HEGEL

and the
H UMAN
SPIRIT
A translation of
the lena Lectures
on the Philosophy
of Spirit (18O5-6)
with commentary
by
LEO RAUCH
Wayne State University Press Detroit 1983
Copyright 1983 by Wayne State University Press,
Detroit, Michigan 48202. All rights are reserved.
No part of this book may be reproduced
without formal permission.
The translation of the text is from G. W. F. Hegel,
Gesammelte Werke, Volume 8: fenaer Systementwurfe
III (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1976), edited by
Rolf-P. Horstmann with Johann Heinrich Trede.
By permission of the copyright holder,
the Rheinisch-Westfahsche Akademie der
Wissenschaften in Diisseldorf.
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 1770-1831.
Hegel and the human spirit.
"Translation of the text is from G.W.F. Hegel,
Gesammelte Werke, Volume 8: Jenaer Systementwurfe III
(Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1976)"T.p. verso.
Bibliography: p.
1. PhilosophyAddresses, essays, lectures.
I. Rauch, Leo. II. Title.
B2908 1983 193 83-12509
ISBN: 0-8143-1739-1
To Gil a . . . whose idea it
/ \
M
b *i
CONTENTS
Preface 9
Introduction: On Hegel's Concept of Spirit 15
G. W. F. Hegel: The Philosophy of Spirit (1805-6) 83
PART I. Spirit According to Its Concept 85
A. Intelligence 85
B. Will 99
PART II. Actual Spirit 119
A. Recognition 120
i. Immediate Recognition 120
ii. Contract 124
iii. Crime and Punishment 128
B. The Coercive Law 132
i. [Law and Marriage] 134
ii. [Law and Property] 138
iii. [Judicial Force] 141
iv. [Law, Life, and Death] 145
PART III. Constitution 151
A. Classes: The Nature of Self-Ordering Spirit 162
i. The Lower Classes and Their Outlooks 163
ii. The Universal Class 167
B. Government: The Self-Certain Spirit of Nature 171
C. Art, Religion, and Science 173
PREFACE
On October 13, 1806, Jena fell to Napoleon's
army. Hegel saw the great man himself, history focused to a
single point, "this world-soul . . . on horseback." Just a few
days before, Hegel had sent the first half of his Phenomenol-
ogy f Spirit to his friend Niethammer in Bamberg, who was
to relay the manuscript to the publisher. Despite Hegel's en-
thusiasm for Napoleon, there was considerable danger. A few
days later, Hegel fled his house and the city, carrying the last
pages of the Phenomenology with him. Tradition has it that
he finished them amidst the sounds of the battle.
Hegel liked to see contemporary events, and philosophy
itself, in global terms; for it is by reference to the cosmic, the
universal, that the particular gets its meaning. Hegel saw Na-
poleon, the "world-soul on horseback" (which phrase the
French eventually mistranslated as la raison a cheval), as the
unwitting instrument for the cosmic emergence of historical
self-consciousness. Hegel's teaching and writing had well pre-
pared him for this sort of perspective, this way of seeing
everything in the broadest possible context. Indeed, in the
preface to the Phenomenology written only after the main
text had been completed, and possibly with the Napoleonic
army already in view, Hegel says: "The true is the totality."
Any partial "truth" would run afoul of its opposite and be
contradicted by it. Only the entirety, Hegel believed, can be
trusted to give the parts their proper meaning. Only a com-
Preface
plete world-system can enable us to understand the details
whether it be a "detail" such as the battle of Jena, or a philo-
sophical "truth/
7
When Hegel came to Jena, in 1801, it was the center of
philosophy in Germany. At the University, twelve men had
been teaching philosophy, among them Schiller, Fichte (until
1799), the Schlegels, and Schelling. Early in 1801, Hegel left
Frankfurt and accepted Schelling's invitation to come and stay
with him. Soon thereafter, Hegel wrote a book entitled The
Difference Between Fichte's and Schelling's Systems of Phi-
losophy. The time must have been an exciting and crowded
one for him. At the end of the summer semester, he submitted
a postdoctoral dissertation (on planetary orbits) as a way of
applying for a teaching post at the University. He took the
qualifying examination and was awarded the right to lecture. It
was his thirty-first birthday. He began as a Privatdozent in the
winter term of 1801-2. Two years later, he announced that he
would present his entire philosophy as a unified world-system.
The lecture series of 1803-4 and 1805-6 constitute two ver-
sions of that system, and a part of the latter series makes up the
subject of this book. In February, 1805, he was promoted to
associate professor, and shortly thereafter decided to publish
the Phenomenology, on which he had been working.
The Phenomenology of Spirit is Hegel's greatest work and
and probably one of the ten most profound works in all phi-
losophy. It has continued to fascinate, for its symphonic com-
plexity as for its gothic mysteries. Many of the ideas dis-
cussed in the Phenomenology were first aired in Hegel's Jena
lectures of 1803 to 1806. This feverish period saw Hegel's first
approaches to themes such as praxis, recognition, alienation,
and the life and death of cultures. These ideas, beyond their
value in and for themselves, have taken their place in the
body of world thought, and have had an enormous impact on,
for example, Marxism, existentialism, and the social sciences.
But it was here that they were given their first formulation.
It was the Phenomenology, however, that had the lasting
impact, and these lectures were forgotten. Not until a century
after Hegel's death were the Jena lectures published. In 1931,
10
Preface
the 1805-6 lectures were published by Johannes Hoffmeister
as Jenenser Realphilosophie II. In the next year, the 1803-4
lectures were published as Jenenser Realphilosophie I. hi 1976,
a critical edition of the 1805-6 lectures was issued by the
Rhine-Westphalian Academy of Sciences, as part of a new and
comprehensive edition of Hegel's writings. The translation,
publication, and discussion of this Jena material has lagged far
behind its interest and effect. No English translation has yet
been done of the 1805-6 series of lectures on the philosophy of
Nature and on the philosophy of Spirit; nor has any book been
devoted in its entirety to them, even though the lectures on the
philosophy of Spirit have been discussed extensively in the
works of Lukacs, Marcuse, Habermas, and Avineri, among
others, and have excited considerable curiosity. (As for the
1805-6 lectures on the philosophy of Nature, no doubt some-
one will be coming forward with a translation of them before
long.)
Each series of the Jena lectures was offered as a world-
system: both a philosophy of nature and a philosophy of the
human spirit. The problem facing any commentator on them,
however, is that they are lecture notes, not finished texts.
Many points are left cryptic, perhaps meant to be expanded in
class discussion. Thoughts are often left unconnected, and
connecting sentences must be interpolated. There are exten-
sive marginal notes, some of great interest, but it is not al-
ways clear what point in the text they are meant to illumi-
nate. In this respect, the 1976 Academy edition sometimes
differs radically from the 1931 edition, appending a note to a
different place in the text and thus giving it a different con-
text of meaning. (A look at the actual manuscript shows how
tenuous all this is.) Some statements merely hint at what
they mean, and the commentator is on thin ice in trying to
interpret them. Of course, one can turn to other writings of
Hegel in support of one interpretation or another, but this
also has its dangers and difficulties.
On one hand, Hegel's thinking is all of a piece: his ideas, in
1805, are continuous with those of 1821 and after. It is as
though he knew, from the very beginning of his mature think-
11
Preface
ing, exactly what his philosophy was and where it would take
him, and he simply set about expounding it. For this reason it
would seem perfectly legitimate to rely on a passage, say, in his
Encyclopaedia (1817) to illuminate some dark point in the Jena
lectures of 1805. The trouble with that approach, however, is
that the consistency we see is established inductively: it fol-
lows from the texts, but cannot dictate their course. Accord-
ingly, no reference to a later work can serve to establish con-
clusively anything about the earlier work and therefore many
of the dark points must remain dark. We must remember that
what we have here are lecture notes, to which Hegel made
numerous marginal additions which are merely keys, not open
doors to his full intentionsand these keys are often keys for
him alone. Sometimes Hegel jots down a word or phrase, and
its connection to the context is clear; sometimes it is not. The
manuscripts themselves resemble the scores of Beethoven
more than Mozart, with numerous changes and additions, de-
letions and insertions. Hegel will sometimes let himself go in a
marginal passage which runs on for pages and seems to depart
from the context which inspired it. The scholars of the Acad-
emy have done an outstanding job in putting the manuscripts
together, even if, in some instances, you can see them guess-
ing. The reader of the translation presented here will have to
keep this in mind, and read the footnotes not as the clarifying
additions that footnotes are usually intended to be, but as after-
thoughts, hints at emerging lines of thinking which Hegel may
have intended to follow up in the presentation of his lectures,
but did not do so in the lectures as written out.
In most of the editorial decisions, I have followed the lead
of the 1976 edition, especially in regard to specific points of
phrasing and the placing of the marginal notes. The editors of
the new edition have obviously been far more scrupulous in
their reading than Hoffmeister was in 1931. I have followed
neither edition slavishly, however, and have broken up para-
graphs and changed punctuation in what I felt were the inter-
ests of clarity. In some cases I have taken the liberty of "at-
taching" a marginal note to a point a few words prior to or
after the place assigned to it in the 1976 edition, on the
12
Preface
grounds that my placement seems to make better sense. But
in no cases are these editorial liberties of a controversial na-
ture, and whenever an explanatory woisd-or phrase has been
added by me, this has been indicated by square brackets.
(Where a marginal note of Hegel's is a word or phrase ap-
pended to a sentence in the text, I have put the phrase in a
footnote without capitalizing the initial letter, to indicate
that it is a continuation of the sentence. Where a marginal
note comprises a whole sentence or sentences, I have natural-
ly capitalized the first word.)
The difficulties for the Hegel translator are further com-
pounded in a work such as this which was never intended for
publication. As a text, these 1805-6 lectures are incomplete:
only in being read by Professor Hegel, in the lecture hall,
would its jotted hints become voiced thoughts. Thus, even
with bracketed additions and introductory essays, this incom-
pleteness is a problem which the translator can at best only
partially overcome.
A further problem stems from the difference between Ger-
man and English as philosophical languages: the tendency, in
German, is to let one word mean as many things as possible,
while the tendency in English is (ideally) to use words which
have no more than one meaning or which will stand for no
more than one meaning throughout a given context. Thus
the German tendency is to be explosively connotative, and
this has unquestionably conditioned German philosophical
thinking up to the present day. This cultural difference
makes philosophy originally expressed in German often ap-
pear ambiguous in Englishunless, that is, the translator
adopts and indicates different meanings for the same word,
as the context dictates. But even this endeavor can prove
frustrating to the translator, who must try to fix a meaning
for a word which Hegel uses loosely.
The three most notorious instances of this ambiguity in
language are, in my opinion, Geist, Entdusserung, and Auf-
hebung. The first of these is used not only in the context of
individual "mind/
7
but also in that of the political and cul-
tural self-awareness on the part of a community, as well as
13
ftsfaee
the very mysterious "spirit" which moves world history.
Since Hegel uses the one word Geist, for these three very
different meanings, what we as readers must do is both to
isolate these meanings from each other and find a common
meaning for all three which would enable us to use the one
term. (This, it seems to me, is the key to understanding He-
gel.) In the same way, Entdusserung means, for Hegel, "exter-
nalization" and "alienation/' each with a positive as well as
negative connotation. In order to convey the meanings of that
term, I have used one word or the other, sometimes both in
tandem. It is obvious that Hegel is in many places exploiting
the ambiguity of these words. Aufhebung, too, has positive as
well as negative connotations, and quite often Hegel intends
both in the one word. Thus it means (at the minimum) "tran-
scendence," "overcoming," "elevation," and "retention," as
well as "cancellation," "negation," "annulment," "dissolu-
tion," "abrogation," "termination," "suspension," "suppres-
sion," "sublation," "removal," and "repeal." Here, too, I have
chosen the word (or two) which I believe best conveys the
meaning. Another somewhat less problematic term is An-
schauung. Despite its variegated meanings, the standard En-
glish rendering is "intuition." I have stayed with that where
possible, but have not hesitated to use other renderings where
the context would have made "intuition" awkward. (After all,
Weltanschauung is "world view," not "world intuition.") In
the questionable cases, I have added the German term in pa-
rentheses in order to alert the reader.
I could go on, to complain (as a translator) of other words
Hegel used, and of the way he used thembut that would be
unmannerly on my part, when the host is so gracious and the
feast so rich.
14
INTRODUCTION
On Hegel's Concept
of Spirit
The Jena lectures are an attempt at presenting a
comprehensive world-system. Any such system must include
(and reconcile) two seemingly opposed aspects: the world of
physical nature and the world of mind. One is extended in
space, the other in time. One is determined by physical forces
and laws, the other is supposedly free. There are numerous
ways of distinguishing between the two sorts of things which
make up the cosmic inventory. And the more sharply we
draw the distinction, the more pointedly the question may be
asked: how can one universe include both sorts of things?
It is easy enough to polarize the distinctionsalmost any-
one can be a dualist. The deeper challenge, however, is to
emphasize the distinctions and then to resolve them, to start
as a dualist and then to arrive at a monistic and all-inclusive
view of the world without, however, blurring the differences.
On the other hand, it is equally easy to be a monist, to say
that everything in the world is only one kind of entity (mate-
rial particles, say, or sense impressions). This, however, leads
to simplification and reduction: spatial entities such as tables
and chairs are undeniably different from mental entities such
as thoughts and desires. How, then, are we to conceive of a
world that can include them both, with their differences?
The profound achievement of Hegel is that he is neither a
dualist nor a monist; he regards both these outlooks as merely
partial truths, and, therefore, as partial falsehoods as well.
Whenever Hegel considers one of the traditional dichot-
15
Hegel and the Human Spirit
omiesmind/body, subject/object, being/becoming, univer-
sal/particular, infinite/finitehe regards it not as offering a
choice between alternative viewpoints, but rather as a polar-
ity which must be resolved. The truth in its totality does not
rest at the level of division, and such division must therefore
be overcome in favor of the higher, comprehensive truth. The
clue to resolving the various divisions, Hegel believes, lies in
the human effort to arrive at such comprehensive truth, or,
more precisely, lies in our awareness of that effort. The hu-
man consciousness, because it "includes" all dichotomies, ab-
sorbs them into itself, is thus the ultimate unity of all differ-
ences. Indeed, it is the very essence of consciousness, as Hegel
sees it, to be the absolute unity of opposites. (The more funda-
mental duality, the choice between dualisms as against mo-
nisms, is as old as philosophy itself.)
The Jena lectures of 1805-6 comprise an internal duality
themselves, since there is a section on the philosophy of Na-
ture and another on the philosophy of Spirit. The former in-
cludes topics such as mechanics, chemistry, and physics,
which are discussed in a way that is rather abstruse and the
entire section is by now well out-of-date. The section on the
philosophy of Spirit, on the other hand, has much to say to us
today, and offers discussions on the topics of intellect, will,
recognition, alienation, property, law, crime and punishment,
social classes, and the theory of culture.
In his Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences (1817),
Hegel divides the philosophy of Spirit into three sections:
Subjective Spirit (which concerns the psychological aspect),
Objective Spirit (concerning the political and social), and Ab-
solute Spirit (art, religion, philosophy). This arrangement is
approximated in the Jena lectures, the difference being in the
main headings and how they subdivide; also, the area of ob-
jective spirit is here given greater weight than the other two.
What Hegel wants to show is the continuity of the human
spirit, from the level of the individual psyche to that of the
transcultural. From the level of the individual intellect to that
of culture and beyond, there is one Geist which breathes
through all.
16
Introduction
PART I. Spirit According tcrlts Concept
A. Intelligence. In undertaking to discuss-*the areas of intel-
lect and will, as two components of the subjective human
spirit, Hegel is addressing himself to another of the well-
known dichotomies in the tradition of philosophy. Intellect
and will have traditionally been seen as two functions op-
posed to one another,- and if any dichotomy ever needed re-
solving, this one does. Indeed it is along these lines that the
psyche itself is divided against itself.
Yet intellect and will have certain aspects in common, as
functions of the psyche. First, there is their indeterminacy,
since no external force can dictate what their content will be.
Second, there is the characteristic way the intellect and the
will point beyond themselves to a specific content. And third,
they have a dimension of universality, whereby their content
is broadened into the "types" which the intellect uses in its
thinking, and in the case of the will, into the "ideals" and
"ends" which the will sets for itself.
Yet the differences between them are just as great. First, the
standards involved in the use of the intellect (e.g., consistency)
are not those of the will (e.g., assertiveness). Second, the intel-
lect's affirmation does not necessarily lead to action, as does
the affirmation on the part of the will. Third, we usually de-
ploy the two functions in opposite directionsthe theoretical
against the practical, the vita contemplativa against the vita
activa. This list of similarities and differences can be extended
at length.
As was said earlier, for Hegel it is the essence of conscious-
ness to be the unity of opposites. This unity requires each of
two opposed elements to be identical to the totality. Yet this
seems self-contradictory, for how can two opposed things be
identical to the same thing? In regard to intellect and will,
however, the contradiction is only a seeming one, since it is
altogether transcended in the unifying consciousness.
We can now see, more generally, one of the ways by which
Hegel arrives at the unification of dualities, whatever they
might be. He will take one term, such as G^ist"conscious-
17
Hegel and the Human Spirit
ness," "mind," "spirit"and apply it to both sides of an oppo-
sition. The opposed entities then become mere aspects of that
unifying termand since that term is of broader scope than
either of the polar terms, we would be wrong (methodologi-
cally) to ascribe an independent reality to either of the poles.
They are therefore annulled, transcendedaufgehobenpre-
served within the unifying term and at the same time negated
by it.
One problematic feature (among many) in this approach is
that the unifying term Hegel uses will most likely already
exist in ordinary language, and thus will carry its connota-
tions with it into its philosophical use. The term is extended
beyond its ordinary connotations by being given a technical
(i.e., philosophical) meaningand then we may expect a se-
ries of clashes between the various meanings. Although the
German word Geist may admit of such technical extension,
the English words "consciousness," "mind," and "spirit" do
so only with difficultyso that, in ordinary English, we gen-
erally speak of a cultural "spirit" or a collective "mind" only
with inverted commas added.
Yet one reason why we cannot rest satisfied with ordinary
language is that it is much too restricted by finitude and par-
ticularity. What marks intelligence, on the other hand, is its
element of universality. Thus intelligence steps back from the
particularity of a thing to see it in its generic, or universal,
light (the way the thing conforms to a type, and so on). Yet in
ordinary perception, and in the language associated with it,
we are immersed in the particularity of objects. In stepping
back from that particularity, we step into an awareness of
ourselves, and in so doing the intelligence becomes pure sub-
ject, entirely "for itself"in contrast to the object, which is
"in itself." For Hegel, then, air knowledge is problematic,
since it involves contrasting elementse.g., the subjective
and the objective, the universal and the particularwhich
must clash, at least implicitly. When the clash is made ex-
plicit, as a conflict or even a contradiction, it can be resolved
(as was said earlier) by the mind in its awareness of its own
activity in positing these elements. Accordingly, all knowl-
18
Introduction
edge leads implicitly to self-kntfwledge. That implicit trajec-
tory, made explicit, becomes the dialectic of knowledge.
Now that we have seen how consciousness is beset by in-
ner oppositions, and even contradictions (which it is supposed
to reconcile), we can well expect the concept of sei/-knowl-
edge (as consciousness of consciousness) to be even more self-
contradictory. Indeed, the concept of self-knowledge is one of
the most problematic and important ones in Hegel's philoso-
phy. Usually, when I know something, I objectify it as there,
as "other" than myself. How, then, can "knowing" be applied
to the self, when the knowing subject is the object known?
Hegel's way out of this difficulty, here, is to say'that what^the
intelligence grasps is not itself but its act.
Above all, in this unity of subject and object in self-
knowlege, intelligence is "in and for itself." In this way the
dichotomy between knower and known is overcome. When I
am immersed in experiencing the ordinary world of objects,
the self is an object "in itself" as all other objects are. But in
knowing itself, the self is both "in itself" and "for itself"
self-enclosed and yet open to itself. Here, then, we have a
concrete example of how Hegel uses the concept of human
consciousness to overcome one of the traditional dichoto-
mies. In my self-consciousness, I have my own "in itself" as
my object: I am separated from it, and yet I am at one with it.
In this we see the autonomy of consciousness, its freedom
from all external determination in the power to relate to, or
negate, any and every thing that is the object of consciousness.
Hegel speaks of the self and consciousness as an All-
Encompassing Night, in which anything, everything, or noth-
ing can occur. Thus the self is negativity, a frightening vacuity,
for it is totally arbitrary in its freedom, free to call forth images
or to ignore them, to connect or to dismember them. To
"mean" (meinen) is to "make mine" {mein). In being reminded
of something, I give it the meaning of being-for-me. hi remind-
ing myself [eiinnein], I re-internalize [innere], and I thereby
re-enter myself.
In all this, Hegel reveals the role of the selfand the im-
plicit awareness of oneself:in all awareness as such. Knowl-
19
Hegel and the Human Spirit
edge already involves a synthesis of content and selfwhich
is why sei/-knowledge is always in the wings and ready to
make its appearance. Thus a thing is never simply there;
rather, with the constant proximity of selfhood, with our
awareness of the self in irs creation of the thing, we see that
the thing is not what it is ("das Ding ist nicht was es ist
;/
),
since instead of simply being there, it is being-for-me. The
thing's being is bound up with the self, its being is the self
("sein Sein ist Ich selbst
;;
): the object is subject. The transi-
tion is easy, then, from this to the self-knowledge in which
the subject is object.
Yet Hegel cannot remain with the Idealism which says that
the thing is not what it is, but is rather made up of our sense
perceptions. This view is only the first step toward truth, a
step we must go beyond. The next step is to turn further
inward to the self, to an understanding of its activity, and
then from there to turn to the outer world again. This move-
ment is a return to beingbut only after we have fully under-
stood the human faculty by which we give names to things
that are there.
The free self gives a name to a meaning, and assigns that
name to the thingas the essence of the thingeven though
the thing itself is altogether different from the noun. This
name-giving is therefore a negative function. Yet by means of
that function the thing is objectified, is seen as being outside
the ego. Hegel points out that this is the most basic creativity
exercised by the mind, and this creativity is in a way recog-
nized in Genesis, where Adam's assigned task is to give
names to things. To name is the sovereign right of spirit,
Hegel says, our way of creating all nature, possessing it as our
own, stamping it with our spirit. The lion becomes a thing
that is named "lion." Nature is thereby made spiritual; the
object's being is thereby our own.
Hegel rejects the Empiricist philosophy which generally
sees us as existing in a passive relation to the world: things
impinge on us (we are the tabula rasa) and thus we have
images of them, or rather we experience our experience of
them, but not the things themselves. Hegel asserts that rather
20
Introduction
than a realm of. images, the wttfld is a realm of names, of
meanings bestowed. That subjective bestowal is externalized:
the name is not merely one "for me"; uather^ it becomes the
thing as it is, this is a lion. Thus the puzzles raised by Empiri-
cism (e.g., the tree in the forest and the problem of solipsism)
are spurious because they emanate from this false picture of
our passivity. Our real relation to the world is entirely active.
In naming, we overcome the particularity of experience.
Thus in addition to man's name-giving capacity, he has a
capacity to rise above particularity, above the immediate, to
universality and thought. The proper name becomes a generic
name, and we see the object in a new light. In rising to that
level, however, we also see ourselves in a new light, as as-
signers of names and meaningsas ego. Hegel is well aware
of the difference between the volatile ego and the determinate
world to which the ego relates. How can that fluid entity
(within) be the basis of all that is out there and fixed? The
answer is that the ego comes to its own fixity in its self-
awarenessthe awareness of itself as activity, as "labor": it
sees itself, at this point, in its expressions and creationsin
artifacts, language, social relationsbut above all it sees
itself.
The constitution of the ego itself is this very process of
self-relation, self-mediation. "Labor" (in the .broad sense
noted above) is the externalization of the ego in an object. But
the ego also returns to itself, as we saw. And it is precisely
this return which is the basis of its transcendent properties
ancTcapacities, its universality and necessity.
As name-giver, the ego preserves everything in its "night,"
and in
<
jeturning to itself it overcomes the immediacy of
things and attains necessity. (Necessity, universality, infini-
tude, the absoluteall are products of the ego's return to it-
self.) Yet how can the ego be free in its activity, free from all
external determination, and yet have necessity? The ego sees
itself as ultimate, as all there is, as the truth of everything
and in thus returning to itself it arrives at necessity. This is,
however, a virtual necessity, I would say, not an absolute or
metaphysical necessity. The best Hegel can do at this point is
21
Hegel and the Human Spirit
to speak of an "arbitrary necessity"but we are here speaking
of the most rudimentary level of intellectual activity. From
that point, the intellect goes on to a "thoughtful looking or
perceptive thought . . . conceptual understanding, an under-
standing necessity."
What must be emphasized, in all this, is Hegel's effort to
rise above the polarized "standpoints." He is_neither a Pla-
tonic Realist who believes that universals actually exist as
part of the objective ordering of thingssince he points to the
activity of the intellect in constituting those universalsnor
a Nominalist who believes that universals are nothing more
than subjective fabrications. For Hegel, each of these stand-
points is only a part of the truth. Accordingly, he must show
that these are not standpoints of which we select one and
reject the other. Rather, they are stages to be gone through
and superceded. This is why he can say that to hold fast to an
objective order is to think of the content of the ego. Certainly,
the ego constructs the order, but it also externalizes it, im-
poses it upon the world, in such a way that it is no longer a
subjective product.
The relation between the ego and the world is therefore the
central issue: in this relation, the ego is neither passively
receptive nor arbitrarily dictatorial. The key term to bear in
mind is Entdusserung: the ego does construct an order, but it
alienates that order from itself, externalizes it, so that it be-
comes the world's order. If the ego could not do this, it wquld
be beset by doubts as to the objective validity of the order it
created. That order is there, in the worldso that the ego can
ignore its own contribution toward it. Yet the ego can only
ignore its own role for a while: the ego eventually returns to
itselfnot with a view to doubting what it created, but in
order to arrive at the order's own necessity which can be seen
only in the ego's self-reflection.
This outlook of Hegel's, in which he tries to go beyond the
traditional dualities, is best seen in a long passage near the end
of the chapter on intelligence, where he argues that opposi-
tions are really identities and identities are opposites; both
22
Introduction
universals and particulars are universals (and yet only one of
them is the universal). Each is turned inward because it is
self-identical; and each is turned outwafcMn its other-related-
ness, its being. The seemingly paradoxical and very Hegelian
insight, here, is that these opposites are identical precisely in
the respect in which they are opposed to one another, and that
they are opposed in the respect in which they are identical.
Intelligence, too, is not hermetically sealed or self-en-
closed. Its proper object is the world, although it can have no
better access to the world than by seeing itself. It sees itself in
the way it creates the world's content and sets it up, out
there. And yet it must ultimately return to* a deeper con-
sciousness of itself, an affirmation of itself in its functioning
as world-maker. This return to itself is its freedom. It is a
freedom empty of content, and yet it provides the element of
necessity to the content of intellect.
What we have seen, so far, suggests a path to the Phenome-
nology. That is, Hegel is not discussing human intelligence as
an isolated faculty, sui generis. Rather, he is discussing intel-
ligence in the light of what it does; and beyond this, he shows
how its activities lead it inevitably back into the self. Both
these aspects become prominent in Hegel's subsequent
philosophy.
B. Will. What characterizes the will is that it seeks its own
assertion. As free of external determination, the will is
sei/-determined. It is not the termination of a process but is
its own termination. (Hegel here exploits the multiple conno-
tations of "determined," "self-determined," and "termina-
tion." "To determine" is beschliessen, which is related to
Schluss, the "termination" of a processsuch as that of delib-
erationand related also to Schluss as "syllogism." When I
say I am determined to carry out my decision, all the ele-
ments of that determination are encompassed within the self.
Because the will is self-enclosed, it cannot be grasped as
though it were externally there. This freedom from external
determination is precisely what gives the will its power. For
23
Hegel and the Human Spirit
the same reason, there is no way of characterizing a particular
act of will as objectively fixed. How, then, are we to grasp, to
understand, the will as such?
The will resists any such attempt to grasp it, objectify it,
since it is autonomous. In being autonomous, directed only at
itself and by itself, the will is freebut this freedom is empti-
ness, negativity. It unites a general purposiveness with an
individual goaluniversal with particularand these now
cease to be distinct from one another. Their unity is now
directed, pointed to something otherand this reflects the
activity of the ego.
The ego goes from passivity to activity when it uses a
tool, and for Hegel, tools are the main extensions of the will.
Man makes tools not only as extensions of the will, how-
ever, but also because he is rational. This may seem alto-
gether positivethe expression of oneself in a thing and
upon a thingexcept that in labor, a man also makes him-
self into a thing. Working with and upon a material object,
he himself becomes a material object. And this self-objectifi-
cation, instead of extending the ego, serves to dismember the
ego into its components.
Here, then, we have the beginning of Hegel's (and ulti-
mately Marx's) criticism of industrial society for its system-
atic dismemberment of the ego and the dehumanization of
man. Hegel elucidates this process of dismemberment and
dehumanization by taking note of the way we utilize an in-
strument, and how that utilization affects our humanness.
First, an instrument itself is inert. When I use it, I place it
between myself and the external world of things. I thereby
save some labor in a quantitative sense. Qualitatively, how-
ever, I take on some of the material inertness of the instru-
ment. I use the tool, to be sure, but I also become it. It is an
expression of myself, and yet I am to some degree turned into
it. The way out of this dilemma is to make the machine
self-activating, Hegel saysbut we now know the dangers in
this.
On the other hand, nature itself has a potential for utiliza-
tion by man, so that we compel nature to do what it ordinari-
24
Introduction
ly would not. Its activityJ&Jblirid/but in it a humanpurpose is
fulfilled. Nature's brute power is made use of, despite itself.
This is our cunning, deviousness. We vmt sit quietly on the
side and watch it all happen. This is evilfeminine, as Hegel
sees itin contrast to the masculine openness of direct pur-
pose and effort. Perhaps there is something effeminate in the
way we have twisted nature around our little finger, and have
made it act as though for itself but actually for our purposes
rather than its own. The suggestion is that industrialization is
decadent for this reason. Hegel speaks of it as evil, subterra-
nean, as it watches nature destroy itself, supposedly for our
sakes. Instead of confronting a difficulty %vith our bare
strength, we are wily in our exploitation of naturehardly an
achievement to be proud of. (Hegel's criticism can be con-
trasted to the later Positivism which saw only progress, glory,
and a new religion in industrialism.) Perhaps the most graphic
image Hegel offers, regarding the way we exploit nature, is to
compare it to a bull: running against a cape it hits nothing,
but it is hit. Yet in exploiting nature, we corrupt ourselves
and our aims. As a result, the will becomes divided against
itself, operating against its own interest. That greater interest
is its universal aspect, while its actions are particularand
the two clash, quite destructively for ourselves.
Our scientific/technological era has promoted the optimis-
tic belief that all human problems can be solved, given the
application of intelligence. Yet there is still the indeterminate
will which we must account for. We are well enough aware of
the possibilities for conflict presented by the confrontation
between intellect and will. Can they be united, reconciled in
some fundamental way?
In a marginal note, Hegel elucidates the clash between in-
telligence and will as though the two were independent egos.
(Obviously, we ought to read this as a metaphor.) Their "first"
(or primal) union hardly comprises a whole, since the only
thing they "share" is their sense of not being united. Thus
they do not really "share" independence, in this rudimentary
marriage of belligerents, let alone a sense of togetherness.
Having got no farther than their respective "independence,"
25
Hegel and the Human Spirit
they have not yet attained "selfhood." Each is in-itself, and is
yet to become self-aware, for-itself. As universal, each is par-
ticular since it is a knowing self; as particular, each is univer-
sal in its self-relatedness.
For Hegel, this is not yet a genuine resolutioneach pole is
still distinct, and mind is neither intelligence nor will alone.
Only in the realm of objective spirit are the two truly united,
realized in the social world. The reason why the intelligence-
will duality cannot be resolved at its own rudimentary level
(i.e., subjectivity) stems from the paradoxical nature of self-
knowledge, which we have seen. That is, the subject is re-
quired to grasp itself as object, as "other," which it isn't. At
their own level, where intelligence and will stand opposed to
one another as "egos," the "other" is both other and self.
Each is identical to the other precisely in that which separates
it from the other. The self-differentiation of each from the
other is at the same time its self-identification with the other:
in seeing itself in the other it knows itself. As independent,
they are the same, each is "in itself" going over into "for
itself." This is the dialectical movement from self-enclosure
into self-awareness. But at the rudimentary level this has not
yet happened. Thus the bifurcation remains. This is why the
tension between them cannot be overcome at the level of
subjective spirit, but must go beyond itself, into the social
world, for its resolution.
Thus no supposed isomorphism between intelligence and
will can resolve the problem, since we are still at the inner
level, the subjective. No personal/psychological description
can be the complete picture, therefore, because it is self-
contradictory. Only in the outer world can intelligence and
will be combinedthat is, in sociopolitical life. The tensions
of subjectivity, meanwhileif we insist on staying with
themfall apart into merely theoretical distinctions. They
are overcome in something like the union of the natural and
the divine, as exemplified in the statement "God is love."
(Hegel discusses this union in the chapter "Art, Religion, and
Science.")
One attempt at resolving the tension between two indepen-
26
Introduction
dent egos can be seen in the'iove-relation, where the two
parties see their love as an independent entity, as thei^ media-
tion. We may try to solidify the relation objectifying it in
marriage, perhaps. We "enter" into marriage, as though it
were an independently existing territory or "place." Yet all
attempts at such objectification of love must fail to resolve
the dichotomy: the only answer is that the parties remain
independent egos, since love is not a material object. The
failure of the attempted resolution may well be constructive,
leading to family life, etc. Yet love is never an independently
existing thing, however much the lovers would like to see it
that way ("Our love will. . ."), and the dialectical movement
only shows us the internal contradictions in the duality when
it remains at its own level. As opposed elements themselves,
the lovers are unified and transcended in a third element, the
offspring. This, too, is transcended in the maturation of the
child, who is himself, yet is also incomplete.
The family, too, is incomplete, to be completed in procre-
ation, mutual care, and so on, although none of these ele-
ments exist independently, and no one of them alone can
provide the complete basis for family life. Loveas subjec-
tive, individualis transcended, fulfilled in a higher spiritual
self-realization. In the family, the members are individuals
and are members, and there is a source of conflict in that
duality. Each one depends on the other although each seeks
selfhood, in the definition of his rights and obligations. The
, concept of rights, on the other hand, emanates from the con-
cept of individuality. How is this abstract notion to be made
concrete?
In being recognized and recognizing {Anerkanntsein, Aner-
kennen), the self emerges from the isolation of its individual-
ity. This recognitionas humanis an essential ingredient in
our humanness. Here we transcend the natural state and enter
the realm of spirit. Man is recognition [Er ist Anerkennen), as
Hegel says.
Property, as a concept, rests on recognitionand Hegel
takes the property right as a paradigm for all rights in general.
Possession, which is not yet ownership, arises with the con-
27
Hegel and the Human Spirit
ceDtj)f self, the "right" to assert oneself and one's power over
all things. Mere possession already excludes the other person,
and becomesproperty when recognition is addedthat is,
when_my ownership is recognized by the person being ex-
cluded from what is "mine." Yet even at the level of mere
possession, I am already being given a form of recognition
when he recognizes me as the one who excludes him.
I immediately possess my body; objects, on the other hand,
have to be "marked" as mine, either by my grasping them or
by my working on them in some way. Here, Hegel refers
implicitly to Locke's labor-theory concerning ownership in
the state of nature, and he recognizes the complexity of this
theory. (For example, how do I indicate that it was I who
worked on this field?)
The complexity of this idea stems from its dependence on
the concepts of pure selfhood and pure equalitya purity ne-
gated by the contingencies of individual needs and individual
existence. In the contract, recognition becomes the basis of
property. Each of the parties is free, even though one party is
injured by being excluded, and the excluded one injures the
excluder in being on the outside looking in. When I exclude
someone, I also exclude his selfhood. I therefore limit his self-
hood, just as he limits me by intruding on my consciousness.
There is a struggle for recognition (which will emerge into
full-blown conflict in the Phenomenology). I may have negated
his selfhood, yet he continues to see himself as a self, an abso-
lutely autonomous will, for which he expects recognition.
In order for such recognition of him to be justified, he must
himself overcome his immediacy, be independent of his sur-
roundings (which he never is). His demand for recognition
asks me to bestow upon him what he cannot bestow upon
himself: autonomy, independence, personhood. In the Phe-
nomenology, this struggle for recognition becomes a life-and-
death matter. Here in the lectures we see the beginnings of it,
in the way the other person tries to transcend his own cir-
cumstances and become a free individual.
What I, as excluder, have not succeeded in doing, at this
level, is to transcend the other person's immediate circum-
28
Introduction
stances in order to recognize hiST autonomous selfhood. I can
do this only by introducing reason, in the form of an abstract
concept of what a person is, qua person, -frrthis way cognition
becomes recognition [Erkennen wird Anerkennen). So long as
each knows himself as a being-for-self the two are divided,
which leads to the life-and-death struggle. They may be unit-
ed in their knowledge (as Hegel said), but this knowledge
alone is not enough for union. The true challenge is for the
will of each to know both, each as complete in himself and
identical to the other. The knowing will is to proceed by way
of the universal. The will of the individual person is seen as
universal. Ultimately, recognition is existence fulfilled by the
will. The immediate recognition is in will, in l,pve. The fulfill-
ment of that recognition is in right, as universal, abstract.
As we saw, the subjective sphere cannot give us the com-
plete picture (nor the complete truth) of man. Accordingly, we
shall now go on to see how Hegel discusses some of the same
themestools, work, property, family, recognitionbut as
exemplified in the social sphere.
PART II. Actual Spirit
For the classical antithesis between intelligence and will,
the synthesis is provided in recognition. By considering recog-
nition, we transfer our attention from the individual/psycho-
logical plane to that of the interpersonal and social. Thus
there are two propositions here, one contextual, the other
methodological. There is in addition a formal proposition
implied here: that in this transition we are going from the
abstract to the concrete; hence, Hegel entitles this section of
the discussion "Actual Spirit." We no longer look at intelli-
gence or will abstractly, as isolated from their contexts or
from one another. Against this all too prevalent approach in
philosophical psychology, Hegel proposes a view of these as-
pects in concreto. Concretely, the life of pure intellect alone
manifests itself in nothing, while the life of pure will can be
erratically destructive. But in a synthesis of the two, wherein
29
Hegel and the Human Spirit
the will is intellect, we have a culmination which can work
effectively in the world. Such a synthesis, extended out into
the world, is an idea as old as Plato's Republic.
For Hegel there is anothermomentoustransition here:
that is, in going from subjective to objective spirit, from the
personal to the interpersonal world, we are going from a
value-neutral to a value-laden world. Neither the intellect nor
the will alone could create a value (since the intellect would,
ideally, be value-neutral and noncommittal, while the self-
enclosed will would let no external or worldly consideration
count for it). Only in the social setting do values arise, sojhat
good and evil become actual as operative forces. Only in that
setting can the synthesis of intelligence and will be realized.
This realization is the work of spirit, as it projects itself out-
ward into the worldin artifacts, values, laws, social codes,
political systems, and so on. But these projections are never
completely spiritual, since their function is to help us cope
with the material world and our own material side. And be-
cause the products of spirit are not completely spiritualand
at this stage all externalizations of spirit are only partially
spiritualthey clash with one another.
A. Recognition. Externalization is at its most rudimentary
level in ordinary work and production. As Hegel says, it is
"consciousness making itself into a thing
/;
("das Sich zum
Dinge machen des Bewusstseins"). At this level what is prob-
lematic is the relation between the worker and the thing he
works on, as he imposes his will (which is spirit) on a mate-
rial object.
The result of this conflictual relationship is that the
worker's humanity is depressed, so that (as we noted earlier)
he himself becomes a thing. Forty years before Marx would
discuss this in the Paris manuscript on "Alienated Labor,"
Hegel already saw the dehumanizing tendency of the Indus-
trial Revolution, and saw it as a philosophical theme. He re-
ports on it not as a sociological observer nor as an outraged
moralist, but as a philosopher who sees this as a stage in the
evolution of the human spirit. His viewpoint, neither socio-
30
Introduction
logical nor metaphysical, is rather a synthesis of the two,
such that both are overcome: i.e., a synthesis in the phenome-
nological. From this viewpoint Hegel tell^us that the most
basic level of spiritual externalization is our relation to our
implements and what we produce with them. That level has
its characteristic modes and outcomes. What is remarkable is
that Hegel should see the Industrial Revolution in the same
primitive and quasi-spiritual terms.
The level discussed here is that of the clash of personalities
which results in the master/slave relation (as described in The
Phenomenology of Spirit). In that relation, the. slave arrives at
a heightened sense of his own individuality. That is not the
case here: the worker is dehumanized, depressed to the level
of the artifact, and if he thinks at all it is in vaguely universal
terms which dispel rather than focus his selfhood. He does
not even have the satisfaction of having made something for
himself that will satisfy a direct need of his. Rather, whatever
usefulness he sees in his productivity involves a dilution of
his identity, not its assertion. Both the worker and his work
thus sink into abstractness.
The synthesis of intelligence and will is in the complete
person, who demands recognition for his personhood, and that
personhood would be fulfilled to some extent in one's work-
ing so as to produce something for one's own benefit. Since
there is no such satisfaction here, there can be no recognition,
or even self-recognition, as person. At best, the worker can
feel that he is contributing, in some remote way, to the wel-
fare of others. But this he thinks in abstract terms, so that the
concrete sense of his own selfhood is in no way involved. The
production as a whole has a universalizable dimension, and as
a result the work process itself becomes abstract.
As worker, I find myself to be only a part of something
and with this the general sense of selfhood, too, becomes frag-
mented. I and another worker see each other as fulfilling each
other's needsbut we see this abstractly, since I do not di-
rectly address your needs. Indeed, the interrelation is so com-
plex that, as Hegel points out, I labor for the needs of many
but it takes many more people to supply mine. There is not
31
Hegel and the Human Spirit
merely a quantitative proliferation of needs and their satisfac-
tions; rather, it is a qualitative development which is required
in order for a certain level of consciousness and spirituality to
emerge. (Thus a certain mode of production is the basis for a
certain sort of consciousnesswhich is quite in line with
Marx's view, and quite the reverse of what Marx will accuse
Hegel of saying.)
We are not, here, in a situation of simple production and
exchange, but rather in the more problematic situation in
which I produce more of a thing than I can use, while my own
needs require the work of more than one other person. If the
worker grasps this, it is merely in abstract terms; and this
realization renders him abstract and empty in his own eyes.
He cannot see himself as an individual having wide-ranging
interests and activities. His work lacks concretenessas do
his life and self.
It is not that our work is mechanical because we have
machines; rather, we develop machines because our mode of
working is mechanical, and because we relate to ourselves in
abstract terms. That is, I can withdraw from involvement in
what I am doing, and replace my own activity with some
natural force, simple movement. And then I am abstractand
half aliveinside as well as out. My self-expression, or exter-
nalization, is thwarted and blighted. The only way for me to
achieve individuality is for me to make my wants concrete
ones, and make them entirely my ownnot needs which can
be equated with those of others in some wider scheme of
things. What makes that equation possible in the first place is
money: by reducing things to their monetary value, our needs
become de-individualized, and thus de-humanized.
The worker sees his universality in the fact that he exists
for others, produces for others, and he wants to communicate
this. This realization, however, still lacks elementary mutual
recognition. The one way he has of achieving such recogni-
tionsuch as it isis by owning property, for here he en-
counters another person's will. Having equated our property
in monetary terms, we recognize one another as equal. Prop-
32
Introduction
erty thereby becomes the externaiization of the self, but at
the cost of one's dehumanization.
The exchange of property, between usy .carries^ with it our
respective identities, such as they are. But, as we saw, the
concept of property involves the concept of exclusion. I trans-
fer to you something I once owned, and your having it now
negates me. This is mutual, and it serves as the basis of mu-
tual recognition. And with the equality of the things ex-
changed we have the basis for the equality of ourselves. There
is a complex interplay here. As was said earlier, possession
becomes property on the basis of recognition; now it can be
seen that our mutual recognition has its basis- in property.
What connects these two opposing phases is the fact that the
concept of recognition has been broadened: in the first phase,
recognition engenders the concept of ownership; in the sec-
ond phase, recognition leads to the elaboration of selfhood
and will.
In any case, I base my very being on my being recognized."
My existence is in being recognizedDasein ist Anerkannt-
sein, as Hegel says. (I propose a Latin equivalent, Esse est
agnosci, as a corollary to Berkeley's phrase.) There is a para-
doxical outcome to this, however: with the mutual-recogni-
tion of our equality as wills, we recognize one another as
equally autonomous and therefore as independentand thus
as different.
What we have seen, then, is the coalescence in Hegel's
thought of disparate elements such as work, self-externaliza-
tion, possession, property, and ego, all of which are mediated
by the process of recognition. In overcoming the particulari-
ties and contingencies in my immediate activity, an element
of universality is introduced into this process. I thereby take
on a universal aspectI am part of a system of ownership,
assigned values, family property, the right of transference, and
so on. All this emanates from my work; and thus recognition
provides the means for the universalization of my activity.
Ultimately the awareness of this has its cumulative effect
upon me, and I see my own being in my being recognized.
33
Hegel and the Human Spirit
What Hegel has presented so far is something of the phe-
nomenology of selfhood as it is experiencedand as it is cast
into relief by activity, work, and ownership. We have also
seen the emergence of the interpersonal relation in simple
form. At this point, Hegel advances to the more complex rela-
tion of accord, the contractual relation. At the rudimentary
stage of the contractual relation, personhood is as yet ab-
stract. We enter into contractual relations but without a fully
developed concept of our own identity. Full recognition of one
another's identity, therefore, has also not yet been achieved.
At the more basic levelexchangewe came to an agree-
ment as to the value of what was being exchanged; and this
agreement was an objectification of our shared will. My eval-
uation (and thus my will) counts for you, as does yours for me.
Thus my will is mediated through yours, and vice versa. Each
of us has externalized himself as individual, yet in a common
willand this is a negation (of self) which is positive.
We now regard one another as real individuals because our
individual wills have become a shared will. From this point,
we can go into a contractual arrangement, so that our act of
exchange is formalized, idealized, expressed in language on
paperand the formal expression counts as much as the
things we actually do exchange.
If selfhood depends on mutual recognition, then it is only
here that that reciprocity really begins. Recognition has been
externalized, and yet it has gone Tsack into itself"will has
gone back into its concept/' as Hegel says. This reciprocity
leadsby way of self-consciousnessto a sense of self, to an
awareness of one's own will and a possible conceptualization
of that will (which is its return to its concept).
Notice that we have arrived at an internalization of sorts.
This is not, however, the result of a clash, as is the internal-
ization in the master/slave relation, through which the slave
comes to an intensified sense of himself. (In the Phenomenol-
ogy Hegel contends that culture and morality result from
such an intemalization.) Here, in the contractual relation,
this is not the caseperhaps because the parties to the con-
34
Introduction
tract are still abstract personae and not actual persons so far
as the contract is concerned.
It is precisely their abstractness thaVcCnstitutes their legal
equality as contractors, as legal "parties." This precludes the
life-and-death struggle described in the Phenomenology,
since there is an agreement between these equal "parties" as
to the value of the articles exchanged. Accordingly, the con-
tractual relation should not be regarded as the true model of
any and all social relationswhether they be marriage,
family, tribe, or wider societysince social relations have
potentialities for spiritual depth not to be found in the ab-
stractness of contracts.
For Hegel, individuality is the product of the interpersonal
relation, not itspresupposition (as for Hobbes). In the contrac-
tual relation, as Hegel sees it, individuality is not yet devel-
oped to its fullest extent. The Phenomenology elucidates this
point: there is no individuality without a clash between per-
sons, no clash without a conflict, and no true conflict without
the risk of death (at least the risk of the "death" of individual-
ity), for there can be no individuality unless it is asserted,
extended to its limit, and then given recognition.
In the contractual relation I can assert my individuality by
rejecting all possibility of an accord. As freely contracting
parties, we always have the freedom to refuse to come to an
agreement. Thus the shared will is shared only to the extent
that the will of each is recognized as individual.
What Hegel intends to show, I believe, is that the individu-
ality which is implicit in the contract is not enough of a basis
on which to build a social structure. We can generalize and
say that in the modern history of political philosophysay,
from Machiavelli to Millthe fundamental outlook was at-
omistic, and therefore the challenge was to show how a social
arrangement could be derived from man's individualistic na-
ture. (Of course there are exceptions to this generalization,
the most prominent of which is Rousseau.) Hegel (who is here
consciously following Rousseau) aims to show that this chal-
lenge cannot be met, the problem cannot be solved, in the
35
Hegel and the Human Spirit
terms statedfirst, because the atomic individual is incom-
mensurable with the state, and second, because civil society
(the system for satisfying private needs) is incommensurable
with the state.
Thus the inadequacies of the contractual relation will have
to be resolved at a higher level. As an individual, the most I
can do is to assert my individual willand although its con-
tent may be shared by you, we are still a long way from a
general or universal will such as comprises a state. When I
enter into a contract, I do somewhat negate or curtail my
individual wishes (I would prefer to get your sheep for noth-
ing, but I must give you my goat for it). By contrast, the
complete assertion of my will would lead to a discord, the
breakdown of an accord between us. Thus my will is to some
extent de-individualized in the contract: I have agreed to do
such-and-such, and I am bound to this agreement. I have, in
fact, declared it to be my will that I will not assert my will to
the utmost. In this way the contract comes into being. My
being recognized as a "party
7
' therefore entails the partial sup-
pression of my individuality, even though, paradoxically, the
contract itself is taken as an expression of my individuality.
This suppressionin effect a coercionis what my recogni-
tion as a free being is based on. As Hegel puts it, echoing
Rousseau, "I become compelled to be a person" ("Ich werde
gezwungen, Person zu sein").
My will is autonomous, yet I myself have limited it. My
existence is particular, yet I have involved it in the universal-
ized mode of expression which is the contract. The universal-
ity, however, is hidden in the particular details of the contrac-
tual arrangement. And yet the particularity of the two parties
is negated in the contract. All this reflects, further, the dialec-
tical nature of selfhood.
My particular existence (comprising individuating details
such as name, height, weight, sex) is dissolved in the over-
arching concept of the person. This is a pure negativity which
deliberately ignores these details, and this is the idealizing
element in the contract. The contract binds me, therefore, as
a legal persona, not as a particular identity. And yet although
36
Introduction
I am bound, as a legal person, to do such-and-such, my per-
sonhood is not in any way. affected or involved. Rather, it is
my specific existence that is affected^pfecisely that which
the contract ignored. We might say, then, that the contract is
directed to me as a person, but compels only that side of me
which is extraneous to my personhood (e.g., name, height,
weight, sex). The idea of my personhood is not derived from
such particulars, since it negates them. In this negation, I am
reflected back into my selfhood. The universal will absorbs
the individual I; nevertheless, in this universal will I see my-
self as person.
The underlying theme in the foregoing discussion has been
the emergence of personhood in the interpersonal relation.
What is problematic here is that in all interpersonal rela-
tionsperhaps in any relation as suchthere is a limiting of
one party at the hands of the other. The limitation may be felt
or not, welcome or not, may be wide or narrow in scope,
constructive or destructive, may or may not be reciprocal, and
so onthere is, it may be said, no limit to the possibilities of
limitation.
The more basic point, however, seems to be that an ele-
s
ment of limitation is inherent in all interpersonal relations as
suchand that in the interpersonal relation the limitation
posed by the other person is the paradoxical means whereby I
delineate my own personhood. Theoretically, an individual
who is totally isolated and never encounters resistance of any
sort would have nothing against which to focus his sense of
self.
The problem is how to delineate the interpersonal relation
in fits most rudimentary form, so that we may see which of its
elements enter into the concept of a person. We know
Hobbes's hypothetical account of how, in a presocial setting
in which men have almost nothing to characterize them as
human, the basic premise of interrelation is hostilitythis
because men's desires are infinite while they are approxi-
mately equal to one another in strength. This theme of the
primordial one-to-one encounter is taken up by Hegel in the
Phenomenology, where the discussion is raised above the
37
Hegel and the Human Spirit
level of the empirical, and is given a phenomenological di-
mension. Namely, men fight not because of unlimited desires
and limited strength but because being a person involves the
need for recognition as a person, and this dependence of one
individual on another entails the limitation of one by the
other. Claude Levi-Strauss says somewhere that the tragic ele-
ment in the Oedipus myth is in the fact that we are born to
parents and do not give birth to ourselves. Along the same
lines, we can say that in groping toward personhood we seek a
psychological autonomy, yet belie that autonomy by depend-
ing on another to recognize us. My needing you, for anything,
limits meeven (and especially) if the need is for recognition
as a person, as human.
In the present lecture we see Hegel approaching the even-
tual discussion in the Phenomenology. In the foregoing dis-
cussion we saw that the attempt to embody recognition in a
contract must fail, because the contract is abstract and imper-
sonal. But here, Hegel seems to be asking a more basic ques-
tion: if any interpersonal relation involves the limitation of
one party by another, how is this different from crime? Vio-
lence, as he will define it, is a form of limitation in which the
victim becomes a mere object for the attacker. It is the break-
down of recognition of the other as human. Yet even before
that extreme is reached the limitation is thereand although
it may differ quantitatively from crime and violence, we may
well ask whether any limitation is qualitatively different
from crime. This is in some way suggested by Proudhon's
remark (1840) that property is theft, a remark repeated by
Marx in 1844. "Mine" means "not yours," and presumably
this "not yours" differs in no significant way from the thief's
saying that what he takes from you is "no longer yours."
No contract can be binding if it "contracts" (literally "lim-
its") my person, honor, and life. Such a contractregardless
of its stipulationsgoes against the very concept of a con-
tract, since I have entered into it as a person, with the tacit
aim of preserving my personhood, yet, by force of the con-
tract, I have limited or even surrendered my personhood. I
have thereby given away my personal will, as though it were
38
Introduction
somehow separable from me. In that contract, my existence
has shrunk, "receded to a mere effect" ("zuriickgetreten zu
einer blossen Folge"), as Hegel says. TliuVsuch.a contract
contradicts itself since it sets a limit to, and even negates, the
very thing it presupposes.
Yet is not this same contradictoriness inherent in all inter-
personal relations? In a contract I am bound, therefore in-
jured, although this is a necessary "injury." In the interper-
sonal relation I am limited, even though this is a "necessary"
limitation, contradictory though it is. The contract "injures"
me as someone already recognized as participant in a shared
will. Our accord, prior to the contract, was between two free
entities whose existences were as yet unbound. In the con-
tract, I count as existent, and my word stands for what it says,
so that it is not separated from my existence. This, then, is
one way in which the contract overcomes my limitation,
even though, the limitation is posited (and reaffirmed) at the
same time that it is overcome.
All this is contradicted by the coercive aspect of the con-
tract itself, which "injures" me in my existence. It is as
though I must sign on the dotted line because my word is not
trusted, my personhood negated. After all, the contract is re-
sorted to because my word is not enough, my word is not
taken as my bond. I am therefore implicitly "insulted" in it,
"injured" in my role as possessor as well as in my will, which
the other party has previously recognized and shared in with
his own. The limitation imposed is an injury to my person-
hood. This is an existential oscillation between the external
and^ internal aspects: the stipulations concern the external
circumstances of my existence, but my ego is involved as
well. There is a tension between my word as freely given in
the initial accord and my word as subsequently compelled in
the contract. It is a tension between my being considered a
universal and a particular.
Against coercionwhich reduces me to a mere object, a
mere effectI retort by presenting myself as an autonomous
being, a being-for-myself (Fuimichsein). It is not merely that I
have been hurt in my ego, but that I have been hurt in my ego
39
Hegel and the Human Spirit
when it was already recognized. My honor is tacitly im-
pugned; the ego-structure which I built up is having its foun-
dation eroded, so that my will and my self-image begin to
yield to the determining forces of the surrounding world,
forces which I cannot withstand as easily as I once did. In our
initial accord we met as persons, as equals, and now I am
injured in what I regard as my universal aspect, my self-iden-
tity. This becomes all the more serious when we realize that
this injury, although on a universal plane, is caused by some-
thing particular, i.e., the object of the transaction.
I therefore feel inferior to the other party: my word has
been impugned, my will has been injuredeven though we
met as equals in our accord. Of course, the other has similar
feelings, but each of us feels inferior, and each of us ignores
what the other may be feeling. Here we are not speaking in
terms of empirical psychology: it is not a matter of whether
this or that individual has certain feelings or others. Rather,
we are speaking in terms of phenomenology: the feeling of
inferiority is embedded in the very meaning of accepting a
legal obligation in place of a self-commitment wherein my
word alone is sufficient. Even if I accept the legal obligation
freely, and impose it on myself, it is no longer true that my
word alone is my bond, and in this change I have suffered
some degree of injury.
We began as equals, yet I (like you) feel injured, inferior,
imposed upon, no longer equal. How do I (or you) overcome
this inequity between us? I avenge myself, Hegel says, al-
though not as I might have done in the natural situation
e.g., revenge in the form of action taken for its own sake in
which vengeance is its own raison d'etre. Rather, whatever
action I take is suffused with a self-conscious intelligence, a
will made universal, as something I share in and recognize.
We ought to take note, here in the discussion of revenge, of
the tension between the objectification of an intent and the
self-consciousness which can soften and dissolve it. The ob-
jectification may be the hardening of an action so that there is
no way of turning back from it, a purpose which has become
calcified into an enmity which can no longer recognize its
40
Introduction
own source and is immune to criange unless self-conscious-
ness is introduced as the solvent.
For example, when my partner in a contract seeks to apply
pressure, he presents the contract as an objecta shared will
which has been given a universal status and has acquired an
independent reality. Thus I am told that there is no getting
out of it, a contract is a contract, etc. The contract now tran-
scends my individual will, and I myself recognize this fact.
And yet my will is the universal as far as I am concerned, and
for me it is the equal of the contract. Here, then, is where the
element of self-conscious intelligence enters as an instrument
of revenge: the accord implicitly involved us as equals,- now,
with the contract, I believe that I am not being considered as
an equal; I therefore "want out" of the accord. Although my
self-image has been injured, diminished, I present it as univer-
sal, the extension of my autonomous will. Yet Hegel sees this
willfulness, this confrontation, as being on a par with crime.
In juxtaposing my will to that of the other party, it is as
though I am committing violence or robberybut the verbal
injury transcends this. How so?
In using invective I do not say: you have done me this or
that wickedness. I say you are wicked. My abusive language
transcends the other partyin objective and universal terms.
When I say that a tree is green, I say this not as a subjective
judgment, but as an objective appraisal of what it is. Simi-
larly, in using abusive language, I presume to be characteriz-
ing the other person: I shrink the other person to nothing, not
merely from my point of view but as being objectively so. For
Hegel, real injury transcends the other party as willwhether
I act in open defiance of his will, rob him, attack him or his
interests in some secret way, or murder him. Vileness con-
sists in my relating to another as nonexistent while I retain
my own inwardness.
The inner source of crime is the coercion on the part of the
law (der Zwang des Rechts). Needs, Hegel says, are merely
the external causes, those belonging to the physical aspect of
the perpetrator. But crime as such is aimed against the person
as such and his self-knowledge. For Hegel, the criminal oper-
41
Hegel and the Human Spirit
ates in the medium of intelligence, the criminal is intelli-
gence. His inner justification is this legal coercion, to which
he opposes his individual will to power, his wish to count for
something and be recognized. He wants to be something (et-
was sein), not necessarily to be famous; he wishes only that
his will may take precedence over the will of others.
"The consummate crime is the will that knows itself as
individual, as being-for-itself, having come into its existence
despite the power of the other will that knows itself as uni-
versal will." This is Hegel's enigmatic formulation; yet why
should knowing oneself as individual be identifiable with
crime, and with consummate crime? The answer is not far if
we think of Adam and of Raskolnikov. It is not that self-
knowledge is criminal, but that the highest criminality in-
volves (as for Raskolnikov) self-justification via self-
knowledgeor (as in Adam's case) knowledge which was
gained through self-assertion. Between these two termini,
Adam and Raskolnikov, we see one of the central themes of
the West, coming to fruition in nineteenth-century thought:
i.e., creativity as linked in some fundamental way to self-
assertion which is destructive, sinful, criminal. The Nietz-
schean rhapsody of will sees itself above all restraint. God is
dead and all is allowed. Hegel speaks of such crime as the
animation of the universal will, being stirred to activitybut
in this it transcends the individual. So he is not speaking of
the Dostoevskian anti-hero after all, but of an impersonal
transcendent will, and not of "the" consummate crime, as
though it were a specific act, but of the height of crime in its
essence.
Corresponding to this conception of crime, punishment is
the restitution made to that universal will. The essence of
punishment does not rest on a contract, nor on the improve-
ment or intimidation of the criminal. Rather, its essence is
the restoration of the damage done to the universal situation
of mutual recognition in which we all exist. We might say it
is a form of restitution to an injured moral order, but that
would once again give it an excessive objectification. For He-
gel, the fabric of mutual recognition is fragile and diaphanous.
42
Introduction
Crime is damage to that fabric, ^rid it is this which must be
restored. Thus, punishment is revenge, but as justicein that
this recognition, though damaged, is to be*
r
made whole. The
criminal therefore gets what he has given in constituting him-
self a power against another, in taking the universal power as
his own and indeed acting as that universal. Against him, the
universal avenges itself. The vengeance can be just, Hegel
says, but here it is justice itself. In crime, the criminal knows
' that he injures a person who is recognized as such, who lives
in the medium of recognition, and whose existence derives its
meaning from such recognition.
In this way recognition has realized itself, comprising in
itself the individual will which surrenders itself and expresses
itself, and at the same time embodying it in a contract. It is a
merging of the particular and the universal. Yet to return to
individuality is crime, as if the individual takes the place of
the social contract. It is an injury by individuality in the usur-
pation of the universal will, which is then to be restored. This
universal will is what must count as absolute, Hegel suggests,
as absolute power over the power of the individual.
B. The Coercive Law. It is a seeming paradox that there is no
freedom without law, yet law is necessarily coercive and thus
restrictive of freedom. A traditional way of handling this para-
dox is to regard the law as unilaterally coercive, as not having
the promotion of freedom as one of its aims, so that if any
freedom arises, it is in spite of, not because of, the law. Thus
the individual is seen as juxtaposed to society, and thus jux-
taposed to the law, in a struggle in which he tries to gain his
freedom while society seeks to thwart his efforts. In this con-
ception there are at least two assumptions: first, that every
society is oppressive in its essential nature} and second, that
the struggle between the individual and society is in the very
nature of their relation, so that the individual makes headway
to the extent that society loses ground, and vice versa.
This is, of course, too broad and simpleminded an ap-
proach. We know, by now, how treacherous it is to use the
concept of "nature": the concept seems to have a descriptive
43
r
Hegel and the Human Spirit
use, but its use is actually prescriptivethat is, we believe we
are speaking in terms of what "is" the case, but we are actu-
ally speaking in terms of what "ought" or "ought not" to be.
Further, there is no such simple tug-of-war between the indi-
vidual and societyneither in the essential "nature" of things
nor in actualitysince the two "parties" to the supposed
struggle are not in the same ontological category and there-
fore do not directly confront one another. In order for two
entities to be opposed they must be in the same realm. The
individual does not simply pit his weight against society,
since society is a composite entity, not an individual person
as he is. What we take to be the struggle of the individual
against society is a struggle between an individual and other
individuals who act in what they deem to be the name of
society.
Another seemingly obvious fact is that the individual ex-,
ists "within" society. Yet that, too, must be seen as a mis-
leading metaphor: first, because individuals are not "within"
society the way matches are in matchboxes; second, because
the "within" metaphor commits the same "is/ought" fallacy
as the "nature" metaphorit appears to speak descriptively,
but its use is to justify a certain state of affairs. It is, however,
less misleading than the tug-of-war image because there is at
least one sense in which it is true to say that individuals exist
within society: they exist in relation to other individuals in a
complicated network of material and spiritual ties, and this
set of complex interrelations constitutes the composite entity
"within" which they find themselves. An individual cannot
engage in a tug-of-war with a composite entity, but it is possi-
ble for him to exist within a composite entity if we establish
a hierarchy of logical types.
In this light, the individual's problem is not simply that of
maintaining his freedom against society's efforts at restricting
it. Rather, his problem is that of maintaining his freedom
while reconciling himself to living "within" society and ac-
cepting its restrictions. This is the problem to which Hegel
addresses himselfand it is a problem which can be seen in
the entire history of political theory.
44
Introduction
The law is necessarily coercive, in two senses of "neces-
sity." Its essence is to prescribe, and it does not prescribe
without dictating, commanding, stating" criteria for compli-
ance, and fixing penalties for noncompliance. In addition to
this necessity arising from the law's essence, its coercion is
also "necessary" in the sense that its force is needed in order
to get certain things to happen, to make men act in acceptable
ways, protect certain interrelations and inhibit others, and so
on.
In addition to its coercive aspect, the law has the feature of
being all-pervasive, encompassing our individual lives in myr-
iad ways. How then can personal freedom be maintained
within the framework of that "necessary" coercion? How can
freedom be maintained when the coercive law is so all-
encompassing?
For Hegel, the fact that the individual exists "within" soci-
ety has direct metaphysical implications: he is the particular,
vis-a-vis society as the universal. The noun "universal" [das
Allgemeine) has the same root as "common" (gemein) and
"community" [Gemeinde). In general, Hegelian Metaphysics
distrusts the universal as unreal and abstract, and accords
reality to the particular existent. Yet when it comes to the
"universal social substance" which is society, Hegel is of two
minds: first, the universal has a "higher" reality, against
which the individual's claim to superior rights is unwar-
ranted; second, the "universal" constitutes a system of needs
and satisfactions, exchange and labor, in which the "particu-
lar" participants are more often victimized than benefited.
In The Philosophy of Right (1821), Hegel will make a pow-
erful distinction between civil society and the statethat is,
between the socioeconomic system of needs and exchange, on
one hand, and the historico-cultural entity, on the other. In
civil society the individual is victimized and oppressed; in the
state, as a metaphysical entity transcending all else, the indi-
vidual is absorbed and fulfilled. The individual comes to civil
society in pursuit of his private interests. The state or nation,
on the other hand, is a spiritual entity (civil society being a
thing of nature). The state, then, is the genuine universal.
45
Hegel and the Human Spirit
Here in the 1805-6 discussion, Hegel has not yet come to
such a distinction in explicit terms, yet implicitly it is there.
At the level of actual or objectified spirit, the social is the
broadest framework providing a context of meaning. The indi-
vidual act gets its deepest meaning by reference to this frame-
work, and it is in this light that the particular agent has his
being as part of the universal. It is not only the medium in
which he exists, it is also the element in which he knows
himself. That is, the individual recognizes himself, as him-
self, in reference to the universal social substance (which, in
the present context, is both the socioeconomic system and
the cultural entity known as the state). In these terms it is
seen as a static structure: its movement derives from coercive
power.
In addition to the difference between the particular and the
universalas a metaphysical rather than a sociopolitical dis-
tinctionthere is also the metaphysical distinction between
the world of immediacy and the process of intellectual media-
tion. The individual person, when considered as part of the
natural and social environment, is unaware of his own
uniquesness vis-a-vis that environment. He is immersed in
immediate existence. When the individual develops a spiritu-
al self-awareness, he steps out of his immediacy, to a media-
tion with himself. The law provides him with the possibility
of a mediated existence with others, in which wills are com-
municated, conflicts resolved, and so on. From this mediated
existence with others he can go on to a mediated relation to
himself. The law is therefore a step in the evolving life of the
spirit, in contrast to the unself-conscious existence in the
world of nature. The law is part of that "common" (hence
"universal") life which is the shared totality, the universal
social substance. (Again, we must see this as signifying the
socioeconomic system, as well as the state.) Hegel expresses
this idea by saying that the law is one's substance as a person.
This, too, will have varied metaphysical consequences, as
we shall see. To the extent that the law is a person's self-
relatedness, or self-mediation, it involves a person's total self-
identification with the law. Thus there cannot, in essence, be
46
Introduction
a tug-of-war between the individual and the law, since the
law is the individual himselfa view which leads to the un-
usual conclusion that the criminal is actually punishing him-
self when he is being punished by the law. The identification
works both ways: the individual is absorbed in, and in that
sense is identical to, the law
;
the law, as the embodiment of a
common will, is the person. But above and beyond all this,
the law is the means whereby the individual becomes individ-
ual. Thus the metaphysical division between the particular
and the universal is overcome: the fullest particularization is
in the individual's complete unity with universality.
This is not the general situation, but rathe* an ideal level
which the individual as well as the law must attain. That is
to say, the law can be as immersed in immediacy as the most
primitive of individualsi.e., when it is merely abstract and
is applied formally, sticking to the letter, without self-con-
sciousness on the part of those applying it. At this level the
law only tells us what is forbidden [verboten), it does not yet
tell us what is bidden {geboten). In the same way, the individ-
ual at this level has not yet emerged from abstractness into
reality and self-realization.
The individual can be identical to the law at either of two
levels: a) at the level of unthinking immediacy, where the
individual is the force of law as something self-enclosed, in-
itself, and where his compliance is as unquestioned as cus-
tom, so that the law needs no conscious application; b) at the
level of fully self-conscious rationality, where the uniqueness
of the individual is completely "realized" (i.e., in two senses:
understood and manifested), and the law is applied so intelli-
gently, brought to bear in such a pointed way, that it seems
tailored to that individual alone.
At the level of immediacy, the individual comes to the law
along with his socioeconomic connections, as though he were
a composite entity like a family. His individuality has not yet
been fully recognized. Thus the universal substance (which is
society) accepts the individual as a structure of relations: fa-
milial, etc. We can see this contrastbetween immediacy and
self-mediationin the different types of marriage, ranging
47
r
Hegel and the Human Spirit
from the rule-bound contractual arrangement to the relation
wherein the partners regard themselves and each other as
fully independent and autonomous individuals. In the same
way, the law can range from an empty formalism to the " tai-
lored " application for the fully realized individual.
We can extend the analogy between law and marriage even
further: Hegel speaks of marriage as the mixture of the per-
sonal with the impersonality of the natural, of the spiritual
and the natural. This is why it is a concurrence of the reli-
gious and the civil, freedom and determinism, individual and
societyand of almost any other dichotomy one could think
of. Indeed, we could take as the underlying assumption for
Hegel's metaphysics in general that whatever dichotomy is
presentedappearance versus reality, spirit versus nature,
mind versus matterthe human being bestrides the line be-
tween the two elements and occupies both. Hegel deliberately
seeks out such dichotomies in order to demonstrate how, un-
like the traditional metaphysical systems, his absolute ideal-
ism is capable of resolving themon the basis of the idea that
the human self is the truth of everything, and thus the recon-
ciliation of all difference.
Accordingly, the law, as the direct expression of the human
spirit, must be expected to do some of the philosophical work
that the concept of spirit is expected to do. In marriage, we
marry our physical bodies to one another, and also (hopefully)
our spiritual selves. But in actuality, often one pole or the
other predominatesand the same holds true for the law. We
might relate to marriage in strictly formal terms, as con-
tracted, indissoluble, etc. The formal emphasis is always the
half-truth, to be contradicted by the living actuality. Thus the
opposite pole to the formalistic emphasis is the fulfilled actu-
ality, and we must expect the law to try to approach that
actuality. Just as genuine marriage does not take place on the
basis of a word mechanically given, but on the basis of con-
scious consent as the expression of will, so the law ought not
to be employed mechanically, but only as the expression of a
common will, i.e., that of the universal social substance.
Just as there is the expectable movement from the natural
48
Introduction
toward the spiritual, from inert immediacy to self-conscious
mediation, from determinism toward freedom, so we must
expect this tendency to manifest itself in marriage, in the law,
and in every other aspect of society. One such manifestation
is in the concept of individuality, which can take a variety of
forms, from the false individuality of natural isolation to the
genuine individuality of the fully participating member of so-
ciety. (The latter concept seems paradoxical, since it is an
individuality involving social ties.) At a further remove to-
ward abstractness, there is the concept of pure personhood,
such as exists in a last will and testamenta disembodied
intention, but an intention all the same.
The social interconnectedness of the individual is gradually
invaded by the law, so that the law takes on some of the
functions previously performed by the family (the actual
family as well as the "family" of one's socioeconomic connec-
tions): e.g., the law validates property rights. Ultimately, the
law provides the network of rights which is the universal
social substance. This social network is necessary, as it pro-
vides the means for the individual's lifeyet Hegel empha-
sizes that this is a necessity which heartlessly sacrifices the
individual to society's ends.
Hegel has a powerful passage in which he condemns this
system, the social substance: it is necessary, but a necessary
evil. To begin with, Hegel sees the individual worker as com-
pletely immersed in the universal. He has his unconscious
existence in it, as though it were his natural environment. He
is utterly dependent upon that system: it provides his physi-
cal sustenance, such as it is, yet crushes his spirit. The work-
er seems successful in exploiting the forces of nature, yet his
daily work is abstract, a mere part of some total product. With
the development of industry, the individual worker is more
productive, but this increased productivity decreases the
value of his individual contribution, since technological pro-
gress makes his part in the work process repetitive and re-
placeable. His relation to his work is abstract, and he does not
emerge from that abstractness.
As needs are increasingly met, they are further multiplied
49
Hegel and the Human Spirit
and diversified. It is as though needs and satisfactions gener-
ate each other, each trying to outrun the other but neither
ever entirely succeeding. With this proliferation of needs and
satisfactions, taste becomes refined and products ever more
complex and differentiated, leading to the many useless frip-
peries we see as the marks of civilization. (Hegel mentions
corkscrews and candlesnuffers, but we could more aptly think
of electronic juice extractors and digital eggtimers.) Man is
raised to be a consumer, and it is obvious from Hegel's con-
text that he condemns man's consumer status as ungenuine,
just as he condemns his producer status as abstract. Homo
emptor is as inauthentic as homo faber.
As producer, man's work becomes increasingly mechanical,
and although this may be applauded as "labor saving," it has
the result of dulling the worker. Hegel contrasts this figure
with that of what we might call, broadly, the "renaissance
man." Gone is the ideal of the fulfilled life of many interests.
The spirituality of the worker shrinks, consricted to a point.
Technology makes his work more perfect, but it is also more
fragmented.
The proliferation of needs and satisfactions leads to the
enrichment of fashion, and Hegel points out that its constant
change is part of its very essence. It is rational that fashions
change, since it would be irrational to try to retain one style
in an area so ephemeral. Here we have nothing like abstract
beauty, but only a time-locked charm or attractiveness. The
striving for newer fashions is paralleled by the search for new
machines, new ways of simplifying and "saving" labor. The
novelty in both areasnew fashions and new machinery
takes its toll in industries where the work is "stupefying,
unhealthy, and unsafe." Increased specialization leads to a
decrease in the worker's skills. Moreover, changes in fashion
or machinery can throw entire populations into abject pov-
erty. As an empirical generalization, therefore, it is possible to
say that these necessary and essential changes lead to an in-
creased polarization between the very rich and the very poor.
Wealth becomes a force, attracting economic "masses" to
itself by a natural gravitation. The rich get richer, a truism
50
Introduction
which Hegel expresses in biblicatterms: To him who hath, to
him is given. The process of acquisition evolves into a vast
system, in which labor becomes even more abstract. The re-
sult is a dismemberment of spirit in the worker, a tearing up
[Zehssenheit) of the will, and thus an increasing hostility and
hatred.
Again Hegel emphasizes the point that this system, al-
though so merciless, is nevertheless the individual's suste-
nance. The system feeds on itself and on whatever is around
it, like a living substance invading the surrounding tissues.
Various remedies are sought to relieve the suffering of its
victims, yet complete control cannot be achieved, since com-
merce must remain free. The alternative to total control is
the employment of the system's victims in other areas of
production. The freedom of commerce takes more and more
victims, perhaps decimating an entire generation of workers
or adding to their suffering. And then we get poor-laws, poor-
houses, and so on. The process, as Hegel seeks to show, has a
logical inevitability to it.
The individual, as a metaphysical particular, is contingent,
in that his situation depends upon economic circumstances
and personal abilities. But we can also regard him, abstractly,
as a universal, the legal person who is the possessor of rights.
This universal status is protected by the state, which main-
tains his right to property, the force of contracts he has en-
tered into, and his recognition as a person.
Thus his immediate existence is mediated through law,
which is universal and gives him his status as universal. At
the same time, however, that there is a mediation between
his particularity and his universality, there is also a polariza-
tion between the two aspects, between his actual existence
and his formal "necessity," as two poles which the individual
seems to equate. This is where the force of the law comes
into its ownin protecting rights and property, and in com-
pelling the execution of a contract. The law does not say you
ought to do this or that, as though its function were merely
advisory. It says you must, and its force makes the obligation
mandatory. Above all, the law bases itself on the recognition
51
Hegel and the Human Spirit
of the legal person, pure personhood, pure will as expressed in
a contract. That will is a shared will (as the will of the
parties), but it is also a common will, the will of society,
which is being evoked here. (This is why an illegal contract is
never binding.)
From that common or shared will [gemeinsame Wille), we
can see how Hegel moves into the concept of a universal or
general will [allgemeine Wille). That universal will is not an
absolute. The law is sufficiently strong to compel as a com-
mon will, and this is what prevails against my individual
wishes. Here, then, in being compelled by the law, I arrive at
my universality of selfhood.
Accordingly the real opposition is not between myself and
the law, between a metaphysical particular and a universal.
The real opposition is between my self as particular and my
self as universal. It is not / who stand against the law, but
rather I who stand against myself. In a marginal note Hegel
says that the process of becoming cultivated (Bildung) con-
sists in seeing oneself in the universaleven if, at first, we
must be compelled to see ourselves in this way. It is an exten-
sion of his earlier statement that the law compels us to be
persons.
I exist as a particular self, and from that vantage point I can
see that particular existence of mine as opposed to my univer-
sal self. Yet that universal self is embodied in the power of
the law. This, then, is the sense in which I can regard myself
as standing opposed to the lawnamely, as a concrete par-
ticular juxtaposed to the abstract universal. Yet this is not the
genuine way of looking at myself, since I am both, as the
previous paragraph indicates. Once again we see a metaphysi-
cal distinction, both sides of which are occupied by man.
There is an element of contingency in my status as particu-
lar vis-a-vis the universal. There is also an element of contin-
gency in the way the law is applied to particular cases. Laws
are indeterminate directives which are to be made determi-
nate in being applied: the simpler the law, the more indeter-
minate; the more determinate the law, the less simple. Fur-
ther," the particular case can come within range of numerous
52
Introduction
laws. The result can be what Hegel calls a "bad infinity/' in
which we produce an endless stream of legislation in a night-
marish effort to account for all contingencies. With the prolif-
eration of laws, our knowledge of them is more contingent
and becomes a matter of chance.
Above and beyond these contingencies, however, the legal
process is the carrying out of right [Recht), securing the rights
of all parties coming before the law. For this reason, Hegel
emphasizes the point that the legal process is as central as the
law itselfperhaps even more central. Yet this point has its
contradictions: e.g., the poor, who are more u\ need of the
law's protection, are less able to secure it.
We saw the sense in which it is possible to say that the
individual stands opposed to societynamely, in the meta-
physical sense of the particular juxtaposed to the universal.
Hegel, however, prefers to lay stress not on the opposition but
on the identification. The law is the essence of the individual
as the expression of his pure will. In this light, the law is his
own absolute power over his own life. But it is also the
expression of the will of society as a collective entity [Ge-
meinwesen), i.e., as a nation. It is a nation's self-conscious
universal will [allgemeine Wille). As this totality the law is,
literally, the voice of the "commonwealth"i.e., of its wealth
in common [allgemeine Reichtum).
Hegel is quick to admit that this politico-economic whole
has its negative as well as positive aspects. It is there, as a
system, for everyone to partake of; yet it also condemns a vast
multitude to a deadening labor and poverty, in order to allow
others to grow richor conversely, can as readily victimize
the rich by depriving them of their wealth. There is a sugges-
tion, here, of a link between Adam Smith's idea of the "invisi-
ble hand" at work in the market, and Hegel's subsequent idea
of the "cunning of history" (whereby history, for its own mys-
terious reasons, operates to elevate and/or destroy individuals
or nations).
Accordingly, the social substance is a combination of com-
monwealth and necessitythe "necessity" being in the na-
ture of a necessary evil. The system is seen as the supposed
53
r
Hegel and the Human Spirit
essence of social life, and the individual identifies himself
with it and regards the law as the extension of his pure will.
Yet although Hegel accepts that identification, he also regards
it as a delusion. That is, the system deludes people into be-
lieving that by their participation in it they attain their rights,
inevitably, and thus that they exist as a "persons, citizens, as
abstract universals worthy of respect." There is no doubt that
Hegel keeps both eyes open. On the positive side, the law
serves to secure rights and justice; but on the negative side, it
victimizes those it benefits. It is therefore the master of evil
as well as of good.
The universal is the individual's substance, and he ac-
knowledges it as such. The acknowledgment can be explicit
or tacit. He can be so completely absorbed by it, even dis-
solved in it, that no acknowledgment is needed. The law is
the extemalization of my right, as pure personbut this is
only in the eyes of the law, and for this reason I am totally
dependent upon it. As legal "person," my right is made exter-
nal by the force of law, and I see this as my essence embodied
in my existence. In Hegel's view, the trouble with such a
concept of personhood is that it is not complete, but merely
legalistic, formal. Obviously, to be a legal persona is not all
that is meant by being a person. We may therefore regard the
tensionbetween the legal concept of personhood and the
living actuality of the personas one of the great problems
for the law and for society in general.
This tension is dialectical, paradoxical: my participation in
society does not provide me with my complete identity as an
individual, as a fulfilled human being. My status as legal "per-
son" rests on my self-identification with a pure will. Yet,
paradoxically, in recognizing myself as pure will I place my-
self outside the universal. And then I really do stand opposed
to society. I see myself as an isolated individual. My self-indi-
viduation isolates me. I see myself as having rights which
stand opposed to the rights or possibilities of others. My right
to move my elbow is limited by the proximity of your ribs,
and so on.
Introduction
Yet if I individuate myself completely I am evil. I place
myself above the rights of others. I thereby try to get the
better of others, to deceive thembut in" so'doing, I also de-
ceive myself, since I deny myself the life of constructive in-^
teraction. Thus Adam's crime is not necessarily the defiance
of God's command. His crime is in his individuationeven
though that individuation is not his express doing. (The ex-
press criminal act had to wait for the mini-society of Cain
and Abel.) In the Encyclopaedia (par. 24), Hegel speaks of the
totally individuated person as Adam, seeking his narrow self-
interest as though he is Adam, with interests altogether apart
from the universal. The evil is this isolated selZ-interest, his
subjectivity ("dieses Bose ist seine Subjektivitat"). Isolation,
then, is the Hegelian equivalent of Original Sin. The interest-
ing question which remains is to what extent, in my libertar-
ian insistence on my rights against society, I may be close to
a similar sin or crime.
At the beginning of this chapter on the coercive law, Hegel
points to the difference between law and recognition: recogni-
tion is piecemeal, but the law is the expression of the univer-
sal social substance, and in it the individual knows himself as
part of that universality. In the long marginal supplement
(originally appended to one of the inner paragraphs, but in this
text moved to the end of the chapter), Hegel addresses himself
to the theme of the recognition provided by the law itself.
The individual is recognized as pure will, and as such he has
rights that are his without his having to claim them. And yet
when the law "recognizes'' him, he is no more than an ab-
straction. He is not fully recognized as a living person. He
therefore stands over against the universal for which he is an
abstractionwhereas the fulfilled individual is not like this
but is simultaneously particular and universal. Total isolation
is evil, perhaps even criminal; and yet the law itself has a
hand in promoting that isolation, by seeing the individual in
merely formal terms, so that in his living actuality he stands
juxtaposed to the abstract universality of the law.
From the legal standpoint, the individual has a universal
54
55
Hegel and the Human Spirit
essence. And if he accepts it, he gives up all claim to his
special status as one opposed to the universal. He thus places
his essence and existence in the hands of the law. The genu-
ine individual, however, opposes being absorbed in the law
because in being absorbed by it, he is made abstract, a quanti-
fied entity, determined by blind forces outside him. He be-
comes a cipher, a statistic. On the other hand, the individual,
in regarding himself as absolute and above everything else,
subjugates another individual who is still immersed in
abstractness. It is the "aware" overcoming the "unaware,"
through force or cunningand as such the "aware" individual
is evil. Thus the paradox is that the law seeks to eclipse me,
but when I try to stand up against it, I go counter to the law,
perhaps to the point of crime. (The idea that total individual-
ity leads to some sort of wrong is not new. Before it appeared
in the Fall of Adam and in Buddhism, it probably found ex-
pression in tribal beliefs.)
At one pole, then, the individual is so individuated as to be
outside or above the law. At the other pole, he identifies him-
self with it so completely that the law is the individual, and
when it punishes him, he is punishing himself. It was said
earlier that the tension between the legal persona and the
living person is one of the problems confronting the law vis-
a-vis the individual. In a similar although inverted way, the
choice between isolation and identification is one of the ma-
jor problems confronting the individual vis-a-vis the law.
Central to all this is the concept of will, which can vary
from the abstract to the concrete, from the "pure" to the
actual, and from the collective form to the utterly personal
expression. The law is there to protect the will and its inter-
ests. Yet the individual may operate against his own interests,
and against the shared will embodied in a contract. It is then a
problem to decide where the duty of the law rests. Ulti-
mately, evil is the will isolated as something absolute. Yet
the will is the lawthe law is willand this clash is what
must be reconciled. This can be done only by seeing ourselves
and our actions as part of the broader realm of spirit.
56
r Introduction
PART III. Constitution
The self is the truth of everything. Not only is it the arena
in which truth itself has its locus, it is also the content of all
truth. This is Hegel's minimal stance. It is close to the critical
idealism of Kant; but Hegel knows that he must go beyond it,
supercede it. This is because there are sociopolitical truths as
well as truths of the absolute spirit (comprising art, religion,
and philosophy), and neither of these can be reducible to the
level of the personal, the individualistic.
There have been thinkers who tried to do just thisi.e., to
derive social truths from truths about the individual. On the
other hand, there have been those who have emphasized the
gulf between the two realms. The dichotomy between the
individual and the social is in itself one of those age-old ones
which Hegel regards as false, and rather as a tension to be
resolved and overcome. Traditionally, either the state is the
negation of the individual, or the individual (as the repository
of fundamental rights) transcends the state.
Hegel seeks to resolve this dichotomy by ascribing to the
state some of the characteristics ascribable to the individual.
For one thing, both have the capacity for self-consciousness,
and in both self-consciousnesses there is the same absolute-
ness, universality, and self-determination. We can also regard
the state as a self-contained end, as we regard the individual.
This, however, leads to a further dichotomy: on one hand, the
state, as an individual end in itself, is a law unto itself; on the
other hand, its concept is the freedom and autonomy of its
individual members. This is another of those false juxtaposi-
tions which are to be transcended. On one hand, the individu-
als each have their particular will; on the other hand, they
know their objective essence to be in their collective exis-
tence. What we see, then, is that Hegel's deviceof resolving
the dichotomies between the individual and society by ascrib-
ing the same characteristics to them bothhas the result of
generating dichotomies as much as of resolving them.
The individual and the state have not only the capability of
57
Hegel and the Human Spirit
self-consciousness, but also the capacity for self-externaliza-
tion (or alienation), and the potential for grasping one's (or its)
own knowledge and values as absolute. In the process of self-
externalization, the individual is enabled to regard his own
knowledge as universal, as objectively valideven though it
is he himself who produced it. Thus there is a movement in
this knowledge from its subjectivity to objectivity through a
process of autoamnesia, by means of which I create knowl-
edge and belief, and ignore their source in myself in order to
set them up in the world.
In society, what is externalized (in self-alienated form) is
culture in general. In myself, the individual, what is external-
ized is the totality of my own particular goals, seen in a uni-
versal light. These are universal in the sense that my values
are seen (by me) as the ones which are objectively right for all
men and as objectively right in and of themselves. The para-
dox in all this is that the values and beliefs which I create and
externalize are precisely those which negate my autonomy as
an individual, since I set these up as a universal power which
is opposed to myself as individual.
/ am thereby universalized, dissolved into the universal
will, but at the sacrifice of that will as mine. The universal
will, which I have created, now comes back to enclose me,
protect meand it now dominates me as a power alien to
myself. This power is embodied in a people, and such power,
thus embodied, is what Hegel means by constitution.
We therefore have a state which is sufficiently self-conscious
to regard itself as an individual, a self, an identity. And in this
self-identification as a state, the generative individualism of its
members is overcomed, ignored. Further, the creative power of
the cultural spiritthe Volksgeistignores itself as the source
of its own store of values and beliefs. This amounts to a cul-
tural self -deception: it is constructive and necessary, certainly,
but it is a self-deception all the same. The ultimate goal of
human history is the stage of self-consciousness in which that
self-deception is overcome, and we realize, in concrete social
terms, that the self is the truth of everything.
As in all self-extemalization, whether on the individual
58
Introduction
level or the social, we could not regard our values and beliefs
as objectively true unless we could ignore our subjective role
in creating them. In this way the general will becomes "pri-
mary" and essentialin the negation of the separate individ-
ual wills which constitute it. The externalized general will, as
"in itself," thereby comes to dominate the individuals who
created itand the individuals have set it up to do just that.
The domination can be fearful, as in the French Revolution
(as Hegel points out), yet it is a necessary and just domina-
tion. The universal (or general) will is set up and obeyed as
being the will of the whole, yet it is constituted, Hegel says,
through the determinate expression of individuals. This is an
expression of trust. Once the general will is there, it takes
priority, it is absolutein such a way that the two wills are
not at all the same.
Since the externalized state is all-inclusive, there are no
values above it to render its actions good or bad. No moral
judgments can be leveled against it. Thus we might find the
value-neutrality of a Machiavelli abhorrent, but what he
really means to tell us (Hegel says) is precisely this, that in
situations of political fragmentation such as that of his time,
the only hope can be for a state which will be (in effect)
beyond good and evil because it is beyond the reach of judg-
ments leveled by a fragmented personal morality.
Thus we can only hope for a rule of law to replace tyranny
(and the tyranny of personal moral judgments) when law is
seen as the embodiment of a universal will, not of an arbitrary
individual will. Then tyranny is overthrown, not because it is
hateful but because the law makes it superfluous.
The individual knows himself in the law. He enters it as a
bourgeois, for the sake of his private interests; but when he
sees his will as the universal (or general) will, he becomes a
citoyen. This transition is the main emphasis of Rousseau,
and we can see in it Hegel's subsequent distinction between
civil society and statehood.
Only when I see myself in relation to the state, so that its
interests are my interests, am I a citizen. At one and the same
time I am an individual and a part of that higher individual
59
Hegel and the Human Spirit
which is the state. This problematic relation is the basis of
the Greek polis. Yet Hegel speaks of a higher consciousness in
which each individual knows himself as fully individual, as
absolute, and as fully identified with the law which is free of
individuals and is a free spirit. The polis, then, was an exten-
sion of individuals united in their wills. What was missing,
Hegel says, was the individuality knowing itself as absolute.
Hegel proposes, then, a methodological progression which
is also a concrete social progression: we begin with the idea of
the individual and the individualistic relations he enters into,-
from there we go to a consideration of social classes and class
consciousness; thence, on to what he calls absolute spirit
culture. The second and third stages comprise the material of
the lectures in the chapters on classes, government, and art,
religion, and science.
A. Classes. If the goal of history is a sociocultural self-
awareness ("spirit becoming its own object"), then we must
show how each sociocultural phenomenon is a step toward
that goal, and how that goal emerges from that process itself.
If self is the truth of everything, then we go beyond that when
the self realizes that it is the truth of everything.
Social classes are a part of the process, which is why Hegel
speaks of them as "self-ordering spirit" ("der sich in sich
selbstgliedernde Geist"). In their progression there is, first, an
element of trust (whereby the individual will externalizes it-
self as the general will, and alienates this will from itself);
second, there is a legalistic stage, in which certain abstract
concepts are formalized; and third, there is a "mistrust" in
which certain objectifications (things, money, representatives)
take over and assume an autonomy of their own:
In social classes, spirit is both divided and unified. Hegel
concerns himself with two groups: the first group comprises
the lower classes (peasants, artisans, merchants), the second
comprises what he calls the universal class (government offi-
cials). What is being considered in each case is the class and
its mentality.
The element of political "trust" appears most evidently in
60
r
Introduction
the peasant class (as Hegel sees it^
w
in 1805), and this is con-
nected to the peasant's trust in nature, in the earth. As the
peasant accepts these with resignation, scr he- accepts the so-
cial and political burdens placed upon him. He knows his
own mind, yet he will do what is required of him if he is
spoken to as a man and is not denied his rights. If these are
denied him, he is likely to rage destructively.
Artisans pride themselves on their control and exploitation
of nature and its forces. "The self has thus gained indepen-
dence from the earth" ("Das Selbst istiiber die Erde herausge-
treten"). We may also think of the work ethicthe craftsman's
sense of integrityin this connection. There is* a developed
sense of individuality here, reinforced by the owning of prop-
erty. With this there is an element of ostentation, aimed at
proving oneself the equal of othersbut this is part of the
enlarged sense of selfhood.
In the mercantile class, especially, one's self-identification
is bound up with ownership. The actual grasp of selfhood is
dissolved in the sense of having, which is stronger than the
identification with one's class. Hegel seems to suggest that
the merchant class is parasitic, since its work is not produc-
tion but mere exchange. The merchant operates in a spiritual
medium which is separated from utility, work, immediacy.
(At an extreme remove, there is the "work" of the stock-
broker.) There is some objectivity in dealing with trade goods,
but this is overcome in the abstractness of money, which
encompasses all else and to a great extent takes the merchant
out of direct contact with objects. The value of a thing is
expressed in monetary termsand this in turn affects the
value placed on persons. Thus money is a further element in
the dissolution of selfhood and individuality.
Hegel is much more interested in the universal class, or the
class of universality ("der Stand der Allgemeinheit"). Its uni-
versality is reflected, first, in its involvement in every aspect
of the individual's life. It is reflected also in the administra-
tion of the "common"wealth for the public good, and in other
universal aspects such as rights, laws, the policing power, and
so on.
61
H egel and the H uman Spirit
Hegel proposes that laws be varied for different classes ("an
easier, coarser justice for the peasant class"). This was, in any
case, the situation de facto and often de jure (and is still too
often the prevailing mode in many parts of the world). But
advocating, as Hegel does, a class differentiation in legal
codes and in the administration of justice (as when he sug-
gests that upper-class offenders be confined in a fortress,
rather than in a common prison amongst lower-class crimi-
nals) certainly goes against the concepts of justice and equal-
ity before the law. (One thinks of upper-class crimes, such as
treason: Walter Raleigh was confined in the Tower of London,
not in a common jail; and his execution was by beheading,
not common hanging. But what if a gentleman commits a
common crime, such as murder or theft?) We can understand
Hegel's view, however, if we see his call for class differentia-
tion in the law as a move against the formalistic application
of the law, without regard for circumstances, individual char-
acter, and so on. The fact remains, however, that class differ-
entiations in the law go against the fundamental intuition as
to what "equal justice" and "due process" ought to be.
The universal class comprises employees of the state. Pri-
marily, their universality consists in the fact that the interest
they serve is not a private one but the interest of the state as a
whole. Hegel also calls it the open class for the same reason
(i.e., its being nonprivate). The business mentality shares in
this universality, since business aims at a universal dimen-
sion in its views about itself (e.g., in its "public relations," the
business class likes to think of itself as serving the interest of
society at large), but in fact this is an abstract view, empty of
content. Whatever content is given to this idea must remain
abstract, since the service to society is supposedly disinter-
ested. Hegel stresses how much of this is empty talk. The
French Revolution may have abolished privileged classes (for
a time), but, he notes, it certainly did not abolish class in-
equality. The suggestion is that in the light of such inequal-
ity, any talk of the businessman's altruistic service to society
is equally empty.
The universal class, then, contains some of the business
62
Introduction
mentalitye.g., its impersonality.-But the missing element is
individuality. (He is not speaking of the individuality of per-
sons, here, but of the "individuality" of the-s^ate as a totality.)
This individuality is supplied, Hegel says, by the military
class. Hegel seems to be suggesting that it is the participation
of the military element which gives the universal class its
dedication to the whole, its sense of self-sacrifice going even
beyond moral limitations. Thus war can be seen as crime on
behalf of the universal ("Verbrechen fur das Allgemeine").
B. Government. One way in which the dichotomy between
the individual and society can be resolved is to say that the
pursuit of individual interests is not opposed to the wider
social interest but actually serves it. Hegel says that there is
cunning in the government's turning the private pursuits of
individuals to public advantage. Yet the strength of govern-
ment, in Hegel's view, is the autonomy of the individual, his
absolute freedom.
And yet government itself is an "individual," with a will,
and so on. This and other such "individual" functions are
abstract, however, and a government would be wise to suit
these abstract elements to the different classes. Its action is
informed by spirit, even though its operation is not in the
sphere of spirit but in that of immediacy.
Fulfillment of freedom consists in spiritual self-awareness.
The same criterion of fulfillment applies to the "individual"
which is the governmentwhich is why Hegel characterizes
government as "the self-certain spirit of nature" ("der seiner
selbst gewisse Geist der Natur").
C. Art, Religion, and Science. Here we arrive at spiritual ab-
solutenessnot the inner, personal realm, nor the realm of
social and political activity, but the realm in which spirit
grasps itself in its creation of spirit. That is, it creates a world
which has the form of spirit itself. This aspectself creating
self, spirit creating spiritconstitutes its absoluteness.
Yet in this absoluteness there are levels. At the level of the
immediate it is art. There is a tension, here, between the
63
H egel and the H uman Spirit
immediacy of the art object and its infinitude of meaning, its
absoluteness. In that tension, however, something of the in-
ner life is revealed. Eventually, in his extended lectures enti-
tled The Philosophy of Fine Ait (published posthumously),
Hegel will expand upon the evolution of that tensionthe
way in which the spiritual form gradually frees itself from its
material content and the finite object attains infinite signifi-
cance. Here in the Jena lectures he considers that tension only
in the light of music and the plastic arts. He speaks of music
as pure motion, a formless motion (gestaltlose Bewegung)-,
ultimately, in his later lectures, he will come to speak of
music as a motion having an excess of form and a minimum
of content.
The absolute in art is the balance of form and content in
such a way that human spirituality, personhood, is revealed.
In sculpture, "the quiescent presentation of the divine" ("die
ruhende Darstellung des Gdttlichen"), and in Greek statuary
in particular, this balance is achieved. Hegel considers certain
extremesnature poetry, landscape artas bad because the
immersion in the natural denies the spirituality which is art's
proper aim. Art, however, fails in its attempted revelation of
spirit: it is not the clear, self-knowing spirit but the inspired
spirit (dei begeisterte Geist) which is still enmeshed in the
visible. Art is therefore never fully adequate to its spiritual
aim, which is why it must be transcended by religion.
In art we have the illusion of a self-enclosed living world.
This is illusory, and it fails because it is caught up in the finite,
the visible and audible, while aiming at an infinitude which
can never be seen or heard. Thus the godly presentation is
never of the genuinely godly because it is presented. For this
reason the "truth" of art is in religion (as the "truth" of religion
will be found in philosophy). Art cannot provide the final grasp
of the absolutei.e., spirit knowing itself as absolute.
In religion, on the other hand, spirit is directly concerned
with the spirit itself. We grasp that God is self-certain spirit
the self which is the truth of everything. He is represented as
a Person. And yet, although this personhood is precisely what
we share with the Godhead, and the representation as such
64
Introduction
ought to bring us even closer, the-fact remains that in repre-
senting the deity we alienate the world from ourselves so that
it is farther than ever from the divine rathe** than closer to it.
That is, the deity is represented as spirit reconciled with it-
self, and this reconciliation, this self-identity, is represented
as occurring only in the other, divine world, not in this one.
Religion convinces us that whatever occurs in this world is
reconcilable with spirit. But it does not reconcile spirit with
itself, unless it be in the divine.
It is the role of absolute religion to overcome this, and to
present God as a self in whom all is reconciledthis being
the role of self as the truth of everything. But this does not
succeed completely. For example, since human existence is
contingent, there is for us a split between our existence and
our essence; this is reconciled in God but not in man. In God,
existence and essence are one, the self is identical to thought.
But it is not man's essence to exist, for if it were, he would be
existing necessarily and eternally. The unity of essence and
existence is represented in God becoming man because man
himself could never represent that unity.
Since God is that unity, he can be the self in which all
dualities are overcome because the most profound duality is
overcome in him. Thus God's sacrifice is in his becoming
human: God's "other" is the world of man and nature, and
yet God becomes that "other." As a result, reality itself is
transcended, negated, just as God overcomes his own self-
enclosedness.
The element in common between God and man is what is
brought out in God's representation. That representation must
be inadequate since there is no necessity to it (as most religion-
ists would agree). Yet this leaves the Godhead as mysterious as
ever; and the supposed union with humanity is as problematic
as ever. God's will remains closed to us. To try to give that will
a definite shapesay, by seeking to establish God's kingdom
on earthis fanaticism in Hegel's eyes (perhaps because it is
the secular state in disguise).
All this is designed to show that the concept of God, vital as
it is, cannot be made to satisfy reason. As Hegel explains: reli-
65
Hegel and the Human Spirit
gion attempts to rise above reality but does not succeedand
when it does, it becomes unreal. It serves the public interest
and is therefore immersed in the world, enmeshed in the state,
such that the genuinely religious element is left to the imagi-
nation. What religion preaches may well be true, Hegel says,
but its truths are accepted without insight or comprehension.
Such comprehension can be provided only by philosophy
the absolute science, as Hegel calls it. This has the same
content as does religion, but in conceptual form. In it, the self
as such [Ich als solches) is the knowledge of absolute spirit.
That knowledge of the absolute is knowledge of the here and
now, but seen in universal terms; and again it is the self
which provides the bridge between the individual and the
universal.
We arrive, then, at a knowlede of the immediate which is
the knowledge of spirit knowing itself. Philosophy must un-
dergo self-alienation, so that when the spirit knows itself it
knows it as "other." Once it has achieved this release, spirit
can be seen as creating the world and man. It is as though
spirit had to create matter in order to return to itself as
spiritor as though it had to create man so that spirit could
be grasped in and through matter (this is the "message" of the
Incarnation). Externalized spirit is like a jet of solar material
shooting out into the void, only to be drawn back into itself
by its own "gravity." Spirit then returns to itself, and sees the
world and man as spirit's own work.
The world is the process whereby spirit comes to know
itself. Philosophy is the description, the form, and the aim of
that process.
In Hegel's view, no discussionsuch as a discussion of the
philosophy of Spiritcould ever be adequate so long as it is
isolated from its broader world context. Every area on a map
is limited by its neighbors, and these become the mediating
factors in its definition. Similarly, the truth about any "field"
of study is to be seen only when that field is set into its wider
context.
Some problems arise, however, when we come to draw the
66
Introduction
conceptual boundaries of that contextual world. Here, in the
1805-6 lectures, that world comprises the realms of Nature
and Spirit. This is not because Hegel waVthinking only in
those terms at this time. The editor of the Academy edition
points out that Hegel prepared a manuscript on the philoso-
phy of Nature and the philosophy of Spirit, as these were the
announced topics of his forthcoming lecture series, i.e., what
he called his Realphilosophie, or philosophy of reality. A
simultaneous course of lectures covered Logic and Metaphys-
ics,- and the wider world-system, of which the 18056 lec-
tures on Realphilosophie were a part, would be presented la-
ter in the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences (1817),
including the topics of Logic, Nature, and Spirit.
As far as the 1805-6 series is concerned, any "complete"
view of the world would have first to reconcile the realm of
matter extended in space with the realm of Spirit in time.
(Ultimately, it would also have to include the realm of pure
concepts such as Being, Becoming, and Essence.) It is not
enough merely to discuss the realm of Nature and then to go
on to discuss the realm of Spirit. Rather, the implicit problem
is to show how two utterly different realms such as Nature
and Spirit (or, ultimately, Logic, Nature, and Spirit) belong to
one world-while at the same time emphasizing the differ-
ences between them. What is needed is a unified view which
does not blur the differences, yet which does not keep them
so far apart as to leave them unrelated.
Even though Hegel had been thinking, in 1805-6, of a
world-system in which the context of Nature/Spirit would
link up with Logic at one end (and/or with some sort of tran-
scendental ontology at the other), we are here compelled to
regard the 1805-6 lectures as they stand, and that is as the
presentation of a complete (if limited) philosophy of reality.
Regarding this system which comprises the realms of Nature
and Spirit, two features are to be observed. First, the continu-
ity between the two realms is established by the fact that
some characteristic elements in the final link of the realm of
Spirit are already present in the most rudimentary stage of the
realm of Nature. This means that Spirit at its highest level
67
Hegel and the Human Spirit
has some vital aspect in common with matter at its lowest,
and this common element informs the entirety. Second, the
continuity is established by the fact that the realm of Nature
is divided in such a way that its sections are developmental
stages, and that the most highly developed section of Nature
can almost be seen as the bottom rung in the realm of Spirit.
Thus Nature at its highest level is animal life; and animal life
is the necessary basis for the life of Spirit.
The first of these two points is elaborated in the last few
paragraphs at the end of the 1805-6 philosophy of Spirit lec-
ture. There, Hegel gives us a summary view of Nature and
Spirit. The paragraph which begins "This insight is philoso-
phy " (sixth from the end) could be regarded as a world-system
in miniature. It says that while speculative philosophy goes
out of itself and returns as self-awareness, natural philosophy
expresses the Idea in the form of immediacy. Both return to
themselves eventually, as concept. The philosophical world-
system is itself a culmination of the activity of Spirit. What
that culmination involves is a return of Spirit to itself as
self-consciousness. When we go to the beginning of the phi-
losophy of Nature we find another return, similar yet differ-
ent. Matter is the Idea turned back on itself, into immanence
and immediacy, a self-enclosedness from which only the in-
ner tendency to development (in the direction of Spirit) can
save it. On the other hand, Spirit's return to itself is an open-
ness to all else, since it includes all else in its purview.
In the third paragraph from the end we find another correla-
tion: between man and world. Man's consciousness is divided
and returns to itselfand the same division and return occur
in the world. "One stroke creates them both." In the last
paragraph we are told that this is the eternal creation. The
universe itself must return to itself, as Spirit. Thus the end is
already implicit in the beginning. And only then are Nature
and Spirit seen to be one reality.
The second pointabout the highest stage in Nature being
the lowest stage of Spiritis somewhat more problematic,
particularly because the page connecting the two discussions
is missing in the 1805-6 text. The Academy editor shows
68
Introduction
that it must have been missing'from the earliest time that
anyone was aware of the manuscript (Michelet, 1842). The
gap is unfortunate, but its content can be* Strrmised from the
rest of Hegel's works. We must assume that the two discus-
sions, on Nature and on Spirit, would not have been juxta-
posed without their continuity being shown. The philosophy
of Nature culminates with a section on the organic, and in
the discussion of animal processes, ending abruptly with
some words about illness. How this discussion contributes to
that of the transition from Nature to Spirit may perhaps be
clarified by the section in the 1817 Encyclopaedia on this
topic. There, the section on the organic is considerably ampli-
fied, ending in a discussion of disease, therapy, and self-
induced destruction. The organism exists as an opposition of
two principles: its singularity and its universality. As long the
organism is alive, it manages to hold these opposed aspects
together. But universality gets the upper hand eventually, and
the "unity" is destroyed. In dying, the organism reverts to
"type," to sheer inert materiality, a particular object. It is as
though the living organism could no longer bear the opposi-
tion within itself, and succumbed to it. In dying, it does
achieve a return (of sorts), in that it is now "in itself." This is
its closest approximation to Spirit's self-aware return, which
is "for itself." The return to materiality, achieved in death, is,
suprisingly, the best that the organism can do in the direction
of autonomy. (Only in human self-consciousness is the oppo-
sition between particularity and universality overcome: aware
of oneself as self, one is both particular and universal.) So the
"highest" level of nature is the dying animal life
;
and this is a
strange contrast and parallel to human life, where "return" is
the positive attainment of selfhood.
When the human individual becomes self-aware, this is the
death of him as a "natural" inchoate being. Thus Nature itself
attains its fulfillment by becoming Spirit. This is the death of
its particularity as well, and the emergence of its universality
or concept. In the self, however, both these aspects are ne-
gated. The Idea (which informs Nature) exists inadequately as
mortal nature. It becomes adequate to itself as thought, which
69
Hegel and the Human Spirit
is immortal. As Hegel says, "This is the transition from Na-
ture to Spirit." The goal of Nature is to break through "its
husk of immediate sensuous existence," to consume itself
and come forth again as Spirit. "Nature has thus become an
other to itself in order to recognize itself again as Idea and to
reconcile itself with itself'' [Philosophy of Nature, par. 376,
Zusatz).
Yet Spirit is not merely Nature having become other. It is
there implicitly from the very beginning, as we saw. Spirit,
since it is the goal of Nature, is "prior" to it. We can therefore
say that Nature has proceeded from Spirit, just as Spirit has
proceeded from Nature. Spirit proceeds from the immediate,
then apprehends itself abstractly, willing to achieve its own
liberation by fashioning Nature out of itself. Spirit comes to
itself, then, using Nature as its intermediary.
These discussions in the Encyclopaedia concerning the
transition from Nature to Spirit, then, should help to clarify
the individual discussions of Nature and of Spirit in these
Jena lectures.
Let us now turn to a very condensed consideration of the
1805-6 lectures on the philosophy of Nature. The series is
divided in the following way: I. Mechanics, II. Formation and
Chemism, III. The Organic.
Hegel opens his Philosophy of Nature with a very provoca-
tive statement, which my previous discussion of the connec-
tion between Nature and Spirit should help illuminate. He
says: "The Idea, as existence returned into its concept, can
now be called absolute Matter or Aether. It is clear that this is
synonymous with pure Spirit, for this absolute Matter is
nothing sensuous but rather the concept as pure concept in
itself, which, existing as such, is Spirit."
Thus, the two (Nature and Spirit) are not merely parallel
but equivalent, so that the connection is established at the
very beginning, and in the strongest terms: matter is indeter-
minate Spirit, returned into its essence out of otherness; it is
the substance and being of all things, the receptivity for all
form, etc. This Aether is the Being of everything, a pure
70
r
Introduction
simple negativity and fluid transparency, pregnant matter,
having suppressed all difference and left it behind, and so
forth. Thus this absolute Matter is pure self-censciousness, a
nonexistent Being going over into existence, and the element
of reality, Hegel says, is the general determinacy in which
Spirit is there as Nature.
This position, of course, requires further argument, and
should not be assumed at the beginning. Yet since this is the
very point at which we emerge at the end of the philosophy of
Spirit, we could say that the remaining two series in the phi-
losophy of Nature lectures (on formation and chemism, and
the organic) in their entirety constitute the argument for his
initial view.
With Kant, we may see the need to posit the functional
unity of space and sensory consciousness: it is this unity that
makes perception possible. We may then ask ourselves
whether, by regarding spatiality as a function of conscious-
ness, we have found the bridge we want between Nature and
Spirit. The important difference, however, is that we are
speaking only of the spatial medium, not of its extended con-
tents. That is, Kant's view is epistemological, while the
bridge which Hegel seeks to establish is metaphysical. This is
why Hegel declares that he will ignore the Kantian view here,
namely, because it does not provide the answer to the meta-
physical problem.
On metaphysical grounds, then, Hegel notes two character-
istics of the spatial continuum: its being there, and its being
distinct from the self. Space cannot, therefore, be regarded as
a function of consciousness. And for this reason, moreover,
we must regard Spirit as falling outside spatiality.
And yetalthough Spirit falls outside spatiality, and ex-
tended things subsist outside Spiritthe reconciliation of Na-
ture and Spirit falls to Spirit to achieve. The reconciliation,
positive though it is, passes through the process of negation.
We may observe, as a general fact, that in Hegel negation has
both an epistemic and an ontic side: negation is what the
mind does to reality in taking it apart to understand it; and it
is what reality does to itself, as it extends and limits itself.
71
Hegel and the Human Spirit
Thus, dimension is negated in space, as a limit that is over-
come. Yet conversely, the plane is the limit of space, the line
is the limit of the plane, the point is the limit of the line. In
the same way the line is the first negation, the plane the
negation of that negation, and so on. And conversely once
again, the point (which had the negative significance of not
being extended in space) is now seen positively as the nega-
tion of limit, and so on. Note the swing here between positive
and negative elementsas polar, and yet as identical.
Once again we must note that these swings are for Hegel
fully dialectical, in the sense that they are epistemic as well
as ontic. This can be seen as well in regard to timewhich is
and yet is not (a negative aspect reflected in Augustine's well-
known remark on time, in the Confessions, 11.14). Further,
the Now is, yet is limited by the negative future and past;
these are themselves in the positive present, which is nothing
more or less than its unity with the future and past.
The meeting place for space and time is the now-point. Its
essential characteristic is negativity (and this should provide
us with a clue to the meeting place for spatial Nature and
temporal Spirit). The now-point is self-negating, being there
yet becoming othera dialectic aspect reflected in Zeno's
views (as Hegel notes).
The essence of movement is in the unity of time and space:
real time subsists in space; space is differentiated in time.
Movement is not a mere predicate or condition of the world;
rather, it is closer to the essence of the self as such, as the
subject returning to itself. But as psychic, movement is more
characteristically posited as being in time rather than in
space, around the quiescent midpoint about which all "move-
ment" revolves. In addition, all this is grasped in self-con-
scious Spirit, turned back upon itself, where all resolution
ultimately resides.
Matter exists in the contradiction between what it is in
itself and what it is for us. This contradiction, too, is over-
come (as every contradiction is overcome) in self-conscious-
ness, consciousness turning back upon itself. Matter imitates
consciousness in this by returning to itself as lightwhich is
72
Introduction
absolute velocity, matter so immaterfalized as to be pure ex-
tension, "pure transparent possibility." Where space is mere
abstract subsistence or being-unto-itself (ArTsichseyn), and
temporal duration is abstract being-for-itself [Fuisichseyn],
light is existent being-within-itself [daseyendes in sich seyn).
As such, light is pure existence; it is the power of universal
reality to extend outside and beyond itself (ausser sich zu
seyn).
Although this is a very condensed presentation of Hegel's
account, the reader may at least see in it how he spiritualizes
Nature, even humanizes it. This is yet another way of over-
coming the division between Nature and Spirit, namely, by
showing how Nature resembles and even imitates Spirit. No
doubt the argument is meant to be taken literally, by and
large, yet its justification is merely analogical. A case could be
made for the view that Hegel's entire metaphysical system is
one vast analogy, based on the world's resemblance to the
human Spirit. From this stance it is but a short step to saying
that the natural world is matter trying to become Spiritthe
grandest analogy of all.
If we can literally say that matter returns to itself as light
(that is, without placing quotation marks around the word
"returns"), then this is certainly a dematerialization of mat-
ter. Yet if we see this as analogy, we can see the human (i.e.,
spiritual) truth of it in the Gothic cathedral, whose walls are
pure light. But we are then speaking on the plane of symbol,
not of an articulated philosophy of nature, literally intended.
Once we accept the analogical basis for all this, however,
we open ourselves to a broad range of suggestive possibili-
ties. Thus, for example, the light which is being-within-itself
entails its own potentiality and development. As Hegel says,
it is the word which is as yet without articulationa clear
reference to the opening sentences of the Gospel of John.
With this, the reality of light is its being-as-subject [Subjekt-
seyn), and this involves its dispersion into innumerable
points. It is therefore juxtaposed to matter which is self-en-
closed, incommunicative, in darkness. This is the ma s s -
selfless, indifferentwhose concept is outside itself (mean-
73
Hegel and the Human Spirit
ing that it is not self-moving) and which exists in order to be
negated and overcome.
The absolute fluidity of light is emblematic of fluidity in
generala gravity turned back upon itself, having retreated
from the realm of the partcular and the external. This also has
the opposite significance, Hegel says, of having emerged from
its internality into existence (even though it is supposed to
have returned from existence). Yet the opposition is a merely
seeming one: as representing self-conscious Spirit, light has
necessarily to turn away from particularity to the universal,
from external objects to its own inner self; yet this return is
the very basis for its effulgence.
As we may expect, a hierarchy is set up whereby the vari-
ous terms serve as analogies for stages of spirit: thus magne-
tism is the subjectivity [Subjektseyn] of matter, but it is also
the first dimension of the subject, the line; and from this we
may go on to posit further dimensions (possibly also the
"plane" and "solid") in the process of spiritual evolution.
Thus nature has its expressive geometry, as in crystals,
whereby some higher intent is adumbrated if not made mani-
fest. (One thinks here of the crystal experiment at the begin-
ning of Thomas Mann's Doctor Faustus.) This is not some-
thing external to nature, but is rather nature'sown life-principle,
as Hegel says. He does warn us against interpreting this liter-
ally, as though the earth's magnetism involves an actual iron
bar going from pole to pole. It is precisely this warning against
a thoroughgoing literalness that opens the possibility of a phi-
losophy of Nature, rather than a descriptive depiction of na-
ture at the primary level.
Underlying all movement is the concept of process. This
can be seen in very narrow terms, but also more generally as
the individualization of the universal and the universalizing
of the particular. "Process" is therefore a term for mediation
of all kinds. It is a totality wherein no differentiation is inde-
pendent. There are self-limiting processes, burning them-
selves out in time. There also are processes of mutual inter-
penetration, wherein the identity of individual components is
74
Introduction
lost. (Thus, water's oxygen and hydrcTgen can be differentiated
chemically but not mechanically.)
Earth, air, fire, water, light, oxygen, hyxkogen, nitrogen,
carbonall are treated emblematically in Hegel's discussion.
They represent certain modes of process and transformation,
accretion and dissolution. Once again, the paradigm of all
process is extension and self-return, differentiation and its
resolutionnamely, the very process that is characteristic of
the activity of Spirit.
We encounter sentences such as the following: "The sun is
the pure force which maintains itself as pure force, lacking all
reality in its existence, remaining the simple perception, pure
general presence or essence. . . . The sun is the pure negation
[Aufgehobenseyn] of the earth's moments according to their
general absolute indifference, or pure substance." These sen-
tences cannot be accepted as literally true. We see, therefore,
that Nature is given a ritual function; the cosmos is seen as a
speculum mentisMind, or Spirit, being read into Nature.
Thus there is nothing neutral in Nature: all its processes in-
volve phases such as division and negation, identity and
othernessand these are terms brought over from human
experience.
Our relation to Nature, then, is not passive. Rather, we
interpret Nature in terms of the general categories of our ex-
perience, yet in such a way that Nature is not dissolved in
materiality, reduced to the neutrality where matter and mind
are no longer distinct. Nature and Experience (or Spirit) inter-
penetrate, to be sure, yet the dichotomy between them is
maintained and even heightened.
In general, the aim of science has been to neutralize nature:
everything is analyzed into the elemental, and all that is hu-
manly experiential or evaluative is filtered out. hi Hegel's
philosophy of Nature, on the other hand, we find precisely
this human signification reintroduced. Fluidity and tempera-
ture, for example, are no longer abstract states; they are bur-
dened with a human meaning. We might criticize all this as
animistic. The point is, however, that as philosophy, Hegel's
75
Hegel and the Human Spirit
presentation addresses itself to the problematic relation be-
tween Nature and Spirit. The fact that in the modem scien-
tific attitude the element of Spirit is neutralized does nothing
to resolve the problem; it only avoids it. Thus what Hegel is
aiming at is unity without reduction. If there can be a concep-
tual union of the mechanical and the chemical, then there
should be such a possibility with regard to the natural and the
mental (or spiritual), matter and light (as pure self). The ques-
tion which remains open is whether Hegel's analogical unity
is the most viable one.
From this point, Hegel goes on to discuss the organic
realm, without, however, adequately illuminating the connec-
tion between the chemical and the biological. Rather, there is
a passage devoted to the mysticism of light, reminiscent of
Roger Bacon. In it, light is described as the general presence
and reality, penetrating all aspects of the physical body. This
is now a living body, although it is not yet endowed with a
soul. Light is a general "self" which is not yet this individual
self. Its parts are independent, yet purposively united in a
whole. Individual bodies still have part of their essence out-
side them: the organic is in the process of becoming, as the
physical body emerges out of its primordial unity of mass and
temperature, from generality to individuality. The body is not
passive in all this
;
rather, it is itself the agent in its evolution,
a self which is the force of its own negation and process. In
any case it becomes the self it already is: "The beginning is
the same as the end/'
Inorganic naturesun, earth, air, and seagives rise to a
process in which the chemical aspect has lost its significance
as absolute, as a living process on the verge of expressing
itself in forms of life. There is even a suggestion that con-
sciousness is the "rational" part of earth. We find that in
inorganic nature its concept is immediate to it, an immanent
purpose which is the universal, whereby it becomes an indi-
vidual thing. The universal purpose coagulates, as it were,
into particularity. Each particular is a totality reflected into
itself, so that its very existence involves a process of becom-
ing itself. Life is essentially this flowing penetration of all
76
Introduction
particulars; the totality is the universal substance comprising
its particular parts. Their particularity is transcended in the
becoming of the universal purpose. The rJrtic'ess is circular,
therefore: a movement from the unity of the universal, out-
ward into its particular opposites, and back into itself, to con-
stitute a reality which is the power governing the individual.
The organic process is the mediation between inorganic
nature and the species, the unity of individuality and univer-
sality. The organic thereby resembles self-consciousness in
occupying this positionand indeed, Hegel says (cryptically)
that the organic is the self. In the transition from the inor-
ganic to the organic, the chemical/physical aspect finds its
limit, since this is where inorganic substance is assimilated
and transformed into organic. Finally, the organic process is
one of individuation where selfhood is arrived at, as the ulti-
mate stage. The individual has, so to speak, torn loose from
the species, yet the individual rises to fulfill the species.
In the plant world, individuality is still immanent, not re-
turned into itself in such a way that there would be a sense of
selfhood. The idea of life without consciousness has its mysti-
cal aspect. The mysticism of light enters here, since the pro-
cess of photosynthesis converts sunlight into protoplasm,
spirit into matter (an Incarnation?). For Hegel, the mystical
aspect is also in the plant's gradual extension as it prolifer-
ates; space is then equated with lifethe seed put into the
ground to release its secret powers. Yet its "selfhood" is light.
Light is the primary element for it, notably in the way the
plant turns toward the light, like one person seeking another.
The animal, on the other hand, is an individual, separating
itself from the earth as something external to it. It is capable
of free, arbitrary movement; it relates to others as individual;
it exists for itselfwhile, in contrast, the plant organism is
selfless. The animal is capable of self-negation, as it takes the
steps to promote its own growth and transcendence.
The concept of the animal organism contains three aspects:
universal nature, as embodied in the physical elements; the
negativity of the self, expressed in a freedom of form; and the
union of the two in the individual. These three aspects corre-
77
Hegel and the Human Spirit
spond to the categories of the universal, particular, and singu-
lar, standing to one another in the relation of thesis, antithe-
sis, and synthesis (although Hegel does not here state this
explicitly).
These aspects are elaborated in a bewilderingly complex
discussion of the heart, liver, lungs, lymph, blood, digestion,
reproduction, and so forth. It would be possible, I suppose, to
regard each of these as playing a symbolic emblematic role in
the broader Hegelian scheme. But that would be too simple,
and not at all Hegelian. The challenge, rather, is to deal with
these things on their immediate level, and to derive the sense
of the whole from within the abundance of detail itself, while
yet holding in mind the emblematic character of this detail.
For example, the animal reaches out to something because
it lacks it; when its desire is met, it turns back to itself. This
could be seen as a foreshadowing of a similar process on a
higher and far more significant level: the development of self-
hood in the return of self-consciousness to itself; and this
return is itself, an adumbration of the return of the World-
Spirit to itself in the self-consciousness of a culture.
Yet Hegel's philosophy of Nature is not meant to operate
on the plane of the symbolic surrogate. Rather, the world
reveals its meaning at its own level, and this is a meaning
which is then seen to infuse the whole, Nature and Spirit.
Obviously, there are many questions to be asked in connec-
tion with Hegel's viewstoo many to be considered here, let
alone resolved. I shall raise only two questions: 1) Has Hegel
demonstrated the connection between Nature and Spirit? 2) Is
his mode of argument acceptable? Clearly, the two questions
bear on one another.
1. He has tried to show not only how Nature and Spirit
share certain aspects, but also how they are mortised. That
direct connection, I suggest, is absolutely essential to estab-
lishing the continuity of his system, yet it remains the weak-
est link in his argument. He goes directly from the chemical
to the organic, as if this were merely a step from chemistry to
biology, or from inorganic to organic chemistry. We are not
78
Introduction
even certain that there is no category mistake committed
here. The link between Nature and Spirit must be argued for.
Yet the argument is only indirect and anaiegical, with more
assumed than proven.
He must keep the two realms distincteven as they are
shown to be connected. A counterexample to that distinct-
ness would be provided by the reduction of a spiritual entity
to a natural one. This problem is still the object of concern
and debate, and in the absence of a universally accepted solu-
tion, Hegel's presentation has some weight. Nature and Spirit
are distinct if the one is irreducible to the otherand this
seems to be the view held by Hegel, even if he^seeks some
common basis shared by both.
He is not a Romantic, since that view is simplistic. He does
not seek God in everything. On the other hand, he cannot be
content with the utter distinctness of Nature and Spirit, since
this would deny the overarching meaning for which he is
searching. Indeed, he also seeks to demonstrate the identity of
Nature and Spirit, despite their distinctness, and even to
show that the difference between identity and difference is no
difference at all. As a way of overcoming difference, panthe-
ism fails,- but we can overcome pantheism if difference itself
is overcome, resolved at a higher level. I suggest that his is as
good an explanation as any: it is the Aristotelian view which
sees the final cause as the first cause; for Hegel, this means
that the end of self-conscious Spirit is implicit in the entire
development from the beginning.
2. Hegel's mode of argument is, however, highly question-
able, even if it is suggestive and insightful. In defense of the
questionable aspects, we can point out that (at least for us,
today) his argument is heuristic rather than substantive. That
is, it helps us to ask questions, not to answer them. Yet we
may wonder whether Hegel does not cominit a heuristic im-
modesty, whether he is not guilty of explanatory overkill in
trying to reconcile Nature and Spirit. The mind/body problem
still stands in need of a solution, but can we say the same
about the Nature/Spirit problem? Or ought we to say that the
latter is a genuine and all-embracing problem, of which the
79
Hegel and the Human Spirit
mind/body problem is a subissue? The temptation is to say
(with the Logical Positivists) that if the Nature/Spirit problem
is susceptible of "solutions" such as Hegel's, then it ought
not to be entertained as a problem at all.
We have learned, however, that problems do not get solved
by being "dissolved" or dismissed. Indeed, in my view it is part
of the proper philosophic attitude to cast our nets as broadly as
possible, and to see problems where most people would not see
them. Nature is there, and so is Spirit (in the form of thoughts,
political values, cultural phenomena, etc.). The path of reduc-
tion has, I believe, failed. We therefore have the choice of re-
garding the two areas as utterly distinct and unrelateda view
which is impossible to maintain warrantably, since human life
is immediately immersed in bothor we can admit that we are
faced with the problem of reconciling the twoand although
this is difficult, it is not impossible.
In Hegel's reconciliation, there is perhaps too much that is
intuitive and mystical. Further, too much of the section on
Nature is now factually outdated. Yet with all this, it is an
immensely interesting attempt at constructing a philosophic
view of nature: a Naturphilosophie.
"The beginning is the same as the end." In order to under-
stand the process we must therefore look to its goal, which is
the development of Spirit in the world. And it is to his phi-
losophy of Spirit that we now turn.
r
Introduction
Selected Readings
Shlomo Avineri. Hegel's Theory of the Modern State. Cambridge, 1974.
John N. Findlay. Hegel: A Re-examination. New York, 1976.
Jiirgen Habermas. Theory and Practice. Boston, 1973.
H. S. Harris. Hegel's Development: Toward the Sunlight. Oxford, 1972.
Georg Lukacs. The Young Hegel. Cambridge, Mass., 1975.
Herbert Marcuse. Reason and Revolution. Boston, 1960.
Charles Taylor. Hegel. Cambridge, 1975.
81
THE PHILOSOPHY
OF SPIRIT
(1805-6)
G . W E HEGEL
HEGEL
and the
H UMAN
SPIRIT
B]B]E)B]B]E]B]E]B]E]B]B]E]B]B]B]BJB]B] |
A translation of
the lena Lectures
on the Philosophy
of Spirit (18O5-6)
with commentary
by
LEO RAUCH
PART I
Spirit According
to Its Concept
Wayne State University Press Detroit 1983
A. Intelligence
In Spirit, the subsistence of an objectits
spaceis Being. Being is the abstract, pure concept of subsis-
tence. I and the thing are in space.
1
Space is posited as essen-
tially distinct from its content. It is not the essence of its
fulfillment itself. It is only a formal universal which is sepa-
rate from its particular. The subsistence of Spirit, however, is
truly universal; it contains the particular itself. The thing is.
It is not in Being [as content is in space]; rather it itself is.
That, in immediate form, is the essence of intuition [An-
schauung): knowing some being (Seyenden). Spirit, however,
is this mediated with itself. Spirit is what it is only in tran-
scending what it is immediately, stepping back from it. In
other words, we are to consider the movement in Spirit, i.e.,
how a being becomes universal for it,
2
or how it makes a
being universal, positing it as what it is. Being is the form of
immediacy, but Being should be posited in its truth.
(a) Spirit is immediate, as generally intuiting, so that a be-
1
Attention [is] in general the selection of a single point, differentiation fox
Spirit.
2
how it posits the thing
85
The Philosophy of Spirit
ing is for it. But it comes back out of this immediacy, returns
into itself, is for itself. It posits itself [as] free of this immedi-
acy, distancing itself from it at first; it is like an animal, it is
time, which is for itself, and [it is] the freedom of time as
wellthis pure subject that is free of its content but also
master of it, unlike space and time which are selfless.
Spirit (Geist) [i.e., mind] starts from this Being and [then]
posits it within itself as something that is a not-being, as
something in general sublated [aufgehobnes). In so doing,
Spirit [mind] is the representational power of imagination
(vorstellende Einbildungskraft) as such. It is the Self against
itself. At first, Spirit itself is intuition; it places itself in oppo-
sition to this Self. The object [i.e. the external thing] is not its
object now, but rather its own intuition, i.e., the content of
the perception as its own [content]. When I look at something
[Im Anschauen), what I look at is in mefor it is I, after all,
who look at it; it is my looking.
3
Spirit steps out of this
looking, and looks at its lookingi.e., it looks at the object as
its own, at the object [now] canceled as a being [and taken as]
image. In the looking, Spirit is the image. For it, insofar as it
is consciousness, [the object] is a being that is severed from
the I. For us, however, it is the unity of both [i.e., its indepen-
dent being and the I]. It becomes clear to Spirit that it [i.e.,
Spirit itself] is in and for itself [an und fur sich)but to begin
with, in the looking, Spirit is only in itself. It complements
this [being-in-itself] with the for-itself, with negativity, sepa-
ration from the in-itself, and goes back into itself. It takes its
first self as an object, i.e., the image, Being as mine, as ne-
gated [als aufgehobnes).
This image
4
belongs to Spirit.
5
Spirit is in possession of the
image, is master of it. It is stored in the Spirit's treasury, in its
'Like the animal, Spirit is in itself arbitrary movement, freedom, the Self
of time and space, arbitrarily positing content here or there in space and time.
Time and space are the external relation. Spirit cancels this external relation
as jmere] form. The Being [Seyn] actually belongs to the I as such, not (to)
space and time.
4
Night of Retention
3
to its simple self, but what is simple contains no difference; thus here too
it is in Spirit as undifferentiated
86
I. Spirit According to Its Concept
Night. The image is unconscious, i7e." it is not displayed as an
object for representation. The human being is this Night, this
empty nothing which contains everything inits simplicitya
wealth of infinitely many representations, images, none of
which occur to it directly, and none of which are not present.
This [is] the Night, the interior of [human] nature, existing
herepure Self[and] in phantasmagoric representations it
is night everywhere: here a bloody head suddenly shoots up
and there another white shape, only to disappear as suddenly.
We see this Night when we look a human being in the eye,
looking into a Night which turns terrifying. [For from his
eyes] the night of the world hangs out toward us.
Into this Night
6
the being has returned. Yet the movement
of this power
7
is posited likewise.
The image is many-sided, its form as its determinacyand
this leads to other determinations and to multiplicity in gen-
eral. The I is the form, not only as simple self but also as
movement, the relation of parts of the imagepositing the
form, the relation, as its own. Insofar as it comprises a part of
the content it transforms it.
8
[The I] for itself is here free
arbitrariness[able] to dismember images and to reconnect
them in the most dissociated manner. If the self, in its draw-
ing forth of images, allows itself to go nearer the passive rela-
tion, then it is under the domination of the so-called associa-
tion of ideasan English phrase referring, even today, to the
mere image (e.g., of a dog), an idea. The laws of this associa-
tion of ideas refer to nothing more than the passive ordering
of representation (e.g., if two things are usually seen together
they tend to be reproduced together, and so on). This arbitrari-
ness is empty freedom, for its content is [merely] sequential,
merely formal, and concerns form alone.
(b) The object has thereby received form in general, the
determination of being mine. And in being looked at again, its
being no longer has this pure signification of being [as such],
6
self-positing, internal consciousness, activity, division
7
the power to draw images out of this Night or to let them fall away
8
an altogether different movement from that of space and time, subsisting
freely before this existing movement
87
The Philosophy of Spirit
but of [being] mine: e.g., it is familiar to me, or I remind
myself of it, or immediately in it I have the consciousness of
myself. In the immediate intuition (I had] only the conscious-
ness of it; but if it is familiar it takes on for me this express
determination. We are also reminded of something through
something else
;
merely the image of the object is brought in
upon us; remembering adds the element of being-for-self
(Fiirsichseyn). I have already seen
9
or heard it; I remind myself
of it; I do not merely see or hear the object, but I thereby go
into my inner selfI remind \erinnere: literally, "re-internal-
ize"] myself, taking myself out of the mere image, and placing
myself into myself. I then "place" [or: posit] myself vis-a-vis
the object in a special way.
(c) This being-for-me, which I add to the object, is that
Night, that Self, in which I immersed the objectthe object
which is now brought forth and is an object for me. And what
is before me [now] is a synthesis of both:
10
content and /. Yet
the external object itself was negated [aufgehoben] in that
very synthesis, and has become something other than it is. It
has come under the domination of the Self, and has lost the
significance of being immediate and independent. Not only
has a synthesis occurred, but the being of the object has been
negated (aufgehoben).
The point, therefore, is that the object is not what it is. Its
content is not free of its being; its being is Self. Its content is
its simple essence as such, [but] this is something'other than
its being. As a totality, it counts as different, has a different
essence; the Self has a different meaning, or counts as a sign.
In the sign, it is the being-for-self (as the essence of the object)
that is the object, and it is negated according to its totality, its
content. Its content no longer has its own free value. Its being
is the I itselfIdealism, become its own object. [According to
this view:] the thing is not what it is. Its being is the Self. My
being-for-self is [now] the object as the essence of the thing,
connected in memory only synthetically, externally. Here the
v
its being-for-me is superficially tied to intuition
l0
Its being is as this being-for-me, determinate inwardness.
88
I. Spirit According to Its Concept
I, as the inner [aspect] of the thing,~fs
M
itself the object. As yet
this inwardness of the thing is separated from its being; the
universal [i.e., the thing qua thing], is not yet-posited.
This fact
11
that I look at the thing as a mere sign, yet at
its essence as I, as meaning, as reflection in itselfthis itself
is [my] object. Only then is it merely immediate inwardness;
it must also enter into existence (Daseyn), become an object,
so that on the contrary this inwardness is made externala
return to being [Seyn).
This is language, as the name-giving power.
12
The power of
imagination provides only the empty form,- [it is] the designa-
tive power positing the form as internal. Language, on the
other hand, posits the internal as being (seyendes). This, then,
is the true being of spirit as that of spirit as such. It is there as
the unity of two free Selves [i.e., imagination and language]
and [as] an entity (Daseyn) that is adequate to its concept. At
the same time it immediately negates itselffading, yet per-
ceived. Above all, language speaks only with this Self, with
the meaning of the thing; it gives it a name and expresses this
as the being of the object.
[We might ask, for example,] What is this? We answer, It is
a lion, a donkey, etc.[namely] it is. Thus it is not merely
something yellow, having feet, etc., something on its own,
[existing] independently. Rather, it is a name, a sound made
by my voice, something entirely different from what it is in
being looked atand this [as named] is its true being. [We
might say:] This is only its name, the thing itself is some-
thing different; but then we fall back onto the sensory repre-
sentation. Or [we might say:] It is only a name, in a higher
sense, since to begin with, the name is itself only the very
superficial spiritual being. By means of the name, however,
the object has been born out of the I [and has emerged] as
being (seyend). This is the primal creativity exercised by
Spirit. Adam gave a name to all things. This is the sovereign
right [of Spirit], its primal taking-possession of all natureor
the creation of nature out of Spirit [itself].
1
'Inwardness which is itself there.
1
Memory, creativity
89
The Philosophy of Spirit
(Consider] Logos, reason, the essence of the thing and of
speech, of object [Sache) and talk (Sage), the category[in
respect to all of these,] man speaks to the thing as his.
13
And
this is the being of the object. Spirit relates itself to itself: it,
says to the donkey, You are an inner [subjective] entity, and
that Inner is I; your being is a sound which I have arbitrarily
invented. The sound, "donkey," is altogether different from
the sensate entity. Insofar as we see it, and also feel or hear it,
we are that entity itself, immediately one with it and ful-
filled. Coming back as a name, however, it is something spiri-
tual, altogether different.
[In this light] the world, nature, is no longer a realm of im-
ages internally suspended (aufgehoben), having no being.
Rather, it is a realm of names. The realm of images is the
dreaming spirit, concerned with a content lacking all reality,
all existence. Its awakening is the realm of names. Here we
have a division: Spirit is [only] as consciousness; only now do
its images have truth. The dreamer believes this as well, but it
is not truethe dreamer cannot distinguish himself from the
one awake, while the one awake can distinguish himself from
the one who is dreaming, in that what is so for him is true. "It
is true" [means] it is no longer merely one's being-for-self that
is there, the object [as] images. Rather, the enclosed being-
for-self at the same time has the form of being: it is.
In names,
14
we actually first overcome the looking (An-
schauen), the animal [physiological] aspect, as well as space
and time. The looked-at [object] is evanescent; its totality is
like a simple atmosphere, an aroma,
15
simple individuality,
raised out of feeling into a higher spiritual sense. Individual-
ity,
16
actuality as suchbut it is as yet primal, without its
own content, immediate. The name has yet another meaning
than what it is.
17
The object, in the sign, has another meaning
l3
and lives in a spiritual Nature, in his world [of Spirit)
14
the boundary altogether taken back into itself, cut off
is
as in the meaning of feeling and warmth; being and sign [as] negated
being
l6
thus aroma [is] primal actuality and therefore particularity
l7
The other meaning rests in the fact that the name is the as yet undevel-
oped particularity in itself. It is this, the being of the image; it is in its
90
I. Spirit According to Its Concept
than what it isthe inner. The meaning of a name, on the
other hand, is the sensate being. Its content must become
equal to its simple existent spirituality. --*^
\ The Spirit goes back into itself from this being of the
namethat is, its name-giving is an object for it as a realm, a
' multitude of names. They are simple, enclosed in themselves.
The many-sidedness of the image is enveloped and suppressed
in this Self. The power of imagination takes the object (with
its many-sidedness) out of its immediate environment.
18
Yet
the name is solitary, without relation of tie. [Names com-
prise] a series which is not self-supporting, since the name has
no determinacy in it, no intrinsic relation to something else.
19
The I is all alone the bearer, the space and substance of
these names. It is their order, their interrelation of complete
mutual indifference. In themselves they have no rank "or rela-
tion. Thus the I must now look at itself as ordering this, or
look at them as ordered and maintaining this order, so that it
is permanent.
The I is first of all in possession of names; it must preserve
them in its Nightas serviceable, obedient to the I. Not only
must it regard names in general, it must also look at them in
its space as a fixed orderfor this is their interrelation and
necessity, the intrinsic relation of many different names. It is
determinacy (unity with its opposite, gone back into particularity). Determi-
nacy (is) the incomplete union of being and being-for-self.
18
cutting out a piece of space, interrupting, negating the continuity of
spaceyet there is the association of ideas cutting across boundaries
19
(a) The I stands juxtaposed to the multiplicity of namestheir content,
as particular, is foreign to it, but their determinacy is the I and their particu-
larity is simple.
(b) Juxtaposed to the names is the I, their simplicity, their essence. They
are related to one another by means of the I, their essence. The I alone is the
necessity, which in itself is its own contrary. Names, moreover, have the I as
their being, since they are simple.
(c) How does this become the necessity of names, their fixity/so that the I
becomes their being, or so that the I which is their essence becomes their
beingl For being is what is fixed, objective, while the I is the form of pure
unrest, movement, the Night in which all disappears. In other words, the I
had its immediate being [universal) in the name. Now through mediation it
must become it through itself. Its unrest must become the self-fixation, as
unrest, as pure movement transcending movement. This is labor. Its unrest
-becomes object, as fixed multiplicity, as order. The unrest becomes order by
the very fact of becoming object.
91
The Philosophy of Spirit
up to the I to create their content out of itself. Its content
consists of undifferentiated (gleichgultigen) names; but in
their indifference as a multitude, the Self, as something nega-
tive, is not as it truly is. The negative element, in the multi-
tude of names, is the independent relation of each to the
other. This relation is ascribed to the names as such; the I
holds them fixed in necessity
20
a necessity not yet ascribed
to them but only that of a fixed order.
Or it is actual memory, having itself still in its object, as
understanding which has an object. Memory preserves the
name in general, the free and arbitrary connection of this
image (or meaning) and a name, so that the image evokes the
name, and the name the image. But on a higher level the
relation is freed of this inequality, so that a name is related
only to another name [or sound)e.g., the words "lightning/'
"thunder" [Blitz, Donner), in their [phonetic] similarity to the
empirical phenomenonbut free names are not interrelated.
The I is the force of this free order
21
an order not yet posited
as necessary, although it is an order [nevertheless).
The I is the free bearer, the free nonobjective orderit is
the first I to grasp itself as force. It itself is necessity, free of
representation, the fixing and fixed order. The exercise of
memory is therefore the first work of the awakened spirit qua
spirit.
22
The inventing and bestowing of names is a creative^
arbitrariness. In memory this arbitrariness is what disappears
firstthe I has come into being. The name is [now] a fixed
sign, a permanent relation, universal. The I has [thus] sur-
rendered its arbitrariness in its being, positing itself as univer-
sal. Therefore order, here, is necessary relation as such. Yet
this itself is as yet an inner or contingent orderan arbitrary
necessity [as it were]for its aspects are not yet posited, are
^ n the name, the I is immediate particularity; self-positing as such
makes it a necessity, albeit an empty necessityas when we speak of destiny
without knowing what its law is, its content, (orj what it wants.
2
'Suppression of arbitrariness, empty particularity. In the name, it [the IJ
has heretofore been particularity in itself; now [it is) bound to no material
which it can go beyond. Thus it remains in itself, opposed to material as well
as to sensory consciousness in this emptinessempty self as self.
"Immediate transcendence of itself, directed to itself.
92
T
I. Spirit According to Its Concept
not yet in themselves. It is merely-a "necessity in general, i.e.,
contingent.
Now this holding on to such a relatiotuoi the name or
names is the immaterial movement and occupation of Spirit
with itself. It no longer connects sensory existing representa-
tions together arbitrarily, merely reproducing them as they
are.
23
Rather, it is a free force and maintains itself as this free
force, At the same time, its work is such that the I makes
itself into what it is in name-giving, namely a thing, a being
[seyendes]} it is of the names, and it is a thing. The I makes
itself into a thing, in that it fixes the order of names within
itself. It fixes them within itself, i.e., it makes itself into this
unthinking order, which has the mere appearance of order. In
the appearance of order there lies the Inecessity, the Self
with its aspects. But these aspects are as yet purely indiffer-
ent. Only as memory can the I make itself into a thing, be-
cause the thing into which it makes itself is in itself I.
24
It is
now the active I, the movement making itself into that object
which (in naming) it immediately is. The for-itself of recollec-
tion is here its activity [turned] to itselfbringing forth itself,
negating [negiren] itself. If the name is seen as the object
about which the I is active, then the I annuls itself (hebt sich
auf). . .
This work is therefore the primary inner effect upon itself,
an altogether unsensory occupation and the beginning of the
free elevation of the Spirit, for here it has itself as objecta
far higher work than the childish occupation with external,
sensory or painted pictures (plants, animals with a big snout,
yellow mane, long tail, etc.). This [concern with] seeing
1
, at-
tention,' is the primary necessary activity[concern with] see-
"passive connectionor altogether arbitrary
24
This work is repetition of the same; therein lies the irony. The I re-
nounces its free arbitrariness, [and thereby] transcends the determinate. Repe-
tition is the positing of equality of being [in a thing and its repetition],
holding to itself as same. It is repetition of something familiar, where there is
no further interest in the thing, no enjoyment at finding itself in the other. [It
does not involve going beyond itself, as in] name-giving, [and is] therefore a
purely unsensory activity. It is the retention of abstraction, fixing itself as
empty space and stars, pure fixation, (a) Pure, liberated activity, repetition,- (b)
without objectivitythe elements to be secured are as yet indifferent.
93
The Philosophy of Spirit
ing precisely, with the activity of Spirit, fixing, abstracting,
extracting, exertion, and overcoming of what is indeterminate
in sensation. Yet this activity is not directed at itself.
25 w
[In] this concern with itself, [the I has the aim of] producing
itself [sich hervoizubringen)the reverse of that [process)
which makes a thing into the I. Holding to an order is the I's
thinking its own content. The content is not due to the name
which the I sees as its own. Rather, it is due to the form,
orderbut as a fixed, arbitrary, contingent [order], it is exter-
nality, thingness. I know something by heart[this means
that] I have made myself into an indifferent order. I am order,
relation, activitybut this order is arbitrary. The I is thereby
made into a thing.
2s
(a) Naming: the universal feature of this sphere, (b) Activity, being-for-
self, memory: inner effectiveness, (c) Being-in-and-for-itself: the I reflects on
its activity, i.e., reflects itself from it and makes its activity its object. The
immediate product is that we know something by heart, but not yet in-
wardly. The I is beingan altogether incomplete, external product. The to-
tality is the fixed relation, posited by the I, and it is fixed because of the
same. This relation is necessity: memory (Gedachtnis) is the becoming of
thoughts [Gedanken), the becoming of an unsensory object; i.e. (a), one which
is no longer an image, and (b) one in which the name's particularity is sup-
pressed. The work, one's own activity, is particularity, as ordering is the Self.
The I is objective to itself as multiplicity, because its activity is movement,
differentiation. It itself is the order, and the order of differences which are its
own and which remain enclosed in iti.e., thing, elements (which are so in
themselves or for us). All this is thoughtful looking or perceptive thought
[denkendes Anschauen oder anschauendes Denken). Brought forth through
its work are not indifferent names for things, but rather elements (of the
things|, a partition within that activity itself. This product is its object, and is
also immediate to it. It is conceptual understanding, an understanding neces-
sity, explanation, a search for the cause of an effect. The sensory is deter-
mined as effect, etc.it is for the I what it was for us in its name. The
essence of a thing, for the I, is something other than it is. It is merely a sign,
but its meaning is not accidental; rather, it is its essence because it is univer-
sal. The I looks at the categoryit conceives what it understands is the thing
itself, not because it understands or because it is the form of selfhood. Rather,
it is because it understands the thing itself; the content of the thing is
thereby doubled.
Understanding: (a) the relation of opposed concepts; (b) their unity,
ground. They have their substance in Being. Ground is sublated Being.
(a) Distribution. Our object is the thing; the I is the Self; substance is the
unity of opposed determinations which it distributes among many substrates,
(b) In the thought of the substance, the thing itself becomes this Self. Sub-
stance and accidental propertyunited in cause and effect, [as] spiritualized
things. But their essence is spiritualization. Activitythe mere form of inde-
pendence |isj the causeis absorbed \geht zu Grunde: literally, "perishes") in
the product.
94
I. Spirit According to Its Concept
This directedness to the name thue-has the opposite signifi-
cance: namely, that the directedness to the I, with the nega-
tiori~of the name as a being-for-itself, is posi$e4 as arbitrary,
active. What is posited is the universalitywith equal value
and equal elevation (aufgehobenseyn) given to the active I and
the object: namely, the I has become the object. In the name
it has only become a being, as opposed to being-for-itself; so
that the name is as yet arbitrary, particular.
Thing, understanding, necessity: the thing as simple uni-
versality, necessity as self-movement. The thing has a neces-
sity to it, since it has the I's selfhood to it. A difference in the
thing is a difference in the Self; i.e., it is a negative relation to
itself. Understanding, insight is the difference, not in the
thing but rather of the thing vis-a-vis the understanding. Ac-
tually it is not the understanding which belongs here, but
rather the experience of consciousness
26
[i.e., a phenomenol-
ogy of spirit].
Thus the I is active in connection with the thing or with
universality as such, i.e., the movement of the universal is
posited. The difference between the two [I and the thing] is
that the I is differentiated from itselfit is the universal to
16
Understanding, judgment, conclusion: first of all, the understanding is
related to the thing, so that the thing's form of being is present to the under-
standing. One, many, cause, etc.relation of form as that of different opposed
spiritual entities. Abstraction, or the concept, has its substance in being.
Concepts enter in only in the relation. The thing is not yet in itself the
quiescent, the unity of opposed determinations. Yet these spiritualized deter-
minations are absorbed (gehen zu Grunde) in simple neutrality, in universal-
ity which becomes the ground. Now, for the I, the ground is the universal as
such; it knows itself to be the understanding; it speaks of determinate con-
cepts as its own. Secondly, therefore, the understanding judges, it is the
movement of the determinate concept. Particularity and universality are dif-
ferent and opposed.
Conclusion: (a) At first sight, these two (i.e. the particularity of the indi-
vidual psychic act, and the universality of its content] are the same only in a
third element. The copula is the /, which supports themit is, above all,
emptiness. But how is this third thing constituted? (b) It is not the pure
copula, A = A, empty identity. Some believe it to be the absolute, or it would
not be the identity of the two. (c) Rather, it contains the twothe I is their
identity as well as their opposition, (d) They are the same (as entities), and
each is identical to the other precisely in the respect in which the one is
opposed to the other, and opposed in the respect in which the one is identical
to the other. Difference and identity are the same. What remains to them is
the empty form of being, which they have long since lost.
95
The Philasaphy c> f Spirit
which it is opposed as the negativity which it itself contains.
This negativity itself, in the form of universality, is particu-
larity. Both [subject and object] are completely indifferent to
one another, since each is the universal, i.e., each is the rela-
tion of itself to itself.
These extreme (poles), however, are at the same time sim-
ply related to one another: identical to one another in their
indifference or universality, each related to itself but also for
the othersince each itself is what it is only in opposition to
the other. The ground [of everything) has come to be through
this movement, enveloping the universal within it in its sim-
plicityonly as negativityand concealing it. The particu-
lar, on the other hand, as the negative, is negative in exclud-
ing the other, the not-negative, the universal. Both relate to
themselves and are thus universal, yet at the same time only
one of them is the Universal. Each is the negative of the
other, yet only one of them is the Negative. The one (the
particular) is inwardly universal in its relation to itselfto
itself, since it excludes the other and its external being, and is
negative toward this other. The other (the universal), how-
ever, is internally negative; it contains the negativity in itself
but is universal outwardly.
27
Each thereby has externally what it is internally, as has the
other. In other words, the in-itself of each, that which it is not
for the other, this is the other; it is that which is for it. Each
is its own contrary, both are themselves this movement: this
being-other, yet being self-related; relation, too, is the con-
trary of their equivalence (Gleichgiiltigkeit) which they have
in judgment.
The inward being of each is differentiated from its outward
being. They are thus divided in themselves, self-negating [sich
aufhebende). That inward being is in and for itself. But this
too (e.g., negativity, universality) is its other. Thus the univer-
27
Memory is the positing of necessity in general, (a) The concept [is| under- ^
standing of what is necessary in opposites only. The ground is the I, thus /
positing itself in judgment, (b) Judgment (isj the positing of the equivalence of
both, nonrelatedness, as determined concepts, (c) The conclusion is the unity
of both, so that each is itself this unity of opposition and equivalence.
96
I. Spirit According to Its Concept
sal is self-identical. Thus it is negativity, since this is its
inner. Just as it is particularity, it is also universality, the
contrary, nonidentity. Its true being is its outward being, i.e.,
only in its relation, not in and for itself. At the same time, the
universality of either side [outer and inner] thereby has the
significance of being. The two sides are so identical to one
another that here too what they are in themselves falls apart
into two equivalent aspects. The universality as such is only
the one; being, however, is the reality itself, subsistence as
multiplicity.
, Both are therefore universal, and only one is the Universal.
They are beings (seyende), and yet they are not identical in this
being [Seyn)\ the one sort of being is the inner, the in-itself of
the other, and they are negative. Their unity is itself something
other than both extremities, since they are opposed to one
another; yet their juxtaposition is such that precisely in that
respect wherein they are juxtaposed they are identicaland
again, in such a way that their juxtaposition is something other
than their self-identity. Yet precisely in their unity and their
mutual opposition they are related to one another; and in that
both are other than this unity, this otherness is their middle
term which relates them. The conclusion is therefore posited:
insofar as the two extremes are opposed they are one in some
third element; and insofar as they are identical, it is precisely
their opposition, that which divides them [das sie dirimi-
rende), that is the [unifying] third element.
This third element, however, is such that it is everything
the other two are. It is universality, negativityand since
there is more than one universal, it is their being. Universal-
ity is such that it is immediately identical with itself and is
opposed to itself, divided into itself and its contrary. The
same is true for negativity. And simple being is immediate
multiplicity. It is the unity of contrariesthe self-moving
universal that divides itself into beings which are that unify-
ing thirdand is thereby the pure negativity. The understand-
ing is reason, and its object is the I itself.
28
28
(i.e., so that the particularity which is the content of language becomes a
purely negative particularity; it becomes object as such)
97
The Philosophy of Spirit
The main point is that the thinghood, insofar as it is uni-
versality, at the same time presents itself immediately as be-
ing, and the negativity or unity is thereby posited. Thinghood,
represented as being, comes to its conclusion by way of
judgment.
29
Their relation, by means of the contrary, is some-
thing other, the third element. Yet each is mediated with the
other by means of this third element: the particular, in its
self-relation according to its Self, is in itself not there; the
understanding is its in-itself.
30
Likewise, the universal is not
there as negativity. This is its in-itselfand the same goes for
the understanding, since this is the in-itself (das Ansich).
The understanding is (a) the inner side of each; but likewise
it is (b) the outer side of each, since as negativity it is the
external, the existence [Daseyn) of the particular; and as uni-
versal it is the external, the existence of the universal. It is
likewise (c) the beipg {Seyn) of many, containing all that is
[multifarious and mutually] indifferent. Thus it is this pure
movement of universality, which is the in-itself and the exis-
tence that is differentiated from it. The understanding is rea-
son which is its own object. Reason is the inferred conclusion
in its infinitude, dividing itself into extremeseach of which,
insofar as it exists, immediately has its other as its in-itself.
31
In this light, intelligence has no other object for its con-
tent, but having grasped itself it is its own object. The thing,
the universal, is for intelligence as the thing is in itself:
29
(a) These aspects are other than the I, but what is their being! They are
in themselves, for they are other, (b) (They are other as] particular and univer-
sal; but this difference is such that precisely in their difference they are
identical, i.e., they are not, not other than the I.
J0
The movement of pure categories is the becoming of beingbecoming
ground in the form of things. Thus the ground has, as its inner aspect, the
movement of [external] entities. Conversely, in the movement to a conclu-
sion the ground goes towards being, insofar as this movement returns to the
simple nonnegative identity of all its elements; but (this is] totality, reality as
this transparent interplay of all aspects. The contrary (object), the extremes,
are real, in such a way that this constitutes their fulfilled being, i.e., to be
opposed in that which makes them identicalthe rejection of the synony-
mous, and the reverse. Thus being is itself this pure movement. The conclu-
sion is the unity of opposition as such; mediation is itself immediate unity.
3
'Particularity, immediate negative unity of equivalence and opposition
actuality. The I is all actuality.
98
L Spirit According to Its Concept
sublated [negated] being, as positive, as I. Intelligence is ac-
tual (wirklich) the possibility of an effect (Wirken). The ob-
ject is in itself what intelligence is, ancHthis is why the
object can be sublated [aufgehoben)but intelligence has not
yet been active for itself ("for itself" in the sense that the
intelligence has looked upon the transformation as its own,
upon activity as the Selfi.e., the change, its objective mi-
nus, as it itself).
This intelligence is free, yet its freedom is, on the other
hand, without content," at whose cost and loss it has freed it-
self. Its movement is the opposite: to fulfill itselfnot
through passive absorption,
32
but through^ the creation of a
content wherein the intelligence has the consciousness of its
own activity, i.e., as its own positing of content or making
itself its own content. In theoretical knowing, the intelligence -
can as well know in terms of imagery, in memory, knowing
itself, not as content but as form. Thus the I itself is not the
ground [the basis], the universal, upon which the determina-
tions and differentiations of intelligence are presented.
33
B. Will
1
Volition [simply] wills, i.e., it wants to posit itself [assert
itself], make itself, as itself, its own object. It is free, but this
freedom is the empty, the formalthe evil. It is in itself de-
termined [beschlossen)it is the termination [Schluss: liter-
ally, "conclusion"] in itself. [It has these aspects:] (a) it is the
universal, purpose; (b) it is the particular, the Self, activity,
^Form and content; empty objectivity, universality.
Review of [the chapter on] intelligence: understanding is objectified as
light; reason is [objectified as] perceiving, hearing.
Intelligence: its object has the form of abstract beingwhat it is in itself
land] for us-, in the understanding, a joining in itself, internality not yet
separated from it.
Movement toward the I, through positing of the I, because being is in
itself universalas in Spirit, so for us in its concept. This for the I is self-
positing, at first only a formal positing.
The drive has its own content, purpose,- what is juxtaposed to volition is
volition itself and indeed for it.
99
The Philosophy of Spirit
actuality;
2
(c) it is the middle [term] of both these, the drive.
3
The drive is two-sided: [there is] the side that has the content,
the universal, which is purpose; and the side that is the active
Self [that achieves it]. The one side is the ground, the other
the form.
(a) Exactly which of these is the determinate content of the
drive cannot be specified as yet, since this has not yet been
determined. So far, it has none, since we have only got so far
as positing the [mere] concept of the will. What impulses.the I-
may have are first revealed in the content of its world; these
are its drives.
(b) The determinate manner in which that termination [or
"conclusion"] is posited in the I is such that all elements of it
are enclosed in the Self as the universal, as global, [so that] it
is now the totality, and its opposite is merely an empty form
for self-consciousness. This also comprises the force of its
"conclusion," of its willso that the will, insofar as it ex-
presses an external aspect, is in this taken back into itself
without exhibiting a determinate aspect by which it can be
grasped: thus, what are velvet paws for one are claws for
another,- but no matter how we try to grasp the will we feel
only smooth satin which we cannot hold on to. The will is
thus a totality and therefore unassailable.
(c) This global termination,
4
rounded in itself, is at the
same time turned outwardit is actual consciousness, al-
though it is here regarded as enclosed within the I. Namely,
the will is being-for-self which has extinguished, all foreign
content within itself. But thus it is left without a_n other,
without contentand it feels this lack.
5
Nevertheless, it is a
lack which is likewise positive. (It is purposethe form by
2
Termination: magnet in each extreme [pole|. The I judges, thus is re-
flected in itselfemerging out of the extreme.
3
The first division of the "conclusion" is the equivalence [Gleichgiil-
tigkeit) of the extremes. The Self is immediate to allactivity is of the Self.
4
Positing of the "conclusion" in its extremes, so that these are mediated
through another relation. Particularity juxtaposed to purpose.
5
It is a lack because the "conclusion" is the immediately primary, and
thus the equivalence of its extremes. ""
100
I. Spirit According to Its Concept
which it is mere purpose is the Incomplete being. Being as
' such has thereby become form.)
The negative, exclusive [element] is thus* ifrthe will itself
so that it is therein concerned only with itself, and is thus
that which is excluded from itself. [In this way] purpose
stands juxtaposed to the Self; [it is] particularity, actuality for
the universal. The feeling of lack is the above mentioned
unity of both in the drive [uniting purpose (universal) and
activity (particular)] as feeling, as lack of opposition. This
"conclusion" is merely the first: the universal and the par-
ticular are locked together in the drive. The extremes have
the form of equivalent being for one anotherthus positing
the primary reality, which is incomplete.
The second "conclusion" is the satisfaction of the. drive.
6
This is not the same as the satisfaction of a desirewhich is
animal, i.e., its object has the abstract form of actual being,
externality. Only in this way is it for the Self. Thus the union
is likewise the pure disappearance. But here, being is mere
form: thus what is I in its totality is the drive. This the I
separates [from itself] and makes its own object. This object is
not empty satiety, the simple feeling of Self, which is lost in
desire and restored in its satisfaction.
7
Rather, what disap-
pears is the pure form of equivalence of the drive's extremes
the purpose, content, juxtaposed to particularity. And the dis-
appearance of this equivalence is the disappearance of the
contrast[thus it is] being, but a fulfilled being.
It [the I] becomes regardful [anschauend], through immedi-
acy, the overcoming (Aufheben) of contrast. (In general, the I
always, goes over into looking and feeling, in this way.) The
main point is the content of the object. The object separates
itself from its drive, thereby acquiring a different formthe
quiescent drive, become itself, fulfilled in itself. The lack was
6
Positing in the element of universality, equivalence, beingfor this is
the truth: not to be enclosed within the I, the I internally stressed.
7
Extemal self-consciousness, being, and desireabstract being-for-itself.
Animal, thus not a particular satisfaction but a universal. Desire is an ele-
ment, being-for-itself is the "conclusion" enclosed in the Self.
101
The Philosophy of Spirit
in the looking of the empty I
8
for this was object to itself. It
held the differences of the "conclusion" together; it com-
prised their equivalence, their subsistence, not being as such;
it was the primary immediate I', but I as such. The drive
having been separated from the I, it is released from the Self
the bare content held together by its being.
The work of the I: it knows its activity in this, i.e., knows
itself as the I, heretofore [hidden] in the interior of being. [It
knows itself] as activity (not as in memory), but rather so that
the content as such is [revealed] through it; this is because the
distinction as such was its own. The distinction makes up the
content, and that alone is what is important herethat the I
has posited the distinction out of itself and knows it as its
own. (Name and thing are the former distinctionnot the
distinction, as such, of the I; the latter is simple.)
Determination of the object: it is thus the content, the
distinction of the "conclusion"; it is particularity and univer-
sality, and their mediation. But [as] a being, immediate, its
mediation is dead universality, thinghood, otherness; and its
extremes are particularity, determinacy, and individuality. In-
sofar as it is the other, its activity is that of the I; it has no
activity of its own; this extreme falls outside it. As thing-
hood, itJs passivity, the [mere] communication of this activ-
ityas fluid, but as having something alien in it. Its other
extreme is the opposite: the particularity of its being and of
its activity. It is passive, it is for another, touches it,
9
some-
thing that can be worn away [in] communication with the
other. This is its being, but it is at the same time the active
form set against it. Converse relation: in one sense, the activ-
ity is merely something communicated, communication it-
self, purely receptive; in another sense, it is activity directed
at another.
s
to it itself as differentiated in itself (not as an external object)
*The play of this activity is the transformation of its passivity into activ-
ity. Thinghood is its midpoint, simple universality; force is its other side,
outside it, merely communicatedfor it is pure object, which the I has
within itself as something alien. Consider the tool. Man makes tools because^-
he is rational, and this is the first expression of his will. This will is still
abstract. Cp. the pride of peoples in their tools.
102
I. Spirit According to Its Concept
The gratified impulse is [thus] the"transformed labor (aufge-
hobene Arbeit) of the I
;
this is the object working in its stead.
Labor is one's making oneself into a thing isich zum Dinge
machen). The division of the I beset by drives is this very same
self-objectification [sich zum Gegenstdnde machen). Desire
must always begin anew, never succeeding in ridding itself of
its labor. The drive, however, is the unity of the J as objectified
[als zum Dinge gemachten). ' '
The bare activity is pure mediation, movement; the bare
satisfaction of desire is the pure extinction of the object. The
labor itself!? as such is not only activitythe acid [which
dissolves passivity]but it is also reflected in -itself, a bring-
ing forth: the one-sided form of the content [as] particular
element. But here the drive brings itself forth; it brings forth
the labor itself[so that] the drive satisfies itself, [while] the
other elements fall into external consciousness.
The bringing forth is the content also insofar as it is what
is willed, and the means' of [fulfilling] desire, its determinate
possibility. In^the tool and in the plowed and cultivated
field, I possess a possibility, a content as something univer-
sal. Thus the tool [as] means i of greater value than the goal
of desire, which goal is particular; the tool encompasses all
such particularities.
But a tool does not yet have the activity within it. It is an
inert thing; it does not turn back into itself. I still must work
with it. Between myself and the external [world of] thinghood,
I have inserted my cunningin order to spare myself, to hide
my determinacy and allow it to be made use of.
11
What I spare
myself is merely quantitative,- I still get callouses. My being
made a thing is yet a necessary element[since] the drive's
own activity is not yet in the thing. The tool's activity must
be placed in the tool itself, so that it is made self-acting. This
happens (a) in such a way that its [own] thread is interlaced
with it and its two-sidedness is utilized, in order to make it go
back on itself in this opposition. In general, its passivity is
10
not cause, the same is effect .
"The I remains the soul of this "conclusion," in relation to the activity of
the I.
103
The Philosophy of Spirit
transformed into activity, in persistent collaboration. Above
all, it happens also (b) in order that nature's own activity be
employedthe elasticity of the watchspring, [the power of]
water, windso that, in th^ir sensory existence, these do
something other than what they [ordinarily] would do. Their
blind doing is made purposeful,
12
in opposition to them-
selves.
13
[This is the] rational control of natural laws in their
external existence. Nothing happens to nature itself; the par-
ticular purposes of natural being become a universal purpose.
The bird flies thither. . . .
Here the drive withdraws entirely from labor. The drive
lets nature consume itself, watches quietly and guides it all
with only the slightest effort. [This is] cunning.
14
[Consider]
the honor of cunning against powerto grasp blind power
from one side so that it turns against itself; to comprehend it,
to grasp it as something determinate, to be active against it
to make it return into itself as movement, so that it negates
itself.
Thus the destiny of the individual thing is [in the hands of]
Man. Through cunning^ the will becomes feminine.
15
The
outgoing drive, as cunning, is a theoretical contemplation, the
unknowing a drive to knowing. There are two powers, two
characters, here. This contemplationof how the being, in
itself, negates itself [sich aufhebt)is different from the drive;
it is the I that has left it and gone back into itself, the I that
knows the nullity [Nichtigkeit) of this being, while the drive
is tensed within it.
l2
The reality, equivalence of the "conclusion's" extremes, pitted against
one another, so that this equivalence [is| in itself.
'*The individual hen: theirationale of its existence is that it is fed and
eaten. A wind, a mighty stream or oceansubjugated, utilized. We do not
exchange compliments with them. JCp.J the miserable sentimentality at-
tached to individual [manifestations of nature].
l4
the broad side of force is attacked by the point of cunning
l5
Cunning is something other than craftiness. The most open dealing is
the greatest cunning. (We must understand it in its truth)namely, through
one's openness the [aim of the] other is brought to light, revealing itself in
and for itself, thereby destroying itself. The great deed is to compel others to
be what they are, in and for themselves, in the light of consciousness. Even if
they are right, they do not know how to justify themselves in words. Silence
is the worst, vilest cunning: fundamentally, the master [is the one who) gets
the other to mislead himself [by his own action).
104
. . I. Spirit According to Its Concept
The will has [thereby] become~tToubled, split in two. It is
determined, it is character. One sort of character involves this
tension, the power in the confrontation* ~of beings.
16
This
power, however, is blind, has no consciousness of the nature
of this being. It is fully open, straightforward, driving and
being driven. The other sort of character is evil, [enclosed] in
itself, subterranean, knowing what is there in the light of day,
and watching something accomplish its own destruction by
its own efforts, or else turning actively against the thing,
thereby introducing a negative element into its being, indeed
into its self-preservation.
The first of these [operates] as a being confronting another
being. The * second [operates] by using reason, as a being
[against] something it does not take with full seriousnessas
when a cape is offered to the bull which runs against it and,
hitting nothing, is hit nonetheless. The will has divided itself
into these two extremes, in one of which it is whole and
universal, while in the other it is particular.
17
These extremes
18
are to posit themselves in one, the
knowledge of the latter going over into cognition (Erkennen).
This movement of the " conclusion" is thereby posited, so
that each i si n itself what-the other is. The one, the universal,
is particufarity, the knowing Self.. Concomitantly, the particu-
lar is the universal, since it is self-relatedness. But this must
16
The male has desire, drive; the feminine drive is far more aimed at being
the object of drive, to excite, to arouse drive and to allow it to satisfy itself in
it. . . . ' "
17
The will's solitary existence is [thus] completed.
l8
First union of intelligence and will; i.e., there are two independent egos,
for one another. The first "conclusion" of the will has so altered itself that
the being of each "term" has acquired the significance of the I. [Being is just
the contrary of lack [absence], but it is lack itself, or a lack,, is felt because
there are these extremes.)
These two egos, however, comprising the "terms" of the "conclusion,"
are not yet the totality, and are opposed to one another insofar as the one is
internally what the other is externally. First the equivalence [of the extremes]
is overcome (aufgehoben), and in its place has come the I, being-for-self. This
is the first knowledge an independent I has of an independent I. And because
both are egos, knowledge, there is for them this equality of both in their
opposition. The one is identical to itself in the other, turned against the
other; the other encloses in itself its unrest, its activity, and keeps itself
calm, as though nothing had happened.
105
The Philosophy of Spirit
become something for them [something they are aware of], so
that this equality becomes a knowledge of this equality.
(a) The drive comes to look at itselfit returns to itself in
that satisfaction. In the same manner, it has become knowl-
edge of what it is. The simplexetum to itself, the knowledge, is
likewise the mediation for the division of the "conclusion."
The drive is outside itself, in the other simple Self, and knows
the Self as an independent extreme. At the same time this
knowledge knows its essence in the other. There is tension in
the drive, the independence of both extremes.
(b) In itself there is the supersession (Aufheben) of both:
ea^h [of the two "selves") is identical to the other precisely in
that wherein it opposes it
;
the other, that whereby it is the
"other" to it, is it itself. In the very fact that each knows itself
in the other, each has renounced itselflove.
Knowledge
19
is precisely this ambiguity: each is identical to
the other in that wherein it has opposed itself to the other.
The self-differentiation of each from the other is therefore a
self-positing of each as the other's equal. And this knowledge
is cognition in the very fact that it is itself this knowledge of
the fact that for it itself its opposition goes over into identity;
or this, that it knows itself as it looks upon itself in the other.
Cognition means one's knowing what is objective, in its ob-
jectivity, as knowledge of one's Self: i.e., a [subjectively] con-
ceptualized content, in the sense of a concept that is object.
This cognition is merely a cognition of characterssince
neither one has as yet determined itself as a Self vis-a-vis the
other. Only the one is knowledge in itself, the other is
knowledge as outward activity; and the one is the universal
substance directed outward, the rounded substance, [while]
the other [is] directed inward. Thus they are only opposed
characters, not knowing themselvesbut either knowing
themselves in one another, or else knowing themselves only
in themselves.
l9
In the form of knowing they are for one another. Each is independent,
not yet knowing what is involved for him in this being other. They are in
themselves the same. This in-itself going over into being-for-itself is their
movement.
106
I. Spirit According to Its Concept
The movement of knowing is thills'in the inner realm itself,
not in the objective realm. In their first interrelation, the two
poles of the tension already fall asunder." ^o be sure, they
approach one another with uncertainty and timidity, yet with
trust, for each knows itself immediately in the other, and the
movement is merely the inversion whereby each realizes that
the other knows itself likewise in its other. This reversal also
rests in the fact that each gives up its independence. The
stimulus is itself an excitation, i.e., it is the condition of not
being satisfied in oneself, but rather having one's essence in
anotherbecause one knows oneself in the other, negating
oneself as being-for-oneself, as different. This self-negation is
one's being for another, into which one's immediate being is
transformed. Each one's self-negation becomes, for each, the
other's being for the other. Thus thejather is for me, i.e., it
knows itself in me. There is only being for another, i.e., the
other is outside itself.
This cognition is love. It is the movement of the "conclu-
sion", so that each pole, fulfilled by the I, is thus immediately
in the other, and only this being in the other separates itself
from the I and becomes its object. It is the element of [custom
or morality], the totality of ethical life [Sittlichkeitj-^-though
not yet it itself, but only the suggestion of it. Each one [here
exists] only as determinate will, character, as the natural indi-
vidual whose uncultivated natural Self is recognized.
High chivalric love
20
falls within mystic consciousness,
which lives in a spiritual world regarded as the true one, a
world which now approaches its actuality, and in this world
such consciousness glimpses the other world as present.
Friendship is only in shared work, and [the emphasis on it]
occurs in the period of moral development: e.g., the modera-
tion of Herculean virtue, Theseus and Pirithous, Orestes and
Py lades.
20
[There is aj two-fold suggestion of the ideal in the actualelevated out
of immediate existence to the status of an ideal of universal Self; and descent
from the heavenly world into the present (by the rungs of a heavenly ladder;
say) so that the divine is in the present. God is love, joy, because the natural
is given recognition.
107
The Philosophy of Spirit
Love
21
thereby becomes immediately objective for itself.
Movement enters into it. Satisfied, it is the unity of poles, the
unity which had previously been the drivethis satisfied
love.
22
Distinct from the (two) characters is the third, the
engendered. The unity divides itself into poles which are
equivalent toward the middle.
23
They are different beings.
The satisfied love at first becomes so objective for itself
that this third is something other than the two poles [i.e.,
other than the two individuals involved]; this is the love that
is a being-other (Andersseyn), immediate thinghood, wherein
the love does not know itself immediately, but rather exists
for the sake of an other (just as the tool does not have its
activity [inhering] in it itself). Thus both parties realize their
mutual love through their mutual service, mediated in a third
which is a thing. It is the mean and the means of love. And
indeed, just as the tool is the ongoing [objectified] labor, so
this third element is a universal as well; it is the permanent,
ongoing possibility of their existence. As equivalent poles,
they
t
are. This being, since it is a being of the polar extremes,
is transitory. As middle, as unity, it is universal. It is a family
possessionas movement [it is] acquisition.
24
It is from here
1
onward that there is the interest in acquisi-
tion and permanent possession, and in the general possibility
of existence. It is from here onward, actually, that the desire
itself enters in as such, namely, as rational, sanctified (if one
so wishes). The desire is satisfied in shared labor. The labor
does not occur to satisfy desires as individual but as general.
The one who works on a given object does not necessarily
consume it. Rather, it becomes a part of the common store,
and all are supported by it. Like the tool, it [constitutes] the
2
'God is love, so that he is the spiritual essence: a great cognition, a
cognition of cognition.
"North American aborigines kill their parents; we do the same.
"Love split up into existing poles, whose middle stands against them as
an abstract being, wherein each presents his love for the other (but thereby
makes) himself into a being-other, a thing. Working for the other person is
likewise an ongoing gratification of desire. The thing (thus) acquires the sig-
nification of love.
"Possession means that a thing is mine, the I is universal, with many
egos involved.
108
I. Spirit According to Its Concept
general possibility of enjoyment and "also the general actuality
of it. It is an immediate [nonmediated] spiritual possession.
Family property has in it the element' o- activity, higher
than the element of instrumentalityso that both the polar
parties are self-consciously active. But this object does not yet
have the element of love in it.
25
Rather, the love is in the
polar parties. The cognition on the part of both characters is
itself not yet a [fully] cognizant cognition [erkennendes Er-
kennen). The love itself is not yet the object. The I of love,
however, withdraws from love, pushes itself away from itself
and becomes its own object. The unity of both characters is
only the love, but it does not know itself as the love. It knows
itself in the child, in whom the two see their lovetheir
self-conscious unity as self-conscious.
The unity is the immediate object, a particular entityand
the unity of love is at the same time a movement to tran-
scend (aufzuheben) this particularity. On one side this move-
ment means the transcendence of immediate existence: e.g.,
the death of parents; they are a disappearing process, the self-
annulling (sich aufhebend) source. Against the [concept of
the] procreated individual there is this movement, as con-
scious, the becoming of his being-for-himself, education.
26
According to. his essence, however, there is the transcendence
of loyejis such.
The [idea of the] family is decided in these -elements: (a)
love, as natural, begetting children; (b) self-conscious love,
"Love is (a), as equality, posited as an abstract being. Possession appears
as something alien, but in its concept it is (b) actuality, Self, being-for-self.
26
[The individual, in his spiritual becoming] is immediate spiritual sub-
stance, seen as his essence but as alien, whereby he does not yet have his Self.
It serves [individuality, but) it is not individuality, the being-for-self. Yet his
service is activity, and through it that spiritual substance is made his own.
Movement adds the elementJ?f Self. (A driven wheel retains its motion for a
time, even after it has ceased to be driven.) But the,I, the concept, [is] itself
motion. It moves by means of another, converts this to self-motion and, on
the other hand, converts this into otherjiess and objectification of the I, and
being-for-selfnot as the abstract element of desire, but rather as the totality
which lias proceeded from the totality of love. Two totalities now stand
juxtaposed. It is character which has become itself through mediation,
through service towards substance, the totality. He is therefore no longer a
natural character, but has abandoned his natural existence. The determinacy
of the will is overcome: the actuality of love.
109
The Philosophy of Spirit
conscious feeling, sentiment and language of the same; (c)
shared labor and acquisition, mutual service and care; (d) edu-
cation [of offspring]. No single function can be made the en-
tire purpose [of the family].
Love has become its own object, and this a being-for-itself.
It is no longer [a function of] character, but has the whole
simple essence in it itself. Each [member] is the spiritual rec-
ognition itself, which knows itself. The family, as a totality,
has confronted another self-enclosed totality, comprising indi-
viduals who are complete, free individualities for one another.
Only here, then, do we find the actual being for the Spirit, in
that it is a self-conscious being-for-itself.
At the same time they are related to one another and are in a
state of tension in regard to one another. Their immediate
existence is exclusive. One [family member] has, say, taken
possession of a piece of landnot of a particular thing, e.g., a
tool, but [a part] of the permanent general existence [freely
available]. Through his labor he has designated it [as his], giv-
ing to the sign his own content as existent: a negative and
exclusive significance. Another party is thereby excluded from
something which he is. Thus the existence is no longer "gen-
eral" [i.e., things are now defined as "belonging" to individu-
als).
This relation is usually what is referred to as the state of
nature,
27
the free, indifferent being of individuals toward one
another. And the [concept of] natural right should answer the
question as to what rights and obligations the individuals
have toward one another according to this relation, which is
the element of necessity in their behavior as independent self-
consciousnesses according to their conception. Their only in-
terrelation, however, lies in overcoming [aufzuheben) their
present interrelation: to leave the state of nature. In this in-
27
State of nature: there, "right," as absolute, includes the pure [concept ofj
person, pure recognition. Yet man is not in the (theoretical) state of nature
but immersed in (actual] existence, a human being in his own concept. But in
the state of nature he is not (living) in his concept, but as a natural entity in
his existence. The question contradicts itself immediately: to consider man
in the light of his concept means that I do not consider him as in the state of
nature.
110
r
/. Spirit According to Its Concept
terrelation they have no rights, ntr obligations towards one
another, but acquire them only in leaving that situation.
What is posited thereby is the concept oJreely interrelated
self-consciousnessesbut only the concept itself. Since it is
only a concept, it is still to be realized; i.e., it is to transcend
[aufzuheben) itself in the form of a concept and approach
reality. In actuality, it itself occurs unconsciously in the dis-
solution of the problem and in the problem itselfuncon-
sciously, i.e., so that the concept does not intrude into the
[realm of the] object.
The problem is this: What is right and obligation for the
individual in the state of nature? The concept of this individ-
ual is taken as the basis; out of this concept the full notion is
to be developed. I bring to it the definition of right. I show the
individual to be a bearer of rights, a gerson. But this demon-
stration occurs within me; it is the movement of my thought,
although the content is the free Self. This [conceptual] move-
ment, however, does not leave this demonstration as it is; i.e.,
it is [itself] the movement of this concept.
Right is the relation of persons, in their behavior, to others.
It is the universal element of their free beingthe determina-
tion, the limitation of their empty freedom. I need not spell
out this relation or limitation for myself and produce it;
rather, the object, in general, is. itself this creation of right,
i.e., the relation of recognition. In recognition [Anerkennen),
the Self ceases to be this individual; it exists by right in recog-
nition, i.e., no longer [immersed] in its immediate existence.
The one who is recognized is recognized as immediately
counting as such (geltend), through his beingbut this being
is itself generated from the concept; it is recognized being
[anerkanntes Seyn).
Man is necessarily recognized and necessarily gives recog-
nition. This necessity is his own, not that of our thinking in
contrast to the content. As recognizing, man is himself the
movement [of recognition], and this movement itself is what
negates [hebt auj) his natural state: he jus recognition; the
natural aspect merely is, it is not the spiritual aspect.
The individuals, as they are toward one another [in the
111
The Philosophy of Spirit
state, of nature], do not yet recognize one another; rather, their
being is disturbed. One individual, say, has disturbed the sit-
uation through his [taking] possession [as just described], al-
though this is not yet property.
28
The right of possession im-
mediately concerns things, not a third party. Man has the
right [in the state of nature] to take possession of as much as
he can, as an individual. He has the rightthis is implicit in
his concept of what it is to be a Self, by which he is the power
over all things. But his taking possession also acquires the
significance of excluding a third party. What is it in this sig-
nificance that binds the other person? What may I take pos-
session of, without violating the rights of the third party?
Such questions, as well, cannot be answered. Taking posses-
sion
29
is the empirical [act of] seizure,
30
and this is to be
justified through recognition. It is not justified merely by vir-
tue of its having occurred.
[It is as] in -himself that the immediate person takes posses-
sion. There is this contradiction, that the immediate com-
prises the content, the subject, whose predicate is [presumably]
to be its right. A thing is my property because it is recognized
[to be such] by others. But what is it, exactly, that others recog-
nize? It is that which I have, which I possess. Thejcontent [of
"property"] therefore emanates from my possession. Can I
therefore have whatever and as much as I want? I cannot take
it from a third party and expect recognition [as owner], because
what he has is already recognized [as his]. Yet in that I take
possession of something immediatelyi.e., as something be-
longing to no oneI exclude him, in himself. And thus, in
taking possession, the question of recognition comes up again:
28
If I therefore regard him in this natural state as immediately possessing,
and I ask what is right, here, this requires an absolute determination, even
though the situation is Jone of) contingent being. The interrelation between
the two is contingent as well, and there is no [absolute) determination to be
had here. It seems that because the thing is mine, I am to be recognized as
immediately counting for something, in the form of immediacy. This recog-
nition is the [basis of] right.
29
as outward, a determination of universal being
^Contradiction between having and being-for-self. In having, I am imme-
diately existent. The former as immediate being, the latter as being-for-self.
Immediate contradiction: [this is] my thing insofar as it is mine, not insofar
as it is a thingdistinction.
112
I. Spirit According to Its Concept
I take, that which could have become his. It merely could be-
come his possession, but it is mine in actuality. His possibility
comes after my actuality. He must recognize, me as actual.
What do I possess, however? (a) My body; (b) the thing I
already have, in my mouth or in my hand.
31
Yet I possess not
only this, but also that which I have marked with my desir-
ing, my glance, as something wanted, grasped for. Children
maintain they have a right to something because they saw it
first, or wanted it first. Adults, although they can do nothing
else, become angry because someone else got'there first.
Besides my having grasped something immediately, how-
ever, an existent thing is shown to be mine by means of some
sign, e.g., my very working on it. Whatever is designated as
mine the other person must not do damage to. The Resigna-
tion, however, is at the same time contingent: e.g., an en-
closed plot of ground with, [as] a boundary, nothing more than
a furrow drawn around it,
32
is designated as mineand yet
not [i.e., "mine" is not a predicate intrinsic tQ that sign]. Tjie
sign has an unlimited range:
33
putting up a stake on an island
signifies
34
that I wish to take possession of it; likewise, in
working on a metal cup I cannot separate from it the form I
have given it. But in the case of a cultivated field or tree I
have worked on, where does the imposed form begin and
where does it end? The inner side of each clod of earth is left
untouched,
35
or moved very slightly, and similarly with the
underside, [it is] not moved much, etc.
31
Objectivity. Free separation of what is mine (in possession, the free
object of love). Essence, thingthe form as mine.
"Extension of the objective Ithrough its signification[onto, say,] a
weapon, mass.
33
Form, hollowing out of a formed thingthe thing qua thingbelongs to
me; my will attaches to it in its Self.
34
The first possession [is] by chance, thus it is an aspect of contingency to
be overcome.
35
A stony piece of ground is worked on, on some of its sidesbut where it
has not been worked on I can di g... tree, not planted by him . . . animal.
[This cryptic marginal note is left unexplained by the German editors. From
the context, however, it is an apparent criticism of the classic labor-theory of
ownership. Thus if I own a piece of land, and a tree sprouts on it with no
effort on my part, I could not truly say that it is mineor so the theory
would suggest. Trans.]
113
The Philosophy of Spirit
The sensory immediate, to which the universal is applied,
does not correspond to this universal, is not encompassed by
it. It is a "bad infinite" division.
The sensory immediate is not in itself universal; there is
always a contradiction in regard to this content. [Example:]
the conformity to the needs of a family, or of an individual,
contradicts the concept of pure Self, or of equality, which is
the basis of right. There is nothing in itself to be determined
here; related to individuality, however) it is the aspect which
belongs to chance. There is no reason in it; reason is yet to be
introduced in such a way that nothing belongs to someone as
the result of direct taking, but only through a contract; i.e.,
this direct taking of possession does not occur, and is not
excluded in itself, but is recognized. The exclusion, in itself,
is rather what is not right, and what should not occur, since
the excluded is thereby not present as actual consciousness,
nor do I thereby relate myself to such a one.
Thus what must happen first is recognition: the individuals
are love, this being-recognized, without the opposition of the
will(i.e., wherein each would be the entire "conclusion/
7
[and] wherein they enter only as characters, not as free wills).
Such recognition is to come about. There.must become for
them what they [already] are in themselves. Their being for
one another is the beginning of it.
They are therefore such individuals, the one having ex-
cluded from his possession,
36
and the other, the excluded,
having become so for himself. They themselves are thus im-
mediate for one another. The conclusion is that each does not
know his'own essence in the other, as character, but knows
his own essence in himself; he is for himselfthe one, how-
ever, as excluded from being, the other as excluding. They are
thus juxtaposed and for one another, so that the one finds
himself much more negated [negirt] by the other as an es-
sence, a being. If, however, he is not for the other, he is on the
other hand for himself.
^His substance, his subsistence is (as) thing which possesses this totality
for itself: in the meaning of this individual totality he only has; it is not yet
property.
114
L Spirit According to Its Concept
The movement thus begins, hefe", not with the positive
aspect of Knowing oneself in another and thereby seeing the
self-negation of the other; but on the contrary, with not
knowing oneself in the other, and rather seeing his, the
other's, being-for-self in the other. The conclusion therefore
begins with the independence of the polar parties in^their
being-for-themselves, so that the independence oLeach is [es-
tablished] for the other. And indeed [it happens] first on the
side of the excluded party, since he is a being-for-himself,
because he is not for the othersince through the other's
[action] he is excluded from being. The other, howeverthe
familyis quietly and impartially for itself.
The excluded party spoils the other's possession, by intro- .
ducing his excluded being-f or-himself into it, his [sense of]
"mine." He ruins something in it, annihilating [i.e., negating]
it as' desire, in order to give himself his selirfeeling [Selbst-
gefiihl)yet not his empty self-feeling, but rather positing his
own Self in another, in the knowing of another. The activity
does not concern the negative aspect, the thing, but rather the
self-knowledge of the other. A distinction in the knowledge of
the other is thereby posited, which only puts one in the exis-
tence of the other. He [the excluded] is also angered thereby; he
is divided in himself, and his exclusion from being is turned
into an exclusion of knowledge. He becomes aware that he has
done something altogether different from what he intended.
His intention [Meynen) was the pure relating of his being to
itself, his impartial being-f or-himself.
Thus angered, the two parties stand opposed to one an-
otherthe orie as the insulter, the other as the insulted. The
insulter did not intend insult to the other in taking posses-
, sion, but the insulted did relate himself to the insulter: what
the insulter annihilated was not the intrinsic form of the
thing, but the form of the other's labor or activity. Thus the
fact that the excluded party has restored himself does not
produce the equality of the two, but rather a new inequality.
Equality [demanded] that both parties posit themselves in the
thing, [asserting themselves with respect to it]. But [here we
have] the higher inequality of the positing of the one in the
115
The Philosophy of Spirit
being-for-himself of the other. The first posited [i.e., asserted]
himself in the unowned thing, the other in the thing already
possessed.
This inequality is to be overcome, negated [aufzuheben). It
must already be overcome in itself, howeverand the activity
of both is only so that this may become [true] for both. The
overcoming (Aufheben) of the exclusion has already occurred;
both parties are outside themselves, both are a knowledge, are
objects for themselves. Each is conscious of himself in the
otheras one who is negated [aufgehobenes), to be surebut
in the same way the positive aspect is on the side of each.
Each one wants to count as something for the other. It is the
aim of each to look upon himself in the othereach is out-
side himself. Each one is the conclusion, one pole of which is
outside himsuperseded [aufgehoben] in the otherand each
is in himself. But both egos, the one in me and the one super-
seded in the other party, are the same. I provide content for
myself as end; i.e., I am positive to myself. My ego is likewise
to be positive; i.e., my positive aspect is now enclosed in
myself, and has only now become my end.
Thus the inequality has the form that (a) the one party has
only overcome [aufhob) the being of the other, while the
other has negated the being-for-himself of the first; and that
(b) each knows himself outside himself: the one (namely the
insulted) has lost [something of] his existence, the other has
restored his existence to himselfbut this restoration oc-
curred at the expense of the other, [and] is conditioned there-
by: it is not an immediate, free acquisition.
Their roles are thus exchanged: for himself, the insulter is
satisfied (not in himself, since his being-in-himself is condi-
tioned); the second party is now the annoyed one, in a state of
tensionan alien being-for-himself has intruded itself into
his being-for-self. He resolves not to expose his existence any
further, but rather to arrive at a knowledge of himself, i.e., to
become recognized.
37
The actual being-for-himself as such is
37
Each knows himself for himself, since the one has overcome the alien
being-for-himself, while the other sees his being-for-himself as overcome
and in seeing it as overcome, he is knowing.
116
I. Spirit According to Its Concept
to be posited, not as a [mere] form "of the thing (since this
form has nothing permanent in it), nor^by means of language
(since the knowledge is [to be] actual). It is wiUr, the being-for-
himself as such. Its actuality has the significance of being
recognized by the other, to count as absolute for him. In order
to count as absolute, however, it must present itself as abso-
lute, as will, i.e., as someone for whom his existence (which
he had as property) no longer counts, but rather this: as his
known bemg-for-himself, that has the pure significance of
self-knowledge, and in this way comes into existence.
Such presentation, however, is the self-executed negation
of the existence that "belongs" to him.
38
It is the directedness
of the will to itself, to the extreme of its individuality. (Char-
acter is only directed to itself as universal.) To him as con-
sciousness it appears that in this he must intend the death of
the other, although it is his own death that is at issuesui-
cide, in that he exposes himself to danger.
39
Thus hejooks upon his negated external existence. This
existence is most his own, converting the being-negated (Auf-
gehobenseyn) of that alien element into his own being-for-
himself that is most his own, because it is reason. This resto-
ration is the reception of his existence in the abstraction of
knowing. The [element of] cunning is the knowing, the being-
in-himself, self-knowledge, as the knowledge of will [as] mere
drive. In the drive the extreme poles have the form of equiva-
lence, indifference, the form of being, not yet a knowing.
The knowing will is to be fulfilled (a) as the will of love,
with the knowledge of the immediate unity of both poles, of
their unity as selfless; (b) in recognition, with the polar ex-
tremes as free Selves. The former is the fulfillment, of the
universal extreme, the latter of the particular, i.e., making
this the total conclusion. This conclusion has in it the ex-
tremes in the form of being-for-themselves. The previous cog-
nition [now] becomes recognition. The two know themselves
38
(a) Property; (b) disappearance of this being-for-self of the form, of proper-
ty; (c) disappearance of his own immediate existence.
39
Force, Lordship, and Servitude. [See The Phenomenology of Spirit, IV.
Trans.]
Ill
The Philosophy of Spirit
as being-for-themselvesthey are separated in this way [by
what they have in common). The movement is the life-and-
death struggle. From this, each proceeds in such a way that he
sees the other as pure Self, and it is a knowledge of the will;
and so that the will of each is cognizant, i.e., reflected com-
pletely in itself in its pure unity. The driveless will, the deter-
mination enveloped in itself to know being as something not
alien.
This knowing will is now universal. It is the state of being
recognized; juxtaposed to itself in the form of universality,
40
it
is being, actuality in generaland the individual, the subject,
is the person. The will of the individual is the universal will
and the universal is the individual. It is the totality of ethical
life [Sittlichkeit) in general, immediate, yet [as] Right.
41
^lSummary notes:]
power of imagination free will in general
recollection tool
sign cunning
How the levels of intelligence and will correspond:
(a) language, name (a) love has existence
(b) understanding, judgment, and (b) judgment, totalitymovement
reason of the conclusion
movement in the element of language
[The following marginal note was attached to the opening of the next
chapter. Trans.)
(a) Intelligence, particular representation, image in generalexistent,
alien, empty "mine." Being-recognized is existence [Anerkanntseyn ist Da-
seyn) fulfilled with the will. (A complete "mine" is fulfilled with the entire
will.)
|b) Will, love, the immediate state of being-recognized. Right, this univer-
sal, abstract being-recognized.
4
'Limitation of freedom, i.e., of the arbitrariness of freedom, in the indi-
vidual, in the contingent.
118
PART II
Actual Spirit
Spirit is actual neither as intelligence nor as will,
but as will which is intelligence. That is, in the intelligence
there is the unity of two universalities, and in the universal
will these are complete Selves. They are a knowing of their
own being, and their being is this spiritual [element:] the uni-
versal will. In this element, the foregoing has now to exhibit
itself. In it, the abstract will has now to transcend or super-
cede itself (sich aufzuheben)just as the abstract intelligence
has transcended itself in the will/ the objects of that intelli-
gence fulfilling themselves on their own. As thus tran-
scended, the will must produce itself in the element of uni-
versal recognition, in this spiritual actuality. Possession
thereby transforms itself into [property] right, just as [individ-
ual] labor was transformed, previously, into universal labor.
What was family property, wherein the marriage partners
knew themselves,
1
now becomes the generalized [sphere of]
the work and enjoyment of everyone. And the difference be-
tween individuals now becomes a knowledge of good and evil,
of personal right and wrong.
'The "permitted" and "not permitted" arise only in [respect to] the other
[person].
119
The Philosophy of Spirit
A. Recognition
i. Immediate Recognition
1
Being-recognized (Anerkanntseyn)
is immediate actuality. And in this element [there is] the
person, at first as being-for-himself in general, working and
enjoying [the fruits of labor]. Only here does desire have the
right to make its appearancefor [here] it is actual; i.e., desire
itself has universal, spiritual being. Labor is of all and for all,
and the enjoyment [of its fruitsl is enjoyment by all. Each
[one] serves the other and provides help. Only here does the
individual have existence, as individual. Prior to this, the in-
dividual is merely something abstract, untrue [as a concept].
Spirit can indeed posit itself in an abstraction, analyze itself.
and give an existence to it (as the animal cannot), where the
Self, placing itself in a system, becomes disease. But [then the
self] has a merely momentary, evanescent existence. Here [in
contrast] desire is. Over against the I as abstract being-for-
itself, there stands likewise its inorganic nature, as being
[seyend). The I relates itself negatively to it [its inorganic
nature], and annuls it as the unity of bothbut in such a way
that the I first shapes that abstract being-for-itself as its Self,
sees its own form [in it] and thus consumes itself as well.
2
In the element of being as such, the existence and range of
natural needs is a multitude of needs. The things serving to
satisfy those needs are worked up [verarbeitet], their universal
inner possibility posited [expressed] as outer possibility, as
form. This processing [Verarbeiten) of Jthings is itself many-
sided, however; it is consciousness making itself into a thing.
But in the element of universality, it is such that it becomes
an abstract labor. The needs are many. The incorporation of
their multiplicity in the I, i.e., labor, is an abstraction of uni-
versal models [Bilder], yet [it is] a self-propelling process of
formation [Bilden). The I, which is for-itself, is abstract I; but
it does labor, hence its labor is abstract as well. The ne^ed in
'abstract being and movement
2
The immediate I of laborimmediate movement of the activity which is
not taken up into knowledgeits labor has the character of abstraction,
working not as a concrete individual(working for| the totality of needs.
120
II. Actual Spirit
general is analyzed into its many aspectswhat is abstract in
its movement is the being-for-itself, activity, labor.
Since work is performed only [to satisfy] trlerfreed as abstract
being-for-itself, the working becomes abstract as well. This is
the concept, the truth of the desire existing here.
3
Each individ-
ual, because he is an individual here, thus labors for a need.
[Yet] the content of his labor goes beyond his need; he labors
for the needs of many, and so does everyone. Each satisfies the
needs of many, and the satisfaction of one's own many particu-
lar needs is the labor of many others. Since his labor is abstract
in this way, he behaves as an abstract Iaccording to the mode
of thinghoodnot as an all-encompassing Spirit, rich in con-
tent, ruling a broad range arid being master of it; but rather,
having no concrete labor, his power consists in analyzing, in
abstracting, dissecting the concrete world into Its' many ab-
stract aspects.
Man's labor itself becomes entirely mechanical, belonging
to a many-sided determinacy. But the more abstract [his labor]
becomes, the more he riimself is mere abstract activity. And
consequently he is in a position to withdraw himself from
labor and to substitute for his own activity that of external
nature. He needs mere motion, and this he finds in external
nature. In other words, pure motion is precisely the relation
of the abstract forms of space and timethe abstract external
activity, the machine.
Among these diverse, abstract, processed needs, a certain
movement must now take place, whereby they once again
become concrete need[s], i.e., become the needs qf an indi-
vidual, who in turn' becomes a subject comprising many
needs. The judgment which analyzed them,
4
placed them
against itself as determinate abstractions.
5
Their universality
3
As its concept is, so [is] its labor. The satisfaction of all the needs of the
individual is not how he becomes an object for himself in his existence,
which is produced by him. Universal labor, division of labor, [labor-jsaving.
Ten men can make as many pins as a hundred.
4
Determinacy, in itself, return to individuality.
5
He himself has made it into a being for the need of others, as in family
property, which, on the contrary, he thereby holds to for itself. The reason is
that his simple existence is universal; his possession has the significance of
being for others.
121
The Philosophy of Spirit
to which this judgment rises is [that of] the equality of these
needs, or value. In this they are the same. This value itself, as
a thing, is money. The return to concretion, to possession, is
exchange.
In exchange, the abstract thing presents itself [as) what it
is, namely, as being this transformation, returning to thing-
hood in the I, and indeed in such a way that its thinghood
consists in being the possession of another.
6
Each one gives
his own possession, negating (hebt auf) its existence [as his]
and in such a way that that existence is recognized therein;
the other receives it with the consent of the first. Both parties
are recognized; each receives from the other the possession of
the other, in such a way that he receives it only insofar as the
other is himself this negative of himself, [consents to this
negation of what is his, i.e., receives it] as property, through
mediation. Each is the negating (das negirende) of his own
being, his propertyand this is mediated through the negat-
ing of the other. Only because the other releases his posses-
sion do I do the same; and this equality in the thing, asjts
inner aspect, constitutes its value, in regard to which I concur
entirely with the opinion of the other
7
[a concurrence of]
that which is positively mine and likewise his, the unity of
my will and his.
And my will counts as actual, existing, [for] to be recog-
nized is to exist [das Anerkanntseyn ist das Daseyn). Thereby
my will counts, I possess, the possession is transformed into
property. In the possession, being has the unspiritual signifi-
cance of my having, as this individual having. Here, however,
6
In his abstract labor he sees his own universality and form, the fact that
it exists for another. He therefore wants to assert this, to communicate this
to others, i.e., so that they are themselves seen therein. [Here is aj second
movement, containing the developed elements of the first. The I is activity
toward another I, and indeed recognized by him, as an I relating to my posses-
sion, but which he wants to have only with my will (consent], just as I direct
myself to his possession only in accordance with his will. (This ontailsl the
equality of both parties as recognized(bestowing) a value, the meaning of
the thing.
7
The thing has the significance of the relation to others. Being for another,
existing, means being recognized; i.e., there is the particular will of each
individual in it and his equalitythe unity of absolutely different (individu-
als!so that for each there is the will of the other.
122
11. Actual Spirit
the being-recognized [enters]the-feeing of the possession,
such that the thing is and I am, and the thing is grasped as in
the Self. Here, being is the universal Self, aod-the having is
the mediation through another, i.e., it is universal. Value is
what is universal [here]; the movement, as perceptible, is the
exchange. This same universality is mediation as conscious
movement. Property is thus an immediate having, mediated
through being-recognized. That is, its existence is [shaping,
recollection, value]
8
it is the spiritual essence.
Here the contingency in taking possession is overcome
[aufgehoben). All that I have, I have through wprk and ex-
change, i.e., in being recognized. (By the same token, I am a
universal person, not this particular person/but at the same
time family. That is ,to say, property is the movement of a
thing in exchange. Afterward, inheritance [involves] the
change of individuals, wherein the family is constantbut
this does not yet come up here.)
9
The source, the origin of property here is that of labor,
my activity itselfimmediate Self and being recognized [is
the] basis. I am- the cause, equally because I have willed
[the] purpose in the exchange: the cause, the ground, is the
universal.' I have willed in the exchange, have posited my
thing as a value, i.e., internal movement, internal activity,
just as [is] labor, sunk in beingthe same externalization
[Entdusserung).
(a) "In laboring, I make myself immediately into the thing, a
form which is Being.
(b) At the same time I externalize this existence of mine,
making it something alien to myself, and preserve myself
therein. In the very same thing I see my being-recognized,
being as knowing. In the former I see my immediate Self, in
the latter my being-for-myself, my personhood. I therefore see
my being-recognized as [my] existence, and my will is this
counting-fdr-something (diss Gelten).
8
(The phrase in brackets is Hegel's marginal note. Trans.]
I am the contingency in the possession of my skill, inclination. Talenta
better, closer contingency. The I itself (as] absolutely necessary.
123
The Philosophy of Spirit
ii. Contract In the exchange, this being-recognized Jaas be-
come object; my will is [recognized as] an existence, as is the
will of the other party. The immediacy of being-recognized
has [now] come apart. My will is presented as more valid
(geltender), not only for myself but also for the otherand it
amounts to as much as existence itself. The value is my opin-
ion of the thing. This opinion of mine, and my will, has
counted [hat gegolten) in the eyes of the other person (medi-
ated through his opinion and will). I have accomplished
something, [and] have [thereby] alienated it from myself (habe
mich dessen entdussert). This negative [element] is positive;
this alienation is an acquiring.
10
My opinion of a thing's value counted (gait) for the other
person, and my wanting something he has. The two parties
regard one another as [individuals] whose opinion and will
have actuality. There is a consciousness, a distinction of the
concept of being-recognized: the will of the individual is a
shared will (or statement or judgement), and his will is his
actuality
11
as [the] externalization of himself which is my
will.
This knowing is expressed in the contract. It is the same as
exchange, but it is an ideal exchange (an offer).
(a) [In it] I give nothing away, I externalize nothing, I give
nothing but my word, language, [to the effect that] I wish to
externalize myself.
(b) The other party does the same. This externalizing/alien-
ating (Entdussern) of mine is at the same time his will. He is
satisfied that I grant him this.
(c) It is also his externalizing, it is [our] will in common
my externalization (Entdusserung) is mediated through his. I
want to externalize myself only because he (for his part)
wants to externalize himself also, and because his negating is
l0
In general, what can I make a contract about? My person, my individual
indeterminate service(morality enters here, in itself indeterminable, indi-
vidual). I cannot make a contract which would involve the totality of my
personhood, a contract which would be unalterable for life. And I cannot
make a contract involving my family, childrenmore of this later.
"The sense of property is that my will and opinions have existence.
124
II. Actual Spirit
my positing. It is an exchange of declarations, no longer an*
exchange of objectsbut it counts as much as the object it-
self. For both parties, the will of the othe* usounts-as such.
Will has [thus] gone back into its concept (Willen ist in seinen
Begriff zuriickgegangen).
Here, however, this division appears, that can as readily-
change into its opposite: the going back into itself [as individ-
ual will opposed to the will that is shared]. The will as such
has validity; it is set free of actuality. But in that very fact
there is the opposite: individual and shared wills are sepa-
rated; the individual will [appears] as the negative of the uni-
versal will. [Thus]. J:here is crime only insofar as I-arn recog-
nized [as .an individual, and] my__will is taken as universal,
counting as will in itself. Prior to recognition there is no
insult, no injury.
In other words, in the contract the shared will has only a
positive significance for my will, just as my will has for the
other: they are in agreement. But it is also possible for them
not to agree. I can unilaterally break the contract, since my
individual will counts as suchnot merely insofar as it is
shared, but rather the shared will is shared only insofar as my
individual will counts. They are equally essential: my indi-
vidual will is as essential as is the equality [of wills]. My
individual will is [the] cause, and the individual and universal
here appear so far apart that my will counts insofar as it is
mere will, before I have performed anything. But the perfor-
mance is [something] existent, i.e., it is the existing universal
will. Thus the division appears in the presentation of the
wills as counting for universal will [as shared] and yet as
existing [as individual]. The universal counts for the individ-
ual will, yet it is not the same.
In order really to assert the difference, I break the contract.
The other party recognized my nonexistent will and was sat-
isfied with it. The fact that it did not exist, that nothing was
done [by me], should indeed have been overcome (aufgeho-
ben)an ought, but he recognized the ought as such. Pre-
cisely in the fact that the will counts as such, there lies the
125
The Philosophy of Spirit
indifference to existence and to time.
12
This is one sense [of
the autonomy of the will], but the opposite sense is the essen-
tiality of what exists, as existing, and indeed [as existing]
against the essentiality of the will as suchi.e., against the
individual will, there exists the entity that has the signifi-
cance of the shared will, against the individuality of the will;
and this [individual will] is rather to be asserted as. prior to
[the shared or universal will].
13
This assertion [of the will as individual] is the overcoming
of that existence [i.e., of the will as shared, as universaland
with it the overcoming of the] compulsion [that says:] the
other must perform; his will (even though it is indeed will) is
not [to be] respected, because [in his participation in a] shared
will he is opposed to himself. My individual will is essential,
but at the same time it is only an element; and in that I have
already posited my individual will as a shared will, I have
posited myself in the same terms. My word must countnot
on the moral grounds that I ought to be at one with myself,
and not change my inner sentiment or conviction (for I can
change these)but [that] my will exists only as recognized.
[In going back on my word] I not only contradict myself, but
also the fact that my will is recognized; my word cannot be
relied upon, i.e., my will is merely mine (mein), mere opinion
[Meinung). The person, the pure being-for-himself, thus is not
respected as an individual will separating itself from the
shared will, but only as that shared will. I become compelled
to be a person.
14
"~~~"
(a) The contract comprises the determinate particular will
as a universal will; (b) hence its contentthe thing, which is
the medium of the relationis a particular thing, a particular
existence from which I can abstract. My contingent will con-
1
Contradiction between the ought and represented existence.
"because it posited itself as such a will, indifferent to its actual existence,
it also limits it
I4
But this limitation is one-sided, contradicted by the idea of property. I
am a person; [in the light of that idea) I am indifferent to [my property as the
content of my) existence, and [yetj I place my personality in my existence.
(This marginal note is possibly a continuation of note 13. Trans.]
126
II. Actual Spirit
cerns contingent things, as in exchange. The existent thing,
which belongs to the medium [of the relation], is something
particular. And I appear as a particular will-against the other
particular willnot as person against person. My will is not
[directed] to the person, nor is it the person, the universal as
such, that makes its appearance. Rather, the universal will is
hidden under the determinate thing. The universal will, as
sharedand as my pure will or personhoodis presented in
the particular [will]. And my pure will as such is in the lan-
guage of my declaration. My pure will has therein taken itself
back, out of the immediacy of the exchange. But it merely
signifies the particular performance; and the shared will [sig-
nifies] merely the dissolution, not of the person as such, but
of the person as particular existent. The [element of] compul-
sion [in the contract] does not touch personhood but only its
determinacy, its existence [in its particularity].
15
But according to the concept, the [particular] existence is
dissolved in [the concept of] the person, and in the universal
will. In other words, that existence is only as pure person and as
pure universal will, as pure negativity. This is the force of the
contract. Just as, in performing [in fulfillment of the contract], I
placed my will in a particular existent, but could do this only as
a person (i.e., because the will counts as being in general), so in
the same way I was compelled as personfor in this negation of
my [particular] existence, my [universal] being in general was
negated (negirt) as well, since these are indivisible.
I am reflected in myself. In compulsion, too, this comes to
light. [In the contract, it is] not this particularity that is com-
pelled; rather, it is /. The concept is therefore posited, set up,
that the universal will absorbs the individual I into itselfas
an existent which is juxtaposed to it[absorbs] the entire in-
dividual I, and that I am [eo ipso] recognized for myself as
person. Not merely my possession and my property are posit-
ed here, but also my personhood-i.e., this insofar as my exis-
tence includes my all, my honor and life.
I5
I am not limited by what the other party believesthat I ought to per-
formbut only by what is; this is what counts.
127
The Philosophy of Spirit
H i. Crime and Punishment Concerning my honor and life
there can be no contract:
16
such a contract is nullified in its
very conception, not [merely) as an individual case.
17
The con-
tract placed my will in a separable particularity. This I have
given away, as in an exchange, and what has emerged is my
existence as pure person. And this is as I now appear, as recog-
nized for my pure will. In the contract [the element of] exis-
tence has receded to a mere effect. But in the contract as such
the matter is settled. Here the necessary movement appears
to be nullified
18
the injury to my honor and life appears as
something fortuitous, contingent.
Yet this injury is necessary. I was compellednot merely
in regard to [the particulars of] my existence, but also in re-
gard to my ego, as reflected in me in my existence. The recog-
nition of my personhood, in the contract, allows me to count
as existing, my word to count for the performance. That is: I,
my bare will, is not separated from my existence; they are
equal. This very will is contradicted by compulsion and force,
for these injure me in my existence. I am insulted, as in the
movement of recognition [Anerkennen). The other person has
damaged my property, not merely in the form which is imme-
diate to me. Rather, he has injured my recognized will as
such, which he recognized as existing and as inseparably
bound up with my existence.
I consider myself injuredand indeed as a person, according
to that concept. There is an oscillation between my existence
as external and as internal (into which I placed my I). The
contradiction strikes me as an inequality between my first and
second wordbut it is the same contradiction as that between
I6
A contract concerns property, (details of one's) existence, not person-
hoodsince a contract is this mediation which sees itself in the thing, in
existence (as in family property, not a child (as| tool in the |sphere ofj will,
not yet).
l7
In the contract my word has the significance of the thing, but as a
contract involving personhood it would be my word, my immediate pure
being itself, that I introduce. There is nothing here that is bindingi.e., the
determinate aspect is personal service.
lH
I have [let us sayj kept to the contracta man of my wordi.e., count-
ing as ideally pure person, as in-itself, as being: invulnerability of the pure
person, of life or of my will as free willpure agreementthat has not yet
bound itself to an existent entity.
128
II. Actual Spirit
the I as universal and as particular.Tn other words: inasmuch
as the other party concluded a determinate deal with me, he
took my pure will as something unequal to"itelf, as the uni-
versal will which has a determinate existence.
Against coercion I therefore present my being-for-myself
not (as in the movement of recognition) my generally injured
self, but rather my injured self [as] recognized. I wish to
show the other party that he ought not to be able to compel
me
;
i.e., that my ego, bound to a determinate performance
(along with the compulsion which I suffered therein), was an
injury to my pure Self. I find my honor aggrieved, my will
negated [aufgehoben) only in the respect of this determinate
existence, but through this my putative pure will [as well]. I
appear as a person against the person of another; I negate his
being as universal, the security of his personhood. I show
him that i n this existence, this determinacy, he has injured
me as universal, and thus has conducted himself inequitably,
since the matter at issue was only concerning a particular
thing.
Thus I, in turn, stand up against him. In his performance
toward me, his will was not injured; rather, he has had his
way and has only alienated [i.e., divested himself of, given up]
a specific thing. His compulsion [of me], however, is an alien-
ation of my will. I overcome this inequality, [I regard] him as
will, just as he does me. I avenge myself on himnot as in
the state of nature [where I direct myself] merely as toward
self-conscious activity for itself, but as toward a will, i.e., a
will that here is likewise intelligence, that thinks of itself,
knows itself as universal,
19
a universal knowing, which is my
knowing as wellin other words, [I avenge myself on him] as
on someone who is recognized.
In coercion, the other party produced the shared will as
something existentand overcame my individual will, which
I alone recognize. My will as such is for me the equal of the
universal will. And since it is injured, deprived of existence, I
now produce it [i.e., re-assert it]so that I negate the other's
l9
what is shared is something that was posited through me as a shared will
129
The Philosophy of Spirit
being which had posited his will as universal, opposed to my
will which did not prevail.
I thereby commit crime, acts of violence, theft, injury, etc.
The verbal injury transcends all this as a universal crime.
20
[In
committing it,] I do not say [about someone] that he has done
me this or another evil, but that he is this. The verbal insult
places him in the universal, as negated. A judgment posits
[e.g.] the tree to be green, [that] it is greeni.e., the judgment
is not [intended as] subjective but [as] universal. Similarly, the
verbal insult transforms the victim's totality into something
that is in itself a nullity. [On the other hand,] the real injury
negates him as a willwhether it be that I steal from him [by
stealth or] rob him [in a hold-up]: in the former, attacking his
unknowing existence, and altogether ignoring his being and
will, but acting against it; in the latter, openly acting against
his existing self-expressive will. The one works underhand-
edly, the other (is openly] injurious.
21
Open murder (not
through deception) is finite, is generally the least under-
handed, yet is the greatest injury. For underhandedness con-
sists in relating to another person as nonexistent, [while I]
retain the form of inwardness, so that my deed does not come
to light, cannot be grasped for what it truly is, but remains
cunningly reflected in itself.
The inner [subjective] source of crime is the coercive force
of the law. Exigency and so forth are [merely] external causes,
belonging to [one's] animal needs. But crime as such is di-
rected at the person as such and his knowing of it, for the
criminal is intelligence: his inner justification is this coer-
cion, the reinstatement of his individual will to power, [his
wish] to count for something, to be recognized. He wants to
be something (like Herostratus*), not necessarily to be fa-
2O
culpa [Latin: fault, blame, failure, defect, negligence); dolus [Latin: de-
ceit, fraud, cunning, treachery]
2l
Theft does not injure the knowing will, (isj secret; (in robbery) the injury
is greater, since it is in the knowing will in its completeness. In robbery I-
attack the other, his intelligence, but only in (a particular aspect of] his
existence, not his pure Being, [his] life. The master's absolute power over a
life, this [is] infinite.
* |Herostratus set fire to the Temple of Artemis in order to immortalize
himself. Trans.]
130
II. Actual Spirit
mous but only to have his will pssvail, in opposition to the
universal will.
The consummated crime is [a function, .of] the will that
knows itself as individual, as being-for-itself, having come
into existence despite the power of the other will that knows
itself as universal will. But this crime is the animation, the
activation, the arousal (to activity) of the universal will. The
universal will is active. The recognized activity is universal,
not individualthat is to say, it is a transcendence [Aufhe-
ben) of the individual will.
Punishment is this overturn, it is retribution as [that] of the
universal will. The essence of punishment does not rest on a
contract [that has presumably been broken], nor [on the aim
of] deterring others, nor [on] rehabilitating the criminal.
Rather, the essence of punishment, its concept, is this transi-
tion, the inversion of the injured universal recognition (Aner-
kanntseyn). It is revenge, but as justice. That is to say, the
recognition which is in itself and was damaged externally is
to be restored.
The criminal is done by as he has done, inasmuch as he had
constituted himself as a power against another, [taking] the
universal as his power, and indeed the universal as suchnot
the individual, as in [personal] vengeance. Revenge can be
just, but here it is justice.
(a) The injured party is recognized in himself; everything
proceeds in the element of recognition, of Right. Dolus, the
crime, has this significance: that the one doing the injury has
previously recognized the injured; that the criminal (usually
the thief) knew what he did, not [necessarily] its determinate
scope, but its general determinacy; that he knew it to be
prohibited, and knew that in this act he does injury to a per-
son, such as is recognized in himself; that he [the criminal]
lives in the element of recognition; [and] that whatever exists
derives its meaning in such recognition.
22
(b) It thereby happens that the injured party suffers no in-
22
The one who believes himself injured attacks the other in his life, his
being, which is immediately one with his being-for-selfa quantitative
relation.
131
The Philosophy of Spirit
jury to his honor. The honor of the one who is robbed or
murdered is not aggrieved, for he is recognized in himself. In
other words, his being-recognized existsnot as in the state
of nature, [where] honor was attacked through injury done to
possessions, i.e., a being-recognized that is as yet only in
thought. The verbal injury injures one's honor, but not abso-
lutely; the injured party is not without rights. In himself, the
one without honor is also without rights.
23
Through this movement, the being-recognized has been
realized, presented as:
(a) comprising in itself the determinate existence and the
particular will; in the surrender of itself to maintain itself in
its expression, retaining its will;
(b) this will as such, as the individual will, as the will
existing in the contract; return into particularity, crime as
though this [individual will] were [the will] as such, crime [as]
loss of the particularity of being through the universal will;
the reconciled universal will, counting absolutely as such
[this is the] deterrent to crime: looking upon the law as the
absolute power, not the power of the individual.
B. The Coercive Law
1
The law is the substance of the person, and has these as-
pects to it:
(a) That this substance is the mediation of the person with
himself in his immediate existencethe substance of his ex-
istence, resting entirely on [his being in] community with
"In death [is] the absolute power, the lord over the individuali.e., the
common will has become pure being.
'The law is different from the being-recognized [Anerkanntseyn], in that
it encloses the Self of the individual within it, in regard to (a) his existence
and (b) his knowingintelligent being-recognized: (a) substance, (b) so that he
knows this universal as such and knows himself therein. These elements
appear in every individual act: that each act subsists in the universal sub-
stance; that the agent knows it; (and) that his particular being is immediately
universal. It is, and is object, as essenceand as something not alien, but as
that in which each agent knows himself. The movement of this intelligent
common life [Gemeinwesen) is his fulfillment, as coercive power.
132
II. Actual Spirit
others,
2
hence the absolute necessity of the same. At the
same time, the totality is nothing more than this universal
subsistence,
3
in which the individual personals transcended,
negated (aufgehoben). That is to say, the totality alone is pro-
vided for, not the individual as such, who is rather sacrificed
to the universal.
(b) The individual counts as possessing property. The uni-
versal [element] is the substance of the contract, i.e., this very
existence, this validation of the shared will. The individual is
person, his security[is] justice, the power which sustains
him as pure being,
4
the power of his life, the power over his
life, as over the maintenance of his subsisting existence.
(c) The individual's existence, within that power, is now
his own process of becoming the universal, education.* That
is, this empowered law has two sides: the individual subsist-
ing in it, and his becoming individual. The subsisting [of the
individual], however, is in general his own self-movement.
The force of the law is in itself, or the Substance.
5
It is this
for the individualan object [for him] which is his essence,
2
In his being-other [Andersseyn] [he is] himselfa will in commonand
indeed [knows] himself as pure abstraction (death) or pure knowing.
3
[There is a] difference [between the case] where the common will is yet to
be created through agreement and specific declaration (as in marriage and
contract) and where the common will already counts as existing (as in inheri-
tance). Law: (a) the mere existence and maintenance of the common will
which has come to be; (b) where there is no [express] will, [there is] the
[implicit] reception of the concept as in-itself[as in] kinship, the content of
law; (c) the law is the existing in-itself [das daseyende Ansich), taking the
place of the living [as in the] guardianship of minors, asserting the right of the
individual as such.
4
Law [is] of the will as such, and of existence.
*[See note 26 in the chapter "Will." Trans.}
5
Content and movement of the law: the law is thus immediate, as is its
content. It is not yet a moral code, not alive, but abstract. As law it is the
existence of the common will of different [individuals] over one individual
thing. They serve in place of the law, coming to a common will regarding a
specific relation, and this they declare (erkldren). The freedomto keep to a
contract or notis thereby cancelled. Insofar as the individual is pure person,
life, will as such, he is the immediate object of the law. That which is not
specified by the law is permitted (i.e., the unspecifiable by law as abstraction).
The law as such can only forbid [verboten], it cannot bid [geboten]because
the individual will is the initiator here, and a common will must still come
into being by its own means. What is individual is the actual, [as] against its
abstraction.
133
The Philosophy of Spirit
his in-itself [sein Ansich)and he himself is the life of that
substance. First he becomes, in himself, the universal con-
sciousness, the dead dull consciousness, then a cultivated
consciousness, maintaining itself in its own pure abstraction.
i. [Law and Marriage] The law as the subsistence of the
individual's immediate existence: he is immediately in it, as a
natural totality; he exists |as it were] as family. He counts as
this natural whole, not as a person (this he has yet to be-
come). He is, first, [in a situation of] immediate being-
recognized; he is someone bound through [the ties of] love.
This tie is a totality of many relations [i.e., functions]: natural
procreation, a shared life together, care, acquisition, child-
raising. The tie [makes up] this whole; the individual is ab-
sorbed in it. It is as this totality that he exists for the law, for
the universalthus it is [in] marriage, not for this or another
purpose, but as the universal. This [is] a total movement in
itselfbeing-recognized, love, regard in care, activity, work,
recapitulation in the child, procreationyet just therein a dis-
solution [of individuality], a grasp of the totality.
This self-enclosed totality is not a contractual tie
;
the
parties contract their property, certainly, but not their bodies.
It is a barbaric view on the part of Kant [to regard marriage as
a contract] for the use of one's sexual organs, with the rest of
the body included in the bargain.* (Soldiers could also force
the marriage partners together in this fashion.)
So that there be no marriage between those too closely
related, there is a positive law governing marriageset in op-
position to the concept of love. [The partners] are to find each
other as independent, naturally free [individuals], not as im-
mersed in immediate [familial] recognition. Those related are
of the same blood, the same recognition [Aneikanntseyn). Al-
ready in this degree of kinship the indeterminacy begins,
more so in regard to further aspects. Concurrence of both
persons: for the law, marriage is will, insofar as both parties
are persons. Both parties [must] concur as to whether they
'(See Kant, Philosophy of Law {1797), sees. 24-27. Trans.]
134
II. Actual Spirit
want to marry, whether they want"this totality called mar-
riage in the universal sense (not in the individual sense as in
the contract); and, since each is to count ndiTas an [isolated]
individual but as a family member, the families of both [must
also] concur.
Marriage is this very mixture of the personality with the
impersonality of the naturalwhich determines the divine as
something natural (that is the spiritual [element] in this nat-
uralness) and not only determines the will. Accordingly, mar-
riage is a religious act yet as far as the will is concerned it is
a civil matter to be brought before the law.
The religious and the civil coincide, as in the concurrence
of persons and of families. The law, as pure will, is freedom
from particularity[the freedom] of persons, of their natural
character, as well as [their freedom from] the particular ele-
ments into which the marriage-relation can be analyzed.
6
This free vitality and the pure law are in mutual interplay
with one another. The pure volition is the result of the living
movement, which has as its being that abstractness, pure
thoughtand the law enters in only from the side of pure
volition, the wish to declare oneself.
The law is that which has encompassed nothing of the many
aspects of individuality; it is not yet the living spirithence
this empirical opposition [between free vitality and purely for-
mal, empty law]. According to the empty law, marriage is in-
dissoluble because the parties have declared their will.
7
But
this view is entirely one-sided. The law, as fulfilled, must take
account of the vitality that is free of the law: withdrawal from
the shared unity of persons in themselves (adultery, willful
desertion, temperamental incompatibility*) [can be grounds
for dissolution]determinations which affect the law's con-
tent. Whether the [higher] purpose of marriage is fulfilled posi-
tively is no concern of the law. A marriage has been estab-
'The law does not compel marriage.
7
The abstract law comes into conflict with that which lives. Such law is
the empty pure will; it must recognize its abstractness and yield to the
fulfilled will. The law is still the non-living universality.
[Hegel uses the French phrase: incompatibilite d'humeur. Trans.]
135
The Philosophy of Spirit
lished: [as to the] possibility of marriage[questions of
whether there is] not too great a difference in age, and [of] the
possibility of supporting oneselflaws remain indeterminate
regarding this content. The break-up of marriage reflects the
positive will of someone who wishes to be separated.
In the eyes of the law, or in itself, marriage is not enacted by
the [mere] promise of marriage, nor by cohabitation, but
through the declared willthe expression is what counts.
Similarly, marriage is in itself not dissolved by adultery, will-
ful desertion, incompatibility, bad economic management
but [only] if both parties see these as grounds and want the
dissolution. The question is, however, whether what the par-
ties see is [truly] so in itselfand conversely, whether what is
[truly] so in itself is what the parties want to see. Their prior
will to marry is changed, but their subsequent will to separate
can change as well. The rigid law could fix itself on the first
will and declare the marriage indissoluble, or consider the nat-
ural factor, the in-itself, and dissolve the marriage. The natural
factore.g., the impossibility of marriage because of too great
a difference in age
;
dissolution because of adultery; positive
injury which is in itself willful (not an empty "in-itself" [such
as] infertility)
8
is the most determinate, i.e., the form of uni-
versality but no [final] determination. Legislation must see
how this is to be resolved, to settle on this or another deter-
mining factor[the] determination, [the] being [of the mar-
riage] concerning other vital purposes [and factors]: military
service, depopulation, the character of social classes, * etc.
In regard to marriage, the individual is seen in the light of
his volition,- but as living, [he is seen] only as being at one
with the familyhe has renounced his natural isolation. It is
in this regard that the family has property: it is the property
not of the individual but of the family. If a member dies, this
accident does not touch the family, and it remainshence
inheritance. It is not the first one who comes along who takes
possession; the state of nature does not enter here. [There is
8
Marriage as the general protection against contingency, and other rela-
tionships.
[Concerning "classes" [Stdnde], see my footnote on p. 162. Trans.)
136
II. Actual Spirit
the] ground of inheritance. Yet the^mdividual is likewise pure
person; it is his property, and as such he is universal: [the
pure person, as testator] does not die; it is Ms declared will
which counts in the disposition of his property, not his being
alive or deadjust as a contract is not annulled by the death
of one of the contracting parties, if his will can be fulfilled
without his being alive.
The dead cannot marry one another, any more than a living
person can marry a heavenly spouse. But in order for one
person to receive the property of another, the recipient need
not [yet] be among the living. Yet this disposition of property
by the individual contradicts [the concept of linear] inheri-
tance. This cannot be mediated in any absolute manner, but
the one [approach] is to be limited by the other in a determi-
nate way. There are bizarre whims in regard to willsas in
the will of Thellusson*fortuitousness, but even here one
must see how this is to be made right in a reasonable manner,
and there must be [some] compromise. The rigidity of the law
is to be applied as much as possible, as long as it is not
excessively so. The will [of the testator] is to be respected
above all.
The law is likewise indeterminate with regard to children
as sucha mixture of their own and yet alien wills. Hence
contracts involving minors are not binding before the law.
The determining factors are maturity (which becomes less of
a determining factor in time), and guardianship. Next the
family enters in;
9
but the supervision on the part of the law
[Thellusson was an English banker who put his vast fortune into a fund
which could not be touched by his sons or grandsons. A commission of
trustees was to invest the money in landed property. Only when the sons and
grandsons had died was the fortune to be divided and distributed among their
descendants. This could hardly take place before seventy years had elapsed,
since some of the grandsons were still children at the time. The fortune was
to be divided into three parts (of 18 million pounds sterling each) for the
descendants of the three sons. The case became a cause celebre and was
heard at the Court of Chancery, before the Lord Chancellor and two other
judges. It was argued that such a vast sum, held in private hands, might have
serious consequences for the economy. The case was reported in the Allge-
meine Zeitung in January, 1799. According to Hegel's biographer, Rosenkranz
(1844), Hegel was a reader of this newspaper. Trans.]
9
Here the law steps in positively, as it does in regard to education.
137
ne Philosophy of Spirit
supplements the family's incompleteness [by serving] as the
pure will of immediate parents.
10
ii. [Law and Property] This law [relating to] the individual's
immediate existence is, as law, the will of the parents, or
sustains their will as such. In the disappearance of the contin-
gent being (death of the parents), the law becomes positive,
taking over the existence which they previously were: the
state [takes charge]. Law is the actual validation of property,
the element of actual existence through the will of all. The
law protects the family, leaves it in its beingbut like the
family, the law is the substance and the necessity of the indi-
vidual. It is the unconscious guardianship over the individual
whose family has "died out" i.e., insofar as he appears as
individual. It is the substance and necessitythe rigid aspect
in which the law presented itself.
Law is the universal right, property in general, protecting
each one in his immediate possession, inheritance and ex-
change. But this is merely formal right, which remains quite
free in regard to content (the element of chance in inheri-
tance). The individual presents himself as earning by means
of labor. Here, his law is only that whatever he works upon or
exchanges belongs to him. But the universal is at the same
time his necessity, a necessity which sacrifices him in his
legal freedom [die ihn bey seiner Rechtsfreiheit aufopfert).
(a) The universal [i.e., the social substance] is pure neces-
sity for the individual worker. He has his unconscious exis-
tence in the universal. Society is his "nature," upon whose
elementary, blind movement he depends, and which sustains
him or negates him spiritually as well as physically. The indi-
vidual exists through immediate property or inheritance,
completely by chance. He works at an abstract labor; he wins
much from nature. But this merely transforms itself into
another form of contingency. He can produce more, but this
reduces the value of his labor; and in this he does not emerge
from universal [i.e., abstract] relations.
10
Education, state institutions, contingency. Family will is to be respect-
ed; law.
138
II. Actual Spirit
(b) Needs are thereby diversifieS-each individual need is
subdivided into several; taste becomes refined, leading to fur-
ther distinctions. [In the production of goods-a* degree of] prep-
aration is demanded which makes the consumable thing ever
easier to use. And so that all of the individual' s incongruous
aspects are provided for (e.g., cork, corkscrew, candlesnuffer),
he is cultivated as naturally enjoying [them] (er wird gebildet
als naturlich geniessendes).
(c) By the same token, however, he becomesthrough the
abstractness of labormore mechanical, duller, spiritless.
The spiritual element, this fulfilled self-conscious life, be-
comes an empty doing [leeres Thun). The power' of the Self
consists in a rich [all-embracing] comprehension; this power
is lost. He can leave some work to the machine, but his own
activity thereby becomes more formalized. His dull work con-
stricts hi m to a single point, and his work becomes more
consummate the more one-sided it becomes.
Yet this multiplicity creates fashion, mutability, freedom
in the use of forms. These thingsthe cut of clothing, style of
furnitureare not permanent. Their change is essential and
rational, far more rational than staying with one fashion and
wanting to assert something as fixed in such individual forms.
The beautiful is subject to no fashion,- but here there is no
free beauty, only a charming beauty (eine reitzende Schon-
heit)* which is the adornment of another person and relates
itself to [yet] another, a beauty aimed at arousing drive, desire,
and which thus has a contingency to it.
Similarly incessant is the search for ways of simplifying
labor, inventing other machines, etc. In the individual' s skill
is the possibility of sustaining his existence. This is subject to
all the tangled and complex contingency in the [social] whole.
Thus a vast number of people are condemned to a labor that is
totally stupefying, unhealthy and unsafein workshops, fac-
tories, mines, etc.shrinking their skills. And entire branch-
es of industry, which supported a large class of people, go
dry all at once because of [changes in] fashion or a fall in
[See Kant, Critique of Judgment, par. 13. Trans.]
139
The Philosophy of Spirit
prices due to inventions in other countries, etc.and this
huge population is thrown into helpless poverty.
The contrast [between] great wealth and great poverty ap-
pears: the poverty for which it becomes impossible to do any-
thing; [the] wealth [which], like any mass, makes itself into a
force. The amassing of wealth [occurs] partly by chance,
partly through universality, through distribution. [It is] a
point of attraction, of a sort which casts its glance far over the
universal, drawing [everything] around it to itselfjust as a
greater mass attracts the smaller ones to itself. To him who
hath, to him is given. Acquisition becomes a many-sided sys-
tem, profiting by means or ways that a smaller business can-
not employ. In other words, the highest abstraction of labor
pervades that many more individual modes and thereby takes
on an ever-widening scope. This inequality between wealth
and poverty, this need and necessity, lead to the utmost dis-
memberment of the will, to inner indignation and hatred.
This necessity, which is the complete contingency of individ-
ual existence, is at the same time its sustaining substance.
State power enters and must see to it that each sphere is
supported. It goes into [various] means and remedies, seeking
new markets abroad, etc., [but] thereby making things all the
more difficult for one sphere, to the extent that state power
encroaches to the disadvantage of others.
Freedom of commerce: interference must be as inconspicu-
ous as possible, since commerce is the field of arbitrariness.
The appearance of force must be avoided; and one must not
attempt to salvage what cannot be saved, but rather employ
the suffering classes in other ways. (The state power] is the
universal overseer; the individual is merely entrenched in in-
dividuality. Commerce is certainly left to its own devices
but with the sacrifice of this generation and the proliferation
of poverty, poor-taxes and institutions.
Yet the [social] substance is not only this regulatory law, as
the power that sustains individuals. Rather, it is itself produc-
tive [of a] general benefit, the benefit of the whole [Gut des
Ganzen).
Taxes [are of two types:] direct taxes on fixed property, and
140
II. Actual Spirit
indirect taxes. Only the former type is in accordance with the
physiocratic system. Raw materials alone are the abstract
base, but [this is] itself a distinct particutarthat appears too
limited; it is abandoned. This branch is missing in the total-
ity, and then incomes are lessened. The tax system must es-
tablish itself everywhere, make its appearance inconspicu-
ously, taking a little from everyone, but everywhere. If it is
disproportionate on one branch, it is abandoned. Less wine is
consumed if heavy taxes are imposed on it. For everything
there is a substitute that can be found, or one does without.
But even so, this necessity turns against itself. The costs of
detection become more considerable, the discontent ever
greater, since the enjoyment of everything is spoiled and is
entangled with complicated details. State wealth must be
based as little as possible on the landed estates (Domdnen),
but rather on taxes. The former are private property and con-
tingent, exposed to waste, since no one seems to lose thereby
but either gains or hopes to gain. Taxes are felt by all, and
everyone wants to see them used well.
iii. [Judicial Force] This elementary necessity or contin-
gency of the individual touches upon judicial force. The
individual is contingent in his actual property, ability, and
understanding (e.g., that a contract is to be kept); but [seen
in] more universal terms, he is essential as possessing prop-
erty in general, i.e., the abstract right.
11
The state is the
existence [Daseyn), the power of right; the keeping of a
contract (and of the permanence in its unutilized property);
it is the existent unity of the word, of ideal existence and
of actuality, as well as the immediate unity of possession
and right: property as universal substance, permanence; the
being-recognized as what counts. To count is the mediation
of the immediate, which has thereby become immediate.
Just as it is immediate subsistence, the [social] substance
here is also the universal lawand the maintenance of this
abstraction vis-a-vis the individual, his known and wanted
"The individual has his supposed right only in the universal.
141
The Philosophy of Spirit
necessity for him, and the attempted balance of this empty
necessity with his existence.
(a) This substance is the subsistence and protection of im-
mediate property, the universal will and its power, the power
of all individuals.
(b) It is the protection of the contract, of the declared com-
mon will, the bond of the word and its execution. And if the
word is not acted upon, [the social substance provides] the
movement producing the action [by enforcing it]. Judicial
force: it insists that the contract be fulfilled. What is [a da-
tum] for it is the shared will, which counts as essential.
The ambiguity of the ought,
12
an ambiguity embedded in the
very concept of contract, has disappeared [in favor of the must].
Posited in it, as what counts, is the will which is distinct from
the immediacy of the performance. The will is there [ist da),
the other party is satisfied with this. But this being-there (Da-
seyn) is merely that of the particularsomething immediate,
not mediated. At the moment of agreement
13
it is thus present
[vorhanden]yet this same unmediated being-present [Vor-
handenseyn) no longer counts, but only a being-present as
shared will, as mediated. The meaning [Bedeutung) counts.
The other party has, to be sure, recognized me as not yet per-
forming [what is specified in the contract], but within the
meaning of the shared will. This meaning is what counts in the
law. The meaning is the inner, the pure personthe law is this
meaning.
In the death penalty [for example], all ambiguity of mean-
ing or existence is overcome [aufgehoben). I am there as I am
in myself, according to the meaningnot the meaning I par-
ticularly introduce but rather according to the meaning of the
common will.
14
The law therefore compels here. Against my
particular meaning, the law carries out the common meaning;
'^Command is lawpure I, pure abstraction in the lawthrough punitive
force.
l3
The individual has externalized [i.e., alienated, divested himself of] his
presumed right. Command is the law which has force.
l4
Over the individual [case] there is no absolute universal will, but a
common will [keinen absoluten allgemeinen. sondem gemeinsamen Willen).
142
II. Actual Spirit
[carries it out] against my [particular] existence, my in-
itselfin other words, against my particular Self, [there is
posited] my universal Self (gegen mein 'besonderes Selbst,
mein allgemeines).
Through this [legal] compulsion, my honor is no longer in-
jured(cultivation)
15
since [external] compulsion does not
comprise my [internal] subjection,- the disappearance of my
selfhood vis-a-vis another Self. Rather, [what is at issue is] my
selfhood with respect to myself, my selfhood as particular with
respect to myself as universaland indeed this universal not
as [mere] power but as the power of the law, which I recognize.
That is, my negative meaning has equally a positive meaning; I
am equally sustained in it. This is likewise all to the good for
me: I am sustained not only in my thoughts, [or sense of] hon-
or, but also in my being.
16
However, the contingency enters here in other ways. In the
concept, this was the contingency in the performance [i.e.,
fulfilling a contract]. Here, [contingency is in] the determining
of the abstract law in its content, generally many-sided, in the
manifold determinations of the individual [case]. The simpler
the laws, the more indeterminate; the more determinate the
laws, the more manifold they are and the further our differen-
tiations are driven. And the concrete individual case is
thereby dissected [zerlegt] all the more, and relates itself to
that many more laws. Since the universal is here applied di-
rectly to the particular (in order that the particular may sub-
sist), there arises the "bad infinity/
7
[To aim at] a complete
legislation in all its fullness is to set out on the same sort of
thing as, for example, wanting to specify all colors. Unending
process of legislation.
The greater this multiplicity of laws becomes, the more
contingent our knowledge of them becomes. Citizens are sup-
posed to know the laws even if they do not understand them,
1
Cultivation: seeing oneself in the universal. At first, people must be
compelled, like animals. [This marginal note occurred further down in the
paragraph, connected to the sentence: "This is likewise all to the good for
me. . . . " Trans.]
16
Because I have positive significance, I do not retain my opinion against
this lawnothing for myself.
143
The Philosophy of Spirit
i.e., do not know themselves in the laws (that is, how the
laws apply in their particular cases). Butto say nothing of
the citizens knowing themit also becomes more difficult
for judges to know the lawsand even if they do, it is in-
creasingly difficult for them to have the laws in memory in
every case. [There is] no collection of laws, [but at best] a
mass of contradictory laws, since we do not know what has
been "bidden" or "forbidden/' The contingency becomes all
the greater in regard to the perspicacity of the judge in apply-
ing the law skillfully to the case at hand[his] presence of
mind.
The administration of justice and legal process is thus the
carrying out of right. It is the proper protection for carrying
out the right of both parties before the law, sustaining their
means of defense for them. The legal process is almost more
essential than the laws themselves. Here the same contrast
enters: to the extent that legal costs are greater, it becomes
less possible for the one most in need of legal protection to
cover the cost. The more admirable the trial proceedings, the
longer they take
;
in short, it is a great evil to all concerned.
Compensation for damages is not completely fortuitous
there is an element of time involved.
17
The law must soften its strictness: (a) by seeking accom-
modation rather than promoting the strict [application of the]
law, [by establishing] committees of arbitration (with which
[as it happens] the jurists are dissatisfied); (b) by the imposi-
tion of penalties on parties seeking litigation [for its own
sake], and on pettifogging counsel; (c) by increasing the legal
costs and, particularly in higher cases, etc., making the laws
more difficult,
18
so that people will seek easier ways out. Yet
at the same time care must be taken to insure that whoever
has the desire can go into a matter in its length and breadth. It
is a delusion to want to find an absolute determination in
such temporally determinate, concretely sensory things and
relations as such.*
l7
Timereciprocity, ruin of entire individuals. Telescoping on a certain
time (is like using a| surgical instrument |in) medicine.
l8
The remedy for an evil is, in turn, itself an evil.
144
r
//. Actual Spirit
iv. [Law, Life, and Death] The administration of penal jus-
tice is the force of the law over the life of the individual. The
law is his absolute power itself over his life-,--#ince the law is
his essence as pure universal will, i.e., as the disappearance of
his will as a particular being, a particular life, hi the same
manner, the law is the release from [the guilt of] crime, and
the pardon. It is as much the lord over the evil life as over the
pure life. For the law, [which speaks in universal terms], it is
as though the [particular] deed had not happened; the existent
(das daseyende) as such has no truth for it.*
This power over all existence, all property and life, and
likewise over thoughtthe right and good and evilthis is
the shared life of the community [Gemeinwesen), the living
nation. The law is alive, a complete and self-conscious life. As
the universal will, which is the substance of all actuality, [it
is] the knowledge of itself as the universal power [over] all
that lives, over every determination of the concept and over
all essential being.
(a) It is universal wealth and universal necessitywhich
comes to be known as such, knowingly recognized as such
[and] comes to be sacrificed to this evil; and it thereby allows
all individuals in general and their [particular] existence to
become a part [of it], so that it can use them. It [i.e., the
system of universal wealth and necessity] condemns a multi-
tude of people to a raw life, to stultification in labor and to
povertyin order to let others amass wealth and [then] to
take it from them. The inequality of wealth is accepted if
heavy taxes are levied; this lessens envy and averts the fear of
distress and robbery. Aristocrats, who pay no taxes, stand in
the greatest danger of losing their wealth through violence,
since they cannot find reconciliation by sacrificing it. State
power [extends over] the individual's existence and subsis-
tence, his necessity and freedom[all of] which he buys by
becoming reconciled to that power. The government wastes
its wealth, saves nothing.
*[Note: at the points in the text above and on page 144 marked by aster-
isks, there were lengthy marginal notes. These have been combined, as (A)
and (B), and placed on pages 14649. Trans.]
145
The Philosophy of Spirit
(b) In the law, the government is regarded as the supposed
essence, and gains respect for itself. Likewise it leaves indi-
viduals with the delusion that they will attain their rights,
and gives t hem this confused opinion of themselves whereby
they see themselves as persons, citizens, as abstract univer-
sals worthy of respect at home; respect sustains the abstract
universal. The government thereby has the goodness to cor-
rect its [system of] right by means of arbitration and reason-
ableness. It is as much the master of the one as of the other
[over) abstract universality or [particular] existence.
(c) Finally, government is the power over life and death, the
[element that instills] fear in the individual. But it is the
master over pure evil. It is the divine spirit, which knows the
absolute other, the evil, the simple other (in thought as such)
as itself.
These are its forces or abstract elements. It has as yet no
existence in which these elements are reflected in them-
selves.
Penal jurisdiction
19
is based on two things: (a) that the uni-
versal is the substance of the individual, and (b) that it is the
substance as known and wanted. He who has given up his
right has externalized (entdussert) himself as an abstract uni-
versal, i.e.: (i) as positive, he counts as someone living, and as
pure will against force, and is protected; (ii) as living and as
will, he has given himself over into the power of the state.
Through the renunciation {Entdusserung) of my supposed
right I am a pure person,
20
but I am so only insofar as I am
law. My existence is the law, i.e., I am utterly dependent
upon it.
Notes to Pp. 144-45 (A) The individual is by legal right (recht-
lich) a person, and juridical force is the movement that is the
externalization [Entdusserung) of his legal rightof his sup-
posed essence. In regard to his existence, he counts as someone
having his will in his existence, and his quiescent particular
will is respected. Yet inasmuch as he has surrendered,
[9
in itself, revenge is just
2O
the existent evil intention [culpa, dolus)
146
II. Actual Spirit
to the universal, his opinion of ii^iV\l\Aeynen von Recht), he
counts as pure person,- and to the extent that (as pure person,
as pure will) he separates himself form the' tmiversal, he is
accounted as the evil. In civil conflict he counts not as pure
will but rather as presumed [gemeyntes) right, against the
universal, such that this presumed right ought to counti.e.,
[as] right, against the particularity of others. Deceit, fraud sur-
rounds his will, yet is directed to his knowledge.
(B) By the very fact of having given up his presumed right,
the individual presents himself as pure being-recognized
(reines Anerkanntseyn), [and] he counts as such. Just as, ear-
lier, his will [had counted] within the common will concern-
ing specific things, so his pure will now counts as such. This
pure being-recognized has immediately in itself these two as-
pects: that of being pure being-recognized (reines Anerkannt-
seyn) and [that of] being pure Being (reines Seyn zu seyn).
(a) As pure being-recognized, as will, the individual is juxta-
posed to force, to the alien will which is not the will in
common. He is protected against force in connection with his
property, his activity, and his life in general. His life is imme-
diately his pure will. Moreover, as pure will he is the abstrac-
tion of pure Being; i.e., he is no longer an opinion of his right,
as though he existed only through his opinion [as individual].
This he is no longer. [Now] he has no life of his own; i.e., the
law has complete power over his life. In his life he stands over
against the universal, wherein he is pure abstractionand
this is his essence as he recognizes it. [hi accepting this] he
has renounced [all claim to] his life as opposed to the univer-
sal. Just as it is a judge over his presumed right, so it is over
his pure being. This is the absolute power over life. The indi-
vidual knows himself positively in it.
(b) The individual standing opposed to this, however, as
absolute power for himself, is for himself absolutely infinite
willand absolute poweri.e., that which is the negating
{das Aufhebende) of another absolute individual. This other
he can negate because [the other] is being, quantitative, deter-
minable through another, unknowing. He [the first individual]
147
The Philosophy of Spirit
grasps the other in this way and thus has subjugated [him]
[as in] murder, crimehe is the evil, [but] only against the
will, force, or cunning.
(c) The law is the actual punishment, this substance which
is the inversion of the conceptso that, in punishment, the
individual has punished himself. The other is his equal, thus
[it is] he himself, not something alien. Punishment qua pun-
ishment, not as revenge. It is turned against the evil, as evil:
e.g., against fraud (a specific crime], not guilt in general. This
satisfies the concept, and the law [is] pacified; the law carries
out the right.
But this pure right is likewise laid open to contingency. In
other words, as pure right it is the abstraction that cannot
remain with itself absolutely.
(i) It has to protect the will as such, and to deflect the
other's force and damage back upon him. But in the individ-
ual, it is difficult to say where force and nonforce apply; it can
begin in the actual contract. Willing is specific will: it has
purpose, is an object for the individual, thus a relation of
knowing. It thereby impinges on otherness, the quantitative,
the contingent. The object of his knowing can be altered for
him, hidden. The link between his ends and his acts or means
is a matter of judgment. He can be made to believe that he
has achieved his purpose by a certain means, whereby he ru-
ins it [although] no actual force was used against him. [Sup-
pose] he has knowingly and willingly suffered an enormous
loss in a contract: the law, for which it is only the declared
common will that counts, here has the actual aim (as its inner
meaning) of protecting [the individual] against an extraordi-
nary injury[i.e.,] the individual will against the common
will which is esentially declared. Here we are to ascertain
(uncertainly) where the actual deception as force that is to be
punished begins.
(ii) Theft, robberythey are just such confusions. They af-
fect a particular existence: the former injuring the will unbe-
knownst, the latter injuring both will and knowing. Yet they
do not injure the absolute will but only [the will in regard to]
something determinate,- i.e., the will in a particular existent
148
II. Actual Spirit
not as pure being, not as life. And the reaction therefore can-
not be the absolute one, death. It touches only [the perpetra-
tor's] freedom, e.g., the thrashing of this particular being. On
the other hand, the apparent security may be too far compro-
mised, so that the pure will is injured therein as well: the
thief or robber, in doing injury to the [particular] will, injures
the pure willindeed, in a particular beingbut the will is
only as pure will. Thus the criminal can also get the death
penaltybut contingent circumstances [enter:] the severity
of the crime, approximate, many-sided determinations.
(iii) Actual murder: the primary thing that is essential is
the evil [intent], the imputation [that it is] not accidental
killing; but there too the motive is difficult to ascertain; it
flies back out of the simple existence of action into the Night
of Inwardness. The criminal's confession is neededsince we
mistrust the inference from external circumstances to inner
motive. This inner must express itself; it is independent of all
circumstances. The law should know that obstinacy against
such expression is not to be overcome.
(iv) Evil is that which is nothingness in itself, pure self-
knowledge; this human darkness in itself (through this itself
the absolute will) is not something alien to the law. It must
recognize this evil as itself, to pardon itor, as deed, undo
it. For even this individual deed is a drop which does not
touch the absolute but is [rather] absorbed by it. [The law is]
Spirit, and treats the person as Spirit. A deathstrokewhat
does it matter to the whole? And therein, again, it is undone
(Ungeschehenes).
149
PART III
Constitution
The state as [common] wealth is as much the
being-negated [Aufgehobenseyn] of individualized existence
as it is [the negation] of the in-itself in existence and of the
pure being-in-itself of the person. In the law alone does the
human being have his existence, his being, and thinking. The
law knows itself as the absolute forcewhich is wealth, even
as it sacrifices the general wealth; which safeguards right [i.e.,
principle], as much as reasonableness and adjustment [i.e.,
utility]; which safeguards life, and punishes with life, as it
pardons evil and grants life where it is forfeit.
Thus this Spirit is the absolute power everywhere, which
lives in itself and now must give itself this view of itself as
such, i.e., to make itself its own end (Zweck). As force it is
only the individual who is the end, i.e., the abstraction of the
individual. The Spirit's self-preservation, however, is the or-
ganization of its life, the spirit of a people, a spirit that in-
tends itself. The concept of Spirit: universality in the com-
plete freedom and independence of the individual.
Spirit is the "nature" of individuals [i.e., the realm in
which they find themselves], their immediate substance, and
its movement and necessity; it is as much the personal con-
sciousness in their existence as it is their pure consciousness,
their life, their actuality. They know the universal will as
151
The Philosophy of Spirit
their particular will, and in such a way that it is their own
externalized particular will; and at the same time they know
it as their objective [impersonal] essence, their pure power
which is their essence, in itself as well as in their knowing [of
it].
In the movement of forces there are three aspects to be
differentiated: (a) these forces themselves, as having devel-
oped through externalization; (b) as the knowledge of them on
the part of individuals; and (c) as universal knowing.
The development of the forces is the externalization
[Entdusserung), but not of necessity; rather, the force of the
universal becomes known as the [objective] essence.
1
For the
sake of this knowledge, each one alienates [entdussert) him-
self [i.e., divests himself of his own forces]
2
not as opposed
to some master, but rather as opposed to the forces [i.e., the
universal power of enforcement], here taken in the form of his
pure knowing, i.e., knowing of himself as externalized, in
other words as universal.
The general form is this development of the individual to
the universal, and the becoming of the universal. This is not a
process of blind [i.e., unknowing] necessity, however, but is
rather one that is mediated through knowing. Thus each one
is thereby his own end, i.e., the end is already the source of
movement. Each individual is his own immediate cause; his
[individual] interest drives him. Yet at the same time it is the
universal that counts for him, the medium, which ties him to
his particular [end] and to his actuality.
'From the viewpoint of the individual, the movement of these forces |isj
due to necessity.
2
This is cultivation in general: externalization of one's immediate self (inj
(a) work in general, taxes; (b) opinion, abstraction of one's concreteness from
oneself as universal, rudeness, taking offense; (c) knowing oneself as pure self,
negated.
(i) Externalization of one's particular Self, putting oneself on the side of
the universalthe universal is the book, dead letterone's life, will, is the
Self of individuals. They are one's force, all help him, one can count on the
support of all.
(ii) At the same time their pure knowing belongs to himthey know it as
their essence, their nature, their moralitypower, pure essence.
(iii) Their particular Selfthey are sustained (by it)and [by] goods, the
universal.
152
III. Constitution
In order that I may have my positive Self in the common
will, the being-recognized (as intelligence) is known by me, so
that the will is posited by me, so that I thefeftr have it nega-
tively, as my power, as the universal, which is the negative of
my own will, through the intuition of its necessity, i.e.,
through the externalization. On its side, the universal pre-
sents itself in such a way that the latter aspect [i.e., the com-
mon will] is my necessity, the former aspect [i.e., my positive
self] sacrificing itself, and thus letting me approach my own
[universality]. In this I gain [my] consciousness as conscious-
ness of myself.
Right was the immediate concept of the spirit-^the force,
the necessity of its movement, the externalizing [das Entdus-
sern), becoming other. (The universal, in that it safeguards my
life and is power over my life, is this immediate unityi.e., of
pure will and existence
3
of pure consciousness and my con-
sciousness of myself. Relating myself to the universal as this
immediate unity, I have confidence in it
4
in it, but as my
negative essence, fearconfidence in the universal that is im-
mediately my will. Not only am I in agreement with it, but in
that it is my real self, it is I who rule. It is lord,
5
public force,
and rulerin these three aspects it is [directed] toward me.)
It [the universal] is a people, a group of individuals in gen-
eral, an existent whole, the universal force. It is of insur-
mountable strength against the individual, and is his neces-
sity and the power oppressing him. And the strength that
each one has in his being-recognized is that of a people.
6
This
strength, however, is effective
7
only insofar as it is united into
a unity,
8
only as will. The universal will [dei allgemeine Will-
en) is the will as that of all and each, but as will it is simply
3
Return into oneselfin pardon. All that is actual [isj deedevil, inner,
actualis the actual, as itselfexistent, absolute certainty of oneself.
4
pure Night of being-for-itself [Fiirsichseyn], absolute knowing that is en-
tirely free of all existence
5
Real spirit, immediate otherness [Andersseyn], universal power.
^ h e concept of constitutionits universal essence.
7
Its knowing itself as object, as alien power, as individual.
8
The spirit's freedom from particularity as such, and the higher freedom
from determinate existence.
153
The Philosophy of Spirit
this Self alone. The activity of the universal is a unity [ein
Eins). The universal will has to gather itself into this unity. It
has first to constitute itself as a universal will, out of the will
of individuals, so that this appears as the principle and ele-
ment. Yet on the other hand the universal will is primary and
the essenceand individuals have to make themselves into
the universal will through the negation of their own will, [in]
externalization and cultivation.
9
The universal will is prior to
them, it is absolutely there for themthey [the two wills] are
in no way immediately die same.
One imagines for oneself the constituting of the universal
will as follows: all citizens come together,
10
they deliberate,
give their vote; and thus the majority comprises the universal
will. Thus we posit what was said: that the individual must
make himself into this [i.e., a partner in the universal will]
through negation, self-surrender. The communal entity [Ge-
meinwesen), the civil union (Staatsverein), [is thus seen to]
rest on a primordial contract, to which each individual is
presumed to have given his tacit agreementactually, how-
ever, in express termsand this determines every subsequent
action of the community. And this is the principle of the
genuine state, the free state.
More realistically, [however,] the group is presented thus:
as constituting the community [prior to the constituting of
the universal will]whether from the beginning (inasmuch as
the community does not yet exist), or that in some way a
revolution has dissolved the previous constitution. Here the
individuals appear as actual individuals, each one wanting to
know his positive will in the universal will. But their positive
individuality, since it is not yet externalized, or does not have
negativity to it in itself, is a contingency for the universal and
this [is] something actually different from these [individuals].
It is not a necessity that everyone want the same; [there is] no
9
Aristotle: the whole is, according to nature, prior to the parts. [See Aris-
totle, Politics 1:3. 1253a20, 25. Trans.]
l0
What is meant to happen is presupposedthey unite themselves for the
salce of universality(an) endthey wanted this because it is in-itself. The
conclusion |is| as in the concept of will.
154
HI. Constitution
ity. Rather, each onesince he is poSfted and recognized as an
individual positive willhas the right to leave and to come to
terms with others over something else. - -
At the same time, however, it is presupposed that they are
a universal will in itself. This "in-itself" (Ansich) is some-
thing other than their actual will, and they have not yet exter-
nalized their will, do not yet recognize the universal will.
Rather, it is only their individuality that counts in it.
11
Yet
their will is an "in-itself," it is there, it is their "in-itself"
i.e., it is their external force, which compels them.
In this way all states were established, through the noble
force of great men. It is not [a matter of] physical strength,
since many are physically stronger than one. Rather, the great
man has something in him by [virtue of] which others may
call him their lord. They obey him against their will. Against
their will, his will is their will. Their immediate pure will is
his, but their conscious will is different. The great man has
the former [i.e., their pure will] on his side, and they must
obey, even if they do not want to. This is what is preeminent
in the great manto know the absolute will [and] to express
itso that all flock to his banner [and] he is their god. In this
way Theseus established the Athenian state.
12
And thus, in
the French Revolution, it was a fearful force that sustained
the state [and] the totality- in general. This force is not despo-
tism but tyranny, pure frightening domination. Yet it is nec-
essary and just, insofar as it constitutes and sustains the state
as this actual individual.
This state is the simple absolute spirit, certain of itself, and
for which nothing determinate counts except itself. No con-
cepts of good and bad, shameful and vile, malicious cunning
and deceit [can be applied to it]. The state is elevated above all
thisfor in it, evil is reconciled with itself. It is in this great
sense that Machiavelli's The Prince is written, [saying] that in
the constituting of the state, in general, what is called assassi-
nation, fraud, cruelty, etc., carries no sense of evil but rather a
n
At first uncultivatedthe element of immediacy in general.
l2
After Solon, Peisistratus made the laws into the citizens' own.
155
The Philosophy of Spirit
sense of that which is reconciled with itself. His book has
indeed been taken as irony. Yet what deep feeling for the
misery of his fatherland, what patriotic inspiration underlies
his cold and prudent teaching[all this) he expresses in the
preface and conclusion. His fatherland, invaded and ravaged
by foreigners, and being without independenceevery noble-
man, every leader, every town regarded itself as sovereign.
The only means for establishing the state was the suppression
of these "sovereignties/
7
And indeed, since each, as immedi-
ate individual, wanted to count as "sovereign/
7
the only
means against the brutality of the leaders was death for them
and the fear of death for the rest.
13
Germans, most of all, have abhorred such teachings, and
[the term] "Machiavellianism" expresses what is most evil
because they have suffered from the very disease [he speaks
of], and have died of it. The indifference of subjects toward
their princes, however, and the [reluctance] on the part of
princes to be princes, i.e., to behave as princes, makes that
tyranny [which Machiavelli speaks of] superfluous, since the
stubbornness of the [German] princes has thereby become
powerless.
Thus the universal is against individuals as such, who want
to know their immediate positive will asserted as absolute
[as] lord, tyrant, pure forcefor the universal is something
alien to them; and the state power which knows what power
is must have the courage, in every case of need where the
existence of the totality is compromised, to take completely
tyrannous action. Through tyranny we have the immediate
alienation [Entausserung) of the individual's actual will
transcended, immediatethis is education toward obedience.
Through this educationrather knowing the universal as the
actual willstyranny has become superfluous, replaced by
the rule of law. The force exercised by the tyrant is the force
1
^Elaboration of the Nordic stubbornness of the Germans: because they
could tolerate no tyrant, they have disappeared as a people. [They were]
merely a nationthe principle of absolute individuality brought into the
worldthe existence of thought in the southern sphere of Christian reli-
gion.
156
HI. Constitution
of law, in itself. Through obediencerthe law itself is no longer
an alien force, but rather the known universal will.
14
Tyranny is overthrown by the people because it is abhor-
rent, vile, etc.but in actuality it is overthrown only because
it is superfluous. The memory of the tyrant is abhorred. Yet
in that very fact, he is also this spirit certain of itselfwho,
like God, acts only in and for himself, and expects only in-
gratitude from his people. If he were wise, however, he would
himself cast off his tyranny when it is superfluous. In this
way, however, his divinity is nothing more than the divinity
of the animal, the blind necessity, which thus deserves to be
abhorred as evil. Robespierre acted in this wayhis-power left
him because necessity had left him, and thus he was over-
thrown by force. The necessary happensbut every portion of
necessity is usually allotted only to individuals.
15
The one is
accuser and defender, the other a judge, the third a hang-
manbut all are necessary.
The rule of law is now not this legislation, as though there
were no [prior] laws.
16
Rather, there are laws thereand the
relation is the movement of [the individual] educated to obe-
dience toward the community {Gemeinwesen)-, underlying all
is this existent essence. A second [element] is trust, which
enters here, i.e., that the individual likewise knows his Self
therein, as his essence. He finds himself sustained in it.
17
Indeed, he may not conceive and understand how he is sus-
tained in it, through what connections and arrangements.
Thus the universal has a negative and a positive significance
simultaneously: the negative as tyranny, the positive in the
substenance of the individual, i.e., through the externaliza-
tion [Entdusserung] of the universal.
14
They make it their ownflattery appropriates it, which they flatter-
self-abnegation is the empowering [Bemdchtigung} of that toward which one
abnegates oneself.
15
Fear has disappeared into obedience.
16
As being in themselves [ansich seyende), the eternal laws of the gods
even if given by Solonare in themselves. The essence of thinking and
beingthere are no self-given laws. These no longer have the form of indi-
vidual will but their own.
17
[This takes the] form of immediate unity.
157
The Philosophy of Spirit
This unity of individuality and the universal
18
is now pre-
sent in a twofold way, [as] extreme poles of the universal,
which is itself individuality (i.e., of state government, [itself]
not an abstraction): the individuality of the state, whose end
is the universal as such, and the other pole of the same, which
has the individual as its end. The two individualities [are] the
same[e.g.,] the same individual who provides for himself
and his family, who works, enters into contracts, etc., like-
wise works for the universal as well, and has it as his end. In
the first sense he is called bourgeois, in the second sense he is
citoyen.
19
The universal will is obeyed as that of the majority, and is
constituted through the determinate expression of, and elec-
tion by, individuals. And those who do not share the opinion
of the majority obey as well, even if measures or laws go
against their convictions. It is their right to protest, i.e., to
retain their convictions,
20
to declare emphatically that they
indeed obey, but not from conviction. It is particularly Ger-
man to attach this tenacity to convictions, this obstinacy of
abstract will, of empty rightwithout regard to the matter at
hand. In this democracy, the will of the individual is as yet
contingent: (a) as opinion in general, he must give it up when
opposed to the majority; (b) as actual willas self, or action
the will [of the majority] is itself individual, and each individ-
ual is subject to it; its implementation posits a genuinely
willess obedience, [in which] each surrenders his opinion
about the implementation; (c) resolutions, laws, here concern
only particular circumstances; the comprehension of the con-
nection between these particular circumstances and the uni-
versalthis comprehension is the insight of all; but because
of their particularity, it is itself contingent.
The election of officials, military leaders, belongs to the
community, as an [expression of] trust in them, but which is
'"Living unityancient custom [Sittlichkeit] [i.e., the totality of moral/
ethical life).
"Provincial or cosmopolitan Burger [Spiess- und Reichsbiirger)the one
is as formally "provincial" as the other.
^tasteless
158
HI. Constitution
first to be vindicated by success. The-circumstances are al-
ways different. This is the beautiful [and] happy freedom of
the Greeks, which is and has been so envied.
2
-^,
The people [as a totality] is comprised of [individual] citi-
zens, and it is at the same time the One Individual, the gov-
ernmentthis One Individual standing only in a reciprocal
relation to itself. The externalization of the individuality of
the will [i.e., of the citizens] is the immediate support of that
will [i.e., of the government].
Yet a higher level of abstraction is needed, a greater [degree
of] contrast and cultivation, a deeper spirit. It is the [entire]
realm of ethical life (Sittlichkeit)each [individual] is custom
{Sitte), [and thus is] immediately one with the universal. No
protest takes place here, each knows himself immediately as
universali.e., he gives up his particularity, without know-
ing it as such, as this Self, as the essence. The higher distinc-
tion, therefore, is that each individual goes back into himself
completely, knows his own Self as such,
22
as the essence, [yet]
comes to this sense of self (Eigensinn) of being absolute al-
though separated from the existing universal, possessing his
absolute immediately, in his knowing. As an individual, he
leaves the universal free, he has complete independence in
himself. He gives up his actuality [in the immediate], is sig-
nificant to himself (gilt sich) only in his knowing.
23
The free universal is the point of individuality. This indi-
viduality, free of the knowledge shared by all, is not consti-
tuted through them. As the extreme pole of governmentthus
as an immediate, natural individualitythere is the hereditary
monarch. He is the firm immediate knot [tying together] the
totality. The spiritual tie is public opinion; this is the genuine
legislative body, [the real] national assemblage. [This requires]
general cultivation. [And what must be avoided is] needless
21
The individual will is identical to the universal will.
22
his Self not in the law, custom; i.e., [the] essence [is] the law; [the Self
as] the evil, which has gone into itself and for that very reason is completely
alienated, having surrendered its existence, knows another world as its own.
In actuality it is only this alienation itself which appears. Juxtaposed to this
absolute universality, there is at the same time the immediacy of being.
"Public opinionone is as rational as one's state is.
159
The Philosophy of Spirit
elaboration of committees to improve laws. [The primary aim
is the) declaration of the universal will which lives in the
execution of all commandsgovernment officials belong to
this spirit.
Governing is carried on differently now, and life is now lived
differently, in states whose constitution is yet the same,
changing little by little in the course of time. Government
must not come out on the side of the past and stubbornly
defend it. But at the same time it ought to be the last to be
convinced to change. Genuine activity, genuine will, through
the election of officialsevery sphere, city, guild [is to be] rep-
resented in the administration of their particular affairs. It is
bad for a people when it [itself] is the government, as bad as it is
irrational. The totality, however, is the medium, the free
spiritsupporting itself, free of these completely fixed ex-
tremities. The totality, however, is independent of the
knowledge [on the part of] individuals, just as it is independent
of the characters of rulers, [who are] empty knots.
This is the higher principle of the modern era, a principle
unknown to Plato and the ancients. In ancient times, the
common morality consisted of the beautiful public life
beauty (as the] immediate unity of the universal and the indi-
vidual, [the polis as] a work of art wherein no part separates
itself from the whole, but is rather this genial unity of the
self-knowing Self and its [outer] presentation. Yet individual-
ity's knowledge of itself as absolutethis absolute being-
within-itself [Insichseyn)was not there. The Platonic Re-
public is, like Sparta, [characterized by] this disappearance of
the self-knowing individuality.
24
Under that principle, the
outer actual freedom of individuals, in their immediate exis-
24
Plato did not set up an ideal, but rather grasped the state of his time in
its inner [essence|. This state has perished, however. Not that the Platonic
Republic is unfeasible on the grounds that Plato dispensed with the principle
of absolute individuality [but rather that the actually existing polis was un-
feasible without this principle). Certainly, the actual does not look like the
ideal, on the outsidebecause the observer keeps to what is immediate, to
the necessary: dissoluteness, decline, slovenliness, the viciousness of indi-
vidualswe must be able to bear [looking at these)the state is [a function
of) cunning. (See Plato, Republic, VI. Trans.]
160
HI. Constitution
tence, is lost. Yet their inner freedom^ the freedom of thought,
is sustained. Spirit is cleansed of the [elements of] immediate
existence; it has entered into its pure element-ef-Arzowing and
is indifferent to existing individuality. Here the spirit begins
to be knowledge; i.e., its formal existence is that of self-know-
ing. Spirit is this Nordic essence that is in itself, although it
has its existence in the selfhood of all.
(a) According to this principle, the multitude of individuals
is a folkgroup (Volksmenge) juxtaposed to one of its individu-
als who is the monarch. They are manymovement, fluid-
itywhile he is the immediate, the natural. He alone is the
natural element, i.e., the point to which nature has fled, its
last residue as positive. The royal family is the one positive
element, the others are to be abandoned.
25
The other individ-
ual [i.e., the citizen] counts only as externalized, cultivated, as
that which he has made of himself. The totality, the commu-
nal entity [Gemeinwesen), is as little tied to the one as to the
other. It is the self-sustaining, indestructible body. Regardless
of the prince's or the citizens' characteristics, the communal
entity is self-enclosed and self-sustaining.
26
(b) Just as free as each individual is in his knowing, in
his outlook (as varied as it is)so [likewise] free are the
forces, the individual aspects of the totality, [its] abstract
elements, [e.g.,] labor, production, the legal climate, admin-
istration, the military; each develops itself entirely accord-
ing to its one-sided principle. The organic whole has many
internal parts which [are complete in themselves and] de-
velop in their abstractness [contributing to the totality]. Not
every individual is a manufacturer, peasant, manual laborer,
soldier, judge, etc.; rather, [the roles] are divided, each indi-
25
The [monarch) alone is born to it, immediate willi.e., great individual-
ity, energy of willing, absolute resolution, of a will in itself [expressed as:] we
command (Wir befehlen).
26
Not the artificiality of legislative, etc., powerSelf is the highestfree
surrender of forces, of necessity.
Cunning: letting each individual do [as he will], each looks out for him-
self, [but this] flows into the universalhigher self-reflection of spirit. Guar-
antee against arbitrariness: general constitution of classes [Stdnde], not
landed classes [Landstdnde). Universal reason [is] the reason of a people, as
clever as the arrangements arefluidity of everything individual.
161
The Philosophy of Spirit
vidual belongs to an abstraction, and he is a totality for him-
self in his thinking [although the totality exists only in the
combination].
27
There are thus three sorts [of aspects] to be developed here:
first, the elements of the totality, the firm outer organization
and its internal parts, [and] the forces associated with them;
28
second, the outlook {Gesinnung) of each class, its self-con-
sciousnessits being as in itself purely knowing, torn loose
from its [immediate] existence; [third,] spirit's knowing its
member, as such, and [his] elevation above [that immediacy].
The first comprises social mores (Sittlichkeit)) the second is
morality (Moialitdt); * the third [aspect] is religion. The first is
the freely released spiritual nature; the second is its knowing
of itself, as knowing of that knowing; the third is spirit know-
ing itself as absolute spirit, [e.g.,] religion.
A. Classes:* The Nature of Self-Ordering Spirit
The spirit
1
knowing itself to be all actuality and all essen-
tialitylooks at itself, is its own object; i.e., it is for itself an
^Organization of spirit: duty, morality, raising each one above his class,
(a) Naturei.e., the class of individuality; (b) universal classits end the
universalbusinessman, scholar, soldier, and government (official); (c) reli-
gion, philosophy, existing spirit.
M
Class (Stand) and the spirit of a class. It is actually this distinct spirit
that develops itself, from crude trust and labor, on to the self-knowledge of
the absolute spirit. It is at first the [general] life of a people as suchfrom
which the spirit must free itself, (a) Its consciousness is in the particular, the
first three classes; (b) its object becomes the universal in, [e.g.,1 the business
class.
|In the Philosophy of Right, Moralitdt is the inferior product of "subjec-
tive individuality in opposition to the universal," to be fulfilled in the total-
ity that is Ethical Life [Sittlichkeit). In the Phenomenology of Spirit, however,
it is Sittlichkeit that is inferior, as the edifice of nonreflective social mores to
be surpassed by self-conscious morality. Trans, j
11 Although Hegel does go on to use the term Klasse, and his notion of the
Stande. here and in the Philosophy of Right, is closer to the early modern
sense of "estate" or "social station" than to the contemporary or Marxist
sense of "class," I have nevertheless decided to use this term so as to avoid
locutions such as "the peasant estate" or "the business social station."
Trans, j
'The lower classesi.e., those having their object and their consciousness
in the particular.
162
r
///. Constitution
existing organism.
2
It constructs its"c*6nsciousnessonly then
is it true spirit, in itself. In each class [Stand], the spirit has (a)
a distinct task: to know its own existence and^activity in that
class; and (b) a particular concept: knowing [its] essentiality.
These two are partly to be divided, partly united. The first
element is trust; the second is the division of trust in the
abstraction of right; the third is absolute mistrusti.e., when
what counts as absolute are things, money, representatives,
the universal. With this there enters the object that is in itself
the universal object: the state as end. [There is a] knowledge
of duty, moralitybut this universal knowing [takes place] in
its particular branches, [as in] the business class: Then, [to
know] the universal qua universal[this is] the scholar (for
whom the most important thing is a certain vanity about his
own Self). Finally, to know the negated actual individual, the
danger of death[this is] the military class. [All this, in com-
bination, comprises the] absolute individuality of a people.
i. The Lower Classes and Their Outlooks* (a) The peasant
classthe class of immediate trust and of crude concrete
labor. Absolute trust is the basis and element of the state. In
the developed state, however, the trust returns to one class, to
the elementary point of departure and to the general element
that remains in all, but which takes on its more conscious
form. Thus the peasant class is this unindividualized trust,
having its individuality in the unconscious individual, the
earth.
3
Just as, in his mode of work, the peasant is not the
laborer of the abstract [i.e., industrial] form, but rather pro-
vides approximately for most or all of his needs, so only in his
inner life is his work connected to his activity. The connec-
tion between his end and its actualization is the unconscious
aspect: nature, the seasons, and the trust that what he has put
into the ground will come up of itself. He tills the soil, sows,
^Consciousness is its "matter" from which it makes its existence for
itself.
(The word Gesinnung includes "disposition" and "attitude." I chose
"outlook" so as to avoid awkward locutions later. Trans.]
3
Only the possibility works.
163
The Philosophy of Spirit
but it is God who makes things grow, the activity being
subterranean.
He pays taxes and duties because that is how things are
these fields and houses have always had these burdens on
themit is so, nothing more. [He has] age-old rightsand if
new taxes are imposed, he does not understand why, but sees
this as [the will of] an individual master, sees that the aristo-
crats need much, and that in general the state has need of [the
money].
Yet he does not understand this immediately. He sees only
that money is extracted from him, that businessmen must
live also, and that the distinguished lord, the prince, is just
thatthe lord, the prince. The peasant therefore allows more
than one demand to be imposed upon [his age-old] right; and
he asks not that he understand the thing, but only that he be
spoken to, that he be told what he should do and for what
purpose he is being commanded. [It is] a sharp suggestion [he
receives], so that he notices a certain force present here: he
must provide, and in this form. For his part, he brings his
peasant understanding into play, to show that he is not that
dumb, [that he is capable of] saying something at the harvest
festivitiescertain maximsand in response to the force
used against him, he says he will do what is asked of him.
And insofar as he retains the right of his understanding and
his will, to that extent he obeys. It is the formal [aspect] of
speaking and comprehending. This formalism of knowing
passes over into abstract knowing, just as concrete labor
passes over into the abstract.
Concrete labor is the elementary labor, the substantial sus-
tenance, the crude basis of the whole, like trust. In war, this
class comprises the raw mass. [It is] a crude, blind animal,
self-satisfied in its insensibility. If its right is denied, it is re-
flected back into its individuality, and becomes spiteful. And
when it strikes out, it rages like a blind mad element, like a
deluge which only destroys, or at best leaves a fertile mud and
then is spent, having produced no [meaningful] work.
4
4
Feudal system, freedom from the earththis animal freedom, which goes
beyond plant life.
164
r HI. Constitution
(b) This substantiality passes over into the abstraction of
labor and the knowledge of the universal: the class of busi-
ness and of law [Recht). The labor of the Burger" class is the
abstract labor of individual handicrafts. Its outlook is that of
uprightness (Rechtschaffenheit). It has taken labor out of na-
ture's hands and has elevated the process of giving shape (das
Formiren) above the unconscious level. The Self has [thus]
gained independence from the earth (ist iiber die Erde heraus-
getreten). The form, the self of the work produced is the hu-
man Self; the natural self has died; [now the self is] to be
considered only in its capacity for use and work.
Trust is a closer, more determinate element in conscious-
ness. The Burger class oversees the livelihood of the city, the
number of fellow workers, [etc.]. Its activity and skill are
[those of] contingency, reverting from the contingency of na-
ture [to the work of this class] and [the products] falling to its
share [as its right]. The Burger certainly thinks of himself as a
proprietorand not only because he possesses property, but,
because it is his right to do so, he asserts that right. He knows
himself as recognized in his individuality, and he stamps this
on everything. Unlike the crude peasant, he does not enjoy
his glass of beer or wine in order to rise above his usual
numbness, partly to enliven his prattling gossip and witbut
rather to prove to himself, in his fine coat and in the groom-
ing of his wife and children, that he is as good as another and
that he has achieved all this. What he enjoys thereby is him-
self, his worth and uprightness; this he has earned through his
work, and it stands to his credit. It is not the pleasure itself he
enjoys, as much as the fact that he enjoys it, his self-image
{die Einbildung von sich selbst).
(c) This imagination of his own worth, and of his universal
selfhood in his particularity, becomes an immediate unity, in
that the possessing and counting-for-something become syn-
onymous. The imagination ceases to fill up his [sense of]
class, [i.e.,] ceases to have elevated his particularity to this
'[Burger: citizen, townsman, burgher, member of the middle class, bour-
geois. The original term is retained to avoid clumsy locations. Trans.]
165
The Philosophy of Spirit
universality. What counts is no longer the class as such, but
rather the reality of the possession as such. The abstraction of
right and class is fulfilled, and it counts only insofar as it is
fulfilled.
The mercantile class: the merchant's work is pure ex-
change, neither the natural nor the artificial production and
forming [of goods]. Exchange is movement, spiritual, the me-
dium that is freed of uses and needs, as it is freed of work and
immediacy [e.g., the stock exchange]. This pure movement
and activity is the object here. The object itself is divided into
two elements: the particular (trade goods) and the abstract
(money).
5
[This is] a great inventionthe thing that is needed
has become something merely represented, not something to
be enjoyed itself.
Thus the object, here, is such that it counts only according
to the meaning [placed upon it], no longer in itselfi.e., [as
fulfilling] the need. It is simply something internal. The out-
look of the mercantile class is therefore this understanding of
the unity of a thing with its essence: a person is as real as the
money he has. The self-image is gone. The [inner] significance
has an immediate existence [of its own]. The essence of the
thing is the thing itself. Value is hard cash \klingende
Miintze: literally, "ringing coin"]. The formal principle of rea-
son is there. (But this money, which signifies all needs, is
itself merely an immediate thing.) It is the abstraction from
all individuality, character, skills of the individual, etc. This
outlook is that harshness of spirit, wherein the individual,
altogether alienated, no longer counts. It is strict [adherence
to] law: the deal must be honored, no matter what suffers for
itfamily, one's welfare, life, etc. Complete mercilessness.
Factories, manufacturing, base their subsistence on the mis-
ery of one class.
Spirit, in its abstraction, has thus become an object for
itselfas the selfless inner. Yet this inner is the I itself, and
this I is its existence itself. The form of the inner is not that
dead thing, money, but is in any case the I. In other words, for
5
A11 needs are comprehended in this one.
166
III. Constitution
the spirit, the state in general is the" object of its activity, its
effort and end.
6
ii. The Universal Class (a) The public class is immediately
this involvement of the universal element in everything indi-
vidualthe blood vessels and nerves that weave through
every part, giving it life and sustenance, and bringing it back
into the universal. This class is necessity; and its life dis-
charges the particular into the universal. It is the administra-
tion and development of public wealth, as well as the exercise
of lawand then the [executive powers of the] police.*
The power of government
7
consists in the fact that each
system (as though it were alone) develops itself freely and
independently according to its concept. And the wisdom of
government consists in modifying each system according to
its class; i.e., to let go of the strictness of the abstract concept
for [the sake of] its living parts, just as the arteries and nerves
serve the various parts, developing themselves and accommo-
dating themselves to them. The stiffly abstract allocation of
powers for all classes in the same manner makes for the se-
verity of government. If, however, this abstract [approach] is
modified, although not surrendered, the result is the satisfac-
tion of the classes with their government. [Thus] taxes,
duties, tithes are cruder for the peasant, without great formal-
ity. He need not be subjected to the far-reaching formalities
that occur in regard to customs duties for mercantile goods.
Indirect taxes ought to rest with their entire weight on the
Burger class and merchant class, primarily. The peasant be-
comes more observant and educated in these formalities, but
his insensibility must be taken into consideration.
Likewise in regard to the judicial aspect: there must be an
easier, coarser justice for the peasant class; for the Burger
6
(a) Trust and concreteness of peasants: spirit, as this, is overcome in
abstract universality, [becoming) the opposite of righti.e., the validation of
the universal, (b) The tradesman presents the self-image once againthe for-
mal concept of the unity of self and reality, a naive immediate unity: I =
thingits significance is the concrete.
*[See Hegel's derivation of "police" from "politeia," below. Trans.]
7
substance in which all elements prosper
167
The Philosophy of Spirit
class a more detailed form of justice, so that the Burger may
secure his right in all aspects; for the merchant there must be
the hard, strict justice of business law.
Marriage laws [are to be] varied according to the character
of the classes. [Among the] peasantry and Burger class, [the
parties] get along more easily with one anotherthey fight
and make up again. In the upper classes, however, [there is] a
deeper sense, angrier, that is introspective [geht in sich), [that]
cannot forget or be reconciled.
In regard to penal law as well, there can be differences and
modifications in regard to punishment. The stiffly formal
equality [of law] does not spare character [differences]. One
and the same thing does injury in one class more deeply and
irreparably, while doing no disgrace in the other.
8
Punishment is the reconciliation of the law with itself. If
there is no death penalty involved, then the punishment
ought not to kill a person's civil status. When an offender has
served his full time, no further reproach can [justifiably] be
made to him about his crime. He is [to be] reintegrated into
his class. There is no absolute disgrace. There is injury to
feeling in the fact that he cannot return [to society], is re-
jected by his class, his reputation ruined. In his punishment,
[his place in] his class must still be secured. (Upper-class of-
fenders [are to be confined in] a fortress, not in prison among
criminals of other classes.)
As there is a paricular administration of justice [for each
class], so there is a particular science [governing it][and a
particular] religion[but] our states have not yet got that far.
(Free disposition over one's property. Here the [concept of]
police enters. [The term comes] from politeia, the public life
[of the polis] and the governing and action of the totality
itself. This [sense] is now degraded to [mean] the action of the
8
Duelling is to be permitted for the military class, since it is not a civil
class and lacks the aim of acquisition. [It is] the class of honor, of living in the
pure being-recognized of opinion, not the class of property or right. Private
vengeance, the state of nature, honor of weaponryas for the state, so also for
oneself. The army chaplain must be silent about this. [The last two sentences
of this note appear above the others. They have been transposed for greater
clarity. Trans.]
168
HI. Constitution
totality regarding public security of all sorts: supervision of
business to prevent fraud, realization of general trust, trust in
the exchange of goods. Each individual is concerned only for
himself, not for the general [interest]. The quiet exercise of
his property rights and free disposition of his property in-
volves possible injury to others. [The police are to see to] the
limitation, prevention of injury, as well as to [the situation in
which everything] is carried on only on the basis of trust. The
police are to watch over domestic servants, [to see to it] that a
contract is drawn up. Guilds determine the specific rights of
masters over apprentices and journeymen, regarding wages
and the like.)
The public class works for the state. Spirit has [thus] ele-
vated itself to the universal object. The businessman: his
work is itself very divided, abstract, [akin to] machine-work.
9
It certainly [contributes] directly to the universal, yet accord-
ing to a limited and at the same time a fixed aspect whereby
the businessman can change nothing. His outlook (Gesinn-
ung) is that he is fulfilling his duty. He elevates his specific
generality to the knowing of the universal. In his specific
activity he sees the absolute moral outlookspirit has [thus]
raised itself above characterhe performs a universal [task].
(b) The actual businessman is also part scholar. He knows
[that he is] to fulfill his duty [Pflicht). This knowing is empty,
general. That is, in [fulfilling] the particular duty, it is only
the universal element that counts. This empty thinking of
hisas dutythis pure knowing is to be fulfilled, is to give
itself content in itselfa free content which is at the same
time a disinterested object, a content wherein I have my
thinking as well as my duty, but so that this thinking of mine
is at the same time independent of me.
This is science in general.
10
Here the spirit has some object
9
having the being-recognized in oneself. According to this morality, every-
one conforms, so that he does what pertains to his class, above all.
10
Learned public opinion: a treasure of maxims, of consciousness. The
concepts of right and wronginsightagainst this public opinion one cannot
go. From it, all changes emanate, and it itself is but the conscious lack of
progressive spirit. What the spirit has made its own is superfluous as force. If
conviction is given up, the inner necessity, no force can restrain it. Yet it is
169
The Philosophy of Spirit
or other, which it treats without relation to desire and need. It
is intelligence
11
which knows itself. The object is the concept
of any determinate thing at all, ascending from the thing's
sensual characteristics to its essence. It is an object which
appears alien, however, [and] an activity that treats the
thought as such, [that] externalizes (entdusseit) itself as intel-
ligence, not as absolute actual self.
12
The concept does not
become its own object [as yet]. It elevates its thinking to
universality, suppressing its arbitrariness, all of which is in
itself and necessary.
This missing element is supplied by the military class.
13
That is, the [state as a] totality is an individuality: the activity
of this class is for the existing whole; its thought of this
whole goes back into the selfhood [of the state as individual].
The totality is an individual, a people, turned against others.
[In war there is] the re-creation of the undifferentiated [social]
situation [Stand] of individuals toward one another; [it is the]
state of nature, [but] here it is real for the first time. The
relation [between nations] is partly the placid subsistence of
individuals independent of one another[i.e.,] sovereignty
[and] partly [their] connection through agreements. These
agreements do not, however, have the actuality of a true con-
tract. There is no existent power in them, but rather the "in-
dividual" that is the nation (Volksindividuum) is likewise the
universal as existing power. [International agreements] must
not be regarded, therefore, in the way that civil contracts are.
They have no binding force as soon as one of the parties
annuls them. This is the eternal deception,
14
in concluding
treaties, to obligate oneself and then to let that obligation
the wisdom of government to know what the spirit actually no longer wants.
Its language is that of formal universality, as in the French Revolution: aboli-
tion of privileged classesthis was accomplished; abolition of the inequality
of classesempty talk.
"fulfilled thought
l2
Wai, government [turns] inward, (to) a single peopleart, religion, phi-
losophy.
l
nfhe class of honor, the being-recognized of opinion.
l4
(as is the deception about nations) working for art and loving one
another. The Jews a normal people [Normalvolk). A body of water becomes a
swampempty dream of eternal peace, a golden age.
170
III. Constitution
evaporate. A general confederatiofTof nations (Volkerverein)
for permanent peace
15
would mean the supremacy of one na-
tion, or it would mean there is only one natron (the individu-
ality of nations suppressed), a universal monarchy.
Morality has no part in these relations, since it is the unful-
filled, unindividualized knowing of duty as such. Insecurity,
uncertaintyyet security in the absolute certainty of itself.
The military class and war are the actual sacrifice of the
selfthe danger of death for the individual, his looking at his
abstract immediate negativity, just as he is his immediately
positive self. Crime is a necessary element in the concept of
right and coercive law: [namely, that] each one, as this indi-
vidual, makes himself into an absolute power, sees himself as
absolutely free, for himself, and real against another as uni-
versal negativity. In war this is allowed himit is crime for
[i.e., on behalf of] the universal. The end is the maintenance
of the totality, against the enemy who is out to destroy it.
This externalization must have this same abstract form, must
be without individualitydeath, coldly received and given,
not in ongoing battle where the individual has his eye on his
opponent and kills him with direct hatred; rather, death
emptily given and received, impersonal in the gunsmoke.
B. G overnment: The Self-Certain Spirit of Nature*
In this individuality, as [an] absolute self and [as the] nega-
tivity of the individual person, the government is fulfilled as
the peak of the totality. In war, the government, as self-
subsisting, shakes up the organization of its classesas well
as the all-embracing systems of right, of personal security
and property. It becomes apparent that all this vanishes in
the power of the universal.
1
What this transition involves in
its concept is now at hand: the unsettling [of the entire sys-
tem], its subjugation and coercion under pure power. No
15
War: (a) power against the actuality of systems; (b) wisdom of govern-
ment, damage to principles. [Cp. Kant's essay, "Perpetual Peace." Trans.]
*[This heading is inserted in the margin of Hegel's manuscript. Trans, j
'Police [i.e., the self-regulating power of the community].
171
The Philosophy of Spirit
longer are work and advancement, property right and personal
security, granted their absolute status,- rather, [what we see is]
injury done them. The individual's rootedness in his own exis-
tence [to the exclusion of the public interest], this sundering of
the totality into atoms, here suppresses itself. The individual
has his absolute freedom [in his submission to the totality],
and this itself is the strength of the government.
2
This immediate pure will is likewise self-conscious will.
Government is this willing, the abstract universal willing of
right, etc.; it is the resolution, the single will. The wisdom of
government, primarily, is to suit these abstract elements to
the classes in general, and in individual cases to make excep-
tions to the law.
3
The implementation, as such, is not this
lifeless doing.
4
Rather, the individualization of the universal
is at the same time the supercession [aufheben) of the univer-
sal, and, in individual cases, acting against it. Government is
the spirit that is certain of itself,
5
doing the right [although]
independently of spirit, acting in immediacy.
6
Thus spirit is freedom fulfilled.
7
Class, determinate char-
acter [now serve] as realityand through it [an] all-embracing
abstract system of individual subsistence. [There are] branch-
es of powersyet likewise the freedom of the subsistent as
such [i.e., of the individual], and of his immediately conscious
spirit.
2
The cunning of government m indulging the self-interest of others [lais-
sez-faire] (right, the merchant's understanding knows how it concerns him in
reality)-converting these to its own uses, so that they go back into it.
(Self-interest seen as:) (a) crudeness, (b) morality, (c) science and truth, to spin
out truths beneficial to the human race.
3
Water, not moved by wind, becomes swamp.
"Cunningbeing turned back into itselfthe government (is) this occu-
pied activity.
5
Spirit of government as general outlookcertain of itself in its simplic-
ity, in givng and in taking.
6
the self-certain spirit having come to the repose of universality in itself
7
Morality of self-certain spiritself-certaintymaking the heart the grave
of its heartall joys and sorrows of its heart, pardoning (reading verzeihen for
verziehentrans.] all its own sins and crimes, and done as though nothing
had happened. Its duty simply its self-image, (basing itself] upon class, upon
what it has undergone or done, complete cultivation, forgetting the dangers of
death, labors, etc. Repose in the immediate present. No narrow-minded moral
concepts.
172
HI. Constitution
C. Art, Religion, and Science"
The absolutely free spirit,
1
having taken its determinations
back into itself, now generates another world. It is a world
which has the form of spirit itself, where spirit's work is
completed in itself and the spirit attains a view [Anschauung)
of what is spirit itself, as itself. As intelligence, the existent
(das seyende) has the form [Gestalt) of something other; as
will it has the form of itself.
Being-recognized [Anerkanntseyn) is the spiritual element,
but it is as yet indeterminate in itself and is therefore [to be]
filled out with manifold content. The coercive law is the
movement of this content, i.e., the universal seeing itself as
mediation. The constitution is its [i.e., the free spirit's] cre-
ation of the content out of itselfconstituting itself, but in
the form of object. [The spirit] makes itself into [its] content,
and as government it is the self-certain spirit: it knows that
this is its content and that it [i.e., spirit] is the power over it
[this content][it is] spiritual content. Accordingly, it must
now create this content as such, as self-knowing.
Thus, at the immediate [level], spirit is art: the infinite
knowledge, which, immediately alive, is its own fulfillment
the knowledge which has taken back into itself all the exi-
gency of nature, of outer necessity, and [has bridged] the divi-
sion between self-knowledge and its truth. Immediately, art is
form, indifferent to the content*form which could cast it-
self into any content [and] bring that content to view as some-
thing infinite, allowing its inner life, its spirit, to come out,
[and] making it its object as spirit. Art sways between form
and the pure self of formand thus between plastic and musi-
cal art.
Music is the pure [experience of] hearing, wherein the for-
mative element brings nothing into being but the transitory
sound, and the melody of harmonic motion moves itself to
'Spirit as nature, its own nature calm equanimity [now presented] to view.
* [Hegel's text reads: "Sie ist unmittelbar die Form, der der Inhalt
gleichgiiltig i st. . . . " (i.e., "form to which the content is indifferent"). I have
rendered it as above in order to remove the ambiguity. Trans.]
173
The Philosophy of Spirit
the triad turned back into itself. It is formless motionthe
dance of this motion itself as the invisible presentation, be-
longing to time.
[At] the other extreme, sculpture is the quiescent presenta-
tion of the divine. Between these two [poles] there are paint-
ing (the plasticity that takes color [all] to itself, the selfish
[medium) in the form of pure sensation in itself); and poetry
(plasticity as representation of form in the musical, whose
sound, extended to language, has content in itself).
Absolute art is that whose content is equal to its form.
Everything can be elevated into art. Yet this elevation is an
alien fancy: as existing content, seen prosaically, it must it-
self be equal to the form. This is spirit itself. Hence nature
poetry is the worstlandscape art, etc.since that which
gives it life contradicts the form in which it immediately is.
[This is the] modern formalism in art. [There is, it says,] poet-
ry in all things, a yearning for all, not an external force,- things
are that way in themselves [an sich), in God's viewyet this
"in themselves" [dieses Ansich) is abstract, not equal to their
existence. This purely intellectual beautythis music of
thingshas the Homeric plasticity as its opposite. The
former is unsensory, the latter a sensory viewing [Anschau-
ung). Here we do not have the form of the symbol, of [figura-
tive] meaningthis is touched upon quietly, from a distance.
Here the meaning itself is to come forward, but the form is
lost. Art is in this contradiction with itself: that if it is inde-
pendent it must be extended to allegory, and then it has van-
ished as individuality; and with the [figurative] meaning de-
moted to individuality, [meaning] is not expressed.
Art creates the world as spiritual and as open to view. It is
the Indian Bacchusnot the clear self-knowing spirit but the
inspired spirit [begeisterte Geist) which envelops itself in sen-
sation and image, wherein the fearful is hidden. Its element is
vision [Anschauung)but vision is the immediacy, which is
not mediated. This element is therefore not adequate to the
spirit. Art can therefore give its forms only a limited spirit.
Beauty is form
;
it is the illusion of absolute vitality, suffi-
cient to itself, self-enclosed and complete in itselfthis me-
174
III. Constitution
dium of finitude. Vision cannot grasp the infiniteit is
merely an intended infinitude. This god as statue, this world
of song encompassing heaven and eartK,^lhe universal es-
sences in individual mythic form, the particular essences, and
self-consciousnessall this is [merely] intended, not true rep-
resentation [Vorstellung); it has no necessity to it [which is]
the form of thinking. Beauty is much more the veil covering
the truth than the presentation [Darstellung) of it. Thus, as
the form of life, the content is not adequate to it, is limited.
The artist therefore often demands that the relation to art
be only a relation to form, and that one should abstract from
content. Yet people will not let this content be taken from
them. They demand essence [i.e., meaning], not bare form.
The connoisseur, [however,] is the one who contemplates
pure poetry and the artist's understanding [in a work of art]
the motifs, the detail which is determined by the whole and
brings it out, selected with understanding, the parts being
kept well distinct from one another, etc.
Art, in its truth, is closer to religionthe elevation of the
world of art into the unity of the Absolute Spirit. In the world
of art each individual [entity], through beauty, gains a free life
of its own. Yet the truth of individual spirits is in their being
an element in the movement of the whole. Absolute spirit
knowing itself as absolute spirit: [this absolute spirit] itself is
the content of art, which is only the self-production of itself,
as self-conscious life reflected in itself, in general.
In art, (a) this individual self, this one, is only a particular
self, the artistthe enjoyment on the part of others is the
selfless universal intuition [Anschauung) of beauty; (b) the
determinacy is individual contenthence its immediacy as
existent, like that of the self [when] separated from beauty,
from the unity of individuality and universality, i.e., [the
unity] of the self and its universal existence. In religion, how-
ever, the spirit becomes its own object, as absolutely univer-
sal, or as the essence of all nature, of being and doingand
[yet] in the form of the immediate self.
The Self is universal knowing, and through this the return
into itself. Absolute religion is this knowledgethat God is
175
The Philosophy of Spirit
the depth of self-certain Spiritthereby the Self of all. This
knowledge is the essence, pure thoughtyet, alienated
[entdussert] from this abstraction, He is actual selfhood. He is
a Person, having a common spatial and temporal existence
and this individual is what all individuals are. The divine
nature is not other than the human. All other religions are
incomplete [in this regard:] either [religions of] essence alone,
the fearful essence of natural power wherein the self is nuga-
tory; or the beautiful religion, the mythic, a game not worthy
of the essence, without profundity and depth, where depth is
[nothing more than] unknown destiny. The absolute religion,
however, is the depth brought to daylightthis depth is the I,
as the concept, the absolute pure power.
(In it [i.e., the absolute religion], therefore, the spirit is rec-
onciled with its world. Spirit, as existent, is its organization
and progress through the social classes, distinct character and
distinct duty, each self having a limited purpose and likewise
a limited activity. The knowing of itself as essencein right
and dutyis empty as pure essence and pure knowing; [but]
as fulfilled [it is] a limited many-sidedness, and the immedi-
ate actuality [is] an equally individual [knowing]. Morality, in
its activity, is the elevation beyond class, advancing itself and
the activity of its classdoing something for the universal.)
But the government stands over allthe spirit that knows
itself as universal essence and universal actuality, the abso-
lute Self. In religion, everyone elevates himself to this view of
his own self as a universal Self. His nature, his class, fade like
a mirage, like an island appearing as a fragrant cloud far at the
edge of the horizon[and] he is the equal of the prince; it is
his knowing of himself as knowledge of spirit, [so that] for
God he is worth as much as any other. It is the alienation of
his entire sphere, his entire existing world. It is not that alien-
ation which is only form, cultivation, and whose content is
the [world of] sensory existence againbut rather the univer-
sal [alienation] of the entire actuality. This alienation restores
the actual world to itself once again as complete.
The two realmsactuality and heaventhereby come to
be still far apart, however. Only beyond this world is the
176
III. Constitution
spirit reconciled wi t h itself, not in its present. If it is satisfied
with this world, then it is not the spirit elevating itself above
its (immediate] existence. Spirit is to be shaken in this world,
and in war and trouble it is shaken, and flees from this exis-
tence into thought. Yet there is a longing for heaven, and
likewise a longing for earththe former is for want of some-
thing better. * By means of religion, the spirit has satisfied the
trust that the events of this world and nature are reconciled
with the spiritand [that] no dissonance, no unreconciled
selfless necessity rules in it.
Religion, however, is the represented spirit, the. Self which
does not bring together its pure consciousness wi t h its actual
consciousness, [and for which] the content of the former
passes over into the latter as something different.
The thought
2
the inner ideaof absolute religion is this
speculative idea that the Self is the actual, is thinking
(Denken). Essence [Wesen) and being (Seyn) are [thus] the
same. This is posited [in the idea] that God (the other worldly
absolute essence) has become man, this actual man. But at
the same time this actuality has annulled (aufgehoben) itself,
become a thing of the pastand this God who is actuality and
is [yet] an annulled actuality (i.e., a universal actuality) is the
spirit of the community.
[The idea] that God is spirit
3
this is the content of this
religion and the object of this consciousness:
(a) [as object] of pure consciousness, [as] the Eternal Being
{Wesen), Son and Spirit; here these are all the same Being,
[and] what is posited is not the distinction [between them,
but] the indifference of immediate being;
(b) God,
4
the essence of pure consciousness, becomes an
(Hegel uses the French expression, pis-allei. Trans.]
2
Religion [is] the representation of the unity of knowing and truthi.e.,
as spirit which is the absolute essence, not a dead essence but this life in
itself, as the living Godthe same as cultural spirit (Volksgeist), only [withj
immediacy.
3
(a) True religion, insofar as the absolute essence is spirit; (b) revealed
religion, without secrecy, for God is the Self, God is man.
4
Philosophy, nature that goes into itself, becoming evil (the concept of
pure negativity). But on the other hand, this being in itself [is] the loss of the
positive, in itself. God takes on the form of Self. That which is in itself,
177
The Philosophy of Spirit
"other" to itself: [this other is] the world. But this existence
is [as] concept, being-in-itself, evil. And nature, the immedi-
ate, must be represented as evil, [the counterpart of God,]
each of us coming to an insight into his own evil nature
i.e., so that the nature becomes the concept, the evil es-
sence, being-for-itself (against the essence that is in itself)
but at the same time the contrary, the essence that is in
itself. [Thus, nature is evil in being God's "other/
7
yet is
like God in being self-sufficient.]
That is to say, God appears as actual in nature. [Yet with
God immanent in nature,] everything "beyond" has fled. That
this opposition [between the here and the beyond] is itself
now voidthat the evil, the actuality that is for itself is not
in itself but is universalthis presents itself as well in the
sacrifice of the God-man: (a) the sacrifice of divinity, i.e., of
the abstract Being (Weserz) from "beyond/' has already oc-
curred in his becoming actual; (b) [the sacrifice is also in] the
elevation [Aufheben) of actuality, its becoming universality
5
|[as] universal spiritbut this is [merely] a representation for
consciousness); likewise [it has become:] (c) the universality
of the Self in itself; i.e., the community must renounce its
being-for-self and [the world of] immediate nature. That is, it
must also view [the world] as evil, and this view of the evil is
overcome {hebt sich auf] in the grasp of that representation [of
a universal spirit]. Presentation in worship,
6
wherein that self
[i.e. the communty] gives itself the consciousness of unity
with the [supreme] Being [Wesen). Devotion knows itself in
him: worship [Kultus).
This universal spirit (i.e., the spirit of the community) is
[that of] the state, of the church,
7
the existent actual spirit,
presupposed, presents itself in its existencealienation, cultivation (ofJ ab-
stract essenceso that the divine, too, sacrifices itself, that abstract essence.
It is not the man that dies but the divine, and in so doing becomes man.
5
Immediate selfreconciled natureto imagine the divine in all that is
naturala population of saints, hagiography, epiphanieseverywhere (an)
immediate presence (a new earth, the natural sun extinguished)the pain of
religionpure feeling of alienation.
[The communicant] partakes of the body and blood (of the one who)
sacrifices himself daily in his community, and becomes this individual Self.
7
Synthetic connection of the state and the church.
178
HI. Constitution
which has become its own object as spiritbut as representa-
tion and faith. It is the spirit of the community, but in its
representation it flees beyond its own self," far remote from it.
That immediate knowing is not united with this otherness.
Everything
8
[in this religious expression] has the form of rep-
resentation, of the beyondwithout concept, without neces-
sity, [but as mere] occurrence, contingency. Indeed, the word
[is] the eternal resolution and will of God
9
yet [it is] only
said, not comprehended, not concept, not Self.
The church has its opposite in the state, i.e., in the existent
spirit. The church is the state elevated (eihoben) in thoughts
i.e., man lives in two worlds.
10
In the one, he has his actuality
that vanishes, his natural aspect, his sacrifice, his transitori-
ness; in the other, [he has] his absolute preservation, knows
himself as absolute essence. He dies away from the actual
world, knowingly and intentionally, in order to gain the eter-
nal, the unactual life in thought, [as] universal Self.
Yet this eternal has its existence in the [cultural] spirit of a
people [Volksgeist). It is the [cultural] spirit which itself is but
spirit [as actually existent, in the state], through this move-
ment[although] opposed to it in form, [yet] identical to it in
essence. The government knows this, the cultural spirit
knowsthat it itself is the actual spirit, containing itself and
the thought of itself.
If is the fanaticism of the church to wish to establish the
eternal, the heavenly kingdom as such, on earthi.e., against
the actuality of the state, [like] keeping fire in water. [Yet] the
actuality of the heavenly kingdom is the state itself: reconcil-
iation, in thinking, of the essences of both, through the church.
If they are unreconciled, then state and church are incomplete.
The state is the spirit of actuality. What reveals itself in it
[i.e., the state], must be commensurate to it [i.e., to the spirit
of actuality]. The state need not respect consciencethis is
ago
8
The in-itself is remotethe reconciliation in its being has occurred long
9
Pain [is] not thinking, not universal. [See note 5, above. Trans.]
10
He is assured of [their] reconciliation[although] in devotion [the] enjoy-
ment is not present.
179
The Philosophy of Spirit
the inner, [and] whether it is to count as action or as principle
of action must be revealed in those [elements] themselves.
The church is the spirit that knows itself as universal: the
internal, absolute security of the state. The individual counts
as individual; everything external is in itself insecure and
unstable.
11
In the state is [the individual's] complete guaran-
tee [of security]. What a person does [on the basis of] religion
he does from his thought of himself,
12
insofar as [that self-con-
ception] is not a [broader] insight [of] universal thoughts,
without ignoring the varying many-sided aspects of the indi-
vidual. This is duty (Pflicht); i.e., to this I must yield. It isis
justified in the absolute essence. Morality [is grounded] in the
absolute essence, insofar as it is my knowing[but] there, [as
universal, it is] absolute essence in general.
Religion as such is in need of the existent world, of the
immediate actuality. It is the universal,
13
therefore under the
dominance of the state, is used by it, serves it. Usedbecause
religion is what lacks actuality (das Wirklichkeitslose), hav-
ing its selfhood in the actual spirit, [and] thus is as negated
[als aufgehobenes). On the other hand, religion is [rather] the
thinking which elevates itself above its actuality: this inner
stubbornness that [leads one to] give up one's own existence
and be ready to die for one's thought; it is the unconquerable
[in the individual], who dies for the [sake of] the thought, for
whom the pure thought is everything; [religion is] his inner
thinking as such, having the meaning of action which other-
wise appears as something contingent. So high has thinking
as such been raised[in the individual] going to death happily
for the sake of faith. The state that subordinates itself to the
church, however, has either surrendered to fanaticism and is
lost; or else a priestly regime has been established, demanding
not the alienation (Entdusserung) of action and existence and
specific thoughts, but of the will as such and indeed of the
ll
They work up and produce [bearbeiten] only individual things; they do
not count as absolute.
l2
God is everywhere, is pure thought; (cp.) if a person is secreted by him-
self, his solitariness, his thinking, are there with him.
^particular class (Stand), determinate character
180
HI. Constitution
will in existence as suchand certainly not toward the uni-
versal, the being-recognized, but rather toward a single will,
as such. ~*~"
Heaven flees from religion in the actual consciousness
man falls to earth and finds the religious [aspect] only in the
imagination. That is, religion is so intrinsically selfless that it
is the spirit merely representing itselfi.e., so that its ele-
ments have, for it, the form of immediacy and occurrence,
without being conceived or comprehended. The content of
religion is probably truebut this being-true [Wahiseyn) is an
assurance without insight.
This insight is philosophythe absolute science. Its con-
tent is the same as that of religion, but its form is conceptual.
[It can be divided into:] (a) speculative philosophy[concern-
ing] absolute being which becomes "other" to itself, becomes
relation to itself [in] life and knowledge, and a knowing
knowledge, spirit, spirit knowing itself; (b) natural philoso-
phy[concerning the] expression of the Idea in the forms of
immediate being. It is the going into itself, evil, becoming
spirit, [becoming] the concept existing as concept. This pure
intelligence, however, is likewise the opposite, the universal,
indeed sacrificing itself and thereby becoming the actual uni-
versaland the universal actuality that is a people; [it is]
created nature, the reconciled essence in which each one
takes his bemg-for-himself, through his own alienation and
[self-]sacrifice.
In philosophy it is the I as such that is universalthe I
that, in the concept, is the knowing of the absolute spirit, in
itself, as this. There is no other nature here, not the nonpres-
ent unity, nor a reconciliation that is to exist and to be en-
joyed in the beyond, in the future. Rather, it is here, here the I
knows the absolute. It knows, it comprehends, it is no other,
[it is] immediate, it is the Self. The I is this indissoluble con-
nection of the individual with the universalof individuality
as the universality of all nature, and the universality of all
essentiality, all thinking.
The immediacy of spirit is the [cultural] spirit of a people
(Volksgeist)i.e., as existent absolute spirit. Religion [is] the
181
T
The Philosophy of Spirit
thinking spirit, but which does not itself think, not about
itself. Therefore [it has] no identity with itself, no immediacy.
This knowledge on the part of philosophy is the restored im-
mediacy. Philosophy itself is the form of mediation, i.e., of
the concept. As immediacy, the self-knowing spirit in general
is what is disunited in natureand [in] the knowledge of it-
self. And this spirit is consciousness, immediate sensory con-
sciousness which is something "other" to itself in the form of
something existent. Spirit is its [own] quiescent work of art,
the existing universe, and world history.
Philosophy alienates itself from itselfat its beginning it
arrives at the immediate consciousness which is that same
disunited consciousness. Thus philosophy is man in general.
And as [it is] the [ultimate significance] of man, so it is for the
world; and as with the world, so with man. One stroke
creates them both.
What was there before this time?[in] the other of time
(not another time, but eternity, the thought of time)? In this,
the question [itself] is suspended {aufgehoben), since it refers
to another time. But in this way, eternity itself is in time, it is
a "before" of time. Thus it is itself a past, it was, was abso-
lutely, is no longer. Time is the pure conceptthe intuited
(angeschaute) empty self in its movement, like space in its
rest. Before there is a filled time, time is nothing. Its fulfill-
ment is that which is actual, returned into itself out of empty
time. Its view of itself is what time isthe nonobjective. But
if we speak of [a time] "before" the world, of time without
something to fill it, [we already have] the thought of time,
thinking itself, reflected in itself. It is necessary to go beyond
this time, every periodbut into the thought of time. The
former [i.e., speaking about what was "before" the world] is
the bad infinity, that never arrives at the thought from which
it goes forward.
This division is the eternal creation, i.e., the creation of the
concept of spiritthis substance of the concept, which sup-
ports itself and its opposite. The universe [is] thus immedi-
ately free of spirit, but must nonetheless revert to itor,
rather, [in] spirit's own activity, its movement. Spirit is to
182
III. Constitution
produce the [final] unity for itsefflikewise, in the form of
immediacy it is world history.
14
In it, this [antithesis] is over-
comenamely, that only in themselves are nature and spirit
one being [Wesen). Spirit becomes the knowing of them [and
thereby unites them].
u
Man does not master nature until he has mastered himself[nature 1 is
the process toward the spirit in itself. So that this "in-itself" be there the
spirit must conceive of itself.
183
A native of Berlin, Leo Rauch^received the
Ph.D. degree in philosophy from New York
University in 1968. He has been associated
with Ohio State University, the Universities of
Texas and Cincinnati, and with the Center for
the Philosophy and History of Science at
Boston University. He is presently in the
Department of Philosophy at Bab son College in
Massachusetts. Dr. Rauch is the author of The
Political Animal and Faith and Revolution, of
monographs on Hegel, Kant, and Plato, and of
numerous articles.
The manuscript was edited by Julia Fitzgerald.
The book was designed by Don Ross. The
typeface for the text is Mergenthaler VIP
Trump, based on a design by Georg Trump in
1954. The typeface for the display is Friz
Quadrata. The text is printed on 55-lb. S.D.
Warren's #66 Antique text paper and is bound
in Joanna Mills' Kennett Cloth over binder's
boards.
Manufactured in the United States of America.