ARIANA

MONTHLY

THE VISION OF RAISING AWARENESS TO THE NEED

FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PASHTUN PEOPLE

APRIL 2010

Awesome April! We would like to wish all our readers

NEWROZ MUBARAK!

Newroz brings a day of merriment and joy to parts of Central Asia, in which some parts
usually face the day to day tyranny of war. The vernal equinox, which marks the starting
point for Spring season is celebrated in Afghanistan and Pakistan, along with Iran, Iraq, some
parts of India, Tajikestan, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Along with
the starting of Spring season, this also marks to the start of a New Year in Iran and some
other countries and is celebrated any time between 20th-22th March each year, depending
on when the sun enters Aries. The celebrating Newroz is descended from the traditions of
Zoroastrian religion and traditions and in historical terms and has been celebrated for over
 3,000 years. Although there is a lack of information on when people started to celebrate
Newroz, the oldest records go back to the Arsacid/Parthian times (247BC – 224 AD). What
makes Newroz significant today, is that the UN General Assembly recognized the
International Day of Newroz this year in 2010.

The Pashtun Society would like to wish all our readers and society members a HAPPY
NEWROZ! We hope that the forthcoming spring will bring joy and happiness to all!

Shaneela Rahman
President,
UWSU Pashtun Society

AFGHANISTAN AND THE WORLD

Pakistan needs friendly Afghanistan

(Al-Jazeera) As in all primitive societies, the social structure in Washington is made up of many
tribes. Among the tribe of foreign policy specialists, there are many clans and sub-groupings, who in
turn are divided along geographic and substantive lines.

One finds among their ranks a motley assortment of retired government officials, greying military
officers, scholars, think-tankers, NGOers, and others who nurse the memories of influence lost or
who indulge their fantasies as political "wannabes" by acting as informal briefers and advisers to
those with real, current power and influence.

It was at one such gathering in recent days, where a group of reputed experts on Pakistan were
dispensing their wisdom to a senior government official, that I heard one of them say something quite
profound: "Beware the word 'must'," he said.

Indeed, that is a word one hears constantly with reference to Pakistan: Pakistan "must" deal with the
religiously-based militancy permeating its society and "must" get over its decades-long obsession
with the security threat from India.

It "must" eradicate the dangerous extremist groups in its midst, "must" move aggressively to route
militants from the Tribal Areas, and perhaps most importantly of all, "must" break all ties with the
Afghan insurgents, arrest their leaders, and unambiguously aid the Kabul government in its quest to
defeat the Afghan Taliban.

I do not disagree with any of that. The problem is that discussions as to how Pakistan is to be induced
to do what it "must" usually come down to sterile, two-dimensional formulations regarding the use of
"pressure" and "leverage" to induce the Pakistanis to do what they would not otherwise do on their
own.

The fact of the matter, however, is that no country will reliably do what it believes to be against its
national interests. That is as true of Pakistan as it is of any other country.

Friendly neighbour needed

With regard to the Afghan Taliban, and their insurgent allies in the so-called Haqqani group and
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hezb-i-Islami (HIG), Pakistan's ambivalence – if that is not too mild a word –
in the face of demands from Washington and Kabul derives from its perception of its strategic national
interests.

Long concerned about its lack of "strategic depth" in confronting its huge nemesis to the east,
Pakistan is understandably concerned about having a friendly regime to its west.

A Kabul government dominated, as it is, by Pakistan's old Northern-Alliance antagonists hardly

qualifies, particularly given the eagerness with which it solicits and supports a strong Indian
presence.

And lest we dismiss Pakistan's fears of military confrontation with India as some sort of irrational
preoccupation, we need only remember the heated war-advocacy of some political elements in
India as recently as November 2008, in the wake of the Mumbai attacks.

A strong government in New Delhi was able to resist such calls, but who is to say what might happen
in the face of another perhaps worse terrorist outrage emanating from uncontrolled – and largely
uncontrollable – militants based in Pakistan?

Given Pakistan's inability to stop such attacks even on its own soil, how could any Pakistani
strategist or military planner dismiss the possibility of another Indo-Pakistani crisis like the one we
witnessed in May 2002, when a previous attack on the Indian Parliament brought the fully-mobilised
armies of the two powers to the very brink of war?

To say that Pakistan is largely at fault for this state of affairs is not to dispel the danger. Doubts about
Washington's willingness to stay the course in Afghanistan have been exacerbated by Barack
Obama, the US president, himself, given his talk of a US draw-down beginning as early as summer
2011.

As Pakistan contemplates the possibility of a near-term US withdrawal, is it any wonder that they are
unwilling to unilaterally and, in their minds, gratuitously sacrifice links with the only elements through
whom they could hope to exert influence in a country of such strategic importance to them?

I have been heartened by indications that civilian officials, at least, in the Obama administration
understand that the key to changing Pakistani policy on Afghanistan and the Taliban insurgency is to
change the strategic environment in which such Pakistani decisions are made.

But while the concept might be right, actually changing the strategic environment – which most likely
would require a combination of substantial changes in Afghan government policy toward India and
very significant, sustained progress against the Taliban on the ground – will be very difficult.

Changing the strategic environment

No doubt, the urgency surrounding these questions was stepped up several notches this week during
US discussions with Pakistan's Chief of Army Staff, General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, who is visiting the
US to participate in the Pakistan-US Strategic Dialogue.

Indeed, it is hard to imagine a more opportune time for such discussions in light of Pakistan's recent
arrest of the Taliban's second most senior official, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, and the reported
arrival in Kabul of a senior delegation of the HIG.

It is true that there are persistent rumours in Washington which indicate that the arrest of Baradar was
something of a "happy accident", and that his detention, along with those of several other Afghan
Taliban officials, do not yet indicate a strategic shift in Pakistani policy.

Meanwhile, others suggest that Pakistan's arrest of Baradar was motivated by concerns that his
rumoured involvement in political talks aimed at intra-Afghan reconciliation could leave the
Pakistanis out of the loop.

Leaving all of this aside, now is clearly the time for the US and Pakistan to engage in serious talks
about both the conditions and prospects for genuine political reconciliation in Afghanistan.

It seems to me that any sort of rational calculus would suggest that the legitimate interests of the
US, the Afghan government, and Pakistan do not greatly diverge.

The current Taliban demand for US withdrawal as a precondition for talks is not only a practical non-
starter; it would surely lead to renewed Afghan civil war, which cannot be in Pakistan’s interest.

A full break

On the other hand, anything less than the full break with al-Qaeda demanded by the US of Afghan
insurgents would be likely only to condemn the region to re-live the past, recreating the conditions
which led to the US intervention in Afghanistan in the first place.

Only a peaceful reconciliation which subjects the Taliban to some sort of democratic accountability
can assure both continued unity and stability in the country, while ensuring the Pashtun influence
on Afghan national policy which Pakistan sees as a safeguard of its own interests.

Make no mistake: I cannot see the current senior Taliban leadership accepting such a future, or
such a role for itself.

However, the point of a realistic and constructive dialogue on these issues between the US and
Pakistan would be to bring the two countries to the point of actual operational cooperation on the
political front.

With eventual three-way agreement on the aims and principles of a political reconciliation process,
Pakistan - rather than blindly
tolerating a violent and recalcitrant Taliban leadership as its only viable fall-back option for the
future - might instead be motivated to break with the irreconcilables in favour of more
accommodating leaders.

Pakistan cannot be allowed to, dictate the future of Afghanistan. Without its active and willing co-
operation, however, no lasting Afghan peace will ever be won.

To those engaged with Pakistani leaders this week, I would repeat: Beware the word 'must'.

(Robert Grenier was the CIA's chief of station in Islamabad, Pakistan, from 1999 to 2002. He was
also the director of CIA's counter-terrorism centre).

As Taliban makes comeback in Kunduz province, war spreads to northern Afghanistan

(Washington Post) KUNDUZ, AFGHANISTAN -- For most of the past eight years, this northern
province has been relatively peaceful, far removed from the insurgency in the Taliban heartlands of
Kandahar and Helmand in the south.

But the past year has brought such a dramatic Taliban comeback in Kunduz that Gen. Stanley A.
McChrystal, commander of U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan, is planning to shift some of the
ongoing troop reinforcements to the north of the country, the first significant American deployment to
the region since the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001, U.S. officials say.

The plan for the additional 30,000 U.S. troops that President Obama is sending to Afghanistan had
been to focus on the south and east of the country, where the Taliban is strongest. But U.S. officials
say that about 3,000 of those troops will be shifted to operations in the north to augment a contingent
of German soldiers, which numbers about 1,100 and has been more focused on reconstruction efforts
than on battling insurgents.

U.S. officials are concerned about a vital NATO supply line that runs from Tajikistan through Kunduz,
amid fears that the Taliban is preparing a campaign of disruption. They also said insurgents, under
increased pressure from international forces in the south, are seeking to compensate by stepping up
operations in the north in a bid to force U.S. forces to spread out and thus dilute their effectiveness.

Local officials and residents say two of the province's districts are almost completely under Taliban
control. There, girls' schools have been closed down, women are largely prohibited from venturing
outdoors unless they are covered from head to toe, and residents are forced to pay a religious "tax,"
usually amounting to 10 percent of their meager wages.

"The Afghan government is the lawful government," said Abdul Wahed Omarkhiel, the government
head of one district, Chardara, which lies four miles from the provincial capital, Kunduz city. "But the
Taliban's law is the gun."

Warning that their district is too dangerous for a foreigner to venture into, Omarkhiel, other
Chardara officials and tribal elders traveled to Kunduz city to meet with a Washington Post
reporter. They said disillusionment with the Afghan government, widely seen as incompetent and
corrupt, and the slow pace of reconstruction had helped create favorable conditions for a Taliban
resurgence.

"When people have problems, they don't go to the government. They don't go to the police," said
Moeen Marastial, a member of parliament. "They go to the Taliban, and the Taliban decides. There
are no files and no paperwork."
Fertile ground for Taliban

In some ways, Kunduz was always ripe for a Taliban return.

Kunduz's population is about half Pashtun, which is unusual for a northern province. These
Pashtuns -- descendants of those who relocated here in the 19th century -- have maintained links
with their fellow tribespeople in southern Afghanistan and in Pakistan.

Kunduz is also home to a complex mix of armed groups, including the Hezb-i-Islami militia, loyal to
warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar; the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan; and the Haqqani network, led by
former mujaheddin commander Maulavi Jalaluddin Haqqani and his son. All these groups are loosely
affiliated with the Taliban. Against that backdrop, officials in Kunduz say they have just 1,500 police
personnel for the entire province. "The number of police is not enough, and they are not well-
equipped," said Mohammad Razaq Yaqoubi, the police chief in Kunduz. "We need 1,500 more police.
And well-equipped. Then we will be able to retake those districts."

Some local officials said the Taliban was performing well as a surrogate government in the absence
of any Afghan official presence, was dispensing a brand of justice that seemed swift and fair, and had
tempered some of the more extreme behavior it had shown during its 5 1/2 -year rule in Afghanistan.

"They are very just solving cases," said Abdul Ghayour, head of the Chardara council. "They satisfy
both sides. If it is a serious, serious case, they will solve it within one hour, without wasting your time."

"When they were in power, they were brutal," said Yarboy Imaq, the deputy head of the council. Now,
he said, "there are a lot of changes to their policy" in an apparent bid to be "more acceptable to the
people." When pressed in an interview, Imaq added uneasily, "If I sit here and say a lot of bad things
about the Taliban, I couldn't live there even one night."

Women still bear brunt

One thing that has not changed is the Taliban's view of women.

Immediately after assuming control in Chardara, the Taliban ordered that girls be allowed to attend
school only for the first three years. The elders said the Taliban mandated that girls could return to
school only if they were sequestered and had female teachers, but there are none in the district.

Boys can continue to go to school but only in traditional Afghan dress, the loose-fitting salwar-
kameez, according to locals.

Mahboba Haidar, who runs a women's self-help organization that includes a garment factory and a
kindergarten, said the few families that could afford to have moved away from Taliban-controlled
areas so their girls can continue in school.

Women in Taliban-held areas are mostly prohibited from venturing out alone or without their
burqas. "When women are sick or have to go to the doctor, they have to get permission from
them," said Karima Sadiqi, a member of the provincial council. "They are the same Taliban,"
Sadiqi said. "If they were different, they wouldn't have closed the girls' schools."

The most dramatic sign that the war had spread to the north came Sept. 4, when German troops
called in a U.S. airstrike against two NATO fuel tankers hijacked by the Taliban in Kunduz.

The strike killed up to 142 people, a large number of them civilians who had gathered around the
trucks to offload gasoline.
 Afghanistan Challenge is not to create “Western-Style democracy

- Ahmad Shah is a Afghan social entrepreneur and human rights activist living
in London. He is currently studying MSc in International Business Economics
at the University of Westminster. The opinions expressed are his own. -

An oft-heard refrain holds that Afghanistan is a “graveyard of empires” where

corruption and violence are endemic; a land that never had a strong central
government, and cannot be democratised. While perhaps flattering to Afghan
pride of strength, these half-truths bear little relation to reality.

It is true that Afghans are fiercely independent, and that Pashtun precepts concerning honor are more
sacred than life itself. It is also true that no outside power has ever succeeded in subjugating
Afghanistan. None of this means Afghanistan is destined to remain a failed state.

In fact, for much of the 20th century Afghanistan had a strong central government. Corruption may
have always existed, but until recently it was not the centrepiece of Afghanistan’s economy or society.
Under King Zahir Shah, who ruled from 1933 to 1973, Afghanistan was stable and progressive, and
while not a wealthy country, it was certainly not one of the poorest.

So how did Afghanistan come to its present predicament? In brief, Soviet intervention destroyed the
nation’s fabric of central government. However over the last eight years corruption and injustices
against the civilian population not only destroyed the fabric of local tribal governance but completely
devastated Afghanistan as a nation.

Until 1973, Afghanistan was peaceful and sovereign, with capable and respected police forces,
national army, educational institutions and health facilities, under a constitutional monarchy. In 1973,
Dauod Khan, a Soviet sympathizer, overthrew King Zahir Shah and six years later the Soviets
invaded.

This set in motion a chain of events whose consequences are still with us. When the last Soviet-
backed government fell in 1992 and the U.S. turned its attention elsewhere, Afghanistan descended
into chaos and civil war.

Therefore, Afghanistan’s challenge is not to create a “western-style democracy” but to restore what
existed not long ago. Grand corruption, which began as a plague on the Afghan government, has
spread like a virus throughout society.

According to Transparency International, Afghanistan is now the second most corrupt country on
earth. It has become increasingly difficult for any legitimate business to function normally. Honest
entrepreneurs face constant demands for bribes from government officials, and in the extreme, risk
murder for resisting blackmail, refusing bribes or competing with the economic interests of powerful
officials.

That is why a small number of privileged, connected elites have accumulated staggering wealth, while
99 percent of the legitimate, productive business sector struggles merely to survive.

During the period of conflict and war that began in the early 1970s, the late Haji Allah Nazar
Dustukhel – a prominent parliamentarian, tribal elder, and entrepreneur – remained in
Afghanistan. As a member of parliament, he was an outspoken critic of Soviet intervention and
was imprisoned for almost a decade.
After his release, he avoided politics and developed businesses to create jobs in his native country.
He refused to support the Soviet backed regime in Kabul despite offers of various high ranking
positions by the then Afghan President the late Dr. Mohammad Najibullah. Others fled to pursue
safer lives abroad and most of these “fair weather nationalists” have now returned with some of
them exploiting their public offices for yet more personal enrichment.

Despite this impeccable legacy, during the last few years even the late Allah Nazar’s heirs have
become victims of Afghanistan’s culture of corruption and impunity. On Nov 1, 2008 his grandson,
Mohammad Ashraf Dustukhel, was murdered as his car passed by the President’s office and the
Ministry of Defense, just a few meters from a police precinct near a police check point. Sixteen
months later, the case remains unsolved.

Although the motives and identities of those who killed him remain unknown, one thing is clear:
Ashraf Dustukhel was a businessman continuing on his grandfather’s tradition of honest business,
doing well and doing good for Afghanistan. One can only assume that for certain powerful interests,
doing well and doing good are now zero-sum endeavors. If the police are helpless to solve a murder
literally in their own front yard, one must wonder if the reasons go beyond bad luck or ineptitude.

By themselves, unsolved murders do not mark a society in crisis. When combined with other
disturbing trends, such as the arbitrary abrogation of private property rights of the “unconnected” and
rampant official corruption, a more disturbing picture emerges. The late Ashraf Dustukhel’s family,
along with many others, has had their land expropriated without due process or legal authority by high
ranking officials in Maidan Province and Central Kabul.

State-owned land has been sold to mysterious buyers at bargain prices. Similarly, the late Ashraf’s
business partners absconded with his funds. Despite the recent resignation of the head of the Afghan
Senate, and the new assertiveness of Parliament in rejecting Karzai appointees, real progress
requires more systemic changes.

High-ranking public officials must be required to publicly disclose in writing, under oath, their personal
and family assets (as is done by most elected and senior appointed officials in Western countries).

Rent-seeking and demands for bribes must be investigated and prosecuted according to the law,
regardless of the subject’s prominence or connections. Finally, we will know that Afghanistan is well
on its way to restoring stability and civil society when its citizens are not gunned down with impunity
before the eyes of the police.

Untangling the Punjabi Taliban Network

(This article was originally published in the CTC Sentinel, published by the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point)

By Raheel Khan

Since 2006, pakistan has been victim to rising terrorist violence from a nexus of militant factions
consisting of al-Qa`ida, Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and fighters from Punjab-based militant
groups.1 All three entities share a common, violent Islamist ideology, and they have solidified bonds
in response to Pakistan limiting its operations against Indian-administered Kashmir, while at the
same time expanding operations against Pakistani Taliban factions in its northwest.2 These factors
have caused previously disparate groups to join together against a common enemy, the Pakistani
government, which is allied with the United States and NATO in the “war on terrorism.” As a result
of these developments, Punjab Province itself is increasingly at risk. Punjabi militants have
established cells across the province, and according to security officials are running their own
training facilities in southern Punjab.3 The March 12, 2010 twin suicide blasts that killed at least 45
people in a high security area of Lahore underscored this concern.4
Punjab Province is Pakistan’s most critical region. Geographically, it is Pakistan’s heartland and
the country’s most populated province.5. It contains a number of strategically significant cities,
such as the garrison city of Rawalpindi, Lahore, Multan and Gujranwala. Moreover, the country’s
civil and military recruits are drawn mainly from the province. Any destabilization of Punjab
Province would have dire ramifications for Pakistan and would also endanger international
coalition operations in Afghanistan.6

The threat has become increasingly serious. In September 2008, alleged militants of Punjabi origin
were interrogated in the wake of the al-Qa`ida-linked Marriott Hotel bombing in Islamabad that killed
more than 50 people.7 On March 3, 2009, Punjabi militants attacked the visiting Sri Lankan cricket
team in the Punjab capital city of Lahore, killing eight people.8 On March 30, 2009, a police training
center just outside Lahore was attacked and eight people killed.9 The unprecedented assault on the
military’s General Headquarters (GHQ) in the garrison city of Rawalpindi on October 10, 2009
displayed the growing sophistication and intent of the network.10 Finally, on October 15, 2009, three
teams of militants launched a coordinated assault in Lahore, attacking the regional headquarters of
the Federal Investigation Agency, the Manawan Police Training School, and the Elite Police
Academy; the combined assault killed more than 30 people.11 Attacks have continued into 2010.

This nexus of militants has evolved significantly since it first emerged in 2006-2007. Although the
sophistication and intensity of their operations reached new levels in 2009, the higher frequency of
attacks also shed more clarity on the network. This article will revisit the formation of the Punjabi
Taliban network and show how its disparate militant groups are coordinating operations.12
Merging the Agendas

From 2001-2006, militancy in Pakistan was largely divided into two different agendas. In the country’s
northwest region, Taliban factions focused on fighting international and Afghan forces in Afghanistan,
and other Western targets in Pakistan. To the east, Punjab-based militant groups such as Lashkar-i-
Jhangvi, Sipah-i-Sahaba and Jaysh-i-Muhammad focused their attacks on Indian forces in the
disputed region of Kashmir or on Shi`a Muslims in Pakistan.13 In 2006-2007, however, this dynamic
was altered in response to Pakistan ceasing support for militancy in Indian-administered Kashmir.14

In response, many Kashmir-focused militants joined forces with Taliban factions in Pakistan and
Afghanistan.15 The two agendas have partly merged, and this became especially evident after the
Pakistan government’s military operations against Islamic hardliners at the Lal Masjid (Red
Mosque) in Islamabad in mid-2007.16 The mosque was operated by Maulana Abdul Aziz and
Abdul Rashid Ghazi, both strong supporters of the Taliban and allied Islamist movements.17 The
Punjab-based militant groups—particularly Lashkar-i-Jhangvi and Jaysh-i-Muhammad—were also
associated with Lal Masjid, and some of their members turned against the state after the siege.18

Based on rough estimates, more than 5,000 individuals from the seminaries in southern and
northern Punjab Province joined terrorist training camps in North and South Waziristan in the
wake of the military operation against Lal Masjid.19 Fighters now part of this loose collaboration
among Taliban factions in Pakistan’s northwest and formerly Kashmir- or sectarian-focused
militants in the east and northeast are now referred to as the “Punjabi Taliban.”20 Restrained from
continuing activities in Indian-held Kashmir, members of Punjab-based militant groups joined
forces with the TTP and al-Qa`ida to undertake joint operations in Pakistan. As described by Dr.
Ayesha Siddiqa, an Islamabad-based analyst, Punjab has been turned into a “factory where
suicide bombers are produced. Punjab has become a major recruiting ground and hub for the
planning of terrorist attacks, and it’s a human resource for the fighting in Afghanistan.”21

Moreover, there is evidence that during this period al-Qa`ida operatives escalated efforts to
engage Punjabi militants and draw them into their fight against Pakistani security forces. Senior al-
Qa`ida stalwarts such as Shaykh `Isa al-Masri reportedly recruited Punjabi and Kashmiri jihadists
into the Pakistani Taliban and al-Qa`ida, engaging recruits from Lashkar-i-Tayyiba, Jaysh-i-
Muhammad and Harkat-ul-Mujahidin.22

The cooperation among the groups has developed to the point that leaders of the Punjabi Taliban
network are represented in the TTP’s 40-member shura (council).23

This fact was revealed in October 2009, after Pakistani security forces arrested Iqbal and Gul
Muhammad, purportedly two high-ranking Punjabi Taliban members. According to a journalist for
Pakistan’s Dawn, The two, who were in charge of militancy in Punjab, officials claim, served as
the link between Taliban’s main leadership in Waziristan and the increasingly threatening Punjabi
Taliban network, a grouping of sectarian and Kashmir focused militant groups responsible for the
Taliban hits in Punjab and the federal capital.24

Similarly, “Dr. Usman,” the alias of the militant who was arrested during the October 2009 attack on
Pakistan’s GHQ, was also reportedly a member of the TTP’s shura.25

Joint Operations

Al-Qa`ida, the TTP and the Punjabi Taliban network have cooperated to strike targets deep inside
Punjab Province.26 U.S. and Pakistani authorities believe that the bombing of the

Marriott Hotel in Islamabad in September 2008 and the deadly attack on Sri Lanka’s cricket team in
Lahore in March 2009 were examples of combined operations.27 The deployment of seasoned
operative Dr. Usman, who has links to al-Qa`ida, to lead the attack on the GHQ in Rawalpindi in
October 2009 was a demonstration of power by this coalition, which many thought was weakened by
military offensives in the Swat Valley.28

Rehman Malik, Pakistan’s interior minister, warned in the Financial Times in June 2009 that a Swat-
like situation could emerge in southern Punjab if terrorists fleeing military operations and U.S. drone
strikes take shelter in southern Punjab under the protection of Lashkar-i-Jhangvi and Jaysh-i-
Muhammad.29 In the wake of the latest military offensive in South Waziristan at the end of 2009, it is
believed that some middle and lower rank militants may have shifted to southern Punjab, while the
core leadership is strongly believed to be hiding in North

Waziristan.30 Indeed, the deadly alliance has increased the number of attacks in Punjab, and it
appears that Punjabi militant leaders are exercising control over Taliban fighters who fled the
military operations in the northwest.31

Following the well-planned attack on the Pakistan Army’s GHQ, the army admitted the scale of the
threat it faces from this nexus, whose ranks include soldiers from the Pakistan military.32

Dr. Usman, for example, the sole surviving attacker on the GHQ, was a former army medical
corps soldier from Kahuta, a town in the heartland of Punjab Province.33 After leaving the army,
Dr. Usman first joined Lashkar-i-Jhangvi, and then later Jaysh-i-Muhammad.34 From there, he
became a member of the TTP and remained a close associate of Ilyas Kashmiri, the chief of al-
Qa`ida’s paramilitary operations in Pakistan.35

The case of Iqbal and Gul Muhammad also revealed the connections between Punjabi militant
groups and Pakistani Taliban fighters in the northwest. Authorities believe that Iqbal and Gul
Muhammad, who were captured in October 2009, were in charge of militancy in Punjab, serving
as the link between the central TTP leadership in Waziristan and the Punjabi Taliban
responsible for attacks in Punjab.36 It is also thought that the two had a role in most of the major
attacks in Punjab, including the three coordinated attacks in Lahore and the one on the GHQ in
October.37

These attacks clearly displayed the increased strategic, operational and tactical level of
collaboration among the groups.38 In December 2009, it is believed that the deadly alliance
targeted Pakistan’s main intelligence agency, the ISI, with a car bomb in Multan, killing 12 people
including security personnel.39 Similarly, the busy Moon market in Lahore was targeted by this
same network as well, resulting in the deaths of 49 civilians.40 Militants bombed a high-profile
military mosque in Rawalpindi in December 2009, killing senior military officers and their families,
including a major-general, brigadier, and many officers; a total of 40 people died in that attack,
including 17 children.41

Additionally, the nexus has started violent attacks in Pakistan-administered Kashmir.

From June 2009 to January 2010, 20 people have been killed and 125 injured—mostly security
personnel—in five terrorist attacks in Pakistan-administered Kashmir.42 The attacks have
included suicide bombings. It is ironic that the same militants who previously focused their
operations on Indian-administered Kashmir are now targeting their own side of the border.

Conclusion

Al-Qa`ida, the TTP and the Punjabi Taliban network are driven by a shared Islamist ideology.
Nevertheless, authorities believe that the relationship largely remains tactical. The Pashtun Taliban
and the Arab-led al-Qa`ida organization provide money, sanctuary, training facilities and suicide
bombers, while Punjabi Taliban factions provide logistical support in Punjabi cities, including target
identification and managing and assisting suicide bombers from the northwest.43

The nexus reportedly share each others’ seminaries, sanctuaries, training facilities and jihadist cadres
to conduct terrorist activities across Pakistan.44 South Asia analyst Bruce Riedel explained, “These
groups are fighting for recruits from the same Punjabi families and clans that the Pakistani army
recruits from for its officer corps.”45 Military operations in FATA—particularly the October 2009 military
offensive in South Waziristan—and drone attacks on Taliban safe houses have dispossessed the
militants from their land and destroyed their physical infrastructure. This may be one reason why the
battlefield has shifted to Punjab.

As stated by Pakistani defense analyst Lieutenant-General (retired) Talat Masood, “the increasing
cooperation among the three groups is a serious threat to Pakistan but the Pakistan army and the
intelligence agencies are aware of it.”46 While the political government is playing down the threat,
Pakistan’s army accepts that these militants have joined forces and claims that the military is fully
cognizant of this new development.47 It remains to be seen, however, whether Pakistan’s security
forces will be able to
turn back the tide of jihadist violence sweeping across the country.

Raheel Khan anchors a live 50-minute current affairs Pashtu program from Pakistan Television
Peshawar Centre with focus on the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and Afghanistan. He is a
freelance journalist with expertise on militancy in the Pashtun belt. He heads the private media
and research company Stratcom Private Limited.

1 The Punjabi Taliban comprise members from a number of Punjab-based groups that were formerly focused on Indian-
administered Kashmir or on sectarian attacks against the Shi`a community in Pakistan. The Punjabi Taliban include members from
Lashkar-i-Jhangvi, Jaysh-i-Muhammad and Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan—fighters from other Punjab-based groups may be involved
as well. For more details, see Issam Ahmed, “Why Pakistan’s Old Jehadis Pose New Threat—At Home and in Afghanistan,”
Christian Science Monitor, December 8, 2009; Kachan Lakshman, “Heartland Trauma,” Kashmir Herald, February 7, 2010; Raza
Khan and Ayesha Nasir, “Punjabi Taliban Threat is Growing, Pakistan Fears Shift in Control,” Washington Times, October 21,
2009.
2 Pakistan’s northwest consists of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and North-West Frontier Province.
3 Alex Rodriguez, “Taliban Taps the Punjab Heartland,” Los Angeles Times, November 16, 2009.
4 Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan claimed responsibility for the attack. For details, see “At Least 37 Killed in Pakistan Bombings,” CNN,
March 12, 2010; “TTP Claim Lahore Bombings; 39 Dead,” Geo TV, March 12, 2010.
5 According to 1998 census numbers, approximately 72 million people live in Punjab Province.
6 Sabrina Tavernise, Richard A. Oppel Jr. and Eric Schmitt, “United Militants Threaten Pakistan’s Populous Heart,” New York
Times, April 13, 2009.
7 The suspected militants were alleged members of Lashkar-i-Jhangvi and Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islam. For details, see Amir Mir,
“South Punjab Threat,” The News International, October 25, 2009. For the al-Qa`ida-link, see “Pakistan al-Qaeda Leaders ‘Dead,’”
BBC, January 9, 2009.
8 Ibid. Also see “‘Cricket Attacker’ Held in Lahore,” BBC, June 17, 2009.
9 “Siege at Pakistan Police Academy,” BBC, March 30, 2009.
10 “Six Soldiers, Four Assailants Killed in Attack on GHQ,” Dawn, October 10, 2009.
11 Jane Perlez, “Pakistan Attacks Show Tighter Militant Links,” New York Times, October 15, 2009.
12 Ibid.
13 Rodriguez, “Taliban Taps the Punjab Heartland.”
14 Regardless of whether Pakistan has ceased all support for operations in India or Indian-administered Kashmir, it has certainly
reduced its support dramatically.
15 Syed Saleem Shahzad, “Pakistan’s Militants Ready for More,” Asia Times Online, March 5, 2009.
16 Aoun Sahi, “Ulterior Motives,” The News International, October 25, 2009; Tavernise et al.
17 Bill Roggio, “Red Mosque Leader Abdul Rasheed Ghazi Killed During Assault,” The Long War Journal, July 10, 2007.
18 Personal interview, Tahir Khan, editor at News Network International and correspondent for BBC, Islamabad, Pakistan, March 12,
2010.
19 Mir, “South Punjab Threat.”
20 Alex Rodriguez, “Pakistani Extremists in Punjab Seen as Rising Threat,” Los Angeles Times, August 22, 2009. For one of the first
articles that discussed the Punjabi Taliban, see Hassan Abbas, “Defining the Punjabi Taliban Network,” CTC Sentinel 2:4 (2009).
21 Ibid.
22 Bill Roggio, “Senior Al Qaeda Leader Leaves Pakistan,
Directs Iraq Operations from Syria,” The Long War Journal, August 21, 2009. For an in-depth profile of Shaykh `Isa al-Masri and his
role in violence in Pakistan, see Erich Marquardt and Abdul Hameed Bakier, “An Ideological and Operational Threat: Abu `Amr/Shaykh
`Isa,” CTC Sentinel 1:8 (2008).

23 The TTP shura is a 40-member umbrella council of top militant commanders that coordinates and supervises TTP operations in
Pakistan. For more details, see Baqir Sajjad Syed, “Top Guns of Punjabi Taliban Captured,” Dawn, October 23, 2009.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
26 Tavernise et al.; “Pakistan al-Qaeda Leaders ‘Dead.’”
27 Ibid.
28 “‘Dr. Usman’: Last Desperate Act, 26, 2009; Tavernise et al.
30 Personal interview, Khan.
31 Perlez; Khan et al., “Punjabi Taliban Threat is Growing, Pakistan Fears Shift in Control.”
32 Declan Walsh, “Pakistani Army Facing Threat from Punjabi, al-Qaeda and Taliban Militants,” Guardian, October 12, 2009.
33 Ibid.
34 Amir Mir, “Punjabi Taliban Avenge Qari Zafar’s Death,” The News International, March 9, 2010.
35 Ilyas Kashmiri was thought to have died in a U.S. drone strike in South Waziristan in September 2009. It appears, however, that he
survived the strike and is still active. For other details, see Hassan Abbas, “Deciphering the Attack on Pakistan’s Army Headquarters,”
Foreign Policy, October 11, 2009; Alex Rodriguez and Zulfiqar Ali, “Pakistani Al Qaeda Leader Killed in U.S. Strike,” Los Angeles
Times, September 18, 2009; “Ilyas Kashmiri Alive, Lays Out Future Terror Strategy,” Daily Times, October 15, 2009; Eli Lake, “‘Dead’
al-Qaeda Terrorist Surfaces for Media,” Washington Times, October 15, 2009.” Daily Times, October 13, 2009.
29 Farhan Bokhari, “Pakistan Puts Southern Provinces on Alert as Taliban Threat Grows,” Financial Times, June 26, 2009; Tavernise
et al.
30 Personal interview, Khan.
31 Perlez; Khan et al., “Punjabi Taliban Threat is Growing, Pakistan Fears Shift in Control.”
32 Declan Walsh, “Pakistani Army Facing Threat from Punjabi, al-Qaeda and Taliban Militants,” Guardian, October 12, 2009.
33 Ibid.
34 Amir Mir, “Punjabi Taliban Avenge Qari Zafar’s Death,” The
News International, March 9, 2010.
35 Ilyas Kashmiri was thought to have died in a U.S. drone strike in South Waziristan in September 2009. It appears, however, that
he survived the strike and is still active. For other details, see
Hassan Abbas, “Deciphering the Attack on Pakistan’s Army Headquarters,” Foreign Policy, October 11, 2009; Alex Rodriguez
and Zulfiqar Ali, “Pakistani Al Qaeda Leader Killed in U.S. Strike,” Los Angeles Times, September 18, 2009; “Ilyas Kashmiri Alive,
Lays Out Future Terror Strategy,” Daily Times, October 15, 2009; Eli Lake, “‘Dead’ al-Qaeda Terrorist Surfaces for Media,”
Washington Times, October 15, 2009.
36 Sajjad Syed.
37 Ibid.
38 Alex Rodriguez, “Militants Attack 3 Police Sites in Lahore, Pakistan,” Los Angeles Times, October 16, 2009.
39 “12 Die in Attack on ISI Offices in Multan,” The News International, December 9, 2009.
40 Syed Saleem Shahzad, “Taliban Expand Terror Campaign in Pakistan’s Punjab,” Thaindian News, December 9, 2009.
41 Pamela Constable and Shaiq Hussain, “At Least 40 People Killed in Pakistan Attack,” Washington Post, December 5, 2009.
42 Zafar Iqbal, “Taliban Reach Kashmir,” GroundReport.com, January 19, 2010.
43 Tavernise et al.
44 Mir, “South Punjab Threat.”
45 Khan et al., “Punjabi Taliban Threat is Growing, Pakistan Fears Shift in Control.”
46 Raheel Khan, “Al-Qaeda-TTP and Punjabi Taliban Forge Strong Connections,” CentralAsiaOnline.com, March 1, 2010.
47 Ibid.

ARTS AND CULTURE

Poetry

My Swat, My Long-lost Home

Like a bird on the wing

In my own lightness and glee
Let me fly to my land of serenity
For, solitary among the throng,
I am smothered,

Smothered in a land of tall buildings

And fine homes and baths
In a land of empty, starless skies
And sights of a tired and frustrated folk,
Hurrying about swarming streets,
Watering the soil of the land of those
Who water the roots of my people’s demise!

Let nostalgia seep into my veins

And take me away, take me home!

Take me to the land of my people

Where my sighs will become clouds of serenity
Where the loud gushes of my rivers

Threaten for justice for my people

Where only my sweet-scented soil
Has the power to rekindle my being

Take me to the popular lush valleys of Swat

To the sights of green fields,
Encircling me in their treasures of emeralds,
To those gardens of mint, those gardens of flowers!
Oh! Their liberating scent in the evening air,
In the wake of dusk, at the rooster’s call

To those modest houses with their mud walls!

Where the music of children’s innocence

Empowers the clear skies of the village,

Their laughter clinking in the air

Take me! Take me to those spacious courtyards

With trees of bounties in open yards, open skies
No fogs of suffocation
Take me away!
Take me home!

- by Shehnaz, U.S.A.

MAAT SANGOONA – Submited by Jouhar Langaween

Khalil Jibran (1883-1931) yu dase anzorgar au lekawal wo, che da zamany, au tolaneez jwand da
nasazgar wakhtoono na ye dardedalee zra au naqalara rooh sa mahsoos kari di, haga ye da qalim pa
jaba pa naser, nazim, au kala da anzor pa shakel ke bayan kari di, au da khpal zaangarhi asloob pa
waja pa narhiwaal adab ke yao Lwar maqaam laree.
Jibran deer kitaboona lekali di, che (tol pa tola) da stayane ward di, au da narly bela belo jabo ta
jabarale shavi di, Che pa haghey ke yu kitab Arabay jaba k “AL AJNIHA AL MOTAKISERA”
noom lari, Angrezay ta da"The Broken Wings"au biya Dr.Khaliq Ziar da“MAAT SANGOONA” pa
noom pukhto ta jabarale de.

Dr.Khaliq Ziar che pa isaasi toga da Teb sara talooq laronki Doctor dey, kho da dey sara yu deer
zeraak insan, lekwal, tareqi pasand au qam paresth shayer hom dey, che da khpal qaam au khpaley
jabey sara behada da meeny jazba lari, au hom da waja da che da Tab pa laro da taag
sara yu shan "Parallel" mutawazi da Adab (Literature) pa laro mazal kavi, au da dey reshtoney jazbay
laka bala ye pa pukhto naser ke deer leek kary dey. Da dey kitab (Maat Sangoona) Na makhkey ye
hom dowa da tarekh ketaboona"Da KHURA AU DA KHALAK" au da "PUKHTANOO
BAGHAWATONA"da angrazey jabey na pukhto ta jabarale di.Au ous ye yu da shaery kitab “Talwasy”
chaap shave dey.

Hase kho kitab lekel au jabaral domra gran kar na dey, kho bya hum kha au pa mayar pora lekal deer
gran kar dey.

Da hom yu haqeqath dey che yu lekwal kom jazbat, khaylat au ehssasat “EXPRESSION" pa
Khapala jaba ke lari, pa bala jaba ke haghasey terjoma kawal yu deera loya tajreba, twan au poha
gwari. Kho waly Maat sangoona navel Dr.Seeb dase jabarale dey, che da lekwal da kyahloto, jazbato
au ehssasato (Expression) Sara ye pora pora insaf kare dey, au da tako taroon ye dase kary dey,
che da dey kitab pa lowstalo bandey lowestonki dase mahsosa vi, laka che da Khalil Jibran pa khpala
pa pukhto ke lekaley v.

Da de kitab da lekalo pa wakht ke che da mahzab ao da khazo da jwand pa hawala pa Arabo ke kom
halaat wo hagha pa nan wakht ke zamong pa pukhtane tolana ke tar dera hada pa nazar razi, pa de
novel ke da yao zalme au da yawe peghle da meeny qisa bayan shave da Che khpaly rekhtonay
jazby, meena ye da zamany au da mashreqi tahzeeb da rasem au rewaj dapara qurbani karey da.Da
day novel markazi kirdar yua dasy mazloma jenay da che da mahzabi masharanoo au khpalo
tolanezo bandezono pa panjra ke bandewana da, jaba ye gohusa, shunday preek, au da wass
sanoogona ye maat di .

Laka che lekwal pa yu zay ke da haghe duwa dase ra naqal kare da che," Ay zama khdaya pa ma
rahem ouka au zama maat sangoona pewand ka"

Lekwal pe yu zay ke da tolanez jund da bela belo arakhono pa bara ke sa dase leki, “Da narly
deer hewadona dase di, che da Moor au Plar mall dolat au jidad da bacho da para gahm jor
shee”, au da mashriqi thezeb Mahzabi Mashran
“Laka de esayano padari, Musalmanano emam, au da Berhen pandath hagha nahag jor she che
khpal khkar pa gano pmunjo nesi au pa beshmera kholo ye veena rakagi”

Ka moong dey baraney leek ta lag paam okro, no pa dey ke lekwal yu bunyadi pegham warkarely
dey. Che zamog da pukatani tolanez jund Sara deer samoon khwre.

Da dey kitab pa jabaralo ke Da Dr.Seeb yao hadaf da dey che pa pukhtane tolana ke da khazo sara
narawa saloook pa gwata kre, aw bal da che da mazhabi tabqe sara taluq laronke mashrano kirdar
khalko ta pa daaga kre tar so che pukhtana khpale de kamzori arkhono ta mutawaja kre zaka che da
Dr Saib pa khyal da kamzoray zamung tolanez , syasi, shawori au kaltori jund ta deer ziyan rasa vi.

Zama pa khyal da Dr.Seeb maqsad ba hala tersara she, che pukatana da kitab oulwali, au da khpaly
dey komzoray na khaber she, khpal dost dukhman opejane aw da khpale chatake tolaneze wade
dapara laar hawara kre.

Da yu deer kha navel dey au che somra sefat ye hom okary no kam dey, Au da Dr.Seeb la tarafa pa
pukhto adab (Literature) ke yua bala deera loya ezafa da.
 THIS MONTH IN AFGHAN HISTORY
The Eighteenth Century

APRIL 21st, 1709

INDEPENDENCE OF KANDAHAR FROM THE SAFAVID EMPIRE

Hajji Mirwais Khan Hotak, (‫ ) ﻣ ﯿﺮ وﯾ ﺲ ﻧﯿﻜ ﮫ‬was an influential tribal chief from Kandahar that eventually
went on to establish the Hotaki dynasty, which ruled Afghanistan and Persia.

Due to attempts to forcedly convert the Afghan citizens of what was then
the eastern frontier of the Safavid Empire to Shia Islam, Mirwais Khan,
armed with a fatwa from Ottoman Mecca and knowledge of the
weaknesses of the Persian military structure (gained whilst being tried in
court at Ispahan), assassinated the then Georgian viceroy of Kandahar
Gurgin Khan, declaring Kandahar independent. A Persian-Georgian
force of 30,000 sent to subdue the new Afghan threat two years after,
lead by Gurgin Khan’s nephew Kaikhosro, was summarily defeated;
another force lead by Rustam Khan two years after that met the same
fate.

APRIL 22nd, 1725

ASHRAF KHAN HOTAKI TAKES OVER HOTAKI DYNASTY

Mirwais Khan died in 1715 of natural causes, and was succeeded by his
brother, Abd Al-Aziz, who was overthrown and assassinated two years after by
Mirwais Khan’s son, Mir Mahmud Hotaki.
Mir Mahmud then went on to lay siege to the Persian capital Ispahan, and, after
a decisive victory at Gulnabad and six months of surrounding and blockading
the capital, was acknowledged by the then ruler Sultan Hussein as the new
Shah of Persia. His reign was a particularly violent one, and as Mir Mahmud
was succumbing to insanity, executing anyone who he thought would
overthrown him or otherwise present a danger to his power, Afghan officers
freed his cousin (and son of the executed Abd Al-Aziz) Ashraf Khan from his
imprisonment. The ensuing coup lead to Ashraf Khan’s takeover of the throne,
and three days later, Mir Mahmud died, apparently suffocated.

Ashraf Khan (pictured) halted both Russian and Turkish onslaughts to the Empire. After defeating
Ottoman forces near the capital, a peace agreement was signed in 1727. Two years later, however,
the Afsharid Turkmen rebel Nadir Shah Afshar, with a force made up of Persians and many Ghilzai
(amassed after their defeat near Herat) defeated Ashraf Khan at the Battle of Damghan, signaling the
end of Hotaki rule in Persia. Upon his retreat to Afghanistan, Ashraf Khan was killed by a party of
Baloch tribesmen.
 THIS MONTH IN AFGHAN HISTORY
The Twentieth Century

APRIL 28th, 1978

SAUR REVOLUTION

On the 17th Paril 1978, one of the leaders of the Parcham faction of
the Communist People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), Mir
Akbar Khyber, was assassinated. During the funeral ceremonies held
two days later, some 15,000 sympathisers of the PDPA gathered in
Kabul. Alarmed by this demonstration of communist strength, the
President of the Republic of Afghanistan Mohammad Daoud Khan
started arresting PDPA leaders, though it was too late, and by the 27th,
the coup had begun, culminating in the assassination of the President
and his family by the PDPA, and the establishment of the Democratic
Republic of Afghanistan.

APRIL 14th, 1988

GENEVA ACCORDS

The agreements of the settlement of the situation relating to Afghanistan during the Soviet invasion
was signed between Afghanistan and Pakistan, with the United States and the Soviet Union serving
as guarantors.

The agreement contained, among other measures, a timetable for the withdrawal of Soviet troops
from the country. The Afghan resistance, or Mujahedeen, however, were neither party to the
negotiations nor to the Geneva Accords, and consequently refused to accept the terms of the
agreement.

As a result, the civil war continued after the completion of the Soviet withdrawal.

APRIL 30th, 1992

JAMIAT-E-ISLAMI TAKE KABUL

After the fall of the Communist government under Dr. Mohammad

Najibullah, the ensuing civil war with that of the government and the
various Mujahedeen groups started to tip the other way. Internal
dissensions, economic difficulties, and foreign interference caused
Dr. Najibullah to resign in order to make way for a neutral interim
government. In the ensuing chaos, two of the major Mujahedeen
groups; Hezb-e-Islami and Jamiat-e-Islami, raced toward Kabul from
their relative positions in order to gain the seat of government first.

By 30th April, Kabul became under complete control of the Jamiat

faction.
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