M. R. Wright - Introducing Greek Philosophy-Acumen (2009)
M. R. Wright - Introducing Greek Philosophy-Acumen (2009)
M. R. Wright - Introducing Greek Philosophy-Acumen (2009)
M. R. Wright
ACUMEN
© M . R. Wright 2009
Preface viii
Chronology xi
Map of the ancient Mediterranean xii
3 Cosmologies 63
4 Pagan monotheism 85
Epilogue 201
vii
Preface
viii
PREFACE
ix
PREFACE
what intelligent and articulate philosophers from the past had to say
on such perennial problems. A brief appendix to the discussion of
these topics has been added, concerned with the secondary sources
and fragmentary nature of much of the available evidence. The range
of possible interpretations of their testimony adds to the interest i n the
study of these pioneers.
I am grateful to my daughter Cathy and to my husband for reading
an early draft of the manuscript from the point of view of interested
amateurs in the subject; their own clear thinking helped to clarify
potentially obscure material. Giannis Stamatellos commented on the
work as a text for present and intending students, and I drew on his
expertise i n later Greek philosophy for assistance with the Epilogue.
From Acumen I wish to thank Steven Gerrard for his encouragement
and sound advice, and Kate Williams for her patience and attention to
details throughout, and for designing the map.
M . R. W
Aberystwyth
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Chronology
Single dates are approximate for the mature work of the persons named.
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1. Mapping the territory
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INTRODUCING GREEK PHILOSOPHY
the Greek world, to the colonized towns of southern Italy and Sicily. It
moved with Xenophanes as he travelled throughout Greece from his
native city of Ionian Colophon; Pythagoras migrated from the eastern
island of Samos to the Italian Croton; Parmenides settled i n neigh-
bouring Elea; and Empedocles rose to prominence i n Sicily. It was not
until the time of Pericles i n the fifth century that Athens emerged as
the third and most enduring centre of philosophy, attracting intellec-
tuals from all over the Greek world. Anaxagoras and Democritus were
drawn to Athens from the east, sophists came there from western and
northern colonies to captivate the new generation of aspiring politi-
cians, and then, in the fourth century, Aristotle moved down to Athens
from Thrace, followed soon after by Epicurus from Pythagoras island
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of Samos and the Stoic Zeno from Cyprus. Only Socrates and Plato
were native Athenians.
Antecedent to the emergence of philosophical thinking was the
legacy of the Homeric epics: the Iliad, the war poem of the last year of
the siege of Troy, and the Odyssey, which tells of the return home of the
Greek hero Odysseus from Troy to Ithaca. Throughout the Greek world
these were a unifying factor, known, quoted and used authoritatively in
a variety of contexts. In the history of philosophy the poems are most
relevant for their ethics and theology. Moral principles were adapted
2
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the past and the search for non-mythical explanations of the world as
we know it.
Between Hesiod and the first philosophers lurk the shadowy figures
of Orpheus, Musaeus and Epimenides. They are credited with cosmo-
gonies that begin with such vague Hesiodic entities as Chaos, Night,
Aither and Erebus, and relate the subsequent production of an egg, and
the emergence of a significant personage or personification from it.
Another early mythographer, Pherecydes of Syros, narrated a different
genealogy starting from Zas (Le. Zeus) and Chronos (Time), which
involved the biological model of a tree rather than an egg to explain
the first beginnings, and also, spread upon the tree, an embroidered
cloth that portrayed the natural features of earth and sea.
It was from the main city of the Ionian coast, the busy port of Miletus,
with its close links to the hinterland, that the first named philosophers
- Thales, Anaximander and Anaximenes - came. Their interests and
methods, which involved i n particular a search for a unifying account of
the origins and present diversity of the physical world, became known as
Milesian or Ionian. Thales was on the list of the Seven Sages, and sayings
attributed to h i m formed part of the repository of received wisdom. He
wrote nothing himself, but, as far as we can judge from the comments
of Aristotle (Metaphysics 983b20), he explained the source of life, which
continues to nourish and maintain an animate world, by the abiding
presence of one stuff - "water". He was said to base his theory on obser-
vations that both semen, the source of life, and nourishment, which
supports it, are moist, that heat is generated and fuelled by moisture, and
the buoyancy of water keeps the earth that floats on it stable. Aristotle
admits that he is filling i n gaps, and there is no way of knowing how
far Thales' own arguments went, but three features are incontrovert-
ible: the expectation that the complexities of the world can be readily
explained in physical rather than theological terms, a new confidence in
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the explanation offered and the stimulus provided for others to criticize,
adapt and develop the first attempts at such an explanation.
Anaximander, Thaïes successor, wrote down his thoughts i n the
first recorded prose work in European literature. Only one sentence
survives, probably dealing with opposites such as hot and cold, wet
and dry: "From the source from which they arise, to that they return
of necessity when they are destroyed, for they suffer punishment and
make reparation to one another for their injustice according to the
assessment of time" (DK 12B1). 4
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of which one sentence is extant: "As our soul {psyché), which is air,
maintains us, so breath (pneuma) and air (air) surround the whole
world" (13B2). I n this fragment there is a new use for the word psyché
(soul), which is no longer viewed as a shadow of the former self flit-
ting endlessly in the realm of the dead, but as the ever-present principle
of life, which holds together, strengthens and controls the individual.
In addition a connection is established between the relationship of
soul/air to us and breath/air to the whole world order, so that it too
is alive and controlled. Anaximander s indeterminate "limitless" now
has a character, that of the air we breathe, essential for life and an
obvious candidate for the boundless source of that life. Anaximenes
then argued that all things could be derived from this one intermediate
and indeterminate substance according to differences in quantity:
when thinner, air would have the appearance of fire; when thicker of
mist; then it could condense further to become water; and further still
to produce earth and rocks. We have the understanding here of the
functioning of a "first principle" that explains and is responsible for the
original emergence and subsequent maintenance of life.
Pythagoras of Samos
The island of Samos is close to Miletus and the Ionian coast. Pythagoras
was one of its most famous citizens, but he was compelled, most likely
for political reasons, to emigrate, and he, and his philosophy, moved
westwards, over to Croton, the Achaean colony in southern Italy. His
influence increased in the Italian towns, and he again became involved
in local politics, "honoured by the men of Italy", according to one
of the few direct references to h i m by Aristotle (Rhetoric 1398bl4).
Pythagoras himself retired to the neighbouring city of Metapontum,
but there were various attacks on his followers in subsequent years,
and it is reported that their houses and meeting places were burnt
down, until Achaeans from the Péloponnèse finally restored order. The
most famous of these early followers were Philolaus of Croton (470¬
390 CE) and his younger contemporary, the mathematician Archytas of
Tarentum, who was said to have been a close friend of Plato.
Pythagoras was an oral teacher and left no writings. He is named only
once by Plato as "teaching a way of life still called Pythagorean", and it is
said that his followers were interested in music and astronomy (Republic
530d, 600b). Aristotle is similarly noncommittal, and speaks indirectly
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Xenophanes of Colophon
Heraclitus of Ephesus
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Parmenides of Elea
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goddess denies movement and change since, from the previous argu-
ment that "is not" cannot become "is", what is not the case cannot
come to be so, and, since "is not" cannot become "is", what is true at
one time cannot not be true at another. This brings the further impli-
cation that there is no way of distinguishing past from future, so esti is
to be understood i n terms of a tenseless present. Finally, it is deduced
that with the denial of movement comes the denial of room for move-
ment. Since a gap is a spatial "is not" (and "is not" is rejected spatially
as well as temporally), there can be no gaps. This means that there is
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Zeno of Elea
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Melissus of Samos
The philosophy that started i n the Italian town of Elea now went
eastwards, to Pythagoras island of Samos, and found an advocate
in Melissus, a general who is said to have sunk the Athenian fleet i n
441 B C E . He adopted the main arguments of Parmenides Aletheia, but
introduced some modifications of his own. He agreed with Parmenides
elimination of generation and destruction (since these involve prior
and posterior temporal states of nothingness), and with the conclusion
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Empedocles of Acragas
The first reactions to the Eleatic thesis, which had started i n the west
with Parmenides and Zeno, and was supported i n the east by Melissus,
came from Empedocles back in Sicily, and from Anaxagoras in
Clazomenae, an eastern Ionian city. The movement of arguments and
counter-arguments to and fro across the Mediterranean that charac-
terizes Presocratic thought only settled in Athens at the end of the fifth
century, with the arrival of Anaxagoras, Democritus and the sophists
there. Empedocles was roughly contemporary with Zeno and Melissus,
and like them he supported Parmenides i n some respects, retaining
Eleatic wording and Parmenides' medium of the Homeric hexameter,
but other arguments were adapted or modified, to take into account
the observed plurality and change of the physical world. Empedocles
agreed that continuity i n time and extension in space could not be
broken up by nothingness, and that there was no absolute generation
or destruction. He effected a compromise between Eleatic logic and
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Anaxagoras of Clazomenae
But early in Pericles career some of his associates were targeted by his
political opponents. Anaxagoras was consequently tried and sentenced
to exile on a charge of impiety, specifically for saying that the sun was
merely a hot stone, and the moon a lump of earth. I n exile Anaxagoras
chose to return to Ionia, to the town of Lampsacus. His one book was
8
already written and on sale i n Athens. Socrates read it but was disap-
pointed that the theory of m i n d given i n it was purely mechanical, with
no concern for working towards "what was best" (Apology 26d).
Starting at the beginning, Anaxagoras claimed that once "all things
were together" (59B1). This would seem to mean that there was a
complete and uniform fusion of all the elementary components of the
cosmos, in contrast to Empedocles mixtures of particles of earth, air, fire
and water, which retain their individual characteristics. Furthermore,
in denying the existence of a m i n i m u m smallest or a maximum largest,
Anaxagoras showed i n effect the irrelevance of size to the complexity of
material, for " i n everything there is a portion of everything". Following
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Diogenes of Apollonia
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the mid-fifth century Athens became the political and cultural centre
of Greece, but unrest among the allies and Sparta's growing suspicions
of Athenian successes led to the Peloponnesian War, the shocking loss
of life i n the Sicilian Expedition and the eventual defeat of Athens by
the Spartans at Aegospotami in 405 B C E ; the democratic leaders were
then exiled and the Spartans imposed the rule of the Thirty Tyrants
on the Athenian people. But the democrats returned soon after, the
tyrants were overthrown and there was uneasy peace until the rise of
Thebes and eventually the threat from Macedon.
A l l these events affected the direction and development of phil-
osophy. The excitement and opportunities of Periclean Athens
attracted the brightest minds from across the Greek world, including
the Presocratics Anaxagoras and Democritus, and also the itinerant
professors known as "sophists". Among these were Protagoras from
Abdera, Democritus' home town, Prodicus from the island of Ceos,
Hippias from Elis on the southern mainland, and Thrasymachus from
Chalcedon on the Bosphorus. Gorgias came from Leontini in Sicily,
and Euthydemus and his brother from the island of Chios; they moved
from there to Thurii i n southern Italy and thence to Athens. The
extensive travels of these sophists inclined them to relativism, i n the
sense that they found that traditions and beliefs vary from one place
to another according to local custom (nomos). When they discussed
ethics, however, in relative terms, the exposure to conflicting judge-
ments was seen by the more conservative Athenians to have unwel-
come and even dangerous consequences.
The sophists had wide interests, covering language, grammar and
literary criticism, law, rhetoric and public speaking, history, politics
and anthropology. Some were interested in science and mathematics,
but generally these topics were seen as irrelevant to the main purpose
of public achievements. The ambitious, talented and privileged youth
of Athens could no longer be satisfied with the traditional educa-
tion, which focused on the Homeric poems and physical training, but
required a form of higher education for a successful political career,
and this the sophists were able to supply. They fostered the ability to
argue ones case in public, to w i n over the assemblies and councils to
one's point of view and to help ones friends and discomfit ones oppo-
nents on the political scene, and i n particular they taught and practised
the skills of arguing for and against a given topic. Historians and dram-
atists had long used this device, when opposed arguments relating to
a course of action were presented as contrasting persuasive appeals by
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Socrates
Socrates was the first philosopher from Athens itself. He so loved the
city that he left it only once, on compulsory military service, and, when
he did take a walk outside the walls, as described in the rural setting
of Plato's Phaedrus, he was gently mocked for being so overcome by
the charm of the countryside. Although at the heart of fifth-century
thinking, Socrates wrote nothing, and what we know of h i m comes
mainly from four sources. For his contemporary, the comedy writer
Aristophanes, he was hardly distinguishable from the sophists or some
of the earlier Presocratics. I n his play Clouds, Aristophanes portrays
Socrates as engaged i n running a school, charging fees, busy with mete-
orological studies and teaching unscrupulous arguments, making the
worse, the more unjust cause, defeat the better; all this the Socrates in
Plato's Apology vehemently denies. I n some of the biographical works
of Xenophon, however, who was also a near contemporary, Socrates
appears unexceptional, giving advice on common practical problems,
and ready to die not for great principles, but because his faculties
were becoming weak in old age. Xenophon was basically a military
man, and it may well be that, while admiring Socrates as "the best
and happiest of men", the subtleties of Socratic arguments eluded h i m .
Aristotle, writing later, rarely mentions Socrates, but the few remarks
relating to h i m are most valuable. He attributes two innovations i n
philosophy to Socrates: inductive argument and universal definition
(i.e. i n searching for "what a thing is" he would take what is common
to a number of instances and make deductions accordingly). Aristotle
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also links Socrates to two ethical "paradoxes", namely that "no one does
wrong willingly" and "virtue is knowledge" (Metaphysics 1078b28;
Eudemian Ethics 1216b3).
The main evidence for Socrates' character and philosophical origi-
nality, however, is to be found in the writings of Plato, but there is
an immediate difficulty i n separating the historical Socrates from the
Platonic character. I n the so-called "early" works of Plato, Socrates
is shown engaged i n direct dialogue with one or more respondents,
attempting to clarify their thoughts regarding various ethical tradi-
tions and beliefs. The exception is the Apology, Plato's version of
Socrates' defence at his trial on charges of impiety and corrupting the
young. I n the course of this speech the main characteristics attributed
to h i m by Aristophanes are repudiated, and, unlike the Socrates of
Xenophon, his readiness to die relates to his refusal to abandon the life
of philosophy. I n Plato's central dialogues, Socrates is more clearly a
spokesman for Plato's own views, especially relating to the metaphys-
ical theory of forms and the immortality of the soul; i n the later works
of Plato, Socrates is often not the main speaker, or not even present.
It is possible therefore to trace with some caution a number of stages
in Plato's portrayal of Socrates. First there is a defence of Socrates' life
and work, and a presentation of h i m engaged in arguments that tend to
negative conclusions, followed by the introduction of positive Platonic
material intermingled with Socratic biography. Then there are writings
that are almost wholly Platonic, generally to the exclusion of Socrates.
Finally there are the Laws: a long exposition delivered by a visitor to
Athens from Crete, which contains much dogmatic material on polit-
ical issues, and i n some ways is even anti-Socratic in its repression of
free speech as a threat to ordered government. 10
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This linking of virtue to knowledge, along with the quest for defini-
tions of underlying realities and the requirement of wisdom in polit-
ical leaders, had a lasting influence on Socrates' most famous follower,
Plato of Athens. This influence was compounded by Socrates' own
unflinching adherence to moral principles and his condemnation by
his fellow citizens. O n Socrates execution i n 399 B C E , a disillusioned
Plato, now twenty-eight years old, abandoned the political career
expected of someone with his aristocratic family connections, and
went travelling to Italy and Sicily. On a second visit to Syracuse in
Sicily it is said that he attempted, without success, to groom the heir
to the throne, the young Dionysius I I , for the role of "philosopher-
king". Plato eventually settled back i n Athens and continued his with-
drawal from personal involvement i n the politics of the city. Instead
he established the Academy, an informal society of the brightest young
minds, where there were programmes of research into philosophical
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who was a member of the Academy for twenty years, never seems to
have approached Plato directly, or raised questions on difficulties he
had with some aspects of Platonic metaphysics.
Twenty-six works are contained i n the Platonic corpus, as well as
a further nine of more doubtful authenticity; thirteen Letters and
13
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refutes the maxim that "might is right", or, as it is put here, that "justice
is the interest of the stronger". Another important work is Protagoras,
which opens with an ironic tableau of different sophists surrounded
by groups of devoted students i n the house of Callias, but then moves
into a dialogue with Protagoras himself. The subjects discussed include
the merits of democracy, the unity of the virtues, virtue as knowledge
and its possible mastery by pleasure (which involves an interlude on
hedonism) and Protagoras' final doubts on virtue as a subject that after
all might not be teachable. The "Socratic" works also include Apology
and Crito. Apology is Plato's version of Socrates' defence at his trial on
the charges of impiety and corrupting the young, and Crito is set in
prison as Socrates awaits execution. Here Socrates puts forward argu-
ments in favour of his refusal to attempt to escape, and shows that he
is ready to accept his death as the law requires.
The next group of dialogues involve Socrates and Socratic biog-
raphy but introduce two themes that appear to be Plato's own sugges-
tions for solving some Socratic problems, namely his theory of forms
and proofs and myths concerning the immortality of the soul. These
occur in Phaedo, which starts and finishes with a straightforward
account of Socrates' last day i n prison talking with his friends, and
of his execution by drinking hemlock. The dialogue has the sub-title
"On the Soul", and, appropriately on such a day, the possibility of a
future life is raised and agreed on through a series of proofs and a final
myth. I n these sections the character Socrates abandons the hesitancy
he showed i n the earlier works and, more as the spokesman for Plato
himself, puts forward positive views. Symposium is a similar case, in
14
that the biographical details about Socrates are vivid: the invitation to
the drinking-party, the "trance" on the way there, the speeches on the
theme of love (eros), Alcibiades' portrait of Socrates and his attempted
seduction of the older man. But Socrates' own speech, which is attrib-
uted to the priestess Diotima, ends with an account of a Platonic "form"
namely beauty itself, which is the true goal of the lover as he moves
from the initial attraction of a beautiful body to the recognition of the
beauty of the soul within. Phaedrus also brings in idealized forms in
the myth of the journey of the soul i n the company of the beloved to
the heavens and the sight of the things "out there" that include the form
of beauty "that was once ours to see in all its brightness" (250b).
The long Republic again has Socrates as principal speaker, here faced
with the challenge of showing why we should follow justice for its
own sake without regard to any adverse consequences now or after
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death. To tackle the problem Socrates first looks for justice in the city
"writ large" as a guide to its presence i n the individual. The investi-
gation involves the theoretical construction of a city with its classes
of philosopher-rulers, military executive and working population,
corresponding to reason, spirit and desire in the soul, and concludes
that justice lies i n each part performing its particular function and the
whole working i n harmony. I n the central books, three of the topics,
called "waves", are faced and discussed i n more detail, namely women
as rulers, communal families and the education of the philosopher. It
is here that Plato, through Socrates, gives the clearest exposition of the
theory of forms. This is the subject of the climax of the philosophers'
education, when they comprehend the realm of true being set against
this world of opinion, and the unique position of the supreme "form of
the good" in maintaining the structure of the whole. Although Socrates
admits that this concept is extremely difficult to grasp, he offers three
aids to understanding it i n the accounts of the simile of the sun, the
diagram of the line and the allegory of the cave. The following books
then detail the degeneration of city and soul from the enlightened rule
of philosophers i n the state and reason in the soul to their opposites:
political tyranny and psychological turmoil. The tenth book of the
Republic acts as a double appendix to the whole. The first part gives a
philosophical justification for the banishment of poetry, drama and art
from the educational syllabus, and the second looks to the rewards of
the just, which have been shown to be achievable i n this life, and are
now further enhanced by the description of after-death experiences i n
the famous Myth of Er.
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the sea. The events were to be described i n more detail i n Critias' own
dialogue, but this longer account stops in mid-sentence after a few
pages on the origins of Atlantis, its political customs and complicated
architecture, and its degeneration from its divine origins.
Before Critias dialogue, however, and after the summary of the
early books of the Republic, Timaeus, the main speaker i n the work
named after him, gives, also in mythical form, one of the most complex
mathematical and scientific accounts to have survived from antiquity.
It is a narrative that starts with the generation of the cosmos by a divine
craftsman, who fits a world body (made of the four Empedoclean
elements of earth, air, fire and water) into the revolutions of a world
soul, i n the likeness of an ideal model. But the elements are then
found to be not basic enough. They themselves are composed of more
fundamental mathematical units, and the whole is to be explained as
the imposition of their mathematical form on to disordered space.
Human body and soul are further imperfect replicas, and the oppor-
tunity is taken here for a comprehensive account of their structure and
functioning, including an analysis of physical and psychic health and
disease. The work ends with a eulogy of the cosmos as a perceptible
divine object i n the image of the intelligible: grand, good, most beau-
tiful, unique and complete.
In the later dialogues Plato is often seen making a fresh start on
topics that had been of interest to h i m earlier, but where his treat-
ment of them now seems to h i m to be unsatisfactory. For example, he
continually suggests proofs for the immortality of the soul, as he tries
to show by reasoning that ones soul, inhabiting a living body, would
survive the death of that body; Phaedo contains four such proofs, and
Republic and Phaedrus two further attempts. The theory of forms,
on the other hand, which had played an important part in the meta-
physics of Phaedo, Republic and Timaeus, receives a devastating series
of attacks i n Parmenides. The spokesman for the theory here is a young
Socrates, who is severely reprimanded by father Parmenides himself
for not establishing a firm foundation for his reasoning. Parmenides
recommends that Socrates should practise a series of exercises in
the manner of Zeno's dilemmas for his philosophical training, and
proceeds to give an extensive series of examples of what he means.
Doubts expressed in Parmenides about the theory of forms, which had
seemed to be a central Platonic tenet, reappear by default in Theaetetus.
Here the structure is that of a standard Socratic definition dialogue:
Socrates is the questioner, the search is for a definition of knowledge
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Aristotle of Stagira
The first and by far the most important of the ancient responses to
Plato came from Aristotle. He was born i n Stagira, a town i n Chalcis
in northern Greece, travelled down to Athens and joined Plato's
Academy at the age of seventeen, where he stayed for twenty years,
until Plato's death i n 347 B C E . After that, perhaps ill at ease with subse-
quent changes in the Academy, Aristotle moved east to Assos and the
facing island of Lesbos, and then north to Macedon, to be tutor to the
young Alexander. Aristotle returned to Athens in 335, and established
his own company of scholars there i n the Lyceum, a gymnasium he
rented outside the city boundaries; his followers were subsequently
known as Peripatetics, from his habit of talking while walking up and
down the colonnade (the peripatos) there. Twelve years later Aristotle
left Athens for the second time when his connections with Macedonia
made h i m politically suspect. He went back to Chalcis, where he died
soon after, in 322 B C E , at the age of sixty-two. Theophrastus, from
Eresos in Lesbos, took his place as head of the Lyceum.
Plato's completed literary products survive but we know little of
his teaching; with Aristotle the reverse is true. His polished essays
are no longer extant, except for a few fragments, but the vast number
of works that are left are more like notes or research jottings. There
is often a lack of organization, with numerous repetitions, many-
pronged attacks on the same problem and arguments so terse as to be
almost unintelligible. Clearly there are also many contributions from
others, especially in the biological treatises, and many revisions of the
material, either by Aristotle himself or those close to h i m . The four-
teen books of Metaphysics, for example, cover a variety of disparate
themes, and were only brought together by Andronicus of Rhodes in
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and fear in the audience and so provides an outlet for these feelings in
what Aristotle calls katharsis a "purging" of violent emotion. History is
y
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Plato and Aristotle are at the heart of Greek philosophy, and there was a
time when it was thought that all that was needed to master the subject
was a detailed study of Plato's Republic and Aristotle's Ethics. Now,
however, there is increasing interest i n the centuries following their
lifetimes, and a recognition of the later achievements of those known
collectively as "Hellenistic" philosophers, the most important of whom
were the Epicureans, Sceptics and Stoics. Since Socrates himself wrote
nothing, the method and content of his philosophizing had been open
to different interpretations and were responsible for developments in
directions other than those taken by Plato and Aristotle. Aristippus
and his followers the Cyrenaics (so named after Aristippus' home town
of Cyrene) interpreted Socrates' search for happiness and the best life
as the search for the life of greatest pleasure. They thought that the
function of reason was to control sense-experience by maximizing
pleasure and minimizing pain to achieve a life of hedonism based on
natural desires; in the practical calculations involved, however, there
was still a role for Socratic independence and self-mastery. I n their
ethics they were forerunners of the Epicureans.
Contrasted with the Cyrenaics were the Cynics, who followed
20
Socrates in his asceticism, and in his emphasis on the moral life. For
the Cynics the goal of human life was virtue, and this brought its own
rewards. They opposed the Cyrenaics i n despising pleasure, and delib-
erately courted hardship on the grounds that it provided an oppor-
tunity to assert their self-sufficiency and moral superiority. W i t h a
missionary zeal that was often taken to extremes, they attempted to
impose their views on others by aggressive confrontation, contin-
uous preaching and ostentatious poverty. The most famous Cynic
was Diogenes of Sinope ("Socrates gone mad" according to Plato at
Diogenes Laertius [hereafter DL] 6.54), who lived the simple life of
21
a wandering beggar, rejecting all ties of home, family and city, and
the related conventions. One positive consequence of not belonging
to any particular city was that he proclaimed himself a citizen of the
whole world, and considered that all human beings, as well as gods
35
INTRODUCING GREEK PHILOSOPHY
Epicurus of Samos
36
MAPPING THE TERRITORY
The Stoics
The Stoics were closer to the Cynics, and, like them, saw themselves
in direct descent from Socrates. They approved his ascetic way of life,
and continued his interest i n the rigorous analysis of basic terms. Their
logic was able to profit from Aristotle's work, while they based their
physics on the divine fire that the Presocratic Heraclitus had made
central to his philosophy. Their overriding interest, however, was in
ethics, based on the twin Socratic foundations of care for the soul and
the alliance of virtue with knowledge. This intellectualizing of virtue
- the recognition of a fundamental connection between knowing right
and doing right - was a distinctive feature of Greek ethics from its
beginnings in Socratic dialectic through its developments in Plato
and Aristotle down to the Hellenistic era. The Stoics adopted it whole-
heartedly, made it central to morality and did not shrink from the
consequences of believing that the supreme good is virtue, which alone
has intrinsic merit and is to be desired for its own sake, and the only
evil is vice. They claimed that this is where nature herself leads us,
from the first basic instinct, which is for survival (and not for pleasure
as the Epicureans supposed), through awareness and attachment to
rational processes, to a consistent choice of what is appropriate and
according to nature. It is only then, i n practising virtue under the guid-
ance of reason, that we shall realise our human potential and so be
truly happy.
37
INTRODUCING GREEK PHILOSOPHY
Aristotle's school had declined i n importance soon after his own depar-
ture from the Lyceum, until there was a revival i n the first century
B C E by Andronicus of Rhodes, who initiated a series of commen-
taries on Aristotle's works. Plato's Academy had a divided history after
the death of his immediate successors, his nephew Speusippus (who
38
MAPPING THE TERRITORY
39
INTRODUCING GREEK PHILOSOPHY
40
2. Language, logic and literary form
Before exploring the six key topics, we should consider the linguistic and
literary forms i n which Greek philosophy was expressed and its logic
developed. The search for truth, for an acceptable explanation of how
things are, embracing the world and the relation of the state and the indi-
vidual to it, was stimulated right from the start by the spirit of competi-
tion. This was aided to a considerable extent by the spread of literacy.
Once new ideas were written down they could be published abroad,
and were then available for analysis, criticism, defence, modification
and improvement, i n an extraordinarily fast movement of arguments
and counter-arguments across the Mediterranean. We find, however,
that individual philosophers chose and developed distinctive literary
forms in both poetry and prose as appropriate to their ways of thinking.
Not only do we have different dialects, especially Ionic from the coast
and islands of Asia M i n o r and Attic for philosophers based in Athens,
but prose could be answered with epic verse, and verse countered with
prose, the verse sometimes prosaic and the prose i n a variety of styles.
Some set out their philosophy in enigmatic sentences, or as puzzles and
dilemmas, or used the tricks and flourishes learnt from rhetoric. Plato,
for the most part, preferred a dialogue form as closest to actual conver-
sation, which could show an argument advancing step by step, but he
also took great care i n setting the scene, and, where the material was
unsuitable for logical analysis, he used a narrative form in extraordinary
myths. When Cicero gave Greek philosophy a Latin voice, his dialogues
were more legalistic, comprising long speeches for and against different
41
INTRODUCING GREEK PHILOSOPHY
Thales, the first of the Milesians, was one of the "Seven Sages". As such
he was cited as the author of many wise sayings, the most famous being
"All things are full of gods", and "Stone has soul because it moves iron".
Although he too wrote nothing his work was known, and Aristotle
himself supplies arguments for the thesis attributed to h i m that water is
the first principle. Thales provided the impetus for his fellow Milesians
Anaximander and Anaximenes to respond with their own theories,
which they did in the new medium of prose, Anaximander "somewhat
poetically" and Anaximenes in "simple and unremarkable Ionic speech".
Prose writing was being used in decrees and constitutions, in the first
medical writings, in narratives (including Aesop's fables) and historical
narrative i n particular. Soon afterwards it appeared i n the systematic
geography and genealogies of Hecataeus, who was also from Miletus,
and wrote in his own name "what I think is the truth". He was following
the earlier Milesians in abandoning a verse form for that of common
speech, which was suited to their new outlook on the world around
them, as they deliberately countered the traditions of myth, ritual and
religion on which the epic poetry of Homer and Hesiod had been based.
Anaximander, for example, used the language of the law courts for the
series of wrongs and reparations acted out by the elemental opposites,
and Anaximenes adopted a mathematical ratio (as a:b so c:d) to explain
the relationship of breath and soul to air and cosmos. 1
42
LANGUAGE, LOGIC AND LITERARY FORM
even i n antiquity, gave h i m the title "the Obscure". The first fragment,
however, is longer than the others: one sentence with a complicated
syntax. It opens the collection with a literary flourish, devised to arouse
the reader's interest and set out the main theme. His aphoristic or
2
Xenophanes was more poet than philosopher and wrote various types
of poetry i n various metres, including the iambic metre of tragedy,
43
INTRODUCING GREEK PHILOSOPHY
the epic hexameter and elegiac couplets. The elegiac poems were suit-
able for a symposium or to celebrate an Olympic victory but i n this
metre there is also a four-line skit on Pythagoras and transmigration. 4
44
LANGUAGE, LOGIC AND LITERARY FORM
the fourth book of the Iliad as a pattern for the list of his own four
deities: Zeus, Hera, Aidoneus and Nestis. These are not divinities in
any recognizable sense, to be prayed to or appeased, but they have been
recast as the four elements of fire, air, earth and water, essential to the
structure of individual and cosmos i n the design and mechanism of
natural processes.
New discoveries about the moon are also set out in Homeric vocab-
ulary. Three passages from the Odyssey - Odysseus looking all round
at a high rock (Odyssey [hereafter Od] 12.233), the man who comes
from another place (allotrios phos; Od 16.102), birds passing under the
rays of the sun (Od 2.181) - are taken over by the philosophers in their
explanation of the m o o n shining by reflected light, travelling round
7
the earth always facing the sun, eclipsed when the earth intervenes,
and, like the sun, being not a divinity but a rock made of compacted
air. I n another context Parmenides adapts the Homeric description of
Odysseus tied tightly to the mast with bonds so as not to be seduced
by the Sirens (Od 12.196) for the certainty of his proof of the eternity
of being, and of Hector before Troy ("fate bound h i m fast"; Iliad [here-
after II] 22.5) for the invincible strength of logic (DK 28B8.37-8). As
a final example, Empedocles uses the format of a Homeric simile - "as
a Carian woman colours ivory with purple, so, Menelaus, were your
thighs stained with blood" (II 4.141-7) - first to describe the mingling
of elements to form compounds i n the simile beginning "as painters
take pigments of various colours" (DK 31B23), and then in more detail
to explain the structure and function of the eye, in lines suffused with
Homeric vocabulary:
45
INTRODUCING GREEK PHILOSOPHY
Argumentative prose
Zeno himself does not resolve his puzzles, but they serve as a warning
that critics of Parmenides theory need to be careful about the system
they would put in its place. I n response to Zeno, Melissus partially
adapted Parmenides conclusions to take account of Zeno's approach.
Anaxagoras chose one horn of the dilemma - that there is infinite
divisibility i n seamless matter ("you could not cut off one part from
another with an axe"; 59B8) - and used that as the basis for his theory
of matter, whereas Democritus chose the other - that there are abso-
lute minima, and called them atoms (atoma, uncuttable units). These
46
LANGUAGE, LOGIC AND LITERARY FORM
Socrates and the sophists turned their main forms of argument away
from physics and cosmology to politics and ethics as more relevant
to human life in the bustling cities of fifth-century Greece. The soph-
ists generally prided themselves on their skills i n rhetoric and persua-
sion, whether in a long speech on a set theme, a counter-argument to
a given topic or a short, cut-and-thrust question and answer to score
a quick point. Plato is still the main source for their activity, especially
in the verbal fireworks of the two brothers i n Euthydemus and the
serious confrontations with Thrasymachus i n Republic 1 and Callicles
in Gorgias. I n the dialogue named after Protagoras he shows h i m
9
47
INTRODUCING GREEK PHILOSOPHY
reproducing, particularly i n his early writing, the vivid cut and thrust of
intellectual engagement. Dialogue was a literary genre "between poetry
and prose" according to Aristotle (DL 3.37); the direct exchange of
speeches is part drama and part literary prose, and recalls the inter-
changes between heroes in epic poetry and the stichomythia (line-by-
line exchanges) of characters in comedy and tragedy. It was defined as
"a discourse consisting of question and answer on some philosophical
or political subject, with due regard to the characters of the persons
introduced and the choice of diction", and was contrasted with dialectic
in which a proposition is either established or refuted by question and
answer (DL 3.48 [Life of Plato]). Reproducing (or inventing) Socratic
10
Some Platonic scholars are impatient with his literary bent and
would prefer to ignore the details at the beginnings of the earlier
dialogues and the final myths, and concentrate on the hard philosophy
in between, but in Plato's works the range of styles elaborates the phil-
osophy and cannot be separated from it. This can be shown by the
care he takes i n setting the scenes of his dialogues, introducing the
characters, varying the exchanges, bringing i n the poetic language
of simile, allegory and metaphor, and using the narrative of myth to
complement the argument. Aristotle, in contrast, in the extant corpus,
presents his most important work in the form of continuous prose
notes: difficult, concise and candidly exploring possible variations in
the vast range of subjects he undertakes. Whatever the topic, his style
is consistent.
Most of those dialogues of Plato i n which Socrates is presented as
the main speaker have finely wrought settings, with characters that
suit the topic to be discussed. The definition dialogues, for example,
12
are carefully staged. When the subject is courage, the main speakers
are two illustrious military experts, Laches and Nicias; there is a
graceful compliment to Socrates presence of m i n d i n the retreat of
the Athenian forces before the Boeotians at Delium, and the dialogue
starts with the pros and cons of recruits training i n full armour. The
48
LANGUAGE, LOGIC AND LITERARY FORM
49
INTRODUCING GREEK PHILOSOPHY
says that the echo of these words resound i n h i m and make it impos-
sible for h i m to hear anything else.
Three further dialogues (out of many) may be mentioned briefly
for the care taken in setting and character. The most beautiful is the
opening scene of Phaedrus, where Socrates and his companion leave
the city on a summers day, paddle i n the cool water of the Ilissus, and
finally settle on a gentle grassy slope under a tall and spreading plane
tree, reclining i n the fresh sweet air to the sound of the cicadas; the
heat and the seductive atmosphere have an uncanny effect on Socrates,
which he attributes to Pan and the other strange powers of the place.
The setting is recalled i n the central part of the work in the interval
between the discussions of love and rhetoric, and here the cicadas
shame the human beings into engaging in dialectic rather than the
long speeches. When it is time to leave, Socrates makes a sober prayer
to Pan, whose presence i n the rural setting had been palpable: "Dear
Pan, and the other gods here, grant me inner beauty concordant with
my outside world. Let me understand that only the wise are wealthy,
and allow me no more riches than a moderate man would need or
manage" (Phaedrus 279b-c).
The Symposium dialogue in contrast has an urban rather than a
rural setting. Here Socrates is described as looking his best, having
bathed and put on shoes. On the way to the drinking party he goes
into one of his "trances", standing still and oblivious to his surround-
ings as he works out a knotty problem. When he arrives he finds that
the entertainment is to be provided by the guests themselves, each
giving a speech on eros (sexual love). These speeches reflect the erotic
currents present i n the pairings of some of the guests and the character
of the individual speakers: the doctor as long-winded, the comedy-
writer Aristophanes interrupted by hiccups. Towards the end of the
evening the young Alcibiades gatecrashes the party, half drunk, his
garland askew and accompanied by a retinue of flute girls. He proceeds
to deliver a portrait sketch of Socrates that shows h i m to be the ideal
(and restrained) embodiment of that eros which has engaged the whole
company.
The third dialogue in this trio is Phaedo, set in prison, where Socrates
speaks about death and immortality on his own last day, which will
finish with his execution by poison at sunset. The opening and closing
pages of Phaedo are straight biography, reporting the prison setting
and the last gathering of friends, and, at the end, the farewells to
Socrates and his courageous death. But the dialogue marks a turning
50
LANGUAGE, LOGIC AND LITERARY FORM
point i n that here Socrates engages with two topics that are particu-
larly Platonic: the theory of forms and the immortality of the soul.
When the theory appeared in Symposium it occurred in the context
of Socrates being instructed by the priestess Diotima i n the approach
to absolute beauty, and i n Apology, Socrates speech at his trial, his
personal view of time after death was thought to be either in the trad-
ition of meeting other people who had died and gone to the shadow
world of the dead i n Hades or as a long and dreamless sleep. Plato,
however, can now be found using Socrates as a mouthpiece for his
own suggestions for solutions to problems that Socrates had raised but
abandoned i n perplexity, especially concerning definitions, essences,
the philosophic life and post mortem rewards of virtue.
The same topics r u n through the ten books of Republic, where
Socrates is presented as the main speaker throughout. The first book
is a standard definition dialogue on the subject of justice, where confi-
dent definitions fail and the usual perplexity results. But when there is a
fresh start with the plea to show that doing right should be pursued for
its own sake i n whatever situation and without regard to consequences,
Socrates confidently takes control of the conversation with the other
two, Plato's brothers Glaucon and Adeimantus, becoming more or less
passive respondents. The earlier type of definition dialogue, with no
Platonic forms, myths or talk of immortality, and ending i n bewilder-
ment, is found once more, i n a late work, Theaetetus, where a definition
of knowledge is required, but the suggestions made fail to survive the
Socratic testing. This dialogue is set out as a narrative, read by Euclid
the Megarian from notes he made earlier from Theaetetus' recollec-
tion of the conversation, with supplements and corrections from later
meetings with Socrates. The format allows a move back to the direct
narration of the earlier works, without the cumbersome indirect speech
and constant use of "he said" that Plato had used throughout some of
the middle works. I n the initial conversation here Euclid reports the
13
51
INTRODUCING GREEK PHILOSOPHY
52
LANGUAGE, LOGIC AND LITERARY FORM
Platonic myth
53
INTRODUCING GREEK PHILOSOPHY
by their victims are released from further suffering. Good souls are
directed to the true earths surface, but for the truly virtuous, named as
those who practise philosophy, there are even fairer mansions. Socrates
concludes that this is all "a reasonable contention" and "a belief worth
risking" and, in the myth, he justifies his earlier surprising statement
that the life of philosophy is a preparation for death.
The Phaedrus myth (246a-57a) also follows an immortality proof
that treats soul as a principle of movement (rather than of life or
reason), and comes between the two main subjects of the dialogue:
love and rhetoric. The myth has a celestial setting with a cosmic vision
of a chariot procession of Zeus and the Olympian gods encircling the
outer heaven and contemplating the realm of truth beyond. Human
souls follow them with greater or lesser success, but most fall, and are
born on earth, to endure a round of lives. One who practises phil-
osophy and survives three times without wrongdoing is then free of
reincarnation, and rejoins the divine procession, whereas others are
likely to degenerate through a series of human and animal bodies. The
poetic (and persuasive) prose that Plato adopts i n his myth makes the
moral to be drawn all the more effective, as this passage shows:
Socrates says that the story of the true nature of the soul is long, and
only a god could tell it, but what it resembles a man might relate, as he
has done, and in a shorter time.
These four eschatological myths, from Gorgias, Phaedo, Phaedrus
and Republic, are recounted by Socrates as continuous narratives, and
contrary to his persona in earlier dialogues, where he is distrustful
of long speeches and ornate prose. He there recommends that phil-
osophy is pursued not by lecture-type instruction, but by dialogue,
two people proceeding together, with mutual agreement at each stage
of the argument. It would seem that i n these myths Socrates is being
presented once more as an appropriate spokesman for Platos own
views concerning the survival of the soul after death, and the morals
54
LANGUAGE, LOGIC AND LITERARY FORM
55
INTRODUCING GREEK PHILOSOPHY
science and cosmology) called Timaeus. He tells the tale of how the
world body and world soul, and the human body and human soul,
were constructed, and brings i n all the related details from cosmology,
astronomy, mathematics, medicine, biology and chemistry that make
up the main part of the work named after him. Such scientific material
is, perhaps surprisingly, said to be suited not to philosophy but to myth
because its subject matter is set firmly in the realm of "becoming", and
as such has no reality i n the sense of timeless truth; a description of it
can be no more than a "likely account" The heavens, with the circles
of the fixed stars and planets regulated by number, imitate as far as
possible the uniformity and eternity of the model that its maker used,
but, i n life on earth i n the region below the moon, the resistance to the
master plan results i n a continuous struggle for permanence and order.
Although it was thought that accounts of the natural world will never
reach truth, it is agreed that progress is possible, and scientific advance
can be made by the continuous replacement of one theory by another
that is "more probable". Plato plays down his mythical narrative of
the cosmos as merely entertainment, light relief from the hard work
of metaphysics, while still giving his own interpretation of the latest
achievements i n the sciences as a contribution to the ongoing debate
about the structure of the physical world and how it functions. 15
56
LANGUAGE, LOGIC AND LITERARY FORM
57
INTRODUCING GREEK PHILOSOPHY
Philosophic letters
58
LANGUAGE, LOGIC AND LITERARY FORM
For the sake of those, Herodotus, who are unable to work care-
fully through each and every detail of what we have written on
nature, and who lack the ability to comprehend my longer books,
I have personally composed an adequate summary of the entire
system, to make it easier to commit to memory the most general
doctrines. (DL 10.34)
59
INTRODUCING GREEK PHILOSOPHY
sky gods. The genre of the philosophic letter, written to a specific indi-
vidual but intended for a wider audience, was to have a long history,
practised by Seneca i n the early Roman Empire, by Paul to Timothy,
for example, i n the New Testament, and, i n the letter-diary format
of "meditations to oneself", by the emperor himself, Marcus Aurelius.
60
LANGUAGE, LOGIC AND LITERARY FORM
some have seen a conflict i n Lucretius between the poet and the phil-
osopher. Lucretius' work has at times been denigrated as passages of
superb poetry interspersed with long discourses on atomic theory, but
it is his intense conviction i n the Tightness of Epicurus' philosophy
that drives the poetry, giving it power and beauty, and an enhanced
seriousness.
Lucretius' poem also contains two examples of the last literary form
to be discussed, the philosophic hymn. Praises in hexameter verse to
various gods have survived from earliest times under the general title
of Homeric Hymns; they were composed for individual recital rather
than for an assembly or choir. Their content would include an address
to the god under various titles, an account of myths relating to his or
her birth, travels and honours, and a final prayer. The Stoic Cleanthes
was probably the first to adapt the genre to a philosophical context,
using the format of an independent address to a god to develop a new
theology. I n his Hymn to Zeus the conventional figure of Zeus as the
all-powerful sky god was recast, according to Stoic theory and in the
tradition of Heraclitus, as intelligent and perfect logos, steering the
whole and maintaining it i n the best possible state. The hymn opens
with the lines: "Greatest of immortals, Zeus of many names, ever all-
powerful, / first principle of nature, master of the universe, all hail!" It
continues in this vein, praising Stoic divine providence in its aspects
61
INTRODUCING GREEK PHILOSOPHY
You who were the first to be able to lift high so bright a torch
in the deep darkness, casting light on the blessings of life,
you I follow, O glory of the Greek people.
You are our father and guide us with a father s advice ...
62
3. Cosmologies
Physicists through the ages have looked for an explanation for the
behaviour of fundamental particles and forces within a single frame-
work that would reveal the simplicity and power of the principles on
which the functions and structures of the universe are based. There are
a number of assumptions underlying this ongoing search, and their
origins can be traced to the beginnings of Greek philosophy. The first
is that there is a basic structure to the universe embodied in "laws of
nature". Secondly, these are accessible to human reason, so that the solu-
tion to the problem of finding a theory that would unite so much diver-
sity, and account for what is permanent through change, is within our
grasp. Thirdly, progress is made through criticism and adaptation of
what has gone before, and with these continual advances an ever more
accurate story is told. Finally, however, there is the "axiom of undecide-
ability': that there may be an ever closer approximation to certainty
but, given our impermanent and contingent state, the struggle cannot
succeed. Scientific advance is achieved by the continual replacement
of one theory by another that is more probable than its predecessor,
through a combination of brilliant intuition and the careful applica-
tion of research (which the Greeks called historia). The results at each
stage provide the stimulus for subsequent achievements i n an ongoing
and open-ended exploration of what exists now, and how such things
came to be.
63
INTRODUCING GREEK PHILOSOPHY
A theory of everything
From the beginning the Greeks were ready to find a "theory of every-
thing" and, in a spirit of extraordinary optimism, they set out to inter-
pret "the whole": the formation and present structure of the universe,
its underlying laws and the role and function of its parts. It was thought
that the bewildering array of phenomena could be pared down to an
explanation in terms of simplicity, unity and order; such an expla-
nation would be within the range of human intelligence, and the
subject was worthy of the effort required to reach an understanding of
it. At the beginning of philosophy, the Presocratics, i n their creative
thinking, and stimulated by the competition with earlier and contem-
porary theories, speculated on such subjects as the reduction of matter
to basic elements, forces of attraction and repulsion at work on them,
the mathematical structure of things, continuous flux and regeneration
in the cosmos, the possibility of a constantly expanding universe and
an initial version of atomic theory.
Hesiod's Theogony
64
COSMOLOGIES
and is in turn deposed by his own youngest son, Zeus. The ascendancy
of Zeus is finally achieved after he and his sibling gods are victorious
in a mighty cosmic battle against his father s generation of Titans. A
succession of matings by Zeus produces the next generation of divini-
ties, and the various histories and attributes of these, the "Olympians",
are given briefly. There is nothing about the first human men, but a
great deal about the first woman, Pandora, her jar of evils and her role
as a punishment sent to earth by Zeus i n retaliation for Prometheus
theft of fire, in a story not immediately reconcilable with the earlier
account of human ills as part of the natural order of things. Hesiod s
great achievement was to bring together all this material, which comes
mainly from the traditions of early Greece and the East, and to weave it
into a comprehensive account, in the epic style of Homer, of the ways in
which the natural world and its standard features arose, and to include
also early stories of the gods and the establishment of cults. Along with
the Homeric poems, Hesiods Theogony set the traditions of myth and
ritual, but the genealogy model that he used for his cosmogony was
soon challenged.
First principles
primary to such opposites as hot and cold, dry and moist, and separate
from them. The reported argument is that if one of these opposites (or
material related to them, such as Thales' "water") were the first prin-
ciple and limitless, it would eventually overwhelm and destroy the rest,
so the arche must be different from the opposites, and have no char-
acteristics itself. It is the source from which the opposites arise and to
which they return when they are destroyed for, as Anaximander says
in the surviving fragment, "They suffer punishment and make repara-
tion to one another for their injustice according to the assessment of
time". The opposites are represented here as quarrelsome neighbours.
At some time or place one encroaches on its counterpart, and that in
turn, at another time and place, makes good the loss and itself becomes
65
INTRODUCING GREEK PHILOSOPHY
the aggressor. Gains and losses balance out overall i n a cosmic equilib-
rium, exemplified i n the repeated sequences of bright days and dark
nights, hot, dry summers and cold, wet winters.
Anaximanders second correction of Hesiods generation story was
the claim that the stage of the emergence of the perceived cosmos is
due not to a gendered, personified individual producing a child, but
to "something capable of generating hot and cold" coming out of the
eternal limitless, in a process that combines an automatic separation
with biological growth. He went on to explain that the hot and cold
that were then generated became defined as a sphere of flame and
dark mist; part of the mist was compacted into earth, and this was
surrounded by a layer of air, which in turn was enclosed by the fire
"like bark round a tree". The earth at the centre was thought to be
cylindrical, its depth a third of its diameter, and, in a brilliant deduc-
tion, Anaximander maintained that it would stay stable in its central
position because it was "freely suspended" with no reason to move
in one direction rather than another. The earth was eventually encir-
cled at proportionate distances by sun, moon and stars, described as
three rings that had broken off from the original fiery "bark" and were
enclosed by part of the dark mist; these had openings, one each for the
sun and moon rings and several for the stars, which allowed the inner
fire to shine through. Winds and sea emerged as the result of the sun
then affecting the mist about the earth. Since the shape of the earth
was cylindrical, it was thought possible that there could be creatures
living in the "anti-podes", which is the other surface of the cylindrical
earth, with their feet literally opposite to ours. Finally, Anaximander
suggested that the human race itself had its origins in the protection of
the warm sea rather than the more barren and dangerous land: "There
arose fish or fish-like creatures, inside which human beings grew and
were retained until puberty; then these creatures broke open, and men
and women emerged who were capable of feeding themselves" (DK
12A30).3
66
COSMOLOGIES
67
INTRODUCING GREEK PHILOSOPHY
individual psyche) takes its place in the cycle of the changes or "turn-
ings" of the world masses, from fire to water to earth, and back through
water to fire. It is an ingredient in the changes but also controls them,
"as goods for gold and gold for goods" (B90). The proportion or logos,
according to which all these amounts are measured and balanced at
different times and places, maintains the equilibrium of the cosmos,
and the continual movement of the parts ensures the permanence of
the whole, so that "changing it rests" (B84a). The sun plays a crucial
part as a primary concentration of fire, controlling the lengths of
the days and the seasons, and the distance of the solstices. A n d here
Heraclitus goes straight back to Anaximander, in the belief of temporal
and spatial gains and losses found i n hot summers and cold winters,
parched deserts and flooded fields, balancing out in a cosmic equilib-
rium controlled over time.
Elements
68
COSMOLOGIES
69
INTRODUCING GREEK PHILOSOPHY
70
COSMOLOGIES
explained, "for how could hair come from what is not hair or flesh
from what is not flesh?" (BIO). In any object, great or small, all possible
ingredients would be present, some imperceptible, but others would
dominate to give the object its particular appearance. W i t h "mixing"
and "separating" (the terms for "birth" and "death" also used by
Empedocles) there is a rearrangement of the parts and a preponder-
ance of different ingredients with a resulting different appearance. The
cause of the mixing and separating are not opposing forces, as with
Empedocles, but pure cosmic Nous (Mind) which knows and controls
all things, now and in the future, and caused the initial rotation in the
original mixture.
Anaxagoras is unique among ancient cosmologists i n writing about
an expansionist universe, attributed to this power of M i n d : " M i n d
controlled the whole rotation, so that it began to rotate in the begin-
ning. A n d first it began to rotate from a small area, but now rotates
over a wider area, and will continue to rotate ever more widely" (B12).
As a result of the "swirl" or vortex (dine) initiated by M i n d , the denser
part came to the centre to form the earth, what was less dense made up
the sea around it, and the lighter air and fire formed an outer covering.
Anaxagoras, however, recognized that with the vortex there would
be a counter-tendency for heavy bodies to be swung outwards, and
posited sun and stars as red-hot stones hurled from the centre and
now carried round in revolutions in the aither. There was a beginning
to the cosmos in its generation from the original mixture, but now the
rotations continue outwards indefinitely into the future.
Atomic cosmology
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INTRODUCING GREEK PHILOSOPHY
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COSMOLOGIES
The model for most Presocratic cosmologies was biological, that of the
living animal, whereas for the atomists it was mechanistic, based on
the random movement of atoms through the void. It was Democritus
who first used the term micros kosmos (DK 68B34) for the individual,
seeing a human being as an ordered system i n miniature, compa-
rable to the whole in its composite matter and ordered structure. The
macrocosm-microcosm link, however, was common to most of his
predecessors; it is found for example in Anaximenes air as human
and cosmic breath, Heraclitus' logos in the form of fire as control-
ling intelligence for the whole and the individual ps^cne, Empedocles
elements as world masses and constituents of animal parts, and M i n d ,
for Anaxagoras, providing the same guidance and understanding in
the universe and in some of its creatures. I n the Timaeus Plato sees the
6
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INTRODUCING GREEK PHILOSOPHY
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COSMOLOGIES
We may say that we have now reached the end of our account
of the whole, for this cosmos has now received the full number
of mortal and immortal creatures. A living animal, visible itself,
it contains all that is seen; a perceptible god, it is an image of
the intelligible, supremely great and good, most beautiful and as
perfect as possible, this one uniquely generated heaven. (92c)
The Stoics, starting with Chrysippus, took over this theory of the
cosmos as alive, and with a rational soul. He had an argument to
support it:
In this Plato and the Stoics deliberately set themselves against the
atomists and their soulless, non-perceptive, non-intelligent plurality
of worlds, which were composed from lifeless atoms moving randomly
through void.
The world body, according to the Timaeus myth, is made of the four
Empedoclean elements, with water (cold and wet) and air (wet and
hot) as the mean proportion between the two extremes of earth (dry
and cold) and fire (hot and dry), the detailed proportions given owing
much to Pythagorean mathematical theory This body is described as
spherical and smooth, engaged in circular motion, free from disease
and old age (another blow to the atomist theory of worlds deterio-
rating before their final disintegration), complete and self-sufficient.
The world soul is described as intermediate between eternal being and
temporal becoming, having both knowledge of the eternal and true
opinion of the temporal, the eternal being expressed in the circle of
the Same (at the outer edge of the fixed stars) and the temporal the
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INTRODUCING GREEK PHILOSOPHY
circles of the Different (which give the orbits of the planets). World
body and soul are put together through their centres, the soul directing
the movements of the body and providing it with a divine source of
unending and rational life.
From the myth at the end of the Republic (617b-e) it is found that
Plato in this context adopted the Pythagorean theory of the "harmony
of the spheres" which was an imaginative combination of principles
of mathematics, harmonics and astronomy. After experimenting on a
single string with a moveable bridge, Pythagoras himself, or one of his
early associates, discovered that the separate notes that were produced
corresponded to the length of the string from the bridge, and that the
octave, and the ratios of fourth and fifth, were precisely determined
by these mathematical intervals. Since a large body moving through
space was assumed to produce some sound, and the planets were such
bodies, they would be producing sounds as they rotated; and, since
they were thought to move at speeds i n proportion to their distance
from the centre, it is likely that they would continually give off sounds
related to the ratios of their orbits. At the circumference were the fixed
stars, and then, i n order, the seven planets Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, Venus,
Mercury, Sun and Moon, with earth at the centre. The proportionate
distances and speeds of the planets correspond to the ratios of octave,
fourth and fifth, "and on the top of each circle stands a siren, which is
carried round with it and utters a note of constant pitch, and the eight
notes together make up a single scale" (Republic 617b). We are not
8
76
COSMOLOGIES
77
INTRODUCING GREEK PHILOSOPHY
A fifth element
78
COSMOLOGIES
79
INTRODUCING GREEK PHILOSOPHY
form at odds with the underlying matter, and externally by the outside
forces of constant change. I n the region of the upper sky the endeavour
to reach the perfection of the divine results in the faultless rotation of
the heavens.
This simple pattern, however, was to some extent undermined by
Eudoxus, working in Plato's Academy, who observed that the motions
of the planetary spheres had to be independent of each other to account
for the phenomena of their "wanderings". To counter this, a complex
system of interactive spheres would be needed, and this is what
Aristotle eventually conceded (in the later insertion of chapter 8 into
Metaphysics Lambda). He thought there that for the mechanization of
planetary movement to succeed it would be necessary to posit fifty-five
concentric spheres, thirty-three to produce the observed phenomena,
and a further twenty-two to act as "reagent" spheres, nullifying the
effects of one planet's sphere on the next.
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COSMOLOGIES
The Epicureans went further and denied any centre to the universe;
nor could there be an absolute "up" and "down" i n space, but only rela-
tive to an individual. The universe, by definition, is all that there is,
and they denied that it had any boundary, for what is on the other side
of the boundary would be included in what there is; this meant that,
from any position in it, the universe stretches away, equally infinite
in all directions. To give some idea of this infinity, Lucretius takes the
movement of lightning, the fastest known phenomenon, and says that
the dazzling flashes, racing through an interminable tract of space,
could not traverse it, nor even shorten the distance still to be covered
(DRN 1.1001-7). I n this context, Lucretius also introduces the "spear"
10
Suppose you allow that space is finite, and someone runs to the
very edge and throws a spear, do you think that it would fly on
straight ahead or meet an obstruction? It must be one or the
other, but either answer would have you admit to a limitless
universe. If the spear continues on, then there is no boundary, if
it is stopped I shall go after you and ask you to throw from there,
and so on ad infinitum, (1.968-76)
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INTRODUCING GREEK PHILOSOPHY
it. Only Leucippus and Democritus accepted the reality of empty space
as such, claiming that "is not" is as valid an existing entity as "is". The
"empty" (kenon as void) and the " f u l l " (solid atoms) are all that there
is. The Epicureans developed this further, pulling out the implications
of limitless material in limitless space for numerous worlds:
Our present world is one of those that had been generated from clusters
of atoms and continually expanded until it reached maturity, but inevi-
tably the composite structures will fall apart, the whole complex disin-
tegrate, and its constituent atoms move out into space, some perhaps
to reform into other worlds. Now our world is past its prime, and, as it
is subject to internal decay and external blows, its end is unavoidable.
The description of the process by Lucretius at the end of his second
book foretells global warming, the exhaustion of the parched earth and
gradual widely spreading decay until the "moenia mundi" the mighty
walls of the worlds citadel, attacked on all sides, crack and completely
collapse (2.1144-74).
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COSMOLOGIES
combination of air and fire i n "warm breath" the essence of life. This
theory followed that of Heraclitus, in that pneuma for the Stoics was
also viewed as the rational organizing principle, divine (called, as it
had been by Heraclitus, both Zeus and logos), pervading the cosmos
and its organic parts, and holding it all together by means of its tensile
energy. Here too there is a macrocosm-microcosm pattern, with the
individual organisms not only replicating the whole i n miniature but
all being interconnected as animated matter.
Since the cosmos for the Stoics, following Plato in the Timaeus, was
a living thing, an "animal" they expected it to have a life cycle. Its birth
was from fire and air, which was then partially transformed into earth
and water to give the elements of the organisms that subsequently
emerged. But then, as an animal, the cosmos would grow, reach matu-
rity, decline and eventually pass away; this "passing away", according
to the Stoics, would be as a re-absorption into the original fire in a
massive cosmic conflagration called ekpyrdsis. Then the cycle started
again. There had been earlier suggestions of such a notion of recur-
ring time cycles, in particular i n the alternating dominance of Love
and Strife found i n Empedocles' Physics, and the story of a succession
of repeated cosmic eras in Plato's myth in Politicus (268d-274e). It was
also a reasonable assumption that, as the days and months and seasons
of the year recur with the turnings of the sun and moon, so there
might well be a "Great Year", when all the planets return to their earlier
position. This "Great Year" would have its own great summer of confla-
grations and its winter of floods, and natural disasters of this kind had
been preserved in the myths of Phaethon, in which the chariot of the
sun crashed to earth causing a conflagration, and of Deucalion and
Pyrrha, the only human beings saved when once the whole earth was
flooded. The Stoic Chrysippus finally combined these precedents into
a version of cyclic time dominated by Heraclitean fire in the theory
of ekpyrdsis. This meant that, at specific periods of time comparable
to a "Great Year" there would be a conflagration and destruction of
the cosmos, and then a regeneration and return to the former state of
affairs:
When the stars are brought back to the same position every-
thing that happened in the previous cycle is repeated in exactly
the same way. There will again be a Socrates and a Plato and
everyone else along with the same friends and fellow citizens; the
same things will happen to them and they will do the same things
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INTRODUCING GREEK PHILOSOPHY
again, and every city and village will return. The restoration of
the whole occurs not once but many times, indeed without end
into infinity ... There will be nothing strange compared with
what happened before, but all will be exactly the same down to
the smallest detail. (Nemesius, On Human Nature 38.11 l ) n
In their cosmology, as with their ethics, the Stoics did not shrink from
taking their theory to its logical conclusion. Yet this is no more extreme
than contemporary theories of parallel and successive universes.
84
4. Pagan monotheism
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INTRODUCING GREEK PHILOSOPHY
Against a n t h r o p o m o r p h i c gods
86
PAGAN MONOTHEISM
One god, greatest among gods and men, not at all like mortals
in body or mind.
As a whole he sees, as a whole he thinks, and as a whole he
hears.
A n d always he stays in the same place, not moving at all,
nor is it fitting for h i m to travel in different directions at different
times,
but with no effort at all he keeps everything else moving,
by the thinking of his mind. (B.23, 24, 26, 25)
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INTRODUCING GREEK PHILOSOPHY
Natural theology
From Thales, the first of the Milesians, comes the dramatic and enig-
matic saying that "all things are full of gods". Homeric polytheism is
2
88
PAGAN MONOTHEISM
all that there is arises originally from it and duly returns to it in meas-
ured sequence over time.
This new understanding of the divine was then developed by
Anaximander s colleague Anaximenes with two innovations, shown in
the original wording of his one extant fragment: "As our soul {psyché)
which is air maintains us, so breath and air surround the whole world".
First, the soul is introduced as that which holds together, strengthens
and controls the individual, and this is analogous to the divinity,
without birth or death, which encloses the cosmos and is its source.
Secondly, this divine source is not indefinite, as with Anaximander,
but is now assigned a specific yet invisible character: that of living
breath. These Milesians find that it is in the workings of nature that
the truly immortal - what is birthless, deathless and limitless - is to
be found, as both the origin of life and its support and control. This
first principle (or arche) names what there was before anything else;
it has a role i n providing a causal explanation of the world and its
phenomena, but does not itself have to be explained. Similarly it is a
"beginning" for other things, but without having a beginning itself,
and, since there is no end to its continuing existence, it is also "death-
less", athanatos, the Homeric synonym for a god. There is in addition
the concept, developed i n Xenophanes and Heraclitus, of an intelli-
gent divinity that surrounds and "steers" everything, containing the
whole and i n some way responsible for its movement and activity. But
the emergence of this idea of monotheism i n nature has nothing to do
with morality, even though Anaximander used the concept of justice
(diké), and Heraclitus that of law (nomos). These terms are a way of
expressing the principles of order, measure and limit regulating the
workings of the cosmos and the patterns of movement of the celestial
bodies within it.
Cosmic divinities
Empedocles is working along the same lines when he adapts the tradi-
tional divine attributes of power, privilege and deathlessness to the
functioning of nature i n his forceful introduction of the four elements:
"Hear first the four roots of all things - / bright Zeus and life-bringing
Hera, Aidoneus / and Nestis, with whose tears the world's streams flow"
(DK 31B6). Using Homeric metre and style (similar to the catalogue
of gods i n Agamemnon's oath at Iliad 4.275), Empedocles subverts
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INTRODUCING GREEK PHILOSOPHY
the Homeric context. The fragment lists four gods, two male and
two female, one pair (Zeus and Hera) belonging to the upper realm
and the other (Aidoneus, god of Hades and darkness, and the water-
nymph Nestis) to the lower. But these are no longer divinities i n any
recognizable conventional sense, to be prayed to or appeased, with
known appearances and histories: they have been recast as the eternal
unchanging elements of fire, air, earth and water. I n this exploration
of what it means to be a god, the immanence of divinity is now shown
in the workings of the universe, in the inherent designs and mech-
anisms of natural processes. I n addition, according to this new view
of the natural world, the eternal, unchanging basic ingredients of life
(which Empedocles calls "roots", the botanical term indicating their
vitality) are set up as worthy of the respect and wonder with which the
Olympians were traditionally regarded.
Parmenides built on Anaximanders denial of absolute birth and
death, and hammered home the implications with forceful argument,
presented as a speech concerning truth delivered by a goddess to a
young man at the end of his journey to the ends of the earth. She starts
by saying that the first pair of "signs" characterizing what truly is points
to the denial of generation and destruction. There could not have been
a beginning, she argues, for, before the beginning of what there is, there
would have been what there is not, and how could what there is have
come from what is not? And, with a question embodying what was later
known as "the principle of sufficient reason", she asks what compul-
3
90
PAGAN MONOTHEISM
91
INTRODUCING GREEK PHILOSOPHY
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PAGAN MONOTHEISM
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INTRODUCING GREEK PHILOSOPHY
on the soul, which is the most important part of ourselves, i n its most
important concerns (Republic 378a-e).
In the second book of the Republic, challenged to show that one
should pursue justice for its own sake without regard to the conse-
quences in life or after death, Socrates looks first for the nature of
justice in the state as easier to recognize (because " w r i t large"); this
leads into the discussion of how a state would be constructed, and
the guidelines for the primary education of its citizens. It is said that
the harm inflicted by polytheistic myth i n the tradition of Homer and
Hesiod lies in their appeal to emotion rather than to reason, and espe-
cially in the pernicious examples they present to their young audience
of immoral behaviour: the stories are sacrilegious, false, unsuitable
and dangerous i n their effect. The Presocratics, led by Xenophanes,
had been against attributing to gods and goddesses the image of their
human worshippers, in appearance, clothing and physical features;
Plato inveighs further against the wrong actions attributed to them.
Violence of children towards their parents - as i n Kronos treatment
of his father at the very beginning of Hesiod's genealogy - and battles
between the gods, their jealousies and the unfair treatment of heroes
that are found throughout the Homeric poems are condemned as
misrepresentations of the true nature of divinity. I n addition, lying
and deceit ascribed to gods are unacceptable, as in Zeus sending
Agamemnon a misleading dream, or Thetis' powerful accusation of
the conduct of Apollo, who promised health and long life to her chil-
dren: "He who joined i n our feasting, he who said all this, he it was
who killed my son" (Republic 383b). Plato, through Socrates, gives the
corrections to these attributions i n monotheistic terms. God must
always be portrayed as he naturally is: as good and the source of good,
ever truthful and with no grounds for deceit.
The last principle to be observed by the educators, in addition to
justice and truth, is an Eleatic one: that god is changeless. The argu-
ment here is a deduction from the perfection of god: change comes
about either from an external agent or internally, but strong and
healthy bodies, and courageous and intelligent minds, stay constant
themselves and are least affected by time or other external agents; god,
therefore, as most perfect, would not be touched by outside events nor
could change come from within. Any such change would necessarily
be for the worse, and it is impossible for god to want to cause his own
deterioration. The divine, again as i n Presocratic language, "stays as he
is, uniformly and for ever".5
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PAGAN MONOTHEISM
This then which gives truth to objects known and restores its
power to the knowing subject, say it is the form of the good; and,
since it is the cause of knowledge and truth, regard it as known,
but, while these two - knowledge and truth - are fair, i n thinking
it other than and even fairer than these two, you will be thinking
rightly; and knowledge and truth, as i n the other world light
and sight are thought of as as sun-like but not the sun, so here
it is right to think of these two as god-like but not right to think
of either of them as the good, but the state of the good is to be
valued even more highly. (508e)
A n d I think you agree that, for the objects of knowledge, not only
is there derived from the good their ability to be known, but their
being and their reality is also given to them from it; for the good
is not existence but is further beyond existence, exceeding it i n
dignity and power. (509b)
The sun, which is the cause of light and sight, corresponds to the
good, the cause of truth and knowledge, and, as the sun gives its objects
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INTRODUCING GREEK PHILOSOPHY
birth and nourishment, the good gives its objects (which are the other
forms) their being and reality. The good is the cause of the being of the
forms, of their truth and of our knowledge of them. Forms are to be
understood i n relation to their goodness and as a subordinate kind of
goodness, whereas the good "is on the other side of being" a superior
kind of reality, beyond definition.
In the allegory of the cave the sun is again used as an aid to under-
standing the good. The upward journey of the released prisoner to the
visible world above the cave, and his final contemplation of the sun,
is comparable to the philosophers struggle to reach the good, and,
when it is grasped, he realizes that it is the cause of all that is right
and beautiful: of light in the visible world and of truth and under-
standing i n the intelligible world. Here the form of the good is empha-
sized as the object of knowledge, as would be appropriate in the context
of the education of the philosopher, but there is a similar panegyric of
another form, that of beauty in the Symposium, as the true object of
love. When the lover moves upwards from love of a particular body
to love of soul, and from there to love of intellectual pursuits, it is said
that he would finally reach beauty itself:
The form of beauty here, like the form of the good i n the Republic,
is described in the elevated language of earlier monotheism, and given
the attributes of timelessness, unchangeability, perfection and unique-
ness. Where the form of the good is made responsible in some way for
the existence, truth and reality of what is intelligible, and, derivatively,
for the phenomena of the visible world, the form of beauty is the goal
of all human desiring.
Creationism
96
PAGAN MONOTHEISM
the good. I n the generation myth of the later Timaeus there is a third
interpretation: the divine in the character of a craftsman-god, a
demiourgos. I n this context our world is not represented as dependent
in some unspecified way on the form of the good, but described in
terms of a specific artefact constructed by a craftsman i n the likeness
of a perfect model. Imperfections i n the copy are due to the recalcitrant
material, which resists to some extent the imposition of the ideal form,
much as a sculptor or carpenter has to deal as best he can with flaws in
the marble or wood that work against the desired result. Plato elevates
the persona of an ordinary workman i n stone or metal to that of creator
of the world, and then gives h i m divine attributes. He is described as
eternal god, the one and only creator, and also the caring father, good
in himself and also the source of all external good. Because he is free
of envy, this god, in contrast, wants all things to be as like himself as
6
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INTRODUCING GREEK PHILOSOPHY
The point is reiterated at the end of the Republic i n the Myth of Er,
where the soul alone is said to be responsible for the choice of the next
life on earth, and any ills that it may contain: the aitia (cause, blame) is
with the one who chooses, god is anaitios (blameless; 617e). The good-
ness and generosity of god as creator of the cosmos and human souls
are also emphasized throughout the myth of the Timaeus, when, as has
been seen, being devoid of envy he brings into being the best possible
world. A n d there is one further occasion in the context of myth where
the goodness of god is emphasized. In the Theogony Hesiod had told of
how Kronos mutilated his father and i n turn was overthrown by his son
Zeus, which Plato's Socrates in the Republic calls "the greatest lie about
the greatest subject". In the Politicus dialogue, however, Plato, with an
anonymous "Eleatic visitor" as spokesman, recommends that Hesiod s
tale in his other poem, Works and Days, should definitely be published,
for there Kronos is an acceptable role model, in that he was said to have
inaugurated a golden age of happiness on earth, securing for humanity
peace, justice and law. Consequently the Politicus myth explains how
order in the cosmos alternates with chaos, and all is well only when the
Kronos-type god is i n control, "for all the good there is i n the universe
stems from its constructor, whereas cruelty and injustice stem from the
disorderly condition it was i n previously" (273b).
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PAGAN MONOTHEISM
Gods as allegories
One way of finding an explanation for the traditional role of the gods
in human affairs was i n the use of allegory, where the name of a god or
goddess was used in the context of an action or attribute typically asso-
ciated with them. Plato denounced this interpretation i n his criticism
of the poets at Republic 378d on the grounds that the inexperienced
would find it difficult to distinguish allegory from reality, but such
an understanding was familiar from earliest times. I n the Homeric
poems, violent and sudden happenings internal to a character could be
attributed to the external activity of gods: for example a loss of temper
accompanied by the urge to violence might be the result of the breath
of Ares, the god of war; a bright idea that comes into ones mind unex-
pectedly is from Athena; and "the works of golden Aphrodite" is the
euphemism for sex. In his tragedy Trojan Women, Euripides shows
Helen attempting to excuse her elopement with Paris on the grounds
that she was i n thrall to this powerful goddess, but his mother exposes
her guilt i n the line "my son was fair and you desired him". I n his
Encomium to Helen, the sophist Gorgias pursued this question of her
innocence or guilt i n relation to the goddess: was Helen accountable
for her actions, or had she been possessed by Aphrodite?
Empedocles took such allegorizing further, and redefined the func-
tion of traditional gods by giving his elements divine names: Hera for
air, Zeus or Hephaistos for fire, Nestis for water and Aidoneus for earth.
He describes the simple ratio i n the structure of bones, for example, as
two parts earth, two of water and four of fire as follows:
The kindly earth received into its broad hollows of the eight
parts
two of the brightness of Nestis and four of Hephaistos, and these
came to be white bones,
held together by the gluing of harmony. (DK 31B96)
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INTRODUCING GREEK PHILOSOPHY
and cherishing the myriad forms of life. I n his third book, on the
mortality of the soul, Lucretius further allegorized, and here inter-
preted the traditional realm of Hades and its great sinners as human
mental torments that are self-inflicted: Tantalus* fear of the falling rock
is to be understood as superstitious dread of oppressive gods, Tityos'
anguish is the gnawing of unrequited passion; Sisyphus toil is the
useless labour involved in unfulfilled ambition; the Danaids' collecting
water i n sieves represents the futility of insatiable desires; the whip
lashings of the Furies are the stings of conscience - in sum, "the life of
the foolish becomes their own hell on earth" (3.978-1023).
The Stoics adapted in a different way the Homeric polytheism that
continued i n Greek and then into Roman culture; they saw the benefits
of nature in terms of individual presiding deities, exemplified i n Roman
literature, in which the name "Ceres" was commonly used for corn or
bread, "Neptune" for water, "Vulcan" for fire and "Liber" for wine. Most
importantly Zeus/Jupiter stands for or "is really" for the Stoics much
more than the sky god, as i n Euripides' words: "You see the high vault
of boundless aither which surrounds the world with soft embrace, /
This think of as the highest god, this understand to be Jupiter" (fr. 386,
Nauck, quoted by Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods 2.65). The impli-
7
100
PAGAN MONOTHEISM
bounty of nature but as various aspects of the one god; when this was
properly understood, individual citizens could with a clear conscience
join i n the worship and reverence of these gods under the names that
custom had bestowed on them, as Cicero explains in On the Nature of
the Gods (2.7\).
The creator god of Plato's Timaeus, as we have seen, devised the world
to be as perfect as possible, and the Stoics followed this lead i n the
"argument from design". As the details of an artefact point to an intel-
ligent artist or engineer, so the design of the whole cosmos, from the
intricacies of planetary movements to the complexities of living organ-
isms, indicate a designer: i n modern terms the watch has a watch-
maker. But against this was the anti-religious stand of the teaching
of Epicurus, set out most vividly in Lucretius poem. This attitude
denied the existence of a universal, providential divinity from the clear
evidence of a lack of intelligent design. How could an intelligent divine
power have made the world when so much is wrong with it? Lucretius
presents numerous examples of the earths imperfections as testimony
that there is no supernatural design: tanta stat praedita culpa (it has
so many faults) is the phrase he uses (5.199). Two-thirds of planet
earth are uninhabitable, because so much of it is too hot or too cold,
or covered by water or drought-stricken deserts; the fruits of agri-
culture are ruined by heat, frost, winds and storms; the human child
is naked and vulnerable; illnesses come with the changing seasons;
and untimely death stalks abroad. Not only are there no designer gods
producing the best possible world, but fear of gods and their vengeful
punishments in this world and after death is to be explained as a device
used by influential men to subdue the people, and so achieve their
own ends. A famous example was the sacrifice of the young and inno-
cent Iphigenia to further military ambition, summed up i n Lucretius'
famous line: tantum religio potuit suadere malorum (so much evil was
wrought by the powerful persuasion of religion; 1.101). The whole
poem is a defence of the position that an omnipotent divinity involved
in what happens on earth is not a primary principle i n the forma-
tion and maintenance of the cosmos, but a social construct developed
subsequently i n the history of the human race, which "caused tribula-
tion for generations to come" (5.1194-7).
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established in great detail by the Athenian visitor for the best possible
state is threatened by the priority given to nature and chance by some
philosophies, along with the denial of divine existence, rational design
and providential care for all aspects of the cosmos, including human
life. The Athenian deals with this serious opposition by imagining a
bright young atheist as its representative, and himself as presenting the
counter-argument in a calm and orderly fashion, beginning "my child,
you are still young and your opinions will change with time" (Laws
888a). The young man holds that the basic elements of earth, air, fire
and water owe their existence to nature and chance (as the result of
random atomic conglomerations) and that the secondary bodies, the
stars and planets, arise from the natural movement of the elements.
The consequent interaction of opposites then produces plant, animal
and human life. The gods are fictions, found not in nature (physis) but
as a result of human construction (techne).
In response the Athenian sets out the argument to reverse this
conclusion, wishing to convince his young opponent that soul (psyche)
is prior to matter rather than emerging later than it. Using an analysis
of kinds of motion first raised i n the proof for immortal soul in the
Phaedrus and to be taken up later by Aristotle i n Metaphysics Lambda,
the Athenian traces the chains of movement and alteration back to an
original "self-mover", which is not dependent for its life and activity on
any external cause, but is itself responsible for subsequent generation.
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PAGAN MONOTHEISM
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104
PAGAN MONOTHEISM
as the arche, the ultimate first principle, and is fine and good (kalon).
It is in this context that the primary substance is called "god" (theos)
for the first time, and given the masculine pronoun, at the point when
life that is eternal and most good is attributed to h i m .
But what does god do, as pure actuality? What kind of life is his?
According to Aristotle, our life is best and happiest, however briefly,
when we are engaged i n contemplative thought. It is to be expected
then that what is best for us sometimes would belong to god for ever
in his everlasting existence, and, since "thinking in itself belongs with
what is good in itself, and the highest thought with the highest good"
(1072b 18), god is a thinking being. But the thinking has to be of some-
thing, it needs an object. Now it was endemic in Greek philosophy
to assume that subject and object are mutually affected in awareness
and understanding of the external world. Individual human beings
are limited i n their range of knowledge by their internal condition,
and that condition constantly changes as it is made better or worse by
stimuli that are external to it. We can improve our abilities through
effort and practice, but never reach higher than those abilities allow,
so that the external object of perception and thought is always more
powerful than the subject. For a divinity that is supreme, unchanging
and engaged in thinking, there is only one object appropriate, or even
possible, for its thinking. The object of thought cannot here be more
powerful than the thinking mind, for nothing is more powerful than
the divine mind; and it cannot be less powerful, for then the object, by
its influence, would cause an inadmissible deterioration in the divine
thinking subject. The object of thought therefore has to be identical
in power and substance with the subject, which means that the only
available object for the gods thought is himself, and his thinking is
indeed called "thinking about thinking" (1074b35). This activity is best
and happiest, but there is no further clarification on what such self-
thinking could mean, and Aristotle does not raise the issue again in
the extant works. Towards the end of Metaphysics Lambda, however,
there is a suggestion as to the way i n which god as supreme and ulti-
mate being, inwardly focused on the pure activity of self-contemplative
thought, eternal, unchanging and apart from the visible cosmos, is still
responsible for what is beautiful and good in it. Not only is he the cause
of the unending rotation of the heavenly bodies through their desire
to emulate his perfection with their own perfect circular movement, 9
105
INTRODUCING GREEK PHILOSOPHY
106
5. Souls and selves
In Homeric epic the human soul only featured at the end of the life of
the individual. Heroic action was finished when the warrior lay slain
on the battlefield while his soul (his psyché) had an endless shadow
existence in Hades. The very opening of the Iliad sets out the distinc-
tion when it states that the wrath of Achilles sent many mighty souls
of heroes to Hades, but left the men themselves (autoi) to be carrion
for dogs and birds. I n the Odyssey the souls going down to Hades are
compared to dreams taking wing (Od 11.224) and to twittering bats
(Od 24.6-9), They keep their recognizable features ("he was wondrously
like the man himself", says Achilles of Patroclus ghost; // 23.107), but
generally they have no meaningful speech unless they drink sacrificial
blood or appear to mortals with a specific message. Their consolations
are i n the memory of their own past heroic deeds, the preservation of
their name among men, and their joy i n the record carried on to the
next generation, as, for example, the ghost of Achilles strides gladly
through the fields of asphodel after hearing from Odysseus of his son's
great achievements (Od 11.538-40,24.93-4). W i t h the exception of the
prophet Teiresias, who is permitted to keep intact his understanding
(nous) and his thoughts (phrenes), the greatest loss for the departed is
to be deprived of the power of reasoning. Physically and mentally the
life of the Homeric hero is over. It would take Plato, with Socrates as his
spokesman, to overturn this strong tradition, and make the opposite
claim. Instead of the time on earth being seen as the only true life, and
the time after death as a shadow existence, he would view our existence
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here as a kind of imprisonment or living death, and real life, the life
of reason, which is akin to the divine, would come with the release of
immortal soul from mortal body.
Between Homer and Plato an understanding of the complexities i n
the nature of psyché was developed, and the question of its relation-
ship to the body was explored i n depth. After the Homeric epics, which
were for public recital, came the flowering of lyric poetry, composed
for a small audience and a more intimate setting. The lyric poets
looked inwards to scrutinize their personal feelings and emotions i n
their daily involvement with others, so that there arose awareness of
an inner life, continuous psychic activity that could have an immediate
physical effect. Sappho provides a famous instance of this in an explicit
analysis of the results that conflicting emotions of joy, love and jeal-
ousy had on her senses at the sight of her beloved with another: her
tongue became paralysed, her eyes were blinded, there was a d r u m -
ming in her ears, and her whole body suffered from tremors, perspi-
ration and increased temperature (fr. 31). This exploration of mental
trauma and its physical effects was continued by the tragic poets, and
by Euripides i n particular. I n Phaedra's great soliloquy, for example
(Hippolytus 373-430), the queen reflects on the inner torment that has
brought on her fever and caused the weakness in her limbs as unre-
quited love conflicts with shame and guilt; she concludes that the only
honourable option for her is to keep silent about her passion, and to
waste away in a self-inflicted death. I n contrast, i n Euripides pres-
entation of Medea's passionate analysis of her feelings towards Jason
and the dishonourable position she finds herself in, the result is not
silent submission, but wild looks, hysterical behaviour and eventu-
ally violent infanticide (Medea 1-46,214-66, 764-93). I n Ion, Creusas
weeping is the physical expression of her souls inner sorrow, as when
she says: " M y eyes stream with tears, and my psyché grieves, / the target
of wicked plotting by men and gods" (876-7). The whole force of lyric
poetry and tragic drama rested to a great extent on the depiction of
strong emotion overpowering dispassionate decision-making, and the
physical effects of that conflict on the characters involved.
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SOULS AND SELVES
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INTRODUCING GREEK PHILOSOPHY
110
SOULS AND SELVES
not i n your going find the limits of soul though you travelled the whole
way, so deep is its logos" (B45). As well as being roused to an increasing
realization of the true nature of the external world, and of humani-
ty s part i n it, when awake and working, and even when sleeping (as
B26 and B75 indicate), the individual is encouraged to engage like
Heraclitus i n self-searching, drawing on the souls limitless resources
for continuing enlightenment.
Much of Heraclitus' enigmatic interpretation of the role of psyche is
taken over by Anaxagoras i n his more explicit explanation of the role
of Nous (Mind) in the cosmos and in the individual. This all-pervading
M i n d for Anaxagoras has the characteristics ofpsyche developed earlier
- knowledge, power and control - and is the continuing motive cause
for the present structure of the whole and its future expansion. But, in
attempting to define the nature of M i n d itself, Anaxagoras stretches
the language available to h i m to the limits, preparing the way for a
subsequent shift of terminology from the material to the immaterial.
Anaxagoras was in agreement with Heraclitus i n maintaining that
cosmic life and m i n d are related to the universe as individual life and
m i n d are to each human being. The nous he describes however is not
air (as Anaximenes proposed) or Heraclitean fire, but the most rare-
fied of all things and the purest: unlimited, independent and, above all,
not mixed or tainted with anything else. I f it were, its purity, know-
ledge and power would be at once diminished as it became physically
involved with the immediate mixture, and eventually with the totality
of things. Here are Anaxagoras' words on cosmic Nous:
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INTRODUCING GREEK PHILOSOPHY
Here the proportion of cosmic light and dark i n the physical structure
of individual human beings determines the nature of their thinking.
The spectrum ranges from total light, which gives complete knowledge,
to complete darkness, the state of the unknowing corpse. Although
Anaxagoras introduces Nous as an additional factor, neither he nor
Parmenides explains (as Heraclitus had attempted to do) how individ-
uals are responsible for their given level of understanding, or whether
they have the means to improve or diminish it.
Democritus and the early atomists also had a mechanistic theory
of the psyche. They claimed that only atoms and void exist; a world is
composed of just these two, and so is the individual, the microcosm (and
it was Democritus who first called the individual the mikros cosmos).
The physical human body was thought to be a coherent structure
composed of various atom-groups moving i n the body's empty spaces,
and soul (psyche) and mind (phren) had a similar material basis. What
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SOULS AND SELVES
keeps individuals alive and provides for the quality of their thought are
groups of fine, spherical atoms interspersed throughout the molecules
of body atoms and the intervening void. These spherical atoms react to
other atomic movements internally, and to the impact of external forces,
which means that psychic and mental events would be non-moral, and
out of the individuals control. This is made explicit in a quotation of
Democritus from Sextus Empiricus: " I n fact we have no certain under-
standing, but it changes according to the condition of the body, as well
as the force of what enters in and presses against it" (68B9). Our ability
to be aware of our surroundings is dependent on our physical condition,
which continually changes as atoms from the external world push on
the outside of the body, some penetrating inside. Accurate observation
is therefore impossible, and true understanding is no more accessible
than something at the bottom of the sea ( B l 17). Such psychic activities
as reflection and considered decision-making have no firm foundation,
but are inextricably linked to random atomic motion.
They say that once, as he was passing by when a puppy was being
beaten.
He took pity on it and spoke as follows:
"Stop! Don't hit it! for it is the soul of a friend of mine,
which I recognised when I heard its voice". (21B7)
This fragment (in elegiac verse) is the first extant reference in Greek
to transmigration, and three significant conclusions can be drawn
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INTRODUCING GREEK PHILOSOPHY
from it: for the ironic humour to be effective, the theory would have
been well known; the psyche was assumed to transmigrate not only
between human beings but, in this instance at least, from human to
animal form; and it could continue with the same voice, recognized
by Pythagoras himself. As the theory developed, the soul was thought
to have a completely independent and even everlasting existence, only
temporarily consigned to any particular body. The Homeric view of
the full human life lived by the hero in this world, with just a bare
shadow existence for the psyche after death, is competing with the idea
of life here being the shadow existence, and after-death experience the
reality. This will be expounded by the Platonic Socrates, both i n argu-
ment and in eschatological myth.
Before that there is a compromise position taken up by Empedocles.
He calls the soul daimon, and links it with his own personal history,
having been born as boy, girl, plant, bird and fish (31B117), in exile
from a divine state ( B l 15.13), but now enjoying the best human life
as poet, prophet, healer and leader, and on course to rejoin the gods
(Bl 12.4-6, 146, 147). But these fragments come from his popular
address to the citizens of Acragas, and should be interpreted i n
the light of his technical treatise to his student Pausanias. There he
follows Parmenides' Doxa i n having thinking depend on the quality
of the mixture of the ingredients that make up the body, two (light
and night) for Parmenides (B16) but four (earth, air, fire and water)
for Empedocles. Those who have the most harmonious mixture of
elements in the organ of thought, which is literally the blood around
the heart, are the wisest (B105), although (and here Empedocles antici-
pates atomic theory) the continual physical changes i n the structure
of the body as well as external influences alter the character of the
thinking. But Empedocles, like Heraclitus, was ready to give some
responsibility for the quality of the thought to the thinker, who could
improve it by constant intention and effort. There was also a moral
effect in that the individual was encouraged to align with the work of
Philia, the universal power of unity and attraction, and reject the divi-
sion and hate characteristic of the opposite Strife (Neikos).
On the cosmic scale it is inevitable that Strife will become dominant
until, "as time goes round" it yields to Philia and the world returns to
a state of unity that is identified with god (B27-9). When Empedocles
says that he "trusted i n Strife" (B115.14), this does not necessarily
mean that he remembered what happened or that a choice was then
open to h i m . He deduces that the parts of elements of which he is now
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SOULS AND SELVES
composed have been used for different forms of life in earth, air, fire
and water. None of these inferior forms of life were satisfactory because
their mixtures were out of proportion (B121, 130, 136) or they were
not properly constituted or cut off too early, but now Empedocles sees
himself as a recognizable ego, who has attained the highest form of life
on earth, with the best mixture of elements producing a pure phronesis.
He encourages his fellow citizens to follow his example by ceasing from
quarrelling and slaughter and restoring the universal friendliness char-
acteristic of an earlier age (B128). In particular he urges Pausanias to
think the right sort of thoughts "with goodwill and unsullied atten-
tion", but if, like most men, his thoughts are trivial, his phronesis will
deteriorate, and eventually disintegrate to join the separating masses
of earth, air, fire and water ( B l 10.6-10).
Empedocles here found a way of reconciling the Pythagorean "wan-
dering soul" with the materialism of the other Presocratics (including
Parmenides' light and dark noema in B16) i n a personal daimon made
up of elements in as near perfect a ratio as possible, but which would
disperse and the parts reform into further individuals. In such the-
ories the soul was not in conflict with the body but a part of it, with a
particular constitution that could, in most accounts, be made better
or worse according to the motivation and lifestyle of the individual.
Plato, on the other hand, i n adopting and modifying the Pythagorean
viewpoint, found divisions within the soul to account for a much more
sophisticated psychology, but also set soul against body in a lifelong
struggle between care for the soul and bodily satisfaction.
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Later he reiterates the point: " I spend all my time trying to persuade
you, young and old, not to care for your bodies or your possessions but
for your soul above all else, to make it as excellent as possible" (30a-
b). Here body (soma) and soul (psyché), and the concerns of each, are
forcibly contrasted: wealth and honour belong with the body, but truth
and understanding with the soul.
The Apology is a public speech with touches of humour and irony,
delivered to a large and mainly hostile audience who, i n the end,
impose the death penalty. I n the Crito, i n contrast, Socrates is talking
in the privacy of his prison cell to one friend only, explaining, i n all
seriousness, why he must refuse the offer of escape and face death.
Here we are moving into new moral territory, and Socrates is most
reluctant to use the word psyché i n this context. He elicits agreement
to a straightforward question: "Is there a part of us which is improved
by healthy actions and ruined by unhealthy ones?" This is obviously
the body, and so, Socrates continues: "What about the part of us which
is harmed by injustice and improved by justice? Do we think that this
part of ourselves, whatever it is, which is concerned with injustice and
justice, is inferior to the body?" Crito answers, "Certainly not". "But it is
more deserving of honour?" "Of course" (Crito 47e-48a). The cautious,
neutral wording which Socrates uses ("this part of ourselves, whatever
it is") would seem to be a way of conditioning us to accepting a new
duality, a strong body-soul contrast that ties the soul firmly to the
ethics of right and wrong action in its improvement or deterioration.
The dramatic setting of Plato's Phaedo, which was also known by the
title On Soul (psyché), comes immediately after the Crito, describing
events i n the prison on the last day of Socrates life. The beginning and
the end read as straight biography, with the news of the return of the ship
from Delphi that marked the day of execution, the gathering of friends,
the farewell to family, the last bath and the drinking of the hemlock. The
long conversation in the central part, however, draws on material that
is clearly Platonic rather than Socratic, especially when it deals with the
immortality of the soul and the so-called theory of forms.
In the Apology, Socrates had been reported as claiming that he was
uncertain about what awaits one after death (40c-e). Perhaps it is anni-
hilation and the dead have no consciousness of anything, and then that
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SOULS AND SELVES
When it's released from the body it may no longer exist anywhere,
but be dispersed and destroyed on the very day that the man
himself dies, as soon as it is freed from the body; as it emerges it
may be dissipated like breath or smoke, and vanish away, so that
it will nowhere amount to anything. (Phaedo 70a)
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INTRODUCING GREEK PHILOSOPHY
again; souls therefore exist in some place after death from which they
return to life in a body again. Furthermore, if there were not these
corresponding cyclic processes, then everything would end up at one
extreme, as being enormously large, or being asleep or being dead,
which is not the case (70d-72e).
The second proof is an argument from recollection, considering
the soul as intellect, and complementing the first proof, which took
the soul as life principle. It uses the example of our being reminded by
a portrait of its original, and assessing the likeness; however close the
likeness, it can never be exact, and we can make a judgement on its
shortcoming from our acquaintance with the original. Similarly i f we
look at a couple of sticks of roughly the same length or at an apparently
beautiful object they will remind us of the originals, perfect equality
and real beauty. We can assess the deficiencies in the particulars and
rank them as more or less close to the originals because we have an
understanding of the paradigm (or form) i n each case. We could not
have this memory and understanding from this world, where nothing
is absolutely perfect, and so we must remember it from a previous exist-
ence. The remembering soul therefore existed before the body's birth,
and, from the previous proof, where opposites were shown to succeed
each other, it must also exist after the body's death (72e-77e).
The third proof, from "simplicity", involves certain characteristics of
the soul, as well as a reaffirmation of the existence of perfect "forms".
It is said that there is a basic contrast between what is simple and
constant, that is, which has no parts, and so does not disintegrate into
them and is therefore eternal, and the complex and variable, composed
of parts, and therefore destructible and mortal. Forms belong in the
first category, being simple, eternal and constant, the invisible objects
of knowledge, whereas a body belongs with the composite, being
mortal and changing, and the visible object of perception. So where
does soul belong? It is not a "form" but similar to it i n being invisible
and connected with knowledge, and, since it has many of its attributes,
it is more likely that it also belongs with the simple and eternal, rather
than the complex and mortal (78c-81a).
Socrates' friends are uncomfortable with these proofs, and offer
counter-examples that would refute them. First, the soul might be
a "harmony", which would disintegrate with the body at death, in a
similar way to the cessation of an invisible and beautiful melody, when
the instrument that has produced it breaks. A n d secondly there could
be a series of transmigrations, which would be i n agreement with
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SOULS AND SELVES
Forms give explanations (the "safe, silly answer" that beautiful things
are beautiful because of beauty), and they stay themselves (Simmias
is tall next to Socrates, and short next to Phaedo, but tallness is never
shortness nor beauty ugliness). If soul is taken as the principle of life
rather than the agent of thinking, then it is possible to make certain
comparisons. Fire is always hot and never cold, snow is always cold and
never hot, three is always odd and never even, and, comparably, what
partakes of soul is alive and never dead. Importing forms (fever, fire,
soul) bring with them the relevant imported forms (illness, heat, life),
and exclude the opposite forms (health, cold and death), which retreat.
In other words, soul can no more be dead than three can be even, fire
cold or snow hot (102b-107b).
But Plato was still not satisfied. He continued his search for a water-
tight proof for the immortality of the soul, and made two further
attempts, one i n the Republic, which again takes soul as the life prin-
ciple, and the other from the Phaedrus, which views it as the source of
the body's movements and activities. In the last book of the Republic,
Plato has Socrates arguing once more for an immortal soul (psyché), to
the astonishment of his respondent Glaucon. Socrates looks at what it
is that is essentially (rather than accidentally) destructive of anything
and finds it in the evil, the flaw or the disease that is specific to it.
For example, when the eyes are attacked by ophthalmia, the body by
illness, grain by mildew or iron by rust, the specific evil in each case
eventually causes the destruction of the related object. Should there be
anything that can be marred by its specific evil but not destroyed by
it, then nothing else could do so, and it would be indestructible. Now
the specific evil of the soul is injustice, with its accompanying vices of
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INTRODUCING GREEK PHILOSOPHY
cowardice, indiscipline and ignorance. The soul has never been killed
by these, nor has it been destroyed by any evil specific to the body,
and so, i f it is immune to its own evil and to any harm to the body it
inhabits, then it is indestructible (Republic 608d-61 la). The argument
is clearly unsatisfactory i n its question-begging premise of only one
specific evil in each case (and the Epicureans later argued at length
that destruction of the body involves disintegration of the soul). I n
addition there are also problems with the soul being taken here as a
simple entity, whereas a great part of the psychology and politics of the
Republic as a whole depend on it being complex, made up of the three
parts of reason, spirit and appetite.
Plato could not rest in his search for a rational basis for the souls
immortality, and attacked the topic for the sixth time, in the Phaedrus
(245d-e). As presented by Socrates, soul is now regarded as more
sophisticated than the principle of life for the body; it is also the
source of its movement, change and general activity; as such all soul
is deathless (pasa psyche athanatos). The proof has three stages. First,
what is always i n movement is immortal, but that which is a source
of movement to something else but is itself moved would stop living
when it stops being moved. Only what moves itself, the self-moving,
never stops moving (for that would be to abandon itself). Secondly,
the original principle, the arché, of movement has necessarily and by
definition no beginning and would not end (or else everything would
perish). Thirdly, since soul moves the body and is the source of its own
movement, when the body that is kept alive and moved by the soul is
destroyed, soul abandons the body but not itself, and continues eter-
nally in its self-movement. Cicero was so impressed by this argument
that he translated it into Latin and linked it to his own eschatological
myth at the end of his De república (in the section surviving sepa-
rately as Somnium Scipionis, "Dream of Scipio"); he also introduced
it, naming its source i n Platos Phaedrus, i n the first book of Tusculan
Disputations (1.53-4) i n a general discourse on soul.
After-death experiences
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SOULS AND SELVES
however valid the proofs might be, they have dealt with soul in a gener-
alized way, as principle of life or intelligence, and offered little reassur-
ance to Socrates' friends that the individual, whom they have loved and
conversed with, will still in some way be i n existence after drinking
the hemlock. When Crito asks Socrates how he wishes to be buried
(Phaedo 115c), Socrates replies that it does not matter what happens
to his body, for the real person, who is talking to them and marshalling
all these arguments, will be up and away: the antithesis of the Homeric
position where the man himself (autos) lies dead on the battlefield and
only a shadow existence awaits his psyché. The eschatological myths
combine some traditional literary features with Pythagorean ideas of
transmigration and cyclic time. They also involve a. judgement in which
injustices in this world are redressed and the unjust suffer punishment,
and also a moral, on how life should be lived now. Despite disclaimers
of their truth status they round off their dialogues to drive home, in
imaginative narrative, the philosophical themes.
The myth that ends the Gorgias (523a-27c) is the simplest: uncon-
nected with an immortality proof, not involving transmigration and
having the traditional features of a judgement. The good are sent to
enjoy the Isles of the Blessed; the wicked, i f curable, have a limited
time of punishment, viewed as medicine for the soul to improve it
and restore it to health; but the lot of souls who are beyond help is
to suffer eternal torment i n atonement for their crimes, and to act as
visible deterrents. Socrates finds the account persuasive, and true as
far as he is concerned. It summarizes his long argument with Callicles
that we should seek the reality not the appearance of goodness (for
the judgement will be of naked judge on naked soul), and replaces
Callicles principle, that justice is the interest of the stronger, with the
Socratic position, first i n argument and then in myth, that it is worse
to do wrong (which harms the soul) rather than to be wronged (which,
whether by robbery, violence or even murder) only affects the body.
The Phaedo myth (107c-114c), which follows the four proofs for
immortality, sets up a complex geography of underground rivers and
an exotic "true earth", as high above this one as this is above the ocean,
having aithér equivalent to our air, with a landscape abounding in
colour and riches. There is a judgement, where souls may be released
if they are forgiven by their victims and return to our world; but again,
if they are incurable, there is an eternity in Tartarus. The good dwell in
the splendour and light of the true earth, and the most excellent, the
philosophers who have spent their lives in preparation for death, go
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Every man who has preserved or helped his country, or has made
its greatness even greater, is reserved a special place in heaven,
where he may enjoy an eternal life of happiness ... so cherish
justice and pietas, owed to parents and kin, and most of all to
ones country. That is the life which leads to heaven, and to the
company of those who have completed their lives i n this world,
and are now released from their bodies, and dwell in that region
which the Greeks have taught you to call the Milky Way.
(6.13-16)
After defining death as the parting of soul from body, Plato had
attempted to prove the immortality of soul in general as the pervading
principle of life and reason, and then to account for the survival of
individuals i n the myths of the journey of their souls after death. I n
this context he modified earlier Pythagorean ideas of metamorphoses
and assimilated them to literary traditions of post mortem judgement
and places of reward and punishment. He was directly opposed here as
elsewhere by the Epicureans, who were influenced by the Presocratics
Leucippus and Democritus, and argued for the dissolution of the soul
along with the body at death. They rejected Pythagorean and Platonic
dualism and maintained that soul has a material atomic structure
like everything else, and is as vulnerable to disintegration as the body
which houses it. This position is set out most forcefully by Lucretius
in the third book of his De rerum natura, which is concerned with the
substance, structure, function and mortality of soul, and is a key text
in ancient psychology, both for its anti-Platonic polemic and its posi-
tive argument.
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The Greek word psyche is used for both the principle of life and of
reason; i n Latin the two senses are split into two words - anima (for
life) and animus (for mind). They are, however, one soul substance:
animus concentrated in the heart where, it was supposed, are thought
and feeling, and anima spread through the body. I n his Latin presen-
tation of the Epicurean Greek position, Lucretius first insists that the
soul (as anima) is material, and as much an integral part of us as the
hand or foot. Soul and body, far from being i n conflict, work together,
as can be seen in the physical results of mental disturbances (we may
blush at a memory, or go pale and shake with fear), and in the mental
results of physical disturbances (in fainting from pain, for example).
The soul wakes the body up and generally pushes it around, making
it do as it wants, and the body i n turn affects the soul with reduction
of willpower and distraction i n thought. Such reciprocal movements
can only come about by touching and pushing, which involve material
objects on both sides; both therefore have a material, atomic, structure,
but the soul atoms are smaller, smoother and rounder than those of the
body and have more surrounding void, which makes for swifter move-
ment. These soul atoms form clusters, or molecules, with the charac-
teristics of breath, air, heat and a fourth element, the "soul of soul"
(anima animae), deeply hidden in the heart, the most fundamental
part of us, which is responsible for our thinking but also for conscious-
ness and ultimately life itself. As an eyeball can be damaged but the
eye still sees, whereas, i f the pupil is pierced, sight is lost at once, so
the anima may be affected (if an arm or leg is injured, for example) but
we still live but, i f the animus is struck (as happens with a blow to the
heart), the patient dies (3.94-257).
Once the structure of the soul and its close involvement with the
body had been established, Lucretius proceeded to counter Pythagorean
theories of transmigration and Platonic proofs for the immortality of
the soul, on the basis, long accepted i n Greek philosophy, that change
indicates mortality (a beginning and an end to life) and changelessness
immortality. He first tackled the non-existence of the soul after death,
showing that, because the soul substance is flimsy, it flows out, like
water in a jug, when the body no longer holds it. Soul and body grow,
mature and age together and are therefore likely to die together, and
the soul has its own ills, which presage its mortality. I n fever, drunk-
enness and epilepsy the body clearly affects the soul/mind (animus)
for the worse, and in the case of creeping paralysis the body gradually
destroys the soul/life (anima). Furthermore the soul as animus cannot
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SOULS AND SELVES
A three-part soul
Platonic myth, as given especially i n the Phaedo and Republic, and the
proofs that precede them, which concern the soul either as life prin-
ciple or agent of reason and memory, take the soul as a unit: a single
entity that is joined to the body at birth, struggles with it through life
and separates wholly from it at death. However, in books 2-4 of the
Republic, Plato, through Socrates, argues for a soul with three parts that
are parallel to three classes i n the state. The struggles within this tripar-
tite soul are vividly portrayed in the figure of the charioteer and his two
horses i n the myth that comes in a central section of the Phaedrus, and,
in the non-Socratic myth of the Timaeus, the functioning and relation-
ship of the three parts of the soul to the three related areas of the body
are explored. I n these passages the focus is not on soul as life principle
or self-mover but on the mental conflict arising from the separation of
rational functioning from spirit and appetite, and its resolution in the
125
INTRODUCING GREEK PHILOSOPHY
126
SOULS AND SELVES
part of the soul. The other horse in the traces, representing the part
of the soul driven by appetite, is black, crooked, "a haphazard jumble
of limbs", and can scarcely be controlled by the whip and goad. When
charioteer and horses come within sight of the beloved, the black horse
is said to get out of control, and the charioteer has to wrench the bit
from its teeth, splashing its tongue and jaws with blood and painfully
pinning its legs back on to the ground. Only after several such attempts
does the horse finally calm down, and the charioteer, assisted by the
white horse and with the black horse now subdued, approaches the
beloved in reverence and awe. Then:
127
INTRODUCING GREEK PHILOSOPHY
Soul as self
128
SOULS AND SELVES
129
INTRODUCING GREEK PHILOSOPHY
130
SOULS AND SELVES
131
6. Believing, doubting and knowing
132
BELIEVING, DOUBTING AND KNOWING
H u m a n ignorance
133
INTRODUCING GREEK PHILOSOPHY
H u m a n progress
Yet, with the authority of the Muse (and Parmenides also had presented
his philosophy as expounded by a goddess), it is possible to be confi-
dent i n the truth of what the poet says, but it also requires concen-
trated effort on the part of the listener. The argument has first to be
articulated (B4) and then taken in and studied by the pupil, but, if
he is distracted by the countless trivialities that beset people and dull
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BELIEVING, DOUBTING AND KNOWING
135
INTRODUCING GREEK PHILOSOPHY
we know nothing about anything, but for each of us there is the re-
shaping of belief" (B7). 1
136
BELIEVING, DOUBTING AND KNOWING
137
INTRODUCING GREEK PHILOSOPHY
Dioysodorus, who, like Protagoras and Gorgias (but with fewer scru-
ples) introduced disputants to the tricks of their trade for a fee, teaching
their students how to defeat any opponent on any subject, and to draw
absurd conclusions from any set statement, whether true or false. The
dialogue shows the brothers giving a dazzling display of their wizardry
with words, succeeding in their eristic by seizing on a lack of preci-
sion in the use of terms, along with punning and equivocation. For
example, the young Cleinias is asked whether his dog has puppies, and
then, because the dog is a father, and is his, the dog is his father. More
seriously he is discomfited by the question "Is it the clever or the igno-
rant who learn?" and Dionysodorus whispers to Socrates that which-
ever answer the lad gives, he will be proved wrong, for all the questions
are designed as traps. Cleinias reply that clever people do not learn,
because they know already, is trumped with the counter-example
that, with a specific task, previously unknown, it is the clever, not the
ignorant, who learn (Euthydemus 275d-277c, 298e). This particular
dilemma was to surface again i n the Meno, when Socrates himself is
faced with the challenge that the search for knowledge is pointless, for
either one knows already, in which case the search is irrelevant, or, i f
one does not know, it would be impossible to recognize whether an
answer found was the right one or not (Meno 80d-e).
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BELIEVING, DOUBTING AND KNOWING
both true and false statements use the same words, but, i f the words
relate to what is the case, the statement is true, i f not, then that same
statement is false. A n example given i n this section is the statement " I
am an initiate". I f ten people were sitting i n a row and each said " I am
an initiate", this could be false nine times and true the tenth for the one
who has actually been initiated, although the words are the same. 2
He led a life consistent with this doctrine, going out of his way
for nothing, taking no precaution, but facing all risks as they
came, whether carts, dogs or precipices, but he was kept out of
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INTRODUCING GREEK PHILOSOPHY
harms way by his friends who used to follow close after h i m . ...
He was so respected by his native city [Elis, i n the Peloponnese]
that they made h i m high priest, and on his account voted that all
philosophers should be exempt from taxation. (DL 9.62, 64)
In his comedy Clouds, Aristophanes had put Socrates firmly among the
sophists, for he showed h i m on stage teaching the tricks of rhetoric for
a fee, setting up contrary arguments, staging a confrontation between
Right and Wrong, questioning conventional religion, having strange
ideas on cosmology, engaging i n hair-splitting eristic and making the
worse cause trump the better. But Plato's Socrates, as reported i n the
Apology, the defence speech at his trial, claimed that Aristophanes
was wrong on all counts, and that this caricature contributed to the
prosecutions charge of corrupting the young. Socrates was especially
insistent that he never taught or accepted a fee, or troubled himself
with cosmological speculations. He recognized that he knew nothing
himself and indeed believed that knowledge was impossible for any
human being; it was for this claim that the Sceptics who came after
Plato in the Academy, and then Pyrrho and his followers, looked back
to Socrates as one of their number.
Socrates' mother was a midwife, and i n a passage i n the Theaetetus
Plato shows Socrates practising his mothers craft, not in helping to
give birth to children of the flesh but in bringing thoughts to birth:
My patients are men, not women, and my concern is not with the
body but with the soul that is in labour. A n d the highest point of
my art is to prove by every test whether the offspring of a young
mans thought is a false phantom or instinct with life and truth.
Heaven constrains me to serve as a midwife, but has debarred
me from giving birth. So of myself I have no sort of wisdom, nor
has any discovery ever been born to me as the child of my soul.
(Theaetetus 150b-c) 3
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BELIEVING, DOUBTING AND KNOWING
of the terms being used. The Laches, for example, named after one
of the characters who is a military man, is a dialogue of this type. It
starts with a discussion of the merits of fighting i n armour, but soon
turns to a search for a definition of courage. The first suggestion is an
example of courage: "holding ones ground and not running away".
The second suggestion, "endurance of soul", is an improvement on this
(since it has a more general application); this i n turn is modified to
"wise endurance of soul", and finally to "knowledge of what is truly
frightening". Similarly with the Euthyphro. Piety is first interpreted as
"prosecuting the impious", but this is too narrow, so the next move is to
suggest that it is "what the gods love" or, more explicitly, "what all the
gods love", and, lastly, "knowledge of what is pleasing to the gods". In
Charmides the first definition of the virtue of sdphrosyne ("prudence"
or "temperance") is "quietness and modesty", then "minding one's own
affairs" and, thirdly, "knowing oneself", ending with the interesting
but unworkable definition as "knowing knowing" or "knowledge of
knowledge".
The common pattern of these dialogues shows an expert, such
as the general i n Laches and the priest in Euthyphro, starting confi-
dently with an answer to the question "What is xV\ which is dismissed
because its scope is too limited. Subsequent amendments broaden the
issue, but the respondent becomes more and more uncomfortable as
Socrates shows up flaws in the answers, and he finally gives up. The
definitions, however, improve in the process, and end with knowledge
being involved. Although the answers are clearly moving i n a direc-
tion more acceptable to Socrates, they all still fail under examination,
and the end result, for Socrates and the respondent, is a state of aporia,
literally "no way out", which causes bewilderment and discomfiture in
the respondent, and produces a confession of ignorance from Socrates.
This claim by Socrates to know nothing (after a display of dialectical
skill that silences the respondent) came to be known as his "irony", and
is well described by Meno in the dialogue named after h i m :
Socrates, even before I met you I heard that you are a perplexed
man yourself and reduce others to perplexity. At this moment I
feel that you are exercising magic and witchcraft upon me, and
positively laying me under your spell, until I am just a mass of
helplessness <as if stung by a sting-ray>. M y mind and my mouth
are literally numb, and I have nothing to reply to you.
(Meno 80a)
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142
BELIEVING, DOUBTING AND KNOWING
what it was that was common to them all, which would encompass a
general truth that brought them under the same name, a constant factor
in different situations and a standard for judging further instances. He
gives two examples of what he is aiming at, in the definition of "speed"
in the Laches as "the ability to do much i n a short time" (192b), and of
"shape" in the Meno as "the limit of a solid" (76a). I n the moral sphere
it was expected that, once the general truth had been crystallized in the
definition and the process applied to a series of different virtues, then
the set of definitions would build up to a body of moral knowledge;
this could then be applied to a particular case and the right action
would follow. The "skill" (techne) acquired was comparable to that of
4
143
INTRODUCING GREEK PHILOSOPHY
144
BELIEVING, DOUBTING AND KNOWING
Plato on knowledge
145
INTRODUCING GREEK PHILOSOPHY
146
BELIEVING, DOUBTING AND KNOWING
and reaching true conclusions, and his diagrams drawn in the sand
are only particular rough reminders of the real objects. Similarly, it
is expected that the true statesman or philosopher would know ideal
justice and look to this and apply his knowledge of it when dealing with
particular cases of just and unjust actions. I n a contrast reminiscent of
Heraclitus, most people are said to be like those asleep or dreaming in
their state of doxa related to the changing world around them, while
the few, the true lovers of wisdom, are awake, having knowledge of
unchanging forms.
Take a line divided into unequal sections (A, B) and divide each
section again in the same proportion, and you will have the parts
related in respect of clarity and obscurity. I n the visible (section
A) one subsection {a') represents images, the other subsection
(b') the objects which the images resemble - animals, plants and
the whole range of manufactured articles. (Republic 509d)
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INTRODUCING GREEK PHILOSOPHY
that images from it (such as triangles drawn in the sand) are used i n
theorems about mathematical form (such as triangularity itself), and
section (b) which deals only with forms "through them and to them
and concludes with them" Each section has its own related state of
mind: (a') "guessing" (eikasia); (b') "conviction" (pistis); (a) calcula-
tion (dianoia); and (b) understanding (nous). The ratios of the sections
(a':b :: a:b :: A:B) show, i n terms of "clarity" and "obscurity" that true
r
A B
visible, belonging with opinion intelligible, belonging with knowledge
a' b' a b
(states
guessing conviction calculating understanding of mind)
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BELIEVING, DOUBTING AND KNOWING
ances during his time i n the cave to knowing the true reality of the
upper world. The capacity for knowledge, comparable to that of sight,
is innate in everyone, but the soul, which has this capacity, must be
turned round as a whole from the world of change until the m i n d s eye
can bear to look straight at reality.
In the Republic the way for the soul to make the journey from opinion
to knowledge is through a strict and difficult ten-year programme of
higher education, consisting of a study of the principles of arithmetic,
geometry, stereometry, astronomy and harmonics. These disciplines
are an appropriate preliminary to philosophy i n that they train the
m i n d to turn from the world of sight to the world of thought: from
particulars to the forms. Finally, the student is ready to study dialectic,
which makes no use of the senses, but by means of reason goes to the
essential reality of each entity and does not stop until it reaches the
forms, and ultimately the form of the good. Education here would
supplement, perhaps even replace, two other means that had been
suggested for bridging the gap between the visible world and that of
the forms, namely love (eros) i n the Symposium and Phaedrus, and
memory i n Meno and Phaedo.
The journey of love, described in the Symposium by the priestess
Diotima, moves, like that of education in the Republic, from the
particular to the universal. The lover first falls in love with a beau-
tiful body, which enhances his appreciation of physical beauty in all its
instances. From this appreciation he recognizes that beauty of soul is
superior to that of the body as discourses (logoi) are generated between
the lover and the beloved. But then a superior beauty is recognized in
actions and laws, and higher still are the sciences and technical know-
ledge. Finally the lover faces the "vast sea of beauty", and the desire
to know drives h i m , through reasoning and thinking, to catch sight
of a special kind of knowledge, which has as its object the constant
and eternal form of beauty (Symposium 210a-211b). Later, i n the
Phaedrus myth, there is a development of the relationship described in
the Symposium, i n that the two together, lover and beloved, cooperate
in their moral and intellectual partnership, and eventually may "grow
their wings" and return to their place i n the revolution of the heavens.
There they contemplate the true reality with which true knowledge is
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INTRODUCING GREEK PHILOSOPHY
150
BELIEVING, DOUBTING AND KNOWING
invisible, pure and divine forms that are the objects of knowledge with
composite, changing, mortal, visible particulars that are the objects
of sense-perceptions. The body belongs with the latter, but the soul,
although not one of the forms, is like them in being imperceptible
and connected with ruling and knowing; it is therefore likely to have
the other characteristics of divinity and immortality (78c-80d). These
two points from the Phaedo, of knowledge as recollection and forms
contrasted with particulars, become entangled with the philosophical
discussion of the life of the soul as separate from the body. This is
resolved in the end by an eschatological myth, the truth of which is
guaranteed, not by knowledge, but by persuasive opinion (114d).
The use of forms and their apprehension by reason was crucial
to the arguments concerning philosophical activity in Phaedo and
Republic, but, as we have seen, i n the later Theaetetus the attempt was
made to examine the nature of knowledge without bringing them into
the discussions. This would suggest, along with the criticisms of forms
at the beginning of Parmenides, written at about the same time, that
Plato was becoming increasingly dissatisfied with a two-level ontology,
which restricted knowledge and truth to the eternally unchanging,
and opinion to shifting phenomena. This tendency is supported by
the dialogue Sophist, linked to Theaetetus, where only five forms are
used - being, same, other, rest and movement - which are compared to
"vowels" interweaving among consonants; they make discourse mean-
ingful, without any moral implications.
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INTRODUCING GREEK PHILOSOPHY
the natural world cannot be invariably true but only "for the most
part" a position midway between certain knowledge of timeless and
necessary truths and ignorance of the unknowable, which is due to
accident or chance.
From another perspective, Aristotle regarded objective know-
ledge as "theoretical", contrasting it with both "practical" knowledge,
which is concerned with day-to-day living, and "productive" know-
ledge, which aims at some beautiful or useful result, such as a sculptors
statue or a doctor's cure. Then he made a further threefold subdivision
of theoretical science into: (i) mathematics; (ii) natural science; and
(iii) theology (Metaphysics 1026al8). Where Plato had seen the math-
ematician using diagrams of triangles and squares as visual aids to
abstract reasoning about the perfect triangle and the square, Aristotle
claims that the mathematician studies actual physical objects but as
triangles or squares: "the unchanging but material", i n his terminology.
Natural science is concerned with physical objects, animate and inani-
mate, changing and material, in the world around us, to be studied as
they are; from them we can deduce comprehensive principles that are
relevant to generation, movement and decay. Theology, or "first phil-
osophy", on the other hand, is not at all related to the world around
us, but deals with the immaterial and unchanging, concerned with
the heavenly bodies in their rotations, and including the cause of their
rotation: the "unmoved mover" or "pure being", named as theos.
All of these divisions of theoretical knowledge, according to
Aristotle, are pursued for their own sakes, in the disinterested study
of what there is, and the related primary principles. Practical know-
ledge, in contrast, has as its subject matter human beings themselves,
in their individual interests, characters and decisions (the study called
ethics), and also i n their relationships with each other i n institutions
and societies (the subject matter of politics). Lastly there is productive
knowledge, which deals with art, poetry and rhetoric. Philosophical
logic, the development of which is regarded as one of Aristotle's greatest
achievements, he viewed as the pervasive organon (literally "tool"). It
is involved i n all the different spheres of knowledge, laying down the
general principles, the standards of truth and the methods of argument
that govern their study.
This great structure of the patterns of human knowledge had
a place for all the branches of learning. Aristotle's colleagues i n the
Lyceum would be able to slot into this framework a particular subject
of investigation and make some advances, keeping to the principles
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BELIEVING, DOUBTING AND KNOWING
There are two ways i n which new truth may be acquired, according to
Aristotle. I n the first, one moves from the particular to the general, by
the method of induction (which, he said, originated with Socrates). By
taking a characteristic common to a series of instances we can discover
a general rule that would cover cases not yet examined. This is the way
in which doctors and lawyers work to produce a set of medical or legal
principles. O n the other hand there is deduction or "demonstration"
(apodeixis)> which moves from the general to the particular. This can
be through perception and familiarity, as in the engaging example of
toddlers, who at first call all men "daddy" and all women "mummy"
until they learn to differentiate the individual from the class (Physics
184M2).
In formal deduction the syllogism is used, explained as a logos
(a "type of argument") " i n which statements are made, and some-
thing other than what is stated follows necessarily from them" (Prior
Analytics 24bl8). Here the starting-point, the initial premise, may be:
(i) a self-evident truth (such as the "law of contradiction" - that at the
same time and in the same respect "is" and "is not" cannot both be
true); (ii) a mathematical axiom (for example " i f equals are taken from
equals, equals remain"); or (iii) a common conception i n ethics that is
generally acceptable (such as "self-control and endurance are praise-
worthy"). The syllogism then makes a valid deduction from the initial
premise through a middle term to a conclusion. The most common
are the "always true" type (all B is A, all C is B, therefore all C is A ) ,
and those partially or "for the most part" true (all B is A, some C is fi,
153
INTRODUCING GREEK PHILOSOPHY
In many ways the Epicureans and Stoics who came after Plato and
Aristotle followed the guidelines laid down by their distinguished pred-
ecessors in their theories of knowledge. They too recognized the power
of dialectic, which brought with it the assurance of valid argument, a
firm foundation for knowledge and the tools to withstand opposition.
The notion of a criterion of truth was developed, and Lucretius' poem
shows that a variety of arguments, evidence and literary devices was
used to explain and support the wisdom of Epicurean teaching. The
Stoics, in contrast, extended Aristotle's forms of syllogism into proposi-
tional logic, reducing complex arguments to their simplest format and
then setting out rules for the interaction of the propositions involved
(as i n the example " i f it is day, it is light, but it is day, so it is light" or
154
BELIEVING, DOUBTING AND KNOWING
"but it is not day so it is not light"). They also believed in the innate
capacity for reason, arising from primary natural instincts, and main-
tained that, as children mature, encouraged first by the appropriate
environment and then by education, they begin to understand how
actions follow instinct and to choose accordingly; when the habit of
so choosing is formed, the conditions are ripe for the emergence of
wisdom and for action as a moral agent. Subsequent knowledge is built
up from first impressions i n a series of stages that were illustrated by
the founder of Stoicism as follows:
Zeno would spread out the fingers of one hand and display its
open palm, saying "an impression is like this". Next he clenched
his fingers a little and said "assent is like this". Then, pressing his
fingers close together to make a fist he said that this was cogni-
tion, and finally he brought his left hand over his right fist, grip-
ping it tightly, and called this final stage "scientific knowledge"
(epistéme, Latin "scientia"). (Cicero, Académica 2.145)
155
7. Leadership, law and the origins
of political theory
Political anthropology
The first articulated view of the past was i n the "golden age"
mythology set out in Hesiods Works and Days (109-201). First there
was a "golden race of mortal men" under Kronos; they lived a simple,
pastoral life, free of toil and sickness, enjoying the bounty of nature
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LEADERSHIP, LAW AND T H E ORIGINS OF POLITICAL THEORY
were still thought to exist in remote parts of the world: i n the south
among the Ethiopians, in the north among the Hyperboreans, and in
the centre, hemmed in by mountains, among the Arcadians, the oldest
race on earth. This mythology of simple people, remote from civiliza-
tion and uncorrupted by the wrongs of social and political life, led to
the idea of the "noble savage" in historical times. Examples were the
Persians, who were taught to "ride, shoot a straight arrow and speak
the truth" (Herodotus 1.136), and the Scythians, beyond the Danube.
In Rome there was admiration for the Germans and the Parthians,
and sometimes for foreign chieftains brought to Rome in triumph,
such as Jugurtha from Africa and Caractacus from Britain, whose
moral superiority shamed their technically advanced conquerors.
The history of civil wars in Rome, and the memory of their origins as
simple farmers, also strengthened the Roman sense of degeneration
from an earlier age. 2
157
INTRODUCING GREEK PHILOSOPHY
158
LEADERSHIP, LAW AND T H E ORIGINS OF POLITICAL THEORY
for self-preservation, the natural environment for living the best kind
of life. Human beings are "political animals" in that they reach their
full potential i n the life of the polis maintained by justice and law; only
creatures below them and gods above them can survive and flourish
in isolation.
The most striking and detailed account of primitive life and its
development into the civilized life of the city is found i n the fifth book
of Lucretius poem (5.925-1149); this is the officiai Epicurean view,
which goes back to Epicurus and perhaps even further to Democritus
himself. It is a direct attack on "golden age" mythology, and is based
3
cities were built, and ruled by kings, who promoted ability, beauty and
physical strength.
Eventually gold was discovered and mined, and, with the acquisi-
tion of property, wealth became the criterion for success. The kings
were overthrown, and there was widespread violence and disorder,
with each man struggling for himself. It was at this stage that a "mutual
contract of social peace" arose:
Leadership i n H o m e r
Before considering the implications of such a "mutual contract" for
social peace in the reality of democracies i n fifth-century Greece, there
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INTRODUCING GREEK PHILOSOPHY
160
LEADERSHIP, LAW AND T H E ORIGINS OF POLITICAL THEORY
The kings (who have their honour from the gods) and the elders
should begin;
then the men of the people should say what is honourable and
do what is just,
and none give crooked counsel to the city;
then victory and power will belong to the people, (fr. 3, Bergk)
The Homeric trilogy of kings, lords and soldiers is here replicated in the
"mixed constitution" of kings, elders and commoners. The combined
assembly now includes the third class, who enjoy the ordered rights of
speech and are free to give advice. I f their counsel is wise and honour-
able, and their actions just, then the city as a whole will prosper.
It was the Athenians who claimed to be the inventors of law and to
have established the first constitution. This is brought out in Pericles'
famous funeral speech in the second book of Thucydides, and summa-
rized by the orator Lysias:
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INTRODUCING GREEK PHILOSOPHY
The Greeks are free, but not entirely free, for they do have a
master and that master is law, w h o m they fear even more than
your subjects fear you. They do whatever this master commands,
and his commandment is always the same: not to retreat in battle,
against whatever odds, but to stand firm, to conquer or to die.
(7.104)
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LEADERSHIP, LAW AND T H E ORIGINS OF POLITICAL THEORY
Respectful awe (sebas) and fear his kinsman, shall keep the
people from acting unjustly by day and night ... I counsel the
people to despise both anarchy and despotism, and not to cast
out fear entirely from the city, for what man will be just who has
nothing to fear? Respect for law, held i n due dread, safeguards
the city and defends its territory, such as is found nowhere else.
{Eumenides 690-702)
The second example is from the Suppliants, and shows the power of the
king restrained by the will of the people. The Argive ruler has to choose
between refusing asylum to the suppliants, or becoming involved in
a war with Egypt. Although he is sole ruler, he cannot act without
the peoples endorsement, and so gives their decision: "The city's vote,
democratically taken, has decreed that the women should not be
surrendered. It is fixed permanently, not inscribed on wax or parch-
ment, but clearly spoken by free men" (Suppliants 942-5). The single
ruler is bound to act according to the collective will of his people.
One further and famous example from drama, however, in
Sophocles' Antigone, shows a conflict between a ruler and his people,
and between constitutional law and a higher, unwritten law. Creon,
the king, is attempting to restore stable government to Thebes after
civil war. His opening "policy speech" introduces many familiar points,
including the city's guarantee of the security of its citizens ("our city
is our life"), the "ship of state" analogy when the state is set back on
course after the political storms, and a summary of the evils following
civil discord. But the opposition of abstract concepts here is not
between Solon's dysnomia and eunomia ("bad law" and "good law"),
but between destructive anarchy (literally an-archia, "no government")
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INTRODUCING GREEK PHILOSOPHY
So the rule of one man over many, which Aristotle saw as the natural
order based on the unit of the household, came to be abandoned in
the Greek states, whether as monarchy or its obverse of tyranny. I n
war individual heroism shown by the leader i n the dash for glory was
replaced by ranked hoplite fighting, where cooperation was essential
for survival, as each man defended his neighbour on one side and was
himself defended on the other. A n d i n peacetime, as we have seen, the
state prospered when the citizens freely respected rights and obligations
under the rule of law. The political vocabulary of balanced equality
9
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LEADERSHIP, LAW AND T H E ORIGINS OF P O L I T I C A L THEORY
when they are evenly balanced. The doctor aims to bring those who are
ill back to health by reducing the dominance of one power (monarchia)
and restoring equilibrium. Far from being the ideal, monarchy is in fact
harmful to the organism, and should be checked by a "blending" with
its opposite i n due measure. This may well connect with Pythagorean
10
Those who speak with sense must put their strength i n what is
common to all, as a city does in its law, and much more strongly,
for all human laws are nourished by the one divine law; for this
165
INTRODUCING GREEK PHILOSOPHY
The citizens "must fight for their law as for their city-walls" (B44),
for it derives the strength to support the life of the city from an ever-
living world-wide law secured by logos. This idea was later taken up by
Empedocles, who spoke of "a law for all extending through wide-ruling
air and measureless sunlight". These Presocratics - Anaximander,
13
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LEADERSHIP, LAW AND T H E ORIGINS OF POLITICAL THEORY
the three lifestyles in order of merit, ranking as the lowest that which
aims at pleasure, the next the one that values honour (gained from
the political life rather than the military), and the highest that devoted
to philosophy; this means that philosophers, who have wisdom and
understanding of right and wrong, justice and injustice, would be most
suited to government (Nicomachean Ethics 1097M7-35). Secondly,14
since the aim of individuals and the city is the same (to achieve the
best life), then the same life is best for each human being individually
and for his city, and the same virtues will be relevant for both (Politics
1325b30-32).
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INTRODUCING GREEK PHILOSOPHY
citizens agree to defend the city when required, and to obey the Laws
in courts of justice, in extreme cases even submitting to execution i f
that is the verdict resulting from the due processes of the court. The
citizens agree to the terms, and show their agreement by living perma-
nently i n the city; if they disagree, then they are free to leave and live
elsewhere, i n a lawless or supposedly more lenient state. Socrates had
lived all his life i n Athens, enjoying the advantages of life there, and
now he must keep to his part of the "contract". Socrates insists that he
has to do as the Laws of Athens require, and not leave i n a dishon-
ourable way, "returning wrong for wrong, breaking agreements and
injuring those who should be most honoured - himself, his friends,
his country and his country's laws" (Crito 54c).
There was, however, another version of the "social contract" put
forward by the more unscrupulous sophists: that there was an agree-
ment among the weaker citizens in the polis to band together and make
up laws to keep the strong in check. This was the tradition according
to nomoSy the voluntary surrender of individual freedom i n exchange
for the benefits of social order, but by nature, physis, the strong could
do as they wished, if they had the power, and rewrite the laws to their
own advantage.
The first statement of this glorification of the "state of nature" that
brings with it the boast that "might is right" comes in Hesiod s fable of
the hawk and the nightingale:
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LEADERSHIP, LAW AND T H E ORIGINS OF POLITICAL THEORY
that their cause was just and favoured by the gods, and warned that if
the Athenians moved against Melos it would arouse further hostility
to the empire from both their allies and the Spartans. The Athenians
replied that, as the stronger, they would act in their own interests and
not take moral issues into account; they believed that the gods, too,
rule where they can, that the Spartans would, as always, follow the safe
path of expediency, and that the allies would consider prudence before
honour. The Melians refused to submit, and the Athenians immedi-
ately used their superior force against them, destroyed their city, killed
the men and sold the women and children into slavery. 15
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INTRODUCING GREEK PHILOSOPHY
tends the sheep and fattens them up not for their well-being but for
his own gain. Justice, similarly, is for the good of the stronger and the
one in command, and harmful to the one who obeys and serves. A
person of great power outdoes everyone else; justice and morality 16
Constitutional theories
170
LEADERSHIP, LAW AND T H E ORIGINS OF POLITICAL THEORY
are always causing trouble. One ruler is preferable, when he has the
wisdom to govern and the ability to control the people. 18
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INTRODUCING GREEK PHILOSOPHY
as most likely to ensure the good of the individual citizens and of the
polis as a whole {Politics 3.1). Aristotle suggested that where all the citi-
zens rule and are ruled i n turn there would be the framework for coop-
eration among them for the common good. This could be achieved
through a system of rotating "offices", which would be the foundation
of the constitution and the source of law. The power of those holding
office would be guided by the collective law, and limited by the time of
tenure. Citizens would be united to each other and to the polis through
distributive justice, which would treat them all equally in the context of
judicial procedures, recognizing rights and obligations, and, i f neces-
sary, imposing penalties if they should be infringed. Although the
holders of office would be constantly changing, the laws defining and
maintaining government would be permanent and stable, and indeed
passed on from one generation to another to ensure the continuity of
the common good achieved. 19
Citizenship
In the Greek polis the citizens (politai) who were actively engaged in the
political life of legislation, attendance at assembly and on juries, voting,
office-holding, deliberation and decision-making (and military service
when necessary) would be adult free-born males, formally registered,
at age eighteen, in the local "deme" (ward or village). Children and
slaves were excluded, and also women, who, although free-born,
played no part in the public life of the city, except in religious ritual and
some festivals. The position of women was clearly a subject for discus-
sion in classical Athens. Women had no political rights, were subser-
vient to a male i n the household - father, uncle, brother or husband
- and were expected to stay at home, bearing and raising children, and
engage in spinning, weaving, cooking and other household tasks. I n
the theatre, however, powerful women were portrayed on the stage,
and three of Aristophanes comedies show a dominant female char-
acter: i n Lysistrata organizing other women to withhold sex from men
as an anti-war protest; i n Thesmophoriazusae i n an attack on Euripides
for his depiction of female characters i n his plays; and i n Women in
Assembly taking over the legal and executive powers of the city from
the men. Plato saw no reason why women should not be as qualified as
men to become philosophers and rulers of the state. They may be phys-
ically weaker but that is irrelevant when it is a question of intellectual
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LEADERSHIP, LAW AND T H E ORIGINS OF POLITICAL THEORY
Utopias
173
INTRODUCING GREEK PHILOSOPHY
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LEADERSHIP, LAW AND T H E ORIGINS OF POLITICAL THEORY
started in the home and spread outwards to kin, friends, fellow citizens
and allies, ends in the embrace of all humanity (totius complexus gentis
humanae; Cicero De finibus 5.65). 24
175
8. Ethics, goodness and happiness
Plato's dialogue Meno opens with the following question: "Can you
tell me, Socrates, whether virtue (arete) can be taught, or, i f it is not
teachable, is it the result of practice, or does it come to people, not by
practice or through teaching, but from their nature, or is there some
other explanation?". Socrates refuses to answer until a definition of
virtue itself is established, but the question sets out several criteria for
marking out the good from the bad. Some people perhaps have it in
their nature to be kinder or braver and generally more good than their
neighbours, others may have been taught courage and self-discipline,
and others again may work continually at controlling their tempers or
being more prudent. O n the other hand, what is responsible for a child's
unruly behaviour? Is it bad parenting exacerbated by weak teaching, is
it a question of getting into bad habits or keeping bad company, or does
it just happen that there are black sheep in the most respectable fami-
lies? Meno has put his finger on problems that were as perplexing for
the Greeks as they are for modern educationists.
For Homer, being good (agathos) was mainly a question of class. The
adjective is applied to those of noble birth who are leaders i n the
assemblies and outstanding warriors; its opposite is kakos, which refers
especially to one who is cowardly, weak or of low birth. Arete ("good-
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ETHICS, GOODNESS AND HAPPINESS
The word "ethics" comes from the Greek ethos, translated as custom or
habit. It first appears i n Heraclitus in the enigmatic three-word sentence
177
INTRODUCING GREEK PHILOSOPHY
ethos anthropoi daimon (DK 22B119), which means, literally, "habit [is]
human destiny". Heraclitus was the first to consider moral action as a
problem requiring philosophical analysis, and he linked it to a combina-
tion of physical structure and continued endeavour, where the person-
ality resulting from the habit of certain kinds of thoughts and actions
affects the physical composition of the soul. The individual soul for h i m
is made of the same constituents as the cosmos: fiery logos and its "turn-
ings" of water and earth. Given these constituents, he believed that we
are able to improve or diminish the powers of soul. In particular, we may
extend its range of knowledge through searching and enquiring, for the
more we know, the more there is yet to know in the unfathomable depths
of the souls logos. In an almost literal way, such learning makes for a
"drier" soul, and "dry soul is wisest and best" ( B l 18). On the other hand,
although resistance is hard, the gains of indulgence are at the expense
of soul, and giving i n to desire decreases our psychic powers. Evidence
for this can be found in the behaviour of the drunkard, who has literally
dampened his soul; this reduces his ability to control his body (so that he
stumbles) and to express his thoughts i n clear speech (for the words are
slurred). But Heraclitus was still Homeric enough to recognize that the
best choose undying glory above all else, and that the greatest honour is
due to the young who die in battle, the "Ares-slain" (B29,24).
Empedocles followed Heraclitus i n seeing character as dependent
on physical structure and habitual behaviour. He claimed that people,
like animals and plants and the cosmos itself, are made of the four
elements of earth, air, fire and water i n varying proportions. Their
thinking and choosing depend on the mixture of these elements i n
the blood around the heart, where the quality of thought is related to
the approximation to the ideal ratio (one to one) of the ingredients.
Individuals can improve their thinking and their character through
their own efforts, although this may prove difficult, as he advises his
student Pausanias:
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ETHICS, GOODNESS AND HAPPINESS
179
INTRODUCING GREEK PHILOSOPHY
Teaching v i r t u e
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ETHICS, GOODNESS A N D HAPPINESS
three counts. Everyone has a natural talent for political arete, and this
can be enhanced by practice, i n the environment of family upbringing
and regular schooling, and then by the higher education provided by
the sophists.
Later in the Meno, however, the problem arises of finding suitable
teachers. The hypothesis is put forward that being good involves know-
ledge of some kind, and in that case it will be teachable and there
will be teachers of it. But then it is difficult to find such teachers.
Respectable citizens and even distinguished statesmen have hired
teachers in riding, music, athletics and the like for their sons, but not
experts i n goodness, presumably because they could not find any, or
did not think the subject teachable, especially when it was seen that the
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INTRODUCING GREEK PHILOSOPHY
sons of good fathers have sometimes gone to the bad. A n d if the soph-
ists, along with parents and poets, are rejected as qualified instructors,
then doubt is thrown on goodness being teachable, or, indeed, linked
to any special kind of knowledge or skill (96c). Here we need to explore
Socrates own position.
The study of individual virtues and their eventual link with knowing
something, although finally rejected, was the basis of two "paradoxes"
attributed to Socrates, namely that "virtue is knowledge" and "no one
does wrong willingly". I n the interpretation of these statements we
find that Socrates was looking for an art or skill i n living comparable
to the skills displayed by professionals and craftsmen. A doctor builds
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ETHICS, GOODNESS AND HAPPINESS
by no means a common view, for surely one can know what is right,
but deliberately do wrong for various reasons? Socrates, however, is
able to persuade even Protagoras to agree with h i m when he puts the
following question:
Most people think that often it is not the knowledge that a man
has which he follows but something else - at one time anger, at
another pleasure or pain, sometimes love and frequently fear;
they regard knowledge as a slave, pushed around by these other
emotions. Do you agree, or would you rather say that knowledge
is a fine thing, and master of a man, and, i f he can distinguish
good from evil, nothing would force h i m to act contrary to know-
ledge, since practical wisdom (phronesis) is all that he needs?
(Protagoras 352b-c)
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INTRODUCING GREEK PHILOSOPHY
The point is that if we truly understand what is best for us in our long-
term interests then we follow the path of virtue. Being afraid to do the
right thing, for example, or supposing the wrong is more pleasant,
results from a basic misunderstanding of the nature of good and evil.
The reason for this belief for Socrates is that any injury that is done
to one affects only material possessions or physical health, whereas
doing wrong to another affects the soul of the wrong-doer. Care for the
soul is of overriding importance, and any kind of decent life requires
it to be given precedence over the body. Socrates' own austerity was
well known. He had no interest in personal comfort, wearing the same
tunic summer and winter, and living i n poverty, impervious to heat
and cold and physical danger. Nor did he worry about what people
might think of him, but instead showed his own concern for others in
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ETHICS, GOODNESS AND HAPPINESS
at his trial, " I spend all my time going about trying to persuade you,
young and old, to make your first and main concern not for your
bodies or your possessions but for your soul, that it might be i n the
best possible state" (Apology 30a).
That Socrates was willing to adhere to these principles i n his own
"care for the soul" is shown on two occasions. I n the first, at his trial, he
supposes naturally enough that the Athenians were mainly interested
in repressing his philosophical activity. Criticism of their lifestyle,
their politics and their politicians was tolerated when the Athenians
democracy was strong, but, after the war with Sparta, the imposition
of the rule of the Thirty Tyrants and the eventual return of the demo-
crats, the political situation became fragile. The former tolerance was
no longer advisable, and it seemed more prudent either to compel
Socrates to abandon his provocative confrontations or to send h i m into
exile. Socrates then sees himself faced with the same kind of choice
as Achilles: of keeping to his heroic principles with an early death, or
sacrificing them for a long and quiet life in obscurity. Like Achilles, he
chooses death rather than disgrace, and says: "Where a man has once
taken up his stand, either because it seems best to h i m or because that
was the position assigned to h i m , there I believe it is his duty to stay
and face the danger, taking no account of death or anything else before
dishonour" (Apology 28d).
The second occasion concerns another chance Socrates had to
avoid execution, when, as we have seen, his friend Crito offered to
arrange his escape from prison. Socrates reasons for remaining are
again concerned with staying true to the principles he has always lived
by. Even i f he has been unjustly condemned, he reiterates his prefer-
ence to suffer wrong rather than to do wrong, and harm his city by
disobeying its laws. 10
W h y should we be good?
185
INTRODUCING GREEK PHILOSOPHY
"injustice" but the Greek terms dike and dikaiosyne are much broader
than that, covering morality as a whole as well as the specific virtue.
Glaucon speaks first, saying that i n general people think that it is best
to do injustice without paying a penalty, and worst to suffer it without
being able to take revenge. Justice is between the two, valued not for
itself but because the weak cannot act unjustly with impunity, and need
to develop measures to prevent the stronger wronging them. The desire
to outdo others and get from them as much as possible is pursued as
a natural good, but this is countered by state laws and conventions,
which require us to treat others with respect. But suppose one came
upon a "ring of invisibility", like Gyges in the Lydian story? When Gyges
found that no one could see h i m when he turned the ring round on his
finger, he at once killed the king, married the queen and did whatever
he wanted with no risk of retaliation. Glaucon claims that any one else,
just or unjust, would do the same i n that situation, and Socrates is chal-
lenged to show why one should not take advantage of such an oppor-
tunity. The case could be made more extreme by giving the unjust man
the reputation and rewards that accompany a good name, and taking
away from the just man his good name, exchanging it for the reputation
for injustice and all the sufferings and punishments that go with that.
In such circumstances why should we be good for its own sake if we
can get away with misusing our position and doing whatever we like?
Adeimantus chimes in with further support for Glaucons challenge.
It is generally the case, he says, that doing wrong is more profitable
than doing right; those with wealth and power, however acquired, are
thought fortunate, and the weak and poor are despised, even though
they have higher standards of behaviour. Can we expect punishment
in the next life for our injustice, if not i n this? Perhaps, Adeimantus
suggests, there are no gods, or they are not concerned with what we
do, and, even if they are, we have been told that they can be influenced
and persuaded by prayers and offerings. A young person might well
suppose that it is best to create a facade of illusory goodness to deceive
those around h i m , but keep behind it "the greedy and crafty fox" of
the fable (Republic 358c-367e). How then will Socrates defend right
action for its own sake in all circumstances? The subject is crucial and
its importance is recognized, for "our argument concerns no ordinary
topic, but how we ought to live" (532d). n
In the long reply, a more affirmative Socrates takes over from the
doubting persona of the first book, who had finished on the usual note
of an admission of ignorance, not knowing what justice is, whether it is
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ETHICS, GOODNESS A N D HAPPINESS
and reason i n the soul, and courage belongs with the army, and with
spirit i n the individual. Moderation (sophrosyne; also called "self-
control" or "temperance") is the friendly relations between the parts,
and justice turns out to be "having and doing ones own thing", as is
appropriate to the divisions i n city and soul. This somewhat strange
conclusion links different aspects of virtue with the three key functions
in the state and the three parts of the soul, i n the interests of social and
individual prospering. The aim of the whole discussion was to find out
what justice is and why, in the broader perspective of moral action, it
is to be followed. When reason rules, the right choices are made in
the light of its wisdom, spirit aids reason in providing the motivation
for acting and pride i n the achievements, moderation submits to the
arrangement i n the interests of the whole, and the resulting harmony
secures a well-integrated, properly functioning "just" individual.
The converse of this is shown i n detail i n later books, when failing
regimes are related to individual degenerate psychic states. The first
move i n the decline comes when spirit overcomes reason, and the
demands of "honour" prevail. This is followed by reason and spirit
being made subservient to the overriding desire for wealth and posses-
sions i n the "oligarchic" regime of the moneyed classes and i n the
corresponding profit-driven individual. In a democracy, the next stage,
the people do as they wish with no restraints from a ruling or m i l i -
tary class, and the democratic man gives i n to his desires at random.
The final degradation is i n tyranny (akin to dictatorship), where the
best citizens are soon imprisoned or murdered, the tyrants cronies
put i n their place, the treasury ransacked and the people impover-
ished and downtrodden. The corresponding "tyrannical" soul is the
contrary of the just one, for here the voice of reason is silenced, and
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INTRODUCING GREEK PHILOSOPHY
all the mans energies work to satisfy his rampant desires. The differ-
ence is shown especially at night time. Through the day the good man
shows wisdom i n his intellectual activities and choices, deals w i t h his
desires in moderation, perhaps calms his spirit after an angry outburst
and then sleeps peacefully at night. His direct opposite, the "tyran-
nical" man, who is described here as "envious, untrustworthy, friend-
less, host and nurse to every kind of vice", lives i n fear and self-loathing
by day, and at night has violent dreams. While his reason is asleep the
wild part of his soul, bloated with food and drink and out of control,
goes on the rampage, and, maddened by the attempts to satisfy itself,
brings on nightmares of incest, murder and every k i n d of wickedness.
By means of some dubious mathematics, it is concluded that the phil-
osopher-king is 729 times happier than the tyrant, and the tyrant the
same number of times more wretched (Republic 587d). Although the
"tyrannical" man is deliberately portrayed as an extreme case, we are
told that "it is clear from our dreams that there is a dangerous, wild and
lawless form of desire i n us all, even i n those who seem to be moder-
ately inclined" (571d-572b). The detailed psychological analysis of
13
the previous discussion had provided the tools and the incentives for
keeping such lawless desires i n check i n the interests of the best type
of individual life in the best managed constitution.
So far, then, it would seem that the first challenge had been met, and
the case made for acting rightly for its own sake. It had been shown
to be best to have a balanced personality, using discernment to make
sensible decisions, and harnessing our energies to achieve an organized
and harmonious life. Our natural desires to quench our thirst, eat well,
enjoy sexual relationships and have an adequate standard of living are to
be respected but not allowed to dominate or get out of hand. But there is
still the further question of whether objective standards of morality do
exist, or whether we are to define our own values in a random way, as
each thinks fit. Plato takes it for granted that we all pursue "the good",
that we want something that really is good, and are ready to do every-
thing for its sake, but we do not know exactly what it is (505a-d). The
subject is given its most detailed treatment in the context of the role of
the philosopher-rulers in books 6 and 7 of the Republic, i n what is tech-
nically a digression from the first challenge. Socrates is now dealing
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ETHICS, GOODNESS AND HAPPINESS
w i t h an elite few, or perhaps only one person i n the state, but even so
he refuses to discuss "the good" in the same way as he had treated the
individual virtues, "and even to arrive at my own view is too big a topic
for the discussion we are now started on" (506d). Instead he offers as
guidelines the simile of the sun and the allegory of the cave. 14
The theory of forms is introduced for the first time i n the Republic in
this digression. It is agreed that there does exist "justice itself", which
acts as a standard for individual just acts and gives them its value;
similarly for other entities that have a common name there is a para-
digm case, imperceptible but accessible to reason. Above all there is
the form of the good, (also called "good itself" or "essence of good-
ness"), which is found to have a special status. Its offspring is the sun,
and, as the sun allows eyes to see and objects, including itself, to be
seen, so the good allows m i n d to know, and forms, including itself, to
be known. I n the allegory of the cave the sun is like the fire that illu-
minates the carved figures and allows their shadows to be seen on the
facing screen, but, i n the world above, the good itself takes the place of
the sun, illuminating the objects of knowledge i n the intelligible realm.
The prisoner who is dragged up from the cave to see the sun eventu-
ally understands how it explains everything in the cave as well as in
the upper world, and this throws light on how the philosopher-king
or -queen, after a gruelling higher education, can achieve knowledge
15
189
INTRODUCING GREEK PHILOSOPHY
the three lives; i n their judgement, the life of the philosopher would
be most pleasant.
This position, however, is somewhat modified i n the discussion of
the PhilebuSy a later dialogue devoted almost exclusively to the subject
of pleasure. The "middle" life discussed i n the Republic, and repre-
sented by the athlete and warrior, is dropped, and the discussion
focuses here on the claims of pleasure in contrast to intelligence as the
main ingredient i n the good life. A straight antithesis between the two
is rejected, however, i n the context of the totality of the good life for
human beings. Intellectual activity on its own is said to belong to the
divine, whereas pleasure without consciousness or understanding of it
characterizes only the simplest forms of animal species. The satisfactory
life for human beings, and the one to be commended, requires both
ingredients combined i n moderation. Reason brings intelligence with
it, together with order, truth, moderation and beauty in the pattern of
17
right living, involving not only theorizing and dialectic (which produce
"pure" pleasures) but also the application of knowledge in sciences and
crafts. These activities, along with those concerned with health, result
in the "mixture" of advantages that would be available to everyone.
Plato's mature conclusion here makes the "best life" more accessible
to people generally than the Socratic view that the life of the philoso-
pher is the only one worth living. It is also closer to the recommended
choice of Odysseus in the M y t h of Er: to take up, from all the possibili-
ties offered, the undistinguished life of an ordinary man.
Aristotelian ethics
Aristotle treated the question of how we are to live our lives as a scientific
exercise, spelled out i n the Eudemian Ethics and the more significant
Nicomachean Ethics (which has some overlap with the Eudemian). i8
He
starts with given data, which in this case are common opinions, and
the consensus is that everyone wants to be happy. It is our aim i n life,
and why we act as we do. Sometimes there are "intermediate" goods,
where one thing leads to another (as money to buy a house, education
to enhance a career), and there might be further intermediate goods
(as the house being needed for a family, the career for greater prestige),
but these intermediates have to end at some point i n an ultimate good,
and this is agreed to be happiness. It is curiously pointless to ask: why
do you want to be happy? Happy people have fulfilled their desires and
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ETHICS, GOODNESS AND HAPPINESS
achieved their aim, but the problem comes with defining the content of
their happiness, and this is what Aristotle sets out to do. 19
good knife", "a good flute-player" and "a good drink", the primary
meaning relates to successful functioning, as, for these examples, in
cutting effectively, playing well or quenching thirst. What is good,
therefore, for human beings would relate to their practical functioning
as human beings, and the outstanding characteristic of human life,
which distinguishes it from that of plants and animals, is the ability to
think. Aristotle concludes that happiness is to be found in the active
life of reason, " i n the perfect realization of the true self", which, in
non-Aristotelian language, means something like " i n working to
the best of our abilities". But we cannot live by reason alone, and
21
Aristotle is ready to admit that basic needs should be met, and a length
of time allowed for their enjoyment, "for one swallow does not make a
summer, nor one day a happy life" (Nicomachean Ethics 1088al8). He
summarizes as follows:
We see here that the successful and happy life should satisfy the
whole person, since it combines the exercise of reason i n contempla-
tion with considered action and the enjoyment of leisure and moderate
comfort. The virtuous activity that belongs with reason is sophia
(theoretical wisdom), which is concerned with scientific study and the
intellectual life of philosophy, and this takes the highest place, being
close to the divine. But human beings are political animals, as Aristotle
famously said, and they function best i n a well-regulated society. It
is in this context of political activity that the moral virtues of justice,
courage, generosity and the like flourish; phronesis (practical wisdom)
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ETHICS, GOODNESS AND HAPPINESS
Stoic virtue
The linking of virtue with reason and understanding had started with
Socrates. It was further developed by Plato i n his concept of the ulti-
mate reality of goodness itself, and adapted to a more realistic lifestyle
by Aristotle. The Stoics, however, reverted to the Socratic line and took
it to extremes. The fundamental connection between knowing right
and doing right meant that, for them, the slightest deviation was a
failure of intellect. Since they also adopted the suggestion that indi-
vidual virtues were interrelated as particular applications of a general
theory of conduct known as the "art of living", they concluded that
either a person was completely virtuous, knowing the principles of
right action i n every situation, or, being ignorant of them, was both
foolish and vicious. They thought of the soul as literally highly strung
and, comparing it to an instrument that is either i n tune or out of tune,
they claimed that the state of the soul is either in harmony with itself
and producing right actions according to nature, or is i n discord, with
wrong actions resulting.
This theory started from a study of primary natural instincts. 23
193
INTRODUCING GREEK PHILOSOPHY
the one evil, and that only in practising virtue under the guidance
of reason will they realize their humanity to the full and so be truly
happy. 24
Those who reach the highest good are few and, i n the daily lives of
most of us, moral issues are not always pressing or dominant; advice
is needed, therefore, on how to make decisions on a non-moral level.
Provided it is always recognized that virtue is the only good and vice
the only evil, the Stoics were ready to divide everything else into what
is to be preferred, what rejected and what is of no consequence at all.
What is preferable is natural, and so obviously includes life itself as
25
right, but, where there is discord within, then vicious action will follow.
This means that there will be no improvement i f the wrongdoer is
physically punished, but attention should be given to treating the indi-
vidual's psychological state and the underlying pathos: the sickness
or disorder that caused the eruption into violence. A n encouraging
aspect, however, was the assertion that human beings are programmed
by nature to be good. It is i n accord with our humanity that reason
develops from sound foundations, and the life of virtue to which it
will lead us is consistently i n harmony with that humanity, and indis-
pensable to happiness. I f we do not reach the goal the fault may be
due to many causes, for example weak parenting, ill-health, unsympa-
thetic environment, bad company or misguided education, all of which
would work against progress towards the best life. More positively,
the application of virtue to our natural affinities meant that the Stoics
emphasized duty to parents and relatives, service to the community
and responsible government i n the wider sphere of politics.
194
ETHICS, GOODNESS AND HAPPINESS
the prospect of another life, better or worse than this according to our
present behaviour, was likewise ruled out. It is the assurance given
29
is given its due, and the partnership fostered rather than ignored or
suppressed. A n d it is open to everyone. Greek philosophy tended to be
contemptuous of ordinary people, and to offer its choicest fruits to a
mature and intellectual male elite; the Garden of Epicurus was unique
in opening its gates also to women, the poor and the ignorant.
Stoic ethics, as we have seen, started from primary natural instinct,
which they said was for self-preservation. The Epicureans on the
contrary claimed that this instinct was for pleasure:
195
INTRODUCING GREEK PHILOSOPHY
primary natural and necessary desire is for food and drink, and
Epicurus candidly maintains that someone who is hungry is unlikely
to be happy; hunger is an obsession that has to be satisfied before
attention is turned elsewhere. But it is not difficult to satisfy this most
pressing need, and the pleasure of the satisfaction is independent of
the simplicity of the means: "Plain food brings enjoyment equal to that
of a lavish banquet when the pain of want is removed; and a starving
man reaches the peak of pleasure i n a meal of bread and water" (DL
10.130). The case is similar with other natural and necessary desires,
which are best satisfied by simple means, to provide the foundation for
a happy life. Luxurious clothing and housing, for example, can vary the
pleasure involved but not increase its density, and the pursuit of ever
more luxury panders to unnecessary desires and can be harmful i n
the long run. I f we understand the limits of living and realize that it is
easy to remove the pain caused by want, then life can be complete, and
there is no need to struggle. Excess of any kind is liable to endanger
the state of well-being:
196
ETHICS, GOODNESS A N D HAPPINESS
which examines the motive for every choice and rejection, and
drives away those beliefs which cause the greatest tumult in the
mind. (DL 10.132)
197
INTRODUCING GREEK PHILOSOPHY
too quickly loses his temper, another gives in to fear too soon, a
third meekly accepts an insult. I n many other respects there are
different human characteristics, and different habits following
from them, but one thing is sure - the traces of natural faults
that reason cannot over-ride are so insignificant that nothing
prevents us from leading god-like lives. (Lucretius 3.307-22)
Friendship
Friendship was a topic that interested all the main philosophers. Plato
wrote a dialogue called Lysis that attempted to analyse friendship
{philia), starting from the assumption that a friend is the most precious
of all possessions, and moving on to the question of how a friend is
acquired. Are my friends the people I like or those who like me? But
perhaps friendship unrequited is not true friendship, and there has
to be mutual attraction. This then raises the topic of whether "likes"
or "unlikes" are attracted to each other. Does my best friend have a
background, character and habits similar to mine, or are we opposites,
laughter-loving balanced by seriousness, for example, or impulsiveness
by calm? I n either case, where the friendship is reciprocated, the true
friend becomes "my own".
Plato's Symposium and Phaedrus deal with erotic friendships. Eros
is the subject of the different speeches of the guests at the symposium,
and the culmination is the speech of the priestess Diotima as reported
by Socrates. I n this, the "ladder of love" is explained. A person is first
attracted by the handsome appearance of another, then realizes that
beauty of soul and character is more commendable than a pretty face.
But then the move is made away from the individual to understanding
fine laws and institutions and the beauty i n mathematical theories,
and finally beauty itself is reached i n all its splendour. The journey,
however, seems to be a selfish one, as the beloved is abandoned for a
higher object of desire, but i n the Phaedrus myth this position is modi-
fied. Lover and beloved together help each other to "grow their wings"
and ascend to the contemplation of forms.
Aristotle devoted two books of his Nicomachean Ethics to the subject
of friendship. Like Plato, he would regard a friend as "ones own", in fact
a "second self" and so value his or her welfare with the same consid-
eration as his own. The company of business colleagues may be useful,
198
ETHICS, GOODNESS AND HAPPINESS
199
INTRODUCING GREEK PHILOSOPHY
200
Epilogue
201
INTRODUCING GREEK PHILOSOPHY
202
EPILOGUE
visible world i n the generation of time as it projects its light onto the
negative force of matter. As well as publishing this work by Plotinus,
Porphyry wrote an introduction, Isagoge, to Aristotle's Categories,
which was translated into Latin by Boethius, and so directly influenced
medieval discussions of the "problem of universals". Porphyry's own
philosophy was concerned with the metaphysics of the divine nature
and the One, and ways in which individual souls could be detached
from passions and enter a higher reality.
The second phase of Neoplatonism centred on the Syrian Iamblichus,
who had studied under Porphyry in Athens, and had then set up his
own school near Antioch. Iamblichus wrote extensively, introducing
into Neoplatonism a particular interest in Pythagoreanism, now
known as "Neopythagoreanism", as well as a more elaborate form
of Porphyry's metaphysics. Neopythagoreanism had started in the
first century C E , and went on to combine the three hypostases from
Plotinus with features from Plato's Timaeus and Parmenides. I n the
203
INTRODUCING GREEK PHILOSOPHY
204
EPILOGUE
205
206
EPILOGUE
207
APPENDIX
Sources for Greek philosophy
208
APPENDIX: SOURCES FOR GREEK PHILOSOPHY
ists. Socrates is shown doing cosmology, running a school, and teaching the young
to argue against their elders. Although the Platonic Socrates denied these claims,
Aristophanes gives a contemporary view of him as hardly distinguishable from the
more unscrupulous sophists.
Arius Didymus (1st century B C E ) : This philosopher was a friend and adviser to
the emperor Augustus. He wrote works entitled On Sects and Epitome, both of
which contain summaries of previous philosophies, including an important survey
of Stoic physics and ethics; some of this material is preserved in Eusebius and
Stobaeus.
Cicero (106-43 B C E ) : Towards the end of his life, in enforced retirement from
politics, the famous Roman orator and statesman devoted himself to philosophic
writing. He presented, in Latin prose, the views of the post-Aristotelian Hellenistic
schools, with his own friends and teachers acting as spokesmen for the different
positions. His Académica summarized Carneades' scepticism, and the more
dogmatic response to it from the later followers of Plato. On the Nature of the Gods
first gives an unsympathetic summary of the Epicurean stand against conventional
religion, which is answered by Balbus as spokesman for Stoic theology, the third
book contains a compromise between the two. More important are the five books
On Supreme Good and Evil {Definihus bonorum et malorum), which give a deroga-
tory account of Epicurean ethics, but, in the person of Cicero's friend the younger
Cato, the most complete summary of Stoic ethics available as a continuous text.
Clement of Alexandria (1 st-2nd century C E ) : One of the most erudite of the early
Church Fathers, Clement was a convert to Christianity who continued to be inter-
ested in Greek literature and philosophy. The Stromateis, a miscellaneous collection
209
INTRODUCING GREEK PHILOSOPHY
Diogenes of Oenoanda (2nd centrury C E ) : This Diogenes is famous for the long
wall he erected in Lycia in central Turkey, around 200 C E . The wall is over forty
metres long and four blocks high, and is inscribed with columns of Greek text
relating to Epicureanism. It is a main source for Epicurus, including summaries
and direct quotations, which Diogenes publicized with the declared aim of encour-
aging his fellow citizens to follow the Epicurean way of life.
210
APPENDIX: SOURCES FOR GREEK PHILOSOPHY
teaching against attacks from Stoics and others, and an adaptation of it to contem-
porary issues.
Sextus Empiricus (2nd-3rd century C E ) : Sextus is the main source for ancient
scepticism, in three books on Outlines of Pyrrhonism and eleven Against the
Mathematicians. Outlines is a summary of the work of the early Pyrrhonists,
especially that of Aenesidemus, and compares scepticism with other Hellenistic
schools. Against the Mathematicians similarly involves quotations and reports
from a variety of philosophers, especially Epicureans and Stoics, but also includes
some Presocratics such as Xenophanes, Heraclitus, Pythagoras and Democritus,
who were seen as forerunners of the sceptics in raising doubts about the possibility
of human knowledge.
211
INTRODUCING GREEK PHILOSOPHY
evidence is still useful to set beside that of Aristophanes and Plato in the search for
an accurate reconstruction of the historical Socrates.
Diels-Kranz (DK)
The standard collection of fragments of the Presocratics and Sophists is H . Diels &
W. Kranz, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, 6th edn (Berlin: Weidmann, 1951). It
is in three volumes (the third is a comprehensive index) and, in a section for each
philosopher, gives the sources for the passages under "A", and then direct quota-
tions with author, context and textual apparatus under "B". D K 22B93, for example,
would be the reference for fragment 93 of Heraclitus, the subject of section 22.
Even if translators or commentators use their own order for the fragments, there
would always be a reference or concordance to the D K numbering.
212
Glossary of Greek philosophical terms
213
GLOSSARY OF GREEK PHILOSOPHICAL TERMS
214
Notes
215
NOTES
at his own request, the date of his death was an annual school holiday; cf.
Aristotle, Rhetoric 1398b 10 on honours given to the wise.
9. His crucial question was: "how could hair have come from what is not hair,
and flesh from what is not flesh?" (DK 59B10).
10. The main dialogues may be classified as follows: (i) Socratic defence and
literary criticism - Apology, Crito, Ion, Hippias Minor; (ii) Socratic elenchos -
Laches, Charmides, Euthyphro, Hippias Major, Lysis, Euthydemus; (iii) mainly
Socratic - Gorgias, Meno, Protagoras, Cratylus, Symposium; (iv) Socratic/
Platonic - Phaedo, Republic, Phaedrus, Timaeus; (v) also Socratic/Platonic
- Theaetetus, Parmenides, Sophist, Politicus, Philebus; and (vi) dogmatic/anti-
Socratic - Laws.
11. This is the first word the modern traveller to Greece sees on arrival, as it is
used for searching and examination by customs officials.
12. In Diogenes Laertius, Life of Plato 3.37, and Aristoxenus, Harmonics 30-31,
it is reported that only Aristotle stayed to the end of the Phaedo reading, and
that the audience gradually deserted the lecture when it became clear that the
content was seriously mathematical.
13. The works in the Platonic corpus of doubtful authenticity are: Alcibiades I and
II, Cleitiphon, Epinomis, Erastae, Hipparchus, Menexenus, Minos and Theages.
The main authentic dialogues are listed above in note 10.
14. Two of the Phaedo proofs involve the assumption of "forms" as perfect
and unique paradigms of the many imperfect particulars found in this
world; this is the first appearance of the so-called "theory of forms"; see pp.
118-19.
15. The exact text is: "The safest general characterization of the European philo-
sophical tradition is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato. I do
not mean the systematic scheme of thought which scholars have doubtfully
extracted from his writings. I allude to the wealth of general ideas scattered
through them" (Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology [Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1929], 39).
16. The following is a summary of Aristotle's main works: (i) on logic - Categories,
On Interpretation, Analytics (Prior and Posterior), Topics and Sophistic Refuta-
tions; (ii) on natural science - Physics, On the Heavens, Generation and Decay,
Meteorology, On the Soul (and some related short essays); (iii) on zoology -
Animal Studies, Parts of Animals, Animal Movements, Progression of Animals,
Generation of Animals; (iv) on first philosophy/theology - Metaphysics (this
title means simply "[written] after (meta) physics"; "metaphysics" acquired
its later meaning from the subjects discussed by Aristotle in the work); (v)
on practical and productive sciences - Nicomachean Ethics, Eudemian Ethics;
(vi) and Politics, Rhetoric and Poetics.
17. Translated into Latin as quinta essentia, from which the word "quintessence"
is derived.
18. Plato had realized that the organ of thought was located in the head, but
Aristotle's biological studies are weakened to some extent by his reverting
to earlier theories, placing the centre of thought and perception in the heart
216
NOTES
area, which obviously seems to house the life force of the body at its centre.
Epicureans and Stoics followed Aristotle in this view.
19. Hamartia has often been translated as "sin" or "tragic flaw", which has caused
critics to look for a "flaw" in famous characters in tragedy, but the meaning is
simply "mistake", which the protagonist may try to avoid but which eventually
causes the reversal of fortune.
20. The Cynics were literally the "dog-philosophers" (the Greek word for dogs
is kynes), so called because of their bark-like scolding and shameless street
behaviour.
21. Diogenes reduced his needs to a minimum, starting the philosopher's
"uniform" of staff, cloak and food-bag; when he saw children drinking from
their cupped hands, he threw away his own cup as unnecessary (DL 6.57).
The famous "tub" he is said to have lived in was more probably a large storage
jar.
22. None of Xenocrates' works survive, even in fragments. He was famous
for saying that philosophy "heals life's disturbances" (Clement, Stromateis
2.22).
23. The most famous Megarian paradox was the liar paradox, which in Cicero's
version is: "if you say that you are a liar and this is true, you are lying"
(Academica 2.95).
217
NOTES
218
NOTES
the theory that the sense organs do not have sensation themselves but are
the means through which the soul perceives, he says that if sight is to be
explained as an immortal soul looking through unshuttered windows, why
is it we can/ee/ the eyes functioning (as when we screw them up if the light is
too bright), and follows this with the reductio that, if the eye is a window for
the soul, the soul would see better if the eyes were taken out, "frames" and all
(3.362-9)!
3. Cosmologies
1. The Greek to a-peiron is a neuter singular noun made from the adjective
apeiros (unlimited) with the definite article; the initial alpha negates the sense
in peiron (from peras) of "limit". In the grammar of the word, Anaximander
deprives his principle of gender, character and boundary. To gonimon (that
which is capable of generating [hot and cold]), which comes out of the
apeiron, is another neuter noun, similarly invented to depersonalize the
primary principle.
2. Arche (from archo; "I begin" and " I rule") was Aristotle's term, but it may well
go back to Anaximander. Its dual sense is as with the English "first"-, first in
time and first in importance.
3. The sources for Anaximander s cosmology go back to Theophrastus, Aristotle's
successor; cf. D K 12A9-11 and A14.
4. According to Aristotle, Xenophanes used to look up at the night sky and
was the first to "one-ify" making up a verb, henizo ("I consider as one"; "I
have a unified theory of everything"), from hen, meaning "one" (Metaphysics
986b24).
5. The phrase in this form is first found in Plato's comment on Heraclitus at
Cratylus 402a, and connected with D K 22B91 and B12: "you cannot step into
the same river twice".
6. The analogy between cosmos as animal, and animal as cosmos, was also
used in medical theory. As well as the general connection between cosmic
elements and opposites with "humours" in the individual, the Hippocratic
text On Sevens (ch. 6) relates the seven levels of the cosmic concentric spheres
in detail to parts of the body; ch. 11 links geographical sites with bodily parts,
and Airs, Waters, Places is concerned with the theory that climatic conditions
resulted in specific personality traits in the local inhabitants.
7. The verb is gegonen (Timaeus 28a), the perfect tense of gignomai, but the
perfect tense in Greek has reference to a present state.
8. Cf. "the eight orbits, two of which have the same speed, make distinct notes
numbering seven (a crucial number in almost everything), separated by inter-
vals; clever men have imitated this music with strings and in song" (Cicero
Dream of Scipio, at Republic 6.18:). Some Pythagoreans removed the earth
from its central position, and replaced it with a central fire.
9. Aristotle typically dismissed this imaginative theory on the pragmatic
grounds that, since the force of thunderclaps can shatter stones, the much
greater sound of stars in their movement would cause much greater havoc,
219
NOTES
which is clearly not the case. "It is fair to say that we do not hear it and that
bodies are not observed to suffer any violent effect because of the fact that no
noise is produced" (De Caelo 290b).
10. This is an expansion of a passage by Epicurus in his "Letter to Herodotus"
(DL 10.41).
11. The quotation, which is likely to go straight back to Chrysippus, is from
Nemesius, On the Nature of Man 38.111 (Long & Sedley 52C). See the edition
of Nemesius by R. W. Sharpies & R J. van der Eijk (Liverpool: Liverpool
University Press, 2008).
4. Pagan monotheism
1. Here Cicero is reporting the Stoic view. Similarly, for Seneca: "We gener-
ally attach great importance to an opinion held by the whole human race,
and accept it as convincing argument. We infer that there are gods from
everyone's instinctive belief, and no nation has yet been found, so far beyond
the reach of law and civilization, as to deny their existence" (Letters 117).
This argument for the existence of god was known as "consensus gentium".
2. The saying is quoted by Aristotle, De anima 411a8, and discussed by Plato,
Laws 899b.
3. The principle had already been used by Anaximander in a spatial sense to
explain the stability of the earth; see p. 66 and ch. 1, n. 6, p. 215.
4. Apology 23a-b, 28e, 29d, 39a. The language of obedience to god is similar in
Phaedoy in the injunction against suicide: "it is not unreasonable to say that
we must not put an end to ourselves until god sends some necessary circum-
stance, like the one facing us now" (62c).
5. Republic 377b-3&3c\ andXenophanes B26, Parmenides B8.26-31, Empedocles
B28, 29.
6. Envy (phthonos) is a typical attribute of the gods of epic and tragedy, which
incites them to bring ruin on hubristic mortals who threaten their status.
7. The counterpart to this - not saying that the god is to be interpreted as sky,
but that the clouds in the sky are gods - is one of the so-called Socratic
beliefs that, along with the denial of the divinity of Zeus, was lampooned by
Aristophanes in his comedy Clouds.
8. Scepticism goes back to the sophists and especially Protagoras, as in the
opening of his work On the Gods: "I am unable to discover whether the gods
exist or not, or what they are like; there are so many obstacles - the obscurity
of the topic and the shortness of human life" (DK 80B4).
9. See the diagram, p. 79, which shows the paths of the rotation of the spheres
of the planets and the circle of the fixed stars; the rotation is maintained
continuously by their perpetual desire for the prime mover.
220
NOTES
original Ionian, the sense of strength and power in the kratos stem would be
genuine.
2. The end of Anaxagoras B12 - "each individual object most obviously is and
was what that object has most of" - is similar to the wording of the last line
of Parmenides' fragment here.
3. "Simmias is human" is a constant, saying what he is essentially; "Simmias is
tall" is an "accidental attribute" since its truth may depend on who is standing
next to him or his age at any particular time.
4. In his speech in defence of Murena, Cicero mocked the prosecutor Cato for
believing, as a staunch Stoic, that there were no grades of wrongdoing. He
also brought out some of the perplexities of this "all or nothing" position in
his six essays on "Stoic Paradoxes". But Roman Stoics generally attempted to
mitigate the harshness of this conclusion with a theory of progress from folly
to wisdom.
221
NOTES
usually taken as the source for the abridged version given in Diodorus Siculus
1.8.
4. The significance of animal cries and the primitive language of infants was
recognized in the development of communication, in opposition to Plato's
"name-giver" (nomothetes; the role of Adam in Genesis), who named animals
and objects, and also to Heraclitus' interest in a name connecting with the
nature of the object referred to, discussed throughout Plato's Cratylus.
5. In the Odyssey (6.103fF.) the primitive Cyclopes are noted as exceptional in
having no leaders, communal life and assemblies for debate or public laws
(themistes), "but they live in mountain caves, and each imposes his private
themistes on his own wife and children, and ignores the others".
6. See for example Iliad 1.490-91; 2.205-6; 4.341-4; 9.96-102, 438-43;
12.310-21.
7. Cf. Aristotle's summary: "Law is a mutual guarantee of rights" (Politics 3.9).
8. Political comment in drama was not confined to tragedy. Most of Aristophanes'
comedies have themes relating to the contemporary political scene. It is said
that when Dionysius of Syracuse asked for an analysis of the Athenians'
constitution, Plato sent him a collection of Aristophanes' plays.
9. Cf. Hesiods genealogy, which linked justice (dike), good government
(eunomia) and peace (eirene) as sisters, born of Zeus and Themis (Theogony
901-6). In non-mythical terms, the imposition of divine authority on a primi-
tive form of natural order produced in human society the rule of law, which
enables justice to flourish and brings the benefits of peace.
10. The theory comes from Alcmaeon: "What preserves health is isonomia
between the powers - wet and dry, cold and hot, bitter and sweet and the rest,
and monorchia among them is the cause of sickness, for monorchia of one or
the other is destruction; health is a blending in due measure" (DK 24B4).
11. Cf. an early form of communism: "According to Timaeus Pythagoras was
the first to say 'friends share everything'" (quoted by Plato at the end of the
Phaedrus) and "friendship is equality" (Iamblichus, Life of Pythagoras 175¬
6). And: "When Xenophilus the Pythagorean was asked by someone how
he could best educate his son, he replied 'by making him the citizen of a
well-governed state'. Throughout Italy Pythagoras made many men honour-
able and true (kaloi kai agathoi, literally beautiful and good, the standard
Greek phrase for the best kind of people)" (Aristoxenus at D L 8.16-17). The
hostility roused by the Italian Pythagoreans, which resulted in one incident
of a number of them being trapped and burnt to death, seems to have been
motivated by their attempts to put their political theories into practice.
12. Cf. "War is father of all and king of all; some it shows as gods and others men,
some it makes slaves and others free" (DK 22B53), and "You must understand
that war is common and strife justice, and everything happens as a result of
strife and necessity" (B80).
13. D K 31B135, quoted by Aristotle in support of the general prohibition against
murder, according to "universal law and natural justice" Aristotle himself
suggested a cosmos: family analogy in that god manages the cosmos as the
222
NOTES
head of a family does his household or as a general manages his army, where
the good is shown both in the individual parts and the whole (Metaphysics
1074aB-22).
14. A three-part state is in the pattern of kings-nobles-soldiers in the Iliad, and
in the illustration attributed to Pythagoras of the three sets of people who
go to the Olympic games, namely spectators, athletes and money-makers.
Cf. also the bribes the three goddesses offer Paris for the prize of the golden
apple: Hera brings power, Athena wisdom and Aphrodite sexual pleasure.
15. In the long run, however, the Athenians lost. Their cruelty was long remem-
bered, allies were alienated and the Spartan general Lysander expelled the
Athenian power base from Melos and eventually imposed on Athens itself
the rule of the Thirty Tyrants.
16. The Greek word for justice (dike) is broader than its English translation, and
can cover morality in general. The Republic as a whole sets out to tackle the
question of the superiority of the morally good life, whatever the circum-
stances. On the "contract" see also Cicero: "Where there is widespread fear,
man afraid of man, class of class, then, because no one is confident of his
own strength, a sort of bargain (quasi pactio) is made between them ... so
not nature or desire but weakness is the mother of justice" (Republic 3.22).
17. Aristotle quotes Homer with approval here: "one ruler let there be" (II
11.204).
18. Darius won the argument, and was himself appointed king after cheating in
what was meant to be open competition for the office (Herodotus 3.85-7).
19. Aristotle's interest in constitutions resulted in his setting up a research project
in the Lyceum, which collected and reported on 158 different types found in
the Greek world; only the Constitution of Athens survives.
20. See Cicero: "only the wise are free" (Stoic Paradoxes V), that is, the wise man is
(really) free even if in (apparent) slavery. These "paradoxes" are essays by Cicero
on Stoic aphorisms that run counter to accepted opinion (doxa). The sayings
are typical of the provocative rhetoric found in both Cynics and Stoics.
21. The name was coined by Thomas More in 1516, ambiguous in its Greek deri-
vation between eu-topos (good place) and ou-topos (no place).
22. There is a play on the double meaning of nomos here as both "law" and
"pasture"; the citizens would be "nourished" by the law like cattle grazing
together from the same pasture.
23. Cf. Cicero: "It is consistent with natural instinct that the wise man should be
ready to take part in politics and government" (Definibus 3.68). The advice
given in the Dream of Scipio summarizes the application of virtue to the
natural affinities: "practise justice and affectionate duty (iustitia et pietas) to
parents, relatives and then above all to your country" (Republic 6.16), and
adds that well-run cities (coetus hominum iure sociati) are pleasing to god.
Stoic theory here contrasted sharply with the Epicurean aversion to partici-
pation in politics as a threat to personal tranquillity (KD 37).
24. This comprehensive cosmopolitanism perhaps started with Socrates even
before the Cynics. It is said that when asked which city he was from, Socrates
223
NOTES
224
NOTES
12. For more details on state justice, see above, Chapter 7, pp. 126-7.
13. There is a vivid reinforcement of the required restraint in the myth of the
"black horse" in the three-part soul, which the charioteer, with the help of
the white horse, tries to tame; cf. above on Phaedru$ pp. 164-7.
y
14. For the details of the simile and the allegory see above, Chapter 6, pp.
147-9.
15. For women as philosophers, cf. Chapter 7, pp. 172-3.
16. There were no money prizes in the official games. The prize was just an olive-
wreath, but the fame the winner achieved made the effort worthwhile.
17. At Philebus 64e, "to kalon" combines the senses of being beautiful, fine and
appropriate for human living.
18. There is another work on ethics under Aristotle's name, with the title Magna
Moralia; this is generally accepted to be later, and probably written by one of
Aristotle's students.
19. Eudaimonia is the word generally translated as "happiness". It involves general
"flourishing", success, prosperity and literally "good fortune" (the presence of
a good daimón).
20. The term "focal meaning" was coined by G. E. L. Owen and has become the
classic term; see his Logic, Science and Dialectic (London: Duckworth, 1986),
ch. 10.
21. Aristotle's view here, of happiness arising when we are true to ourselves and
do the best we can, surfaces again in Cicero: "We should all assess our own
character and regulate that one, and not try to see how another's might suit; for
the character that each person has suits that person best" {De officiis 1.113).
22. Roger Crisp defines virtue ethics as a theory "which makes essential refer-
ence to the morality of virtue itself, with a focus on agents and their lives,
rather than discrete actions". For Rosalind Hursthouse, "The virtuous person
has particular virtues that can be understood as traits humans develop in
order to live well. Such motives arise in a natural fashion without some-
one's having an eye on moral rules and laws". And John McDowell claims
that "Rules of any form of rationality can be grounded only in human prac-
tice". All quoted in R. Crisp & M. Slote (eds), Virtue Ethics (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1997).
23. The main text here is Cato's exposition of Stoic ethics in the third offivebooks
of Cicero's Definibus.
24. This is the "art of living" (ars vivendi). The idea started with Socrates, who was
searching for a techne of living well, combining theory and practice, compa-
rable to that exercised by doctors and artisans. But the Stoics saw the "art" as
more like that of dancing, where the movements are not random, but have
a pattern. Furthermore, this art does not aim at an external product, but the
skill is shown in the actual performance (Cicero, De finibus 3.24).
25. If life "for the most part" is according to nature then life is preferable, but if it
is "for the most part" contrary to nature then suicide, the "rational departure",
is justified (Cicero, Definibus 3.60). This could be in serving ones country,
to save a friend or to avoid wrong action ("death before dishonour") and
225
NOTES
incipient insanity, which threatens the life of reason ("reason or the rope"
as Diogenes put it); see the discussion in J. M. Rist, Human Value (Leiden:
Brill, 1982), 62. To show indifference to life was the ultimate expression of
moral freedom, an occasion for a display of "fortitude and philosophic calm"
(the more familiar sense of "Stoic"). It accounted for a spate of Stoic suicides
under Roman emperors, following the example of Cato, who preferred death
to submission to Caesar.
26. The moral of Cicero's Dream of Scipio, the Roman Stoic version of Plato's
Myth of Er, was to cultivate the virtues of iustitia and pietas, which together
covered respect for family, state and gods.
27. This is shown by the physical aspect of the soul, defined as warm breath
(pneuma), being in the correct tension (tonos).
28. C f : "death, the most awesome of evils, is nothing to us, for while we exist
death is not present, and when death is present we no longer exist" (KD 2).
Traditional after-death punishments were seen as allegories for the mental
torments we bring on ourselves now; see Chapter 4, p. 100.
29. "We have been born once, but it is impossible to be born twice; in eternity,
necessarily, there is no future life for us" (Vatican Sayings 14).
30. As, for example, in Plato's Phaedo: "as long as we have the body with us,
and our soul is kneaded into this evil thing, we shall never have unqualified
possession of the object of our desire" (66b); "we must have no association
with the body beyond what is absolutely necessary, nor allow ourselves to be
affected by its nature" (82e).
31. This is known as the "hedonistic calculus", as explained in Platos Protagoras:
Like a skilful trader, put into the scales the pleasures and pains, and
their nearness and distance, and weigh them, and then say which
outweighs the other. If you weigh pleasures against pleasures, you
should of course always take the more and the greater, or if you
weigh pains against pains you take the fewer and the less; or, if pleas-
ures against pains, then, if the pains are exceeded by the pleasures
- whether the nearer by the distant or the distant by the nearer - you
would choose the course of action in which the pleasures are to be
found, and avoid the one in which the painful exceeds the pleasant.
(356b-c)
The similar Epicurean version is given at D L 10.129-30.
32. Cf. "Friendship goes dancing round the world, telling us all to wake up and
give thanks for the happy life" (Vatican Sayings 70).
33. The political life allows one to show "greatness of spirit" (De officiis 1.72), and
it is given as a condition for the soul returning to the stars after death in the
Dream of Scipio (Cicero, Republic 6.16, 26).
Epilogue
1. Interest in Stoic logic revived later, and its underlying principles had a consid-
erable influence on medieval methods of argument.
2. In the twelfth century, Arabic philosophers, such as Suhrawardi of Aleppo,
226
NOTES
227
Further reading
General
Annas, J. 2000. Ancient Philosophy: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Cohen, S., P. Curd & C . D. C . Reeve 2000. Readings in Ancient Greek Philosophy,
2nd edn. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett.
Furley, D. (ed.) 1999. From Aristotle to Augustine, Routledge History of Philosophy
2. London: Routledge.
Guthrie, W. K. C . 1962-81. A History of Greek Philosophy, 6 vols. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Hamlyn, D. W. 1989. The Penguin History of Western Philosophy. Harmondsworth:
Penguin.
Irwin, T. 1999. Classical Thought Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kenny, A. 2004. A New History of Western Philosophy. Vol Î: Ancient Philosophy.
Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Taylor, C. C . W. (ed.) 1997. From the Beginning to Plato, Routledge History of
Philosophy 1. London: Routledge.
Sedley, D. (ed.) 2003. The Cambridge Companion to Greek and Roman Philosophy.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Zeyt, D. J. 1997. Encyclopedia of Classical Philosophy. Chicago, I L : Fitzroy
Dearborn.
Translations of the Homeric poems and Hesiod are in Penguin Classics and widely
available elsewhere. All classical texts (with facing translation) are published in the
Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press). This is the
best place to find Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, 2 vols, R. D.
Hicks (ed.) (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1925).
228
FURTHER READING
Individual studies
Coxon, A. H. 1986. The Fragments of Parmenides. Assen: Van Gorcum.
Curd, P. 1998. The Legacy of Parmenides. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press.
Curd, P. 2007. Anaxagoras of Clazomenae. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Kahn, C . H. 1979. The Art and Thought of Heraclitus. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Kahn, C . H . 2001. Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett.
Huffman, K. A. 1993. Philolaus of Croton. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Inwood, B. 2001. The Poem of Empedocles, 2nd edn. Toronto: University of Toronto
Press.
Lesher, J. 1992. Xenophanes of Colophon. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Schofield, M. 1980. An Essay on Anaxagoras. Cambridge, Cambridge University
Press.
Stamatellos, G. 2007. Plotinus and the Presocratics. Albany, NY: SUNY Press.
Taylor, C. C . W. 1999. The Atomists: Leucippus and Democritus. Toronto: University
of Toronto Press.
Wright, M. R. 1981. Empedodes: The Extant Fragments. New Haven, C T : Yale
University Press. Reprinted (Bristol: Bristol Classical Press, 1986).
Socrates
Allen, R. E. 1980. Socrates and Legal Obligation. Minneapolis, M N : Minnesota
University Press.
Gulley, N. 1968. The Philosophy of Socrates. London: Macmillan
229
FURTHER READING
Kraut, R. 1984. Socrates and the State. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Santas, G. X. 1979. Socrates. London: Routledge.
Stone, I. F. 1988. The Trial of Socrates. Boston, MA: Little Brown.
Taylor, C. C. W. 1998. Socrates: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Vlastos, G. 1991. Socrates, Ironist and Moral Philosopher. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Plato
Cooper, J. M. & D. S. Hutchinson (eds) 1997. Plato: Complete Works. Indianapolis,
IN: Hackett.
Kraut, R. (ed.) 1992. The Cambridge Companion to Plato. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Most of Plato's major dialogues are translated with introduction and notes in
Penguin Classics, Oxford World Classics and the Clarendon Plato series.
Individual studies
Annas, J. 1981. An Introduction to Plato's Republic. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Grube, G. M. A. 1980. Plato's Thought, 2nd edn. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett.
Robinson, T. M. 1970. Plato's Psychology. Toronto: Toronto University Press.
Ross, D. 1951. Platds Theory of Ideas. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Rowe, C . J. 1984. Plato. Brighton: Harvester.
Schofield, M. 2006. Plato: Political Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Vlastos, G. 1975. Plato's Universe. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Vlastos, G. 1981. Platonic Studies, 2nd edn. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press.
White, N. 1976. Plato on Knowledge and Reality. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett.
White, N. 1979. A Companion to Plato's Republic. Indianapolis, I N : Hackett.
Aristotle
Barnes, J. (ed.) 1984. Aristotle: Complete Works. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press.
Barnes, J. (ed.) 1995. The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press.
Some of Aristotle's works are available in the Clarendon Aristotle series, Penguin
Classics and Oxford World Classics. They can all be consulted in the Loeb
editions.
Individual studies
Ackrill, J. L. 1981. Aristotle the Philosopher. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Cooper, J. 1975. Reason and Human Good in Aristotle. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press.
Kenny, A. 1978. The Aristotelian Ethics. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
230
FURTHER READING
Hellenistic philosophy
Algra, K., J. Barnes, J. Mansfeld & M. Schofield (eds) 1999. The Cambridge History
of Hellenistic Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Inwood, B. 8c L. P. Gerson 1997. Hellenistic Philosophy. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett.
Long, A. A. 8c D. N. Sedley 1987. The Hellenistic Philosophers. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Long, A. A. 1986. Hellenistic Philosophy, 2nd edn. Berkeley, C A : University of
California Press.
Individual studies
Annas, J. E. 1992. Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind. Berkeley, C A : University of
California Press.
Annas, J. E. 8c J. Barnes. 1985. The Modes of Scepticism. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Asmis, E. 1984. Epicurus' Scientific Method. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Clay, D. 1983. Lucretius and Epicurus. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
DeWitt, N. W. 1954. Epicurus and his Philosophy. Minneapolis, MN: University
of Minnesota Press.
Hahm, D. E. 1977. The Origins of Stoic Cosmology. Columbus, O H : Ohio State
University Press.
Powell, J. G. F. (ed.) 1995. Cicero the Philosopher. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Reesor, M. E. 1989. The Nature of Man in Early Stoic Philosophy. London:
Duckworth.
Rist, J. M. 1969. Stoic Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Rist, J. M. 1972. Epicurus: an Introduction. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Sellars, J. 2006. Stoicism. Stocksfield: Acumen.
Sharpies, R. W. 1994. Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics. London: Routledge.
Sedley, D. N. 1998. Lucretius and the Transformation of Greek Wisdom. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Smith, M. F 1993. Diogenes of Oenoanda: The Epicurean Inscription. Naples:
Bibliopolis.
Smith, M. F. 2001. Lucretius, On the Nature of Things, 2nd edn. Indianapolis, IN:
Hackett.
Wright, M. R. 1991. Cicero: On Stoic Good and Evil Warminster: Aris 8c Phillips.
231
FURTHER READING
Themes
Adkins, A. H. A. 1972. Moral Values and Political Behaviour in Ancient Greece.
London: Chatto & Windus.
Cooper, J. M. 1999. Reason and Emotion: Essays in Ancient Moral Psychology and
Ethical Theory. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Copenhaver B. P. & C . B. Schmitt 1992. Renaissance Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Ferguson, J. 1958. Moral Values in the Ancient World. London: Methuen.
Gerson, L. P. 1990. God and Greek Philosophy. London: Routledge.
Gosling, J. C . B. & C . C . W. Taylor (eds) 1982. The Greeks on Pleasure. Oxford:
Clarendon Press.
Gould, T. 1990. The Ancient Quarrel between Poetry and Philosophy. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press.
Graham, D. 2006. Exploring the Cosmos: The Ionian Tradition of Scientific
Philosophy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Hankinson, R. J. 1998. Cause and Explanation in Ancient Greek Thought. Oxford:
Clarendon Press.
Herman A. 2004. To Think Like God: Pythagoras, Parmenides and the Origins of
Philosophy. Chicago, IL: Parmenides.
Huby, P. 1967. Greek Ethics. London: Macmillan.
Kahn, C. H. [1960] 1994. Anaximander and the Origins of Greek Cosmology.
Indianapolis, IN: Hackett.
Kahn, C . H. 1996. Plato and the Socratic Dialogue: The Philosophical Use of a
Literary Form. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lloyd, G. E. R. 1973. Early Greek Science. New York: Norton.
Luscombe, D. 1997. Medieval Thought. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Nussbaum, M. C. 1986. The Fragility of Goodness. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Price, A. 1989. Love and Friendship in Plato and Aristotle. Oxford: Clarendon
Press.
Sambursky, S. 1956. The Physical World of the Greeks. London: Routledge.
Seeskin, K. 1987. Dialogue and Discovery: A Study in Socratic method. Albany,
NY: SUNY Press.
Sorabji, R. 1980. Necessity, Cause and Blame. London: Duckworth.
Sorabji, R. 1983. Time, Creation and the Continuum. London: Duckworth.
Sorabji, R. 1988. Matter Place and Motion. London: Duckworth.
Wright, M. R. 1995. Cosmology in Antiquity. London: Routledge.
232
Index of passages
Aeschylus B2 6,89,109,217
Eum 690-702 163
Supp 942-5 163 Aristotle
DA 402a 10 128
Alcmaeon (DK 24) 405a21 42,88,217
B2 43 408b-409b 129
B4 222 411a8 42,217,220
415M5 131
Anaxagoras (DK 59) DC 271a33 79
B l 15,70 290b 220
B8 46 £ E 1 2 1 6 b 3 21
BIO 43,71 Met 982bl2 1,132
B l l 112 983a24-b5 154
B12 71,92,111,221 983b20-26 4,42,217
B21a 43 986b44 219
1009b11 135
Anaximander (DK 12) 1026al8 152
A9 65,219 1072a26-bl0 104
A10 219 1074al3-20 223
A l l 219 1074b35 105
A14 219 1076a31 171
A30 66 1078b28 21,142
B l 5,164,217 1088al8 191
B2 88 N E 1097M7-35 167
1101al4 191
Anaximenes (DK 13) 1103bl 192
A 5 - 7 67 1178al 131
ÍNDEX O F PASSAGES
PA 645a6-7 32 B9 117
P/rys 184M2 153 B24 224
239b9-30 218 B28 224
Poet 1451b5 35 B34 73
Pol 1252a24-53bl 158,169 B49 43
1325b30 167 B53 224
3.1 172 B76 224
3.9 222 B97 224
Pr An 24bl9 153 B106 180
K/zeil398bl4 6 B117 113,221
1398bl0 216 B171 43
1419bl0-13 34 B247 43
SophRef 183b 37 138
Diodorus Siculus
Catullus 1.8 222
234
INDEX O F PASSAGES
235
INDEX O F PASSAGES
Hesiod Lucretius
Theogony 26-7 133 1.1 99
108-10 218 1.101 101
453-8 86 1.72-77 62
901-6 222 1.968-76 81
WD 109-201 156-7 1.1001-7 81
202-12 168 2.1067-76 82
2.1144-74 82
Homer 3.1-4 62
Iliad 1.1-5 107,133 3.94-257 124
1.150-51 160 3.307-22 198
I. 490-1 222 3.362-9 219
2.205-6 222 3.978-1023 100
4.405 221 5.199 101
4.141-7 45 5.925-1149 159
4.287 89 5.1143-6 159
4.341-4 222 5.1194-7 101
9.96-102 222
9.410-16 177 Lysias
9.438-43 222 2.18-19 161-2
I I . 204 223
12.310-21 222 Melissus (DK 30)
15.190-3 218 B4-6 91
22.5 45 B7.2 13
22.108-10 177 B8 13
23.107 107 B9 91
Odyssey 2.181 45 BIO 13
6.103 222
9.295 218 Parmenides (DK 28)
11.224 107 B6.6 218
11.538-40 107 B6.7-9 69
11.582-601 47 B8.1-33 91
12.196 45 B8.6 11
12.233 45 B8.26-31 220
16.102 45 B8.37-8 45
20.195 218 B8.56-9 69
24.6-9 107 B8.61 11
24.93-4 107 B9 69
B10.1-4 218
Horace B14 69
Odes 3.6 221
B16 70, 112, 115,218
Iamblichus
VP 135-6 222 Plato
Apoll8b 73
21a-d 142
236
INDEX OF PASSAGES
237
INDEX OF PASSAGES
6 0 8 d - l l a 120 Solon
613c-21d 53,122
617b-e 76 Elegies 5 162
617c 98
619a 122 Sophocles
Symp 209b 221 Antigone 345-60 156
2 1 0 a - l l b - c 96, 149,221 450-57 164
Theaet \50b-c 140 Thucydides
208c 145 5.17 168
Tim 17a 218
28a 219 Tyrtaeus
30a-c 97 fr. 3(Bergk) 161
34a-c 97
36a-c 76 Xenophanes (DK21)
40b-c 80,97 B7 113
41d-43c 128 B8.2 8
42b-c 97 B l l 67,87,133
51b 58 B14 87
54a-55e 76 B15 87
71a 128 B16 87
92c 75 B18 133, 144
B23-6 87, 133,220
Plutarch B27-9 67
Moralia 329a-b 175 B32 67
B33 67
Protagoras (DK 80) B34 133
B4 135,220
Bl 135 Zeno ofElea (DK 29)
Bl 91
Sappho B3 46
fr. 31 108
Seneca
Epist 19.10 199
117 220
238
Index
For ancient authors see also Index of Passages.
239
INDEX
240
INDEX
as self-thinker 31,103-6 justice 51, 62, 64, 89, 94, 98, 123,
as wise 9,142 126, 158, 164-7, 197
see also unmoved mover definition of 25, 26, 146, 183,
gods as elements 45 186-7, 192
Olympian 3, 8, 54, 65, 86, 97, 177 form of 147,189
good, the 28,188 as interest of the stronger 168-70
form of 26, 36, 95-6, 148-9, personified 10
188-90, 191
lecture on 24 knowledge 95,103-4,112,132-55,
golden age 156-7, 159, 173, 180 190
Gorgias 19, 24, 99, 135-7 definition of 27-8,51
Great Year 83-4 of knowledge 141
and opinion 8, 75, 127, 143-5
Hades 45,51,86, 100, 107 see also virtue
hamartia 34, 217 Kronos 64,98, 156
happiness 33, 36, 43, 60, 190-92,
195-7 "ladder of life" 14, 33, 106, 108, 130
harmony 8,9, 134, 165 law(s) 98, 156, 159, 164-7
of the spheres 7, 53, 57, 76, 122, natural 18,32,63,137
219,220 principles of 2, 167, 222
hedonism see pleasure rule of 161-4
hedonistic calculus 37,196, 226 universal 62, 64, 165-6, 175, 222
Hellenistic philosophy see Laws of Athens 49, 167
Epicureans, Sceptics, Stoics Leucippus 17, 71, 179
Hera 44, 45, 70, 86, 89, 99, 223 "liar" paradox 217, 221
Heracles 47, 62, 142 light and dark 3, 16, 112, 115
Heraclitus 8-9, 42-3, 68, 83, 87-8, "like to like" 71
110-11, 134, 138, 145, 165-6, Line, diagram of 26,147-8
177-8 logic 29, 31, 38, 45, 53, 152-3, 154¬
Herodotus 86,162,171 5, 226
Hesiod 3-4, 8, 42, 44, 64-5, 86, 133, logos 9, 28, 74, 83, 110, 134, 144-5,
156-7, 168, 173 165,178-9
historia 63, 134 love (eros) 25, 50, 104, 148-50, 198
Homer 3,8,18,42-5,47,86,99, love (philia) 14,15, 62, 70,104,179
107-9, 133, 160-61, 173, 176-7; Lucretius 36,40,42,44,60-62,81-2,
see also poetry 99-100, 123-5,210
Homeric Hymns 61 Lyceum 30,36,152,202
Hursthouse, Rosalind 225
Marcus Aurelius 40, 60, 201
inductive argument 20, 142-3, 153 mathematics 2, 7, 27,31, 42,67, 76¬
irrational numbers 7, 77 7, 80, 146-7, 149-50, 152-3
"is" and "is not" 10, 13, 17, 29, 81-2, matter 78,82-3,102,130
91, 153 prime matter 77,81
Isles of the Blessed 53, 121, 174 McDowell, John 225
isonomia 5, 171, 222 medicine 2, 17, 27, 143, 164-5, 219
241
INDEX
Megarians 39 false 29
Melian debate 168-9 true 144-5
Melissus 12-13,91 see also knowledge
memory 33,64,118,125,149-50 opposites 5, 8, 16, 31, 65-6, 77-8, 88,
meteorology 59, 77 102, 117, 138, 164
microcosm 110,112
and macrocosm 73, 83, 127 Panaetius 38, 39, 175
"millet seed" puzzle 12 Parmenides 2, 9-11, 12, 44-5, 68¬
Mind (Nous) 15,16,135 70, 90-91, 112, 115, 145-6
human 69-70,112 Pericles 2, 15, 18,22, 161
cosmic 71,91-2, 111-12 Persia 1, 18, 157, 162
misologia 144 Pherecydes 4
monarchy 34, 170-71,174 Philia see love
moon 5,15,45,66,67,69,78-9,97, Philolaus 6,80,129
111, 151 philosopher-ruler 52, 56, 59, 146,
Muses 3,44,64,133 172-3, 174
myth(s) 4,74, 137, 151 phronesis 36-7, 115, 135, 183, 192-3,
of gods 3, 4, 42 197
Platonic 53-6 Phoenicians 1,2
of metals 158 piety 49,59, 102, 123, 141
of the soul 53-5 planets 7,67,71,75-6,79-83,97,
of succession 3, 64 104
of cosmology 27, 56 Plato 3,23-5,30,41,93-8,102,198
see also Atlantis poetic style 52-3
Myth of Er 26,53,98,122,190 and politics 166-7, 174
as source 9,21,47
nature 5,18,41 works 24-9,58-9,216
natural instinct 36, 37, 155, 193, see also creator god, forms, myth,
195-6, 200 soul
natural science 152 pleasure 25, 28, 35, 36-7, 43, 59, 137,
natural state 169 189-90, 195-8
natural theology 85,89-91 Plotinus 203
see also law pneuma 6,82-3,89,130,226
Nemesius 220 poetry 34-5,43-6,48,217
Nestis 45,70,89,99 epic metre 3, 10, 13, 36, 41, 44-6,
Neoplatonism 7, 28, 203-5 60-61
night 4, 11,64,69 simile 45-6,48,52
"noble savage" 157 versus philosophy 3, 26, 61
nomos 18,19,89,145,223 polis 1, 34, 158-9, 161-2, 172-5
versus physis 168-70 political anthropology 156-9
nothing(ness) 12-13, 17, 137 Poseidon 45,86, 177
Nous see Mind Posidonius 38,39,175
Prodicus 19, 47
Oedipus 132 progress 38, 56, 63, 134, 163, 180,
opinion 55,132,133,145,151 194, 221
242
INDEX
243
INDEX
244