FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. Nos. 54344-45. January 10, 1994.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plainti-appellee, v s . WILLIE
AMAGUIN, GILDO AMAGUIN and CELSO AMAGUIN, accused.
WILLIE AMAGUIN and GILDO AMAGUIN, accused-appellants.
SYLLABUS
1.
REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; ASSESSMENT OF
THE TRIAL COURT; RULE AND EXCEPTION. The matter on credibility of the
witnesses is addressed to the sound judgment of the trial court which is in a better
position to decide them, it having heard the witnesses and observed their
deportment and manner of testifying during the trial. Consequently, the
assessment of the trial judge is usually received with respect, if not conclusiveness,
on appeal unless there is a showing of arbitrariness. Always, this has been the
familiar rule.
2.
ID.; ID.; ID.; TESTIMONY OF A SINGLE WITNESS; IF CREDIBLE AND POSITIVE;
SUFFICIENT TO CONVICT. The defense belittles the testimony of Hernando Oro
pointing to accused Willie Amaguin as the gunman as it stands "singly and alone,"
in contrast to the declaration of the defense witnesses exonerating Willie and Gildo.
While the defense may have presented a number of witnesses who, as the trial
court puts it, "virtually `sang' in a chorus that the killers were (Celso and Danny
Amaguin and a certain Ernie Ortigas) not the two accused herein (Willie and Gildo
Amaguin)," still the trial judge had the opportunity, as well as the right and
responsibility, to assess their credibility - just like all other witnesses. After all, there
is no law which requires that the testimony of a single witness needs corroboration
except when the law so expressly requires. As it is often said, witnesses are to be
weighed, not numbered. If credible and positive, the testimony of a single witness is
sucient to convict. Indeed the determination of the credibility of witnesses is the
trial court's domain, hence, we respect its factual findings.
3.
ID.; ID.; ALIBI; CANNOT PROSPER UNLESS ACCUSED PROVED THAT IT WAS
PHYSICALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR HIM TO BE AT THE SCENE OF THE CRIME. For,
even the respective defenses of the accused, i.e., accused Willie Amaguin's alibi that
he did not participate in the fray and that he was in the nearby house of his uncle
drinking with his friends, and accused Gildo Amaguin's denial that he was unarmed
but later forced to hurl stones to defend himself, are without sound basis. Alibi is
one of the weakest defenses that can be resorted to especially where there is direct
testimony of an eyewitness, not only because it is inherently weak and unreliable
but also because of the ease of its fabrication and the diculty of checking or
rebutting it. Besides, alibi to be believed must be supported by the physical
impossibility of the accused to have been at the scene of the crime. And as in an
alibi, a denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is a negative and
self-serving evidence which deserves no weight in law and cannot be given greater

evidentiary value over the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on

armative matters. Thus, as between a mere denial of the accused and the positive
identication and detailed declarations of the prosecution witnesses, the trial court
committed no error in according heavier weight to the latter.
4.
CRIMINAL LAW; QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES; TREACHERY; RULE FOR
APPRECIATION THEREOF. While we have already ruled that even a frontal attack
can be treacherous, as when it is sudden and unexpected and the victim is unarmed,
here, it appears that the aggressors did not employ means tending directly and
specially to insure the execution of the crime without risk to themselves arising
from the defense which the oended parties might make. It must be noted that the
assailants attacked a group of six (6) individuals who could have been armed. It is
highly probable that at least one of those attacked could oer resistance and could
put the lives of the aggressors in danger, as what indeed happened when accusedappellant Gildo Amaguin and his cousin Danny suered injuries as a result of the
ght which, from all indications, ended in a free-for-all. That Pacico sustained 15
stab wounds and a gunshot wound, and Diosdado, ten stab wounds and a bullet
wounds, does not necessarily mean that treachery attended the killings. As already
adverted to, for treachery to be appreciated, the oender must employ means,
methods, or forms in the commission of the crime which tend directly and specially
to insure its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense which the
offended party might make. Here, there is serious doubt.
5.
ID.; CONSPIRACY; CONSTRUED IN CASE AT BAR. On the third assigned
error, i.e., that there was conspiracy between Gildo and Celso, who remains at large,
the evidence shows how Celso and Gildo simultaneously assaulted the Oro brothers.
While Celso lunged at Pacico, Gildo aimed his slingshot at Danilo who was hit by
its dart, and immediately attacked Pacico with a knife. Under the circumstances, it
is evident that Gildo and Celso acted in unison and cooperated with each other
toward the accomplishment of a common felonious objective. Certainly, there was
conspiracy between the brothers Gildo and Celso, and it was not necessary to prove
a previous agreement to commit the crime since from their overt acts, it was clear
that they acted in concert in the pursuit of their unlawful design.
6.
ID.; AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES; ABUSE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH;
APPRECIATED IN CASE AT BAR. In Crim. Case No. 8041, where Willie mortally
shot Diosdado, he should be liable for homicide. And, since Diosdado was already on
bended knees and pleading for his life when fatally shot, the aggravating
circumstance of abuse of superior strength, although not alleged in the information
but proven during the trial, may be considered as a generic aggravating
circumstance. In Crim. Case No. 8042, where Willie shot Pacico while lying
prostrate already with numerous fatal stab wounds, Willie should be liable for
frustrated homicide it appearing that the gunshot wound was not fatal although his
intent to kill was evident. Likewise, the aggravating circumstance of abuse of
superior strength may be appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstance.
7.
ID.; MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES; VOLUNTARY SURRENDER; ELEMENTS;
PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. We agree with accused-appellants' view that

voluntary surrender should be appreciated in their favor. While it may have taken
both Willie and Gildo a week before turning themselves in, the fact is, they
voluntarily surrendered to the police authorities before arrest could be eected. For
voluntary surrender to be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance, the following
elements must be present: (a) the oender has not been actually arrested; (b) the
oender surrendered himself to a person in authority; and, (c) the surrender must
be voluntary. All these requisites appear to have attended their surrender.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J :
p

The coup de main on the Oro brood sent two brothers to the mortuary and a third to
medical care. The bloodbath resulted in the brothers Willie, Gildo and Celso, all
surnamed Amaguin, being charged with the murder of the Oro brothers Pacico and
Diosdado. Willie and Gildo went through trial while Celso to this date remains a
fugitive.
cdrep

The culpability of the Amaguin brothers was recounted by Hernando Oro, a younger
brother of Pacico and Diosdado. Hernando narrated that in the afternoon of 24 May
1977, he and his brothers Diosdado and Danilo, brother-in-law Rafael Candelaria, an
rst cousin Sergio Argonzola were invited by their eldest brother Pacico to the
latter's house in the interior of Divinagracia Street, La Paz, Iloilo City, for a small
gathering to celebrate the town esta. 1 At about ve o'clock in the afternoon, after
partaking of the meager preparations put together by Pacico, he (Hernando) and
his companions decided to leave. They were accompanied by their host to the plaza
where they could get a ride.
cdll

On their way, while traversing Divinagracia Street, Pacico was called by accused
Celso Amaguin: "Pare, come her." But Pacico answered: "Pare, not yet because I
have to conduct my guests rst." Immediately, Celso, with a butcher's knife in
hand, rushed towards Pacico. Gildo, Celso's younger brother, with a knife tucked to
his waist, followed with a slingshot known as "Indian pana" or "Indian target".
While Gildo aimed the dart from his slingshot at Danilo, which hit the latter on the
chest, Celso hacked Pacico. Gildo then stabbed Diosdado with a knife. Thereafter,
Willie, the eldest of the Amaguin brothers, appeared with a handgun and
successively shot the brothers Pacico, Diosdado and the eeing Danilo. Diosdado,
own kneeling, gasping for breath and pleading for his life, was again shot by Willie
who next red anew at Pacico. Meanwhile, Gildo and Celso repeatedly stabbed
Pacifico who already lying prostrate and defenseless. 2
Danilo Oro, the youngest of the Oros, likewise testied. He said that at
around ve o'clock in the afternoon of 24 May 1977, while walking along
Divinagracia Street on their way to the plaza for a ride home with his three
brothers and two others, they were waylaid by Celso, Willie and Gildo, their
cousin Danny, all surnamed Amaguin, and several others. Celso placed an arm on

the shoulder of Pacico and stabbed him with a knife. 3 Then there was a clash
between the two groups. In a split second, he (Danilo) was hit on the left chest
by a dart from the slingshot of Gildo whom he saw aiming at him. He (Danilo)
pulled the dart from his chest and ran away but was hit on the lips by a bullet.
Then he was pushed by Hernando to seek cover. 4
Rafael Candelaria, a brother-in-law of the Oros, also took the witness stand. His
version was that while he, his brothers-in-law and one Sergio Argonzola were
walking along Divinagracia Street that afternoon, two men approached them.
Without any provocation, one suddenly stabbed him. After being hit on the left arm,
he immediately ed to the plaza where he agged down a passing cab to take him
to the hospital. He did not see what happened next to his companions. 5

The defense however maintains that it was the Oro brothers who started the ght.
Accused Gildo Amaguin recounted that on 24 May 1977, at about ve o'clock in the
afternoon, Pacico with ve others went to their house in Divinagracia Street, La
Paz, Iloilo City, and approached his brother Celso, who was waiting for his wife at
the foot of the stairs. While Pacico was talking to Celso, a companion of Pacico
came forward, held Celso by the shoulder and said: "This is the bravest man in
Divinagracia Street, the Amaguin." Meanwhile, another companion of Pacico gave
Celso a ying kick that sent him reeling. Gildo then went down the house shouting:
"Don't ght." However, the attackers drew their knives and slingshots. In return,
Celso pulled out his knife. Since one of the companions of Pacico lunged at him,
Gildo retreated to the other side of the road and threw stones at his attackers.
Meanwhile, he saw his cousin Danny hit Danilo Oro with a dart from a slingshot.
But later Danny himself was stabbed from behind by one of Pacico's companions.
Then Ernie Ortigas, a guest of Celso, emerged from the Amaguin residence holding a
revolver. Ernie initially red three warning shots, after which he successively shot
Pacico and a person who tried to stab the former as well as an unidentied
companion of Pacico. Later, both Ernie Ortigas and Celso Amaguin escaped towards
the railway tracks. 6 The following day, he was brought by his uncle to the PC
authorities in Fort San Pedro for "safe-keeping" and turned over to the local police
after a week.
LLpr

The story of Gildo was conrmed by Vicente Belicano 7 and Nilda Tagnong, 8 longtime residents of Divinagracia Street, and Nenita Amaguin, mother of the accused
brothers, who even armed that her son Celso was indeed troublesome, 9 but
added that Willie "never had any brush with the law." 10
On his part, Willie related that he was in the house of his uncle along Divinagracia
Street that afternoon drinking with some friends. He left the group after hearing
some explosions coming from the direction of his mother's house and then seeing
his cousin Danny, with a stab wound at the back, being taken by two policemen,
and his wounded brother Gildo running towards the plaza. Thus, he went to his
mother's residence to nd out what happened. But when he got there, the incident
had already ended. As a consequence, he was told by his mother to look for his two

brothers who were wounded in the ght and to take them to the hospital. 11 he
turned himself in after ve days, upon learning that law enforcers were looking for
him.
Ulpiano Vencer, Rogelio de la Paz and Pat Jereos all conrmed that accused Willie
only left their gathering after the explosions were heard, and only after seeing his
wounded brother Gildo and his cousin Danny, who was in the company of two
policemen, pass by.
Perla Belleza, a vegetable vendor in the La Paz Public Market, also testied that
after hearing six explosions, she saw an unidentied man with a revolver running
away from the scene of the crime, followed by accused Celso who was holding a
knife. She was certain that the unidentied man was not accused Willie as the
latter was very well known to her, she being a former neighbor of the Amaguins. 12
Dr. Tito Doromal, Asst. Medico-Legal Ocer, Iloilo Metropolitan District Command,
INP, conducted an autopsy on Pacico and Diosdado. He declared that out of the 15
stab wounds and one gunshot wound Pacico sustained, ve of the stab wounds
were fatal. With regard to Diosdado, four (4) stab wounds, out of ten (10), and the
lone bullet wound he had sustained were considered fatal. 13
After a joint trial, and nding the version of the prosecution to be more credible, the
then Court of First Instance of Iloilo, Br. II, 14 found the accused Gildo Amaguin, also
known as "Tigib," guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, and . . .
sentenced (him) to Reclusion Perpetua, both in Criminal Cases Nos. 8041 and 8042,
together with all the accessory penalties, and to pay the costs."
As regards Willie Amaguin alias "Tikboy," the trial court found him guilty "as
accomplice in both Criminal Cases Nos. 8041 and 8042, and . . . sentenced (him) to
an indeterminate penalty of Seventeen (17) Years, Four (4) Months, and One (1)
Day to Twenty (20) Years each in said cases together with all the accessory
penalties, and to pay the costs."
cdll

Both accused were "further sentenced to indemnify the heirs of the late Pacico Oro
and Diosdado Oro, jointly and severally in the total sum of P24,000.00 as death
compensation; P20,000.00 (as) moral damages; P10,000.00 (as) exemplary
damages; and P5,000.00 for burial expenses, in both Criminal Cases Nos. 8041 and
8042."
In this appeal, accused Willie Amaguin and Gildo Amaguin claim that the court a
quo erred: (a) in categorizing the oense/s as murder; (b) in nding Willie Amaguin
to be the person involved in the incident; (c) in holding that there was conspiracy
between the brothers Gildo and Celso Amaguin (the latter is at large); (d) in nding
Gildo Amaguin to be armed with a knife and an Indian target when he was only
armed with stones; and, (e) even assuming the accused to be guilty, in not holding
them responsible for their individual acts, and in not appreciating the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender. 15
Before disposing of the other issues raised by appellants, we resolve the second and

fourth assigned errors rst to determine which of the two conicting versions of the
incident deserves credence. Their resolution rests upon the credibility of the
witnesses who have come forward, a matter addressed to the sound judgment of
the trial court which is in a better position to decide them, it having heard the
witnesses and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial.
Consequently, the assessment of the trial judge is usually received with respect, if
not conclusiveness, on appeal unless there is a showing of arbitrariness. Always, this
has been the familiar rule. 16
In the instant case, the trial court has accepted as credible the testimonies of
Hernando and Danilo Oro who positively identified accused Celso and Gildo Amaguin
as having started the assault on the Oro brothers with the use of a knife and an
"Indian pana," and accused Willie Amaguin as the gunwielder who shot the brothers
Pacico, Diosdado and Danilo during the fray. We see no reason to disregard the
assessment. We simply cannot set aside the factual ndings of the trial court absent
any showing of capriciousness on its part.
The defense belittles the testimony of Hernando Oro pointing to accused Willie
Amaguin as the gunman as it stands "singly and alone," in contrast to the
declaration of the defense witnesses exonerating Willie and Gildo. While the
defense may have presented a number of witnesses who, as the trial court puts it,
"virtually 'sang' in a chorus that the killers (Celso and Danny Amaguin and a certain
Ernie Ortigas) not the two accused herein (Willie and Gildo Amaguin)," 17 still the
trial judge had the opportunity, as well as the right and responsibility, to assess
their credibility just like all other witnesses. After all, there is no law which
requires that the testimony of a single witness needs corroboration except when the
law so expressly requires. As it is often said, witnesses are to be weighed, not
numbered. If credible and positive, the testimony of a single witness is sucient to
convict. 18 Indeed the determination of the credibility of witnesses is the trial court's
domain, hence, we respect its factual findings.
For, even the respective defenses of the accused, i.e., accused Willie Amaguin's alibi
that he did not participate in the fray and that he was in the nearby house of his
uncle drinking with his friends, and accused Gildo Amaguin's denial that he was
unarmed but later forced to hurl stones to defend himself, are without sound basis.
Alibi is one of the weakest defenses that can be resorted to especially where there is
direct testimony of an eyewitness, not only because it is inherently weak and
unreliable but also because of the ease of its fabrication and the diculty of
checking and rebutting it. 19 Besides, alibi to be believed must be supported by the
physical impossibility of the accused to have been at the scene of the crime. 20 And
as in an alibi, a denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is a
negative and self-serving evidence which deserves no weight in law and cannot be
given greater evidentiary value over the testimony of credible witnesses who testify
on armative matters. 21 Thus, as between mere denial of the accused and the
positive identication and detailed declarations of the prosecution witnesses, the
trial court committed no error in according heavier weight to the latter. 22
Hence, this version of the prosecution prevails: Celso and Gildo, together with

others, attacked the Oros. During the fray, Gildo was armed with a knife and an
"Indian target." And just as they were about to nish o the Oro brothers, Willie,
the eldest of the Amaguins, appeared with a revolver and delivered the coup de
grace.
The factual setting having been settled, we now go to the rst assigned error, i.e.,
that the lower court erred in categorizing the oense as murder there being no
treachery since "the combatants were face to face" and "[c]onfronting each other
frontally . . . that each will know each other's next move." 23 Except for appellants'
premise, the argument has merit. The killing of Pacico and Diosdado cannot be
qualified by treachery.
While we have already ruled that even a frontal attack can be treacherous, as when
it is sudden and unexpected and the victim is unarmed, 24 here, it appears that the
aggressors did not employ means tending directly and specially to ensure the
execution of the crime without risk to themselves arising from the defense which
the offended parties might take.

It must be noted that the assailants attacked a group of six (6) individuals who
could have been armed. It is highly probable that at least one of those attacked
could oer resistance and could put the lives of the aggressors in danger, as what
indeed happened when accused-appellant Gildo Amaguin and his cousin Danny
suered injuries as a result of the ght which, from all indications, ended in a freefor-all. That Pacico sustained 15 stab wounds and a gunshot wound, and Diosdado,
ten stab wounds and a bullet wound, does not necessarily mean that treachery
attended the killings. As already adverted to, for treachery to be appreciated, the
oender must employ means, methods, or forms in the commission of the crime
which tend directly and specially to insure its execution without risk to himself
arising from the defense which the oended party might make. 25 Here, there is
serious doubt.
On the third assigned error, i.e., that there was conspiracy between Gildo and Celso,
who remains at large, the evidence shows how Celso and Gildo simultaneously
assaulted the Oro brothers. While Celso lunged at Pacico, Gildo aimed his slingshot
at Danilo who was hit by its dart, and immediately attacked Pacico with a knife.
Under the circumstances, it is evident that Gildo and Celso acted in unison and
cooperated with each other toward the accomplishment of a common felonious
objective. Certainly, there was conspiracy between the brothers Gildo and Celso,
and it was not necessary to prove a previous agreement to commit the crime since
from their overt acts, it was clear that they acted in concert in the pursuit of their
unlawful design.
cdll

However, it was error to rule that accused Willie was an accomplice to his brothers.
There being no sucient evidence to link him to the conspiracy, he should be liable
for the natural and logical consequence of his own felonious acts. Hence, we take
exception to the conclusion of the trial court that Pacico and Diosdado did not die
due to the gunshot wounds inicted by Willie. Dr. Tito Doromal, the medico-legal

ocer who autopsied the bodies of Pacico and Diosdado, testied that while the
gunshot wound sustained by Pacico was not fatal, that suered by Diosdado was
fatal. 26
Consequently, in Crim. Case No. 8041, where Willie mortally shot Diosdado, he
should be liable for homicide. And, since Diosdado was already on bended knees and
pleading for his life when fatally shot, the aggravating circumstance of the abuse of
superior strength, although not alleged in the information but proven during the
trial, may be considered as a generic aggravating circumstance. 27
In Crim. Case No. 8042, where Willie shot Pacico while lying prostrate already
with numerous fatal stab wounds, Willie should be liable for frustrated homicide it
appearing that the gunshot wound was not fatal although his intent to kill was
evident. Likewise, the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength may
be appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstance.
Finally, we agree with accused-appellants' view that voluntary surrender should be
appreciated in their favor. While it may have taken both Willie and Gildo a week
before turning themselves in, the fact is, they voluntarily surrendered to the police
authorities before arrest could be eected. For voluntary surrender to be
appreciated as a mitigating circumstance, the following elements must be present:
(a) the offender has not been actually arrested; (b) the offender surrendered himself
to a person in authority; and (c) the surrender must be voluntary. 28 All these
requisites appear to have attended their surrender.
prcd

Now, we turn to the penalties.

In Crim. Cases Nos. 8041 and 8042, Gildo Amaguin is guilty of two (2) separate
crimes of homicide for the death of Diosdado and Pacico, respectively. The penalty
prescribed by law for homicide is reclusion temporal. 29 Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, and appreciating the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender
with no aggravating circumstance, the maximum penalty to be imposed on accused
Gildo Amaguin for each of the homicide he has committed, which he must serve
successively, should be taken from the minimum of the imposable penalty, which is
reclusion temporal the range of the minimum period of which is twelve (12) years
and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months, while the minimum
should be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, which is prision mayor the
full range of which is six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years, in any of its
periods.
In Crim. case No. 8041, Willie Amaguin is guilty of homicide aggravated by abuse of
superior strength but oset by the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender,
and in Crim. Case No. 8042, he is guilty of frustrated homicide likewise aggravated
by abuse of superior strength but oset by voluntary surrender. For the homicide,
applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law and taking into account the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender which, as earlier mentioned, osets the
aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength, the maximum penalty
should be taken from the medium of the imposable penalty, which is reclusion
temporal the range of the medium period of which is fourteen (14) years eight (8)

months and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months, while the
minimum should be taken from the penalty next lower in degree which is prision
mayor in any of its periods.
For the frustrated homicide, the imposable penalty is one degree lower than the
penalty prescribed by law for the consummated oense, and one degree lower than
reclusion temporal is prision mayor. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law and
the attending circumstances which oset each other, the maximum penalty to be
imposed should be taken from the medium of the imposable penalty, which is
prision mayor the range of the medium period of which is eight (8) years and one
(1) day to ten (10) years, while the minimum should be taken from the penalty
next lower in degree, which is prision correccional the full range of which is six (6)
months and one (1) day to six (6) years, in any of its periods.
Cdpr

WHEREFORE, the decision of the court a quo nding the accused-appellants WILLIE
AMAGUIN and GILDO AMAGUIN guilty in Crim. Cases Nos. 8041 and 8042 is
MODIFIED as follows:
(a)
accused-appellant WILLIE AMAGUIN is found guilty of HOMICIDE in Crim.
Case No. 8041 and is sentenced to six (6) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of
prision mayor minimum as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and
twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal medium as maximum, and of FRUSTRATED
HOMICIDE in Crim. Case No. 8042 and is sentenced to six (6) months and twenty
(20) days of prision correccional minimum as minimum, to eight (8) years, four (4)
months and ten (10) days of prision mayor as maximum, to be served successively;.
(b)
accused-appellant GILDO AMAGUIN is found guilty of two (2) separate crimes
of HOMICIDE in Crim. Cases Nos. 8041 and 8042 and is sentenced to six (6) years
two (2) months and one (1) day of prision mayor minimum as minimum, to twelve
(12) years, six (6) months and ten (10) days of reclusion temporal minimum as
maximum, for each homicide, to be served successively;
(c)
in Crim. Case N. 8041, accused-appellants WILLIE AMAGUIN and GILDO
AMAGUIN are declared jointly and severally liable to the heirs of Diosdado Oro for
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity consistent with prevailing jurisprudence; and
Cdpr

(d)
in Crim. case No. 8042, accused-appellant GILDO AMAGUIN is liable to the
heirs of Pacifico Oro for P50,000.00 as civil indemnity.
Costs against accused-appellants WILLIE AMAGUIN and GILDO AMAGUIN in both
cases.
SO ORDERED.

Cruz, Davide, Jr. and Quiason, JJ ., concur.

Footnotes
1.

TSN, 16 January 1978, pp. 36-37.

2.

Id., pp. 38-41.

3.

Id., 17 October 1977, pp. 4-6, 27.

4.

Id., pp. 8-11, 28-34.

5.

Id., 23 February 1978, pp. 59-60.

6.

Id., 14 September 1978, pp. 99-105.

7.

Id., 22 August 1978, pp. 23-27.

8.

Id., pp. 39-43.

9.

Id., 23 October 1978, p. 120.

10.

Id., p. 121.

11.

Id., 15 January 1979, pp. 5-7.

12.

Id., 22 August 1978, pp. 35-37.

13.

Id., 6 December 1977, pp. 2-6; Exhs. "A" and "B".

14.

Judge Midpantao L. Adil, presiding.

15.

Brief for Accused-Appellants, p. 1.

16.

17.

People v. Deuna , G.R. No. 87555, 16 November 1993; People v. Clapano , G.R.
No. 106525, 8 November 1993; People v. Ramilla , G.R. No. 101435, 8 November
1993; People v. Remollo , G.R. No. 104498, 22 October 1993; People v. Sencil ,
G.R. Nos. 105959-60, 12 October 1993; People v. Salamat , G.R. No. 103295, 20
August 1993.
Decision of the trial court, p. 7.

18.

People v. Nimo, G.R. No. 92533, 5 October 1993, citing People v. Villalobos , G.R.
No. 71526, 27 May 1992; 209 SCRA 304, 315.

19.

People v. Amador , G.R. Nos. 100456-59, 10 September 1993; People v. Cortes ,

G.R. No. 105010, 3 September 1993.

20.

Id.; People v. Remollo, G.R. No. 104498, 22 October 1993.

21.

People v. Sencil, G.R. Nos. 105959-60, 12 October 1993.

22.

People v. Gerona, G.R. No. 100230, 8 November 1993.

23.

Brief for Accused-Appellants, p. 42.

24.
25.

People v. Javar , G.R. No. 82769, 6 September 1993, citing People v. Cruz , G.R.
No. 94375, 4 September 1992; 213 SCRA 1992.
Art. 14, par. 16, Revised Penal Code.

26.

See Note 13.

27.

See People v. Amato, No. L-28273, 18 January 1982; 111 SCRA 39.

28.

People v. Canamo, G.R. No. 62043, 13 August 1985; 138 SCRA 141.

29.

Art. 249, Revised Penal Code.