Dr. Rolf Sattler (Auth.) - Biophilosophy - Analytic and Holistic Perspectives (1986, Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg) PDF
Dr. Rolf Sattler (Auth.) - Biophilosophy - Analytic and Holistic Perspectives (1986, Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg) PDF
Dr. Rolf Sattler (Auth.) - Biophilosophy - Analytic and Holistic Perspectives (1986, Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg) PDF
Biophilosophy
Analytic and Holistic Perspectives
With 27 Figures
Springer-Verlag
Berlin Heidelberg New York Tokyo
Dr. ROLF SATILER
Biology Department
McGill University
1205 Ave. Docteur Penfield
Montreal, Quebec H3A IB!
Canada
The use of registered names, trademarks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the
absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws
and regulations and therefore free for general use.
Typesetting, otTsetprinting and bookbinding: Briihlsche U niversitiitsdruckerei, Giessen
2131/3130-543210
To Hyacinth,
beautiful woman and flower
Preface
Rolf Sattler
Acknowledgements
I wrote the first draft of this book during my last sabbatical leave
in South-East Asia where I was collecting plants for my research in
morphology. Thus, first of all, I am very grateful to my hosts: the
late Dr. Kam Yee-Kiew at the University of Malaya in Penang, and
Mrs. Thippavan Scott at Kratomtip on Phuket island in southern
Thailand. Many weaknesses of the first draft were rectified as a
result of the kind criticism by many students and the following
colleagues and friends: Drs. Charles and Joanna Adams (Introduc-
tion), Prof. Masaaki Asai (Chap. 4), Dr. Rejane Bernier (Chaps. 7, 9,
10), Dr. Michael Bradie (Chap. 1), Mr. Sylvain Bournival (Chaps. 1
to 10), Ms. Claire Cooney-Sovetts (Chaps. 1-10), Dr. John Cornell
(Chap. 7), Mr. Jean Caumartin (Chap. 1), Mr. Anthony Ferguson
(Chaps. 1,2, 8), Dr. Eduard O. Guerrant, Jr. (Chap. 1), Prof. Rainer
Hertel (Chaps. 1-4), Dr. David L. Hull (Chap. 1), Prof. Aristid
Lindenmayer (Chaps. 1,9, 10), Dr. Robert H. Peters (Chaps. 1-10),
Ms. Ghislaine du Planty (Chaps. 1-10), Mr. Yves Prairie (Chaps. 1
to 10), Dr. Rolf Rutishauser (Chaps. 1-10), Dr. Kurt Sittmann
(Chap. 8), and Dr. Gunther Stent (Chaps. 1-4). I am also grateful
to Ms. Celina Dolan and Ms. Joanne Smith for typing the manu-
script, to Ms. Elspeth Angus for typing the index, to Ms. Doris
Luckert for bibliographical assistance, and to Ms. Claire Cooney-
Sovetts and Mr. Guy L'Heureux for the preparation and photo-
graphy of a macerated maple leaf whose netted venation system
served as the basis for the cover design. Finally, I want to thank the
staff of Springer-Verlag, especially Dr. Dieter Czeschlik, Dr. Guido
N. Forbath,Ms. Karin G6del, Miss Ingrid Samide, Mr. Werner Eisen-
schink, and the Briihlsche UniversWitsdruckerei for the highly com-
petent, efficient, and rapid production of this book.
Contents
3 Facts ........... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 61
3.1 Introduction - Facts as singular propositions. . . . . . . . . .. 61
3.2 First Definition of 'Fact': A proposition of a real particu-
larity. Criticism of naive realism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
3.3 Second Definition of 'Fact': A proposition ofan objective
datum of perception. Perceiving and sensing. Primary
realm. Culture- and theory-dependence of facts ......... 63
3.4 Objectivity - Two definitions. Relativity and culture-
dependence of objectivity. States of consciousness .. . . . .. 65
3.5 Facts and Reality - Vatum' ('donne '), 'observation',
'factum' ('fait '; 'Tatsache '). Absolute and moderate rela-
tivism. Criticism of absolute relativism. Patterned conti-
nuum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
3.6 Experience - Perceiving, sensing, and experience as being
(Zen) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 70
3.7 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
In this book, I shall examine the most general and fundamental assump-
tions underlying biological research and its conclusions. Whether some of
these assumptions are labeled philosophical or theoretical is of no absolute
importance to me. I am more concerned with the consequences these assump-
tions may have for biology, our personal existence and society. I want to
show that they may fundamentally influence the quality of research as well
as living. In fact our well-being and our survival may depend on at least some
of them.
As a means of introduction to the foundations of biology, I shall now pre-
sent three examples of assumptions that are often made in biological research.
The first example is thinking in terms of a common factor which means that
the same phenomenon must be caused by a common factor. Thus, alcohol
consumption is seen as the causative common factor of drunkenness. The
biophilosophical questions that confront us here are the following: How valid
is thinking in terms of common factors? Can we take it for granted that this
kind of thinking provides satisfactory answers in all cases? If not in all cases,
in which cases is it appropriate and in which cases is it useless to search for
common factors? Or is it generally misguided to hope that the idea of a com-
mon factor may provide explanations? To answer such questions we have to
analyze the assumptions underlying the notion of a common factor. I shall
briefly refer to only one of them that is not seldom implied in biological
research. It is the assumption that the common factor has an inherent prop-
erty or properties that cause a certain effect. When the common factor is a
substance, that substance is thought to be endowed with a property or prop-
erties leading to a certain effect. Thus alcohol through the way it is consti-
tuted chemically is seen as the cause of drunkenness. In other words: the
chemical constitution of alcohol unavoidably leads to drunkenness.
I think that this assumption is no longer tenable in the light of modern
scientific and philosophical inSights. One could go as far as to assert the op-
posite of the above postulate: a substance has no inherent nature that neces-
sarily leads to a certain effect or effects. In short: a substance has no effect(s).
Hence, a specific substance cannot be considered as a common factor for a
certain effect. Why not? Because a certain effect is not fully determined by
one or even a few substances (factors). It is determined by a substance (fac-
tor) or substances (factors) in a certain context or environment. Hence, it is
the factor(s) as well as the context that determine the effect. The cause of
the effect does not reside in the substance (factor) alone, but in the whole.
Therefore, the search for substances (factors) that determine certain effects
is questionable [for a detailed and rigorous analysis see, e.g., Weiss (1973),
pp.99-106].
Unfortunately, a great deal of biological research still seems to be aimed
at discovering ultimate causes in terms of substances. Many publications
3
have titles such as "the effect of (a specific chemical substance) ... " Such
titles may suggest a belief in the essential nature of a substance that inde-
pendently of its context causes the effect. It seems, however, that many
authors are more or less aware of the importance of the context. In that
case, the question arises: what is the general value of demonstrating the
"effect" of a substance in one particular context? Generality, the principal
aim of science (see Chap. 1), seems to be defeated in such approaches (which,
of course, does not exclude their usefulness for specific purposes).
Applied sciences, such as pharmacology, also appear to suffer from think-
ing in terms of common factors (see, e.g., Weiss 1973). Instead of investigat-
ing the whole context, research is often focused on the "effect" of a par-
ticular substance as if it would cure certain diseases. Yet examples abound
that demonstrate the importance of context. Depending on the physical and
mental state of a person, LSD may have strikingly different "effects": it may
"cause" heaven or hell. Evidently that which "causes" heaven or hell is not
LSD alone, but the whole context which includes the person who is taking
LSD and his or her environment.
These biophilosophical considerations have important consequences for
biological research. They emphasize the importance of systems thinking that
analyzes the whole (see, e.g., Bertalanffy 1967, 1968; Laszlo 1972b; Gray
and Rizzo 1973; Gorelik 1975; Wuketits 1978, 1983). They suggest the de-
velopment of multivariate models of analysis and thinking in terms of multi-
dimensional spaces. Fortunately, more and more biologists are employing
such methodology. As a consequence they are not only better equipped to
deal with the integrated wholeness of organisms and ecosystems, but they
are also able to show in which particular instances the simple approach in
terms of common factors may be useful. Whenever certain variables of the
whole context are constant or nearly constant, an explanation in terms of
common factors may be warranted. It works in those particular instances,
but for a different reason than assumed by essentialists who attribute an
inherent power to substances or factors.
The example on thinking in terms of common factors shows that bio-
philosophical analysis is important in several respects: It places research into
broader perspectives and it provides guidelines for specific research projects.
Hence, it is not only important for the generalist and philosopher, but it has
also crucial significance for the scientist in the laboratory or the field. Thus,
biophilosophy is not necessarily armchair philosophy of an esoteric nature
as many biologists tend to think, but is of fundamental practical importance
because it is at the roots of all research.
As a second example of an assumption underlying biological research I
want to point out that philosophical assumptions occur not only in the
answers given to problems of research, but also in the questions asked in the
4
laboratory or the field. Thus, most biologists quite often ask the following
question when they encounter an unidentified plant or animal: Does indi-
vidual X belong to species A or B? This kind of question may imply the be-
lief that the individual X must be either species A or B, i.e., this question
may be based on an either-or philosophy which implies that nature is dis-
continuous in that case. It excludes the possibility of continuous variation,
in the above example at the species level. Consequently the idea of inter-
mediates between species is not taken into consideration and accordingly
not reflected in the question asked.
Research in systematics has shown, however, that boundaries between
species are not always sharp. There are cases of intermediates between so-
called species. At least in these cases the assumption of an either-or philosophy
at the species level is not justified. Hence, it is not appropriate to ask an
either-or question. Such a question would constitute a pseudo-question in
that case.
Pseudo-questions are based on pseudo-problems, such as finding discon-
tinuities in a continuum. They exist not only in systematics but probably
in all areas of biology (see, e.g., Wuketits 1978, p. 38; Sattler 1978a). It is
important to detect pseudo-questions and pseudo-problems because they
are a hindrance to research. Biophilosophical analysis may help to separate
pseudo-questions from useful questions, although there are cases in which it
may be debatable whether a question is appropriate or not.
Practicing biologists often take it for granted that if an answer cannot
be given to a question we just have to work harder and eventually the answer
will appear. Such optimism is not warranted in the case of pseudo-questions.
In fact, it will lead to a waste of time, energy, and money. So, again, we can
see that biophilosophical analyses may have very concrete, practical, and
"down-to-earth" implications.
Not seldom it is said that common sense can protect us from pseudo-
problems and other nonsense. Although this may be true in some situations,
it is not generally the case. Common sense is not infallible. It may reflect
cultural, philosophical, scientific and religious prejudices and thus prevent
us from breaking through traditionally biased ways of thinking and percep-
tion. Either-or questions and thinking in terms of common factors are exam-
ples.
The third example that I shall present here in support of the importance
of biophilosophy has a rather metaphorical meaning. It is the question: do
we have a soul? An answer given by a famous surgeon was the following:
I have dissected many corpses, but I never found a soul. One might ask, did
he really want to find a soul? Others who want to find the soul, experience
it. Does this mean that we find what we want to find? In more general terms:
do our preconceptions and our expectations influence our perception of the
5
world? A whole range of answers has been given to this question from af-
firmation to negation (see Chap. 3). Although it may be impossible to reach
agreement on this issue, it is important for biologists to reflect on it because
it touches the core of all empirical science, which is based on facts. For if
even the facts of science are controversial and relative, what can we expect
from generalizations based on them? What then is the strength and value of
science? Because of the fundamental importance of this issue, I have devoted
a whole chapter to facts [for an excellent and penetrating discussion see also
Woodger (1967), pp. 15-20].
My conclusions on the importance of biophilosophy are as follows. All
biological statements and questions have theoretical and philosophical foun-
dations. We can grasp the full significance of biological statements and ques-
tions only to the extent that we are aware of their foundations. Hence, bio-
philosophy concerned with foundations is of paramount importance to biol-
ogy.
One can, of course, carry out good biological research without a knowl-
edge of foundations. That does not mean that such research lacks founda-
tions. It simply means that the researcher is not aware of them. To the extent
that such subconsciously implied foundations are appropriate, the conducted
research may be very successful. However, the scope of this somewhat blind
approach is limited. Major breakthroughs of a revolutionary nature that
involve a change of philosophical foundations are unlikely (see also Mohr
1977, p. 29).
In contrast to research that is oblivious of its foundations, biophilosophical
awareness provides a more comprehensive understanding of biology and a
prerequisite for innovation at a more basic level than that of "normal science"
(see Chap. O. Furthermore, biophilosophical awareness has existential and
social dimensions. The most basic questions we ask as social human beings
cannot be completely answered at the level of scientific statements. They
refer particularly to the foundations of these statements. They lead us to
the bottom of things which upon close inspection will disclose itself as bot-
tomlessness .,. no-thingness '" wholeness and unity (see, e.g., Izutsu 1971,
1974; Rorty 1979).
1.1 Introduction
The aim of science is to gain knowledge of the world, in the case of biology
knowledge of the living world. Knowledge has many forms. Weigel and
Madden (1961) distinguish empirical perception through categories, meta-
physical intuition, reason, faith, awareness or pure consciousness, and mysti-
cal experience. Pure consciousness and mystical experience go beyond knowl-
edge inasmuch as they are a state of being. Science is only concerned with
scientific knowledge which is expressed in singular and general propositions.
Singular propositions are also called facts, whereas general propositions are
referred to as hypotheses, models, rules, laws, and theories. As we shall see
later on, the difference between Singular and general propositions is not
absolute or fundamental, but rather a difference of degree.
Theories are the most comprehensive and the best confirmed general
propositions of science. They are the ultimate aim of science; the more
10
general and the more confirmed they are, the better. Thus, the ultimate aim
of biology is a comprehensive and well-confirmed theory of life. We are still
far away from such a theory, but we have biological theories of a general
nature that have been confirmed to a certain extent. An example of such
theories is the Synthetic Theory of Evolution (Fig. 1.1). (For a discussion
of the semantic view of theories see Sect. 1.5).
Laws are also well-confirmed general propositions, yet they are less com-
prehensive than theories. Thus, "any (well-confirmed) general proposition
within the framework of a theory may be called a law" (Mohr 1977, p. 48).
One should add that the formulation of laws may precede that of the frame-
work of the theory to which Mohr referred. Normally, two kinds of laws are
distinguished: deterministic laws and probabilistic laws (see Chap. 2). It is
probably fair to say that most of the biological laws are probabilistic. Many
11
of them have numerous exceptions and thus are more appropriately called
rules. It is disappointing to many biologists who search for lawfulness that
so often general propositions which have been thought of as laws degenerate
into rules as more and more exceptions to the law become known (see, e.g.,
Kochanski 1973, p. 42). In some instances, the rules may also dissolve or
become questionable. An example is Haeckel's postulate that ontogeny is a
brief recapitulation of phylogeny. At first proposed as a law, it was later on
considered a rule (see Fig. 1.1) and has been questioned even as a rule (see,
e.g., Dullemeijer 1974, p. 218; Gould 1977; Voorzanger and van der Steen
1982).
Hypotheses are propositions that in contrast to theories and laws have
not yet reached a high degree of confirmation. Since confirmation is a mat-
ter of degree, no clear-cut distinction can be made between the general hypo-
theses on the one hand and theories and laws on the other hand. As far as
degree of generality is concerned, hypotheses may range from very general
and comprehensive propositions to rather specific, even singular propositions.
In the latter case, hypotheses may coincide with facts, since facts contain a
hypothetical element, and for that reason have also been termed low-level
hypotheses (Lakatos 1968, 1978). Thus, very widely defined, hypotheses
range from factual statements (singular propositions) to very general pro-
positions of differing degrees of confirmation which in the extreme case
border on theories. One might even include theories as extreme cases of
confirmation among hypotheses, although this is not customary. In this sense,
one would state that all scientific knowledge is hypothetical ranging from
very specific propositions to very general ones, and from very questionable
propositions to highly confirmed ones, the latter being customarily referred
to as theories, or also as hypotheses if one opts to choose an unusually wide
definition of the term. For my discussion of scientific methodology, this
widest definition of hypotheses will be useful. To avoid confusion, I shall
always state when I use the term hypothesis in this widest sense. Otherwise
the term hypothesis shall be used in the ordinary sense as defmed above,
namely as a general proposition that excludes theories and laws at one end
of the continuum, and facts at the other end. In this sense, several special
kinds of hypotheses can be distinguished: auxiliary hypotheses, ad hoc
hypotheses, and working hypotheses (Fig. 1.1).
Auxiliary hypotheses are additional assumptions that are necessary for
the testing of any hypothesis or theory. No hypothesis or theory can be
tested in isolation. Auxiliary hypotheses are thus unavoidable. What may
constitute an auxiliary hypothesis in one context, may be the main hypo-
thesis to be tested in another context. Hence, it depends only on the context
whether a hypothesis functions as the main hypothesis or as an auxiliary
assumption (auxiliary hypothesis).
12
between all those notions, but it shows that the concept of model is used in
a very general way. One could go as far as to say that model building and
model testing have become the main occupation of many biologists. (For an
example see Fig. 1.1).
Facts (also referred to as data) are singular propositions that constitute
the empirical basis of science (Fig. 1.1). Sometimes even well-confirmed gen-
eralizations are considered facts. For example, it is stated that evolution is a
fact. I do not use the term fact in this sense.
Since facts are of utmost importance in science, a whole chapter is devoted
to facts (Chap. 3).
Induction Example
I
Singular proposition Swan A is white
l
(fact)
induction ;"ductioo
Inductive generalizations do not carry logical force, i.e., they are not ar-
rived at by deductive logical reasoning. From the fact that one swan is white,
it does not follow logically that all swans are white. Hence, inductive general-
izations cannot be proven. Even if many additional observations would sup-
port the inductive generalization, one could not be sure that future obser-
vations would also be in agreement with it (see below). Thus, inductive gen-
eralizations are constantly open to revision. They are not established truths.
Even if they were correct, we would have no way of demonstrating (proving)
it.
Although one can hardly deny that induction in the above and other more
complex forms plays a role in science, it would be inappropriate to claim that
it is the only method that generates general propositions (see, e.g., Cohen
17
and Hesse 1980). It may not even be the most important method. As soon
as the scientific problem reaches a certain level of complexity, intuition and
deductive reasoning are required in order to arrive even at a tentative solution
(e.g., Hempel 1966 ; Medawar 1969). The method that can be employed then is
the 'hypothetico-deductive method.' It can be presented in a simplified dia-
grammatic form as follows (Fig. 1.3):
intuition deduction
F===
Problem ---.~hypothesis ---....,.~Deduced state
logic of affairs
agreement
or
disagreement
Observed
state of affairs
We have already seen that inductive generalization does not lead to statements
whose truth can be asserted. Does the same apply to statements arrived at
by the hypothetico-deductive method? More specifically, does agreement of
the deduced and observed state of affairs en tail proof of the hypothesis under
consideration? Or, vice versa, does disagreement mean disproof? In more
general terms: is certainty of scientific knowledge possible? If not, what is
the status of validation of general scientific propositions? In the following
section I shall examine three postulates (or philosophies) with regard to the
status of scientific knowledge. In this connection, I shall base my discussion
primarily on the hypothetico-deductive method, and I shall employ the term
'hypothesis' in its widest sense so that it includes theories. The reader who
does not approve of this definition of 'hypothesis' may replace 'hypothesis'
by 'hypothesis including theory.'
1 I use the terms 'truth,' 'proof,' 'disproof,' and 'certainty' in the strong sense, i.e.,
meaning absolute truth, final proof and disproof, and absolute certainty. It might be
objected that this is contrary to common usage. I am not convinced of that. For example,
when someone says "It is true that it rained on the other side of the mountain," we
normally understand this statement in the absolute sense. If we were not (absolutely)
certain, we would say: Probably (or most probably) it rained on the other side of the
mountain. Or we would choose some other expression that indicates literally that there
is at least some doubt whether it actually rained.
19
K
intuition deduction
Problem .. hypothesis • Deduced
state of affairs
agreement - proof (verification
in the strong sense)
or
disagreement-- disproof
Observed (falsification)
state of affairs
Fig. 1.4. The first postulate (philosophy) of validation: hypotheses may be proved Gus-
tificationism). The context which is indicated in Fig. 1.6 is omitted here
cepted for a long time until one day black swans were eventually found.
Nonetheless, an observer who limits his search to one area of the world in
which only white swans occur would never fail to make successful predic-
tions. He could die with the conviction that all swans are white (because he
never found an exception) and yet he was wrong. However, as an analyst of
scientific methodology he could come to the following realization: Although
I have always encountered agreement between the deduced and observed
state of affairs, my hypothesis has not been proven and never will be proven.
I have to accept that all scientific knowledge is unproven knowledge. I have
to realize that certainty is not attainable in science [for other examples see
Polanyi (1964), p. 94].
Someone who clings to the ideal of certainty may not yet capitulate at
this stage and argue as follows. Since the number of swans must be finite,
we could hope to observe eventually all swans and thus prove the new hypo-
thesis that all swans are either white or black. But how can we ever obtain
certainty that we have observed all swans? It seems that certainty is really
unattainable 2. However, the scien tist and philosopher who stubbornly hopes
to reach certainty at least in some instances would continue to argue as, for
example, Hartmann (l948) or Nachtigall (1972). These authors would admit
that certainty is not possible in the swan hypothesis because it is a hypo-
thesis that is validated by observations of naturally occurring events and
things. They insist, however, that hypotheses validated by observations of
experiments may be proven. Hence certainty is possible in experimental
biology according to these authors. It is not difficult to demonstrate that
their claim is untenable. If we consider our coleoptile hypothesis as an
example of experimental biology, then we can see that even an experiment
cannot constitute proof of an hypothesis. The fact that the coleoptile stops
growing after removal of its tip is in agreement with our hypothesis, but this
agreement could be due to different reasons: either because the hormone
source has been removed as postulated by the hypotheSis or because the
system has been too much disturbed as a result of the injury of the coleoptile.
Experiments entail interference with the object under consideration (even
in a so-called controlled experiment). Ifwe cut off the head of a human baby,
it would also stop growing. How can we ever have absolute assurance that
after the removal of the tip of the coleoptile it ceases to grow simply because
the hormone source is lacking? It could stop growing for many other reasons.
How could we ever devise experiments to test all of the other possible reasons?
And if we could, how could we be certain that we have thought of all possible
2 I am not claiming that the swan hypothesis is of great importance to biological theory,
nor am I assuming that species are natural kinds (see Chap. 4).
22
Besides the social implications, there are also existential dimensions. One
encounters often the belief that we need certainty in order to live a fulfilled
life. Riedl (I980) and other evolutionary biologists claim that the urge for
certainty has evolutionary roots and is therefore quite natural. I tend to
think, however, that this urge results mainly from cultural conditioning,
since in some cultures the preoccupation with certainty does not exist as in
our Western culture. And even in our culture some individuals have freed
themselves of this desire. The fact that many of us find it difficult or impos-
sible to acknowledge uncertainty, does not "prove" that certainty is necessary
for living. It simply shows that those clinging to the desire of certainty are
using this ideal as crutches for living. As a result their natural ability to live
freely has atrophied because of the constant culturally reinforced use of
these crutches. In that situation it may indeed be unwise to throwaway the
artificial support from one day to the next because that might lead to a col-
lapse in cases of extreme dependence and atrophy. But any person who has
still some strength can learn to strengthen atrophied abilities again through
increased use and thus will succeed to walk without crutches and finally may
jump and dance. Moving and dancing in total spontaneity is the antidote to
a worried life dominated by the urge for certainty. Many Eastern philosophies
and ways of living are rooted in this spontaneity which is beyond the rigid
quest for verbal truths and certainties (see, e.g., Lao Tsu's Tao Te Ching
1972; Watts 1951; Trungpa 1973, 1976; Rajneesh 1975a,b, 1978).
K
intuition deduction
Problem • hypothesis • Deduced
state of affairs
agreement - confirmation
disagreement - disproof
Observed (falsification)
state of affairs
Fig. 1.5. The second postulate (philosophy) of validation: hypotheses cannot be proved,
but they may be disproved (falsified) (falsificationism). (The context which is indicated
in Fig. 1.6 is omitted here)
24
our temporary conclusion is that silver salmon find their way home by per-
ceiving the distinctive odor of the river in which they hatched.
The question that we have to ask now is whether this view of validation
and the progress of science is tenable. My answer is again no. Disproof of a
hypothesis is not possible for at least two reasons:
(1) Facts, i.e., the observed state of affairs, cannot necessarily be con-
sidered to be true. As I have mentioned already, facts also contain a hypo-
thetical element, although they may be much less hypothetical than the
hypothesis to be tested. For that reason facts have also been termed low-
level hypotheses or observational hypotheses. It is evident that one hypo-
thesis, i.e., the high-level hypothesis to be tested, cannot be disproved by
another hypothesis, i.e., the low-level hypothesis of the observed state of
affairs. Hence disproof of the high-level hypothesis to be tested is not pos-
sible, since in the case of a contradiction between a high-level and a low-level
hypothesis the falseness may reside in the low-level hypothesis (i.e., the fact).
What does this mean with regard to the salmon example? It means that the
observed state of affairs, namely that blindfolded salmon return to their
home river, could be faulty. Although it might be extremely unlikely that
it is faulty, one cannot absolutely guarantee that it is true. For this reason,
the visual hypothesis cannot be eliminated once and for all. In order to il-
lustrate the hypothetical element of facts, we may look at other examples
of facts. "This tree is dead" is a fact whose hypothetical nature is easily re-
cognized. How could we be absolutely sure that a tree that looks dead ac-
tually is dead? How hypothetical the fact is would depend, of course, on
the specific case. In some instances it might indeed be rather questionable
whether the tree is dead, whereas in other instances this statement may border
on certainty. But we can not be certain even at the level of facts. Another
example: "The shape of this leaf is elliptical." In this case it is even more dif-
ficult to imagine why this observation could be wrong. But maybe a closer
inspection would reveal that it is not exactly elliptical. Maybe we got an al-
together wrong impression. Illusion and mass hallucination have been reported
in many instances (see, e.g., Gregory and Gombrich 1973). Thus, although
it is difficult to imagine errors at the factual level, we cannot totally exclude
the possibility that in a particular situation the fact may be faulty. There-
fore, we have to reject the second postulate of validation [see also the quota-
tion by Woodger (1952) at the beginning of this chapter].
(2) In the discussion of scientific methodology I have pretended so far-
for the sake of simplicity - that a hypothesis can be tested separately from
other hypotheses. This is not possible. A hypothesis is always tested in con-
junction with auxiliary hypotheses. Therefore, in the case of a clash between
the hypothesis to be tested and the fact, neither the hypothesis nor the fact
need be faulty, but one of the auxiliary hypotheses could be wrong. If we
26
take a simplified case of only one auxiliary hypothesis, we arrive at the fol-
lowing scheme (Hempel 1966, p_ 23), H being the hypothesis to be tested,
A the auxiliary hypothesis, and e the fact:
If H and A, then e
e is not the case
H and A are not both true
With regard to the salmon example I might mention the following auxiliary
hypotheses:
(a) The operation technique used for the experiment leads to complete
blindness. Suppose that this auxiliary assumption is false, then the fact
that the operated salmons (which we assumed were blindfolded) return-
ed to their home river no longer contradicts the visual hypothesis.
(b) It is assumed that in the case of complete blindfolding the animal does
not compensate for this visual loss by a regulatory mechanism which
enables it to reach its goal by means different from those of the normal
behavior. If this auxiliary hypothesis were wrong, then the success of
the actually blindfolded animals again would not contradict the visual
hypothesis because the animals adapted to the experimental condition.
(c) The percentage of operated animals that return home is statistically sig-
nificant, i.e., cannot be explained by chance or other factors.
These examples may suffice to illustrate that disproof of a hypothesis is not
possible because it is linked to auxiliary hypotheses. Very often it may be
difficult or impossible to enumerate all auxiliary hypotheses because one
may not be aware of them. In addition, the hypothesis to be tested is linked
to the general background knowledge of the scientific discipline and even to
metaphysical assumptions (Bunge 1977). Hence the scientific and philos-
ophical background, which so often is taken for granted, may also be respon-
sible for contradictions between facts and the hypothesis to be tested, i.e.,
the fault may reside in the generally accepted bulk of scientific and philos-
ophical knowledge and the hypothesis to be tested may be correct. An ex-
treme consequence of this is expressed in the Quine-Duhem conventionalist
thesis according to which "any statement can be held to be true no matter
what is observed, provided that adjustmen ts are made elsewhere in the sys-
tem" (Presley 1967).
In spite of the above arguments that one may level against the postulate
of falsifications, there are still biologists who subscribe to it and go as far as
to define a scientific hypothesis as a proposition that is falsifiable. The term
'falsification,' however, appears to be used differently by different authors,
as I noted it for the term 'verification.' Thus, a similar ambiguity has been
created as in the case of the first postulate of validation. It is possible that
27
Observations (information)
and their description
(conceptualization and
syntactical treatment)
Scientific, intuition intuition
> - - -.......~problem . . po hypothesis·
philosophical and logic (or mductlOn) + auxiliary
and cultural hypotheses
background
Personality
of the scientist (s)
logic
Deduced
deduction state of affairs
. Ka~::~:;:tion
disagreement
Observed disconfirmation
state of affairs
Fig. 1.6. A more realistic scheme of scientific methodology than the oversimplified ver-
sions of Figs. 1.3 -1.5
the third postulate differs drastically from the first two. If, however, proof
in the first postulate and disproof in the second postulate are interpreted in
a weak sense, both of these postulates merge with the third one. Thus,
actually a continuum between the three postulates exists.
Since confirmation does not entail that the hypothesis is correct, and
since disconfirmation does not mean that the hypothesis is false, the burn-
ing question is: how do we decide which hypothesis is acceptable and which
is not? A hypothesis that has been confirmed in all tests could be provisonally
accepted without any problem. Vice versa, a hypothesis that has been only
disconfirmed can be provisionally rejected. However, if, as is usually the
case, a hypothesis has been confirmed in some instances and disconfirmed
in others, how are we to arrive at a rational and objective decision? How
many disconfirmations are needed for a rejection of a hypothesis? There are
no objective and rational criteria to answer this question satisfactorily. The
history of science shows that the personality of the individual scientist, the
scientific community and society at large may play an important role (see,
e.g., Rose and Rose 1976a,b; Chant and Fauve11980; Coley and Hall 1980;
Gould 1981; Thuillier 1981 ; Edge 1983; Lew on tin et al. 1984). Thus, in ad-
dition to the objective inner-scientific (or internal) factors, psychological
and social factors that may be referred to as outer-scientific (or external)
decide whether a hypothesis is accepted or discarded. Scientific practice
shows the interplay of these factors. In many cases individual scientists dis-
agree. What is acceptable to one may be questionable or even totally unac-
ceptable to another. The inner-scientific evidence may be the same to all of
them, yet they weigh it differently: what to one of them may be an irrelevant
anomaly, to another one may be an important contradiction which, in his
opinion, justifies the rejection of the hypothesis. What is the greatest dis-
covery to one of them may be utter nonsense to another one. However, there
are hypotheses that have been accepted by a vast majority of scientists. We
may ask how such an agreement is possible. The answer is easy to give: in
cases of agreement either no or relatively few disconfirmations of the hypo-
thesis under consideration are known, or if more disconfirmations exist, they
are played down by the scientific community. Thus, in the latter case, the
social force of the scientific community and the more or less pronounced
conformist attitude of many scientists facilitate acceptance of the status
quo with regard to scientific hypotheses, theories, and conceptual frame-
works. It is also important to realize that often disconfirmations are ignored
or suppressed. They are not mentioned in many textbooks and therefore
many students may not realize that the hypotheses are actually question-
able. At a later stage in their career, when the students or scientists may
discover the suppressed disconfirmations, conditioning by the scientific com-
munity may already have reached a stage in which their minds have become
30
,
• - empirical input-
.
: I '.
.
existing theory ~ ideals of science: 2 basic values:
a) empirical adequacy (A)
b) integrative generality (G)
However, since the ratio of A/G is a matter of degree, I think that the
difference between a scientific and a nonscientific theory is also a matter
of degree. Thus, a continuum ranging from strictly scientific to completely
nonscientific postulates can be recognized. Consequently, the attempt of
demarcating science from nonscience is illusory (see also, e.g., Bunge 1977;
Hull 1983). This includes the methodology. Hence, a methodology absolutely
unique to science does not exist because scientific methodology intergrades
with nonscientific methodology. What I have called "scientific methodology"
is typical for science, but it is not totally discontinuous with methodologies
used in everyday life and activities which are normally classified as non-
scientific (e.g., Feyerabend 1975, 1982).
Laszlo's model is comprehensive. Yet I think that additional complexities
occur which I indicated by stippled arrows in Fig. 1.7. As will be pointed
out especially in the chapter on facts, facts are theory dependent. Thus, a
new theory may lead to a different perception offacts. Furthermore, a new
theory may influence the ideals of science, and the ideals of science in turn
may affect the perception of facts. This shows that the scientific enterprise
is a highly complicated network of interrelations between facts, logic,
psychological, and social factors. We may ask whether under such conditions
progress is still possible. In other words: does the acceptance of a new theory
necessarily mean that it is closer to the truth than its rejected predecessor,
or does the theory change rather reflect a psychological/social preference?
Table 1.1. Characteristic of three paradigms (after Maruyama 1974, modified by John-
son 1977). The three paradigms "correspond roughly to what we might loosely call
"hierarchists", "individualists", and "mutualists" (Maruyama 1974) [Reported from
Johnson (1977) by permission of the author)
view the new disciplinary matrix, exemplar, and theory are just different,
representing another perspective of nature. This conclusion shatters the be-
lief in scientific progress at the level of disciplinary matrices. Two objections
may be raised, however. First, as Kuhn himself (1970, Epilogue) has pointed
out, theories of a new disciplinary matrix may allow more accurate predic-
tions and the solution of a greater number of problems ("puzzles"). Thus, in
this respect they may be superior to their predecessors in spite of their in-
commensurability. Second, itis questionable whether normal and revolution-
ary science can be easily distinguished in all disciplines. Toulmin (1974), for
example, argues that Kuhn has exaggerated the discontinuities between dis-
ciplinary matrices. Greene (1971, 1981) provided an example by showing
that the change from creationist to evolutionary thinking was a gradual pro-
cess, not a sudden revolutionary shift. One may have to accept the idea then
that at least some of the scientific shifts are continuous and thus do not cor-
respond to Kuhn's model of revolutionary science. Probably a whole continu-
um from sudden (revolutionary) to gradual (evolutionary) shifts can be found
in the history of science.
One might question whether in the case of a gradual shift the notion of
incommensurability still applies. I think that in spite of the continuous change
the difference of the early and late view may be so striking that they may
indeed be incommensurable. Hence, even a gradual change of scientific think-
ing and theorizing would not necessarily remove the problem of incom-
mensurability.
In discussing the possibility of scientific progress, another aspect has to
be taken into consideration. When an evolutionary or revolutionary paradigm
shift occurs, the new paradigm is not necessarily accepted by the whole
scientific community. A split may occur in the community, part of it em-
bracing the new paradigm and another part adhering to the old one. In this
way more than one paradigm may coexist at a particular time. Each paradigm
with its supporters represents a school of thought. This phenomenon of dif-
ferent schools is especially pronounced in psychology where today we find
behaviorists, cognitive psychologists, Gestalt psychologists, psychoanalysts,
etc. side by side (see, e.g., Brandt 1982). Since these schools are based on
different paradigms (disciplinary matrices), meaningful communication be-
tween them is difficult (if not impossible). Thus the different schools con-
tinue their research more or less in isolation from each other. Some of them
may have relatively few adherents, but that does not necessarily mean that
they are further from the truth. We cannot tell whether they will attract more
supporters in the future or whether they may become extinct with the death
of their leaders. Even extinction is not necessarily an indication of the in-
feriority of the doctrine; it might reflect a lack of openness of the other
school(s) and thus a failure to appreciate a highly evolved paradigm.
39
The way in which we view theories (and other theoretical constructs, such
as laws) is also relevant to the question of progress (see Stegmiiller 1976).
Throughout this chapter I have referred to "theory" in a traditional sense,
i.e., as "a system of logically related propositions" (Bunge 1980, p. 225);
these propositions have empirical content, i.e., they tell us something about
the world or some aspect of it. In contrast to this received view of theories,
a semantic view has been developed by Suppes, Sneed, Stegmiiller, and others
(Beatty 1980, p. 400). According to this semantic view, a theory is only a
definition; more specifically, it is "a statement that defines a type of natural
system" (Giere 1979, p. 69). This means a theory no longer tells us anything
about the world. In order to make a statement about the world we need a
"theoretical hypothesis" which asserts that some specified system of the
world is an instance of the type of system defined by the theory (Giere 1979,
p. 70,160).
If we now look at Mendel's theory of inheritance in terms of the semantic
view, we have to recognize that it does not tell us anything about sweet peas
or any other aspect of the world. It simply defines a system. Giere (1979)
who developed a simple version of the semantic view of theories formulated
Mendel's theory in the following way: "A system of inheritance of a single
characteristic through sexual reproduction is a Mendelian system if and only
if it satisfies the laws of segregation and dominance" (Giere 1979, p. 77).
The two laws could have been written out in the definition of the theory.
Only for the sake of clarity did Giere (1979, p. 77) state them separately.
The important point is that the laws are also definitions without empirical
content. Therefore, to make empirical claims we need theoretical hypotheses
that pronounce actual genetic systems as instances of Mendel's theory. An
example of such a theoretical hypothesis is the following: "The system of
inheritance of height in sweet peas is a Mendelian system" (Giere 1979, p. 77).
This example is a reformulation of one of Mendel's postulates in terms of
the semantic view.
One major advantage of the semantic view of theories is that the endless
discussion on the correctness, falsity, or the degree of adequacy and con-
firmation of any specific theory becomes irrelevant since the theory no longer
makes claim about the world. The central question now is to what extent a
theory is applicable, i.e., how many empirical situations are instances of the
theory. When theories with an increased domain of applicability are develop-
ed, we may speak of progress. However, as long as there are situations that
remain outside the domain of a certain comprehensive theory, the proposal
of complementary theories that can absorb these situations also constitutes
progress. Thus, the semantic view of theories is compatible with the idea of
41
1.6 Conclusions
Modern philosophy of science has gone far beyond the naive belief that
science reveals the truth. Even if it could, we would have no means of prov-
ing it. Certainty seems unattainable. All scientific statements remain open to
doubt [see, e.g., Prigogine and Stengers (1979) who emphasize the openness
of science]. We cannot reach the absolute at least as far as science is con-
cerned; we have to contend ourselves with the relative. Nature and logic are
not the only determinants of the evolution of science. Ideals and values,
psychological and social factors (also called external factors) play an im-
portant role. Science is culture dependent. Subjectivity cannot be completely
eliminated and irrationality or nonrationality may influence the scientific
enterprise. Whether scientific progress occurs is questionable at least to the
extent that paradigms may be incommensurable. However, the development
of complementary paradigms may be seen as progress too. Inasmuch as the
unity of science is not within reach, we have to content ourselves with a
range of complementary perspectives (perspectivism). Thus science is plural-
istic with regard to paradigms.
These conclusions need not lead to pessimism and resignation. Inasmuch
as they are more appropriate than absolutistic, rationalistic, and objectivist
dogmas, they provide a sounder basis, may cure our hubris, may lead to more
humility, tolerance, and understanding and thus may diminish repression
and destruction.
1.7 Summary
hypotheses, models, laws, rules, and theories. The ultimate aim of science is
the acquisition of the most comprehensive and best confirmed theories
(com pare, however, below The semantic view of theories).
Scientific methodology
General considerations. The importance of a knowledge of the methodology
employed is emphasized. Laboratory methodology is used as an example to
show that the perception of a cross-section of a leaf under the microscope
is determined not only by the structure of the leaf but also by the prepara-
tion methods, the methods of microscopy, and the mode (method) of percep-
tion which depends on the organization especially of our sensory apparatus
and nervous system. Hence, knowing one particular object requires an
understanding of the methodology employed which includes the observer.
In contrast to the methodology required for the perception of singularities,
the term 'scientific methodology' usually refers to the methodology by
means of which general propositions of science are obtained.
The semantic view of theories. According to this view, theories and laws are
only definitions, i.e., they are not about the world. Therefore, the question
whether a theory or law is correct, false, confirmed or disconfirmed, is no
longer meaningful and is therefore replaced by the question whether a theory
or law applies to a particular situation. If more than one theory or law applies,
these are considered complementary. It is obvious that the semantic view of
theories is of fundamental importance to science and philosophy.
2 Laws, Explanation, Prediction,
and Understanding
"Too often we forget that science evolved out of the ratio-
nalism of the Middle Ages, which was characterized by a
faith based on reason, and has become, instead, a reason
that is based on faith - faith in the ultimate orderliness of
Nature" (Davenport 1979, p. 2)
"Whenever we proceed from the known into the unknown
we may hope to understand, but we may have to learn at
the same time a new meaning of the word 'understanding'"
(Heisenberg 1962, p. 201)
2.1 Laws
a law. However, the statement that mitosis divides the genetic material into
equal parts is a law because it supports the counterfactual conditional that if
mitosis were to occur, the genetic material would be divided into equal parts.
[Concerning subjunctive conditionals which are also supported by laws see
Hempel (l966), p. 56].
The criterion of counterfactual (and subjunctive) conditionals is not ac-
cepted by all philosophers of science as sufficient for the distinction of laws.
Tondl (1973, p. 181) remarked that "there is no way of demonstrating any
clear-cut or unequivocally definite boundary between expressions which we
acknowledge as having the character of scientific laws, and expressions which
we consider as empirical generalizations, etc." Nonetheless, the search for
criteria of demarcation continued. Hull (l974, p. 71) thinks that the only
criterion "that shows any promise of being adequate is the actual or eventual
integration of natural laws into theories, while descriptive generalizations
remain isolated statements." This approach has at least two consequences
which may lead to difficulties: (l) it makes laws theory-dependent, and (2)
"at anyone time in the development of science it is not easy to decide which
apparently true universal generalizations are merely descriptive or accidental
and which will become incorporated into currently emerging theories" (Hull
1974, p. 71). Hull presented the following example of a generalization (reg-
ularity) which has not yet been incorporated into scientific theory: All the
proteins that make up terrestrial organisms are of the same kind - the levo
form (A few dextro amino acids are associated with certain bacteria)" (Hull
1974, p. 72). He noted that "although there are chemical reasons for all the
proteins in a single organism to be of the same form, there is nothing about
current chemical or biological theory that would lead one to expect this form
to be levo rather than dextro. From the point of view of current scientific
theory this fact is purely accidental" (Hull 1974, p. 72). Hull considers the
concept "accidental" to be relative. This means that what may be accidental
or random with regard to one body of laws and/or theories, may tum out to
be determined in terms of a different set of laws and/or theories.
Mohr (1977, p. 62) lists a number of deterministic (universal) laws in bio-
logy. He refers to them as principles which, to him, is just another name for
"universal law." I mention here only the first of his examples: AG =1= 0,
whereby G is the symbol for Gibbs free energy. According to another formu-
lation of this law, "every living system requires the continuous supply of
free energy to compensate for the continuous production of entropy" (Mohr
1977). This formulation says: "there is no living system that is in thermo-
dynamic equilibrium" (Mohr 1977).
In contrast to a deterministic law, a probabilistic law is a statement that
can be briefly formulated as follows: when F, then probably G. It can also
support counterfactual and subjunctive conditionals. Many biological laws,
47
such as for example Mendel's laws, are probabilistic (see also, e.g., O'Brien
1982; Knox and Considine 1982).
Both deterministic and probabilistic laws may be either process laws or
coexistence laws. A process law implies that G follows F in time, whereas a
coexistence law requires that F and G be contemporaneous. Mendel's laws,
for example, are probabilistic process laws, whereas laws of comparative
morphology are coexistence laws [see Chap. 5 and Mohr (1982)]. [For
other examples of coexistence laws (or cross-section laws) and their critical
evaluation in phylogenetic investigations see Hull (1974), pp. 77-80].
There are laws that may be comparable to axioms of a purely deductive
system such as, for example, the law that "all physical laws (= laws of physics)
may be applied to living systems (or, are valid in biology)" (Mohr 1977,
p. 63). The validity of this kind of law is dependent on an all-inclusive phi-
losophy or meta-theory of living systems (see Bunge 1977). Other laws that
are propositions deduced from more general propositions depend on the
proposition from which they are deduced in addition to the more inclusive
philosophy mentioned above. Empirical laws according to Mohr are "general
propositions that are results of limited inductive inference rather than of
deductive reasoning" (Mohr 1977, p. 56). These empirical laws depend on
the whole network of auxiliary hypotheses and the higher level theoretical
framework of the particular discipline. They integrade with the more funda-
mental and general laws [for a discussion of causal laws, which are process
laws, see, e.g., Hull (1974), pp. 72-87 and the chapter on causality in this
book].
Even the most general and the most highly confirmed laws are subject to
doubt. As is the case for any scientific proposition, we cannot attain certainty
for laws. Hence we must remain open and be prepared that new empirical
evidence may require an alteration of our laws. Although many scientists
take this critical attitude toward our present-day laws, they often insist that
there is an inherent order and lawfulness in nature. If our present laws are
not perfect, they say, that does not indicate that there are no perfect laws
in nature. It simply means that we have not yet found the laws of nature.
But how can we be sure that there are laws in nature? The fact that we have
been successful in formulating laws that, to varying extents, appear to cor-
respond with nature can be interpreted in two ways: (1) It can mean that
we have discovered in those laws the inherent order and lawfulness of nature;
exceptions to those laws contradict, of course, this view. (2) It could mean
that the laws are our inventions which correspond to nature only partially;
exceptions do not contradict this view. An analogy may illustrate what is
meant by a partial correspondence. It has been said that there are no pure
circles in nature. Pure circles are only in our minds. Yet, although there are
no (pure) circles in nature, projecting the notion of circle into nature does
48
"a state of formless fluidity: nothing stable, nothing definite" [Chuang Tzu,
quoted by Izutsu (l967), p. 402]. Today many people, especially within the
counterculture, are rejecting or questioning their belief in law and order.
This need not lead to anarchy. On the contrary, if it is grounded in a pro-
found understanding and experience of life, it may create harmony.
To some extent, our modern Western society has become polarized be-
tween adherents of the counterculture and the traditional culture. Extreme,
dogmatic, and destructive statements have been made on both sides. I think
that both sides and society at large would greatly benefit from a recognition
of the limitations of each viewpoint. Thus a reconciliation would be possible
accepting that chaos and order are just different aspects of the Unnamable.
It should be added that the preceding conclusions depend on a certain
conception of lawfulness and chaos. Lawfulness is understood in the sense
of invariant regularities. That is the notion that, for example, is advocated
by Hempel (l966) and many other philosophers of science. Chaos is under-
stood as the negation of the above kind of lawfulness. Instead, it could be
viewed as a state that lacks the simple lawfulness of "when F, then G", but
nonetheless does not imply that everything is possible. In other words: chaos
according to this other view may refer to an interdependence of events, yet
not in a form that would correspond to any traditional notion of order and
regularity (see also Chap. 8).
If the notion of lawfulness is defined in a broader way that does not re-
quire the "when F, then G" stipulation and if chaos implies interdependence,
it is conceivable that these different definitions of lawfulness and chaos
actually approach each other and that certain connotations of them may
perhaps even coincide. In that case, the quarrel between those who advocate
lawfulness and those who talk of chaos is ill-founded because it is based on a
misunderstanding of the meaning of terms. Thus, proponents of different
terms may not disagree as much as they think and as the terms seem to indi-
cate.
2.2 Explanation
(l) the requirement of explanatory relevance, Le., the propositions used for
the explanation must be relevant [for an amusing example of explanatory
irrelevance see Hempel (l966), p. 48]
(2) the requirement of testability, Le., "the statements constituting a scien-
tific explanation must be capable of empirical test" (Hempel 1966, p. 49).
As these requirements are met, an explanation is possible if the phenom-
enon to be explained (Le., the explanandum) can be derived from an ex-
planans (Le., that which explains) that consists of a law (or laws) termed
covering law(s) and the pertinent particular circumstances (initial conditions
and/or boundary conditions). This model of explanation is referred to as the
covering law model of explanation (Hempel 1965, 1966). Two types of ex-
planation are distinguished depending on the kind of laws used for the ex-
planation: (l) deductive-nomological explanation which is based on deter-
ministic (= universal) laws ('nomological' is etymologically derived from
'nomos,' for law), and (2) probabilistic explanation which utilizes probabi-
listic laws.
1. Deductive-nomological explanation. - This kind of explanation is a de-
ductive subsumption under deterministic (universal) covering law(s) and
fact (s). What has to be explained (Le., the explanandum) follows logically
as a special case of a covering law (or laws) and relevant particular circum-
stances. Thus, "the explanation fits the phenomenon to be explained into
a pattern of uniformities and shows that its occurrence was to be expected,
given the specified laws and the pertinent particular circumstances" (Hempel
1966, p. 50).
Deductive-
nomological
{DeterministiC law
. .
(S)} Explanans
P.ertment partIcular (i.e., that which explains)
clIcumstances
} Explanandum
Explanation Fact or law (i.e., that which has to be explained)
This example shows that in addition to the two laws the general principle
of causality is implied (for a criticism of this principle see Chap. 6). As a
result of the boundary condition, the validity of the two more specific laws
is restricted to flowering plants.
Since in the covering-law model of explanation law{s) and particular cir-
cumstance{s) are necessary, a crucial insight of an explanation may be due
to the discovery (invention) of a new law (or laws) and/or circumstance (s).
Auxiliary assumptions may also be necessary. Furthermore, all sorts of other
factors and background knowledge which are usually not stated explicitly may
be relevant to the explanation (see, e.g., Wimsatt 1976, 1980; Hull 1981a).
f
to the following scheme:
Probabilistic Probabilistic law (s) }
explanation Pertinent particular circumstance(s) Explanans
======makes highly probable
Fact or law } Explanandum
Since many biological laws are probabilistic laws, many explanations in bio-
logy are of a probabilistic nature, i.e., they are not arrived at with deductive
certainty, even if the covering law(s) and fact{s) would be certain (see, e.g.,
Knox and Considine 1982). However, since neither laws nor particular cir-
cumstances can be certain, all explanations, including deductive-nomological
explanations in which deductive certainty exists, are of a hypothetical nature,
i.e., they might be wrong.
It has been debated whether the covering law model of explanation is
the only way of explanation. If this were so, then areas of research in which
laws cannot be formulated could not provide explanations. Areas of such re-
search might be historical disciplines such as phylogenetics, although it is
debated whether the difficulty in obtaining laws is inherent in the disciplines
or simply due to lack of information at the present time. Regardless of the
54
reason(s) for the paucity or lack of laws in such disciplines, we might ask
whether it is possible to have a model of explanation that does not depend
on covering laws. Goudge (1961) and a number of other authors (see, e.g.,
Weingartner 1967) answered this question in the affirmative. Alternative
models of explanation proposed by Goudge are "integrative explanation"
and "narrative explanation" (see Goudge 1961; Hull 1974, 1981). In the lat-
ter kind of explanation, "an event like the evolution of mammals or extinc-
tion of dinosaurs is explained by specifying the temporal sequence of events
which lead up to it" (Hull 1974, p. 97). "Laws or law-like statements are
explicitly said not to playa role. The event to be explained is fully explained
by virtue of the fact that it falls into place" (Weingartner 1967, p. 9). Ruse
(1973) objected to this claim by pointing out that theories, such as evolu-
tionary or genetic theories, playa central role in such explanations. Hull
(1981) agreed, but added that their "role is not the derivation of the event
to be explained." According to Hull, theories and laws are mainly used to
determine the historical entities (such as dinosaurs) or particular individuals
for which a narrative explanation is given.
Woodger (1967) characterizes explanation in a very general way as analysis
or relating. "The process of explanation will consist, therefore, either in ex-
hibiting the relation of what is to be explained to something else, or in di-
minishing its complexity by analyzing it" (Woodger 1967, p. 273). Woodger
doubts whether it is possible to achieve a purely analytical explanation and
suggests that in the actual procedure of science both analysis and relating are
always operative.
leuken (1968) also supports a broad view of the notion of explanation
which to him is a synonym of "clarification" (van Laar and Verhoog 1971,
p. 289). In his opinion explanation is "everything that contributes to our
insight into the phenomenon under study." As a consequence of this broad
view he distinguishes eight different kinds of explanation (see van Laar and
Verhoog 1971, p. 288). Tondl (1973) and Achinstein (1983) also describe a
variety of different models of explanation.
Explanation is the product of an explaining act, i.e., verbal or written
communication. According to Achinstein (1983), the explaining act has been
neglected in most models of explanation. Thus, Hempel (1965, 1966), like
many other explanation theorists (see Achinstein 1983), stressed mainly the
product of explanation and its logic. Achinstein tries to show that an ex-
planation cannot be understood independently of the explaining act (see,
e.g., Achinstein 1983, pp. 81-83). This is so because ''what explains some-
thing for someone might not explain it for someone else, because of differ-
ences in beliefs, puzzlements, or intelligence" (Achinstein 1983, p. 9). Thus,
the persons involved in the process of explaining become important and ex-
planation can be seen as relative to these persons and their context including
55
their cultural milieu. Psychological and social factors are again involved (see
Sects. 1.3.3/4).
2.3 Prediction
Prediction in the strict sense is the forecasting of future events, whereas pre-
diction in the wide sense is the forecasting of any unknown event, i.e., it
comprises postdiction or retrodiction which is the inference of events of the
past, such as the existence of certain fossils before they were actually dis-
covered. To some extent the pattern of prediction in both senses is compar-
able to that of the covering law model of explanation. In both cases the
premises consist of law(s) and particular circumstance(s). However, the de-
duction functions either as an explanation or a prediction depending on
I
whether the deduced fact is known (as in the explanation) or unknown (as
in the prediction).
t
Law(s) ) Premises Law (s) } Premises
Prediction Particular Explanation Particular (Explanans)
circumstance (s) circumstance(s)
Although the symmetry between the two models appears striking, more and
more asymmetries have been discussed in the literature (see, e.g., Hull 1974,
p. 92). Whereas some of these asymmetries may apply generally, others may
occur only in certain kinds of predictions. An example of the latter kind was
mentioned by Mohr (l977, p. 69): in the case of X-ray induced point muta-
tions precise prediction is not possible because such mutations are probably
always quantum events which belong to the realm of microphysics where
the uncertainty principle applies. Explanation of such a mutation (once it
has occurred) is, however, possible in a precise way.
Some authors place enormous emphasis on prediction and the predictive
power of hypotheses (and theories) and go so far as to suggest that general
scientific propositions are defined in terms of predictive power, which means
that only a proposition with predictive power is scientific. It is furthermore
often assumed that the greater the predictive power of a hypothesis, the
higher its degree of confirmation and the closer it is to the truth. Although
it may be tempting to embrace prediction and predictive power as the crite-
rion for science, some warnings may be appropriate. On the one hand, it is
known that false hypotheses (i.e., hypotheses which we think are false) may
have considerable predictive power. A well-known example is Ptolemaic
astronomy which allowed and still allows accurate predictions of the move-
ments of stars. On the other hand, correct hypotheses coupled with wrong
56
2.4 Understanding
2.5 Summary
3.1 Introduction
this way, then even some generalizations may count as facts. Some biologists
who subscribe to this view refer to organic evolution as a fact. I prefer to
use the term 'fact' in its narrow sense, i.e., as a singular proposition. The
question that I want to discuss now is how singular propositions are related
to reality. In this regard very divergent views exist depending on the philo-
sophical position. I shall present two of those views. The first, I suspect, is
of little or no use to the scientist, whereas the second applies to the scientific
enterprise. Both views shall be presented in the form of more specific defini-
tions of 'fact'.
Fig. 3.1a,b. Outlines of portions of two plants (such as Esenbeckia pilocarpoides H.B.K.
or certain Citrus species (a) and Murraya exocita L. (b); buds in the aJdls of the lateral
structures are not indicated)
3.4 Objectivity
to our second definition, whereas this need not be the case for the arts
(including music) and the humanities.
Insisting that science has to be objective (in the sense of inter-subjective)
does not mean that it cannot investigate subjective experiences. But in deal-
ing with subjective experiences, science has to use an objective approach, i.e.,
different subjects have to share the same perceptions with regard to the sub-
jective experiences under investigation.
Many scientists seem to think that an objective experience (in the sense
of inter-subjectivity) must be true or real. This is a dangerous fallacy because
sharing an experience does not necessarily mean that it must be real. Mass
deceptions are shared experiences, yet they do not seem to be true or real,
i.e., what is experienced does not seem to exist objectively in the sense of
our first definition of objectivity (see Fig. 3.2 and Robinson 1972).
a
>>-----«
Hence, the fact that something at a certain time is perceived only by one or
a few individuals is not a criterion for its existence or nonexistence (see also
Rose 1983).
This brings us to another important consideration. What at one time or
one place may be a subjective experience, may become objective at a later
time or another place. It is known that at least some experiences change as
a culture develops. We have witnessed a rather rapid change of experiences
during the last decades in Western society. Stent (1969, 1978) gives us a vivid
description of some of these developments. We also know that at least some
experiences may change from one culture to another. Thus what is considered
subjective or objective (in the sense of inter-subjectivity) is relative. It depends
on the state of evolution of society. It depends on which conceptual frame-
work is adopted for the description of our facts and which state of conscious-
ness is favored as a basis for experiencing and perceiving the world. For ex-
ample, if the majority of us in Western society developed the state of con-
sciousness of the fire-walkers mentioned in Chap. 6, it would become an
objective fact that burning coal does not burn our feet. At the present time
this is still subjective because it is experienced by very few.
Stent (1969, 1978) thinks that our Western society has been undergo-
ing a profound transformation and is "on the road to Polynesia." If we ever
arrive in this paradise or "Golden Age" our perception of the world will
change drastically and many experiences that today are still subjective will
become objective. Thus, if some people in the "Golden Age" still feel like
doing science, many of their objective facts might be quite different from
our accepted facts today.
Quite apart from speculations about the "Coming of the Golden Age"
(Stent 1969), we cannot but conclude that facts (according to our second
definition) are relative. This relativity becomes especially obvious in periods
of transition from one culture to another or from one paradigm to another.
In such periods certain subjective experiences gradually become objective as
more and more people begin to share them. Because of the gradual transition
it may become impossible to tell at a certain stage of development whether
a certain experience is still subjective or already objective. Those to whom
the experience has been familiar for a long time and who have been living in
a subculture in which this kind of experience is common will not hesitate to
call it objective, whereas members of another subculture to whom the ex-
perience is new will be reluctant to accept it as an objective experience. This
discrepancy explains why in our present age of cultural transformation we
are engaged in many controversies over what is objective and what is scien-
tific. Consider, for example, the differing views held on the status of astrology
or parapsychology that according to some are objective and scientific and
in the opinion of others constitute merely subjective pseudo-science.
68
Instead of using the term 'fact', scientists often refer to 'data.' The literal
meaning of 'data' suggests that they are given (cf. the French term 'donnee'
which also means given). In other words: the term 'data', by its etymological
derivation, reinforces the idea that what is described is simply "out there,"
a particularity of reality as it exists independently of our observing it (cf.
Chap. 4, footnote 1).
The term 'observation,' if we take its literal meaning, may suggest at least
that what is "out there" is being observed so that an interaction between the
observed and the observer may be visualized. If this interaction influences
the observed, as may be the case in microphysics, biology, psychology, and
sociology, then we can no longer assume that the observed is real in the sense
that it exists independently of our observing it. In this case the observer is
an integral part of the observed. In such a unity of the observer and the ob-
served, or the subject and the object, objectivity according to our first defi-
nition becomes illusory (see, e.g., Bateson 1979).
The term 'fact,' which is etymologically derived from the latin word 'fac-
tum,' indicates that what is described is made by us (cf. the French word
'fait' which means 'made'). Thus, according to the etymology, facts are not
"out there," but they are our doing (cf. the German word for fact, 'Tatsache',
which etymologically means something that results from an act or a deed
of the observer). In terms of the preceding discussion this means that facts
are produced by our act of perception in a certain state of consciousness,
and influenced by the conceptual framework used for description. We may
ask now whether under these circumstances there are indeed any connec-
tions between our facts and reality. The answers given by different people
are very divergent. It has been said that because facts are made by us any-
thing can be accepted as factual provided one allows for enough changes in
the conceptual framework and the states of consciousness. This extreme point
of view has been taken, for example, by Pearce (1973). I find it difficult to
accept this position. For example, the fact 'there is one cat in this room'
may be replaced by other facts if the state of consciousness and the con-
ceptual framework are different. However, I do not see how it could be re-
69
placed, for example, by the fact 'there are two cats in this room.' Hence, I
think, that there are certain constraints given through reality, and for this
reason I do not think that "anything goes." Many things may go, but not
anything. And since not "anything goes," we cannot conclude that facts are
solely products of the observer and totally arbitrary as far as reality is con-
cerned. I agree with Woodger (1967, p. 135) who wrote: "The objects of
knowledge are in a sense ... creations of the intellectual activity" (and the
state of consciousness, I would add) "just as much as the objects of art are
creations of the aesthetic activity. But in neither case are they free creations"
(for a more detailed discussion of this point and examples see the following
chapter on Concepts and Classification).
To avoid misunderstandings, I want to distinguish now two kinds of
relativism: on the one hand the extreme relativism of Pearce (1973) and
others according to which "anything goes," and on the other hand a moderate
relativism which I have been advocating in the preceding discussion. Moderate
relativism does not claim that facts are real; it emphasizes that facts may
depend on the observer and therefore may be relative. However, it concedes
that reality enters at least to some extent into the facts. The question to
what extent reality is represented by facts is debatable and I do not see how
it can be answered in any general way, if at all. One really needs to know
reality in order to judge to what extent a fact represents it.
Another argument against the idea that facts are solely our creations may
be added. If facts did not mirror reality at least to some extent, how then
would it be possible to succeed in science so that we can make predictions
about the future? Furthermore, how would it be possible for us to survive
in the world if all our observations on which we depend to orient ourselves
were fictitious? Riedl (1980) tells the revealing story of academics who were
debating the reality of facts; when approached by a herd of rhinoceri they
immediately ran for safety. After all, rhinoceri are dangerous. However, we
have to remind Riedl that perhaps rhinoceri are not always dangerous and
perhaps not to everybody. The same could be said of lions. An Indian artist
portrayed a sage sitting peacefully with two lions under a tree.
Now some comments are necessary on the singularity or particularity of
facts. Since facts do not refer to the whole, but only to particularities, they
cut out segments from the unity of the world. Thus the observer does not
only perceive the facts through the "glasses" of his perception, but the de-
limitation of the facts from the whole context of reality is also the creation
of the observer. Again we may ask whether this creation is totally arbitrary
or whether it is constrained by reality. I would think that it is not totally
arbitrary, but may reflect reality to some extent. Although reality appears
to be a unity, it does not seem to be uniformly homogeneous. It appears to
be patterned in the sense of being a "patterned continuum" (Weiss 1973).
70
Particularities thus reflect regions of reality that are partially (but not totally)
isolated from the surrounding regions (for a more detailed discussion see the
following chapter on Concepts and Classification).
In conclusion, it may be said that facts do not represent reality as it is in-
dependently of our observing it. First, our perception projects our state of
consciousness and our conceptual framework onto the facts we describe.
Second, our perception isolates particularities as entities from the patterned
continuum of the unified world. From this point of view, we may state that
facts are not real. However, they do not seem to be totally fictitious either,
but may represent reality to some extent.
3.6 Experience
As the terms 'fact,' 'objectivity,' and 'reality' have different meanings, so,
too, the term 'experience' is used in different ways (see, e.g., Le Shan and
Margenau 1982). In the following, I shall describe some of the meanings of
the verb 'to experience.' First of all, to scientists experiencing can be perceiv-
ing. In that sense particularities are experienced and these experiences are
described as facts. Second, experiencing can also be understood in a more
direct way, namely as sensing as defined by Woodger (1967, p. 134). This is
an experience of what Woodger (1967, p. 134) calls the primary realm of
the world. In contrast to the first kind of experience (perception), here
thought is not projected into this realm. Therefore, this experience is an im-
mediate or direct experience of the world which has not yet been divided up
by discursive thought. Consequently, facts as particularities do not exist.
Experience in this direct sense does not constitute knowledge because knowl-
edge requires thought. Only experience according to the first definition is
knowledge. Naturally, a clear-cut distinction between the two kinds of
experience is not always possible in our daily activities. Especially the direct
or immediate experience is very difficult to obtain for most of us. We are
habitually too conditioned by discursive thought to be able to experience
directly without the intervention of thought. Thus in many instances only
an approximation of direct experience may be possible.
Finally a third kind of experiencing that goes beyond sensing may be
distinguished, but this way of experiencing is possible only for an enlighten-
ed person who has been totally aware of his or her integration with the world.
At this stage there is no longer "any distinction between his [her] self and
other selves, the subject and the external objects. And this is the experiencing
of the Absolute as understood in Zen Buddhism" (Izutsu 1971, p. 505). It
coincides with an enlightened state of being. There is neither subject nor ob-
ject of experience.
71
3.7 Summary
4.1 Concepts
4.1.1 Introduction
English:
Shona:
Bassa:
hui ziza
Having pointed out how concepts are formed, we may now ask what their
status is with regard to reality 1 . Two extreme views have been taken already
in the middle ages (and before). The nominalists think that concepts are
only names that lack any relationship to reality. Thus, as far as reality is
concerned, any name is just as good (or as bad) as any other one. The con·
ceptual realists claim, however, that at least some of the concepts are real.
This means that they "exist in themselves and would exist even if there were
no minds to be aware of them" (Woozley 1967). Hence, they are not the
result of abstraction.
Real concepts are also called universals. The controversy between nomi-
nalists and realists reached a peak during the middle ages in the dispute over
universals. It is not at all over and it seems it will never be totally finished.
Among biologists we also find nominalists and realists. For example, species
by some are considered just as names devoid of a representation of reality,
whereas others maintain that species are real, i.e., they are natural kinds (see,
e.g., Kitts and Kitts 1979). Maybe it is fair to say that most of the practicing
biologists are conceptual realists or have a tendency toward this position.
Thus, to them entities such as "genes," "cells," "organs," "organisms," and
"species" are real (i.e., natural kinds), whereas higher taxonomic categories
such as families, orders, or phyla are often considered to be unreal or only
partially real. There are also authors who take a position somewhat inter-
mediate between extreme nominalism and a realism that postulates natural
kinds defined by the possession of common (essential) properties [see, e.g.,
Dupre (1981) who defends a "promiscuous realism" according to which
species lack essences because they are seen as peaks in a continuum]; although
this view may come closer to nature than the postulate of natural kinds
(essences), it is questionable whether it applies to "ochlospecies with a main-
ly unresolvable, reticulate variation pattern" (Whitmore 1976, p. 25).
1 As pointed out by Bohm (Bohm in Wilber 1982, p. 53), the term 'reality' "is based
on the word res, meaning thing, and the thing is what is known." Furthermore, "res is
based on the word rere, mening to think, and the thing is what you can think about,
essentially. So reality is just what man can know" (Bohm in Wilber 1982, p. 53). In
contrast to this literal definition of reality , in common usage reality tends to be equated
with truth, i.e., "that which is" (Bohm in Wilber 1982, p. 64). I am using the term
'reality' in the latter sense.
76
I think that neither realism nor nominalism are tenable in the extreme forms
as described above. Since concepts are abstractions from reality, they are
not totally fictitious; they do represent at least certain features of reality.
Woodger (1967, p. 153) uses the analogy of a map to illustrate the relation
between concepts and reality. A map represents a certain region of the world.
If it is a good map, it allows us to find our way around. How could this be
possible if there were no correspondence whatsoever between the map and
the region of the world it represents? The better the map, the greater is the
correspondence with reality; the greater the correspondence, the higher the
degree of adequacy. With regard to concepts this means that the more con-
cepts correspond with reality, the more adequate they are.
Woodger's map analogy also shows that even the most adequate concepts
can not represent reality completely. Even a very good map can at best be
an approximation to reality. For example, what in the map is represented as
a straight line is not a completely straight line in nature. In this sense a map
and also a concept are simplifications of nature. Furthermore, a map presents
only some features of a region of the world such as, for example, distances.
It does not represent that region as it is in its total existence "out there."
However, it can incorporate more and more features and thus become more
complete and more adequate. If features are selected that are highly correlated
with others, the degree of adequacy is also greatly enhanced. However, since
the correlation is never complete, no single map can represent all aspects of
a region. For example, a geomorphological map may be partly (or even total-
ly?) correlated with a geological map of the same region, but a political or
economic map will show different aspects. Maps that show different aspects
and are thus complementary to each other, may be equally adequate. In this
situation it is not useful to ask which one is better.
In his description of the map analogy, Woodger also points out that not
all concepts are comparable with maps since all maps have "perceptual ex-
emplification," but not all have concepts. "Perceptual exemplification"
means that the concept refers to something that can be perceived as maps
refer to regions of the world that can be perceived at least in principle. An
example of a concept without perceptual exemplification is the concept
"two" which cannot be perceived. We can perceive two things, but not the
concept "two." Thus, whereas all objects (of our perception and thought)
are concepts, not all concepts are objects (i.e., thought-objects) with a per-
ceptual exemplification. However, all concepts have in common that they
are "representative of, i.e., thoughts of, something else" (Woodger 1967,
p. 155), either an object or something which cannot be represented pictori-
ally.
77
Concepts have been differently classified. I shall present only two classifica-
tions. One distinguishes qualitative, comparative (= semiquantitative), and
quantitative concepts. If we take coloration to illustrate these three kinds of
concepts, "red" is an example of a qualitative concept, "more red" (than
yellow) is an example of a comparative concept, and the tone of color in
terms of wavelength is an example of a quantitative concept. Quantitative
concepts are especially useful in science because of their accuracy and great
empirical content. They provide good tests for hypotheses and theories.
Qualitative concepts are often treated as universals or natural kinds. In that
case they become by necessity mutually exclusive. Thus if, for example,
"red" is considered a reality, then it follows that something is either red or
it is not. In terms of essences, i.e., the philosophy of essentialism, this means
that something is either essentially red or not. If it is essentially red, it mani-
fests the essence, i.e., the reality, of red. Essentialism, which is related to
conceptual realism, can be a great obstacle to scientific research [see, e.g.,
Popper (1962, 1966), for a general criticism, Hull (1965), Sattler (1966,
1974a,b), and Mayr (1976a, 1982) for biological case studies that show the
negative influence of essentialism on biology].
Another classification of concepts distinguishes between individual con-
cepts, class concepts, relation concepts, and quantitative concepts (see Bunge
1967, p. 60). An example of an individual concept is "Charles Darwin";
"biologist" is a class concept; "between" is a relation concept. Individual
concepts are often mistaken for real entities of nature that are supposed to
exist independently of our observation and conceptualization. It seems
paradoxical to consider Charles Darwin a totally isolated entity of nature.
He himself pointed out the continuity of evolution. "Charles Darwin" prob-
ably is a concept with a high degree of adequacy, but it still is an abstraction.
Our constant use of language reinforces the belief that individuals actually
exist as entities independently of our conceptualization (see also below).
It is important to make a distinction between the concept and its term. The
term is merely a symbol, a word, a name that consists of letters. It designates
79
the concept and it refers to reality. The concept is an abstraction that refers
to reality. In order to distinguish concepts and terms, a standard convention
of philosophers that I am following in this book is to place concepts in double
quotation marks and terms in single quotation marks. For example, the term
'red' designates the concept "red" which like the term refers to what is red
in the real world.
A distinction between terms and concepts is necessary because the same
term may be used to designate different concepts and the same concept may
be represented by different terms. For example, the term 'verification' may
be used to designate the concept of "verification" (= "proof') or the con-
cept of "confirmation" (see Chap. 1). And the concept "proof' may be rep-
resented by the terms 'proof or 'verification.' Since we have more concepts
than terms, many words stand for more than one concept. Much ambiguity
arises for this reason.
Many of the terms used in the preceding pages designate different con-
cepts. 'Fact,' 'objectivity,' 'real,' 'hypothesis,' 'explanation,' 'verification,'
'falsification,' and many others have at least two meanings. In some cases
one can avoid confusion by adding 'sensu stricto' (= narrow sense) or 'sensu
lato' (= wide sense) behind the term. Thus, one may distinguish between
'hypothesis s. str.' and 'hypothesis s.lat.' In other cases one has to add special
qualifications in order to avoid confusion. For example, one can refer to
'objectivity in the sense of inter-subjectivity.' Or one can stipulate that one
uses an ambiguous term in only one specified sense. For example, I can point
out that in this book I am using the term 'objective' to designate only "inter-
subjectivity." When I want to refer to reality I do not use the term 'objectiv-
ity,' but the term 'reality.'
The following scheme that is modified after Bunge (1967, I, p. 57) shows
the relation between terms, concepts, and reality in a more comprehensive
context by distinguishing three levels:
Levels Example
Bunge (1967, I, p. 57) refers to the physical level instead of the level of real-
ity. If it is contended that reality is only of a material nature, this is ap-
propriate. I think, however, that reality is neither physical nor spiritual, but
the Unnamable (see Chap. 2). I also think that there is more and more
evidence from a variety of scientific disciplines and a profound experience
of the world indicating that reality is not just atomistic, i.e., composed of a
hierarchy of entities, but that it also is a unity (see, e.g., Bateson 1972, 1979;
Capra 1975, 1982; Bohm 1971,1980). This view does not imply that atom-
istic concepts are totally useless and inadequate. Atomistic concepts such as
"atom," "cell," or "individual" (organism) may capture and represent the
discontinuous aspect of reality. In this sense atomistic concepts are com-
plementary to those underlining the continuous aspect of reality. If we want
to make any general statement at all about the nature of reality and of life it
might be best to speak of a "patterned continuum" (Weiss 1973). Since it is
a continuum it forms a unity, but since it is patterned, elements can be dis-
tinguished. However, these elements are not totally discontinuous and there-
fore an atomistic view of reality that posits a hierarchy of entities such as
elementary particles, atoms, molecules, cells, organs, and organisms does not
seem to be real in the sense of existing independently of our conceptualiza-
tion.
4.1.7 Definition
A definition describes the meaning of a term (or concept). For example, the
definition of 'biology' is as follows:
'Biology' = 'Science of life'
'Biology' is called the definiendum, i.e., that which is to be defined, whereas
'Science of life' is the definiens, i.e., that which defines. "To define a term is
to show how to avoid it" (Quine, quoted by Hempel 1966), because the
term of the definiendum should not recur in the definiens.
The maxim 'Define your terms' is a very important one, especially since
many terms have more than one meaning. Unless a definition is given, con-
fusion may arise. I think that quite a number of controversies in science are
not disagreements on real issues, but are due to semantic misunderstandings
and confusion. Quine's (1961) contention that real and semantic issues can-
not be sharply delimited, complicates the matter.
Although definition of terms is of fundamental importance, we have to
realize that not all terms can be defined. If we define one term by other
terms, we may have to define these other terms again, and so on. Since there
is no end to definitions, we are bound to stop at one point and leave the
81
terms of the definiens of that last definition undefined. These terms that are
no more defined are called primitive terms. We have to grasp the meaning of
these primitive terms intuitively. Thus intuition comes again into play and
since all defined terms are eventually based on intuition it can be said that
the whole edifice of science with all its terms fundamentally rests on intui-
tion. Anyone who claims that science can or should be totally exact should
reconsider this claim in the light of primitive terms.
Naturally, one may choose one's primitive terms as one pleases. For ex-
ample, one may adopt 'identity' as a primitive term or one may defme it by
other primitive terms. However, one term or another will have to remain un-
defined.
4.1.8 Operationism
1. f2 f3 f4 fs
2. f1 f3 f4 fs
3. f1 f2 f4 fs
4. f1 f2 f3 fs
5. f1 f2 f3 f4
Provided four out of five is considered a large number, then the above ex-
ample represents a fully polytypic class. One point of fundamental im-
portance that Beckner demonstrated by his analysis of fully polytypic classes
is the fact that these classes can no longer be defined in the traditional sense
because their members have not even a single defining property in common.
The great merit of Beckner's analysis was to show that the notion of a fully
polytypic class allows us to conceive of classes where the traditional approach
fails.
The traditional concept of classes is called mono typic (= monothetic).
Monotypic classes are defined by a set of properties or at least one single
property. This concept of monotypic classes is only of limited usefulness in
biology. Living systems usually are too variable to conform to fixed sets of
properties. Intuitively this has been known for a long time, especially by
competent systematists. They have, however, failed to point out the logical
structure of polytypic concepts. When I was a student I could not under·
stand why taxonomic classes were not well defined monotypically. Most of
the definitions of such classes were followed by a list of exceptions. These
exceptions, although they did not satisfy the definition, were nonetheless
considered as belonging to the class. I found this situation very dissatisfying.
From a logical point of view, I felt that the individuals that did not satisfy
the definition should be excluded. However, intuitively such exclusion ap-
peared to be artificial and unjustified as it was recognized by competent
systematists. Beckner's (1959) book revealed the solution to this puzzle still
during the time of my graduate studies, although I learned of it much later.
Actually, Wittgenstein had made a similar point long before Beckner, but I
was not aware of that either.
A botanical example of fully polytypic classes are the two major groups
of the flowering plants, namely the monocotyledons and the dicotyledons.
The dicotyledons usually are defined by the follOwing set of properties: two
cotyledons (seed leaves), leaves with netted venation, vascular bundles of
the stem arranged in a cylinder, vascular cambium present, floral parts in
whorls of four or five (or higher numbers, but not three). One can find excep-
tions to all of these properties. Thus there are, for example, dicotyledonous
plants with only one cotyledon. Since these plants share the other properties
listed above, they belong to the fully polytypic class of dicotyledons. It
would be wrong to conclude that such classes cannot be defined as is some-
84
times claimed. They cannot be defmed monotypically, but they can be de-
fined in the fully polytypic sense.
I think it is obvious that the notion of polytypic classes is also of great
significance in everyday life. So often we try to find traditional monotypic
classes which, if imposed rigidly, almost inevitably exclude members that
belong to the class in a polytypic sense. Such cases become of great im-
portance when law and justice is concerned. Too often it may happen, for
example, that someone does not qualify for social benefits because one of
the defining properties of the whole set is not satisfied. In such cases we feel
the injustice intuitively, but often nothing can be done when the monotypic
approach is followed. Consequently there are still many victims of the notion
of a monotypic class. In extreme cases, the difference between monotypic
and polytypic classification may be a matter of life or death.
Although the concept of (fully) polytypic classes allows us to deal with
many problems of classification much more satisfactorily than that of the
traditional monotypic classes, there are certain limitations to the use of the
(fully) polytypic concept. Beckner's first and second condition contain the
notion of "large number." What constitutes a large number? 9 out of 10,
8 out of 10, or still 7 out of 1O? We cannot draw a sharp line and therefore
(fully) polytypic classes cannot be clearly delimited from a collection of
individuals that no longer constitutes a class in either a monotypic or (fully)
polytypic sense. How do we deal with such situations? Zadeh (1965,1971)
presented a solution by his "fuzzy set theory." According to this theory,
class membership is no longer total, but a matter of degree. Any individual
may be a member of a class from 0% to 100%. Being a 0% member of a class
is the borderline case in which the individual does not belong any more to
that class at all. A 1% member would still partially belong to the class and
would be closer to the 0% member than, for example, to a 10% member.
Fuzzy set theory so far has been very little used in biology (see, e.g.,
Marchi and Hansell 1975 ; Dubois and Prade 1980; Beatty 1982). Nonetheless,
I think that this theory has enormous potential in biology because it can
cope successfully with fuzzy situations that are so typical of life. It also
should prove very useful and adequate in psychology and the social sciences
as well as in everyday life situations and in politics. Communists and capital-
ists are often treated like members of two monotypic classes that are defined
by a set of properties. What we find in real life is a whole range of member-
ship from 0% to 100%. Many people actually are partial members of both
fuzzy sets. Much unnecessary antagonism would disappear if we just realized
that we do not belong to mutually exclusive classes, but that we occupy a
place along a "patterned continuum." Weiss (1973) who used the concept
of "patterned continuum" has dealt with these issues and their far-reaching
consequences for society in a most perceptive and penetrating manner.
85
tt+-+-----
Domain of concept A -======-==-
Domain of concept B
Fig. 4.2. Concepts as injunctions. (Slightly modified after Hassenstein 1954, p. 199)
reality. Adequate concepts, like good maps, may help to orient and guide
us. Awareness of the process of conceptualization leads beyond the latter.
Thus, conceptualization in awareness need no longer be destructive.
4.2 Classification
4.2.1 Classes
are continuous with each other as a result of their evolution. Even if one ac-
cepts Eldredge and Gould's (1972) "punctuated equilibria," i.e., the notion
that the evolution of species is relatively rapid and abrupt, one cannot deny
that the transition from one species to another is a relatively continuous pro-
cess which, in time, extends the gene pool of one species to that of another
by a more or less gradual (or abrupt) change ofthe former. Only an observer
who considers simply a cross-section of phylogeny at one particular time,
i.e., a time-slice of phylogeny, may come to the conclusion that many species
are discontinuous. If phylogeny is seen in its space-time extension, then the
continuity between species is obvious. This means, however, that if we ac-
cept the individualistic species concept, we may go further to consider as one
individual the totality of species that share in a common gene pool or exhibit
other ways of genetic integration (see, e.g., Richmond and Smith 1979;
Margulis and Sagan 1985). If now, in addition to genetic integration, the
interaction and continuity of organisms with the environment is taken into
consideration, then we can see the whole world as one integrated system
(see, e.g., the Gaia hypothesis proposed by Lovelock 1979). We arrive at a
scientific view of unity or oneness that is fundamental in mystical experience.
One question that arises with regard to systems of classification is: how do
we construct them? Due to the biophilosophical studies of many taxonomists
much has been learned about taxonomic methodology during the last de-
cades. Particularly the analytical studies of the numerical taxonomists
(Sneath and Sokal 1973) should be taken into consideration, regardless of
whether one accepts the philosophical and biological tenets of the numerical
taxonomists, which have become increasingly sophisticated, diversified and
comprehensive; they may even include evolutionary aspects and thus are not
necessarily restricted to phenetic classifications based on equal weighting of
characters (see below).
The following steps may be distinguished in the construction of a phenetic
system of classification: (1) the choice of classes (that will be classified) with
their members and the distinction of characters with their states, (2) the de-
termination of the degree of Similarity or difference of the classes, and (3) the
arrangements of the classes in a system of classification according to the
degree of Similarity or difference.
To 1. A character has at least two states (or attributes). An example of a
two-state character is "leaf surface hairy," or "leaf surface not hairy." Hairi-
ness is one state, nonhairiness is the other state. It is evident that in certain
cases a multistate character would be more appropriate, such as, for example,
90
the three-state character: "leaf surface not hairy ," "leaf surface slightly
hairy ," and "leaf surface densely hairy." A continuum of states naturally
would be the most adequate representation in at least certain continuous
samples.
Characters and their states are the result of conceptualization. This con-
ceptualization provides the foundation for what is considered the same
character and the same state in different organisms. Sameness is a funda-
mental issue. We know that sameness in the sense of identity does not exist.
Thus we never step into the same river twice because the second time neither
the river nor we are exactly the same as before. "Panta rhei," i.e., all is flow
(Heraclit), means that the water of the river changes constantly, and, as
modern biology has shown, most of the cells and molecules of our body are
replaced at a rapid rate. People who suffer from an "identity crisis" should
realize that there is no identity in this world because everything is more or
less in flux. What appears to be stable is only so because it changes relatively
slowly with respect to faster transformations in the environment. Thus, we
must conclude that what is considered to be the same is never exactly the
same. It can at best be an approximation to sameness. Hence, the very basis
of the classificatory process that assumes sameness of characters is already
an oversimplification. It is only through abstraction that sameness emerges.
The task, of course, is to abstract in the most adequate way.
Showing the sameness of characters is usually referred to as homologiza-
tion (according to one definition of homology). I think that homologization
of this kind, i.e., the establishing of total correspondences (or 1: 1 corres-
pondences) of characters, may be considered adequate in a number of cases.
In other cases the correspondence of characters is rather partial. In these
cases the traditional concept of homology implying sameness should be
replaced by a concept of partial homology which I have termed a semi-
quantitative homology concept (Sattler 1966, 1984).
Homology can be considered as the central concept of comparative bio-
logy and as the most basic concept in taxonomy because homologization
has to be carried out as the first step in the process of classification. It is
ironical that the central concept of comparative biology has been treated
predominantly as a qualitative concept which implies that a character is
either homologous with another one or not. If, as suggested, homology were
conceived as a comparative (= semiquantitative) concept, this would render
comparative biology a truly comparative discipline. A further step to be
taken would be the quantification of homology (see, e.g., Sneath and Sokal
1973). Fuzzy set theory may provide the appropriate tool in this respect. It
would allow us to see a quantitative relation between the so-called same
characters and others that are different. Total homology would then turn
out to be the borderline case in which the degree of homology (= degree of
91
Eldredge and Cracraft 1980; Platnick and Funk 1983). The difficult question
that arises for these taxonomists is how to determine the proper weighting
of characters. Much disagreement and vagueness exists in this respect and as
a consequence phylogenetic systems of classification are often rather specu-
lative, especially in taxa for which fossil evidence is lacking or poor. Thus it
is not surprising that even the most enthusiastic proponents of phylogenetic
systems, such as, for example, Simpson (1961) could write the following:
"Taxonomy is a science, but its application to classification involves a great
deal of human contrivance and ingenuity, in short, of art. In this art, there
is a leeway for personal taste, even foibles, but there are also canons that
help to make some classification better, more meaningful, more useful than
others" (quoted after Mohr 1977, p. 125). Some critics of phylogenetic and
evolutionary systematics would be even more negative. On the other hand,
cladists who have developed a special methodology of phylogenetic system-
atics are more optimistic as far as phylogenetic reconstruction and classifica-
tion are concerned (see, e.g., Cracraft 1983).
Pages and pages, articles and articles have been written to show either
that phenetic systems are the natural ones or, more frequently, the contrary,
Le., that only phylogenetic systems can be the systems of nature. From what
has been said before about the relation of concepts and systems of classifica-
time
Fig. 4.3. Scheme showing a case of discrepancy between phenetic and phylogenetic
classification. Explanation in the text
93
@ SF
8 @ LA
@AA
e 8
e e
e
Populations Numerical taxonomy
Q
\&
e
I
@
AA
e e e 5875L
Chemotaxonomy Allozymes
e
tC:\
\&
e
DNA/DNA hybridization F 1 fertility
Fig. 4.4. Legend see opposite page
95
Fig. 4.4. Upper left: Nine populations representing all six species of section Erythrante
of the genus Mimulus. Upper right: classification consisting of four groups (indicated
by black bars) according to numerical taxonomy. Center left: two groups of most similar
populations based on chemotaxonomy. Center right: two groups of most similar popu-
lations on the basis of their aUozymes. Lower left: Six populations forming one group
according to DNA/DNA hybridization. Lower right : Five fully inter-fertile populations
can be distinguished as a group on the basis of the fertilities of the interpopulation F1
hybrids. (After Vickery 1984)
96
webs), etc. Probably, one could find examples in all biological disciplines.
Furthermore, in many other domains of human activity the terms net and
network have been applied successfully. Cybernetics and systems thinking
utilize the concepts of feedback loops and networks. Nets are not only
known in the physical sphere, but also in the mental realm. Novak (1971,
p. 55) characterized the self as a net and Hesse (1974) developed a network
theory of scientific methodology. The scheme of Laszlo, which I have
modified slightly (see Chap. 1, Fig. 1.7), is also a network model of the
scientific enterprise. A brief scan of bibliographic aids such as Biological
Abstracts reveals that nets and networks have been reported in many in-
stances and in many different disciplines (see Chap. 6 for a discussion of
network thinking).
I think that nets are often a more adequate, although more complex, rep-
resentation of nature than hierarchies. In these cases, hierarchies can be
considered to be a simplified and an impoverished version of nets in which
some relations or interactions have been ignored. These relations have been
indicated by dotted lines in Fig. 4.6. Note that a net results if the dotted
lines are drawn out, i.e., are added to the others.
The reason why the notion of hierarchy works to a certain extent may be
that in some cases the dotted lines represent weaker relations or interactions
so that they may be negligible without a great loss of information. Thus hier-
archies may be considered to be useful approximations in a number of cases,
although nets seem to be the more adequate model in many cases. It is, of
course, possible in certain cases such as phylogenetic trees to abstract in such
a way that trees and hierarchies are adequate representations.
The challenge of modern systematics is to adapt our methodology of
classification to nature so that the resulting systems will become more ade-
quate. We distort nature if we impose rigid class concepts where she is fuzzy
and continuous. In those cases injunctions and fuzzy set theory may be more
appropriate. Classification thus turns into ordering. Ordering is a broader
concept than classifying by means of monotypic or polytypic classes in hier-
archical or nonhierarchical systems. Ordering can lead to yet other systems.
For example, clinal variation, reported in the biological literature, in a
simplified and formalized representation may have the following order:
abc
bcd
cde
def
If the four elements (abc, bcd, etc.) represent individuals, this clinal system
cannot be said to consist of classes, yet it exhibits order. A well-known ex-
ample is the change of vegetation along a gradient(s), such as increasingly
restricted precipitation (see Whittaker 1973; Tivy 1982, p. 197). Since the
change in vegetation structure is continuous, the delimitation of vegetation
types is arbitrary. In such cases ordination provides a more natural representa-
tion of the phenomenon than classification. Ordination is defined as "the
arrangement of samples in relation to environmental gradients as a basis for
gradient analysis" (Whittaker 1973, p. 6). A great variety of ordination tech-
niques have been developed (see, e.g., Whittaker and Gauch 1978).
Although in the preceding discussion mainly classes of individual organ-
isms and groups of organisms were considered, all sorts of other entities can
be classified, such as, for example, processes, functions, chemical compounds,
hypotheses, systems of classifications, methods of classification, ideas,
philosophies, ideologies, religions, life-styles. Again, it may often be more
appropriate to look for order that is not expressed by a system of classes
but rather by a net of fuzzy sets or injunctions. Even the latter may create
distortions (see Chap. 2 on the chaotic aspect of nature), but they may be
more adequate than conventional classes and hierarchical systems. The latter
will, of course, retain a certain practical usefulness, especially if we are aware
of their limitations.
It should not be overlooked that the issues of classification and ordering
may have great social relevancy inasmuch as concepts such as "IQ," "race,"
"ideology ," or "religion" are concerned [for a case study on marijuana show-
ing the social and legal implications of the species problem see Small (1979)].
4.3 Summary
the branches are formed in the leaf axil and then are secondarily displaced
onto the leaf during the development of the latter (see, e.g., Dickinson and
Sattler 1975). However, in other cases, this auxiliary hypothesis has been
confirmed, Le., the branches are initiated on the leaf in a position that is
contradictory to the classical model (see, e.g., Dickinson and Sattler 1974
and Figs. 5.2, 5.3). One might be tempted now to conclude that such ob-
servations falSify the classical model. However, we cannot be sure that all
other relevant auxiliary hypotheses are satisfied. Furthermore, as stated be-
fore, we cannot rely 100% on our observations. We have to acknowledge
that our facts might be mistaken.
Therefore, it seems to me that all we can conclude is that the classical
model has been neither proven nor disproven. It has been confirmed by
numerous facts, yet contradictory facts remain. In order to resolve these
contradictions I proposed a new model of the shoot (Sattler 1971, 1974)
which is based on the old idea of a continuum between morphological cate-
gories (see, e.g., Biinning 1977; Cusset 1982). Specifically, the new model
comprises two postulates (Fig. 5 .4a):
Shoot
Shoot
Phyllome
Caulome
Caulome Phyllome
with or with or
without without
Trichome trichomes trichomes
Fig. 5.4a,b. The new shoot model (to the left) represents a continuum approach to
morphology, whereas the traditional scheme (to the right) is rooted in hierarchical
thinking and the idea of mutually exclusive categories. According to the continuum
model (a) the four typical structures that occupy the four corners of the pyramid are
much more frequent than intermediates. The frequency is indicated by the density of
dots
106
(1) there is a continuum between the following four categories: shoot (in-
cluding the reproductive shoot), stem (in the broad sense of "caulome"),
leaf (in the broad sense of "phyllome"), and trichome (= hair)
(2) the position of organs is variable.
new paradigm would be closer to the truth than the existing one? If the
paradigms are incommensurable they are not comparable and hence the
question is meaningless. In that case the classical paradigm would focus on
one aspect of nature, namely the discontinuous one, whereas the continu-
um model (paradigm) would emphasize the continuous aspect of nature.
Hence, the two views could be considered to be complementary. It would
be progress to interpret plant form and structure from both viewpoints. Such
progress would be particularly beneficial with regard to tolerance between
adherents to different models or paradigms and a generally tolerant attitude
in our society.
The incommensurability thesis is, however, debatable and I am not com-
pletely convinced whether it applies to the situation in plant morphology.
Possibly the continuum model includes the classical model as a special case
(see Sattler 1974), since in the continuum model continuities as well as dis-
continuities can be presented, whereas the classical model does not allow for
continuities between organ categories.
According to the dialectical scheme of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis,
the classical model represents the thesis, and an extreme formulation of the
continuum view that focuses only on the continuum represents the anti-
thesis; the synthesis is the view that plants form a "patterned continuum"
(WeiSS 1973): this synthetic continuum view recognizes both the continu-
um and the pattern that could be described as relative articulation of the
continuum or as relative discontinuity. In this book as well as in previous
publications I have used the terms 'continuum,' 'continuum model,' 'con-
tinuum view,' etc., in the synthetic sense. Accordingly, I recognize that each
plant shows relative articulations or discontinuities and the distribution of
typical and atypical forms is also heterogeneous, i.e., the typical forms are
much more frequent than the atypical ones.
Finally, I want to emphasize that the continuum view need not be inter-
preted as a new paradigm and disciplinary matrix. As I pointed out already,
it may just as well be seen as a modification and extension of the classical
approach. The classical approach is in fact so plastic that it intergrades with
the continuum view. Guedes (1979, p. 135), for example,recognizes posi-
tional variability of organs (such as epiphyllous leaves in Begonia hispida var.
cucullifera) , while retaining the mutual exclusivity of the three kinds of
organs. In other words: he tasks a viewpoint that is intermediate between
the typical classical model and the continuum approach. Other morphologists
could be quoted whose views combine elements of both the classical and
continuum approaches. This means that the two approaches are not sharply
delimited from each other, but form a continuum. Any opposition of the
two approaches as two mutually exclusive schools of thought is therefore
artificial. In addition, opposition and polarization may be detrimental to the
III
law. There is, however, the problem of invariance and universality. Laws in
the strict sense (Le., deterministic laws) are universal and therefore do not
tolerate exceptions. In this regard, axillary branching is not a law. We know
of genera in which branches are formed either on leaves or stems remote
from the axil (see, e.g., Dickinson 1978; Guedes 1979).
It seems that there is a continuum from universal laws (if they exist) via
weak laws to rules and finally irregular occurrences. If the generalization on
axillary branching is still considered to be at the fringe of a weak law border-
ing at a rule, then it would be categorized as a coexistence law (or rule). This
is evident if it is formulated as follows: in seed plants branching tends to oc-
cur in the axil of leaves. In other words: the properties of leaves along a
stem and axillary branching coexist. An example of a process law is the state-
ment that "in higher plants the operation of the physiologically active form
of phytochrome (Pfr) leads to a stimulation of leaf growth while growth of
the internodes is inhibited" (Mohr 1982, p. 101).
The weak law or rule of axillary branching is an empirical law or rule.
Such laws or rules can be generated inductively. The observation of axillary
branching in one plant or a number of plants can be genralized inductively.
Since the law is not universal, one cannot, however, claim that all seed plants
have axillary branching. One can at best conclude that this applies to most
of them.
An example of a more general law (principle) that cannot be derived in-
ductively is the principle of varying proportions. This principle allows the
explanation of much of the diversity of plant form as the result of varying
proportions. In classical morphology it may refer to varying proportions of
organ systems, organs and subunits of organs such as the parts of leaves
(Troll 1949). Thus it is based on the notion of the classical kinds of organs
and therefore is subject to the criticism of the classical model. However, this
principle can also be applied in a wider context (see, e.g., Thompson 1917;
Bookstein 1978).
Law and order. I can now use the postulate of axillary branching as an ex-
ample for the discussion of the difficult question of whether there are laws
and order in nature. As pointed out already, we have found exceptions to
the common case in which branching occurs in the leaf axil. Hence, the
postulate of axillary branching cannot be considered a deterministic (= uni-
versal) law. As far as I know, the same conclusion can be drawn with regard
to all other generalizations of comparative morphology, if not biology as a
whole (see, e.g., McIntosh 1980/1982, pp. 39-40). With regard to the pos-
tulate of axillary branching, the question, then, is whether it is a probabilistic
law. The answer to this question may be yes or no, depending on the point
of view taken. Thus, with reference to the whole flora or vegetation on the
113
Fig. 5.7. Celebration: The rose (by Martin Carey). Ink on paper. 18 X 30",1967. This
psychedelic drawing illustrates beautifully the oneness of rose and environment. [Re-
produced from Masters and Houston (1968, p. 65»)
116
To Chapter 3: Facts
lowing: do all botanists agree on the use of the concepts "Magnolia" and
"flower"? The answer is: no. At least some favor another description. For
example, according to Melville (1962/1963, 1983), the Magnolia structure
is a gonophyll of gonophylls which is quite different from a classical flower
because it consists not only of one axis but of several and has a different
architecture. Melville's description is not generally accepted. The other
description in terms of the classical flower concept has the support of the
majority of botanists. Although there is no complete consensus, i.e., no
complete objectivity, we have a close approximation of a consensus. If we
assume now that Melville's or other unconventional descriptions such as
those by Croizat (1960,1962; see also Heads 1984) or Meeuse (1981) were
to gain ground and would gradually replace the classical one, we would pass
through a phase in which neither one would be objective until the new one
would become objective as a new consensus would be approached.
Facts and objectivity are relative because they are dependent on a con-
ceptual framework which may be part of a theory and in that sense they are
theory-laden. In the above example of the Magnolia flower the implied
theories are either the classical theory or Melville's gonophyll theory. As the
theory changes, the fact changes. Hence, a total independence of facts and
theory seems illusory. Some facts may be more resistant to theory change
than others, but this difference seems to be only one of degree.
Inasmuch as the concepts used for the description of facts depend on the
cultural tradition, facts are also culture-dependent. Thus the term 'flower'
can be used in the sense of blossom. In this sense it has been used in dif-
ferent cultures long before the classical theory had been invented. This shows
that the concept "blossom" is rather robust toward cultural differences. It is
possible, however, that even for the concept of "blossom" nuances of dif-
ferent meanings exist in different cultures. The importance of transcultural
perspectives and investigations is evident at this point.
Cultural tradition may not only influence the conceptual framework that
is used for the description of observations; it also relates to the state of cons-
ciousness which in turn may affect facts. For example, in our ordinary state
of consciousness it is a fact that plants do not have auras. However, in altered
states auras may be observed (see, e.g., Davis and Lane 1978), i.e., auras be-
come facts for a community of people living in an altered state. If our whole
society would develop an altered state of consciousness, auras would become
facts (i.e., objective) according to our second definition.
Consensus does not necessarily constitute truth. The masses can be wrong
just as individuals may be wrong. Conversely, the fact that only few people
see auras does not necessarily mean that therefore auras do not exist. The
advantage of the second definition of fact, which is based on the second
definition of objectivity, is a distinction between consensus and truth. Both
118
subjective and objective experiences may be true or false. Hence, facts are
not necessarily real just because they are objective in terms of inter-subjectiv-
ity (Le., in terms of the second defmition).
Do particularities exist as such? A flower is continuous with the remainder
of the plant. A whole plant is continuous with the environment. Thus a
flower exists not by itself but in the context of the whole. In that sense a
flower and anything that is said about it do not constitute an ultimate real-
ity because reality does not just occur in fragments. Fragments, i.e., partic-
ularities, are our creations. Yet, although they are our creations, I cannot
imagine that they are totally arbitrary creations. It seems that facts are con-
strained by reality, although they may be arbitrary to a certain extent.
With regard to the flower example the primary realm is a patch of colors,
shapes, etc. in its context. Instead of trying to describe it by words, the
primary realm might be better conveyed through a picture of a flower in its
context because the words 'color' and 'shape' introduce already concepts
that are not present in the primary realm. A picture such as a drawing or
painting is, however, dependent on the state of consciousness of the artist.
Thus, a psychedelic artist draws a rose differently from an artist who is not
under the influence of drugs (Fig. 5.7). Furthermore, there are other factors,
such as the technique utilized, that influence the way a flower is pictured.
The primary realm can neither be pictured nor described conceptually, it
must be experienced in a state of mind that transcends discursive thought.
Words, which usually refer to concepts, are a hindrance in the communica-
tion of direct experience. Hence, the sage who can see reality in its suchness
is often silent. Zen poetry is an attempt to say through words what cannot
be said by words. Thus, Ryokan who led a reclusive life in celebration with
nature wrote (see Stevens 1977, p. 59):
Spring flows gently -
the plum trees have bloomed.
Now the petals fall, mingling with the song
of an uguisu.
Many students faiito see that "leaf" is a concept. They assume that "leaf'
is something concrete because one can point at it. Yet one can point at a leaf
only after one has drawn an imaginary line between the "leaf' and the
"stem." In other words: one can speak of a leaf only after one has separated
it from the remainder of the plant through the process of abstraction. Actual-
ly, there is a continuity between the "stem" and the "leaf' (see, e.g., Howard
1974; Rutishauser and Sattler 1985). Hence, a "leaf' as an entity does not
exist in nature, but is a thought-object. The question is whether this thought-
object possesses a high or a low degree of adequacy. In terms ofWoodger's
map analogy one can say that the concept of a so-called natural entity por-
trays nature relatively well, whereas the concept of an artificial entity shows
a rather low degree of correspondence between the concept and nature. Con-
ceptual realists assume, however, that natural and artificial concepts are
mutually exclusive: the former are real, i.e., exist in nature and the latter
represent only a mental construct with no reality in nature. Yet even the
most natural concept results from abstraction and therefore does not com-
pletely correspond with nature. It portrays at best one aspect of nature. On
the other hand, an artificial concept also entails a correspondence with
nature, although to a very limited extent. Hence, the difference between a
natural and an artificial concept is relative. It might be better to drop those
terms in order to avoid misunderstandings.
"Leaf" ("phyllome") and "stem" ("caulome") have been considered real
(Troll 1937). However, their continuity and the occurrence of intermediates
does not support their reality as mutually exclusive essences (Sattler 1974;
Sattler, Rutishauser and Luckert, in press). Nonetheless, the concepts "leaf'
and "stem" are not artificial because typical leaves and stems are relatively
articulated and are quite frequent in contrast to the relatively rare interme-
diates that dissolve the discreteness of the classes "leaf" and "stem".
Term and concept. The two definitions of 'carpel' are an example in which
the same term, namely 'carpel', designates two different concepts. On the
other hand, 'folded megasporophyll' and 'carpel' (in the sense of the first
definition) are two different terms for the same concept.
Fuzzy sets. Another problem arises when we encounter structures that are
intermediate between leaves and stems (e.g., the phylloclades referred to
above). Such structures fit neither a monotypic nor a polytypic concept of
"leaf" or "stem." In this situation the fuzzy set notion is more adequate.
121
Seed plant
The classes root, caulome, and phyllome that comprise the lowest level of
the above (system of) classification are not given, but have to be established
in terms of other concepts such as symmetry, growth pattern, etc. It is de-
batable to what extent they are adequate classes.
In the relatively simple example of the above morphological (system of)
classification not many possibilities of grouping exist. One possibility is to
combine caulome and phyllome to form the higher-level class of the shoot
system, whereas the class of the root system comprises only one subclass,
namely the root class. An alternative would be to unite the classes root and
caulome into the class of the axial system in contrast to the class of ap-
pendicular organs (i.e., phyllomes) which form the appendicular system:
Seed plant
Conclusions
Many modern biologists tend to find the whole field of comparative morphol-
ogy either uninteresting or outdated, which means that it is no longer at the
forefront of basic and challenging biological research. I hope that the pre-
ceding discussion has shown that this is not the case. Like any field, com-
parative morphology comprises classical and modern approaches. The clas-
sical approach remains useful for much "puzzle solving" in terms of normal
science of the classical paradigm. Alternative approaches such as the conti-
nuum approach change the core of fundamental classical postulates, such as
the discrete (atomistic) and hierarchical organization of plant construction.
Possibilities for further innovations abound. Thus, comparative morphology,
like other disciplines, is open to major (r)evolutions. In fact, it is no exag-
geration to say that it awaits the great genius who will be able to propose an
attractive and elegant theory that is highly adequate, or, in terms of the
semantic view of theories, extremely comprehensive.
Comparative morphology deals with the comparison of structures and
forms. This means it is concerned with two fundamental features of living
systems: diversity and structure. In contrast, much modern research in biology
is focused on the detailed analysis of a few selected organisms that are
suitable and convenient for this type of research. Such specialization need
not be negative, provided one keeps in mind that life is diverse. Comparative
studies are, however, important to provide a balanced overall perspective.
With regard to structure and form, it is now more evident than ever before
in the history of biology that these features are characteristic of all levels of
organization. As White (1968, p. XI) noted, "this is a world of form and
structure and can only be properly understood as such." It is, however, im-
portant to realize that structures and forms are constantly changing during
124
6.1 Causality
6.1.1 Introduction
Auguste Comte and following him the positivist and neopositivist thinkers
denied causality altogether. Bertrand Russell (19l3, p. 1) wrote that "causal-
ity is the relic of a bygone age surviving ... only because it is erroneously
supposed to do no harm." Wittgenstein (1922: 5.1316) claimed that the
"belief in the causal nexus is superstition." Collingwood (1940) stressed the
relativity of causes, i.e., causes are relative to the point of view adopted.
"For a mere spectator there are no causes" (Collingwood 1940, quoted by
Dray 1964, p. 46). Kuhn (1977) discussed the general decline in causal think-
ing in physics: "though the narrow concept of cause was a vital part of the
physics of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, its importance declined
in the nineteenth and has almost vanished in the twentieth" (Kuhn 1977,
p.28).
It would be one-sided to quote only those modern philosophers who are
either very critical of causality or who deny its existence and usefulness al-
together. There are also modern philosophers who claim that the notion of
causality is either totally or partially appropriate to deal with nature (e.g.,
Mackie 1975). Thus the controversy over causality continues. Whereas some
think that it is "a relic ofa bygone age" (Russell), others see a comeback of
causal thinking, especially in the biological, psychological, and social sciences
(Bunge 1979a, p. XVII).
After this brief sketch of some of the many points of view of philosophers,
I shall now turn to more concrete biological considerations, which may be
more meaningful for students of biology. I shall attempt to show that de-
velopments in biology have led to a clearer view of causality and thus con-
tributed to our knowledge of biophilosophy. This indicates that science may
also help to solve general philosophical problems, although it cannot free it-
self completely of its philosophical foundation (see Introduction). Science
and philosophy are interacting with each other and in this way are mutually
dependent on each other (see Wuketits 1978).
Cause----.,..
-
Effect
.. Effect
Cause
.. Effect
Cause
--~..
- Effect
Cause
In this chain each cause has an effect that in tum is the cause of another effect,
and so on. Linear thinking in terms of such chains is still employed in biology
as well as in everyday life. For example, the fact that a driver was daydream-
ing may be considered the cause of an accident, which in tum may be the
cause of his injury, which finally may be the cause of his death. Chains of
this sort are linear connections of events or things; hence the term 'linear
causali ty .'
Often, an effect is seen as the result of more than one cause. We speak
then of multiple causation by a plurality of causes (e.g., Wolvekamp 1982;
Hilborn and Steams 1982). In such cases the cause-effect relations have a
branched or hierarchical form as follows:
Cause a _ Effect c
~ .
u,"~b ('C"~"~
Effect h
C.mo d _ Effoot , ~
Cause e - / (= Cause g)
Cause f
Modern biology has shown that the notion of circular interactions is also a
simplification, although a much more useful one than linear causality. The
circles of circular causality also interact with each other and thus a more
adequate representation of interactions in living systems is by means of a
network (for an example see Fig. 6.1; for other examples see Bindra 1976,
p. 42; McMurray 1977,p.278;Lewis 1977; Vester 1978; MacDonald 1983).
From this point of view causality is conceived as network causality. As in
the case of circular causality ,network causality does not imply the traditional
notion of cause and effect. Thus, network causality is also a concept quite
different from the traditional concept of causality; hence, for the sake of
clarity the former might be given a name that does not include the term
'causality.' Network causality is much more akin to circular causality than
either one of them is to linear causality, because both network and circular
causality are in opposition to the basic assumptions of traditional causality,
namely the relation of cause and effect as postulated in the definition above
Erosion.
l ,
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a; Plant nutrll'nts
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131
~! :
~·~[:-----_-~::-c---·-·
~/l ,. . . . . . \, Fig. 6.2. Hypothetical net-
work of strong (solid lines)
_. If "" \ . ,.
and weak (dotted lines) inter-
L... . . . . . . . . . . l
actions. The strong interac-
\ ......~...-....~'. .. ~.......
tions provide a basis for linear,
hierarchical, and circular
"'-r~
causality, whereas the total-
ity of strong and weak inter-
actions represent network
causality
Fig. 6.1. Some interconnections of the marine food web (After Tait 1981, p. 204; re-
produced by permission of the author)
132
weak ones are dotted. This illustrates a hierarchical and linear segment as
well as a circular one (see also Wuketits 1981, p. 86). Since the use of the
notions of linear and circular causality has been successful to a certain extent
in terms of causal explanation and prediction, it seems that the kind of dia-
gram of Fig. 6.2 is not totally fictitious. In other words: there seem to be
differences in nature between strong and weak interactions in such a manner
that they provide an empirical basis for the construction of causal chains,
hierarchies, and circles. This means that the notions of linear and especially
circular causality may be adequate to a certain extent within a limited con-
text. To what extent they will remain useful will have to be demonstrated
empirically by an analysis of the strength and weakness of interactions. How-
ever, even if future research should provide a relatively firm foundation for
the use of the notions of linear and circular causality, a more complete and
comprehensive representation of living systems will have to resort to network
causality. It has become increasingly evident in the biological as well as the
psychological and social sciences that the systems under investigation exhibit
a high degree of complex and netted interactions that cannot be understood
in terms of traditional notions of causality (see, e.g., McMurray 1977, p. 278;
Bunge 1980, p. 42; Wuketits 1981).
One fundamental implication of network causality that also shows how
radically it differs from linear causality is the following: any particular ef-
fect (Le., thing or event) in the network is not caused by one or several
causes, which traditionally are thought to be things or events occurring
temporally before the effect. Any particular effect, which I prefer to simp-
ly call a particular thing or event, is determined by the whole network of
interactions. It may have been "triggered" by a specific change in a specific
place. If "trigger" is equated with "cause," then we could, of course, speak
of "causation." However, such "causation" is quite different from the
traditional meaning as described in the definition given above (Sect. 6.1.1).
One difference is that a trigger does not produce an effect. The effect is
produced by the trigger in conjunction with the whole network (or at least
segments of the network). Another difference is that the same trigger may
have quite different effects depending on differences in the network. Hence
neither condition 2 nor 3 of the traditional definition of causality (see
Sect. 6.1.1) apply to the notion of "trigger" (see also Weiss 1973, p. 99). If
one prefers to define cause as "trigger," then a very weak notion of cause
results. Causes in this sense "are effective solely to the extent to which they
trigger, enhance, or dampen inner processes" (Bunge 1979a, p. 195). Such
"causes" only contribute to the determination of the effect, but do not
produce them entirely. This shows again that the term 'cause' has different
meanings, which may be such that notions intermediate between linear,
circular, and network causality may result.
133
According to Mohr (1977), the way in which I used the term 'cause' in the
preceding discussion is not quite correct. I shall therefore present Mohr's
model of analysis and I shall show that it leads to the same general conclu-
sions as in the preceding discussion of network causality. According to
Mohr's model, biological causal research "must always be regarded as 'fac-
tor analysis,' rather than as causal analysis" (Mohr 1977, p. 77). All we can
do in so-called causal research is "to vary one, two, or (rarely) more factors
in an experiment and to record the effect. Those of the x factors that we
vary in the experiment are called variable factors or briefly "variables"
(Mohr 1977, p. 77) (see Fig. 6.3).
Since the cause a is determined by x factors, a causal analysis would require
a knowledge of all x factors and how they determine the cause a and the
resulting effect a'. Mohr (1977, p. 78) points out that "even with the most
simple living system such as bacterial cells, we are far from being able to per-
form a full-scale causal analysis. Therefore the physiologist will restrict him-
self to a factor analysis" (Mohr 1977, p. 78). In other words: only relatively
few factors, namely the variables, are considered and in the factor analysis it
is shown how these variables influence a particular feature of the system. It
is not shown how they cause it, because the feature is not only caused by
the variables, but also by all the other x factors.
It is a grave misunderstanding that many biologists who are used to work-
ing with variables tend to think that the variables cause the effect. This mis-
understanding can have profound consequences and leads to distorted views
of living systems such as, for example, the postulate of genetic determinism
according to which the genes determine the traits of organisms [for an ex-
cellent criticism of genetic determinism see Weiss (1973), Lewontin et al.
(1984)].
Mohr (1977) uses an example of a single factor analysis in genetics to il-
lustrate the relation offactor analysis and causal analysis. This example con-
cerns the factor that influences (we are tempted to say causes!) the forma-
tion of anthocyanin, a red or blue pigment, in many plant organs such as the
petals of violets. At first Mohr equates the x factors (which according to his
model cause the red pigmentation) with a set of x genes and points out that
only one gene has been pinpointed as a variable, i.e., without this particular
gene the pigmentation will not develop, although all other genes of the set x
are present. On the basis of this experimental evidence it is often said that
the red pigmentation is caused, i.e., produced, by the one gene. This kind of
conclusion is fundamentally wrong because it mistakenly equates a single
factor with the cause. In order to obtain the pigmentation the whole set of
x genes is necessary. And furthermore, other factors of the organism and the
environment are required. For example, the environmental factor light is
necessary for the synthesis of the pigment. This means that the total set of
x factors that causes the pigmentation does not only include the x genes,
but must be extended to include the factors of the whole system of the
organism and the environment of the organism. Thus, by this more rigorous
form following Mohr's model of factor analysis as it relates to causation we
arrive at the same conclusion as that reached in terms of network causality:
any particular event such as the formation of a pigment is determined by
the whole system, which includes the environment.
Figure 6.3 is a very simplified presentation of the total set of internal as
well as external factors which determine a particular effect. The network
between the factors is not indicated. Naturally, the cause should not be
construed as having a distinct existence separately from the factors (see
Woodger 1967, p. 189, footnote). Since the cause is constituted by the fac-
135
tors, we might just as well refer to the factors only. This would provide greater
clarity of the situation. Another reason for eliminating the concept of cause
has been mentioned in connection with the network model of interactions.
If any particular thing or event is determined by everything else, i.e., the
whole system, then the concept of cause is overextended. Evidently, the
original meaning of "cause" no longer applies at the level of networks.
state of consciousness (see, e.g., Babb 1976; Ward 1984). Hence, it is again
the whole system including the state of consciousness of the Kavadi bearer
that determines whether pain and bleeding occur or do not occur. It is evi-
den tly not correct to say that hooks (or the piercing of the skin by hooks)
causes the bleeding and pain, although this is our customary way of looking
upon such phenomena in terms of linear causality.
I shall now briefly apply the preceding general statements to two concrete
examples from medicine. In the first example, the problem of cancer, I shall
proceed from the most simplistic approaches and interpretations to the more
refined and shall show how philosophical assumptions are reflected in the
kinds of questions we ask.
A common question that one can hear is: What is (are) the cause(s) of
cancer? Although this question may be interpreted differently, it may imply
the deeply engrained notion of linear causality. In that case it cannot help us
to understand the phenomenon of cancer because the development of malig-
nant tissue entails network interactions.
Approaching the cancer problem in terms of networks will lead to a num-
ber of important consequences. We shall have to investigate the whole sys-
tem and thus use the approach of systems research and systems analysis. We
shall have to take into consideration all factors of the system and we should
not neglect the environment including the investigator or physician who is
trying to heal the patient suffering from cancer. We shall not restrict ourselves
to the physical aspect of the system, but shall also consider the influence of
mental and psychic factors, i.e., the state of consciousness. Psychosomatic
medicine, which is not yet practiced sufficiently, is an important conse-
quence of this more comprehensive approach. It would be misguided to
search for one factor such as one substance that could cure cancer in all
cases. First of all it is not only one or a few factors that cause cancer or its
cure, but the whole system. And secondly, since the system of one patient
may differ in some ways from that of another patient, different treatment
may be required to achieve the same result. This emphasizes the need of in-
dividuallstic treatment.
The systems view of cancer also provides a broader perspective with regard
to divergent medical practices. Patients have been cured from cancer by
changing their state of consciousness due to meditation and other spiritual
practices. For example, Oki Sensei, the author of Oki-do Yoga, explained in
a Yoga camp which I attended that his intestinal cancer disappeared while
he practiced meditation and Oki-do. Since the state of consciousness is an
139
6.2 Causalism
6.3 Detenninism
tific statements in principle cannot refer to the basic experience of free will.
Science is irrelevant as far as the problem of free will is concerned. Our
existential experience reveals to us the potential of free action. It is up to
us whether we seize upon this potential and live a free life.
Quite often we take it for granted that either-or thinking is appropriate. Ac-
cordingly, we assume that free will must either exist or not. The only task,
then, is to decide which of the alternatives should be accepted. It is, how-
ever, also possible that the alternative does not make sense or does not re-
present a good or useful question. After all questions are not given, but are
dependent on logic, conceptualizations, and other presuppositions. Inade-
quacies in these foundations may lead to questions that are meaningless
(i.e., pseudo-questions) or a distorted and misguided inquiry.
I shall now present the point of view of Schrodinger (1967, Epilogue) on
the issue of determinism and free will. Normally these two phenomena are
seen as mutually exclusive (unless one takes the point of view of existentialists
who refer to two totally different levels). Schrodinger's insight reveals how
these phenomena can become noncontradictory. He starts out with the fol-
lowing two premises:
(1) "My body functions as a pure mechanism according to the Laws of
Nature."
(2) "Yet I know, by incontrovertible direct experience, that I am directing
its motions, of which I foresee the effects, that may be fateful and all
important, in which case I feel and take full responsibility for them."
The solution of the apparent problem presented by these two premises that
appear to be contradictory is the following according to Schrodinger: "I ...
am the person, if any, who controls the 'motions of the atoms' according to
the Laws of Nature." This means that the dichotomy between myself and
the universe is annihilated or has become transparent, i.e., I realize that it
has never existed but is the result of conceptualization. In terms of Indian
philosophy of Vedanta this is "the recognition of ATHMAN = BRAHMAN
(the personal self equals the omnipresent, all-comprehending eternal self)"
(Schrodinger 1967, p. 93). This unity of the personal self, which experiences
free will, and the eternal self, which represents the Laws of Nature, anni-
hilates the contradiction of the two above premises.
SchrOdinger's insight does not amount to a rational solution of the prob-
lem. However, a problem as basic as this cannot be expected to be solvable
just by rational means. It reaches too deeply into our subconscious and the
147
6.6 Summary
on simple action. Determinism s. str. implies simple action and simple inter-
action. Indeterminism s. str. (to which Heisenberg's uncertainty principle
refers) is characterized by stochastic action and stochastic interaction. De-
terminism (sensu Bunge) implies all four types of determination, i.e., it
comprises determinism s. str. as well as indeterminism s. str. Indeterminism
s. str. can be interpreted methodologically or ontologically. In both cases it
entails order which, however, is no longer strictly deterministic if the inde-
terminism is interpreted ontologically, i.e., residing in nature. Indeterminism
s.lat. amounts to lack of order, i.e., chaos. Several questions of fundamental
importance arise with regard to the problem of order and chaos. Is nature
ordered or chaotic? Is order in nature an absolute prerequisite for scientific
research? What are our notions of order and chaos? If these notions are
relative and continue to change, phenomena that today appear chaotic may
reveal aspects of order (in a new sense) in the future.
Free will. Free will also continues to be a controversial issue. Many of those
who deny its existence interpret determinism ontologically and believe that
there are no gaps in the determination of events. Those who defend the
existence of free will may do so for scientific or philosophical reasons. One
scientific argument traces free will to indeterminacy at the microphysical
level which is thought to be amplified to the macro level and thus is sup-
posed to constitute the phenomenon of free will. Existentialist philos-
ophers such as Jaspers point out that free will is an existential experience at
a level more basic than the subject-object division which is a prerequisite for
scientific research. Hence, free will cannot be the subject of science.
Beyond free will. According to the physicist Erwin Schr6dinger, the con-
tradiction between determination and the experience of free is only an ap-
parent one that is resolved through mystical union of the individual person
with the universe and its laws. Hence, it is I "who controls the 'motions of
the atoms' according to the Laws of Nature." Such has been the experience
of the mystics of millenia.
7 Teleology
"But the only real danger to be feared lies in being too
easily satisfied with the belief that the last [final] word has
been said on this topic" (Woodger 1967, p. 451)
"Seeking means: to have a goal; but finding means: to be
free, to be receptive, to have no goal. You, 0 worthy one,
are perhaps indeed a seeker, for in striving towards your
goal, you do not see many things that are under your nose"
(Hermann Hesse: Siddhartha, 1957, p. 113)
7.1 Introduction
Besides the question "what is the cause?", one of the most common questions
asked by students of biology is: what is the purpose (function)? It is often
assumed that if we just knew the purpose or function of a structure or pro-
cess we would have really understood it.
Teleology refers to purposes, functions, and related issues which in turn
refer to the most complex phenomena of living systems. It is therefore not
surprising that, as Ruse (1982) put it, teleology is a "hot" topic which, ac-
cording to Stegrnilller (1969, Vol. 1, Part 4, p. 518), is a nearly unpenetrable
jungle. The literature on teleology is immense. Some of the more recent dis-
cussions are by Canfield (1966), Beckner (1969), Monod (1970), Grene
(1974), Wright (1976), Woodfield (1976), Mayr (1976a), Bernier and Pirlot
(1977), Nagel (1979), and Brandon (1981) (for further references see Grene
and Burian 1983). The following two aspects may be distinguished in the
multitude of controversies on this subject matter:
(1) Disagreement concerning the terms and concepts employed. A num-
ber of terms that refer to a host of more or less different concepts have been
used. Thus the semantics of teleology has become nearly chaotic.
(2) Disagreement concerning the interpretation of the phenomena to
which the multitude of teleological concepts may refer directly or indirect-
ly. Among these phenomena are homeostasis, homeorhesis, self-regulation,
adaptation, survival, selection, integration, organization, goal-directedness,
feedback, and programs. Hull (1974, p. 103), in an attempt to establish pro-
perties characteristic of all teleological systems, enumerated them in terms
of the following four criteria: "prevalence of preferred states, closed feed-
back loops, and programs, and the origin of such systems by means of selec-
tion processes." Being aware of the seman tic difficulties alluded to already,
he added that "we cannot set out a list of criteria which are severally necessary
152
7.2 Terminology
order that we can see," or "the eye is made for seeing," etc. Unless the
author who uses such phrases defines their meaning and/or explicates the
implied notion of teleology (or teleonomy), they are ambiguous and create
confusion because two identical statements may have quite different mean-
ings, whereas statements couched in different terms may be synonymous.
As long as the terms are well defined I find no ambiguity even in a usage of
terms that may be different from the traditional meaning. We know that the
meaning of terms may also evolve and change. There are many examples in
science that illustrate how terms have acquired differing meanings. For ex-
ample, in physics the term 'force' is generally used in a specific sense that
differs from the traditional usage of the term with a variety of connotations
that may also entail the magical and supernatural. Similarly, the term 'tele-
ology' can be stripped of older connotations and can be defined in relatively
precise ways as is evident in the definitions of Nagel (1961), Canfield (1966),
Ayala (1968), Beckner (1969), Stegmiiller (1969), Monod (1970), Mayr
(1974), Wuketits (1978), and others.
Bernier and Pirlot (1977) insist that all terms referring to teleology in the
widest sense (including the term goal-directedness) should be eliminated be-
cause teleological concepts do not apply to plants and the majority of
animals. Although I can see that one might wish to introduce another ter-
minology for the sake of clarity, I am not convinced that the various notions
of teleology (including teleonomy) are totally inadequate with regard to
plants and animals. I tend to think that teleological notions may have at
least limited applicability inasmuch as they refer to an aspect of living sys-
tems that may not be fully describable in nonteleologicallanguage. Besides
that, teleological notions may be of heuristic value not only in biology but
even in physics (Woodger 1967, p. 432). For example, Whitehead (1925,
p. 77) reported that Maupertuis discovered in physics the famous theorem
of least action by starting out "with the idea that the whole path of a material
particle between any limits of time must achieve some perfection worthy of
the providence of God." Whitehead added that "Maupertuis' success in this
particular case shows that almost any idea which jogs you out of your cur-
rent abstractions may be better than nothing" (quoted by Woodger 1967,
p.432).
These considerations on the applicability of teleological concepts and
their heuristic value surpass the terminological aspect and reach the heart
of the teleological problem, namely the question of whether there is pur-
pose in nature and, if so, in what sense. I shall examine crucial aspects of
this problem in the following sections.
158
7.3 Goal-intendedness
o"
agent objective •
anticipation of 0 goal ~.. undesired
-----.:....----~----+ ,~ •
_-------------------- consequences,-
selection of means: side effects
I I
knowledge, technology
I I
I I
To what extent our values and our propensity structure are genetically
determined has been much debated especially since the appearance of
Wilson's "Sociobiology" (1975). It continues to be a highly controversial
subject (see, e.g., Caplan 1978; Ruse 1979; Montagu 1980). The influence
of experience and hence cultural conditioning cannot be denied, although
the extent of it is debatable. Much of what Lorenz (1963, 1973, 1978),
Wilson (1975, 1978),and Lumsden and Wilson (1981,1983) take as inherited
values and propensity structures is considered to be due to cultural condi-
tioning by others (see, e.g., Montagu 1980). For example, aggression, which
according to Lorenz (1963) is instinctive and therefore inherited, may be
largely the result of cultural conditioning (Montagu 1980).
We may now ask: is the teleology as defined by Mohr (1977) and il-
lustrated in Fig. 7.1 applicable to plants and/or animals? I think that most,
if not all, biologists would tend to answer this question negatively. As a next
step, we may then consider to relax Mohr's definition of teleology by re-
quiring fewer of the elements and/or weakening the elements. For example,
we may thus arrive at a definition of teleology that requires for the goal-
setting only consciousness, a propensity structure and experience. Since in
most cases animals have a propensity structure and learn from experience,
the crucial question then is that of consciousness in animals. No agreement
exists among biologists or philosophers with regard to this question (Griffin
1982, 1984; Crook 1983; Ferry 1984). However, there are biologists who
ascribe consciousness to vertebrates and the more highly evolved invertebrates
such as advanced mollusks and arthropods (see, e.g., Griffin 1982). If we ac-
cept this belief, then we have to conclude that teleology in the sense of con-
scious intentionality may exist in a large number of animal species.
We may go further now in our relaxation of Mohr's definition of teleology
by treating consciousness as a comparative or quantitative concept so that
consciousness becomes a matter of degree. In that case, which I discussed
already for human teleological action, goals are conscious only to a certain
degree. If they are conscious 100%, we obtain the second definition of tele-
ology (see Sect. 7.2). If they are conscious 0%, then the second definition
does not apply at all. However, if the consciousness ranges between 0% and
100%, then the second definition of teleology applies partially. In terms of
the notion of a fuzzy set this means that the behavior of certain animals
may be only partially a member of the fuzzy set of teleology, i.e., it is only
partially teleological. From this vantage point it appears quite inadequate
to ask in such cases whether the behavior is essentially teleological or not.
This question would be a pseudo-question in this context.
It may be immediately objected that consciousness is an all-or-nothing
phenomenon which either exists or does not. If this were correct, then, of
course, teleology as a fuzzy set would be an inappropriate concept. How-
161
7.4 Goal.<firectedness
tion. Since the feedback loops and the network of the individual organisms
may select mutations (see "internal selection," Sect. 8.5 .2), they influence
the direction of evolution and in this way might extend the goal-directed-
ness of the individual organism into the evolution of taxa of organisms. How-
ever, since selection by the environment ("external selection") also plays a
role, the internal directionality may be more or less dispersed. This explains
why goal-directedness is less obvious in phylogeny than in ontogeny and
therefore debated or even denied.
As Waddington (1970, 1975, 1977) and others have pointed out, evolu-
tionary theory has tended to neglect the ontogenetic development of organ-
isms, i.e., the events leading from gene(s) to character(s) and from the ge-
nome to the organism. If phylogeny is seen as a succession of (modified)
ontogenies, we have a basis for integrating the goal-directedness of the in-
dividual living systems as it is exhibited during ontogeny with the more
debatable goal-directedness of evolution. If, in addition we shall aim at
integrating goal-directedness and goal-intendedness through a cybernetic
and systems-theoretic analysis, then we may indeed gain more profound
insights. The crux from this point of view is integration.
7.5 FWlction
(and teleonomy) as it relates to reality is the following: are there ends, i.e.,
limits, in nature independently of our teleologic (and teleonomic) interpre-
tation of nature? My answer is no. Let us look at temporal ends, i.e., goals,
first. I think it is evident that a goal is never an end in an absolute sense. If
state D is the goal, it will always be followed by other states and in that
sense it is no end. There are no ends in nature. So what justification do we
have to use the notion of goal in science? This has been alluded to already.
The goal may be a state that is regularly reached even when there has been
diversion in the succession of preceding states. Thus, the goal can be singled
out as a state upon which many sequences converge. This is not fiction, but
a state of affairs in nature. Furthermore, a goal may be a more stable state
than others. This stability again reflects a property of nature that is not
purely fictitious. Nonetheless, we have to realize that even the most stable
state eventually will be followed by another state, i.e., the most stable state,
which at one time may give us the impression to be the end, is no end in an
absolute sense; it is at best a temporary end. And all those sequences of events
and states that converge upon one state, the so-called goal or end, eventually
continue beyond that state toward other states. Figure 7.2 presents in a
simple graphic way the goal-directed behavior of three sequences of states
from the time tl to tn. At the time ts all three sequences converge upon the
same state, the goal, which remains stable for a prolonged period of time till
t 1 0 when the states of the three sequences diverge again from each other to
various degrees. As long as we consider these three sequences of events in
isolation, the goal-directed behavior is striking and we can see that it refers
to something in nature. However, if in a somewhat more realistic view we
take into consideration the network of which the three sequences are a part
(Fig. 7.2.b), then it is obvious that the goal-directedness of the three se-
ts tn time
)
........
".................. .........-
../ ........................ ........
\:.::::. . . >::.:.:.::. . .::::. .:::::.::,).............................. M ........ (:::::::.::::::::::::~::::::.~
a
(:::~fis,:?'!~~;~:\:':J~~t1::J::~~=~
b
Fig. 7.2. Explanation in text
170
example may illustrate this. As I walk along the beach, I leave footprints in
the sand. A little while later as I return these footprints are gone; they have
been washed away by a few big waves. Are they really gone? Have they re-
ally disappeared so that no trace of them is left? Has their existence really
ended? I think nothing could be further from the truth than an affirmation
of these questions. Although they have disappeared as the visible depres-
sions in the sand, they have not disappeared completely: they have become
transformed. Footprints are depressions in the sand that influence the mutual
arrangement of thousands or millions of sand grains. This arrangement of
the sand grains constitutes the footprints. As the footprints are "washed
away," the arrangement of the sand grains changes to the extent that it no
longer satisfies our definition of 'footprints.' If we call this change "disap-
pearance," or "end," or "death," we have not understood much of what has
happened. We simply have imposed concepts that give us the impression of a
dis continuum where there is none in nature. If the change that occurred is
rather drastic and sudden, then these concepts may be adequate inasmuch as
they represent an aspect of nature. However, even in cases of adequacy -
and especially in those cases! - we should realize that there remains a dif-
ference between the description of nature and nature herself. This difference
may be of utmost importance with regard to our experience of the world
and our quality of living (see, e.g., Watts 1951, 1970; Krishnamurti 1970;
Krishnamurti and Bohm 1985).
When we return to the beach and note that our fottprints have been
washed away, we might be tempted to say: they are gone and the beach is
again just the same as before we left the mark of our footprints on it. As
long as we apply the concept of smoothness to the beach, we may indeed
state that the beach is again smooth as it was before. However, if we consider
the reality of that beach we must admit that it is not the same before our
feet touched it and after our footprints have been "washed away." Our foot-
prints have left their mark on the beach even after they are no longer visible
because as a result of those footprints the arrangement of the sand grains is
different. Inasmuch as our footprints influence this arrangement of the sand
grains they leave their mark and the beach will never be the same again. Thus,
after you have touched a man or a woman, he or she will never be the same
again. After you have looked into someone's eyes, (s)he will never be the
same again. After you have said something of importance, your audience or
the other person never will be the same again. Concepts that are unchange-
able, therefore, cannot express reality.
A clarifying remark may be appropriate with regard to the meaning of
"aspect." Figure 7.2 b shows that as a more comprehensive system it includes
the sequences of Fig. 7.2a. What has been represented in Fig. 7.2a therefore
can be characterized as an aspect of the whole of Fig. 7.2 b. It is important,
172
however, to realize that the difference between Fig. 7.2 a and Fig. 7.2 b is
not only a matter of addition. The whole context determines that which is
singled out in Fig. 7.2 a. Hence, what is shown in Fig. 7.2 a does not really
exist as such as it is represented in isolation. This means that if Fig. 7 .2a is
considered to be an aspect of nature it is so in a very indirect sense.
What now is the status of purpose in terms of function? Inasmuch as a
function is a concept, i.e., an abstraction, it also removes us one step from
reality. If functionality is understood in terms of the most inclusive whole
it may refer rather adequately to reality. However, even then it presents, as
we have seen, just one perspective of the whole. Any perspective of reality,
as the term perspective implies, must be dependent on the observer or knower
and therefore is limited. Hence, my conclusion concerning the reality of
functions is the same as with regard to goals: functions are neither absolutely
fictitious, nor absolutely real. Our goal is to invent notions of functionality
that are increasingly adequate and to apply these notions in such a way that
a maximal correspondence of these notions and the natural system is ob-
tained. I think that the notion of integration is very promising and may per-
haps constitute a more general and possibly more adequate concept than
that of function. It is of great usefulness in modern biology. However, even
with regard to the notion of integration, which refers to the integration of
entities such as things and events or processes, we have to realize that in
reality entities are not there; they themselves are abstractions, i.e., they do
not exist as such. How could something that is not absolutely real have an
absolutely real function!
Experience in terms of functionality and integration can also be limiting,
especially when it is restricted to a small subsystem whose integration into
more inclusive systems is not recognized. With regard to human relations
such restriction may lead to much suffering and frustration because of the
unrealistic belief that the subsystem is autonomous. It seems that many
romantic lovers tend to see their relationship as an autonomous whole and
disregard quite unrealistically that it is embedded into a much more inclusive
whole. The discrepancy between the imagined autonomy and the real inter-
dependence may be the source of much suffering and may destroy eventually
the most beautiful relationship. The unrealistic attitude may also show up
when the lover is "lost." Then the "deserted" partner may find himself or
herself in a cold and barren world, although (s)he may be surrounded by the
most beautiful flowers and trees, a sparkling green sea and a glorious blue
sky. The boundless sorrow results from seeing the function of one's whole
existence solely in relation to the beloved person and thus isolating in one's
mind one relation from the context of the more inclusive whole. Novalis
experienced such despair and expressed it in the most romantic poetry. He
finally transcended his blindness and loneliness by seeing through the imag-
173
ined limits of his love relation. During this transformation of his vision his
love became elevated to more and more inclusive religious experiences. In a
similar way, in Sufism erotic love may acquire truly universal dimensions.
Thus, the notion as well as the experience of functionality within self-im-
posed unrealistic boundaries is transcended: love becomes whole and holy.
If purpose is defined in a wide sense so that it comprises goal-directed-
ness as well as functionality, I conclude that in that sense there is no pur-
pose in nature. In other words: purpose is not absolutely real. That does not
imply that purpose is purely fictitious or a totally arbitrary concept projected
into nature. I think that there is an aspect of nature that is rather adequately
dealt with in terms of the notion of purpose, i.e., teleonomic and function-
al propositions. Since that aspect is part of nature, it might be said to be real.
In this weak sense of the term real, purpose may be real. Only in this sense
can I accept the statement that "there are indeed goal-directed systems in
nature" (Ruse 1973, p. 190). However, if real is that which exists inde-
pendently of our knowledge of it, then purpose including goal-directedness
is not real because it is partially a function of our conceptualization. '''Pur-
pose' appears as the universe is dissected" (Bateson 1979, p. 229).
The conclusion that nature, undissected by our thought, has no purpose
is not at all negative. It simply means that nature is infinitely more than any
conceptual description could indicate. She is neither negative nor positive,
neither bad nor good. And in that sense one might even say that she has
neither purpose, nor no-purpose. This, of course, is only a different, perhaps
more careful, way of expressing what I tried to convey in the preceding sec-
tion.
Having discussed purpose in the sense of goal-directedness and function,
I shall now turn to goal-intendedness, i.e., goals or purpose as we know them
in our life and the lives of other human beings. Is not it real that our lives
are shaped by the goals we are pursuing? This is a very difficult question to
answer. In one sense it appears to be a truism because we can see that our
lives may change drastically if we change our goals. If a businessman sud-
denly decides to give up his business in order to pursue the goal of a uni-
versity education in biology, he will experience very dramatically how this
new goal affects his life. Yet we may question whether human goals are real
as goals. As Mohr (1977) pointed out, goal-setting requires consciousness
and free will. Whether free will exists is debatable and it seems that there
will be no last word on this issue either. As I pointed out above, our behavior
is influenced to a great extent by our subconscious. Hence, the role of con-
sciousness in goal-setting is also debatable. This means the existence of goal-
intendedness is questionable at least to some extent even in the human spe-
cies. Existence here is again meant in an absolute sense. I think one cannot
deny that the concept of goal-intendedness applies to human thought and
174
goal-oriented society. Yet that person is not the slave of goals because to
him or her goals have become transparent as something relative in the whole.
The life of that person is whole and not narrowly conceived and distorted
by a one-sided goal.
I think the reason why many people still survive relatively well in our
goal-ridden society is that they are still able to "drop out" periodically and
thus restore the natural equilibrium. Thus many activities of our leisure time
compensate for the loss of wholeness in the narrow-minded pursuit of goals.
For example, dancing and playing may have a spontaneity that surpasses
any rigidity of goal-directedness and purposeful action. In this sense we may
understand Jesus'words: unless you become like children you shall not enter
heaven. To Yogis and other sages, the highest state of being is totally spon-
taneous and therefore without purpose. It is the highest state because it is in
complete harmony with nature which is also without purpose.
Having no purpose is often seen as negative and is experienced as a restric-
tion. However, the opposite may be said: having a purpose means limitation
by an end that is singled out from the continuity of being. Furthermore,
the selection of one end restricts our perception of the world because it is
limited to one perspective. Accordingly, our actions become channeled into
one narrow way. The wholeness is lost in experience as well as in action.
So if goals are irrelevant as ultimate gUidelines for our life, where should
we be going? This question is also irrelevant when goals have lost their grip
on us because we are going nowhere (see, e.g., Trungpa 1981). Since nature
of which we are part is not composed of absolutely distinct entities, i.e.,
things, there are no things that could constitute ends for our behavior. If
we want to go somewhere, we first have to abstract an end and then direct
ourselves toward that end. But in this process we limit ourselves and lose the
whole. Only in going nowhere, we are everywhere. Alan Watts made a film
in which he contrasted the behavior of two brothers. One of them went
around the world rushing from one goal to another, gaining many new ex-
periences, but without really seeing. The other brother stayed in his garden
and saw.
Going nowhere and seeing is difficult for most of us. Goals of all sorts
have too much a grip on us. However, many of us at least occaSionally have
experiences and insights that are beyond the ordinary purposiveness. If we
do not run away from such happenings but instead open up more and more,
goals may gradually lose that power over us and we may come to "a state of
being in which the ideational choice-making movement (toward goals) comes
to a standstill" (Deshpande 1978). Then, one can be and see.
In order to reach that state much diScipline may be required. The resulting
striving may again reinforce purposive behavior. Note the preceding use of
the teleological phrase 'in order to'! However, this goal-intendedness may be
176
only a means to reach a state that is beyond it. Thus the initial purposiveness
may be compared to a boat that is used to reach the other shore of a river.
When one is there, one does not need the boat anymore. It is left behind
and thus becomes irrelevant.
I think that there is a close connection between goal-intended behavior
and stress. As we rush from one goal to another we suffer more and more
from stress and it becomes increasingly difficult to relax physically as well as
mentally. Goals may be projected even into relaxation. However, as long as
we pursue relaxation as a goal we cannot truly relax. Complete relaxation is
letting go of everything, even the goal to relax.
At this point I want to refer briefly to the teleology of certain philos-
ophers and theologians who claim that nature is fundamentally purposeful,
that there is a universal purpose (of a Creator) underlying everything, although
it may be totally or partially hidden to us (see, e.g., Teilhard de Chardin
1955). If this claim is grounded in a profound experience one can, of course,
challenge it only if one shares this experience. If it is predominantly an in-
tellectual speculation of a mind that has been conditioned by a goal- and
purpose-oriented culture the matter is different. In that case I think the
postulated purpose in nature is mainly our projection. However, as pointed
out, this projection is not totally arbitrary, but has a certain empirical basis.
I think it is because of this empirical basis and our social conditioning that
grand schemes of purposiveness in nature still have a great appeal to many
thinkers.
Riedl (1980) also believes that there is purpose in nature. However, to
him purpose seems to be mainly constituted by functionality. He believes
that due to natural selection the evolution of humankind has led to a stage
where nature has become aware of herself. This belief has been expressed in
different cultures and in different ways. Now Riedl goes one step further in
making the additional assumption that it is Western culture in its scientific
culmination that is the pinnacle of evolution and hence comes closest to a
portrayal of reality. In his Fig. 56 (1980, p. 168) the European is on the top
of the evolutionary progression that took its origin from primitive animals.
Riedl does not justify this implicit superiority of the European and Western
mind. Perhaps he considers the high degree of scientific development and
intellectual capacity as a sign of superiority. But who can substantiate that
the Western intellect provides a better understanding of reality than the
intuition of sages in the East and West?
It seems to me that Riedl's outlook and consequently his conclusions
are biased in favor of Western thinking and thinking (i.e., cerebralization)
in general. Riedl does not sufficiently take into consideration that there
are other cultures and a counterculture in the West (see, e.g., Roszak 1969,
1973) that challenge fundamentally his view of things and the underlying
177
state of consciousness. Whereas to a Western thinker the head and the brain
are the most important human organs with regard to the understanding of
nature, in other cultures the focus may be on the whole mind-body or as in
Zen Buddhism at the hara which is a region between the navel and the geni-
tals. Furthermore, whereas to a Western thinker the intellect, the mental,
and the spiritual in a restricted sense ("das Geistige" in the German langu-
age ) are in the foreground, to many sages breathing and the movements of
the body-mind are central. In Zen Buddhism mind is transcended to no-
mind. In that state reality is seen in its suchness.
I think that one can work as a scientist in a purely Western context. How-
ever, if as a "hypothetical realist" (Riedl 1980) one has the ambitious goal
to penetrate the core of reality, a biased pro-Western outlook will not be a
sufficient basis for such an undertaking. If we try to look at the question of
teleology in as comprehensive a way as possible by considering not only
results of science and philosophy but also the variety of experiences in dif-
ferent states of consciousness, we must at least question whether there is
purpose in nature. We may act according to goals, but we may also transcend
goals and purpose. One might argue, then, that our purpose is to become
aware that there is no purpose in nature including ourselves. However, since
the awareness of no-purpose is beyond purpose and any conceptual compre-
hension of the world such a statement is meaningless, and the purely intel-
lectual discussion is just a quibbling over words and concepts.
Even for those who realize this it is not always easy to convey the no-
purpose of nature and life in verbal communication. Thus, Lin Yutang (1938,
p. 119) stated that the purpose of life "is the true enjoyment of it." He
added, however, that this is "not so much a conscious purpose as a natural
attitude toward human life." He warned that "philosophers who start out to
solve the problem [Le., pseudo-problem] of the purpose oflife beg the ques-
tion [of living] by assuming that life must have a purpose." And he added:
"I think we assume too much design and purpose altogether" (Lin Yutang
1938, p. 119). I have quoted specifically Lin Yutang as a representative of
the Chinese culture which in many respects differs radically from Western
cultures (see, e.g., Nakamura 1964). Lin Yutang emphasized that in China
living as enjoyment is considered more important than abstraction and intel-
lectualization about life as in science, philosophy and to some extent even
in poetry. I realize, of course, that China too is more and more influenced
by Western mentality.
I suggests that the reader look upon my conclusions in the spirit of Dada.
As Feyerabend (1975, p. 21) put it, "a dadaist is convinced that a worth-
while life will arise only when we start taking things lightly and when we
remove from our speech the profound but already putrid meanings it has
accumulated over the centuries (,search for truth'; 'defense of justice'; 'pas-
178
sionate concern', etc., etc.)". Since I have not been able to avoid all of those
profound and possibly putrid concepts, I hope that wherever they have slipped
in the reader will take them with a smile.
7.7 Summary
Terminology. The word 'teleology' is derived from the two Greek words:
telos (end, goal) and logos (reason, doctrine). Thus, its literal meaning is the
logos of ends. It has been equated to goal-intendedness, goal-directedness,
purposiveness, functionality, adaptedness, finality, etc. Internal and external
teleology have been distinguished. The term teleonomy has been introduced
to exclude conscious intentionality and the direction of processes by a god,
a creator, or spiritual forces. The concept of function has also been defined
in rather different ways. Six definitions are distinguished.
Function. Two meanings of the concept of function are discussed: (1) Func-
tion as an activity that is necessary for survival, and (2) Function as an activ-
ity that relates to the whole system. The second definition appears to be
more appropriate and of more general usefulness. As is the case with regard
to causality, functionality can also be conceived of in a linear or a network
fashion. Evidently, network functionality is a more adequate concept for
complex living systems than linear functionality. Both network causality
and network functionality refer to the same network and system. However,
the perspective is different: network causality describes how the whole net-
work determines a single structure or process, whereas network functional-
ity refers to the role that one structure or process plays within the whole
network. Hence, network causality and functionality represent complemen-
tary views of the same system. They deal with the interactions in an inte-
grated system, i.e., the organization of that system. To some extent the
term network functionality can be replaced by the general term integration.
Since living systems and the so-called abiotic environment are integrated
with each other, functions may also be ascribed to physical objects such as
the moon.
Teleology and reality. There are no ends and hence no goals in nature. There
is only transformation. Functions are also abstractions and in this sense, like
goals, do not exist in reality. Therefore, if purpose is defined in a wide sense
comprising goal-directedness and function, it is concluded that there is no
purpose in nature. As Bateson (1979) pointed out, '''purpose' appears as the
universe is dissected." This conclusion is not meant to be negative. It simply
means that nature is infinitely more than any conceptual description could
indicate. She is neither negative nor positive, neither bad nor good. In this
sense it may be appropriate to say that she has neither purpose nor no-pur-
pose. Nonetheless, the notions of purpose, function, and goal-directedness
seem to portray an aspect of nature and in this sense are useful concepts.
180
8.1 Introduction
giraffe has a long neck?" is that variant ancestral forms with longer necks
have been selected. A more complete answer to the "how come" question
entails answers to the other three kinds of questions. Thus, the "what"
question is answered with reference to "giraffe" and "neck." The two kinds
of "why" questions are answered in terms of the function of the long neck
and the causal and/or deterministic analysis of its ontogenetic development.
With regard to causation, Mayr (1961) distinguished proximal and evolution-
ary causation. Answers in terms proximal causation (which entail "how"
questions) are provided through the causal analysis of ontogeny, whereas
answers in terms of evolutionary causation (which are based on "what for"
and "how come" questions) are given by evolutionary theory. The latter
comprises the former, since phylogeny is a succession of (modified) onto-
genies.
Most biologists agree that the theory of evolution is the "single most en-
compassing biological theory" (Dobzhansky et al. 1977, p. 505). This com-
prehensiveness of the theory is reflected in the questions asked. For a further
elaboration and application of the four kinds of questions to other biological
disciplines see Simpson (1964, chapter 6). The criticism of causality and
teleology in the preceding chapters should, however, be kept in mind. It may
allow us eventually to step beyond the confines of the above kinds of ques-
tions and answers (see below the section on evolutionary theory).
still be romantic as I used to be. In that sense there has been no change.
However, I think that this lack of change is only apparent, not real. It is due
to abstraction. We single out one general feature. This feature in its general
(abstract) aspect remains the same, yet more concretely there are differences.
The romanticism is not the same anymore. It has changed too, although the
behavior may still be classified under the general category of romanticism.
The question is whether this classification indicates permanence at least at
some point(s). To answer this question, let me refer to a point within a sys-
tem of a space-time extension. If we assumed that such a point would retain
exactly the same relative position over a certain period of time, could we
then conclude that the position of this point remained unchanged? We could
say yes in terms of the same relative position, and we may have to say no
with regard to the absolute position. Furthermore, we may have to say no
because of change in the context. Since the context of the point has changed,
it is not really the same point (unless one subscribes to an atomistic world
view). As the whole system of which the point is a part changes, the elements
are no longer exactly the same. Hence, from this holistic viewpoint perma-
nence does not exist.
Although change appears to be universal, differences between slow and
rapid changes may be very striking. Consequently, one can contrast so-called
stable states or equilibria with labile ones. The former undergo no noticeable
change at the level of the whole system, whereas the latter change rapidly.
The apparent antithesis between structure and function (= process) is the
result of an extreme difference in the speed of change. The component parts
of structures may undergo rapid change (e.g., metabolism). We refer to this
change as the function of a structure. The structure as a whole appears to re-
main relatively stable; however, it changes very slowly and thus constitutes
also a process. From this perspective, everything is process, i.e., change (see,
e.g., Whitehead 1920, 1929; Woodger 1967, p. 330).
The investigation of differing rates of change can lead to interesting
theories. Rene Thom (1975, 1983; see also Zeeman 1976; Saunders 1980)
has approached this question from a global point of view and has developed
the mathematics to deal with the whole continuum from very rapid to very
slow changes. He has, however, focused his attention especially to the rapid
changes which he termed 'catastrophes.' Hence, the name of his theory is
'catastrophe theory.' It has been applied with some success to many fields
of enquiry ranging from geology and biology to linguistics and sociology.
From an epistemological point of view it is interesting to note that Thom's
theory is based on seven elementary catastrophes. Through these elementary
catastrophes the dynamic description of the universe is pOSSible. Yet the
kinds of catastrophes are unchanging like eternal forms. The question that
emerges is: do we require some firm unchanging framework to describe
184
or of a 'cause of evolution' because '" causal laws and the causal postulate do
not deal with unique changes" (concerning uniqueness see below, Sect. 8.3).
Beatty (1980) also emphasized that laws may be evolving, which means that
they are no longer laws in the strict sense. While pointing out exceptions to
Mendel's first law and the Hardy-Weinberg law, he adds that the regularities
on which these laws are based may change in the future. "Even if there were
presently no exceptions to Mendel's law, its truth would be contingent upon
the evolutionary status quo. But the evolutionary status quo is hardly per-
manent" (Beatty 1980, p. 410).
In the Book of Changes (J Ching) and the various commentaries on it
(e.g., Wilhelm 1960) we find references to laws of change, but we also find
them transcended as in the following paragraph (R. Wilhelm's edition, p. 348):
"Alternation, movement without rest, flowing through the six empty
places, rising and sinking without fixed laws, firm and yielding transform
each other. They cannot be confined within a rule. It is only change that is
at work here." .
A number of sensitive philosophers and visionaries have been telling us
for a long time that life is not rigid and that therefore a biology that insists
on static principles in life cannot really understand it. Bergson (1907), for
example, stressed the fluidity and creativity of evolution. He therefore
thought that evolution cannot be captured by science and thought, which,
according to him, can only comprehend the rigid, static, and fixed.
It is understandable that Bergson's ideas are unpopular among most evolu-
tionary biologists. Anyone who clings to law and order and takes comfort
and security in a permanence must feel threatened by someone who denies
the reality of such permanence and security. Furthermore, the denial or
even doubt of absolute lawfulness in nature is often felt as a frontal attack
on science. I have already pointed out that this need not be so interpreted,
although it does not make life easy for the order-oriented scientist (see, e.g.,
Lewontin 1966; Stent 1978; Wimsatt 1980; McIntosh 1980/82,1984;May
1981).
What I think is needed is an increasing adaptation of our scientific models
and theories to nature. In this respect there is ample opportunity for evolu-
tionary thinking to improve. I will give only two examples that may illustrate
how modern evolutionary thinking can become more dynamic, i.e., closer to
nature, than it is at the present time.
The first example concerns evolutionary plant morphology. In this dis-
cipline, static concepts of the pre-evolutionary era are still used, although in
a somewhat different way (see Chap. 5). Probably the same criticism could
be leveled at animal morphology. The approach is often too categorical, too
rigid, with implications of essentialism, which entails the existence of eter-
186
8.3 Historicity
Is historical science possible? And if so, how? These are controversial ques-
tions (see, e.g., Goudge 1961; Simpson 1964; Ruse 1971; Hull 1974; Mayr
1982). At one end of the spectrum of opinions are those who think that
historical science does not differ from nonhistorical science in any important
respect (e.g., Ruse 1971). At the other end of the spectrum, historical science
is viewed as so strikingly different from nonhistorical science that it may be
questioned whether it should still be classified as science.
Major issues at stake in this controversy over historical science are predic-
tion, explanation, and uniqueness of events. With regard to the question of
prediction in historical science, most authors agree that it is difficult to make
187
predictions. But whereas some tend to think that this is only a practical dif-
ficulty due to insufficient knowledge of important parameters, others main-
tain that there are reasons that make prediction difficult or impossible in
principle (see, e.g., Simpson 1964, p. 138, and below in Sect. 8.5.3).
Concerning explanation, one question is whether the covering-law model
applies. Those who answer this question affirmatively accept the existence
of relevant laws because such laws are a prerequisite for an explanation in
terms of covering laws (Ruse 1971). Others like Goudge (1961) who deny
the possibility of explanation by subsumption under laws have proposed an
alternative mode of explanation for historical science, namely, narrative ex-
planation (see Chap. 2). Such explanation requires only a knowledge of an-
tecedent events, not laws. Thus, the fact that I am writing this book is ex-
plained by a number (or even the totality) of events preceding this activity.
A third major issue at stake underlying the two preceding ones is that of
uniqueness. Are historical events unique and, if so, does this preclude any
lawfulness and scientific explanation in terms of the covering-law model?
I think that events are unique, especially if they are considered in their con-
text. As Stent (1978, p. 219) put it, "every real event incorporates some
element of uniqueness." Thus, each sunset is different because the clouds,
the air, and many other aspects are different. The important question to ask
now is the following: is it pOSSible, in spite of the uniqueness of events, to
single out similarities and regularities that would make possible an explana-
tion or even prediction in terms of laws or rules? An answer to this question
is not easy to give. It is interesting that those who have a "cool," abstract
mind (i.e., the "tough-minded") tend to favor lawfulness also in historical
science, whereas the "tender-minded" whose prime concern is the detail of
particular situations are overwhelmed by the uniqueness (Maslow 1966,
p.93).
Two levels of uniqueness can be distinguished: the conceptual and the
experiential (nonconceptual) levels. At the conceptual level, the unique
event is described in terms of concepts. An example similar to the one given
by Hull (1974, p. 98) is 'the election of the first Polish pope' (in Hull's
terminology, this is a necessarily unique event because repetition is in prin-
ciple impossible). Although unique as an event, it is described in terms of
general concepts such as "election," "pope," and "the first." We cannot
categorically exclude the possibility that one day we might come up with
lawful generalizations concerning elections, popes, or first kinds of events.
In that case the unique election of a Polish pope could be explained in terms
of the covering law model as in nonhistorical science. This is not an explana-
tion of the unique event as such, but of some of its aspects that can be ab-
stracted, conceptualized and placed in lawful connections. Inasmuch as these
aspects are part of the unique event, we might say that explanation of unique
188
events is possible; but when we refer to unique events as such in their uni-
queness, explanation in terms of the covering-law model is not possible. Much
of the confusion concerning the explanation of unique events results from a
failure to distinguish the uniqueness as such from aspects of uniqueness that
can be described in terms of concepts that form part of law statements.
At the subjective, experiential level unique events may not be conceptu-
alized. In that case it is impossible to relate them to scientific laws and to
provide explanations in terms of the covering-law model. If we want to
analyze such events scientifically we have to abstract from them and in do-
ing this we lose much or all of the uniqueness of the event. Such loss is
particularly obvious when a deeply felt experience is made the subject of
science. For example, listening together to a piece of music can be an extra-
ordinarily unique experience for two lovers. Any analysis of this event
would be intuitively unsatisfactory or incomplete to them because the uni-
queness of the event would be lost in this way. Uniqueness here implies rich-
ness, fullness, wholeness, and mystery. Since the words wholeness and holi-
ness have the same root (see Bohm in Wilber 1982, p. 53), we may also say
that the holiness of the unique event is lost [see also Riedl (1980, p. 81) who
refers to the loss of individuality as the destruction of the most humane].
Uniqueness as such and scientific analysis exclude each other because the
latter concerns aspects of events and requires their repeatability; uniqueness
as such cannot be repeated. One can experience the uniqueness of events or
one can focus one's attention on abstracted generalization. In different cul-
tures we may find a varying emphasis on one or the other. Jung (1967) con-
trasted Western and Chinese mentality in this respect. He wrote (1967,
p. XXIII): "While the Western mind sifts, weighs, selects, classifies, isolates,
the Chinese picture of the moment encompasses everything down to the
minutest non-sensical detail because all of the ingredients make up the ob-
served moment." Needless to say, no culture would restrict itself completely
to one or the other activity. We find experience of uniqueness in Western
culture as we find abstraction and lawfulness in Chinese culture. Thus,
Wilhelm (1960, p. 23) wrote in his commentary to the I Ching, the Book of
Changes: "Change is not something absolute, chaotic, and kaleidoscopic; its
manifestation is a relative one, something connected with fixed points and
given order."
applied to living as well as nonliving systems. For example one may refer to
the evolution of CO 2 during a reaction in a living or a nonliving system.
Often, the term 'evolution' is used with a narrower connotation: either
as change that occurs in a certain direction, or change that leads to progress.
"The concept of 'direction' implies that a series of changes have occurred
that can be arranged in a linear sequence, with respect to some property or
feature" (Dobzhansky et al. 1977, p. 508). Directionality may imply irrever-
sibility of evolution. Even if the trend of change were reversed, it cannot
lead to the initial state because the context would then be different. Thus, a
reversal of the directionality of change can at best approximate the initial
state. Only very simple processes such as the mutating back of a gene to its
former allelic state can be considered as a reversible change provided it is
taken out of context.
Directional and irreversible changes occur in both living and nonliving
systems. The second law of thermodynamics refers to irreversible and direc-
tional changes, namely the increase of entropy in a closed system. In organic
evolution, the phenomenon of directionality is exhibited in evolutionary
trends such as, for example, the well-known skeletal sequence from early
fossils of horses to the living horse (see, however, Hitching 1982, p. 28).
"Progress" implies more than directionality. It requires that the direc-
tional change leads to "a betterment or improvement" (Dobzhansky et al.
1977, p. 509). Thus "progress may be defined as directional change toward
the better" (Dobzhansky et al. 1977, p. 507). The difficult question to ans-
wer is: what is better? Evidently different criteria can be used for the defini-
tion of 'better' and hence different notions of progress will have to be dis-
tinguished. A large number of such criteria have been proposed by various
authors (see, e.g., Huxley 1942, 1953 ; Rensch 1960; Williams 1966; Simpson
1967; Ayala 1974b). Thus, "progress" has a different meaning to these
authors. Even the same author may use different concepts of progress.
Simpson (1949) examined several criteria such as dominance, invasion of
new environments, improvement in adaptation, increased specialization,
control over the environment, increased structural complexity, and increase
in the range and variety of adjustments to the environment. Some of these
criteria may be applicable only to certain evolutionary trends, whereas others
may be of more general use. Dobzhansky et al. (1977, p. 511) proposed as a
possible general criterion "the increase in the amount of genetic information
stored in the organism." They warn, however, that "one difficulty, insuper-
able at least for the present, is that there is no way in which the genetic in-
formation contained in the whole DNA of an organism can be measured.
The amount of information is not simply related to the amount of DNA."
Another criterion suggested by Ayala (1974b), which is of more limited
applicability, is "the ability of organisms to obtain and process information
190
possible, this would assess only one quality, leaving out many others such
as sensitivity, kindness, happiness, wisdom. Who could substantiate that
intelligence (whatever it means) is more impo tant than kindness?
Monod (1970) presented STE in terms of two basic notions: chance and
necessity. Thus, everything that has evolved, including humankind, is the
result of chance and necessity. Chance occurs through mutations and re-
combination, which lead to novelty and diversity. Necessity applies to the
selection of those variants that are best adapted. What is chance? According
to one common definition, it is an event that occurs "at the intersection of
two independent causal series" (Nagel 1961, p. 326). This definition ob-
viously is based on the notion of linear causality. From the point of view
of network thinking the really interesting and challenging question is the
interconnection of the two so-called independent causal chains in the whole
network. Is this interconnection due to very weak links or are there also at
least some strong interactions? In the former case, it would be adequate to a
certain extent to consider the two chains separately. Hence, the above defi-
nition of chance would have a good degree of adequacy. However, if it turned
out that there are also strong interactions between the two so-called inde-
193
pendent causal chains, it would be rather arbitrary to single out these two
chains and to define chance in terms of them.
The consequences of these considerations for evolutionary theory are
profound. If chance in evolution is not what we have been assuming it to be
according to the above definition, then we shall have to change the theory
of evolution. Thus, Ho and Saunders (1979, p. 573) go as far as to propose
"that the intrinsic dynamical structure of the epigenetic system itself (Le.,
the whole developing organism), in its interaction with the environment, is
the source of nonrandom variations which direct evolutionary change."
Darwin had the admirable modesty to admit that the concept of chance
represents only our ignorance: that which we do not understand we call
chance. Modern biologists have not always taken Darwin as an example as
far as the virtue of modesty is concerned. Students of biology are exposed
to many dogmatic statements made in textbooks and publications of original
research. For example, one can often read that evolution is the result of
pure chance as far as the mutations are concerned with regard to adaption
and survival. In this context chance is usually understood as the meeting of
two totally independent causal chains. Monod (1970) also defines chance in
that sense and comes to the conclusion that evolution is blind: "Pure chance,
absolutely free but blind, at the very root of the stupendous edifice of evolu-
tion" (Monod 1970). I wonder whether evolution is blind or whether Monod
was blind.
Instead of defining chance simply as the in tersection of two independent
causal chains and leaving it as that, I suggest at least the following modifica-
tion: chance is the intersection of two causal chains whose interconnection
in the network of the more inclusive system we do not yet know. I think
that this definition has the ad vantage of being less dogmatic and final. Further-
more, it points to the problems that still have to be solved and does not
obscure them.
According to our present scientific world picture events are integrated
into the network of interactions of the whole system. To me 'interaction'
means interdependence and even interpenetration (see Lewontin et al.
1984, p. 272). Interdependence can be described either in terms of deter-
minism s. str. (simple actions and interactions), or determinism s. lato (in-
cluding stochastic actions and interactions). If either simple or stochastic
interactions will be demonstrated between the two so-called independent
causal chains of evolutionary chance events, then evolutionary theory would
have to be changed drastically because chance according to the above defini-
tion would no longer exist. Evolution would be the result of determination
s. str. or s.lat. (see Chap. 6).
So far science. Now I shall try to go beyond the boundaries of science. If
we shall find no evidence for the deterministic interpretation of what is now
194
called chance, that does not necessarily imply a total lack of interdependence
of the two causal chains. These chains (or rather the reality to which they
refer) could be interdependent in a way that cannot be described through
scientific laws, i.e., they could be interdependent in an irregular way. Irregular
interdependence can be called chaos. Chaos need not lack harmony. In fact
it can be harmonious in a way that is beyond conceptualization and lawful
descri ption.
In Taoism chaos is experienced as harmony (see Izutsu 1967). Harmony
is the way of the whole (Tao). What we call chance or chaos may be activity
within the harmonious whole. However, the harmony of the whole (Tao)
cannot be described in terms of the scientific concepts of "chance" or
"chaos." It is beyond conceptualization and therefore transcends not only
the scientific concepts of "chance" and "chaos," but also that of "law."
The chaos of the Tao is not the "chaos" of scientists, although there may be
a relationship, and the laws that are referred to in Taoism or Buddhism (see,
e.g., Da Liu 1974, p. 7) are not laws of science, which can be described
symbolically, but they are intangible as it is pointed out for laws in the
Prajna Paramita Hridaya sutra (unpublished translation by Master Lim):
All the laws are intangible
Neither manifested nor destroyed
Neither unjust nor just
Neither increase nor decrease
In the center of the intangible nothing is seen or manifested.
You do not have to think to understand it
Here we are beyond abstractions and thOUght and consequently beyond
science. The Prajna Paramita Hridaya sutra "also referred to as the Heart
sutra ... is to be grasped not through the intellect but with the heart - that
is through one's own deepest intuitive experience" (Kapleau 1979, p. 179).
Hence, "you do not have to think to understand it."
The terms law ,lawfulness, order,harmony, and chance are used differently
in different cultures and by different people in our highly pluralistic Western
culture with all shades of the counterculture. Hence, apparently contradic-
tory statements may have the same or similar meaning, whereas the same
statement may have quite different meanings. For example the statement
that there is order in the universe and its negation may have the same mean-
ing depending on the definition of order. The same applies to lawfulness,
harmony, and chance. To communicate well, one has to know how the terms
are defined. And since the definition finally rests on primitive terms whose
meaning is grasped intuitively one has to share the same intuition, i.e., state
of consciousness. Thus, similar experience is important to grasp the sig-
nificance of basic terms such as the above.
195
Questions have also been raised with regard to the status of STE in its various
versions. Is it a predictive theory, or only a nonpredictive explanatory theory,
or not even the latter?
Concerning the question of the predictive power of STE, many biologists
admit that it does not allow for good predictions, if any predictions at all
(see, e.g., Simpson 1964, p. 137). For example, "if we are to predict the
197
Peters (1978) and authors quoted by him]. The crux of the problem lies in
the basic principle of natural selection or the "survival of the fittest." If
"the fittest" are defined as those that survive, then "survival of the fettest"
is reduced to the tautological statement of the survival of those that survive.
The question is whether this tautology can be avoided. Many evolutionary
biologists think so. Dobzhansky et al. (1977, p. 505), for example, propose
that the following is a nontautological formulation of STE: "Among alter-
native genetic variants, some result in features that are useful to their carriers
as adaptations to the environment. Individuals possessing useful adaptations
are likely to leave, on the average, greater numbers of progeny than in-
dividuals lacking them (or having less useful adaptations). Therefore useful
adaptations become established in populations." This formulation hinges on
the notion of adaptation. The above authors admit that the concept of
adaptation is difficult to define. Furthermore, it is not easy to apply it
rigorously (see, e.g., Gould and Lewontin 1979).
Williams (1970, 1973, 1979) has pointed out that the problem of circular-
ity and tautology results from a failure to acknowledge the necessity of
primitive terms. Newton's first law is circular if force is defined by mass and
mass is in turn defined by force. The circularity is avoided if mass is treated
as a primitive term which is left undefined. Similarly, the tautology of the
"survival of the fittest" is removed if "the fittest" is considered as a primitive
term. Whether this strategy is useful and desirable is, of course, another mat-
ter.
Beatty (1980) discusses the seman tic and the traditional views of theories
and shows that the former is better suited for evolutionary theory. "On the
semantic view a theory is not comprised oflaws of nature. Rather, a theory
is just the specification of a kind of system - more a definition than an em-
pirical claim" (Beatty 1980, p. 410). Thus, "whether Mendel's law or the
Hardy-Weinberg law is really a law of nature is irrelevant from the perspec-
tive of the semantic view of the synthetic theory" (Beatty 1980, p. 410).
Empirical claims assert only that a particular breeding group is an instance
of the definition of the law or theory. In other words: the crux is the do-
main of applicability of the theory or law (see Chap. 1.5).
between the two extreme positions of realists and idealists. They postulate
that we can know reality to some extent because there is a certain corres-
pondence between our mind ,i.e., our cognitive structures, and the structures
of the real world. This correspondence is the result of adaptation to the real
world due to natural selection. The adaptation "has been essential for the
survival of man as soon as teleolOgical action, i.e., conscious, goal-aimed,
willed, and purposive action came into play. Thinking before acting requires
right thinking" (Mohr 1977, p.204).
According to Mohr (1977, p. 206) the term 'evolutionary epistemology'
was first used by Campbell (1974) and Vollmer (1975). Many other authors
such as Lorenz (1941, 1973) and Popper (1972, 1984) have greatly contri-
buted to the evolution of this kind of epistemology. Recently, Riedl (1980)
devoted a book entitled "Biologie der Erkenntnis" ("Biology of knowledge")
to this topic. Von Ditfurth (1979) hailed Riedl's book as having the sig-
nificance of a Copernican turn of thinking. In the following discussion of
evolutionary epistemology, I shall refer mainly to Riedl's (1980) presenta-
tion (for other versions see, e.g., Wuketits 1984).
According to Riedl (p. 8), evolutionary epistemology solves the follow-
ing age-old philosophical problems: (1) the a priori, i.e., the question why
and how we consider certain ways of reasoning (such as reasoning in terms
of causes, space, time, and purpose) as given independently of individual
experience, (2) inductive generalization and how it relates to reality, (3) the
quest for certainty, (4) sameness, (5) causality, (6) purposiveness, and (7) the
foundation and validation of rationality. The solutions are the following:
To 1: The a priori are a system of hypotheses that have evolved as a result
of increasing adaptation to reality ["hypothetical realism" of Lorenz (1973)].
Hence, they are a posteriori in terms of evolution. They incorporate what
organisms have learned during evolution and therefore fit the real world as
the fin of a fish fits the water (p. 182). To 2: Reality shows a hierarchical
order with high redundancy (i.e., lawfulness which implies repetition). Such
order must exist because our ordered perception and thinking evolved as an
adaptation to it. Our perception and thinking is thus a reflection of reality.
It is ordered reality that has become conscious of itself. Induction is success-
ful because of the existing order in the world and our adaptation to it. Thus,
we generalize inductively in accordance with the laws or nature. To 3: Ab-
solute certainty is, however, not attainable. Although we have the innate
drive for it, we cannot reach it because of limitations of our senses and
reason (p. 185). To 4, 5, and 6: Thinking in terms of sameness, linear causal-
ity and purposiveness is innate, and since it evolved also as an adaptation to
reality, it corresponds partially with it. Scientific analysis has shown, how-
ever, that absolute sameness does not exist and that causes (efficient causes)
and purposes (final causes) form a network (p. 183). To 7: There is no ab-
200
solute beginning, nor are there first facts or fmal reasons or proof. Hence,
rationality cannot be founded in absolute terms. It must be seen as the result
of increasing adaptation to the order of reality. If it is applied in a context
in which it has not yet been tested and selected during evolution, it can fail
us miserably and lead to devastating consequences. Therefore, the limits of
rationality must be clearly seen.
Riedl also deals with the consequences of his solutions. He points out
that many dualisms are overcome such as materialism/idealism, rationalism/
empiricism, determinism/indeterminism; in other words: the dualisms be-
tween matter and spirit (body and mind), reason and experience, determina-
tion and uncertainty. All this is achieved according to Riedl simply by basing
epistemology on evolutionary theory and by drawing the consequences.
What are Riedl's basic assumptions and postulates?
(1) The methodology of natural science permits the solution of the
epistemological problems. Particularly, objective testability is important
(p. 11).
(2) Evolutionary theory, which is basic to epistemology, borders at cer-
tainty, i.e., the probability that evolutionary theory is correct approaches
100% (p. 12).
(3) Adaptation of organisms always entails an increase in their informa-
tion of the environment significant to them (p. 7). Hence, evolution, as it
leads to increasing adaptation, is a process of increasing cognition. "Leben
selbst ist ein erkenntnisgewinnender ProzeB" (Life itself is a process of ac-
quiring knowledge) [Lorenz (1971, p. 231), quoted by Riedl (1980, p. 12),
(1984, p. 1)].
(4) Life is goal-oriented and success-oriented. "Das Lebendige jedoch be-
darf fortgesetzt auch des Erfolges" (The living, however, is continually in
need of success) (Riedl 1980).
(5) As a corollary of 3 and 4, modes of perception arid thinking have
been selected that come closest to a reproduction of reality.
(6) Consequently, there is a certain correspondence of the order of per-
ception and thinking on the one hand and the hierarchical order of nature
on the other hand. In other words: there is at least a partial isomorphism be-
tween patterns of nature and patterns of perception and thinking.
(7) The foundations of reason are innate, i.e., hereditary. Thus, the urge
to attain truth ( certainty) and thinking in terms of sameness, linear causality,
and purposiveness are not acquired, but inherited. The same is true for our
expectation of the constancy oflaws of nature (p. 68).
To these seven basic assumptions and postulates I want to offer the fol-
lowing criticism:
To 1. As I have been trying to point out throughout this book, scientific
methodology is limited for a number of reasons. How then can scientific
201
this kind of reasoning completely? And how could we explain that in some
other cultures people care less about certainty but enjoy life as it comes? It
seems that our potential is underestimated by Riedl. We are not as rigidly
programmed as Riedl assumes. We are extremely plastic and we can develop
and unfold far beyond the ordinary imagination (see,e.g., Bohm 1973,1980;
Lewontin et al. 1984; Hayward 1984; Krishnamurti 1985; Krishnamurti
and Bohm 1985).
In spite of this criticism, I think that evolutionary epistemology has great
merits. It is dynamic to a certain extent and has dealt with a number of sterile
dualisms, such as those of idealism versus materialism, rationalism versus em-
piricism, determinism versus indeterminism, a priori versus a posteriori. In
general it has broken down the barrier between our biological and spiritual
aspects and is thus helping to bridge the gap between the biological sciences
and the humanities. If it could overcome other dualisms, such as innate versus
learned, if it could incorporate a broader base of more dynamic evolutionary
thinking, and if it could avoid a narrow Western bias, it might even lead to a
new Copernican turn.
Hence, evolutionary theory does not only influence our values but it is
itself influenced by our values as it is typical of scientific methodology (see
Sect. 1.3.4). With regard to Darwinism, values (ideology) of nineteenth
century England have had a great impact. Radl (1930, p. 18) wrote: "Darwin
merely transferred the prevailing English political ideas and applied them to
nature." Thus, he projected into living nature "his English society with its
203
But the dwellers of Academe became clamorous, and frictions did prevail, and great
was the heat thereof. And the dwellers began to speak in many tongues, and strange
were their words, each unto the other. Some spake in Anthropology, and some in
Psychology, and some in Economics, and some in Sociology, and some in Music, and
some in History, and some even in Literature. And the people of the Lord Gene spake
in Biology, but none would heed them.
So the Lord spake unto the people of Biology, saying: "Unto thee shall be given a
New Synthesis, that shall be a mighty Synthesis, that shall reconcile all the peoples of
Academe, the ones unto the others. And no longer shall they speak in Anthropology,
nor in Psychology, nor in Economics, nor in Sociology, nor in Music, nor in History,
nor even in Literature; but they all shall speak in Biology, everyone. And their tongue
shall be Biology no longer, but they shall be born again, and their words resynthesized,
and their tongue shall be called SOCIOBIOLOGY. The people shall know their true
natures, and they shall all behave, each according to his nature, and all shall dwell in
peace and harmony. Great shall be their eminence, and many their disciplines, and
weighty their publications, and neither shall they perish, but their fitness shall be maxi-
mal forever." Thus sayeth the Lord.
The commandments of the Lord Gene unto the people of SOCIOBIOLOGY:
I am the Lord thy Gene, which brought thee to life out of the slime of the ocean
primeval.
Thou shalt have no other gods before me. Thou shalt not bow down to church, nor
state, nor love, nor money, nor the needs of the fellow creatures, but shall act only so
as to Increase thy Fitness. For I the Lord thy Gene am a jealous god, visiting the mal-
adaptiveness of the fathers upon the third and fourth generations of those that do not
look out for their Fitness.
Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy Gene in vain; but shall serve it with
all thy heart and soul and mind and body and phenotype.
Honor not thy Father nor thy Mother, for their interests and thine are in Conflict.
Neither honor thy sister nor thy brother, except according to their Coefficient of Re-
latedness unto thee.
Thou shalt commit adultery whenever possible, that thine Offspring be multiplied,
but the cost of Parental Care be borne by others.
Likewise shalt thou bear false witness, and Cheat, and Fail to Reciprocate Altruism,
but with a guise of Sincerity, that others might not know thy Cheating.
Especially shalt thou covet thy neighbor's wife, and house, and field, and ox, and
ass, and everything else that is his; for with these thou canst Reproduce More, and he
less, and thy Fitness shall Increase over his.
Thus sayeth the Lord.
The Sermon on the Mount
And seeing the multitudes, he went up unto a mountain, and his graduate students came
unto him. And he opened his mouth, and lectured, saying.
Blessed are the Strong in Will, for theirs is the alpha position, and the right to many
mates.
Blessed are the Rich, for they shall inherit the goods, and survive well, and reproduce
greatly.
Blessed are they who neither Hunger nor Thirst, for they shall have time to compete
for mates.
For I say unto you, that except your Fitness shall exceed the Fitness of the Scribes
and the Pharisees, thy genes shalt not increase in future generations.
You have heard it said in olden times; thou shalt commit Adultery.
205
But I say unto you, that whosoever doth not always look upon a woman with
Reproduction in his Mind, shall fall behind in the Race of Fitness.
You have heard it said, An eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth. But I say unto
you, An Altruism for an Altruism, unless thou canst Cheat and Not Reciprocate.
Be ye therefore Adaptive, even as your Theory, which is in SOCIOBIOLOGY, is
Adaptive.
After this manner pray ye: Our Genotype, which art in Phenotype, Maximized be
thy Fitness. Thy kin select, thy race protect, on earth as it is in theory. Give us this day
our Parental Investment, and forgive us our Altruism, as we deceive those who are Altru-
istic to us. And lead us not into Maladaptiveness, but deliver us from Unfitness. For
Thine is the Behavior, and the Selection, and the Reproduction, for ever and ever. Amen.
There have always been individuals with different views based on different
values (e.g., Kropotkin 1902). Especially since the 1960's alternatives have
been proposed more frequently. Thus, for example, the importance of mu-
tualism and cooperation has been underlined at all levels of organization by
an increasing number of authors (see, e.g., Lewis 1973; Novak 1975, 1982;
Haken 1977; Richmond and Smith 1979; De Robertis and De Robertis 1980;
Merchant 1980; Margulis 1981; Margulis and Sargan 1985; Axelrod and
Hamilton 1981; Boucher et al. 1982; Axelrod 1984; Boucher 1985). May
(1982) estimated "that empirical and theoretical studies of mutualistic as-
sociations are likely to be one of the growth industries of the 1980's." To
what extent these studies will affect our values remains to be seen. So far
our "theories of mutualism are still basically mechanistic, mathematical,
fitness-maximizing, and individualistic" (Boucher 1985). There are, however,
attempts to go beyond these presuppositions. For example, Lewontin et al.
(1984) criticize dualistic thinking that is deeply rooted in Western culture.
They underline that in nature there is no opposition of organism and environ-
ment. Organism and environment form a whole. If we are totally aware of
this wholeness, alienation cannot occur because there is nothing to be alien-
ated since the individual does not exist as such. This means that organisms
can no longer be looked upon as respondants to the environment: "Organ-
isms do not simply adapt to previously existing, autonomous environments;
they create, destroy, modify, and internally transform aspects of the external
world by their own life activities to make this environment" (Lewontin
et al. 1984, p. 273) (see also Chaps. 9, 10).
This interpretation of organism and environment and related holistic
views expressed by an increasing number of biologists and philosophers,
based on values that differ rather fundamentally from those prevalent in
Victorian England and modern capitalist societies, does not only affect
evolutionary thinking, but the whole of biology, other sciences such as psych-
ology, and society. The consequences are profound and have many ramifica-
tions. A more general awareness of these implications could amount to a
fundamental transformation of science and society (see, e.g., Leiss 1972;
Bateson 1972, 1979; Novak 1975, 1982; Ferguson 1980; Merchant 1980;
206
Birch and Cobb 1981; Skolimowski 1981; Rose 1982; Capra 1982; Rose
1983; Hayward 1984; Levins and Lewontin 1985)3. It could lead to more
peace, harmony, and understanding.
Many of the alternative values that have become more frequently expressed
since the 1960's are part of or related to Maruyama's (l974) and Johnson's
(1977) mutual causal paradigm (see Sect. 1.4, Table 1.1) [see also Skolim-
owski's (1981) "eco-philosophy"]. The way of thinking associated with
these values is often pluralistic: it accepts contrasting (even contradictory)
models, theories, descriptions, viewpoints, values, etc. as different perspectives
of nature (see, e.g., Varela 1979; Mishler and Donoghue 1982; Lewin 1983;
Ames 1983; Lewontin et al. 1984; Rutishauser and Sattler 1985). It recog-
nizes that any value or philosophy imposes a constraint and thus limits our
understanding. Hence, a plurality of values and philosophies may be enrich-
ing and liberating (see, e.g., Gould and Eldredge 1977, p. 146; Rose 1982;
Rose 1983).
Post-structuralists such as Derrida and Culler have emphasized this point
in terms of "deconstruction" (Culler 1982). Any philosophy needs decon-
struction which "is to show how it undermines the philosophy it asserts"
(Culler 1982, p. 86). The same applies to values, theories, and other kinds
of postulates including interpretations of poetry. If we fail to deconstruct,
our views may become too rigid and one-sided and our science, philosophy,
and life too impoverished.
8.8 Summary
3 See also the excellent CBC series "A Planet for the Taking" by David Suzuki (CBC,
Toronto).
207
influence human values but is itself influenced by our values. Thus values of
Victorian England and modern capitalist societies have been projected into
Darwinism in its traditional and modern form (STE). And Darwinism in turn
reinforces values such as competition in capitalist societies. This feedback
favors strongly the retention of the status quo. Sociobiology is one of its
manifestations. Nonetheless, alternatives have been explored, especially since
the 1960's. Holistic approaches that emphasize cooperation and integration
have been adopted by at least some biologists and the beneficial conse-
quences for society have been underlined. Furthermore, there seems to be
an increasing awareness that pluralism in science and society can be enrich-
ing and liberating. Post-structuralists have emphasized this point in terms of
"deconstruction. "
9 What is Life?
"Living organisms can be understood only when they are
considered as part of the system within which they func-
tion" (Dubos 1981, p. 37)
"Present attempts to develop adequate principles of life
represent perhaps the greatest conceptual crisis in the his-
tory of science" (Davenport 1979, p. 2)
9.1 Introduction
The nature of life has been much discussed by philosophers as well as scientists
(see,e.g., Schr6dinger 1944; Bertalanffy 1952, 1975;Portmann 1960, 1974;
Waddington 1961,1968-72; Grene 1965,1974; Jonas 1966; Blandino 1969;
Jacob 1970; Black 1972; Jeuken 1975; Canguilhem 1975; Elsasser 1975,
1981; Grene and Mendelsohn 1976; Heidcamp 1978; Atlan 1979; Bateson
1979; Buckley and Peat 1979; Varela 1979; Morin 1980; Crick 1981; Mercer
1981). Quite often it has been implied that a characterization or definition
of life must consist of a list of properties (or at least a single property) that
are exhibited by life, but are absent in nonliving nature. Such an approach is
based on the belief in a dualism between life and inanimate nature. During
the last decades, systems thinking has focused attention on more inclusive
systems, such as ecosystems, that comprise living organisms as well as so-
called nonliving matter. A characterization of an ecosystem need not imply
an absolute dualism between life and inanimate nature, but may instead
emphasize the characteristics of the whole ecosystem. From this vantage
point, life and reality may be seen in a more global perspective.
Evidently, the meaning of the question 'what is life?' depends on prior
philosophical assumptions. To an adherent of essentialism it means seeking
the essence of life. To someone who does not subscribe to essentialism but
who nonetheless presupposes a dualism between living and nonliving nature,
the question may concern the search for a property or properties that are
necessary and sufficient to define life. On the other hand, to a reductionist
the question is not so much the distinction of a property or properties that
are unique to life, but rather their reduction to the level of nonliving matter.
An integrated view of whole ecosystems may again imply different philos-
ophical asumptions (see, e.g., Lewontin et al. 1984, Chap. 10). In general
terms, the meaning of the question 'what is life?' derives from the meaning
212
of "what is" and the extension of the concept of "life," i.e., whether "life"
refers only to living organisms or to the whole biosphere.
9.2 Vitalism
(1) It has been said that the postulate of a vital principle "such as an
entelechy is too successful, too general, and gives us no light upon the par-
ticular case" (Woodger 1967, p. 266). This means that a vitalistic doctrine
is no scientific theory. A scientific theory by definition must be testable,
i.e., it must allow us to derive particular test implications. Vitalistic and neo-
vitalistic doctrines, it is said, fail on that account. They do "not indicate
under what circumstances entelechies will go into action and, specifically,
in what way they will direct biological processes: no particular aspect of
embryonic development, for example, can be inferred from the doctrine,
nor does it enable us to predict what biological responses will occur under
specific experimental conditions" (Hempel 1966, p. 72). According to this
criticism vitalistic doctrines are rejected as unscientific, but they are not
criticized because they imply a nonmaterial agent. In fact, Hempel (1966,
p. 72) emphasizes that Newtonian theory also invokes a nonmaterial agent
in the form of gravitational forces. However, the latter theory is testable,
and has explanatory and predictive power.
Although the above criticism may apply to many forms of vitalism, I am
not convinced that it is generally valid. Instead of rejecting all forms of
vitalism categorically as unscientific, I think we should remain open-minded
whether at least some forms of vitalism may be able to provide certain kinds
of explanations and/or predictions. For example, certain forms of Taoist
health techniques as mentioned by Mencius (see, e.g., Da Liu 1974, p. 14)
invoke a vital force called ch'i. Activation and transformation of ch'i through
specific breathing methods may lead to predictable results. Thus, one can,
for example, predict that the activation of ch'i will enable two men or women
to lift a heavy person above the ground just with their little finger. I have
witnessed such events to my great amazement. One can even make a con-
trolled experiment. If ch'i is not activated the same people are unable to lift
the person.
In conclusion, I want to make two observations with regard to the criticism
that vitalism is unscientific. First, at least some forms of vitalism may have
some explanatory and/or predictive power and in that sense are not necessar-
ily unscientific. Further investigation along these lines might be profitable
in several respects. Second, not all forms of vitalism are intended to be
scientific. Criticizing such doctrines as being unscientific is beside the point
unless one claims that anything unscientific is meaningless. Probably Henri
Bergson (1859-1941) could be mentioned as a representative of an un-
scientific form of vitalism. Bergson (1889, 1907) called the vital principle
'elan vital.' It is experienced intuitively. Discursive thought alone cannot
grasp it. Hence, rational criticism of Bergson's vitalism is misguided. The
elan vital as it flows and creates spontaneously must be felt and experi-
enced.
214
Bergson also wrote a book on laughter (Le rire, 1900). This again demon-
strates how much his attitude toward life differs from that of analytic philos-
ophers. To the latter, laughter does not further our understanding of life. To
Bergson laughter may be a profound communion with life. Hence laughter
may bring us closer to the mystery of life than discursive thought, and thus
it may create harmony and happiness. If you do not agree with this, go to
Thailand, "the land of smiles," or other countries where people smile and
laugh a lot, and you will be amazed about the happiness and wisdom of many
of those people. If you cannot visit the "land of smiles" or if the Thais will
have become too westernized by the time you will arrive there, just seek the
company of people who laugh and make you laugh and let yourself be in-
fluenced. Or laugh madly for five or ten minutes. This might do you more
good and solve more of your problems and worries than much thinking (see
also Cousins 1979). I do not want to suggest that laughter is the answer to
all problems, nor do I want to imply that thinking is useless. But I want to
convey that laughter, spontaneity and direct experience can open up strata
of life that cannot be reached by the intellect.
(2) Returning to scientific aspects of vitalism, a second objection to it
concerns the nature of the vital principle. It has been argued that such a
principle cannot be demonstrated empirically as something that occurs over
and above atoms and molecules. Furthermore, it is difficult to imagine how
such an additional principle could have arisen during evolution.
This criticism again need not apply to all forms of vitalism. As Hull (1974,
p. 129) points out, one trend in modern science has been "the shifting of
key scientific concepts from the category of things and substances to the
category of properties, especially relational and organizational properties.
Life is no more a thing than is time, space, gravity, or magnetism. One might
well add mind to this list." If vital forces are also viewed in this way, then
"vitalism becomes a coherent position and the major objections to it can be
circumvented" (Hull 1974, p. 129). To explain magnetism "we need not
postulate a magnetic heaven as a final resting place for good magnetic fields"
(Hull 1974, p. 129). The same may apply to vital forces and if we conceive
neovitalism in this way it may come close to or merge with the generally ac-
cepted way of modern biology. Meyen (personal communication) has poin ted
out to me that Driesch's notion of entelechy is in fact not so different from
modern notions of self-regulation of living systems.
I mention all this to demonstrate that vitalistic doctrines are extremely
diverse ranging from nonscientific experiences to views compatible with
scientific theories or doctrines. Hence, to label a biologist as a neovitalist
does not mean very much except that it is derogatory and condescending
from the point of view of those who think they are above all that but very
often are simply ignorant of the many "forms of biological approaches that
215
9.3 Mechanism
Some people claim that many women suffer from penis envy. I do not know
whether this is true, and if so, to what extent. I know, however, that many
biologists suffer from physics envy. They look upon physics as the most
exact and most advanced science with the most general theories that have
great explanatory and predictive power. Furthermore, they take physics as
the model science and the standard of any other science. In this perspective
biology does not fare well. It has few general laws and theories and its most
comprehensive theory, which is evolutionary theory, has little if any predic-
tive power. Hence, in comparison with physics, biology is still at a pre-New-
tonian stage. It has not even a body of theory comparable to classical
mechanics as far as generality and predictive power is concerned [for a more
detailed discussion of the relation between biology and physics see, e.g.,
Simon (1971, chapter 1); Berta1anffy (1975); Ruse (1977); Elsasser (1975,
1981)].
For a long time the exactness, simplicity, generality, and predictiveness
of classical mechanics have been an ideal for many biologists. Consequently,
they have tried to model biological theory after it, i.e., to explain life in
terms of classical mechanics. Thus, living systems are simply viewed as mat-
ter in motion obeying the laws of classical mechanics. Critics who challenged
the foundation of this kind of mechanism did not receive satisfying answers.
Verworn (quoted by Woodger 1967, p. 238), for example, simply replied to
them that "it is self-evident however, that only such laws as govern the
material world will be found governing material vital phenomena - the laws
... [of] mechanics." Others admitted that this ideal of mechanism was a
"dream and faith" (see Woodger 1967, p. 259). It is interesting to note that
when Verworn made this statement on the self-evidence of mechanics,
physics had already outgrown classical mechanics. How can one expect then
that complicated living systems should be completely understandable in
terms of mechanics, if the latter is not even sufficient to explain all aspects
of nonliving matter! For that reason it is "fairly safe to say that so far as
present-day biology goes, mechanism (in the sense of classical mechanics) ...
is of very little significance, and when biologists talk about mechanical ex-
planation ... they do not have anything like this in mind" (Woodger 1967,
p.262).
So, what do they have in mind? One of the following three notions:
(1) Living systems can and/or should be viewed as physico-chemical sys-
tems.
(2) Living systems can and/or should be viewed as machines. This kind
of mechanism is also known as machine theory of life.
217
(3) Living systems "work in an orderly way" (de Beer 1924, p. 112,
quoted by Woodger 1967, p. 258). This kind of mechanism "makes no as-
sertions about the processes studied, but merely asserts that they take place
according to laws" (Woodger 1967, p. 258). Hence, it may be compatible
with materialistic, machine theoretical, organismic, and even some holistic
and vitalistic philosophies of life.
Thus, when biologists enquire about the mechanism of a process they
may simply think of the order or pattern that explains the process (defini-
tion 3). However, they may in addition imply that this mechanism is physico-
chemical (definition 1) or machine-theoretical (definition 2). Hence, discus-
sion concerning mechanism and mechanistic explanation may be ambiguous
unless the meaning of mechanism is stated.
In order to evaluate mechanism, it is necessary to deal with reductionism
because the latter is closely interconnected with the former and, furthermore,
mechanistic doctrines are often formulated with reference to reductionism.
9.4 Reductionism
fact the properties of sodium chloride are quite different from those of sodi-
um and chlorine_ Thus, already at the level of chemistry we find the pheno-
menon of emergence (Platt 1961). As the systems become increasingly
complex, the results of emergence become more and more striking. Mind
and consciousness may also be seen as the result of emergence (see below,
Sect. 9.8).
Emergent properties result from the particular way in which the ele-
mentary parts are organized and integrated to form a system. Hence, organ-
ization and integration, which in tum reflect interaction, interdependence
and interpretation, are key concepts for an understanding of life (see, e.g.,
Levins and Lewontin 1985). From this vantage point, I want to present
some critical remarks concerning ontological reductionism:
(1) As pointed out already, ontological reductionism in its naive (nothing-
but) form appears to be untenable because it disregards emergence.
(2) Ontological reductionism that allows for emergence is of no great use
to further an understanding of living systems. Listing the component parts
including the atoms and molecules of a living system does not explain its
functioning. The crux and the challenge in the elucidation of living system
is the interaction and integration of the parts, i.e., the problem of organiza-
tion.
(3) It might be pointed out that, although a knowledge of the elemen-
tary units is not sufficient for an understanding of a living system, it is a
prerequisite because how else could one study the interaction and integra-
tion of elementary units unless one knew those units. Thus atomism in a
narrow and in a wide sense is seen as the absolute basis of any biology, re-
gardless of whether naive ontological reductionism or emergentism is adopted.
This tenet, although it may appear plausible, is, however, highly question-
able (see, e.g., Levins and Lewontin 1980,1985). Before criticizing it, the
two kinds of atomism have to be briefly defined. Atomism in the narrow
sense (which is the common sense) refers to the doctrine that the building
blocks of the universe are atoms (in the sense of modem physics). Atomism
in the wide sense implies that reality is composed of units. These units may
be atoms (in the sense of modem physics), or higher (or lower) level units.
With regard to living systems such units may be genes (genetic atomism),
cells, organisms, species, or even nonmaterial units (for the latter see, e.g.,
Sheldrake 1981).
Returning now to atomism s. str., in connection with ontological reduc-
tionism the crucial question is: are atoms the elementary units for the
emergence of the properties of life? The answer of modem physics is no.
Atoms themselves are composed of elementary particles; hence, their pro-
perties are also the result of emergence. What are elementary particles? Are
220
can science become dynamic? (see Sect. 8.2). Thinking in terms of things,
even when they interact in processes, is at least partially static inasmuch as
the things as things do not and cannot change. Change in this view is only a
reshuffling of things which may, however, lead to different emergent pro-
perties.
Although nothingness of the scientist and the Zen Master are not exactly
the same 1 , I think that they overlap and thus refer to the underlying unity
of reality. Science cannot come as close to its as the Zen Master who trans-
cends all dichotomies of thought and all fragmentation arising from it; yet
science has allowed us to glimpse what most scientists of the nineteenth
century could not even imagine.
Epistemological reductionism (also called theory-reduction) has been dis-
cussed extensively by philosophers as well as scientists (see, e.g., Nagel 1961;
Hempel 1966; Woodger 1967; Ruse 1973 ; Hull 1974; Ayala and Dobzhansky
1974; Mohr 1977; Wuketits 1978). In contrast to ontological reductionism
it refers not to reality itself, but to laws and theories about reality. Hence,
"in biology the central question of epistemological (theoretical, explanatory)
reductionism is whether the laws and theories of biology can be shown to
be special cases of the laws and theories of the physical sciences" (Dobzhans-
kyetal.1977,p.491).
Nagel (1961), Hempel (1966), and others have clearly stated what epis-
temological reduction means and requires: the conditions of derivability and
connectability must be fulfilled. Derivability means that the theories and
laws of one branch of science (let us say biology) must be derived as logical
consequences from the theories and laws of the science to which it is reduced
(let us say physics). The science that is reduced is called the secondary
science, whereas that one to which it is reduced is the primary science. In
our case the question is whether biology is a secondary science that can be
derived from the primary science of physics. Connectability refers to the
concepts employed and specifies that all the concepts of the secondary
science (in our case biological concepts) must be defined in terms of con-
cepts of the primary science (let us say physics) without loss of meaning.
In other words: biological concepts must be translated into physical ones.
Thus, epistemological reduction is conceptual and nomic (Le., referring to
laws) reduction.
Having stated what epistemological reduction means, one can ask now
whether biology can be reduced to physics and/or chemistry. At the present
1 Note that my verbal representation cannot be adequate because I cannot but refer
to things such as "some-thing" or the "same thing." In discussing no-thingness, I make
it a thing which is contrary to what I am trying to communicate. Obviously, we are
here at the limits of verbal communication. Hence, the importance of direct experience.
222
the answer is a definite no. I think all informed biologists and philosophers
agree on that. However, a number of biologists and philosophers believe that
eventually biology will be completely reducible to physics and chemistry
and thus become a branch of the physical sciences. Other biologists are less
optimistic in this respect and some even claim that complete reduction of
biology is in principle impossible (see, e.g., Polanyi 1968). To the latter that
include organismic biologists, holists, and vitalists, the autonomy of biological
science is unquestionably established.
Instead of speculating about the future, I think it is more profitable to
look at the present situation. Biologists use a large number of biological con-
cepts such as chromosome, cell, organ, organism, species, consciousness, etc.
All of these concepts and many others will have to be defined in terms of
physical and chemical concepts in order to fulfill the condition of connect-
ability. Furthermore, laws and theories, such as the Mendelian laws or the
synthetic theory of evolution, will have to be logically derived from laws
and theories of physics and chemistry. The difficulties that confront us in
this respect are immense (see, e.g., Ruse 1973; Hu111974; Mohr 1977).
One biological discipline in which may reductionists have been hoping
to be successful is genetics. The aim has been to reduce Mendelian (classical)
genetics to molecular genetics. Classical genetics would then become a special
case of molecular genetics. Instead of two theories or paradigms one would
have only one, namely molecular genetics. Thus, we would be one step closer
to the ultimate aim of science which is to establish the most general and
comprehensive theory.
So far nobody has achieved this goal. Different reasons can be given for
the failure (see, e.g., Ruse 1973; Hu111974; Mohr 1977). One reason is the
problem of translation (connectability) of biological concepts such as that
of the "cell"; hence, Lindenmayer and Simon (1979) discuss the possibility
of reducing Mendelian genetics to a theory that contains both molecular and
biological concepts. Another reason is a lack of exactness, especially of mo-
lecular genetics. Mendelian genetics has been axiomatized by Woodger (1937,
1959). However, "a similarly strict axiomatization has not been performed
so far in the case of molecular genetics" (Mohr 1977; see also Lindenmayer
and Simon 1979). Hence, even the logical prerequisites for a derivation of
Mendelian genetics are lacking at present.
Although the attempted reduction of Mendelian genetics to molecular
genetics has not been successful, "there can be little doubt that much has
been learned from what has been accomplished up to the present" (Dob-
zhansky et al. 1977, p. 495). At the biophilosophicallevel we have learned,
for example, that what at first looked like a successful reduction was in fact
a replacement of one theory or paradigm by another. In a theory replace-
ment the original theory is able to provide kinds of explanations and pre-
223
dictions that the new one cannot give and therefore the original theory re-
mains useful and valuable. Hence, there will be a place for Mendelian genetics
as long as it has not been completely reduced to molecular genetics. And
even if such a reduction should be possible in the future, Mendelian genetics
may remain useful and valuable for purely practical reasons just as classical
mechanics is still a useful and important field.
Some philosophers, historians, and scientists doubt whether any reduc-
tion has ever occurred in the history of science (see, e.g., Kuhn 1970; Mohr
1977, p. 97). Popper (1974, p. 260) pointed out that in the much quoted
model cases such as the reduction of thermodynamics to statistical mechanics
almost always an unresolved residue is left so that the reduction is not re-
ally complete but also a replacement. With regard to progress in science this
means that the new theories do not fully contain older ones as special cases.
Hence, the older theories retain a certain value of their own because they
refer to a part of the domain that the new theory cannot reach. This may
suggest that unification of science (e.g., biology, chemistry, and physics) is
not possible through reduction, but must occur by other means (see, e.g.,
Maull 1977), if it is possible at all.
Facing the fact that reduction of biology to physics is unattainable at
present and for many reasons probably also in the future, one may question
whether it is desirable to concentrate our efforts on reduction. It may be
easier and more successful to build general and comprehensive theories on
the basis of General System Theory and other general approaches that are
not reductionist (see, e.g., Koestler and Smythies 1969; Pattee 1973;Weiss
1973; Bertalanffy 1968, 1975; Bunge 1979b; Wuketits 1978, 1983). Such
theories would comprise the physical and biological (and maybe even the
psychological and social) sciences. As Hempel (1966) has pointed out long
ago, they "might well be couched in novel kinds of terms .. , that afford ex-
planations both for phenomena now called biological and for others now
called physical or chemical. To the vocabulary of such a comprehensive uni-
fying theory, the division into physico-chemical terms and biological terms
might no longer be Significantly applicable, and the notion of eventually
reducing biology to physics and chemistry would lose its meaning" (Hempel
1966, p. 106).
We have to keep in mind that a dichotomy between the physical and the
biological sciences is a tacit assumption of the reductionist ideal in biology.
Only if this assumption is accepted can we entertain the question of whether
biology should be reduced to physics and chemistry. If we look upon natural
science in a more unified way, the question of reduction need not even arise.
Questions are not given awaiting our answer. We create questions by a
certain philosophical and/or scientific outlook and attitude. Instead of
debating just the questions and the possible answers, it often might be more
224
profitable to look at the assumptions that lead to the questions. The endless
and tiring controversies over reductionism may very well become obsolete
through more synthetic and comprehensive approaches that go beyond the
traditional boundaries of disciplines.
If synthetic approaches should fail or - as I suspect will be the case -
should be feasible only to a very limited extent, another fruitful alternative
is perspectivism (Bertalanffy 1975) according to which different paradigms,
theories, descriptions, etc. are seen as complementary perspectives of reality.
Accordingly, reductionist and holistic accounts (i.e., descriptions at different
organizational levels) may be complementary to each other (see, e.g., Varela
1979, p. 104; Hofstadter 1979; Davies 1983; p. 63; Lewontin et al. 1984,
p. 280). For biological research this means "that different approaches are
necessary to fully describe a particular living system, e.g., biochemical
analysis of the elements, physiological blackbox experiments (input-output
experiments), in vitro experiments with isolated organelles, microscopic
analysis of the living system, light microscopic and/or electron-microscopic
observations of the fixed and appropriately 'stained' system. Information
from all these levels is required and indispensable in order to obtain a balanced
description of the system" (Mohr 1977, p. 106). Even research at a given
level requires different perspectives. Levins (1968) illustrated this with re-
gard to model building in population biology. Since it is difficult to develop
models that maximize generality, realism, and precision, we have to sacrifice
anyone or two of these ideals to the other(s). For example, we sacrifice
generality to realism and precision, or we sacrifice realism to generality and
precision. The conclusion of all this is the recognition of a pluralistic philos-
ophy, i.e., the need for a plurality of approaches.
It is obvious that the discussion of reductionism is not only of theoretical
and philosophical interest, but has also very practical and economic aspects
as far as the distribution of research grants is concerned. Should those re-
searchers whose aim is reduction receive higher grants than nonreductionists?
The reader may form his own opinion in the light of what has been said by
various informed philosophers and biologists.
Methodological reductionism, inasmuch as it concerns biology in terms
of our first principal definition of mechanism, claims that living systems
should be studied at the level of molecules and atoms. "For example, genetics
should seek to understand heredity ultimately in terms of the behavior and
structure of DNA, RNA, enzymes, and other macromolecules rather than in
terms of whole organisms, the level at which the Mendelian laws of inheritance
are formulated" (Dobzhansky et al. 1977, p. 490).
The counterpart to methodological reductionism has been called method-
ological compositionism (Simpson 1964) "which claims that to understand
organisms we must first explain their organization ... Accordingly, organisms
225
There are different forms of machine theory of life that mayor may not be
reductionist:
(1) One form of machine theory equates an organism with a machine.
Accordingly, an organism is nothing but a machine (ontological reduction).
The question that arises immediately is what sort of machine? A simple
mechanical device such as a steam engine, a cybernetic automaton, or a
highly sophisticated computer? Probably most, if not all, machine theorists
have the two latter kinds of machine in mind. Although such a sophisticated
machine shares many properties with living systems, it also differs from the
latter in many respects. Therefore, a total equation of a living system with a
machine is not possible. Any biologist who is not intuitively convinced that
(s)he is not just a machine is advised to study the literature on this topic
which provides different reasons why such a view is untenable (see, e.g.,
Bronowski 1966; Bertalanffy 1967; Boden 1979). I shall mention here only
the argument advanced by Bronowski (1966). He explained with regard to
the human mind that it is characterized by self-reference. Self-reference
means that it refers not only to an object but at the same time to itself.
Logical paradoxes such as the statement: "all men and women are liars" are
a result of self-reference. In literature, it is of even greater importance than
in logic and science. Bronowski pointed out that machines including the most
sophisticated computers, lack self-reference. And he concludes: "All that
we can say, and all that I can assert, is that we cannot now conceive any
kind of law or machine which could formalize the total modes of human
knowledge" (Bronowski 1966, p. 14).
(2) Another form of machine theory of life, which more appropriately
is called the machine analogy (Woodger 1967, p. 259) or the computation-
al metaphor (Boden 1979, 1981), is much more modest. It does not imply
that a living system is nothing but a machine, but focuses simply on certain
resemblances (analogies) between machines and organisms. One can hardly
deny that modern machines such as robots or computers exhibit properties
that characterize living systems. For exam pIe, they may show self-regulation,
goal-directedness, memory, and other features of organisms. As a result,
computers supplied with the appropriate programs can serve as models for
living systems and thus simulate certain aspects of life.
226
9.6 Organicism
and approach that has been called organicism or organismic biology (see,
e.g., Plamondon 1975). Authors who have developed this view of life include
Bertalanffy (1952, 1967,1968,1975), Weiss (1967,1968, 1973), and others
(see, e.g., Blandino 1969; Haraway 1976). Needless to say, organicism, as
most other general doctrines on life, has many versions and is therefore not
easy to characterize. Beckner (1959, p. 5),in a detailed analysis of organicism,
distinguished the following four principal doctrines of the organicist view of
life:
1. organizing relations
2. directiveness
3. historicity
4. autonomy of biological theory.
1- 3 are doctrines about living systems, whereas 4 refers to the theory of liv-
ing systems.
To 1: The first doctrine refers to central issues of biology and biophi-
losophy, namely to organization, integration, and emergence. It excludes
on the one hand mechanism in the sense of epistemological and methodo-
logical reductionism, and on the other hand vitalism that postulates a sub-
stantial vital principle in the form of an additional substance or force. It is
in accordance with certain forms of holism and, although it does not deny
that living systems can be looked upon as consisting of atoms and molecules,
it need not be atomistic in an ontological sense. Hence, different interpreta-
tions of the meaning of organizing relations are possible. According to all of
them the whole is more than the sum of its parts because the relations be-
tween the parts lead to the emergence of new properties. These new proper-
ties are not those of an additional entity but are those of the organization of
the whole not found in the isolated parts. Only in this sense is the whole
more than the sum of its parts.
To 2: Directiveness is understood by most organicists in terms of goal-
directedness behavior (teleonomy) and functional behavior (see Chap. 7).
Since teleonomic and functional behavior do not play an important role in
the physical sciences, directiveness is seen as a phenomenon typical of living
systems.
To 3: The historical aspect, which leads to the problem of uniqueness, is
also characteristic of living systems. Beckner (1959) distinguished three
postulates of historicity:
a) All organic systems have histories.
b) The past of an organic system determines, or helps to determine, its present
structure and behavior.
c) Much of the historical development is irreversible.
228
Several of the issues that may arise from these statements have been dis-
cussed or alluded to in Sect. 8.3.
To 4: The doctrine of the autonomy of biological theory implies anti-
reductionism in the epistemological and methodological sense. It may be
compatible with at least one form of ontological reductionism according to
which the laws of physics and chemistry apply to living systems and the lat-
ter consist solely of atoms and molecules. However, if that is granted, it is
emphasized that additional higher-level laws are not reducible to physics and
chemistry because they refer to biological organization that does not exist
at the physico-chemicallevel (see, e.g., Polanyi 1968; Ayala 1968; Wuketits
1978, 1983). Inasmuch as the laws of physics and chemistry are valid for
living systems, the term 'autonomy of biology theory' may be slightly mis-
leading because biological theory is autonomous only in terms of biological
laws, whereas with regard to phYSico-chemical laws it is not autonomous.
This is the prevalent attitude of organicists.
As Bertalanffy (1952, 1967, 1968,1975) pointed out, organismic biology
(or organicism) transcends both mechanism (in terms of epistemological and
methodological reductionism) and vitalism (in terms of a substantial vital
principle). In that sense it is a synthesis at a higher level and a considerable
achievement of theoretical biology and biophilosophy. It should be clear,
however, from the discussion in the preceding chapters that all doctrines of
organicism pose problems that await solutions. Nonetheless, a definition or
characterization of life can now be attempted in terms of organicism which
includes the physico-chemical basis.
So, what is life? It could be said that it is the characteristic of living systems.
The question then is: what is a living system? The following answer might
be given:
Living system = an open system that is self-replicating,
self-regulating, exhibits individuality, and
feeds on energy from the environment.
The openness of living systems is a fundamental feature and very typical,
although not restricted to living systems. A flame, for example, is also an
open system. For that reason, Bertalanffy (1967) referred to life as the 'liv-
ing flame.' Openness is thus a necessary condition for the definition of living
systems, but not sufficient.
Openness of living systems exists with regard to material as well as energy
exchange with the environment. The implication of this openness is that no
229
differences, the two overlap and in the region of overlap refer to that aspect
of reality that unites opposites.
Since the counterculture movement is strongly influenced by oriental
philosophies and religious, the convergence between our Western culture
and its counterculture reflects a convergence of Western science and Eastern
wisdom (see,e.g., Capra 1975, 1982; Snyder 1978;Bohm 1980;Wilber 1982).
Again, East and West are not absolutely in opposition to each other. They
are open toward each other and also form a continuum. Eastern people also
use their intellect in fragmenting and destructive ways as people in the West.
On the other hand, Western people have wisdom too. Profound wisdom is
probably rare in the East as well as in the West.
In spite of resemblances between West and East, or Western culture and
its counterculture, differences remain, especially if one looks at the extreme
ends of the continuum. Not seldom external differences in the dress and
behavior of people reinforce the belief in absolute differences. For example,
biologists in their white laboratory coats surrounded by sterile equipment
form a striking contrast to critics of our Western society who live a simple
life in a mountain retreat chanting Buddhist sutras and doing organic farm-
ing. There are, however, counterculture people who wear suits, white shirts
and ties and there are scientists who dress like hippies. Hence, even with
respect to external appearance we find a continuum between representatives
of Western culture and counterculture, or West and East.
Let us now return to the definition of living systems. Since openness is
only a necessary condition for the definition of living systems, other features
are required that are necessary and sufficient. Self-replication may be con-
sidered both necessary and sufficient, although there may be systems that
do no more reproduce and yet are still alive at a certain period of time. To
avoid this problem one could refer directly to the chemical basis of self-
replication, namely DNA and RNA. In this way it might be easier to charac-
terize life on our planet, but one might exclude extraterrestrial forms of life
(if they exist) that might have a different basic chemistry.
Self-replication and self-regulation are very characteristic features of living
systems. They entail organization (see,e.g., Varela 1979). The latter becomes
increasingly important in higher forms of life due to the complexity of net-
works within the system and between the system and its environment. In-
dividuality implies that no two organisms are exactly alike.
Another basic feature of living systems is that they extract energy from
the environment. They "create their ordered microcosm at the cost of their
surroundings ... and live, so to speak, by extracting order or, as Schrodinger
(1944) phrased it, they feed on negative entropy or negentropy" (Mercer
1981, p. 46). More specifically, the constant generation of entropy in living
systems "is offset by the negative entropy brought in by the energy flow"
231
I think that essentialists have a biased outlook. They select the so-called
essential features, disregard or neglect the remainder and thus lose sight of
the whole. This amounts to a fragmentation of nature which may be de-
structive and dangerous for the individual as well as society.
One aspect that also tends to be neglected or excluded by an essentialistic
definition of life is feeling. Feeling life may reveal just as much of life as
thinking about it and analyzing it scientifically. In fact, feeling may reveal
more about life than thinking. Some would go further and claim that feel-
ing (or intuition) alone reveals life as it is, and thus answers the question:
'what is life?' I think it may be questionable and dangerous to look upon
feeling as the absolute judge of truth. Feeling like thought is usually condi-
tioned by our upbringing, tradition, and culture. Furthermore, it may be
influenced by thought so that what is supposed to be pure feeling is at least
to some extent a reflection of thought (see, e.g., Heaton 1979, p. 183). Feel-
ing, then, at least for the vast majority of people of all cultures, presents only
one perspective of life, though a very important and basic one.
Life as it is may be beyond our experience except to those very few
totally liberated and enlightened beings who, because of a total awareness,
can experience and live life as it is in its suchness. Needless to say, such
experience is beyond all dichotomies of discursive thought including the
dualism of life and nonlife. Reality is experienced as oneness, or one might
say, if one wants to continue using words where they are inadequate, reality
is experienced as the "Manifold and the One" (Arber 1957).
Although science due to its limiting methodology cannot reach that in-
sight, it is most impressive how close modern science has brought us to a
glimpse of oneness and unity which, as I pointed out above, is not the same
as that of mystical experience of oneness but touches upon it or overlaps
with it to some extent inasmuch as it refers to the unity of the universe (e.g.,
Barash 1973). Modern ecology, for example, has described the integration
of living systems with the so-called abiotic environment, emphasizing that
both form a unity which has been termed ecosystem. In a sense, this notion
of ecosystem transcends the naive belief that living systems are absolute
entities that in reality exist separately from nonliving systems. Bateson (1972)
has gone one step further in his "ecology of mind" by pointing out that be-
cause of the wholeness of reality mind is also integrated with nature in such
a way that it is all-pervasive. In that sense Bateson (1972) said that Lake Erie
is part of our mind. "If Lake Erie is driven insane, its insanity is incorporated
in the larger system of your thought and experience" (Bateson 1972, p. 484).
If living systems are seen as integrated with nonliving nature into more
inclusive systems such as ecosystems, the question of 'what is life?' loses
some of its fundamental significance or is seen in a vaster perspective. Even
if life could be defined in isolation from nonliving matter, it cannot be com-
234
A thorough discussion of the relation between mind and matter, mind and
body, and soul and body is beyond the scope of this book. The reader is
referred to the very extensive literature (e.g., Woodger 1967; Rensch 1970;
Ayala and Dobzhansky 1974; Popper and Eccles 1977; Bunge 1980; Rieber
1980; Bohm 1980; Hofstadter and Dennett 1981; Wilber 1982). Yet 1 shall
make at least a few remarks on the mind-body problem, which is not only
an important issue in the philosophy of psychology, but also of interest to
the biophilosopher. It is one of the age-old riddles of philosophy and science
and can be stated in many forms, since it has many dimensions. For example,
it can be presented in terms of the relation of two kinds of knowledge:
(1) public knowledge such as the facts and general statements of natural
science which we share with others; for example, the fact that "this frog has
four legs" or the generalization that "all brains consist chiefly of nerve-cells
and processes" (Woodger 1967, p. 459).
(2) private knowledge which is obtained through introspection; for ex-
ample, the fact that "I am now thinking about the next general election"
(Woodger 1967, p. 459).
Expressed more concretely, the mind-body problem presents itself as fol-
lows. We can describe in biological and physico-chemical terms how light
impinges upon the retina of our eyes, the biochemical and electrical pro-
cesses occurring there and during the conduction through the optical nerve
to the brain. And then at some point we experience a sensation that like
thought is of a different kind from physico-chemical and biological pheno-
mena. What is the connection and/or relation between these two kinds of
phenomena? This is another formulation of the mind-body problem. Bunge
(1980, pp. 3,211) distinguished ten different views Cl'1 the mind-body prob-
lem. I shall mention only four of them:
(1) Interactionist view. According to this view, mind, and body are dif-
ferent kinds of realities which interact with each other. The problem is, of
course, how such an interaction is possible or even conceivable. No satis-
factory answer has been provided as yet. For example, Popper and Eccles
(1977, p. VII) who subscribe to this view "think it improbable that the prob-
lem will ever be solved, in the sense that we shall really understand this rela-
tion."
235
the universe including all existing brains (Pribram 1982). "In the implicate,
holographic domain, the distinction between points becomes blurred; in-
formation becomes distributed as in the example of the surface of a pond.
What is organism (with its component organs) is no longer sharply dis-
tinguished from what lies outside the boundaries of the skin. In the holo-
graphic domain, each organism represents in some manner the universe"
(pribram 1982). One advantage of this view is that it provides a conceptual
framework that may provide an explanation for parapsychological pheno-
mena: in the implicate order of the holographic domain neither space nor
time exist; it is characterized by "undivided wholeness in flowing movement"
(Bohm 1980, p. 11). Another merit of this holographic view is that it points
to the underlying unity of all "things" that are not absolutely real and dis-
connected from each other and therefore do not exist as entities (see Bohm
1980). "Basically, everything is one" (McClintock, quoted by Keller 1983,
p.204).
9.9 Summary
Vitalism. Vitalism may refer to the belief that the whole cosmos is animated
(animism), or, more specifically, to views that life is infused by a vital prin-
ciple which is absent in nonliving matter and which has been conceived of as
a vital substance, fluid, or force. To adherents of the latter view, the answer
to the question 'what is life?' is simple. Life is whatever is governed by the
vital principle. Four kinds of criticism of vitalism are described. Although all
of them are valid to a certain extent, they need not apply to all forms of
vitalism. Not much is gained by condemning or ridiculing vitalism and all its
adherents. Such condescendence is often based on ignorance. Vitalism, in-
cluding its modern neovitalistic versions, is extremely heterogeneous and at
least in some of its forms has the merit of drawing attention to aspects of
life that have been neglected by other doctrines of life.
10.1 Introduction
Pepper's seven world hypotheses are the following: (1) the generating-sub-
stance hypothesis, (2) animism, (3) mysticism, (4) formism, (5) mechanism,
(6) contextualism, (7) organicism. Pepper rejected the first three as inade-
quate and retained the latter four as "the relatively adequate hypotheses."
I shall first refer to Pepper's relatively adequate hypotheses.
10.2.1 Formism
The central category of formism is that of form in the sense of eternal form.
An eternal form is characterized byits essence. Any particular thing or entity
represents or partakes in an (eternal) form. Those things or entities that are
essentially similar (or essentially the same) belong to the same form or es-
sence; or it is said that they represent the same plan, design, or norm. The
fact that things or entities belong to the same form is indicated by the same
name. For example, whatever is called red has the essence of redness, i.e.,
belong to the form of red.
According to Pepper, formism includes "realism" and "platonic idealism,"
and it is associated with Plato, Aristotle, and realists in general. I think that
even in modern biology it is much more widespread than is generally ack-
nowledged (see, e.g., Chaps. 4 and 7). I have criticized formism already under
the names of 'essentialism' and 'conceptual realism' (Chap. 4) and have
pointed out that it is a static and fragmenting philosophy that is not adequate
to the dynamics of life (see also Pepper 1942/70, p. 185). As the rigid frame-
work of static eternal forms, essences, plans, or norms is imposed onto the
fluidity of life and human society, distortion and destruction may become
severe and painful. The history of Western science and culture up to the pre-
sent time is full of atrocities offormism. It is time that we realize this more
fully to avoid more conflict, destruction and war (cf. Sect. 9.7).
Much of the scientific, philosophical and even religious discussion on the
"nature" of life is more or less determined or influenced by formism, for
the "nature" oflife is often equated with the essence or form of life. Hence,
the question may be to conceptualize (if possible in terms of a definition)
the essence of life. This question presupposes that life or anything else has
an essence of its own and thus is distinct from nonlife. In other words: it
243
10.2.2 Mechanism
t
4) Secondary qualities
Secondary categories 5) A principle for connecting the secondary qualities with
the first three primary or effective categories
6) Laws, if any, for regularities among secondary qualities
(secondary laws)
What does that mean? Any particular must be assigned to a location in the
spatiotemporal field. Its primary qualities are size, shape, motion, solidity,
mass (or weight), and number. These basic concepts have a long tradition,
from Democritus to Galileo to modern science and naturalistic philosophy
(Pepper 1942/70, p. 204). They are related to each other by laws. It is im-
portant to note that in what Pepper (1942/70, p. 195) called discrete mecha-
nism many of the structural features of nature are treated in a fragmenting
way as it is the case in formism. "So space is distinct from time, the primary
qualities are distinct from the field of locations, each primary quality is
perhaps distinct from every other, certainly every atom (i.e., localized group
of primary qualities) is distinct from every other atom, has independence of
its own, and every natural law (such as the law of inertia, or the law of ac-
tion and reaction) is distinct from every other law, and distinct, moreover,
from the field of locations and from the atoms distributed over the field"
(Pepper 1942/70, p. 196). It is obvious that it is an enormous danger for
mechanism to fall into the trap of formism and it is probably no exaggera-
tion to say that many mechanists have become more or less infected by
formism (see Pepper 1942/70, p. 210, for an example). The only way to
244
avoid this danger of becoming formist is to imbed the primary qualities and
laws in the spatiotemporal field, i.e., anything is real only if it has a time
and a place (Pepper 1942/70, p. 211). This leads to what Pepper (l942/70,
p. 212) called consolidated mechanism. Here "in place of the discrete particle
is the spatiotemporal path, and in place of the discrete laws of mechanics is
a geometry, or, better, a geography. The purpose of this cosmic geometry is
simply to describe to us the unique structure of the spatiotemporal whole"
(Pepper 1942/70, p. 212; see also p. 214).
Secondary qualities are those with which the biologist is usually concerned,
such as cells, organisms, modes of behavior, consciousness. One could go
further in saying that probably all the characters of human perception are
secondary (Pepper 1942/70, p. 215). The burning problem for mechanism
is how to reduce the secondary qualities and laws to the primary ones. The
difficulties, if not the impossibility, of such a task have been discussed above
(Sect. 9.4). This limits the scope of mechanism enormously because it leaves
many, if not most, of the emergent secondary qualities of living organisms
unaccounted for. Still more fundamental philosophical inadequacies are dis-
cussed by Pepper (1942/70, pp. 220, 230, etc.).
The preceding discussion of mechanism is so general that it includes all of
the different meanings of mechanism distinguished in Sect. 9.3 with the
partial exception of the definition of mechanism as the lawful conception of
life. The belief in lawfulness characterizes not only mechanism, but also
formism and organicism. According to Pepper's scheme the mechanistic world
hypothesis comprises "naturalism," "materialism" (if the secondary cate-
gories are ignored, or denied, or taken as secondary), and perhaps "realism."
It is associated with Democritus, Galileo, Descartes, Hume, Reichenbach,
and others (Pepper 1942/70, p. 141).
As far as the question of life is concerned, mechanistic answers entail the
attempted reduction of life to the primary mechanistic categories. This aim
of reduction, if it is practiced dogmatically, may lead to an impoverishment
of biological theory. This does not mean that mechanistic approaches are
useless. As long as their limitations are seen, mechanistic interpretations
may increase our understanding of living organisms. However, the question
facing us is to what extent, if any, it will be possible to extend the scope of
mechanism. Another question is in what direction mechanism as a philosophy
will be able to evolve so that it may be able to overcome some of its principal
obstacles. For some time already, mechanism has been intergrading not only
with formism but also with contextualism and organicism. Since the latter
two world hypotheses provide far greater scope than traditional mechanism,
an amalgamation of mechanism with these philosophies may provide solu-
tions to some of the dilemmas. Especially the computational metaphor
(machine theory) is promising in this respect (see Sect. 9.5). Pepper (1942/70,
245
10.2.3 Contextualism
10.2.4 Organicism
Organicism as a world hypothesis compares the whole earth and even the
whole universe to an organism [see also Lovelock's (1979) Gaia hypothesis].
Everything is organized and integrated and therefore is characterized by
some degree of organicity. Organicity refers to an organic whole in which
every part implies every other. As a consequence, the alteration or removal
of a part affects the organic whole. Seven fundamental principles are dis-
tinguished by Pepper (1942/70, p. 283). Organicism is associated with
Schelling, Hegel, and modern biologists such as von Bertalanffy (1975) and
Weiss (1973).
How would organicism as a world hypothesis interpret life? Probably,
living organisms would be considered as regions in the universe that exhibit
an extremely high degree of organ city . They are integrated into their environ-
ment, but the integration within the organisms surpasses that between organ-
isms and environment. Looking at it this way, the apparent contradiction
between the organicism of organismic biologists (Sect. 9.6) and organicism
as a world hypotheses may disappear (see, e.g., Varela 1976,1979). Organ-
ismic biologists have focused their attention at organisms in contrast to non-
living matter. Organicism as a hypothesis for the whole universe has dealt
with the most inclusive whole. In this perspective nonliving and living mat-
ter of the whole universe may be seen as an analogy to nonliving parts (such
as the dead wood of living tree trunks) and living parts of an organism. In
both cases so-called nonliving and living components form an integrated
whole. The nonliving parts are probably less integrated with the living parts
than the components of the living parts with each other.
247
10.2.7 Animism
10.2.8 Mysticism
In mysticism "we begin with a very impressive immediate fact, the mystic
experience, a fact that is never lost sight of ... so intense that it undertakes
to absorb the whole universe within it. Where it does not succeed, it de-
nounces the unsubrnissive "facts" as unreal; and since there are many of
these, it spreads unreality far and wide" (Pepper 1942/70, p. 127). Hence,
according to Pepper, mysticism is inadequate because of insufficient scope:
many facts remain that are unsubrnissive to the mystic experience.
I would like to ask Pepper how he, as someone who evidently is not a
mystic and lacks the central mystical experience, can judge which facts are
unsubmissive to the mystic. Pepper seems to assume that facts are given, i.e.,
that they are the same to a mystic and a nonmystic. He is unaware of the
fact that facts may not only be theory-laden but also dependent on the state
of consciousness (see Chap. 3). This means that to a mystic who is in a dif-
ferent state of consciousness the world may be quite different from that of
an ordinary person. For example, what may be a physically or mentally pain-
ful fact to an ordinary person, may not at all be painful to a mystic. So, the
question remains: how can someone who lacks the mystical experience judge
how the world appears to the mystic and whether unsubrnissive "facts"
persist?
Mystical experience cannot be conceptualized. Hence, many mystics have
preferred to remain silent or to convey their experience in poetic and para-
doxical aphorisms (or koans in Zen Buddhism). Mysticism is not a hypo-
thesis about the world, it is an enlightened state of being in the world. Hence,
any philosophical representation of mysticism such as Pepper's explication
of the seven categories of mysticism are bound to miss mysticism altogether.
There are no categories for the mystic.
10.3 Truth
which leads to the formulation of this sentence. Pepper claimed that in this
instance nothing is implied about an identity of form between the sentence
and the nail. However, he admitted that correspondence of form is implied
as the connecting link between primary and secondary categories. The two
kinds of categories cannot be bridged in mechanistic terms. "So the gap be-
tween the primary and the secondary categories still remains the center of
the inadequacy for mechanism" (Pepper 1942/70, p. 231).
10.4 Summary
Introduction. Since living systems are integrated with the whole world,
world hypotheses referring to the whole world are necessary for an under-
standing of life. World hypotheses are comprehensive world views corrobor-
ated by facts and based on a certain way of thinking. Since there are many
different ways of thinking, there is a great variety of world hypotheses.
Pepper (1942/70) reduced this diversity to the following seven principal
world hypotheses: formism, mechanism, contextualism, organicism, gener-
ating-substance hypothesis, animism, and mysticism.
Form ism. The central category of formism is that of (eternal) form charac-
terized by its essence. One principal goal of formism is the reduction of
observable diversity to (eternal) forms. Since external forms do not change,
this view is static, while life is fluid and fuzzy. Answering the question 'what
is life?' means fmding the essence (eternal form) of life.
The being mode refers to experience in the most encompassing way in-
cluding all the subjective nuances. Since such experience is infinite (i.e.,
open toward the whole universe), it cannot be described and therefore the
being mode cannot be defined or characterized: it must be experienced. This
is the challenge and joy of living.
In his Lectures on Zen Buddhism, D.T. Suzuki (in Fromm et al. 1960)
contrasts a poem by Tennyson with a haiku Gapanese poem) by Bashu to
illustrate the difference between West and East. Fromm (1976) reproduces
these two poems to indicate the difference between the having and being
modes of existence. Tennyson's verse is as follows:
Flower in the crannied wall,
I pluck you out of the crannies,
I hold you here, root and all, in my hand,
Little flower - but if I could understand
What you are, root and all, and all in all,
I should know what God and man is
Bashu's haiku (translated into English) runs like this:
When I look carefully
I see the nazuna blooming
By the hedge!
As pointed out by Suzuki and Fromm, Tennyson "needs to possess the
flower in order to understand people and nature, and by his having it (pluck-
ing it), the flower is destroyed" (Fromm 1976, p. 17). In contrast Basho just
looks carefully at the flower (nazuna) and "feels all the mystery ... that goes
deep into the source of all existence" (Suzuki in Fromm et al. 1960). He
does not separate and analyze the flower; in his nonin trusive, nonmanipulative
looking or seeing he can let it live, let it be ...
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