements
were
abandoned,
an
open pragmatic approach
increased the demand for
all kinds of
specialists
and the whole
political
structure
gradually
developed along
new lines which
brought
about a
complete
transfor-
mation of the
intelligentsia's position
in the
post-Stalinist society.
a)
The
quiet
revolution in the
political
structure
One of the most characteristic
changes
which as a rule
accompany
rapid
economic
development
is a tremendous increase in the number of
non-manual
jobs
and
among
them of functions
requiring higher
education. In
Poland,
among
the non-manual
employees
the number of
graduates
was
3Io,401
in
1964, 405,454
in
I968
and
611,129
in
i973.3:
In
1971
there were about
50,000 people
who held Ph.D.
degrees,
the
research institutes
employed
about
300,000 people
and
expenditure
on
scientific research amounted to 2'
5%
of the
budget.32
These
developments
have had a
great impact
on the
composition
of
the
party
and state
apparatus.
An end has
virtually
been
put
to the
massive recruitment of workers and
peasants
to
positions
of
power
and
responsibility,
and the new
postwar intelligentsia
has manned the
available
posts.
The first
big
reshuffle took
place
after October
1956
when
many
thousands of
party
and state functionaries and
army
officers
without
adequate
education were dismissed. A
second,
more
limited,
reshuffle occurred in
1968-69
when a multitude of
young graduate
party
activists, many
of them from Moczar's
following,
climbed
up
the
official ladder.33 Another
period
of
rapid
advancement of
young people
holding university
and technical
diplomas
occurred in conditions of the
economic and administrative
expansion
under Gierek. In
short,
the
intelligentsia
has entered the
apparatus, participates
in the exercise of
power
and
enjoys
the
privileges
reserved for the
ruling
bureaucracies.
This
process
is reflected in the
growing strength
of the
professionals
in the
party.
In
1961
there were in the
party
68,000
engineers, 45,000
1 Rocznik
Statystyczny, 1975,
p.
5.8.
32
Boguslaw Rein, 'Kadry
i baza materialna
nauki',
Nowe
Drogi, 1974, no.
S.
33
See. C. S.
Heller,'
"Anti-Zionism" and the Political
Struggle
within the Elite of
Poland', Jewzih Journal of Sociology,
vol.
II,
no.
2,
19 December
i969.
348
INTELLIGENTSIA
VS. BUREA UCRACY?
349
economists,
43,000
teachers,
and
2,ooo
doctors and
pharmacists.34
In
1973
there were
255,ooo
engineers, 35,000
specialists in
agriculture,
144,000
teachers, 13,000 doctors,
i5,000 professors
and
lecturers,
and
II5,000
economists and accountants. While
party membership
doubled
in the
years 1960-73
the number of
professionals
in the
comparable
groups grew
three or more times.35
The massive advance of the educated strata
through
the bureaucratic
channel of the state and
party
was
accompanied by
a new social
per-
spective
on stratification.36 For
example,
in the
early
sixties a
public
opinion poll
revealed that the level of education was
regarded
as second
among
the factors
shaping
social divisions in Poland
(difference
in
income
being
the
first),
in
1976
the
majority
of
respondents placed
education as third and the differences between
supervisory
and
ordinary
jobs
came second. Most
respondents
drew a clear line between manual
and non-manual
occupations,
and
only 12%
declared that
they
saw no
difference between the two.37 Income
figures
do not
help
to
explain
these attitudes as the incomes of the non-manual workers
averaged
I
I
I
?%
in
I965
and
112%
in
i967
of the
average
manual
wage.38
The difference between the incomes of the different strata of non-
manual workers is much more
significant
since the
respective
indices
were
I64
for
engineering
and technical
personnel
and Io6 for office
personnel.39
In other
words,
the
ordinary
office
employee
is no better
off than the worker
and,
as some studies
prove,
does not
perceive
his
situation as
any
better than that of the manual
labourer,40
but those who
carry
out
specialized
functions and
especially
those at the
higher
level
of the bureaucratic hierarchies
belong
to the
higher
income
bracket,
or at
least share some of the
fringe
benefits available in the world of state
institutions.
Andrzej
Mozolowski,
in an article
published
in
Polityka,
complained
that he was
virtually
unable to find exact data about incomes
of the richest
groups
in
Poland,
but he
pointed
out that not
only private
entrepreneurs
and suburban market
gardeners
but also civil
engineers
working
in
planning
bureaux,
film
producers,
doctors, scientists,
high
officials,
and directors of
large
factories
belonged
to these
groups.41
34
Nowe Lrogi, 1961,
no.
5 (May), p.
142.
35 Rocznik
Statystyczny, 1975,
table
5, p. 21.
36
See S. Ravin, 'The Polish
Intelligentsia
and the Socialist
Order',
Political Science
Quarterly, I968,
no.
3.
37
'Polski
Gallup', Polityka, I976,
no. 8.
38
Krzysztof Szatnicki,
'Distribution of
Wages
and
Income',
The Polish Sociological
Bulletin, 1971,
no.
2, p. 44.
39
Ibid
40
K.
Lutyiska,
'Office workers' views on their social
position',
The Polish Socio-
logical Bulletin, I964,
no.
I, p.
80.
Lutyiska
writes: 'The
majority
of
replies
show that
office workers in both
management
and subordinate
positions,
both men and
women,
regard
the social
position
of the office workers as
being
between the foreman and the
faotoryo Workers.'
41
A.
Mozolowski, 'Wspinaczka po pieniadze', Polityka,
28
September I974.
There seems to be an
equalization
of sorts in the
living
standards
of both the
higher
officials and the
highly qualified professionals,
the
former
enjoying
some
perquisites
because of their administrative
influence,
the latter
having
the
opportunity
of
using
the market
economy
to obtain access to
highly
coveted
goods
and commodities.
The
following presentation
of technical and
sanitary
conditions in
Lodz
provides
an
illuminating
illustration of the differences in
living
standards of different
occupational groups:42
Category %
of flats
with
Average of
W.C. Central Bathroom rooms
per flat
heating
Intelligentsia 79'I 54'9 71I4
2-90
Technicians
44'8
I8'9
22'4
2-28
Office workers
48'4
I8'2
32'I
2'17
Private craftsmen
- -
2'36
Foremen
35'3 I6'4 21'5 2'I5
Skilled workers
28-7
15'0 18-3 1-85
Semi-skilled workers I8'6
8'5
Io'2
I'8I
Unskilled workers
25-5
o'o0
8-9 I'75
b)
Bureaucratic
integration
It follows from the above that the educated strata are a
heterogeneous
aggregate
of
people
located at different levels of
organizational
hier-
archies,
carrying
out different
tasks,
located in different sectors of state
activities and
participating
in various
degrees
in official
political
life.
Moreover,
there are marked differences of social
background
between
occupations;
in
I97I,
for
instance, 70%
of the
prosecutors
were of
working-class
and
peasant origin
and
58%
of the
teachers,
but
only
35%
of the
engineers (chemical), 34%
of the
journalists, 26%
each of
architects and
writers,
and
20%
of artists.43
This is
paralleled by
the cultural differentiation
among
the educated
strata,
the traditions of the 'old
intelligentsia' being stronger
in some
occupations
than in
others,
and the distribution of first- and second-
generation intelligentsia extremely unequal.
Cracow is
known,
for
instance,
as the bastion of the 'classic' Polish
intelligentsia;
in Warsaw
in the institutions of
high
academic
standing
there is a
high
concentration
of
people
from the old
intelligentsia.
Some
professions
seem to attract
more
people
identified with the latter than others.
42
A.
xVojciechowska,
'Differentiation of
Housing
Conditions and the Material
Situation of Various Socio-Professional
Groups
in
Lodz',
The Polish
Sociological
Bulletin, 1971,
no.
2, pp. 50, 57.
4a
A.
Siciiski,
Literaci
polscy. Przemiany
zawodu na tle
przemian kultury wspdlczesnej
(Zaklad
im.
Ossolifiskich, i97x),
p.
50.
INTELLIGENTSIA
350
VS. BUREA UCRACY?
351
Yet one cannot
ignore
the
powerful
forces at work that
integrate
the
educated strata into the framework of the
party
state.
Working
in offices
and state-controlled institutions has become a
predominant
feature of
the
everyday
life of the Polish
intelligentsia. They
attend office
meetings,
take
part
in
conferences,
learn to
cope
with their
superiors,
do the
paperwork
and
develop
the 'us and them' attitudes which define their
relationship
with the
higher
authorities on the one hand and their clients
and customers on the other.
At the same time
they
are all in a
position
of overall
dependence
on
the
state,
even if the
expansion
of the market
economy
has somewhat
reduced this
dependence
in the field of services and commodities.
Individuals have to
rely
on administrative decisions about
jobs, promo-
tions,
trips
abroad,
allocation of
building
sites,
flats in
cooperative
and state-controlled
buildings,
etc.
Non-party people
in their status of
clients of the state are as anxious to
get
on with the
party
bosses as the
party
members,
connections are evaluated in terms of 'who's
who',
irrespective
of the
person's political
or moral
record,
and official favours.
are
highly
valued
by many prominent
members of the intellectual and
professional
circles.
Another
aspect
of bureaucratic
integration
is connected with the
tremendous increase in the number of those to whom L. Labedz referred
as nachal'stvo.4
According
to the census of
occupations
carried out in
October
1973,
there were
103,900 major
executive
positions
in Poland. In
about
97%
of them
higher
or 'more than
secondary'
education was
formally required. According
to a
rough
estimate there are
altogether
about
600,000
directors in Poland and
higher-rank
officials are even
more numerous. This means that
promotions
have become a
major
concern of the educated strata and career motives are
widespread.
The
ambitious
young
men are thus
anticipating
their chances well in advance
and
they
tailor their orientations and attitudes
accordingly.
Thus a
process
called, somewhat
pompously, 'anticipatory
socializa-
tion' is
taking place
on a massive scale. No wonder that the Polish
sociologist
W.
Narojek suggested
a new social
category
of 'men on the
move':
The
dynamic aspect
of individual behaviour oriented to self-
preservation
... manifests itself in the individual's endeavour to move
up
in the
organizational
structure of
society
towards
positions
which
guarantee
a
higher
level of satisfaction of
egoistic
values. In that
respect
the social
personality
of the socialist man is
concisely expressed
in the Latin term 'homo movens' which
explains
the manifestation of
44
L.
Labedz,
'The Structure of the Soviet
Intelligentsia',
in R.
Pipes,
The Russian
Intelligentsia (New York, i961), p. 71.
the same
tendency
that in classic
capitalist society
was
incorporated
in
the behaviour of the 'economic man'.45
No detailed studies exist of the social mechanisms
through
which 'homo
movens'
moves ahead. But there is no doubt that for
many young
graduates
those mechanisms
operate
within the
system
of the
party
state.
The difference between the office holders and
'pure
professionals'
is also narrowed because of the administrative
restructuring
of
pro-
fessional activities.46 Doctors who have to fill in forms and write
lengthy
reports, university
professors
who
spend
their time in conference halls
and on innumerable
boards,
writers who make their
living
by
serialized
mass
production, engineers
who are often more interested in
covering
up
the
shortcomings
of the
productive processes
than in technical
innovations-all are victims of the same
system
that overshadows their
professional
selves.
Many dynamic
individuals find the bureaucratic constraints unbear-
able,
but
many
accommodate
quite
well and even
appreciate
compensa-
tions which are not available in other more
competitive systems.
In
particular,
mediocrities who have achieved a
position
of sonme
importance
can be certain of
retaining
their
jobs
as
long
as
they
do not
defy authority.
In
consequence,
the
development
of bureaucratic mechanisms creates
powerful
vested interests
among
the educated
strata,
both within the
apparatus
of the
party-state
and outside it.
c)
The
formation of
a
compliant personality
The bureaucratization of the educated strata manifests itself in the
emergence
of cultural
patterns completely
different from those
prevailing
among
the old Polish
intelligentsia.
The dominant
type
of social
personality
is that of the
'organization
man'.17 Life chances
depend
on
the nature of the
occupational
position, promotions
are
impossible
without the
approval
of the
bosses,
a clean
political
record is essential in
posts
of trust and
importance,
disobedience is
severely punished
and
conformism
highly profitable.
The new cultural features do not
correspond exactly
to the Western
concept
of the 'bureaucratic
personality'
because of the marked differ-
ences between the Western and East
European
bureaucracies;
neverthe-
less some traits are
very
similar.
.4
W.
Narojek,
'Przeobra2enia
spoleczne
z
perspektywy
losu
jednestki',
Studiu
'Socjologiczne, I973,,
no.
3.
46
'Very
often the scholars are useless because
they
are
entangled
in the
supervisory
activities. This is so common in Polish science that the
phenomenon
of bureaucratiza-
tion of scholars can be regarded
as a social
phenomenon,'
writes
J.
Stankowski in
Tradycje
dzialalnosci
naukowej', Kierunki,
26
January. 1975.
47
See W. E.
Whyte,
The
Organization IVtan (I957).
INTELLIGENTSIA
352
There is in the first
place
the
growing
cult of
specialization,
which
endows :individuals with marketable skills with increased
bargaining
power
within and vis-a-vis the bureaucratic structures.
Along
with
specialization
there is also a
progressing segmentalization
and
privati-
zation that
shapes
the attitudes of the
present-day intelligentsia
in
Poland and in other Communist countries.
All this is at least
partly
due to the
political system,
which
imposes
severe restrictions on
inter-occupational
contacts and cuts the lines of
communication between the economic
sectors,
institutions and
pro-
fessions.
The
impact
of
'segmentalization'
is best reflected in the existence
of
occupational ghettos
in which
people spend
their lives. Here
again
we
deal with a
phenomenon
which is not alien to the
developed
Western
countries.
However,
in the
West, clubs,
political parties, voluntary
associations and
many
other institutions allow
people
to mix with other
groups
if
they
wish,
which is
hardly
the case in the Communist East.
There members of a
professional
circle are doomed to
rubbing
shoulders
with each other in the same
canteens,
restaurants and coffee-houses
attached to their association's
headquarters,
at the same
meetings
and in
the same ministerial corridors. In some institutions
they
are sent to the
same health resorts.
They
know each other and
they
know
everything
about each
other,
which is
pretty
natural,
but
they
are at the same time
ignorant
of what is
going
on in other sectors of
society.
Being part
of an
occupational
circle
gives
them a
feeling
of
security,
consolidates mutual
ties and allows the cultivation of
private loyalties
which often cut
across hierarchical lines.48
'Segmentalization'
is associated mwith the institution of client-master
relationships
within the
professional ghettos,
with the network of
informal communication which
compensates
for the lack of official
information,
and with the unofficial structure of
prestige
and
authority
which
gives
credit to individual achievements even if
they
are not
fully
acknowledged,
or
may
even be
denounced,
in
public.
'Segmentalization'
contributes to what
may
be called
'privatization'
of
the educated strata. Professional
ties,
small informal
groups
and
family
life are the main
components
of the social environment of a member of
the modern
intelligentsia,
and mould his interests
accordingly.
In offices
small talk and
private gossip replace
discussions of
political
issues;
personnel
policy
of the
political
bosses attracts more attention than the
way they
run the
country,
outside events are
hardly acknowledged
and
inside stories about
personalities
and
petty
conflicts seem much more
exciting
than
anything
else.
48
Aleksander
Vallis, 'Strtktura
nieformalna Srodowiska
artysti6 plastyk6w',
Kultura i
spoleczen'stwo, 1961,
no.
4.
353
The
growing
affluence of the
years I971-75
has reinforced this trend
by creating
new
opportunities
for individual
consumption:
to mention
only
individual
trips
abroad,
the
purchase
of
private cottages
and second
homes in the
countryside, car-driving
and car maintenance.
This trend towards
privatization
has
emerged clearly
in
surveys
of
the attitudes of
young people
in Poland.49 The values
they
most
appreciate
are
friendship, love,
emotional satisfaction and an
interesting
job;
the values most often
rejected
are
power,
ambition to
occupy high
positions
and a life full of risk. A lack of interest in
big
social
problems
and social issues in
general
is associated with a
preoccupation
with
personal
problems
and
small-group relationships.
In an article on social and
occupational
attitudes of
young people,
W. Adamski
gives
the
following
list of life
aspirations
of the
younger
and
older
generations
in Poland.50
o/ o
/0
%
Aspirations Young
Older
1.
Happy family
life
69'8 66*5
2. To be a
good specialist
66'9
65'4
3.
The chance to
improve steadily
one's
qualifications 32'5 151
4.
A
good reputation 29'1 34'*
5.
A
good living
standard
27'4
3I'8
6. To be useful to other
people 23'9 29'6
7.
A
quiet
life 22'0
42'4
8. A
diploma
of
higher
education
I6'3 4'9
9.
A life full of adventure
5'I
1'2
1o. To be a social and
political
activist
4'3
6
9
Such verbal
expressions
of life ideals
may
well echo the thesis about
family-
and
profession-oriented
attitudes of both the
young
and older
Poles
against
the
nineteenth-century
tradition of
preoccupation
with
broader social and
political
issues.
d)
Ideology
of professionalism
The
integration
of the
intelligentsia
with the
party
state cannot be
understood without
taking
into account the
development
of the
pro-
fessional ethos
among
the educated strata. Professional values seem to
operate
in
many
cases as a substitute for
political
beliefs and social
commitments;
'segmentalization', 'privatization'
and
depoliticization
are somehow reinforced
by
an
ideology by
which constraints
imposed
upon public
life are not so much
challenged
and resisted as internalized.
49
W.
Adarski, 'Postawy spoleczno-zawodowe mlodzieiy',
Studia
Socjologiczne,
1974,
no. 2.
0
Ibid., p. 148.
INTELLIGENTSIA
354
To what extent
occupational
interests
shape
the attitudes of the
intelligentsia
was best illustrated
by
the
unqualified support
first for
Gomulka and later for Gierek
when,
after Gomulka's
fall,
the new
government
boosted the
economy
and
tightened
the
cooperation
between the state
apparatus
and various
professional groups.
Very
much as in the
West,
for
professional people
a
job
that is
interesting
is all that
really
matters
provided
the
government
is able to
offer
ample
remuneration.
Egalitarianism
is
extremely unpopular,51
the
market
economy
is
highly
favoured as
opposed
to all sorts of collective
consumption
of the welfare state
type, privileges granted
to
diploma
holders are
accepted
as
legitimate,
and low salaries which still
plague
many groups
of
graduates
are resented and
persistently
contrasted with
the
high living
standard of the
intelligentsia
before the war and of
professional
people
in the West.
Professional
titles,
ranks,
symbols
of
occupational
status,
scientific
degrees
are
among
the most coveted and valued social
commodities;
even ministers and
high military
and
police
commanders
try
to raise
their
prestige by studying
for a
respectable degree.
To be
somebody
means to have a
professional
status;
it is the latter that
gains
the
highest
score at evaluations of
occupation
and
prestige ratings.52
Professional
achievement,
professional integrity, professional reputa-
tion are at the same time
powerful
motivations for ambitious and honest
individuals who
try
to
forget
about
politics
and
ignore
the limitations
imposed upon
them in
public
life as
long
as
they
can
go
ahead in their
professional
activities. The
ideology
of the
professionals
is
fairly simple:
i)
The
government
should
carry
out whatever
policies
it
adopts,
while
the
professionals
both in and outside the
apparatus
should do their best
in their
professional capacities;
2)
The best
qualified
are the natural elites and should
enjoy
the
privileges
due to
them;
3)
In return for their
loyalty they
should be trusted and
granted
a
certain
degree
of
autonomy
within their
occupational
cummunities and
professional
associations;
4)
Political conformism has to be
accepted
as the
price paid by
the
professionals
if
they
want to
carry
out their
proper
functions
effectively.
Professionalism becomes in
consequence
a social
philosophy
of sorts
that makes it
possible
to
bridge
the
gap
between the
intelligentsia
and
51
A.
Malewski,
'Attitudes of the Warsaw
Employees',
The Polish
Sociological
Bulletin, 1971,
no. 2.
52
See A.
Sarapata,
'Z badan nad
hierarchiq prestiiu zajec
w
Polsce',
Studia
Socjologiczne, 1975,
no.
i;
A.
Sarapata
and W.
Wesolowski,
'Evaluation of
Occupations
by
Warsaw
Inhabitants',
The American
Journal of Sociology,
vol.
LXVI, I961;
S.
Nowak,
'Social Structure in Social
Consciousness',
The Polish
Sociological
Bulletin,
I964,
no. 2.
355
the
ruling
elite. A
professional
is thus able to
pretend
that he retains
his
spiritual independence
while
being integrated
into the
system
of the
party
state. His real choice is not whether to offer or withhold
coopera-
tion since
cooperation
is built into the definition of all
occupations,
but
whether and how to make the best use of the
political components
of
professional
careers.
And since the
ideology
of
organic
work has a
long
tradition in Polish
society,
which for
many years
existed and
developed
under
foreign
domination,
the
professional spirit
is often combined with the attitudes
of
genuine
social commitment
supported by
the
arguments
of
political
realism. This
philosophy
proclaims
the
necessity
to
pursue goals
that
are within the reach of the educated
strata,
and
urges
the use of all the
opportunities
of economic and social
development
offered under the
conditions of Communist rule and
semi-sovereignty
within the Soviet
empire.
4.
New
confrontations
and
ghosts of
the
past
It follows from this
analysis
of the Polish case that
by adopting
professional
attitudes and orientations the
intelligentsia
is able to
co-exist with authoritarian forms of
government provided
there is
enough
outlet and
appropriate
remuneration for its skills. No wonder
that in a
I974
discussion on the
intelligentsia
in Poland the
following
opinions
were voiced:53
Briefly speaking,
the
geography
and
sociology
of culture eliminated
the
figure
of the old
'inteligent'.
He has been
replaced by
the
profes-
sional,
who for better or worse
operates
within a
strictly
designed
division of labour. The Polish
intelligentsia
ceased to exist with the
Second World War ....
Today
in Poland the
intelligentsia
exists on a
verbal
level,
partly
in
customs,
in the
style
of
life,
in
bric-a-brac,
in
the home
atmosphere.
That is all. It does not exist in the social
structure or in social life at
large.
Yet such
opinions
contrast
strikingly
with the
scope
of the
I974
discussion-which continues to the
present day.
We can observe the
re-emergence
of the
problem
of the
intelligentsia
in Poland on the moral
and normative
levels,
i.e. as a cultural
phenomenon
of some
political
significance.
The
origins
of this
phenomenon
are
complex,
but the
context within which the
concept
of
intelligentsia
is discussed offers
important
clues to some of its
underlying
factors.
I)
There
are,
in the first
place, attempts
to redefine the role of
professionals
and of intellectuals in
general
in view of the new
problems
53 Literatura,
1974,
no.
49,
p.
4.
INTELLIGENVTSIA
356
that can
hardly
be tackled
by
the official
ideology
of Marxism-Leninism.
As one
sociologist put
it:54
We have come to a
point beyond
which the classics of Marxism-
Leninism had to
stop
their reflections. As
futurologists they
were
unable to
go any
further. And now the
question
what to do with that
system,
how to
develop
it,
has to be answered.
Once a
question
of central values and life ideals is
being
raised one is
faced with the
problem
of who should set
up,
and
how,
targets
and
goals
for
society
as a whole.55 Even he who
pays lip-service
to Marxism-
Leninism does not
expect
the doctrine to contain solutions for the
future. No wonder that one of the
leading
fellow-travellers,
Bogdan
Suchodolski,
wrote:56
There is the consciousness of ourselves which is
produced by
the
intelligentsia,
all
types
of it are
extremely important
for modern
civilization and
society.
That social consciousness does not arise in
other
groups,
strata or social circles which are
occupied
with life
itself and not with
pondering
about life.
2)
A second theme in the discussion boils down to the
emphasis
on
culture-forming
functions of educated
people
in view of what could be
called the social anomie
(or normlessness)
in a
rapidly developing society.
There seems to be in the first
place
the trivial
problem
of who is
supposed
to set the standards of
'good manners',
and the belief that the intel-
ligentsia
has a
duty
to work out the norms of social behaviour for all
sections of
society. Journalists
increasingly complain
about uncivilized
reactions
by
the man in the
street;
many
a
reporter
discovers an
offensive
by
what he calls 'scum' and 'ruffians'
and,
characteristically
enough, appeals
direct to the
intelligentsia
to
shape
the manners of
society.
At a more
sophisticated
level the demands are extended to the
culture of life in
general:57
Those who contend that at
present
the social life of educated Poles
consists of
discussing
the merits of cars or the difficulties of
building
a second house or the
prices
of fur coats in
Bulgaria
while
literary
problems,
theatre or the welfare of less fortunate social
groups
are
regarded
as
purely professional
matters which should not interfere
with the
pleasures
of
leisure,
will
rightly say
that education is not
54
Ibid.
55
A.
Malachowski, 'Pamietnik wspolczesny', Kultura, 14
December
I975.
56
B. Suchodolski in
Literatura,
I6
January 1975.
57
'We still know what it means to behave like a member of the
intelligentsia,
how
to
comport ourselves,
and we use these norms more often than the model of behaviour
of the
bourgeoisie, working
class or
nobility,' argues J. Pomorski, 'Jezeli
nie
istnieje',
Literatura, 30 January 1975.
VS. BUREAUCRACY?
357
necessarily
associated with
adopting
the function of an
'inteligent'....
The revival of
intelligentsia
in a new
shape
is a matter of faith . . that
faith is based on the conviction that time works in favour of the
tradition of the
intelligentsia,
that the world of
things
is less
important
than the world of
ideas,
that even the most
complicated gadget
in a
Mercedes will become
boring
sooner than the sonnets of
Shakespeare!
The believers
hope
that time will heal the wounds inflicted
by
the
negative
effects of
achieving
a better
living
standard.
3)
The third set of
arguments
concentrates on the
concept
of social
responsibility
of the
intelligentsia regarded
as the bearers of an
important
-social mission.
The Polish
intelligentsia
embodies a
personal responsibility
of
sorts for the world around
us,
for Poland at the level of a
single
village
or for the
country
as a whole. The
intelligentsia
creates an idea
of its own which
generates
such an
organization
of life as has a
meaning
not
only
because it exists but because we adhere to it
consciously.
Intelligentsia
is a
specifically
Polish
myth
.
.something
that would
have to be invented if it did not exist.58
4)
The fourth line in the discussion which can be discovered in
private
conversations in
Poland,
and is voiced in Polish cultural and
political magazines published
abroad,
deals with the
political
charisma of
the Polish
intelligentsia
and its role in the movement of
political
opposition
in Poland. In a series of articles initiated
by
Kultura
(Paris),
the authors from Poland
emphasize
the
duty
of the
intelligentsia
to
articulate social demands and
argue
the case of close
cooperation
between the
intelligentsia
and the
working
class
against
the
party
rule.59
The
pertinent questions
asked centre on what the
intelligentsia
should
do,
what role it should
play,
what are its duties to
society
as a whole.
One is
tempted
to believe that there are
specific
social conditions
for the revival of the
myth
of the
intelligentsia.
In his alienation
theory
H. Seton-Watson assumed that the
intelligentsia
was a
specific
pheno-
menon of
underdeveloped
countries in which the educated strata felt
frustrated and thus tended to act as a
revolutionary
and
disruptive
force.60 The substitution
theory
elaborated
by
A. Gella
points
to the
role of the
intelligentsia
in situations where
important problems
of the
nation cannot be solved
by
the established
leadership and/or
the
authorities.61
However,
neither alienation nor substitution
theory fully
58
Literatura,
1975,
no.
3.
59
See the debate in Kultura
(Paris), 1974-76,
under the
heading
'Co robic?'
60
G. H. N.
Seton-Watson,
'The Role of the
Intelligentsia', Survey, 1972,
no.
43
(August).
61
See footnote 26 above.
INTE LLIGENTSIA
358
applies
to Communist societies in which the educated strata
are,
to a
considerable
degree, integrated
with the
party
state within which
they
carry
out
important
functions. The
degree
of
integration
varies and some
groups
of the
intelligentsia
are more involved in the activities of the
party
state and more satisfied with the received
gratifications
than the
others.
At the same time causes of frustration exist and account for the
varying degrees
of consensus
(or dissension).
The
following
causes of
frustration could be mentioned
by way
of illustration: Soviet domination
over the life of a nation whose whole tradition is based on the
long
struggle
for
independence
is
generally
and
profoundly
resented;
the
monopoly
held
by
the
party
reduces
many people
to the rank of second-
rate citizens
deprived
of
appropriate
influence and confined to the
marginal (if any)
roles in bureaucratic
decision-making;
the Catholic
intelligentsia
suffers overt discrimination in
public
life not
only by
being
outside the
party
but also
by prescriptive
rules of
promotion
to
higher
posts
in
party-controlled
institutions;
the
ideological monopoly
reinforced
by
administrative control over intellectual life constitutes a
straitjacket
on the cultural life of the
nation;
criticism
against
economic
shortcomings
in the
system
is
invariably
directed
against
the
party
and
state bureaucracies to whom the
inefficiency
and maladministration is
generally
attributed;
the
professional
interests of the 'creative intel-
ligentsia'
clash in
many respects
with the authoritarian
rule,
the
principles
of
meritocracy
and
occupational autonomy being
violated
under the conditions of control over intellectual
communities,
however
selectively
exercised.
These are the circumstances in which social discontent and the need
for alternative solutions find their
corollary
in the
intelligentsia myth.
Reference to the
intelligentsia's glorious past
has become an
important
ingredient
of its
self-image
and continues to
shape
the
expectations
of
those who are
looking
for a new national
leadership.
In a
society
in which there is no
proper
channel of communication
between the
government
and the interest
groups,
in which
political
parties voicing
criticism of
government
are banned and a free
press
does
not
exist,
the bearers of
independent opinion
and the
champions
of
intellectual freedom
naturally
become an
extremely important
com-
ponent
of
political
life. Their influence
surpasses by
far the limited
numbers of those
prepared
to take the risk of
challenging
the establish-
ment.
The
intelligentsia myth replaces-at
least to some extent-the
myth
of the
working
class which dominated the
ideological
scene
during
the
Polish October. The
change
can be at least
partly explained by
the fact
that in
I956
the articulate
opposition developed primarily
within the
E
359
party
and made use of Marxist formulae
by opposing
the workers to the
'red
bourgeoisie'
created
by
Stalinist rule. In later
years,
and in
particular
since
I968,
the foil of
political opposition
has shifted towards the
groups
not affiliated to the
party,
who are nourished
primarily by
national traditions in which the
intelligentsia myth plays
a
major part.
The educated and articulate carriers of
opposition
not
only regard
themselves as the heirs of the old Polish
intelligentsia,
but for some
observers
they
are the
intelligentsia
in the
proper
sense of the word.
Their charisma is based on their devotion to the interests of their
fellow
citizens,
their moral
qualities,
their
courage,
their determination
to face
adversity
and
persecution.
As
fighters
for the cause and
guardians
of
public
interests
they
are
encouraged
and
supported
by
members of the
public
at
large
who
sympathize
with their demands and
expect
them to be
the advocates of social
justice. They
are
openly
or
tacitly
admired
by
those who share their views but are not
prepared
to face the risks
involved,
and even some of their critics are
ready
to
acknowledge
privately
their
bravery
and moral
integrity.
This social climate
exposes
people
otherwise not concerned about
politics
to the
pressure
of social
standards and social
expectations
which
require
from them the
display
of
understanding
for the social
cause,
responsibility
for national
interests and even
heroism,
if certain values are at
stake,
i.e. the
practice
of virtues which are
hardly expected
from Western
professional people.
The result could be described as a
'split personality' syndrome.
Individuals are torn between
incompatible
standards and values: the
norms
promoted by
the
party
state are in conflict with the national
tradition;
the rules of a secure and successful
professional
life contradict
the moral standards
upheld by
individuals who are
highly
esteemed for
their moral
integrity
and intellectual achievements. All this adds to the
instability
of the
system, people
tend to
swing politically
from one
extreme to the
other,
reactions are often
unpredictable
and
erratic,
political
ideas
vague
and inconsistent. Individuals
continually
seem to
face the dilemma of
choosing
between
positivism
and
heroism,
pro-
fessional
groups apply
double standards in
assessing
the behaviour of
their
members;
rebels are written off
by many
as fools and trouble-
makers and
yet
treated with much
sympathy
and
respect; conformity
is
approved
but nonconformism nevertheless
applauded.
5.
Conclusions
The three main
components
of the
nineteenth-century intelligentsia
were
i)
social status marked
by
social conduct inculcated
by breeding
and
training; 2) qualifications
for
carrying
out certain
professional
activities,
and
3)
social
functions, especially ideological
and
political
leadership.
360
INTELLIGENTSIA
VS. BUREA UCRACY?
36I
The difficulties of
dealing
with the
problem
of the
intelligentsia
in modern East
European
societies consist in the dissociation of these
characteristics. The educated strata in Poland have lost their cohesiveness
as a distinctive status
group
and are no
longer
characterized
by
common
social and
political aspirations
which accounted for their relative
unity
in the
past.
The dissociation of the status characteristics makes of the educated
strata a mixture of different
occupational
and
professional groups
with
different
norms,
aspirations
and attitudes. In
political
terms we are
dealing primarily
with a
complex
set of interest
groups clustering
around
institutions, ranks,
professional qualities,
administrative
divisions,
etc.
It follows that what could be
regarded
as broad
generalizations
about the
intelligentsia
have to be
replaced
with detailed studies of various
institutions, professional groups
and
occupational
communities
including
apparatchiki,
technical
intelligentsia,
creative
intelligentsia, higher
and middle
management, teachers,
research workers.
However,
there are some
traditions,
symbols
and cultural traits
that cut across institutional and rank boundaries and
appeal
to that
heterogeneous
mass of
700,000
members of the educated strata. The
intelligentsia
exists,
in other
words,
in its
self-image,
in the
perseverance
of status
distinctions,
even if
they
have lost their substance
long ago,
in the
sphere
of
'symbolic
interaction' and 'collective consciousness'
based on evaluations inherited from the nineteenth
century.
Even
so,
the
intelligentsia
ethos contains
contradictory
elements: it
expresses
on the one hand an attitude of
positive
accommodation of
pro-
fessionals who
carry
out their
important
social functions within the
bureaucratic
order;
on the other
hand, originating
in the traditions of
the
past
and reinforced
by
the liberal and anti-authoritarian trends
coming
from the
West,
it
assigns
an
important place
to dissent.
By
the
differentiation between the 'real' and the 'false'
intelligentsia
a normative
factor has been reintroduced-that of moral
integrity,
social
responsi-
bility
and heroic
self-sacrifice,
the
'intelligentsia
versus
bureaucracy'
hypothesis becoming
itself an
integral part
of a cultural
myth.
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Intelligentsia versus Bureaucracy? The Revival of a Myth in Poland

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