Havelock, E. A. - Dikaiosune. An Essay in Greek Intellectual History - Phoenix, 23, 1 - 1969!49!70
Havelock, E. A. - Dikaiosune. An Essay in Greek Intellectual History - Phoenix, 23, 1 - 1969!49!70
Havelock, E. A. - Dikaiosune. An Essay in Greek Intellectual History - Phoenix, 23, 1 - 1969!49!70
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DIKAIOSUNE
An Essay in Greek IntellectualHistory
(In tributeto George Grube, the distinguishedauthor
of Plato's Thought)
E. A. HAVELOCK
ALTHOUGH THE DOCTRINE of the four cardinal virtues cannot be
documentedin a formalsense earlier than Plato's Republic in the first
quarterof the fourthcenturyB.C., it is commonlyassumed to have been
supported by a traditionwhich went back perhaps two centuriesinto
the archaic period.' The priorityof dikaiosunein the Platonic canon
needs no demonstration.Its proposed definitionconstitutesthe formal
"hypothesis" of the treatise and though the firstbook in the manner
of the other early dialogues on virtue ends aporetically,the treatiseas
a whole devotes itself to completing the definitionwith meticulous
exactitude.2The effectof theeloquent argumentofferedin Plato's written
masterpiecehas been to riveton the mindsof scholarsand laymenalike
the presumptionthat the English terms"justice" and "righteousness"
representwhat had always been a general idea available to the Greeks
throughouttheir earlier cultural history,a concept lying at the back
of theirminds and taken forgranted.
If one asks, Is thispresumptionbased on fact?,the answerwilldepend
on how "fact" is defined.Is it a datum supplied by the intuitionsof
moral philosophy,which has always been prone to assume forits own
purposes that the notion of the moral law as idea or ideal informsour
common humanityand must exist as a realized concept in the minds
of all men who share such a culture as the Greeks possessed? Or is it
'W. Jaeger,Paideia, translated by Gilbert Highet, 1 (Oxford 1946) 106: "Plato took
it over en bloc fromthe ethical systemof the early Greek city-state."Pind. Nem. 3.71-76
and Aesch. Sept. 610 have been interpretedas assuming the doctrine(see also TheognisPhocylides, below notes 50, 51); so L. R. Farnell (Amsterdam 1965) on Pindar ad
loc. (but contraWilamowitz, Pindaros [Berlin 1922] 279, n. 3); P. Groeneboom (Groningen 1938) on Aeschylus ad loc.; James Adam (reprinted, Cambridge 1963) on
Plato Resp. 427E. A "Pythagorean" origin was admitted as possible but unprovable
by Adam (loc. cit.) and supported with demonstrationby F. M. Cornford(CQ 6 [1912]
246-265). See below, n. 4 sub fin.
2Dikaiosune in the polis 432B 2 ff.; in the psyche442D ff.In each case the definition
is completed by a definitionof the contrary and correspondingvice. Further demonstration of the profitabilityof dikaiosune (444E 7 ff.) in effectextends the definition
(588B 6-7) and is again formallycompleted by an expositionof the miseryof the corresponding vice (576B 11 ff.). A mathematical ratio is even established between the two
(587B 4 ff.).
49
PHOENIX, Vol. 23 (1969) 1.
50
PHOENIX
guaranteedby the contentof historicalstudies,which by revealingpatterns of action approved or rejected will reveal also the presumed
guidance of correspondingmoral principles?Or, finally,is it safest to
test the presumptionby the canons of linguisticusage where alone the
idea alleged to exist in the common mind can find verbal expression
and thus submit to verbal measurement?This last will be the methodology of the present paper. We address ourselves to a study of terminology,more particularlyto the historyof the word dikaiosuneitself.
If we except a couplet found in the Theognidean corpus (a false
exception: to this we shall returnlater) the word is not foundin extant
Greek literature before Herodotus. The fact can fail to attract the
attention it deserves because of the prevalence in all authors from
Homer onwards of dike and dikaios, and because of our habit, difficult
to resist,of translatingthese two words as thoughthey belongedin the
mental and moral context of Platonic dikaiosune.3The comparatively
late appearance of dikaiosunetakes on added significancewhen we note
that (with one exception: a fragmentof Euripides) it does not occur in
any of the extant remainsof the pre-Platonicpoets. To the end of the
fifthcentury,its occurrencesare limitedto fivecontextsin Herodotus,
one in Thucydides,one in the Antiphonpapyrus,one in Thrasymachus,
and one (which depends on editorialsupplement)in Damon as cited in
a Philodemus papyrus.4By the second decade of the fourthcenturyon
the otherhand the word has obtained commoncurrency.
One is justifiedin the case of this particularword in notingthe comparative rarityof occurrenceas remarkable.Here, afterall, is the most
convenientGreek noun by which to index the notion of moralityas an
ethicalprinciple,a notionbasic to our own discoursein theWest (whether
we accept or reject it) and one which thereforewould have been thought
equally basic to the discourseof the Greeksto whomwe tracethe founda'The habit is as unconscious as it is pervasive in all who write on such topics as
"Greek Ideals" or the "Greek way of life." Two recent and careful studies of Greek
ethical thoughtare not immune to it. A. W. H. Adkins,Meritand Responsibility(Oxford
1960) 185-186, discussing Euripides' Electra 1051 ("You have spoken dikaia, but the
dike in them is aischron") comments on "the choice of aischron as the term to express
the claims of dikaiosune." L. C. Pearson, Popular Ethics in Ancient Greece(Stanford
1962) 116-117, contrasts the assured claims to justice put forward by Agamemnon
and Clytaemnestrawith "the language of Cassandra, who in all her catalogue of blood
and vengeance has no thought of dike. Her terms are more savage and more primitive
. . . it is only when Clytaemnestra exults over her deed that the notion of justice is
reintroduced."
4The unwary should not be misled by the entries in the index to Diels-Kranz, Vorsokr.,s.v. "dikaiosune," listed under the names of (Archytas), Anaxagoras, Pythagorean
School (four entries), Bias, Hecateaus of Abdera. On this last see below, n. 34. The
s
vocabulary of the formula SLKaLOorV71
printed by Diels-Kranz
dAPLO/EldOKLKSeoos,
(1.452.22) as "Pythagorean," is Platonic; see LS7, s.v. llcdKIS.
DIKAIOS UNE
51
tionsofourmoraland politicalphilosophy.One does nothave to be a philosopher to use it. One would have thought,for example, that it would
be likely to recur in the moralisingmeditations addressed by Pindar
to his patrons and by the chorusesof Greek tragedyto theiraudiences,
or that it would have appeared not infrequentlyas a verbal counterin
the dialectic of Thucydides' speeches. Its scansion, so far as the poets
are concerned,offersno difficulty
in dactyls or anapaests, or for that
matterin lyric.Pindar could have used it, as he does use philophrosune.
Is it not rather an odd accident-to cite a conspicuous example of
omission-that it does not occur anywherein Aristophanes' Clouds, a
play which in its revised versionwas amended to findroom fora fairly
lengthyconfrontationbetween Dikalos Logos and Adikos Logos?
Nor is it easy to identifyany equivalent for the term which might
have made the coinage unnecessary.The neuter of dikaios with the
article carriesus no furtherthan the bounds of meaningset by dikaios
(and to these bounds we shall return).Dikaiotes appears to be a fourthcenturycoinage.' Tentatively we conclude that dikaiosune was coined
sometimeduringthe fifthcenturyand possiblynot before450 to express
a notion which,forwhateverreason, had not hithertodemanded it.
The -osune words (there are several in Homer) have been studied as
evidence of early abstraction.6It is to our purpose to note that they
denote personal properties(what Aristotlewould call dynameis)which
match the behaviourindicatedby the correspondingadjective: theyare
"psychological" words. If we apply this rule of thumb to dikaiosune,as
opposed to dike and dikaios, we might conclude that the notion of
resident
moralityas an attributeof a person,or as a set ofhabit-patterns
in him, did not achieve the status of a "name" (onoma) until Greek
culture had matured,if that is the word, to the stage representedby
Periclean Athens,and that even then the -lame forit was not a popular
one nordid it becomeso untiltheinfluenceof the fourth-century
thinkers
made it so. Further it might be guessed that its appearance marks
the beginningof the internalizationof a moral conception hitherto
viewed froma purelyexternaland social point of view. Dike and dikaios
referto the maintenanceof reciprocalrelationsof right: they connote
"rights" rather than "righteousness"; they were indexes of purely external behaviour whetherof gods or of men.' With the appearance of
dikaiosuneit had occurredto some that this kind of reciprocalpropriety
correspondedto a personalvirtue,the propertyof an individual.
If social and economicchanges occurringat the time were such as to
6It occurs neitherin the extant remains of lyric and drama, nor in the historians.Epic
and elegy would have had to reject it if available.
der Homerkritik(Leipzig 1895) 439.
6Paul Cauer, Grundfragen
7See below, n. 48.
52
PHOENIX
thenan individualized
encourageindividualism,
conceptionof "right"
wouldbe encouragedalso. If thecoinagedoes not appearto be poetic,
thisneednotsurpriseus, forpoeticvocabularyfavoursthe traditional.
Was it not morelikelyto be theworkof the thinkers,
thespeculators,
ofsocietywhomitis oftenconvenient
andtheprosaicminority
toidentify
as theintellectuals?
whichlie in advanceof our investiThese,however,are conclusions
gation.It is timeto turnto usageitself.
The fivecontexts
inwhichHerodotususesthetermarewidelyscattered
hishistory.
It willbe convenient
to listthemalphabetically,
as
through
follows:
A. HERODOTUS
1.95-129
The conquestof Lydia becomesthe historian's
occasionto narratethe
of the
historyof Cyrusthe Persian,whichin turncalls fora summary
ofMedia-Persia.The Medes,havingbrokenawayfrom
previoushistory
theAssyrian
Theirexamplewasfollowed
Empire"gainedtheirfreedom."8
was confined
by theentireAsiaticmainland.Theirpoliticalorganization
to thevillage.A certainDeioces,a manofintelligence
and widereputation,had monarchical
ambitions,whichhe soughtto realizeby conon the "practice"of dikaiosuneforhe understoodclearly
centrating
that in the presentlawlessconditionof the countrythe antagonism
between"right"and "wrong"was fundamental.'
He was accordingly
chosento be "judge" ofhis village.The reputation
ofhislegaladministrationwhichwas "straight"and "correct"'0in contrastto decisions
renderedin othervillagesinducedneighbouring
villagesto bringtheir
suitsto himuntilhe had a monopoly
ofthejudicialprocess.Deioces,as
partof his plan, finallydeclinedto continuethis,pleadingthatit was
forhim to neglecthis own affairs.Faced withan in"unprofitable"
creasingdegreeof "lack of order"(&volt-s,1.97.2 and 3) the Medes
heldassemblyto decidepolicyand votedto establisha monarchy
which
would bringlaw and orderand the opportunity
to get workdone.
man
Chapter98 describeshowtheypickedon Deioces as a well-known
to be monarch,whereupon
he requiredthemto furnish
a royalcapital
An architectural
(whichbecameEcbatana) and a bodyguard.
description
ofEcbatanais followed
ofthePersianpalaceceremonial
by a description
whichDeioces,says the historian,
invented,its motivebeingto stress
his own uniquenessin separationfromhis subjects.His legal administrationbecamesevereand morebureaucratic,
thesubmission
requiring
8TheGreekadds emphasisby repeatingtheidea in triplicate.
OTLTCDa
91.96.2: 5LKaLOacvTV1
7KEE....
ayc-Psr
r6 &bKov
rtLO7/IEVOo
rB baly
iroAf6v eiatL.
0o... .O)
Te Kal 6tK~Covw
Kaos . . . Kard 76 6p0bv
1.96.2-3; cf. Hesiod
...,
Op. 35-39 and 263-264.
DIKAIOSUNE
53
54
PHOENIX
The narrative then resumesthe historyof the Median-Persiankingdom. Though dikaiosuneitselfhas occurredonly once in these 35 chapters, this small event will be seen to gain some significancefromthe
extendedcontextin whichit is found.
B. HERODOTUs 2.141-152 (with extensiveomissions)
The historianhas narratedin garbled forma highlycondensedversion
of Egyptian dynastichistory,concludingwith the reignof one "Sethos,
a priest of Hephaestus" whose policies neglected the interestsof the
Egyptian warriorsto the extentof expropriatingtheirlanded holdings.
At the conclusionof his reginthe Egyptians were "liberated" (2.147.2).
But being unable to conduct theirlives forany lengthof timewithouta
king, they divided the entire countryinto twelve districts,each with
its own king.
These twelve, besides intermarrying,
governed their administration
mutual subversionand also
or
which
forbade
three
rules
regulations
by
mutual aggrandisement,and which guaranteedcompletemutual amity
(2.147.3). Herodotus then gives his account of the motive behind this
arrangement.Directly they had assumed theirrespectivekingdoms,an
oracle had foretoldthat one of them would be monarchof all Egypt.
Their carefulobservance of these three rules was designed to prevent
this. Accordingto the oracle the futuremonarchwould be identifiedby
the fact that he would pour libation in the templeofHephaestus froma
cup of bronze.
And so the twelve kings "employed dikaiosune"'3and continued to
do so until,on a certainoccasion,one of themseemed to fulfillthe oracle
by accident. The eleven took no chances. They establishedby examination that he had done so without intention,so could not consider it
"right" to kill him,'4but they stripped him of his powers and exiled
him. He had in fact,adds the historian,been exiled once before.Being
now a victim of hybris(2.152.3), he planned vengeance on his persecutors, and in due course with the aid of "bronze men fromthe sea"
(that is, Greeks) he deposed the eleven and become monarch of all
Egypt. This was Psammetichus,who foundeda dynasty(chapters158 ff.)
C. HERODOTUS 6.73 and 85-87
S.
. f
7
ovqJLi7
rpoVoLrjs abr"V
DI K AIOS UNE
55
77P )rapaOflK1V,
ELXKOV...
V7E o0 'AO7v7a-oLrpo)claLc
ioLo6bvAL, 6.86.1.
,GLKoov a
E
rEpt ~rapaOOtKt?s. ., 6.86a; cf. ovzve-tX17... KOtO...
o'vr.v1 'XOt8yeV'oOaL
6.86.3.
Oljvat,
6.86.2; iKCw
prViaV6pa4afp . .. laKOtVEW ptoTa fLKaLoovr'p
ip7rrp ...,
6 18To'ToY
T
7s ai s, PXai3KE, tKaLOoLV)YSp
o
fOUvX6IE'cosroXaictoat,
s -s
6.86.3;
v7 Xbyos 7roXXbs,6.86.4.
SLKatoobof?,r
V rL 7T Eiprlpy(UyP
7T?
X6'7, 6.863.
klTbOaro
rapaOcK71'
S. .
ob
..
PHOENIX
56
M
rept rapaGOjK
v
rs OiXXoye 7
8tavoaEOat
'7rarEbVrwc
d.yaO6Bv
6.866.
'
arobb6vat,
. . . rpLv7rC rp6repovabLK7arT 80uao
v 3ptoav . . .
0o bLKas r&Pv 'AOnV'aLouS
2ooirw
23ooXO~
. . , 7.46.2.
XooTLdAero.
ab
243LtoTfjsj'V VvUv
VOpwr77s
riTpt, obva7s Troabrls o'lr7v lrep obatpiat
...
8i ot 7r68e,7.47.1.
?rava&/eOaa
4pdpaov
7.47.2.
2b56ora /itywcrar&vrwrov
6vra roXeAtLrcara,
etvat,
DIKAIOS UNE
57
X.: My dear man, which are these? Is our land army open to criticism
or is our fleetinferior?If eitheris true,additionsare immediatelyavailable.
Art.: No, theirsize is beyond criticism.To increase them is to increase
the hostilityof the two elements: these are land and sea. The sea has
no harbour large enough to shelter the fleet in a storm and you will
need a successionof harbourson the route; the lesson is that men cannot
controlcalamities but are controlledby them. That is one of the two
elements.Now I come to the second: otherobstacles aside, the hostility
directed against you by the land will increase in proportionto your
advance. Success is a commodityin short supply for human beings,
and even in the absence of otheropposition,the land as distance accumulates will starve you. Human excellence consists in planning with
extremecaution, reckoningon every possible vicissitude,beforeacting
with ilan.
X.: You distinguishand define these several matters correctly."6But
you must avoid excessive timidity.If you keep giving second thought
to anything that can come up you will never do anything.An elan
which ignoresexceptionscan run into dangers-say half of those anticipated-but this is far better than a general timiditywhich runs into
nothing.Contentiousargumentsofferedagainst any and every proposal
with no demonstrationof the secure course to take are just as likelyto
court failureas theiropposite. They are self-cancelling.A human being
in fact is denied certainknowledgeof the most secure course. A willingness to act is usually rewardedby success, whichis not trueof continual
hesitation and second thought.The rise of the Persian empire proves
this. My ancestors threw themselvesat danger to achieve what they
did. Great enterprisesin fact always involve great danger. Had they
been guided by your frameof mind this would not have happened. Like
themwe proceedin this campaign to subdue all Europe beforereturning
home. We carry supplies and will also live offthe land which is tilled
and not prairie.
Art.: Since nothing may deter you, take one piece of advice. Great
extensivecalculation.27Cyrusreduced
enterprisescall forcorrespondingly
Ionia to tributarystatus-all of it except Athens. Do not-so I advise
-do not by any means lead forththe Ionians against theirparents.We
don't need them to win. If theyjoin our expeditioneither(a) they will
put themselvescompletelyin the wrong by enslaving their metropolis
or (b) they will put themselvescompletelyin the rightby conspiring
with her to defend her freedom.In the case of (a) they will add no
advantage to us; in the case of (b) theywill gain the capability of doing
2solK6brws Ipv o1' ye rob70rwV
EKaora btLapiaL, 7.50.1.
7.51.1.
X6yov
27wrXevpa
~rKeiYva,,
58
PHOENIX
e
7.52.1.
Kal lreYTTS7a YwKav, aXapt& obekv,
aol a6 5LKaLOealvYvY
is
K
eibov wOLcnKaTaOelsv &pXjv. . . , 7.164.1.
3'rb
r5oLatobvjs
r
32S..
6L tLKaLO
bntvfY ol ars6 &XXpv
o-vvl7ee
&oioav,
rvY
6 IrlroeY
tLKaLOLeYL
ToLtL
AXMOLLr7.164.2.
o.2WU.vroi
iXlrero,
i'e/.re.
OiK AXXLtTrovTroUrwY
DIKAIOSUNE
59
60
PHOENIX
DIKAIOSUNE
61
62
PHOENIX
63
64
PHOENIX
is linked by him with the expressionof "loyalty" and "courtesy." Narrowly considered in this context, it seems almost synonymouswith
personal civility,a freshovertoneto the word, thoughwe recall its link
with amity in example B. However, the matchingreferenceto the same
episode in the historyof IPersian-Ionianrelations (Hdt. 7.10) makes it
clear that the loyalty on this occasion was a piece of prudenceexercised
by a vassal (Histiaeus) who preferredto sustain his overlordin orderto
guaranteehis own security.So the remarkof Xerxes may in factcharacterizeas dikaiosunesimplythe maintenanceof a compact betweenruler
and subject or between two partners-a usage analogous to B. But in
any case the objections of Artabanus are clearlyintendedto cast doubt
on the status of such a dikaiosune: a relationshipwhich is righteousin
one case may turn out to be completelywrongin another."9
The net effectof the slight ambiguitiessurroundingseveral of these
contexts reinforcesthe impressionthat the common source was dialectical, presentingthe concepts of dikaion and dikaiosune as problematic and perhaps relativistic.
These eight occurrencescan be supplemented by four more culled
fromsurvivingprose sources of the pre-Platonicperiod.
F. THE PAPYRUSANTIPHON(Diels-Kranz, Vorsokr.87 B 44; 2.346)
.. . Dikaiosune ... to avoid breakingthe lawful usages of the (particular) city wherecitizenshipis operative. If a human being is to employ
(that formof) dikaiosune most conformablewith interest he should,
when attended by the testimonyof reporters,treat the customs-andlaws as sovereign,but when (he findshimself)isolated fromreporters
(he should substitute) the (rule) of nature.40
G.
THRASYMACHUS
DI K AIOS UNE
65
66
PHOENIX
r
&KaLovqarL.
7re1rbp
TL?7)
aLKE&Lv va 1
A7)
&wLKOlV'Evova
avirrwv
L~-q
This is an objection
madeto theconventional
viewof dikaionpreviously
cited:
t
6 aprvpcEVEVdAXX'XOLs
'
T'dlaX1
o70 &KalovV. .. 8KO^VTos 7T
&Kacov voAlterat.c....
echo
the
of the original; cf.
...
may
conceivably
paronomasia
"4IIapebov
6p&w^Lev
the style of Thrasymachus in B 1; Havelock, op. cit. (see n. 44) 231-233. The sentiment
reads like a sophistic "improvement" upon Hesiod Op. 256-273.
47M. Untersteiner,The Sophists translated by K. Freeman (Oxford 1954) 325, tries to
bringthe statementinto line with the position attributed to "Thrasymachus" in Republic 1 by arguingthat it describes a "tragedy forthe intellect" undergoneby a citizenwho
can only act freelywhen he acts as the majoritywills, and so is paradoxicallysubject to
"a coalition of the weak" who maintain the power of the law. This is fairlyabstruse for
a sophist. It is surely more probable that Thrasymachus argued that what existing
society calls "dikaiosune" is really the interest of the stronger,but refrained from
committinghimselfpersonally to the view that this should always be so; so that he
was capable of using the termdikaiosune at two contrastinglevels. Compare the similar
ambiguity in Antiphon's terminology(above, notes 40, 45) and in Hesiod, loc. cit. The
Marxist position is not very different.
DIK AIOSUNE
67
68
PHOENIX
DIK AIOSUNE
69
70
PHOENIX
NEW HAVEN