2012 Examiners - Report FHS of Philosophy-1 PDF
2012 Examiners - Report FHS of Philosophy-1 PDF
2012 Examiners - Report FHS of Philosophy-1 PDF
OF
PHILOSOPHY
UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD
Introduction
This is the subject report for Honour School Philosophy in 2012. The report will be of use to future
candidates, who should when revising read the subject reports on the papers they are offering. The
report will also be inspected by the Philosophy Facultys Undergraduate Studies Committee as part
of its review of the years examining business.
Prof Cecilia Trifogli
Convener of Conveners
Prizes
The Henry Wilde Prize for the outstanding performance in Philosophy across all joint schools was
awarded jointly to Olinga Tahzib (Lady Margaret Hall, Physics and Philosophy) and Benjamin Zelenka
Martin (Brasenose College, PPE).
The Duns Scotus Prize for best performance on the Medieval Philosophy papers was shared by
Katherine Moe (Exeter College) and Maximus Marenbon (St Hughs College).
The Elizabeth Anscombe Prize for the best undergraduate Philosophy thesis was won by Jacob
Williamson (Somerville College) for his thesis on How Kantian is Rawls A Theory of Justice?.
The Gibbs Prize winners for the best performance in Philosophy in each school were as follows:
PPE
Lit. Hum.
MP, part B
PP, part B
PP, part C
PPP
PML
PT
101
62
10
8
4
13
14
16
102
38
6
15
15
4
5
13
103
154
22
9
1
3
12
14
104
14
1
5
4
18
2
4
105
2
School
PPE
Lit Hum
MP
PP
PPP
PML
PT
Theology
Maths
COS
Total
106
6
1
128
96
215
48
1
82
118
16
2
4
2
2
1
119
3
120
121
122
124
2
125
1
23
3
17
1
2
1
27
26
10
2
1
107
32
5
1
108
12
3
9
1
110
1
1
1
4
2
109
22
6
6
1
1
11
7
31
54
128
130
25
9
6
24
4
112
6
3
113
18
4
7
1
1
6
3
114
38
12
8
1
3
10
11
40
131
132
1
1
115
56
18
5
116
30
12
117
1
3
7
5
1
1
2
3
72
91
49
133
140
141
180
Total
514
154
112
70
65
85
93
4
1
2
1100
2
17
19
23
25
1
4
School
PPE
Lit Hum
MP
PP
PPP
PML
PT
Theology
Maths
COS
Overall
101
64.1
64.0
66.1
65.1
62.4
63.6
102
65.6
59.2
66.3
65.4
66.0
62.6
103
63.3
63.0
66.4
63.1
66.3
104
64.5
65.8
65.0
-
105
-
106
66.8
-
64.2
64.5
63.7
64.6
65.0
65.5
School
PPE
Lit Hum
MP
PP
PPP
PML
PT
Theology
Maths
COS
Overall
118
67.4
-
119
-
120
121
122
124
-
125
-
65.6
64.9
-
64.6
66.1
63.0
64.7
64.1
107
65.6
65.6
-
108
67.9
68.9
-
110
-
109
64.7
61.5
65.5
63.7
66.0
66.6
64.4
128
130
64.9
66.2
65.9
-
112
67.3
-
113
67.5
63.4
68.3
-
114
66.8
65.8
64.4
63.2
66.5
66.8
131
132
67.2
65.9
67.2
65.9
115
65.7
65.6
69.8
116
65.1
63.8
117
-
67.1
65.8
65.8
66.0
64.6
68.4
133
140
141
69.7
69.7
180 Overall
64.8
65.3
66.3
66.2
64.3
64.3
65.0
65.0
66.8
66.9
65.6
Range
0-39
40-49
50-59
60-69
70-100
Total
101
Range
0-39
40-49
50-59
60-69
70-100
Total
118
26
81
21
128
1
19
7
27
102
1
1
14
62
18
96
103
104
4
34
143
34
215
119
1
120
3
2
6
105
106
107
108
109
4
36
8
48
1
6
1
8
8
59
15
82
2
18
11
31
10
34
10
54
121
122
124
125
128
3
14
6
23
4
17
5
26
1
8
1
10
1
14
4
19
110
112
113
114
115
116
117
8
3
11
1
29
10
40
10
46
16
72
9
60
22
91
8
32
9
49
130
131
132
133
140
141
180
3
14
8
25
1
4
3
8
5
4
9
1
1
2
4
108
64.5
67.8
66.6
109
63.8
65.2
64.4
110
112
67.0
66.3
66.5
113
66.9
66.8
66.8
114
66.1
65.5
65.8
115
67.4
65.2
66.0
116
66.1
63.3
64.6
128
130
68.8
66.5
67.2
131
65.0
68.5
65.9
132
133
70.8
68.8
69.7
140
141
180 Overall
65.2
64.9
65.0
Total
2
5
143
722
228
1100
102
64.8
64.4
64.5
103
63.4
63.9
63.7
104
64.4
64.8
64.6
105
106
Female
Male
Overall
65.0
65.0
107
65.5
65.4
65.5
119
62.0
63.2
63.0
120
68.5
66.5
66.9
121
Female
Male
Overall
118
65.8
66.2
66.1
122
67.5
64.6
65.6
124
66.8
64.3
64.7
125
65.7
63.4
64.1
117
arguing that graspability of the basic constituents of a theory of modality was an important
consideration. An ideal answer would have compared realist proposals with those views of
modality which make no reference to possible worlds at all, such as combinatorialism and
modalismunfortunately even the very best of the actual answers did not spend very much
time on these interesting and salient rivals. Many candidates assumed that an understanding
of modality must be a reductive understanding of it, something which is not presupposed by
the question and for which they did not argue.
Q13 (If you are a person, are you essentially a person?) Candidatesdrawing almost exclusively
on material from general philosophy, disappointinglyfocused on personhood at the
expense of attention to essentialism. Most argued from animalism to the falsity of the
essentialist claim, with greater or lesser competence.
Q14 (Can we make sense of change over time without appealing to temporal parts?) was the
most popular question. Many candidates spent far too long describing and evaluating
temporal-parts based accounts of persistence, even though the question did not ask about
them, or about whether a good account of persistence is possible at allit simply asked
whether there was a good account of persistence that did not make use of temporal parts.
The best answers kept discussion of temporal parts to a minimum. Most answers were
competent discussions of endurance, reviewing standard arguments from the literature.
Better approaches showed some snatches of originalityeither in perspective or in offering
less familiar objections and observations. Generally, though, this was answered in a merely
competent fashion. Very few to no answers discussed the notion of wholly present, a crucial
notion for endurantistsno one discussed the now-prevalent multiple location conception
of endurance. A few candidates interpreted the question as meaning whether we can make
sense of change over time without appealing to the A-theoretical determinations of past,
present and future, as if these determinations were what temporal parts referred to.
Q18 (If what is true depends on what exists, how can a presentist explain the truth of Dinosaurs
used to roam around in what is now Oxfordshire?) Mostly well done. A few candidates
strayed into more general evaluations of presentism, but in general the focus was rightly on
truthmaker objections, with the best answers distinguished by their degree of clarity and
incisiveness rather than differing in kind from other answers.
One suggestion for the examiners/USC: induction is on the syllabus for both 102 and 124/105/106.
Given that almost all candidates for the latter papers are candidates for the former too, having the
same topic provides a perverse incentive for difficult-to-police overlap; and there is no reason why
the papers should share this topic. My preference would be for it to be allocated to 124/etc., since
there it connects with issues about confirmation and evidential support that are central to the
subject. In 102, many candidates writing on induction make use of literature that doesnt
substantially differ from the material studied in general philosophy, and there is no natural way to
include better material in tutorials for 102 without overlap with tutorials in philosophy of science.
AE
10
103 Ethics
There were a few outstanding answers, and several more which, even if they were not outstanding
overall, showed a pleasing originality of thought and/or a willingness to shape the answer very
exactly to the question set.
Q1. The requirements of morality are requirements of rationality only if I am rationally required to
ask, of any maxim of action of mine, whether I can will it as a universal law. Discuss.
Many saw this simply as an opportunity to discuss whether all and only morally acceptable maxims
meet some version of a universalizability test. This is certainly relevant, since if moral acceptability
and universalizability dont coincide then it would not be enough to show that the requirements of
morality are requirements of rationality that I am rationally required to ask, of any maxim, whether I
can will it as a universal law. However, the minority of candidates who went on to address the latter
question were rewarded for it.
Q2. Even the best arguments for moral relativism succeed only in establishing moral scepticism.
Discuss.
Candidates sometimes took moral skepticism to mean what Mackie means by this phrase, i.e. the
error theory. That interpretation made the question more of a struggle than it would be if one took
the phrase (surely more naturally?) to mean first-order moral skepticism.
Q3. The only intelligible way of relating moral properties to natural properties is to reduce the
former to the latter. Discuss.
Decently answered on the whole.
Q4(a) The best explanations of moral beliefs explain them by appeal to factors that are incidental to
their truth. So we cannot have any justified moral beliefs. Discuss.
Almost no candidates chose to answer this, though answers to the next disjunct showed that many
were familiar with Mackies argument from relativity, which appeals to best explanation.
Q4(b) Should we be surprised if convinced moral error theorists continue to care about the difference
between moral right and wrong?
A popular question, on the whole decently answered.
Q5(a) Just because reason alone is not a motive to any action of the will (HUME), it need not
follow that moral attitudes cannot be beliefs. Discuss.
A popular question, which many took to be a straightforward invitation to discuss the Humean twostep, i.e. beliefs dont motivate, moral attitudes do, so moral attitudes arent beliefs as if every
Ethics paper must contain this very question, and it is just a matter of identifying it through the
different disguises in which it appears from year to year. But there can be more than one question
about Hume and motivation! The point of italicizing alone was to get people to comment on the
difference between reason alone isnt a motive (or beliefs alone dont motivate) and beliefs
dont motivate, not to ignore the difference.
11
12
not believe we can ever specify what it is about the brain that is responsible for consciousness, but I
am sure that whatever it is it is not inherently miraculous. The problem arises ... because we are cut
off by our very constitution from achieving a conception of the natural property of the brain (or of
consciousness) that accounts for the link. (McGINN) Discuss. 19 responses); Q6 (Are bodily
sensations intentional states? 7 responses); and Q8b (Can we accept the completeness of physics
without being committed to epiphenomenalism about the mental? 24 responses).
Candidates seem to have overlooked the inclusion of the word mere in Q2a, and few answers
considered the implications of the distinction between multiple realizability as a (mere) conceptual
possibility and multiple realization as an empirical claim. However, candidates did generally
demonstrate a good grasp of the various options open to the identity theorist for responding to the
challenge of multiple realizability, and they were able to discuss the limitations of those options in
an intelligent manner.
Answers to Q3 typically suffered from a lack of rigour in characterizing behaviourism and
functionalism. Moreover, many candidates used this question as an opportunity to wax lyrical on the
perceived shortcomings of behaviourism and/or functionalism in general, rather than focus on the
question asked. Some of the best answers spent some time characterizing the philosophical
problems of consciousness.
Q4 was one of the most popular questions, although the quality of answers given to it was not
commensurate with its popularity. Surprisingly few candidates demonstrated any appreciation of
McGinns arguments for the position outlined in the quotation. Many candidates used this question
as an opportunity to discuss Jacksons knowledge argument. This strategy met with mixed success,
although some candidates were able to draw on their knowledge of the debate about phenomenal
concepts to illuminate McGinns position.
Answers to Q6 were somewhat one-dimensional, and candidates tended to give insufficient
attention to objections to the view that they defended. For example, those who argued that bodily
sensations are intentional generally paid little attention to the arguments that have been given for
thinking that bodily sensations are non-intentional. Answers to this question also tended to suffer
from insufficient attention to the question of what it is for a mental state to be intentional.
Most candidates structured their answer to Q8Can we accept the completeness of physics
without being committed to epiphenomenalism about the mental?around responses to Kims
exclusion problem, focusing either on Davidsons token identity account or on treatments of
causation that might allow one to avoid the exclusion assumption, such as counter-factual accounts.
Candidates were generally well-prepared for this question, although few went significantly beyond
the material presented in lectures.
TB
realism about propositional attitude states? What grounds, if any, are there for this further
commitment?), Q20 (What implications might the study of delusions have for accounts of the
architecture of cognition and perception?), and Q21 (Is our everyday folk psychological conception
of thinking and reasoning committed to any principles that are incompatible with connectionism?
What evidence might there be for such a commitment?).
The five Part B answers ranged from brief in extent and under-developed to articulate, well
informed, and showing independent thinking.
MKD
14
some philosophically impressive answers, but a large number of candidates wasted space rehearsing
the history of the argument and its Paleyan predecessor. But, again here, summaries of arguments
does not actually exhibit any philosophical skills, say, by assessing the comparative merits of theism
and multiverse. Admittedly, most candidates who answered this question correctly identified the
multiverse hypothesis as the main alternative explanation to the so-called fine-tuning. However,
very few, if any, candidates raised the philosophical question whether theism or the multiverse
hypothesis violates Ockhams Razor; furthermore, none actually looked in depth at the nature of
Ockhams Razor.
Third, the question of the possibility of God (Is God possible?) was the next popular question and
many candidates correctly related this question of possibility to the modal ontological argument for
the existence of God. Yet once more, standard arguments were rehearsed concerning the
compatibility or not of the divine attributes. Much more could have been done philosophically and
imaginatively with this question.
Finally, the least answered questions were 4 on Dawkins (The robust muscular Christian
haranguing us from the pulpit of my old school admitted a sneaking regard for atheists. ... What
this preacher couldnt stand was agnostics. (DAWKINS) Discuss), and 5 on Kants transcendental
argument (Transcendental arguments purport to identify the preconditions for the truth of
something that is assumed by all parties. Does Kant have a successful transcendental argument
for Gods existence?). Fair enough, since these topics were not directly covered in lectures and
probably not in tutorials. However, it is a pity that no matter what the other questions are on the
paper, candidates still tend to answer the very same core topics in Christian theism every year. In
fact, the nature and content of questions 4 and 5 are totally different from each other. So, a
candidate could have brought in some of their greater philosophical knowledge into at least
question 5, and similarly, into question 7 on unsurpassable knowledge (A being is omniscient if and
only if it has unsurpassable knowledge. Discuss). But there is only the slightest evidence that
candidates are endeavouring to think independently on the nature of the issues at the heart of a
range of questions in philosophy of religion.
To repeat, the quality of the scripts was not generally bad; but scripts did generally lack real,
independent philosophical thinking. Instead text-book answers were often given. Perhaps, with this
paper, part of the problem is that students think it ok to answer questions as if they were
reproducing theology or defending Christian theism. However, this is a philosophy paper for which
rigour, incisiveness and other critical skills are necessary!
PSA
15
Questions 4 (Can basic logical principles be justified?), 9 (What is meant by the claim that
translation is indeterminate? Is it true?), 17(b) (Is exists a second-level predicate?), 19 (Use
determines meaning. Meaning determines truth-conditions. So truth-conditions cannot transcend
use. Discuss), and 21 (Are pronouns variables?) received no answers.
Of the popular questions, Question 1 was well and shrewdly answered, candidates often displaying a
good knowledge of standard theories and criticisms; several showed awareness of the relevance of
higher order vagueness and the difficulties it posed. Question 14(a) was not so well answered, too
many candidates adopting an insufficiently critical attitude to standard problems with descriptivism.
Question 14(b) elicited some very good answers, the best ones containing, rather than
presupposing, at least a brief explanation of logical form. The questions on metaphor and empty
names showed a sound knowledge of the literature. The other questions received too few answers
to draw any substantive conclusion, though the examiners welcomed the fact that most questions
received answers, indicating overall a reasonably wide coverage of the syllabus.
SGW
aesthetic judgement is subverted by his decision to model his account of good taste on his account
of the sensory faculty of taste. Discuss.) could buttress their knowledge of Humes account of good
taste with an equally detailed knowledge of his account of secondary qualities.
3. Few candidates showed much sensitivity to the historical context of art and aesthetics. Several
questions on the paper invited them to consider the historical and cultural specificity of various
aesthetic concepts, and indeed of the idea of the aesthetic as a distinct evaluative field; and they
were amongst the least popular. Question 4 (Is the very idea of a literary canon politically or morally
suspect?) received two answers; question 6 (The realm of the aesthetic is an invention of
modernity. Discuss) received two; and question 7 (Modernism is an indispensable concept for
understanding the history of art; our current need to resort to the concept of post-modernism
indicates that we have reached the end of that history. Discuss.) was the only question on the
paper to be entirely avoided.
4. Candidates were generally unwilling to draw on their personal interests in and engagements with
to enrich their answers. Few discussed particular works of art in any detail, or any real familiarity
with influential periods or movements or schools in the history of art, or figures or events in the
contemporary art world. To judge from these scripts, very few candidates are drawn to this paper by
anything other than a purely academic interest in philosophical aesthetics; we find this hard to
believe.
SM
17
very good knowledge of the secondary literature but did not display a high degree of independent
discussion.
Q.7 Most candidates took this question as an occasion to discuss Kant's reply to Hume's scepticism
about causality rather than addressing the issue in a more comprehensive way. Some attempts were
made to consider Kant's defence of synthetic a priori arguments against the Humean sceptic, but
they were insufficiently critical.
Q.12 This question was generally well-focussed and also attracted some excellent answers. The best
candidates provided a very articulated and subtle discussion of what a substantive notion of the self
can mean and argued incisively for a negative answer.
Q.10 There were some excellent answers that showed a detailed textual knowledge of Kant's
Deduction, good argumentative skills, and effective use of the secondary literature. The weakest
candidates tended to give a clear but too general and scarcely critical presentation of Kant's project
in the Deduction.
CT
18
The most popular Sartre questions were 22 (The problem with Sartres account of bad faith is that
he leaves it unclear how we might avoid it, and what it might be like we did avoid it. Discuss.) and
23 (Sartre neither solves nor dissolves the traditional problem of other minds. Discuss.). Very few
answers to question 22 actually took up the issue of what it would be like to avoid bad faith, if it is
accepted that it is avoidable; the few that did were rewarded for answering the question. Several
high quality answers rejected the idea that bad faith is avoidable, and explained clearly why such a
rejection should be attributed to Sartre. The best answers to 23 were careful to address the sense of
solves and of dissolves in the question, and careful also to spell out what precisely the problem of
other minds is.
There were 7 answers to the Hegel questions, and 11 answers to the Schopenhauer questions with
questions 5 (5 answers) and 6 (6 answers) most popular. Questions 7 and 8 were entirely avoided.
Like last years essays on these two 19th century giants, a fair amount of the essays this year
displayed decent knowledge of the texts. However, many essays failed to motivate the issue
addressed by the respective question, or assess the position held by the mighty dead systematic
philosopher at issue.
JS
19
the conceptual relation of majority-rule to democracy and the substantive question of whether the
best forms of democracy involve majority-rule.
2. Poverty restricts freedom, disability does not. Do you agree?
A very popular question not well answered for the most part, though most were familiar with the
stock point that property rights are upheld by law. A surprisingly large number of candidates either
agreed with the statement or argued that both/neither restrict freedom relatively few argued that
either could represent restrictions on freedom depending on further factors. Many insisted that the
constraints on the poor were human or social while those on the disabled were natural, missing
the extent to which it is the interaction of natural capacity and human or social decision (e.g.
construction of buildings, or jobs) that affects the options available to the naturally impaired.
3. EITHER: Do the industrious owe anything to the lazy or the reckless?
A fairly popular question producing a broad spectrum of quality in answers, the weaker ones
answering only with respect to the lazy or the reckless rather than both. Most took the opportunity
to offer general discussions of luck egalitarianism. A large number of candidates simply assumed the
lazy and reckless to be in relevantly similar positions with respect to the industrious. Stronger
answers reflected on possible different explanatory factors for industriousness, laziness and
recklessness.
OR: What should egalitarians believe?
Again fairly popular and again a wide range in the quality of answers. Weaker ones tended to offer a
general discussion of luck egalitarianism and the weakest took this as an excuse to discuss the metric
of equality. Better answers either discussed the leveling down objection or contrasted the luck
egalitarian view with status or relational views of equality. The distinction between telic and deontic
forms of egalitarianism was sometimes introduced, though very few of the candidates that did so
seemed to understand it.
4. Legislation by representatives is a form of aristocracy. Do you agree?
Very few takers for this question. Those who answered it did not handle the concept of aristocracy
well.
5. Does the claim that gender is socially constructed help the feminist?
This feminism question with no obvious stock answer had few takers. The weakest answers did not
know what socially constructed meant. The best reflected on the different ways in which the claim
might help.
20
6. Socialism and liberalism can be rendered compatible only by abandoning the essence of
each. Discuss.
Another non-standard question, this time requiring candidates to talk about two isms at once,
proved unpopular. Some clearly answering out of desperation talked almost entirely about one or
the other but the few with the resources to discuss both produced some very good answers.
7. Should minority groups have cultural rights?
A fairly popular question. The better answers managed to distinguish between rights for minority
groups and rights specific to members of minority groups. Candidates tended to offer unnuanced
yes or no conclusions. The weakest candidates wrote down anything they knew about rights.
8. Citizens have political obligations, but the obligation to obey the law is not one of them.
Do you agree?
A very popular question answered by many keen to offer standard general discussions of possible
grounds for the obligation to obey the law. Better answers tried to explain why the obligation to
obey the law was indeed a political obligation, though often in a handwaving way suggesting they
were regurgitating something from a lecture rather than something they really understood.
Disappointingly few explored in any detail what other political obligations there might be (e.g. to
engage in civil disobedience?).
9. How can we tell when people are subject to power?
Not a popular question. Most candidates invoked Lukes and answers often focused primarily on a
discussion of when people are subject to power rather than the issue of how we can tell that they
are subject to it. The best answers challenged the framing of the question.
10. Can conservatives offer coherent criteria for evaluating political options?
A tricky question with correspondingly few takers and generally poor answers: little reflection on
what might count as coherent criteria and rarely any discussion of the difference between
philosophical conservatism and political conservatism.
11. Should political theorists be realistic?
Not a popular question but this was generally answered very well perhaps the best of all the
questions - with those choosing it showing good knowledge of the literature and control of the
issues. There was some good discussion of why being realistic might be thought to be a good thing
and on the whole answers came to balanced conclusions on the basis of interesting and coherent
arguments.
12. The principles of justice that apply within nation-states are different from those that
apply between them. Discuss.
This fairly straightforward question proved relatively popular and generally attracted solid answers.
Most candidates offered a general discussion of associative v non-associative views of principles of
justice, while better answers distinguished between different bases for affirming global principles of
justice. There was, however, little reflection on possible differences between principles of justice
and other normative principles. Weaker candidates seeing the word justice chose to write down
what they knew about Rawls.
21
13. Should the state try to be neutral with respect to its citizens views about how they should
live their lives?
A mix of answers though overall this was answered better than other questions. Weaker answers
neglected try and discussed the impossibility of neutrality in abstract terms. Better answers tried to
get to grips with the motivation for trying to be neutral. The best tied this to a reflection on the
unique role of the state.
DPIR
22
6. (7 ) Does Plato think it possible to have knowledge of the many beautifuls? Is he right?
There were some good attempts here to explain the distinction between knowledge and true belief
in Republic V. More consideration could have been given to the problems Plato needs to answer if he
thinks that it is not possible to have knowledge of the many beautifuls (or would need to answer, if
he thought this). For instance, if we cant have such knowledge, then how can knowledge of forms
help philosophers to rule in the world of particulars? Some candidates didnt distinguish clearly
enough between the claim (i) that we cant have knowledge of the many beautifuls, and the claim (ii)
that we cant have knowledge of the many beautifuls unless we have knowledge of a form, beauty.
7. (8) In the divided line, what is thought (dianoia)? Does Plato present a plausible view about the
importance of its role in intellectual progress?
In answering this, candidates would have benefited from a more detailed knowledge of the relevant
parts of the text. There was a tendency, moreover, simply to present Platos view without really
evaluating its plausibility.
8. (9) Even if there is a form of the good, it cannot have any relevance to practical matters. How
might Plato respond?
Most candidates claimed that Plato would answer that an understanding of the form of the good is
important for ruling, but few candidates really attempted to explain why having such an
understanding is important for ruling.
9. (10) Does the Republic offer any good argument against the view that a calm and self-controlled
criminal could be happy?
Not all candidates noticed that Plato might object to the very possibility of a calm and self-controlled
criminal. Of those who did notice this, most simply said that Plato doesnt think it is possible to be a
self-controlled harmonious criminal, without explaining how Plato might defend this claim.
Insufficient attention was paid to what might be meant, in this context, by a criminal.
11 (12). In modern Greece and Italy, governments of unelected economic experts are imposing
austerity. If so, would Plato approve?
There were some good, imaginative answers to this question, making excellent use of the text as a
whole. Several candidates said that though Plato would approve of having unelected experts as
rulers, he wouldnt think that a training in economics qualified one to be a ruler. Some candidates
also went on to discuss whether Plato would approve of imposing economic austerity.
12. (13) Does Platos attack on imitation (mimesis) apply equally well to both poetry and painting?
This was a popular question and was, in many cases, well answered. The best answers considered
arguments from both books 3 and 10.
13a (1a) Passage from I.350
This question was very popular. Most candidates managed to give a plausible analysis of the
argument, and raised objections to it. Several candidates failed to note the possible ambiguity in
outdo (pleonektein)
13b (1b) Passage from IV.420
This question was also popular. The best answers explained the analogy between state and statue,
and went on to raise questions about this. Several candidates discussed whether this analogy
suggests that Plato is thinking of the state in an objectionably totalitarian way. Others discussed
what notion of happiness (eudaimonia) is being employed here. Weaker candidates (especially those
doing the English version of the paper, which gave less context) failed to identify the context of the
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passage, and hence failed to see that it is a response to a worry about whether the guardians will be
happy.
13c (1c) Passage from VII.518
Many answers stressed the difficulty of education and the analogy drawn here between intellect and
sight. The best candidates were also able to discuss what it means to say that the whole soul is
turned around. A few good candidates also raised questions about claim made here that this power
is in everyones soul.
13d (1e) Passage from VIII.553
This passage was frequently misidentified. The better candidates knew the context of the passage,
and were able to discuss what it shows about Platos views on parts of the soul.
13e (1f) Passage from IX.585
Many candidates didnt focus enough on the argument presented in this passage, and attempted,
instead, to rehearse all of Platos arguments about pleasure in Republic IX.
13f (1d) Passage from X.617
There were several excellent answers to this question, many of them containing interesting
discussions of the roles of luck and responsibility.
UC
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Q. 4 (5) Can Aristotle allow that some apparently vicious actions are to be excused when they result
from mental illness?
Some excellent answers, drawing distinctions between different forms of mental illness and relating
them to various claims made by Aristotle in book 3 in particular.
Q. 5 (6) Is Aristotle right to suggest that we are jointly responsible (sunaitioi ps) for our
characters?
Surprisingly unpopular. Better candidates showed good understanding of 3.5.
Q. 6 (7) In what way is magnanimity an adornment of the virtues?
This was a straightforward question. Its unpopularity is perhaps to be explained by its not concerning
a standard tutorial topic.
Q. 7 (8) Analyse critically Aristotles account of the relation between prudence (phronsis) and the
virtues of character.
Better answers showed signs of serious thought about the end of book 6, and were genuinely
critical.
Q. 8 (9) Is the idea of the practical syllogism helpful in explaining incontinence?
Too many candidates answered Yes to this question, and then provided little more than a summary
of Aristotles argument in 7.3. Few seemed aware of the question whether the bad syllogism
concerns sweetness or some other property, such as unhealthiness.
Q. 9 (10) Is Aristotle right that there is something lacking in friendships between vicious people?
Popular and usually well done, including discussion of friendship for utility and for pleasure.
Q. 10 (11) What is the role of pleasure in Aristotles account of the human good?
Unpopular, though those who knew the text were able to offer wide-ranging and imaginative
answers. Little awareness was shown of Aristotles position on false pleasures.
Q. 11 (12) How might Aristotle advise someone undecided between a life of great political virtue and
a life of contemplation?
This was especially well done by those candidates with knowledge of the text as a whole, including
books 1 and 10 in particular.
Commentaries
As often, many candidates did less well on gobbets than on essays. Misidentification was worryingly
common. Some candidates would have benefited from more advice about how to approach gobbets
(the need to say something about the context, and the need to try to find something philosophically
interesting to say about the passage). Candidates should avoid merely paraphrasing the content of a
gobbet, unless that is required for elucidation.
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representatives for concepts since there are strictly fewer of the former than there are of the latter.
Somewhat surprisingly, no answers explicitly mentioned Freges Law V, the truth of which requires
(impossibly) a one-one relation between concepts and their extensions.
Q6a
Answers: 2
This question concerned Freges grounds for drawing a distinction between sense and reference;
answers to it were particularly strong. Candidates wisely began by articulating some theses of
Freges concerning sense and reference for instance, that the former determines the latter, and
that senses are to be distinguished not only from referents but also from ideas. Freges concerns
surrounding identity statements were taken to motivate the distinction; it was also recognized that
his worries about differences in informational value between sentences involving substitution of coreferring terms generalize. A distinction was drawn between the cases of singular terms and of other
expressions and in the former case between names and definite descriptions. General
considerations from the philosophy of language were brought to bear (e.g. those surrounding
Kripkes Paderewski case), as were considerations specific to those working in the period (e.g.
whether Russells theory of descriptions might provide a better explanation).
Q8a
Answers: 2
Candidates were asked to explain how Russell avoided rejecting the law of excluded middle. Answers
were solid, recognizing that he appealed to his theory of descriptions, and to the (scope) distinction
between primary and secondary occurrences. Meinongs alternative was compared; Russells
criticisms were upheld somewhat flat-footedly (in particular, without challenge).
Q8b
Answers: 1
Q10
Answers: 1
Q11b
Answers: 1
Q14
Answers: 2
This question concerned Wittgensteins picture theory of meaning. Candidates distinguished
pictorial form, representational form, and logical form, and recognized that isomorphism is a key
component of the possibility of meaning in the Tractatus.
Q15b
Answers: 1
Q16
Answers: 1
BB
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than appealing to the definition of what it is for a theory to express (represent) an arithmetical
relation and to the -consistency of Tboth of which had figured explicitly earlier in the question.
They appeared to be making the assumption that the standard model of arithmetic was a model of
the theory T, but they didnt say so; and such an assumption was in any case inappropriate.
SB
to reproduce a standard measurement problem essay and looked in detail at the physical analysis of
measurement procedures.
Q. 8. (Bells theorem is not required in order to show that quantum theory is non-local. Do you
agree?) The second most popular question of this section (10 answers). While the majority of
answers had a decent grip on the dialectic, details were often weak or muddled; or where they
werent, the discussion tended to be rather too brief.
Q 9. (Does it matter for questions of quantum ontology that decoherence is not a precise process?)
Six answers; rather mixed. Weaker answers were hand-waving about what decoherence was (indeed
no answer really adequately characterized decoherence) and tended to endorse a Dennett/Wallace
approach without much argument.
Q 10. (Is quantum theory an intrinsically probabilistic theory?) Four answers. By and large not
handled that well, with a notable exception.
Overall comment on the paper: While a good general grip of the issues was on show from
candidates, overall there was a disappointing lack of attention to detail, particularly technical detail,
which was often missing (rendering answers rather thinner than one would like) or muffed. More
ambition in this direction would have led to better answers overall and is to be encouraged.
CGT
wide range of marks for answers to this question. Some used it as an opportunity for automatic
essays on Hilbert and were duly punished; others considered the question on its own merits, using a
broad range of ideas and arguments (including Hilbert's), and were duly rewarded.
Q. 7, 'Can the structuralist give an account of mathematical epistemology without relying on the
existence of abstract objects?', (15 attempts): By far the most popular question, with most
candidates attempting an answer. Unfortunately, very few candidates focused on mathematical
epistemology, as the question required, preferring instead to offer automatic (and irrelevant) essays
on structuralism. As with q. 5, there was a certain amount of attempted restatement of Boolos'
views on plural semantics for second-order logic.
Q. 8a, 'Taking the principle of the excluded middle from the mathematician would be the same as
prohibiting... the boxer the use of his fists. (HILBERT) Discuss.', (3 attempts): Answers tended to
offer a rather vague discussion of issues surrounding intuitionism without focusing on the particular
critique advanced here by Hilbert.
Q. 8b, 'Whether mathematical objects are mental constructions of ours or exist independently of
our thought is a matter of what it is to which they owe their existence; whereas the important
disagreement between Platonists and intuitionists is unaffected by this metaphysical question.
(DUMMETT) Do you agree?', (4 attempts): This question was mostly answered to quite a high
standard. Candidates did well to distinguish the quotation's two parts and to consider agreement
with each of them in turn.
Q. 10, 'Does any philosophical significance attach to the fact that we cannot, in principle, survey an
infinite domain but not to the fact that we cannot, in practice, survey a very large domain?', (2
attempts): The examiners were prepared to reward interesting thoughts about human finitude,
medical possibility, supertasks, etc., but not irrelevant discussion of Hilbert's programme.
Q. 11a, 'Is there more than one legitimate conception of a set?', (3 attempts): All three answers
were interesting and clearly argued, though to varying degrees superficial. Curiously, none
mentioned the limitation of size as a conception of set.
Q. 11b, 'Does the continuum hypothesis have a truth-value?', (2 attempts): Though the question
concerned realism about the theory of sets, candidates focused on intuitionism as the paradigm
alternative with mixed success.
Q. 13, 'What can we learn from Gdels Incompleteness Theorems about the relation between
mathematical truth and provability?', (4 attempts): Candidates seemed to think that the refutation
of Hilbert's Programme exhausted the philosophical significance of the Incompleteness Theorems,
rather than merely being an illuminating example thereof.
Q. 14, 'What is the point of unapplied mathematics?', (4 attempts): Generally well done, if done a bit
too quickly. Candidates would have been well served by considering the point of intellectual
endeavour more broadly: answers tended toward justifying mathematics as a useful tool for
empirical scientists (if only in potentia) or as an enjoyable recreation, but not as a science in its own
right.
BK
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this confusion is; perhaps Aristotles claim that formal, efficient, and final causes are in some cases
one in kind? Another point where more caution is needed is when candidates (e.g., those tackling
question 4) discuss final causation: some do not clarify the distinction between the final cause itself
(e.g., the good of the beneficiary) and what is for the sake of some final cause (e.g., the rainfall).
MP
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With respect to translations and commentaries, the general quality of the translations was good,
whereas the general quality of the commentaries was less encouraging. The best candidates
analysed the claims presented in the passages by emphasizing the philosophical issues emerging
from them, whereas the weakest commentaries mainly proposed very general considerations on the
contents of the gobbets.
LMC
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