Page |i

TABLE OF CONTENTS
AKNOWLDGEMENT
DEDICATION

iv

CHAPTER I 1
1. Historical/Contextual Introduction
2. Statement of the Problem

3. Relevance of the Study 5

5. Methodology

CHAPTER II: FREE WILL AND EVIL

1.1. The Concept of Free Will

1.2. Free Action and Moral Responsibilty

12

1.3. The Plausibility of Free Will of Man

16

1.4. Some Arguments Regarding Free Will 17

17

1.4.2. The Origination Argument

19

1.4.3. Rejecting the Incompatibilist Arguments

20

1.4.4. Frankfurts Argument against the Ability to Do Otherwise 20

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2. EVIL

24

2.1. The Concept of Evil

24

2.2. The Problem of Evil

25

2.3. The Logical Problem of Evil

28

2.4. The Different Arguments on the Existence of God

34

34

2.4.2. Pascals Wager 36

38

2.4.5. Design or Teleological Argument

39

39

2.4.7. The Argument from Religious Experience

40

2.4.8. The Argument from Miracles 40

40

2.4.10. Process Theodicy

41

CHAPTER III: PLANTINGAS FREE WILL DEFENSE

42

1. The Start of Free Will Defense 42

42

3. Plantinga on Free Will and Evil 45

46

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5. Plantingas Free Will Defense

50

CHAPTER IV: PLANTINGAS FREE WILL DEFENSE ON THE PROBLEM OF EVIL 52

52

1.1. The Function and Nature of Free Will Defense 55

56

2. Free Will Defense in the Face of Evil

62

2. Conclusion

63

3. Recommendations
WORKS CITED

68

64

56

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ACKNOWLDEGEMENT
I would like to express my deepest and sincerest gratitude on the following persons who
guided and supported me all throughout the time when I am still doing my thesis. They have
become an instrument into making this dream into reality. These were the following persons who
became a part of this thesis realizable:
To Mr. Fortunato Caguiran, our Librarian, for lending me my resources.
To Rev. Fr. Kenneth C. Masong, M.A., the Philosophy Departments Dean, for also
lending me books and for guiding and helping me in making this thesis be possible.
To Rev. Fr. Joel Huerto, who edited my very first chapter of my thesis and who also
guided me in doing this thesis.
To Rev. Fr. Jesus B. Layug, Jr., our beloved Director, for being my thesis adviser and who
helped me out in reformulating and revising my thesis.
To Jayson Miranda, a good friend and brother, who really sacrifices a lot in order to help
me in making and revising my thesis from the very start up to the last moment of doing this
thesis.
To my beloved classmates who are also my brothers namely: Ryan, James, Ralph, Roniel,
Joseph, Joaquin, Mark Anthony, Gale, Abel, Aldrin Q., Dominic, Marc Del, Elwin, Jaycar,
Edmel, Kong Aldrin, and Aldrin T., who had been my inspiration and strength in order to finish
this thesis.
To my dearly loved parents, Jerry and Efegin Caseja, for their untiring support and love
that gave me the strength in finishing this thesis.
Lastly, to the One, the Creator of all beings, whom I owe my life to God for giving
me this life and my capabilities into making this dream comes into reality.

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I would like to dedicate this masterpiece to my dearest parents

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CHAPTER I
1. Historical/Contextual Introduction
If God is omniscient (all-knowing), omnipotent (all-powerful) and omnibenevolent (all
good), then why does He allow terrible things to happen in this world He had created? It is
written in the Bible, God looked at everything he had made, and he found it very good. (The
New American Bible, Gen. 1: 31) If that is so, did God create evil? Is He the one responsible for
the suffering of innocent people from pain and other afflictions?
These questions about the existence of an omniscient, omnipotent and omnibenevolent
God against the presence of evil is an ancient and venerable tradition. It began at around 2,500
years ago in the ancient Greek Philosophy and until now it still continues to be a very
controversial issue in the field of philosophy of religion.
Objections on the belief in God posed by the occurrence of evil and suffering present a
far more serious challenge than to objections from science. The philosophical problem of evil
can be posed briefly and sharply. It appears to many people, believers and nonbelievers alike,
that an omniscient, omnipotent and omnibenevolent, if he exists, will not allow the kind of evil
and suffering which occur in the world. Therefore, the existence of this evil seems to count
heavily against the existence of God (Evans 130-133). It becomes the greatest test to ones faith
and the greatest temptation for unbelief.
It requires a lot of knowledge to give proofs and evidence to prove the existence of God.
Presenting theistic proofs is the task of natural theology which is an attempt to reach sound
conclusions about the existence and nature of God based on human reasoning. Human cognitive
faculties such as experience, memory, introspection, deductive and inductive reasoning and
inference to best explanation are the method used in natural theology. In contrast with natural

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theology is revealed theology, which is based on statements that are said to be revealed by God
and events that evidently reveal something of God. Then, natural theology has created a
perplexing variety of arguments for the existence of God and the four main types are ontological
argument, cosmological argument, teleological argument (also called as design argument) and
moral argument.
However, none of these arguments proves the existence of God. But then again, some of
these arguments contributed to a cumulative case for the existence of God. According to a
philosopher, namely Richard Swinburne1, cosmological, teleological and moral arguments
independently increase the probability of Gods existence even if none of them makes it more
probable than not. Then evidences such that deriving from providential occurrences and religious
experiences are added to the equilibrium. Swinburne concluded that theism becomes more
probable than its negation. (Audi 610)
If natural theology cannot prove the existence of God, perhaps natural atheology, which is an
attempt to prove the central belief of theism as false, can provide something essential regarding
the problem. And the most notable argument of natural atheology is the problem of evil. There
are varieties of philosophers who believe that the existence of evil constitutes, in one way or
another, a problem for those who accept theistic belief.
The problem of evil is essentially logical problem in nature wherein it sets the theist the
task of clarifying and, if impossible, reconciling the several beliefs which he holds. It is not like
scientific problems that can be solved through discoveries or a practical problem by a hypothesis
or experiments. And this problem does not arise for those world views far different from the
views of that of traditional theism. (Mackie 150-151)
1 For further reading, see The Coherence of Theism. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977 and The
Existence of God. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979 of Swineburne.

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This research paper seeks to expose and give concrete and concise understanding to
support the existence of God using Alvin Plantingas idea of Free Will Defense. This free will
defense is an attempt to refute the problem of evil, the argument that to posit the existence of an
omnipotent, omniscient, and wholly good God in an evil world constitutes a logical
contradiction. Hence, God could not eliminate the possibility of moral evil without at the same
time eliminating some greater good. As Plantinga summarized his defense,
A world containing creatures who are significantly free (and freely perform more
good than evil actions) is more valuable, all else being equal, than a world
containing no free creatures at all. Now God can create free creatures, but He
can't cause or determine them to do only what is right. For if He does so, then
they aren't significantly free after all; they do not do what is right freely. To create
creatures capable of moral good, therefore, He must create creatures capable of
moral evil; and He can't give these creatures the freedom to perform evil and at
the same time prevent them from doing so. As it turned out, sadly enough, some
of the free creatures God created went wrong in the exercise of their freedom; this
is the source of moral evil. The fact that free creatures sometimes go wrong,
however, counts neither against God's omnipotence nor against His goodness; for
He could have forestalled the occurrence of moral evil only by removing the
possibility of moral good. (A. Plantinga, God, Freedom and Evil 30)
The very content of this research paper is to exemplify and discuss one important aspect
of philosophy of religion and the very heart of many of the major religions in the worldthe
belief that God exists, that there really is a being of the sort theists claim to worship and trust,
who is omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent. However, this belief has not been
universally accepted. Many atheists thinkers have rejected it and some claimed that it is plainly
false and that it is irrational to accept. In response to those rejections and oppositions, some
theologians and theistic philosophers have tried to give plausible arguments or proofs for the
existence of God. (A. Plantinga, God, Freedom and Evil 2)
2. Statement of the Problem
The researcher is working on A Philosophical Exposition on the Problem of Evil and
Gods Existence based on Alvin Plantingas Free Will Defense. The researcher wants to expose

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on how Plantingas Free Will Defense tries to answer the problem of evil present in the world
especially nowadays. Moreover, the researcher will try to expose why such evil can be present
when there is a God who is omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent.
If God is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent, therefore there should be no evil
in the world He created. The problem of evil appeared long ago and until now, it is still a big
issue within theology and philosophy. (Evans 130)
There are many accounts in philosophy and religion which attempt to answer the problem
on the existence of evil. Like for example, the Epicurean dilemma which is stated as this:
suppose God exists. Is He willing to prevent evil but not able? Then He is impotent. Is He able,
but not willing? Then He is malevolent. Is He both able and willing, then whence is evil?"
(Hume and Popkin) On the other hand, St. Augustine argued that evil is not truly reality, he
applies the Platonist conception of evil to what is for him a very existential dilemma. He also
said that evil is not a being; it is a deprivation, a lack of the excellence in being which belongs
there. (Ross 123) St. Thomas Aquinas followed Augustine by saying that Since God is the
highest good; He would not allow any evil to exist in His works unless His omnipotence and
goodness were such as to bring good even out of evil. (Aquinas) For Hinduism and Buddhism
the problem of suffering is always connected to the previous unwholesome or evil action and to
nescience2 - both in Buddhism and Hinduism - according to the law of "Karma" or "deed" or
action performed in this or in the previous life of a person. (Ziba)
Even though the problem regarding the existence of evil gives confusions and misunderstanding
regarding faith (for theists), the only way to know the true existence of evil is by experiencing it.
Here are some of the questions that this research paper would attempt to answer.

2unknowing or original ignorance

P a g e | 10
1. What is free will? What is evil?
2. What is Alvin Plantingas free will defense all about?
3. How is Alvin Plantingas free will defense relevant to the problem of evil
The second chapter is a discussion on free will and an exposition of the problem of evil.
On the one hand, the researcher discusses in this chapter the plausibility of the free will of man
and the different arguments, in favor or not of free will, that are related. On the other hand, an
exposition of the problem of evil is discussed in this chapter. There is also an exposition of the
argument of the existence of God in the face of moral evil.
The third chapter is a comprehensive exposition of Alvin Plnatingas free will defense. It
is all-inclusive of the origin and the reshaping of Augustines idea that led Plantinga to his own
version of free will defense.
The fourth chapter deals with the relevance of Plantingas free will defense on the
problem of evil. It is an exposition of his free will defense and on how does it work in the face of
moral evil.
The fifth chapter deals with the summary of ideas, the conclusion and the
recommendation of the researcher based on his study.
3. Relevance of the Study
The study on the problem of evil can offer a significant contribution in understanding the
argument on the existence of God who is claimed as omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent
then evil exist. This research will show proofs and evidences that will enlighten the readers
mind and give clearer view regarding the problem on evil and suffering present in the world.

P a g e | 11
Hence, the focal point of this research is to expose the argument on Gods existence amidst the
existence of evil using Alvin Plantingas Free Will Defense.
Moreover, it is also significant to the readers in order to understand that evil doesnt come
from God who is omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent but it is a product of mans free
will. God has not made evil but man on his own accord. But in the light of this, man still has his
own way to choose what to do for he has the freedom that God has gave him.
In addition, the researcher finds the research very significant because of his interest on
the topic that will lead him to have a clearer and concrete understanding regarding the problem
of evil and the existence of God using Plantingas free will defense. The research will also give
him knowledge about the existence of evil and the rationality of believing in an omnipotent,
omniscient and omnibenevolent God.
4. Delimitation
The main focus of the research is to philosophically analyze and expose the problem of
evil and Gods existence using Alvin Plantingas Free Will Defense. The researcher will present
Plantingas Free Will Defense which is an attempt to answer the question on the problem of evil.
Ideas from other philosophers like St. Anselm and St. Thomas regarding Gods existence will
give clearer understanding on natural theology. And also, St. Augustines idea of free will will be
a great help on the problem of evil that Plantinga adopted to support his own version of free will
defense.
The study will only be touching the problem of evil in the light of moral evil where in the
free will of man is the main focus on the second chapter. Natural evil will not be included in the
study especially in the discussion of problem of evil.
5. Methodology

P a g e | 12
The researcher will use the expository method as the tool on his research. The researcher
will try to expose and present the arguments presented by Alvin Plantinga using his Free Will
Defense as the main tool in defending the existence of an omniscient, omnipotent and
omnibenevolent God while at the same time exposing the problem of evil and suffering. The
researcher will also include some philosophical views on the problem of evil that will support
Plantingas argument.
The researcher will use Plantingas philosophical books like God, Freedom and Evil, The
Necessity of God, God and Other Minds and other philosophical books, journal articles and
scholarly websites which will offer him ideas and views regarding the problem of evil from
different sources.

CHAPTER II
FREE WILL AND EVIL
1. FREE WILL
1.1 The Concept of Free Will
What is it to choose freely? and What is it to be morally responsible for ones
choices? are the central questions on free will. These two questions are very much related with
each other, for freedom of action is indispensable for moral responsibility, despite the fact that it
is not sufficient. That is why most philosophers suppose that the concept of free will is very

P a g e | 13
much related to the concept of moral responsibility. Because acting with free will is simply to
satisfy the metaphysical requirement on being responsible for ones action.
As for Augustine, many historians of philosophy read his account on free will and one of
them is John Rist who says:
There is still no consensus of opinion on Augustines view of each mans
responsibility for his moral behaviour There are those who attribute to
Augustine the full-blown Calvinist position that each man has no say in his
ultimate destiny Other interpreters reject this view in varying degrees. They
will not hold that for Augustine mans will is enslaved, or they would dispute
about the sense in which it is enslaved and the sense in which it is free. (Stump
and Kretzmann 124)
Augustines theory of free will would present that post-Fall human beings, these are
angels that fall from heaven and become part of the world, have free will. Among other reasons
for thinking so, Augustine maintains that the exhortations of scripture would be pointless unless
human beings have free will. (Stump and Kretzmann 133-134) He says,
One must not think that free choice has been removed because [the
Apostle] said, It is God who works in you both to will and to do, of [his] good
will. Because if this were so, he would not have said above, Work out your own
salvation in fear and trembling. For when it is commanded that they work, their
free will is invoked. (Stump and Kretzmann 134)
Also, Augustines argument with the Pelagians, the point he emphasizes is that the postFall human beings are unable to will not to sin unless their will is aided by grace; but he argues
that God gives grace to the intellect and will person who desires it. By his grace God gave the
law, so that people might know what they should do, and that, knowing it, they might ask God
for help in doing it.3
Furthermore, Augustines thinking about the will is very important because of three distinct
features: In one of his book De Libero Arbitrio, he endeavors to build up an anti-Manichean

3 See e.g. De nat. et gratia 12.13. There are even places where Augustine applies this point to
pre-Fall human beings: Even if [Pelagius] were speaking about a whole and healthy human
nature what he says would not be correct, [namely], that not sinning depends only on us, as
sinning depends on us. For even then there would be the help of God which is prepared for
those who are willing [to receive it] (De nat. et gratia 48.50)

P a g e | 14
theodicy which accounts for the presence of moral evil in the world without either
substantializing it or finding its source in divine activity. In this regard, the will is what makes an
action one's own, and placing the burden of responsibility on the one who performs the said
action. And by the time he had composed the Book III of De Libero Arbitrio, yet, Augustine had
come to picture out the human condition in terms of the ignorance and difficulty that attend it,
and these features tend to cause difficulties in the libertarian optimism of his Book I by putting
questions regarding the possibility for man to overcome ignorance and difficulty. However, the
will is still intended to serve as the fulcrum of moral responsibility.
Despite the fact that the two are closely related, it is needed to distinguish the concern
with moral responsibility. With that, Augustine is still engaged in building up an anti-Manichean
representation of the human condition. He is likewise concerned with the aspect of purely
rational or intellectual analysis which falls outside its scope. In his book Confessions this feature
of the discussion is heightened by the fact that the choice entails a necessary moral reorientation
consecutively opposing to habits which have acquired a necessity of their own, but Augustine's
discussion of the example proposes that he perceives it as more than a peculiar or secluded
incident. Rather, it is intended to draw ones awareness to an introspectively available variety of
phenomena that forces one to recognize a fundamentally non-rational component of human
choice.
However, there is a third factor at work here, because the problem of evil in the nonHellenic religious and in the scriptural traditions received a relatively different treatment in the
Greek tradition, even Augustine improved his knowledge with the former e.g. Ad Simplicianum,
circa 396 C.E. and Confessions VII.ix.14,

still the dissimilarity between the two was not

completely lost. Here, one finds less emphasis upon rational analysis and logical argumentation
than upon pledged community membership, trans-generational authority, obedience to divinely-

P a g e | 15
sanctioned standards, and, in some other cases, an explicit suspicion of intellectualism alongside
with an emphasis upon the necessity of divine aid for moral transformation. With this legacy, it
helped Augustine to divert his attention away from the strictly rational features of human agency
and also, to encourage him to think about rationality in innovative ways.
Without a doubt of mistake to classify the religious and philosophical aspects of
Augustine's classical legacy, it is often useful to vision his thought as presenting a gradual
movement away from a Greek intellectualism towards a voluntarism highlighting the profound
ignorance and difficulty of the human condition, in addition to the need for the divine aid to
conquer the ignorance and difficulty. At the heart of this change of emphasis are Augustine's
developing views regarding the will. Without a surprise, this development often has to be
understood against the backdrop of the philosophical and theological difficulties that come to
occupy him over the years.
Relation of human free will to divine foreknowledge is one of these difficulties. Despite
the fact that it is enticing to view this as a clash among the cities of Athens and Jerusalem, the
problem initially arises within the Greco-Roman tradition itself. Even though Augustine's
primary treatment of the problem at De Libero Arbitrio III.24 seems innocent of this fact, his
later treatment at De Civitate Dei V.910 shows that he was aware of Cicero's discussion of the
problem in De Divinatione and De Fato. In later medieval philosophy, it is also worth noting
that, one sees the mirror-image of this problem in terms of the relation of divine freedom and
power versus the extent of human knowledge. The problem is attributable to the concept of
necessity which underlies the Greek conception of knowledge in both cases. So in this particular
case, the problem is on how to resolve the absolute necessity that attends God's knowledge, that
is, if God genuinely knows that this is going to happen, it is impossible for this not to take place,
for more understanding see De Libero Arbitrio III.4 and De Civitate Dei V.9. Now, with the idea

P a g e | 16
that there can be no moral responsibility unless it is ones own power to choose to do other than
the self, from De Libero Arbitrio III.3. Apparently, freedom to do otherwise appears to rule out
the possibility of foreknowledge, and on the contrary, foreknowledge seems to rule out the
possibility of freedom to do otherwise. Within the books De Libero Arbitrio and De Civitate Dei,
Augustines treatment regarding the problem is complex and at times extremely unclear. Also, he
is concerned with defending compatibility of divine foreknowledge and human freedom with the
anti-Manicheans and Cicero by means of arguing that the free exercise of the will is among the
events foreknown by God and that such foreknowledge in no way detracts from our culpability
for our acts of willing that is in his book De Libero Arbitrio III.3 & 4 De Civitate Dei V.9. The
obscurity of the details notwithstanding, Augustine leaves no doubt that he wants to maintain
both that God does have foreknowledge of mans actions and that one is morally responsible for
them.
According to David Hume, the question of the nature of free will is the most contentious
question of metaphysics (Timpe, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy). If this statement is
plausible, then it is not an easy task to know what free will is. Free will is basically to say that an
agent has free will when this agent has the ability to choose his or her course of action. However,
this criterion is also suitable for animals, and naturally one thinks that only human beings have
this free will, and not animals. So, considering free will as a unique ability of human beings that
allows them to control their actions. But it is controversial whether this basic understanding of
what it means to have a free will actually requires an agent to have a specific faculty of will,
whether the term free will is simply shorthand for other features of human beings, and whether
there really is such a thing as free will at all.
1.2 Free Action and Moral Responsibility
Why is it important to be concerned whether agents have free will? Maybe the best
possible reason that the researcher could find is that free will is very much related to two other

P a g e | 17
very important philosophical issues which are freedom of action and moral responsibility.
Nevertheless, these concepts have their close connection with each other and it is critical not to
conflate them.
One almost thinks that an agents free action comes from the action that he does as a
product of exercising his free will. For example, a student named Adrian is reflecting whether or
not to go to school after waking up early in the morning. He might say, I know that I need to go
to school because it is my responsibility as a student to attend my classes. But the problem is, it
started raining and the weather makes me lazy, so, I think that the best decision that I will make
is to go to school. After looking at this statement one can see one reason that is necessary for
free action which is Adrian, as an agent, must first decide or choose to go to school before he
actually prepare and go to school. Presupposing that human actions are those actions which are
products of humans rational faculties then one can see that the chance of free action is based on
the choice of free will. Then one can say that an agents action is basically triumphant in
executing a free choice. And that is free will that is being exercise by an agent.
In addition, there were different accounts offered by various philosophers regarding the
concept of freedom. One of them is David Hume who wrote in his book An Enquiry Concerning
Human Understanding, that liberty, the term he used for free will, is simply the power of acting
or not acting, according to the determination of the will: If one chooses to remain at rest, he may;
if one chooses to move, he also may. So, this hypothetical liberty is generally allowed to belong
to everyone who is not a prisoner and in chains. Thus, the statement proposes that freedom is
basically the facility to choose a course of action wherein an agent is free if not hindered by
external obstacle from carrying out that action. Another philosopher in the name of Thomas
Hobbes said, A free agent is he that can do as he will, and forbear as he will, and that liberty is
the absence of external impediments. (Timpe, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy) Hobbes

P a g e | 18
suggested that freedom consists in there being no external impediments to an agent doing what
he wants to do. Therefore, in the statement earlier about Adrian whether or not go to school,
Hume and Hobbes would tell that Adrian is free to go to school as long as there is nothing that
hinders him from executing his decision, and also he is free not to go to school as a long as there
is nothing that forces him to go if he would choose not to.
On the other hand, others might still consider this approach as a failure in order to
differentiate these two related, but conceptually different types of freedom which were freedom
of will and freedom of action. There might be some reasons behind this differentiation which is
motivated by the evident reality that agents can acquire free will without also having freedom of
action. One may presume, prior to the choice that Adrian made wherein he will go to school; he
is suffering from a headache. Also at that very moment while he is suffering from headache, the
weather is in bad state. The rain started to drop so hard and followed by a sharp lightning and a
thundering sound rolled down the sky. And because of the rain, it flooded the street and vehicles
cannot enter the street no more.
Now, it depends on ones view of what free will is whether or not one can have freedom
of action without free will. Moreover, causal determinism would not require that agents lack of
freedom to do what they want to do. Rather, that agent could still do what he wants to do even
the fact that he is causally determined to do that action. Hence, Hume and Hobbes can be
characterized as being compatibilists4 in nature.
The distinction between freedom of will and freedom of action is not a problem because it comes
out that free will is essential for exercising free actions. So, we can say that if Adrian is
persuaded when he is still asleep to feel like going to the school, in that case still if no external
hindrance is stopping him from carrying through with this decision, it is clear that his decision in
4 According to compatibilists, freedom is compatible with determinism because freedom is
essentially just a matter of not being constrained or hindered in certain ways when one acts or
chooses.

P a g e | 19
going to school is not a free action at all. Persuasion is the main reason thats why it is clear to
say that it is not a free action, because the decision does not arise from Adrians free will. Thats
why, one can say that free will might be an essential condition for free action even if the two are
distinct with each other. The phrase acting with free will means engaging in an action as the
result of the utilization of free will. Use of the phrase does not deny the distinction between free
will and free action.
The second reason to take into consideration about free will is that it seems to be required
for moral responsibility. Though there are various accounts of what exactly moral responsibility
is, it is widely agreed that moral responsibility is different from causal responsibility. Think
about a falling rock that landed on a glass table, and then breaking it into pieces. Although the
rock is causally responsible for breaking the glass table into pieces, it is not morally responsible
for it since rocks are not moral agents. Depending on ones account of causation, it also might be
possible to be morally responsible for a state of affairs even if one is not causally responsible for
that same state of affairs. For present reason, simply say that an agent is morally responsible for a
state of affairs only if he is the appropriate receiver of moral praise or moral blame for that state
of affairs5. Based on the principal view of the relationship between free will and moral
responsibility, an agent is not morally responsible for his actions if an agent does not have free
will. For example, if Adrian is forced into doing a morally bad act, such as stealing money, one
shouldnt hold him morally responsible for this action since it is not an action that he did of his
own free will.
Some philosophers do not believe that free will is required for moral responsibility. According to
John Martin Fischer, human agents do not have free will, but they are still morally responsible
for their choices and actions. In a nutshell, Fischer thinks that the kind of control needed for
5 an agent can thus be morally responsible even if no one, including herself, actually does blame
or praise her for her actions

P a g e | 20
moral responsibility is weaker than the kind of control needed for free will. (Timpe, Internet
Encyclopedia of Philosophy) Furthermore, he thinks that the truth of causal determinism would
preclude the kind of control needed for free will, but that it wouldnt preclude the kind of control
needed for moral responsibility. As this example shows, virtually every issue pertaining to free
will is contested by various philosophers.
However, many think that the significance of free will is not limited to its necessity for
free action and moral responsibility. Various philosophers suggest that free will is also a
requirement for agency, rationality, the autonomy and dignity of persons, creativity, cooperation,
and the value of friendship and love. Thus, one needs to see that free will is central to many
philosophical issues.
The majority view, however, is that one can readily conceive willings that are not free.
Indeed, much of the debate about free will centers on whether human beings have it, yet
virtually, no one doubts that he or she will to do this and that. The main apparent threats to mans
freedom of will are various alleged determinisms which are physical/causal, psychological,
biological, and theological. For each variety of determinism, there are philosophers who deny its
reality, either because of the existence of free will or on independent grounds, accept its reality
but argue for its compatibility with free will, or accept its reality and deny its compatibility.
1.3 The Plausibility of Free Will of Man
The dilemma of the nature of free agency and its relation to the origins and conditions of
responsible behavior is called the problem of free will. There are times when free and
determined are being contrasted that produced the central question whether human beings are
free or are they only determined by external events beyond their control. Another related concern
is whether an agents responsibility for an action requires that the agent, the act, or the relevant
decision be free. With this, it directs awareness to action, motivation, deliberation, choice, and
intention, and to the precise sense, if some, in which one has control of his actions. The use of

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free will is just a matter of traditional nomenclature wherein it is argued whether freedom is
appropriately attributed to the will or the agent, or to actions, choices and deliberations.
The most common interpretations of free are these two elements: first, freedom entails
an absence of determination or definite kinds of determination; and secondly, when ones
endeavors are, properly speaking, the one who owns the act chooses freely. And because of this,
accounts diverge. For some, they take freedom (liberty) or indifference or the contingency of
alternative courses of action to be critical. For example, a man who is pondering on what food he
will eat, each of his choice is an open alternative since it is possible but not yet imposed.
Indifference can also be understood as motivational equilibrium, that is, a condition that some
find critical to the idea that a free choice must be rational. There are others who are focused on
freedom (liberty) of spontaneity, for example, where man is free to choose on what food he likes
to eat which he chooses or desires, it can be equated as doing what one wants. In association
with the two, the third is like this man acts freely if he exercises his control, involving
responsiveness to intent as well as both abilities to perform an act and to refrain. And the fourth
view recognizes freedom with autonomy, for example the man being autonomous to the extent
that his selection is self-determined, that is, by his character, deeper self, higher values or
informed reason.
A recent trend is to assume that agent causation accounts capture, and possible, ones
prereflective idea of responsible, free action. But the failure of philosophers to work the account
out in a fully satisfactory and intelligible form reveals that the very idea of free will and so of
responsibility also, is incoherent or at least inconsistent with a world very much like our own.
1.4 Some Arguments Regarding Free Will
1.4.1 The Consequence Argument
The Consequence Argument, created by Carl Ginet and Peter van Inwagen which is the
most renowned and powerful argument for incompatibilism. This argument is based on a
fundamental distinction between the past and the future. An informal presentation of this

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argument is to be considered first. There seems to be a philosophical irregularity between the
past and the future which is based on the direction of the flow of time and the normal direction of
causation. In a way the future is open while on the other hand the past is not. For example, it
looks as though there is nothing that Adrian can now do about the fact that someone killed Ninoy
Aquino, given that Ninoy Aquino was assassinated by someone in 1985.
Even if one admits the possibility of time travel still stands at this point. If the possibility
of time travel is possible, Adrian can influence what the past turned out to be, but he cannot
literally alter the past. Consider the following argument:
(1) The proposition Ninoy Aquino was assassinated in 1985 is true.
(2) If Adrian travels to the past, he could prevent Ninoy from being assassinated in
1985 (temporarily assumed for reductio purposes).
(3) If Adrian were to travel to the past and prevent Ninoy from being assassinated in
1985, the proposition Ninoy was assassinated in 1985 would be false.
(4) A proposition cannot both be true and false.
(5) So, therefore, (1) is false.
Consequently at most the possibility of time travel permits for agents to have causal
impact on the past, not for agents to change what has already become the past. Thus, the past
seems to be permanent and unchangeable. Though, it appears that the same is not true of the
future, for Adrian can have an influence on the future through his decisions and the succeeding
actions. For example, if he will be inventing a time machine, then at some point in the future he
could get in his time machine and he will be travelling to the past and try to stop Ninoy from
being assassinated. But, given that he was assassinated, one can suppose that his efforts would all
be unsuccessful. Then again, in this way he could refrain from using his time machine.
1.4.2 The Origination Argument
Based on this argument, an agent has free will when his volitions issue from the agent
himself in a particular sort of way (like his beliefs and desires). What is important for free will,
proponents of this argument claim, is not simply that the causal chain for an agents volition goes

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through the agent, but that it originates with the agent. In other words, an agent acts with free
will only if he originates his action, or if he is the ultimate source or first cause of his action.
One can represent a formal version of the argument, called the Origination Argument,
as follows:
(1) An agent acts with free will only if he is the originator (or ultimate source) of his
actions.
(2) If determinism is true, then everything any agent does is ultimately caused by events
and circumstances outside his control.
(3) If everything an agent does is ultimately caused by events and circumstances beyond
his control, then the agent is not the originator of his actions.
(4) Therefore, if determinism is true, then no agent is the originator of his actions.
(5) Therefore, if determinism is true, no agent has free will.
One can see now that the Origination Argument is valid. So, in evaluating its soundness,
one must evaluate the truth of its three premises. Since for an agent to be an originator just is for
that agent not to be ultimately determined by anything outside of him, then premise 3 is clearly
true. The premise 2 of this argument is true by the definition of determinism. One must therefore
reject premise 1 in order to reject the conclusion of the argument.
1.4.3 Rejecting the Incompatibilist Arguments
It is noted that the Origination Argument for incompatibilism is valid, and two of its
premises are above disputed. Thus, rejecting the first premise of the Origination Argument is the
only way for the compatibilist to reject its conclusion. In other words, with the description of
determinism, compatibilists have to reject that free will involves an agent being, the originator or
ultimate source of his or her actions. But how can this happen? Most often, compatibilists
motivate a rejection of the ultimacy condition of free will by appealing to either a hierarchical
or reasons-responsive view of what the will is. If all that is necessary for free will, for instance, is

P a g e | 24
that a definite interconnection between an agents 1st-order volitions and 2nd-order desires 6, then
with that kind of account it does not require that an agent be the originator of those desires. In
addition, since the truth of determinism would not entail that agents dont have 1st and 2nd-order
desires and volitions, a hierarchical account of the will is compatible with the truth of
determinism. Similarly, if an agent has free will if she has the requisite level of reasonsresponsiveness such that she would have willed differently had she had different reasons,
ultimacy is again not required. Thus, if one adopts certain accounts of the will, one has reason for
rejecting the central premise of the Origination Argument. (Timpe, Internet Encyclopedia of
Philosophy)
1.4.4 Frankfurts Argument against the Ability to Do Otherwise
Two other arguments for compatibilism were built on the freedom requirement for moral
responsibility. In the truth of determinism, if one can show that moral responsibility is
compatible with it and if it is also required for moral responsibility the presence of free will, then
one will have absolutely revealed the compatibility of free will with the truth of determinism.
The first of these arguments for compatibilism rejects the understanding of having a choice as
involving the ability to do otherwise. Whereas a good number of philosophers have learned to
acknowledge that an agent can be morally responsible for doing an action only if he or she could
have done it otherwise, Harry Frankfurt has attempted to show that this requirement is in fact not
true.
Frankfurt presents an example in which an agent does an action in situation that leads one
to believe that the agent acted freely (Frankfurt 155). However, unknown that is, happening or
6 According to the hierarchical model, agents can have different kinds of desires. Some desires
are desires to do a particular action; for example, Adrian may desire to go eating. Call these
desires 1st order desires. But even if Adrian doesnt desire to go eating, he may nevertheless
desire to be the kind of person who desires to go eating. In other words, he may desire to have a
certain 1st order desire. Call desires of this sort 2nd order desires. If agents also have further
desires to have particular 2nd order desires, one could construct a seemingly infinite hierarchy of
desires.

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existing without ones knowledge to the agent, the conditions comprise some mechanism or
instrument that would bring about the action if the agent did not perform or do it on his or her
own. As it happens, still, the agent does perform or do the action freely and the mechanism or
instrument is not concerned in bringing about the action of the agent. Consequently, it appears
that the agent is morally responsible regardless of not being able to do otherwise. Here is one
situation:
Adrian is reflecting whether to jog at the oval. Unknown to Adrian, his mother, Petra,
wants to assure him that he does come to a decision to jog at the oval. Therefore, he has
implanted in Adrians head a computer chip such that if he is going to make a decision not to jog
at the oval, he will be persuaded by the chip when it activates and lets him decide to jog at the
oval. Adrian is unable not to decide to jog at the oval, and he lacks the ability to do otherwise
because of the presence of the chip in his head. Although, Adrian decided on his own will to jog
at the oval.
So therefore, Frankfurt believes that the presence of Petra, his mother and the computer
chip in Adrians head play no causal role in his decision making, so Adrian is morally
responsible for his decision. Since he would have been morally responsible had Petra not been
prepared to ensure that he decide to jog at the oval, so, why think that the presence of Petra
makes him not to be morally responsible in his action? So, Frankfurt concludes that regardless of
lacking the ability to do otherwise Adrian is still morally responsible. If Frankfurt is correct with
his conclusion that the possibility of such cases like Adrian seems to be possible, then even
though the truth of determinism is contrary with a kind of freedom that entails the ability to do
otherwise, it is now compatible with the kind of freedom that is required for moral responsibility.
1.4.5 Strawsons Reactive Attitudes

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Peter Strawson argues in an influential article that several of the traditional debates
between the compatibilists and the incompatibilists7 are misguided (119). He believes that the
focus should be instead on what he calls the reactive attitudes which are those attitudes that one
has toward other people based on their attitudes toward and treatment on each other. Essentially
natural human reactions to the good or ill will or indifference of others toward us, as displayed in
their attitudes and actions, says Strawson and that it is the hallmark of reactive attitudes.
Gratitude, resentment, forgiveness and love are examples of reactive attitudes. He also thinks
that these attitudes are essential to interpersonal relations and that they give the foundation for
holding individuals morally responsible. Then he argues for two claims. The first is that an
agents reactive attitudes would not be affected by a conviction that determinism was factual:
The human commitment to participation in ordinary interpersonal relationships is,
I think, too thoroughgoing and deeply rooted for us to take seriously the thought
that a general theoretical conviction might so change our world that, in it, there
were no longer such things as inter-personal relationships as we normally
understand them. A sustained objectivity of inter-personal attitude, and the
human isolation which that would entail, does not seem to be something of which
human beings would be capable, even if some general truth were a theoretical
ground for it. (Strawson 140)
Moreover, he also argues for a normative claim: the truth of determinism must not
destabilize ones reactive attitudes. There are two kinds of cases where it is suitable to postpone
ones reactive attitudes as Strawson believes. The one involves agents who are not moral agents,
like young children or the mentally disabled, should not have reactive attitudes. In the second
kind of case where it is suitable to postpone ones reactive attitudes are those wherein the agent
is a moral agent, his or her action toward others is not associated to his or her action in the
correct way. For example, while Adrian may have the reactive attitude of forgiveness to
Christmer who bumps into him and makes him spill his food, if Adrian were to discover that the

7 such as how to understand the ability to do otherwise

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person was pushed into him, he would not be justified in forgiving Christmer. But the truth of
determinism would neither involve that no agents are moral agents nor that none of an agents
actions are connected to his moral agency. Therefore, Strawson believes, that the truth of
determinism should not destabilize ones reactive attitudes. Because moral responsibility is
basically based upon the reactive attitudes, so he thinks that moral responsibility is compatible
with the truth of determinism. And if free will is a prerequisite for moral responsibility then one
can say that Strawsons argument gives support to compatibilism.
In all of these, the researcher tried to expose some arguments regarding free will not to
confuse the readers but to make them aware that it is not only Plantinga who argues for free will
as one of the disputed arguments. The awareness of other arguments on free will, the researcher
believes, gives way to a critical thinking of readers to weigh what argument is plausible for them.
Either there is an assent or rejection of these is not the researchers concern but an awareness is
prior to judgment.
2. EVIL
2.1 The Concept of Evil
In this world, there are large numbers of cruelties, violence, deceptions, humiliations,
tortures, accidents, natural disasters, murders and killings that human beings are almost
experiencing every day and often present everywhere. And these happenings bring human beings
to experience pain, sorrow, suffering and most severe, death. Some would say that these are all
examples of evil. But, how can one determine an experience as evil? What does the word evil
mean? What is the concept of evil? These questions brought human beings in perplexity on the
existence of an omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent God.
In the book God, Best and Evil St. Thomas Aquinas, one of the prominent medieval
philosophers, gave his concept about evil. He said:
Evil is simply a privation of something which a subject is entitled by its origin to
possess and which it ought to have, as we have said. Such is the meaning of the
word evil among all men (Langtry 42).

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Also, St. Augustine defined evil that which is not a separate entity, but it is a deviation
from a good. Which a subject should possess, it is a failure to be what it should be and hence, a
pure nothingness. (Gilson 144)
So now, evil can be understood as the privation of good or privatio boni, that which
occurs when a being renounces its proper role in the order and structure of creation. Therefore,
something becomes evil when it ceases to be what it is meant to be, or stops doing what it is
ought to do.
It is also important to distinguish the two kinds of evil, the moral evil and natural evil.
Moral evil consists of morally wrong actions and morally bad states of mind together with any
resulting pain, illness, and deprivation such as murder, rape and theft. On the other hand, natural
evil consists of pain, illness, deprivation, etc. which results entirely from impersonal causes such
as earthquakes, tsunamis, landslide and floods. There are times that the two are intermingled, like
for example when earthquakes results in loss of human life due to poor planning or substandard
construction of buildings. But the focus of this paper is on moral evil which Alvin Plantinga is
trying to point out in the free will defense.
2.2 The Problem of Evil
Now, as evil and suffering occur in the realm of humanity, the question on the existence
of God posts problems and confusions in the mind of every human being. What is the problem of
evil all about? What is its effect to human beings?
First, it is needed to know that there are two features of the problem of evil and suffering
which are vital in the problem of Gods existence; these are the philosophical or apologetic
aspect and the religious or emotional aspect. The philosophical aspect is the problem of evil
approached from the standpoint of the skeptic who challenges the possibility or probability that a
God exists who allows such suffering. The use of ones reason and evidences is much needed in
dealing with this apologetic aspect as what the Bible says, Giving a reason for the hope within
us. (The New American Bible, 1 Pet. 3:15) On the other hand, the standpoint of the believer is

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called the religious whose faith in God is severely tested by trial. One must appeal to the truth
revealed by God in the Sacred Scripture upon meeting the challenge of religious/emotional
aspect. (Rood)
Mans faith to God becomes a question upon experiencing evil and suffering. The
existence of an omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent God posts a big question when
dreadful events arise in the life of an individual. Also, the tendency of unbelief comes in because
ones faith is tested caused by these dreadful events. So now, the starting point of unbelief in God
is the experience of evil and suffering. But a number of theists would disagree with that
statement because they would restate it this way He will wipe every tear from their eyes, and
there shall be no more death or mourning, wailing or pain, [for] the old order has passed away.
(Revelation 21: 4) Evil and suffering can awaken a greater hunger for heaven, and for that time
when God's purposes for these experiences will have been finally fulfilled, when pain and sorrow
shall be wiped away.
Furthermore, in the Bible, suffering for Christianity plays a major role. There are some
accounts that would give a positive viewpoint regarding suffering. What are these? In John 9:1-3
it is written, As he passed by he saw a man blind from birth. His disciples asked him, Rabbi,
who sinned, this man or his parents, that he was born blind? Jesus answered, Neither he nor his
parents sinned; it is so that the works of God might be made visible through him. Suffering can
present an opening for God to show his glory, to manifest His mercy, power, faithfulness and
love in the midst of painful and agonizing conditions. Also, suffering can allow one to provide
confirmation of the genuineness of ones faith, and even serve to purify it (1 Pet. 1:7). In the
book of Job, But Satan answered the Lord and said, Is it for nothing that Job is God-fearing?
Have you not surrounded him with your protection? You have blessed the work of his hands, and
his livestock are spread over the land. But now put forth your hand and touch away anything that

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has, and surely he will blaspheme to your face. (Job 1:9-10) Ones faithfulness in trial shows
that serving the Lord is not merely for the benefits He presents but for the love of God Himself.
As for severe trials, it gives a chance for believers to express their love for one another as a part
of the body of Christ who "bear one another's burdens" (1 Cor. 12:26 and Gal. 6:2). As Gods
loving comfort took place in times of affliction, in return one can better express his/her comfort
for others (2 Cor. 1:4). In developing ones godly virtues and deterring one from sinning,
suffering also plays an essential role. In 2 Cor. 12:7, Paul acknowledged that his thorn in the
flesh keeps him from showing, and promoting true humility and reliance on God, his loving
father. While in Psalm 119:71, It was good for me to be afflicted, in order to learn your laws. It
was recognized in this psalm that affliction increases ones determination in following God's
will. As well as Jesus Christ, he acknowledges the vital role of suffering that Son though he
was, he learned obedience from what he suffered (The New American Bible, Heb. 5:8). Jesus
Christ as a true man He learned by experience the significance of surrendering Himself to the
will of His Father, even if it was the most difficult thing in the world to do.
So, the Bible shows how the presence of suffering is important to Christian faith. But on
the other hand, suffering now is a big factor on questioning the existence of a loving and
merciful God of the Bible. The paradigm shift is so obvious because of the effect that it can bring
about to human beings. Evil and suffering now becomes a basis of unbelief to Christian faith.
In terms of other religion one argument is the predestination argument that comes
primarily from those attempting to assert the all-knowing and all-powerful aspects of God. Thus,
conservative Muslims and protestant Christians of the radical reformers, that is, Calvinists, are
the main proponents of this argument.
This argument states that God, being all-powerful, is the ultimate cause of all events good
and evil. But being all-knowing, God is able to see that actions which appear evil to us are
actually somehow good in the eternal perspective of God. As simple, imperfect creatures who are

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totally incapable of grasping the difficult ways of God, one must simply trust the goodness of his
higher, all-knowing purposes even when one cannot visualize how any good could come from a
situation. God doesnt cause the evil, but allows evil to be done by others says a
Softpredestinarian, a predestination believer. But this evil is still not really evil because in the
end one can see that it was actually all for good.
Another theodicy from other religion is the process theodicy which was a product of
Modern Jewish theologians which they developed after the holocaust. It simply denies the initial
idea of the problem of evil. Also, it asserts that God is neither wholly good, all knowing, nor allpowerful. It is also lowers ones expectations of the past and the present while attempting to
provide some hope for a better future.
2.3 The Logical Problem of Evil
The presence of evil and suffering in the world appears to cause a serious challenge in the
belief on the existence of an omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent God. So, if God is allknowing, He should know about all of the horrible things that would happen in the world. Also,
if God is all-powerful, He should be capable of doing something about all of the evil and
suffering that human beings are experiencing. Moreover, if God is wholly good, then surely He
would want to do something about it for He loves His people so much. However, the world is
still full of innumerable instances of experiencing evil and suffering. Therefore, these evidences
about evil and suffering appear to have a conflict with the claim of an orthodox theist that there
exists an omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent God.
The challenged posed by this apparent conflict has come to be known as the problem of
evil.

In the second half of the twentieth century, atheologians usually claimed that the problem

of evil was a problem of logical inconsistency in the beliefs one typically accepts. So in the book
of Plantinga, J. L. Mackie stated:
I think however, that a more telling criticism can be made by way of the
traditional problem of evil. Here it can be shown, not that religious beliefs lack

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rational support, but rather that it is positively irrational, in that some of its central
theological doctrine are inconsistent with one another (God and Other Minds 116).
And for H.J. McCloskey:
Evil is a problem for the theist in that a contradiction is involved in the fact of
evil, on the one hand, and the belief in the omnipotence and perfection of God on
the other (A. C. Plantinga, God and Other Minds 115-116).
The logical problem of evil emerges from these four core propositions: (1) An allpowerful God could permit evil from existing in the world; (2) An all-knowing God would know
that there was evil in the world; (3) A wholly good God would wish to prevent evil from existing
in the world; and (4) There is evil in the world.
As what J.L. Mackie highlighted in his statement that there would appear to be a
contradiction between these four propositions such that they cannot all be true. Given that the
fourth proposition would appear to be undeniable, it can be inferred from above that one of the
other three propositions must be false and thus there cannot be an all-powerful, all-knowing and
a wholly good God. Otherwise, putting it in another way, if God does exist, He must be either
impotent, ignorant or wicked.
Two or three among the propositions might be true at the same time but there is a
possibility that all of the propositions might be true. In simple terms, propositions one (1) up to
the fourth (4) form a logically inconsistent set that the atheologians are trying to point out. So,
what is that logically inconsistent thing that the atheologians are trying to state?
Logically inconsistent statements are set of statements if and only if: that set includes a
direct contradiction of the form p & not-p; or a direct contradiction can be deduced from that
set.
So now, what the atheologians are precisely claiming to do is this: none of the statements
in one (1) through four (4) directly contradicts any other, thus if the set is logically inconsistent,
it must be because it can deduce a contradiction from it. Through this, once atheologian think
through the propositions of the divine attributes cited in one (1) through three (3) one can claim

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that a contradiction can easily be deduced from the first proposition up to the fourth proposition.
The atheologians reason as follows: (6) if God is omnipotent, he would be able to prevent all of
the evil and suffering in the world; (7) if God is omniscient, he would know about all of the evil
and suffering in the world and would know how to eliminate or prevent them; (8) if God is
perfectly good, he would want to prevent all of the evil and suffering in the world.
The three statements six (6) up to eight (8) reciprocally entail that there would not be any
evil or suffering if the perfect God of theism really existed. Nevertheless, the truth that our world
is filled with an astounding amount of evil and suffering is a never ending story. The
atheologians say that reflecting upon propositions six (6) through eight (8) in light of truth of evil
and suffering in the world, one should be led to the following conclusions: (9) If God knows
about all of the evil and suffering, and also knows how to eliminate or prevent it, then He wants
to prevent it, and yet He does not do so, therefore He must not be all- powerful. (10) If God is
powerful enough to prevent all of the evil and suffering, then He wants to do so, and yet He does
not, therefore He must not know about all of the suffering or He does not know how to eliminate
or prevent themthat is, he must not be all-knowing. And lastly, (11) if God knows about all of
the evil and suffering in the world, and He also knows how to eliminate or prevent them, and He
is powerful enough to prevent them, and yet He does not prevent it, therefore He must not be
perfectly good.
So, from propositions nine (9) through eleven (11) one can conclude that: (12) If evil and
suffering exist, then God is either not omnipotent, not omniscient, or not perfectly good.
Given that evil and suffering evidently do exist, one can get that: (13) God is not
omnipotent, not omniscient, and not perfectly good at the same time.
As a result, putting the point more directly, this line of argument implies thatin light of
the evil and suffering that human beings experience in the worldif God exists, if He really
does, He is either impotent, ignorant or wicked. So, it must be evident that proposition thirteen

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(13) contradicts with propositions one (1) through three (3) above. Making the contradiction
clear, propositions one (1), two (2) and three (3) must be put into the following single statement.
(14) God is omnipotent, omniscient and perfectly good.
It is impossible that thirteen (13) and fourteen (14) might both be true at the same time.
These statements are logically inconsistent or contradictory as what the atheologians are trying to
say.
Therefore, proposition fourteen (14) is merely the combination of propositions one (1)
through three (3) and states the innermost principle or belief of classical theism. Nevertheless,
proposition (13) can also be derived from propositions one (1) through three (3) claimed by the
atheologians. Propositions thirteen (13) and fourteen (14), still, are logically contradictory with
each other. All theists believe in propositions one (1) through four (4), and then atheologians
claim that theists have logically inconsistent beliefs because a contradiction or inconsistency can
be deduced from propositions one (1) through four (4). It is never rational to believe something
contradictory as philosophers have always believed in. So, the belief that a perfect God exist is
irrational because of the existence of evil and suffering in the world.
Is there an escape for the believer of God from this problem? In Rabbi Harold Kushners
best-selling book When Bad Things Happen to Good People (1981), he somehow offers the
following escape route for the theist regarding the problem of evil. First, he said that one should
deny the truth of proposition one (1) that God is all-knowing. Now, based on this proposal, that
God in the first place is not ignoring ones suffering when He doesnt do anything to avoid it for
the reason thatGod an all-knowingall the sufferings that a human being experiences, knows
all about them. Being a wholly good God, He also feels the pain of His people. The problem now
is thisGod cannot do something about it because Hes not omnipotent. With Kushners
representation of God, he said that God is somewhat of a kind-hearted wimp. God doesnt have
the power to do something about evil and suffering even though He would like to help. So what a

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theist can do is to deny the truth of the first four propositions in order to escape from the logical
problem of evil, but many theists would disagree with this answer.
In the eighteenth century, David Hume questioned the natures of God. He stated the
logical problem of evil as this, "Is He willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then He is impotent.
Is He able, but not willing? Then He is malevolent. Is He both able and willing? Whence then is
evil?" (Craig, 80). What the skeptic is suggesting is that it is irrational or logically impossible to
believe in the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient and wholly good God wherein the reality
of evil and suffering is present in the world because such a God would not possibly allow evil to
exist if He has these natures.
But then again, the key to the resolution of this evident inconsistency is to be aware of
this: saying that God is all powerful, it is not implied that He is capable of doing anything
imaginable. As what the Holy Scripture states For human beings this is impossible, but for God
all things are possible (Mt. 19:26). However the Holy Scripture also states that God also has
something that which He cannot do. For example, God cannot lie (Tit. 1:2). And also God is not
subject to temptation to sin, nor can tempt others to sin (James 1:13). In simple terms, God
cannot do something that is out of character for a virtuous God. He can neither do anything
that is out of character for a rational being in this rational world that He created. Definitely, even
God cannot undo the past, or to make a circle square, or interchange what is false from what is
true, God cannot do something that is illogical or ridiculous.
Furthermore, it is on this foundation that one can conclude that God could not eliminate
or take away evil and at the same time without rendering it impossible to carry out other goals
which are significant to Him. Surely, as beings who are created in Gods own image, and are
capable of sustaining a deep personal relationship with Him, they have to be beings who are
capable of freely loving Him and following His will without cruelty. Obedience or love on any
other origin would not be obedience or love at all; it is just but mere obedience. However,

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creatures who have the freedom to love God should also have the freedom to hate or ignore Him.
Those creatures who have the freedom to follow Gods will should also have the freedom to
reject it. Furthermore, when human beings do something in ways outside Gods will, the ultimate
result is great evil and suffering. This line of thinking is known as the "free will defense"
concerning the problem of evil.
Even though this research paper will not be talking about natural evil, still, it is also
important to have an idea on these natural evil in the world. So, what about natural evil that is
resulting from natural processes like earthquakes, floods and diseases? At this point it is essential
first to be aware that man live in a fallen world, a world that is full of evil and suffering and that
they are subjected to these natural processes that would not have happened which man did not
choose to revolt against God. Still, it is hard to visualize how one could act as free creatures in a
world much different than their owna world where natural processes permit one to foresee
with some conviction which are mans consequences of their choices and actions. Like for
example, take the law of gravity, wherein this is a natural process that without this it is not
possible for human beings to function, nevertheless in various states of affairs it is also capable
of resulting in enormous harm.
Definitely, God has the capacity to annihilate evilalthough the violation of human
freedom, or a world in which free creatures can function with this kind of reasoning one can
successfully answer to the challenge of the logical problem of evil.
2.4 Different Arguments on the Existence of God
Why does mankind experience suffering? Why do these happen to good people? Why
does one experience horrible things in life? Why are there bad things happening in this world?
Why does God let these things to happen? These questions arise from the lips of different people
every day. Answering these questions is very difficult which are the major perplexity among
believers in different theistic religions and also a major cause of non-belief among the others.

P a g e | 37
This problem of evil now will pose this scholarly question regarding the existence of God which
is: If there is a God who is omnipotent, omniscient, and wholly good, why is there evil in this
world?
Not all of these arguments have their origins in Christian philosophy; Jewish and Muslim
philosophers have made significant contributions to the philosophy of religion, and both Plato
and Aristotle have influenced its development
The Arguments for the Existence of God section sets out to explain each of the common
philosophical arguments for theism, and so to explore the case for the existence of God.
2.4.1 Theodicy: Definition and History
Now, what is a theodicy? Theodicy is a term coined by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz from
the Greek words theos which means God and dik that means righteous or justice. This
theodicy is an attempt to justify or defend the existence of God in the face of evil by answering
the following problem: First, God is all good and all powerful; secondly, the universe/creation
was made by God and/or exists in a contingent relationship to God; and thirdly, evil exists in the
world then why? (Theodicy: An Overview)
Theodicy is a centuries aged set of inquiry. It is often seen by historical scholarship as a
historical ideas and/or social ideologies. The social, political and religious contexts that gave
impetus to reflection on the problem of evil changes from time to time. They are important in the
history of the problem. The reflections of different thinkers may be said to be semicommensurable or, at least, analogous, one cannot set aside a historical sense of where various
insights come from.
The question is whether there is enough commensurability that exists across periods and
thinkers to say that a tradition exists or that later theodicts are justified in borrowing earlier ideas.
Some suggest that theodicy is a modern problem, and that the earlier formulations that is
concerned with evil cannot justify the existence of God, rather to argue for a specific God of

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Marion and while Boethius idea of theodicy is to explain the role of wisdom, or the purposes of
conversion within a history of salvation an idea of Augustine.
Here are the historical lists of theodicies in Christian tradition: Iraneaus, Lactantius,
Pseudo-Dionysius, Augustine, Anselm, Thomas Aquinas, The Mystics, Luis de Molina, Luther,
Calvin, Malebranche, Pierre Bayle, Leibniz, Hume, Kant, Schleiermacher, Karl Barth, Simone
Weil, Alfred North Whitehead and Charles Hartshorne, Dorothee Soelle, Teihard de Chardin,
Jacques Maritain, and Austin Farrer. (Theodicy: An Overview)
Also, theodicy is a good example of an argument used to justify the goodness and justice
of God, in a world where there is evil and suffering. Furthermore, it deals with the problem of
evil. It is usually an attempt to show that it is possible to affirm the omnipotence of God, the love
of God, and the reality of evil without contradiction. The skeptic's argument generally is that
given the reality of evil, one must sacrifice either the power or the love of God wherein a
dilemma arises. If Gods omnipotence will be given up, it seems that God cannot prevent or
overcome this evil. At the same time, if Gods goodness will be unavoidable, it appears that God
will not also prevent or overcome evil. Most theodicies attempt to show that this problem is just
obvious and that it is possible to affirm both that God is all-powerful and perfectly loving,
despite the presence of real evil in the world.
2.4.2 Pascals Wager
Blaise Pascal (1623-62) was a French Catholic mathematician, philosopher and
theologian. In his book Penses, he offered an argument in favor of religious belief which is in
favor of Christian faith that has come to be called Pascal Wager. (Davis 156)
Pascals Wager is an argument for the belief in God based not on an appeal to evidence
that God exists but rather based on an appeal to self-interest. This claim is supported by a
concern of the probable consequences of belief and unbelief. If one believes in God, then, he will
receive an infinite reward in heaven while if he does not then he has lost little or nothing. And if

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we do not believe in God, the argument continues, in that case if he exists then we will receive an
infinite punishment in hell while he does not then he will gain little or nothing. (Holt)
Either receiving an infinite reward in heaven or losing little or nothing is clearly
preferable to either receiving an infinite punishment in hell or gaining little or nothing. It is
therefore in ones interests, and so rational, to believe in God.
2.4.3 Ontological Argument
Before discussing about the ontological argument, it is needed to know what natural
theology is. It requires a lot of knowledge to give proofs and evidence to prove the existence of
God. Presenting theistic proofs is the task of natural theology, is an attempt to reach sound
conclusions about the existence and nature of God based on human reasoning. Human cognitive
faculties such as experience, memory, introspection, deductive and inductive reasoning and
inference to best explanation are the method used in natural theology. Then, natural theology has
created a perplexing variety of arguments for the existence of God. The four main types are
ontological arguments, cosmological arguments, teleological arguments also called as design
arguments, and moral arguments.
Ontological argument was first formulated by an eminent medieval philosopher and a
Catholic bishop by the name of Anselm of Canterbury (1033-1109). This argument is a priori
which is an argument crucially based on a certain definition or concept. Also, it does not involve
looking around at various properties of the world with senses, rather, it asks the reader to think
hard about certain concept, a definition of God, together with certain other metaphysical or
necessary truths. It is also one of the most incredibly fascinating arguments in the history of
philosophy. (Davis 15)
He started with a proposition That than which nothing greater can be conceived. Here
is how Anselms ontological argument works: (1) God exists in the understanding but not in
realityassumption to reduction; (2) Existence in reality is greater than existence in the
understanding alonepremise; (3) A being having all Gods properties plus existence in reality

P a g e | 40
can be conceivedpremise; (4) A being having all of Gods properties plus existence in reality is
greater than Godfrom (1) and (2); (5) A being greater than God can be conceivedfrom (3) and
(4); (6) It is false that a being greater than God can be conceivedby definition of God; (7)
Hence, it is false that God exists in the understanding but not in reality(1) up to (6), reduction
ad absurdum. (A. C. Plantinga 29)
If God's perfection is a part of the concept of God, and if God's perfection implies God's
existence, then God's existence is implied by the concept of God.
He often refers to God as the greatest conceivable being, but this is not like saying God
is the most powerful or the most knowledgeable Being imaginable.
2.4.4 Cosmological Argument (Davis 60-66)
The cosmological argument is first in Platos dialogue laws. It is a posteriori, which is an
attempt to argue for the existence of God based on the things that man know from his experience
and from the things that man learned through the senses.
The cosmological argument focuses on the Three Versions that can be found in Thomas
Aquinas book Summa Theologica. Through this, he suggested 5 Ways of arguing for the
existence of God. Here are the first three versions of the cosmological argument of Aquinas: The
first way is summarized as this (1) everything that is in motion is moved by something else; (2)
infinite regress is impossible; (3) therefore, there must be a first mover. The first way focuses on
motion and at the same time the first or the prime mover that moves all things.
Next is Aquinas second way that is summarized as (4) every effect has a cause; (5)
infinite regress is impossible; (6) therefore, there must be a first cause. The second way is talking
about the first cause of all things in this world.
The third way is summarized as this (7) some contingent beings exist; (8) if any
contingent being exist, a necessary being exists; (9) therefore, a necessary being exists. In
Aquinas third way he focuses on the contingent and necessary existence.
Furthermore, the cosmological argument is the argument from the existence of the world
or universe to the existence of a being that brought into and keeps it in existence.

P a g e | 41
It uses a general pattern of argumentation (logos) that makes an inference from certain
alleged facts about the world (cosmos) to the existence of a unique being, generally identified
with or referred to as God. Among these initial facts is that the world came into being, that the
world is contingent, in that, it could have been other than it is or that certain beings or events in
the world are causally dependent or contingent. From these facts, philosophers infer either
deductively or inductively that a first cause, a necessary being, an unmoved mover, or a personal
being (God) exists. The cosmological argument is a part of classical natural theology, whose goal
is to provide some evidences for the claim that God exists.
2.4.5 Design or Teleological Argument (Davis 97)
This argument is also a posteriori which is based upon facts that can be learned by
experience and through the senses. The word teleological comes from the word telos meaning
end or aim.
The design argument or teleological argument is an inductive argument that tends to
render support for its conclusion. Also, this argument is often stated as an analogical argument
which asks the reader to notice a certain similarity between the distinct things.
That this is so remarkable; there are numerous ways in which the universe might have
been different, and the vast majority of possible universes would not have supported life.
It is far more plausible and far more probable that the universe is this way because it was
created by God.
2.4.6 The Moral Argument (Holt)
Moral principles would often tell what man ought to do. That is, there is an inner
command independent by the agent and such command must have a source. The moral argument
is the argument from the existence or nature of morality to the existence of God. And also, it has
two forms which are the formal and perfectionist.
The formal moral argument takes the form of morality to imply that it has a divine origin.
Morality consists of an ultimately authoritative set of commands. Where can these commands
come from but a commander that has ultimate authority?

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The perfectionist moral argument sets up a problem. How can it be that morality requires
perfection of man? That morality cannot require of man more than he can give, but that we
cannot be perfect? The argument suggests that the only way to resolve this paradox is to posit the
existence of God.
2.4.7 The Argument from Religious Experience (Davis 121)
While religious experiences themselves can only constitute subjective evidence of God's
existence for those fortunate enough to have them, the fact that there are many people who
testify to having had such experiences constitutes indirect evidence of the existence of God even
to those who have not had such experiences.
2.4.8 The Argument from Miracles (Holt)
The argument from miracles is the argument that the occurrence of miracles demonstrates
both the existence of God and the truth of Christianity.
2.4.9 Monism (Holt)
This argument is not a theodicy but a challenge to the existence of evil. Monists argue
that the universe is perfect and good and the concept of evil is just an illusion that suggests the
feeling of suffering in a human being.
2.4.10 Process Theodicy
Process theologians argue that God is not omnipotent and he did not create the universe;
instead, the universe is uncreated and he is a part of it. This is contrary to the all-powerful and
transcendent God of Abrahamic religions. According to process theodicy, God is responsible for
starting the evolutionary process which eventually led to the development of humans, and is thus
partly responsible for the existence of evil and suffering.
The argument also presents that God does not have control over humans thus they are
free to ignore him. But God does everything in his power to ensure the universe produces enough
goodness to outweigh evil in the world, although he is restricted by the laws of nature. Likewise,
God also suffers with humans when evil occurs in them. Whitehead said, God is a fellowsufferer, a companion who understands.

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In all of these, one can conclude that the existence of evil and suffering cannot be
separated from the question of the existence of God. The claim that God exists is somehow hard
to reconcile given the existence of evil. The existence of evil is an issue since time immemorial.
Many philosophers and theologians have tried to articulate and rationalize it, but in the end, no
one received its full affirmation of the acceptability of any given argument. There is still
oppositions and refutations. But this does not render the investigation absurb. There is still need
for constant research and philosophizing. After all it may have answer, if there is any and no one
knows how, when and why?

CHAPTER III
PLANTINGAS FREE WILL DEFENSE
1. The Start of Free Will Defense
Why do mankind experience suffering? Why do evil things happen to good people? Why
do we experience horrible things in our life? Why are there bad things happening in this world?
Why does God let these things happen? These questions arise from the very lips of different
people every day. Answering these questions is very difficult and it is also the major perplexity
among believers in different theistic religions in the world. And at the same time, it is a major
cause of non-belief among others. This problem of evil now will pose this scholarly question

P a g e | 44
regarding the existence of God which is: If there is a God who is omnipotent, omniscient, and
wholly good, why is there evil in this world?
2. St. Augustines Free Will Defense: A Model of Plantinga
Free will is often the key issue in the medieval period by Christian philosophers. One
famous philosopher by the name Augustine of Hippo contributed a lot in the medieval period
when it comes to the matter regarding free will and evil. And this free will defense was patterned
by Alvin Plantinga and making it as his model for his argument.
The question of free will is often a key issue in the field of ethics. Many moral
philosophers like Newman, Kant, and Sidgwick argued that people need to be truly free in their
decision-making, if their actions are capable of being judged, and considered morally significant.
In other words, if people have no choice but to act in a certain way, are they accountable for what
happens as a result of them doing something? Now, the need to look into Augustines Free Will
Defense argument is important when it comes to the problem of evil. To begin understanding
Augustines theodicy, one needs first to examine his ideas in the light of two major influences in
his life.
The first is Manichaeism which was established by Mani at around 216-76 CE to which
Augustine was associated for some time. Manichaeism was a gnostic faith that emphasized the
duality or separation of darkness and light. This duality was expressed in two eternal principles,
i.e. matter and God which are opposed to each other. Escape from the bonds of the physical
world or matter, was said to be the aim or purpose of humanity. Augustine eventually became
disheartened with Manichaeism because he came to see it as a bad philosophy which is a set of
sophistical fantasies without rational coherence or explanatory force and as a result he began to

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reject the notion that evil is an independent and corrupt substance. The other key factor
influencing him was the teaching of Plotinus (204 BCE up to 70 CE). Plotinus taught the
goodness of creation and the chaotic nature of evil. He often speaks of matter as evil, and of
the Soul as suffering a fall, but in fact he sees the whole cosmic process as an inevitable result
of the superabundant productivity of the One8, and thus the best of all possible worlds.
Augustine's belief that sickness and wounds are nothing but the privation of health, seems
logical when it comes to illness, and may work on a number of levels elsewhere. However, if this
is the case, where did evil9, first begin? As far as Augustine is concerned, evil entered the world
because of the wrong choices of free beings10. In other words, corruption occurred as a result of
free will.
The freewill defense finds support from the first book of the Bible. It can be found in Genesis
chapter 3 when Adam took and ate the fruit from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil.
However, this was not because Satan tempted him, but because he was encourage by the woman,
Eve.
Within Augustine's Divine order of things, the angels in heaven partake of the highest
degrees of goodness. Though, some of these were said to have revolted against God, before the
creation of humanity. Thus there exist two rival camps in the heavens and on earth. The first one
is seeking to follow the ways of God (the City of God), and one seeking to follow their own
desires (the City of the World).

8 postulated by Plotinus as a principle superior to intellect and being, totally unitary and simple
9 the ability for things to become corrupted
10 free in the sense that there was no external force necessitating them to do wrong

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Augustine's theodicy has been largely adopted by the Western Church and has become
the yardstick of orthodoxy with regard to addressing the problem of evil and suffering. The key
idea is that God is in control of everything, but not the choices of free-agents such as humans and
angels. However, despite of this, Augustine's free will defense is not without its problems. For
example, in John Hicks critique on Augustine he argues whether angels are truly capable of
sinning?11 If a perfect being sins then surely, as Hick argues, they were not perfect in the first
place, and God is to be held accountable as their Maker? Of course, Augustine held that God
created the angels and humanity in the full knowledge that some would fall or sin, even though it
was never God's desire for them to do so. So, as far as Augustine is concerned, although God is
the Creator and he knew that some of God's created beings would sin, God is absolved from
blame, because God did not force anyone to make these choices.
Both the Augustinian and Irenaen theodicies 12 assume free will, that is, the notion that moral evil
stems from moral agents, and free agency is a necessary condition for human development.
According to the free will defense, the goodness of free agency outweighs the evil derived from
free moral agents. Supporters of the free-will defense argue that divine intervention would
compromise human freedom, thus preventing human development.
3. Plantinga on Evil and Free Will
An emeritus Professor at the University of Notre Dame who is noted to be a Christian analytic
philosopher in the name of Alvin Plantinga, had formulated his own argument regarding the

11 If the angels are finitely perfect, then even though they are in some sense free to sin they
never will in fact do so.
12 Irenaen theodicy focuses on Christian Theodicy, which is a defense on the goodness of God
in the face of evil.

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problem of evil after so many years of his constant effort in trying to solve the logical problem of
evil. He called this argument "The Free Will Defense" which is trying to solve the logical
problem of evil.
Alvin Plantinga, a Christian philosopher, thought that the problem of horrendous evil was
the primary theoretical difficulty for believing in God for those people outside of the Christian
faith. As a response, he wrote the book entitled God, Freedom, and Evil, and many believe that
he successfully answered the charge that the belief in the existence of God was said to be
logically impossible because of the reality of evil and suffering. He made naturalistic
verificationism momentarily move away into a modest obscurity because of his restatement of
the free will argument. On the other hand, the argumentation regarding free will moved Plantinga
and his critics. So, Plantinga defended his argument and answered those who said that, though he
had presented a powerful answer to the continuing problem of evil and suffering, other Christian
beliefs continued implausible. For that reason, Plantinga published another book entitled
Warranted Christian Belief which is his magnum opus. This book argues for a particularly
Christian type of religious epistemology.
Plantinga notices his work as a different approach from the earlier theodicies, mainly his
understanding of St. Augustines work. He claims that he is not attempting to prove that evil is
a part of Gods magnificent plan, as what is in the thought of St. Augustine. Rather, his goal is far
more modest because he desires to show that evil does not require a logical inconsistency for the
orthodox Christian.13 He claims that evil might be greatly troublesome to the Christian mind, but
13 By orthodox, the definition given by Plantinga, where he states that the brand of Christian
faith he writes of is that which is common to the great creeds of the main branches of the
Christian church, what unites Calvin and Aquinas, Luther and Augustine, Menno Simons and
Karl Barth, Mother Teresa and St. Maximus the Confessor, Billy Graham and St. Gregory
Palamasclassical Christian belief, as we might call it. It is taken from the Preface of his

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it does not inevitably nullify the believers faith.
Plantingas goal is simply to avoid contradicting what he sees as the heart of his free will
defense, that is, the statement that God is omniscient, omnipotent, and wholly good. And he
said that this is not a free will theodicy but rather a free will defense. Also, he is not claiming to
know why God permits evil.
4. Plantingas Reshaping of Augustines Free Will Theodicy
For the past several decades, Alvin Plantinga is one of the prominent Christian
philosophers of religion. In the article written by Brown, John Stackhouse said that Plantinga is
not just simply the best Christian philosopher of the last century, but also, he is the most
important philosopher of any stripe. (Brown 323) Furthermore, with some of his thirty named
lectureships and having been honored with various honorary degrees, several scholars from a
variety of disciplines, philosophical schools, and religious orientations have pointed to Plantinga
as one of the most influential philosophers of religion writing today. (Beilby 29)
In recent decades, only Plantinga more than any other thinkers has revived and reclaimed
the God question for modern philosophers. Because of the long-standing academic bias against
integrating personal faith into ones academic work it leads Plantinga to state on the suitability of
using Christian themes in formulating a philosophers worldview:
Followers of Bertrand Russell and Madelyn Murray OHare may disagree, but
how is that relevant? Must my criteria, or those of the Christian community,
conform to their examples? Surely not. The Christian community is responsible to
its set of examples, not theirs. Plantinga holds that ones religious beliefs have an
influence on every aspect of ones life, including ones academic endeavors. There
may be such a thing as neutral chemistry or physics, but not in theology!
Plantinga believes that the theist and the non-theist have fundamental differences
in their approach to epistemology. . . . And ones answer to these questions
[questions of faith] will affect your appraisal of what counts as a suitable
explanation of a given range of facts. (Beilby 37)
Plantinga does not only avoid the god of the philosophers for a complete Christian
theism, he also freely admits that he sees himself as a successor to Christian orthodox tradition.

Warranted Christian Belief.

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Plantunga believes he writes of what is common to the great creeds of the main branches of the
Christian church, what unites Calvin and Aquinas, Luther and Augustine, Menno Simons and
Karl Barth, Mother Teresa and St. Maximus the Confessor, Billy Graham and St. Gregory
Palamasclassical Christian belief, as one might call it. (A. C. Plantinga, Warranted Christian
Belief Preface) A great deal of Plantingas work has been apologetic in nature, which is very
sophisticated in type. Still, that he is a world-class philosopher and at the same time a defender
of Christian orthodoxy. On this point, Plantinga says:
One of my chief interests over the years has been in philosophical theology and
apologetics: the attempt to defend Christianity (or, more broadly, theism) against
various sorts of attacks brought against it. . . perhaps the main function of
apologetics is to show that, from a philosophical point of view, Christians and
other theists have nothing whatever for which to apologize. I can scarcely
remember a time when I wasnt aware of an interested in objections to
Christianity and arguments against it. (A. C. Plantinga, Warranted Christian
Belief Preface)
Plantingas primary purpose is not like those of the Christian apologetics that often aimed
at the conversion of non-Christians. For him, the main role of apologetics in his work is to assist
those in the Christian community who, for whatever reasons, have questions about their faith.
Secondly, Plantinga can see the apologetic endeavor as useful for those on the fringes of the
Christian community, and perhaps even for those adamantly opposed to Christian theism.
(Beilby 23)
From Plantingas work regarding the problem of evil, much of his reputation stems up.
His influence in this area is that though there are still several people who continue to believe that
Plantingas argument didnt unscathe the logical problem of evil, vast majority accepted and sees
his argument as a success. Perhaps the best evidence for the success of Plantingas Free Will
Defense is that since the publication of his argument, the vast majority of atheists who employ
the problem of evil do so inductively, not deductively; evil is claimed to be evidence against

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Gods existence, not a decisive refutation of Gods existence. (Beilby 11)
There were many questions that arose in the post-Holocaust and post atomic age, whether
or not anything similar to an Augustinian-style theodicy should even be attempted. Thus,
Terrence W. Tilley says that Plantinga simply does not take the awful reality of evil seriously
enough. (229) He also added that theodicies are not addressed to people who sin and suffer.
They are addressed to abstract individual intellects who have purely theoretical problems of
understanding evil. (229) Also, Kenneth Surin agreed with Tilleys position that admonishing
theodicists because of their lack of realism and practicality. There are two things that must be
said in reply to this: First, Plantinga is not doing pastoral theology, in fact, he willingly declares
that no theodicy would give any hint as to what Gods reason for some specific evilthe death
or suffering of someone close to you, for examplemight be. (A. Plantinga, The Free Will
Defense 25) Also, as being an analytic Christian philosopher, Plantinga restricts himself to the
theoretical or theological realm. But it is not a problem for his theodicy because metaphysical
theories typically are not required to provide relief or consolation. . . . The dividend of a
metaphysical theory is theoretical, not experiential or practical. (Cress 114) He also knows well
about the distinction between the formulation of technical philosophy and theology, and the
practical world of pastoral care. He noted that academic writing on the problem of evil, will
probably not allow the believer to find peace with himself and with God in the face of the evil
the world contains, (God, Freedom, and Evil 29) but that is not its purpose. Another reason that
criticism of Plantinga in this area is misplaced is because he, like St. Augustine, he is also
extremely anxious about evil. Plantinga also realizes that suffering is like a stain in the world that
God created and it is also like something to which those antagonistic toward the faith could
easily use in their attack upon Christianity. Evil has always been deeply troubling to him, as

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He admitted. (A. C. Plantinga, "Self-Profile", in Alvin Plantinga 34) Because Augustine took the
problem of evil too seriously, he turned away from Platonism and Manichaeism. It is the primary
stumbling block to intellectually satisfying Christian faith, as evil is frequently perceived. But in
some case it can be made that it was precisely the seriousness with which Augustine took evil
and made him to embrace the Christian faith. The embrace of Christianity can be seen by
Augustine as directly connected with the philosophical need to provide an account of the nature
of things and the human condition [as marred by sin] which is both rationally satisfying and true
to our lived experience. (Maker 149-160)
After all, through the thinking of both Augustine and Plantinga regarding the puzzlement
of evil there is a trace of realism, not naivet. Even if they are often accused of retreating into
airy speculations far separated from the true problems of human suffering, a case can be made
that, comprehensively by writing on the subject, both men succeed in making the dilemma of
evil even more terribly real. How did they do this? It is by rejecting explanations that try to
place the blame on anything or anyone other than humans, which the Christian tradition, and
most other religions, clearly say the onus rests. Hinduism teaches that suffering is the wages of
sin one has accrued in his past life, and the Manichees of Augustines pre-Christian period taught
that humans were tempted by a malignant cosmic power to sin, but such theories do not resonate.
It is the same effort to absolve the problem of evil, and to place the burden of sin upon
humankind, that one also find in Plantinga. The entire thrust of his work on the free will defense
is to silence critics who think that evil is an indictment of Gods goodness.
5. Plantingas Free Will Defense
There were also many philosophers who presented different arguments regarding the
problem of evil like Hume, Mill, Cleanthes, Gruner, J.R. Lucas, C.A. Campbell and Kant. In the

P a g e | 52
contemporary time, Alvin Plantinga presented his version of the Free Will Defense that he had
adopted from St. Augustine. His argument regarding the existence of evil is somehow related to
Augustines free will defense that he had modified. But still, many philosophers had refuted his
version. Plantingas concept of the free will puts forth a defense offering a new proposition that
is intended to demonstrate that it is logically possible for an omnibenevolent, omnipotent and
omniscient God to create a world that contains moral evil. He does not need to assert that his
new proposition is true; merely that it is logically valid. Plantinga's approach differs from that of
a traditional theodicy, which would strive to show not just that the new propositions are sound
but that they are also either true, prima facie plausible, or that there are good grounds for making
them.
Alvin Plantinga's version of the Free Will Defense is an attempt to rebut the logical
problem of evil, which posits the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good God in an
evil world constitutes a logical contradiction. Plantinga's argument is this; "It is possible that
God, even being omnipotent, could not create a world with free creatures who never choose evil.
Furthermore, it is possible that God, even being omnibenevolent, would desire to create a world
which contains evil if moral goodness requires free moral creatures. (God, Freedom and Evil
30)
The Free Will Defense can be looked upon as an effort to show that there may be
a very different kind of good that God cant bring about without permitting evil.
These are good states of affairs that dont include evil; they do not entail the
existence of any evil whatever; nonetheless God Himself cant bring them about
without permitting evil. (Plantinga, God, Freedom and Evil 29)

Alvin Plantingas Free Will Defense is usually stated something like this way:

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A world containing creatures who are significantly free (and freely perform more
good than evil actions) is more valuable, all else being equal, than a world
containing no free creatures at all. Now God can create free creatures, but He can't
cause or determine them to do only what is right. For if He does so, then they
aren't significantly free after all; they do not do what is right freely. To create
creatures capable of moral good, therefore, He must create creatures capable of
moral evil; and He can't give these creatures the freedom to perform evil and at
the same time prevent them from doing so. As it turned out, sadly enough, some
of the free creatures God created went wrong in the exercise of their freedom; this
is the source of moral evil. The fact that free creatures sometimes go wrong,
however, counts neither against God's omnipotence nor against His goodness; for
He could have forestalled the occurrence of moral evil only by removing the
possibility of moral good. (30)

The majority of the philosophers agreed with Plantingas free will defense and thus sees
the logical problem of evil as having been sufficiently rebutted. Robert Adams says that "It is fair
to say that Plantinga has solved this problem. That is, he has argued convincingly for the
consistency of God and evil." (225) Then William Alston said that "Plantinga has established the
possibility that God could not actualize a world containing free creatures that always do the right
thing." (29) And also, William L. Rowe has written "granted incompatibilism, there is a fairly
compelling argument for the view that the existence of evil is logically consistent with the
existence of the theistic God", referring to Plantinga's argument. (115) In Arguing about Gods
existence Graham Oppy offers an opposition, acknowledging that many philosophers seems to
suppose Plantinga's free will defense because it utterly demolishes the kinds of 'logical'
arguments from evil developed by J.L. Mackie, an atheologian.

CHAPTER IV
PLANTINGAS FREE WILL DEFENSE ON THE PROBLEM OF EVIL

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1. Free Will Defense at Work
One of the atheologians who have tried to prove the absence of God by using the problem
of evil is J. L. Mackie. Mackies argument against God from evil is briefly stated as follows:
(1) God is omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good.
(2) Any omnipotent God can create any logically possible world.
(3) There is at least one logically possible world which contains significantly free
creatures who perform only moral actions.
(4) A perfectly good God would want to create such a world (3).
(5) The actual world contains moral evil
(6) God, so described, does not exist. (LaFollette 115)

J. L. Mackies argument can be synthesized in one sentence: God does not exist because
there is moral evil in the world. (LaFollette)
Plantinga eagerly accepts (1), (3), (4) and (5), but rejects (2). That is to say, he argues that
God would have, if he could have, created a world with only significantly free creatures who
always act morally. Yet, he argues that God cannot create such a world. "What is really
characteristic and critical to the Free Will Defense is this claim that God, though omnipotent,
could not have actualized just 'any possible world he pleased." (LaFollette 124)
Plantinga started his defense by trying to illustrate that there are some possible worlds
that cannot be actualized by God. For instance, he argues that: If God were a contingent being
that is, did not exist in all possible worlds, subsequently there are obviously possible worlds He
could not actualize, explicitly those world in which He did not exist. Certainly, the response to
this claim is just simple: Plantinga provides it himself in the development of ontological proof
later in God, Freedom, and Evil. The very critical premise of this evidence is the claim that God
is a necessarily existent being, that is to say, that God exists in all possible worlds. Moreover,

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because he strongly supports this evidence, he is unable to consistently hold the absence of God
in some possible world(s) adequate enough to show that God could not have actualized those
worlds. In contrast, he will have to throw out his ontological proof if he would like to continue
this assertion in his Free Will Defense. However, even if he does maintain this argument by
abandoning his ontological proof, the atheist can, as even Plantinga admits, successfully revise
(2) to say:
(7) An omnipotent God can actualize any possible world in which he exists. (LaFollette
125)
However, since it is evident that Plantinga wanted to hold that God is a necessarily
existent being, the atheist does not need (7); he can continue to assert the stronger proposition
(2). With these responses, Plantinga is so much aware that is why he takes another track. Now, in
LaFollettes work, he said that:
Plantinga begins his argument by setting forth an example which he
contends will establish his claim. Here is a trivial example. You and Paul have just
returned from an Australian hunting expedition: your quarry was the elusive
double-watted cassowary. Paul captured an aardvark, mistaking it for a cassowary.
The creatures disarming ways have won it a place in Pauls heart; he is deeply
attached to it. Upon your return to the States you offer Paul $500 for his aardvark,
only to be rudely turned down. Later you ask yourself, What would he have done
if Id offered him $700? Now what is it, exactly, that you are asking? What
youre really asking in a way is whether, under a specific set of conditions, Paul
would have sold it. These conditions include your having offered him $700 rather
than $500 for the aardvark, everything else being as much as possible like the
conditions that did in fact obtain. Let s be this set of conditions or state of
affairs. S includes the state of affairs consisting in your offering Paul $700
(instead of the $500 you did offer him); of course it does not include his accepting
your offer, and it does not include his rejecting it; for the rest, the conditions it
includes are just like the ones that did obtain in the actual world. So, for example,
s includes Pauls being free to accept the offer and free to refrain; and if in fact
the going rate for an aardvark was $650, then s includes the state of affairs
consisting in the going rates being $650.
Now, let us deal with future events. For an instance, think about, some
human being, Maurice, who will, at some time t in the near future, be free with
respect to some insignificant action-like having oatmeal for breakfast. That is, at
time t, he will be free to take oatmeal, but also free to take something else, let us
say, shredded wheat, perhaps. Next suppose we consider s, a state of affairs that

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is included in the actual world and includes Maurice's being free at time t to take
oatmeal and free to reject it. This s, Plantinga tells us; includes neither Maurices
taking nor rejecting the oatmeal. For the rest, s should be considered as much as
possible like the actual world. But even thoughs does not include Maurices
taking or not taking the oatmeal, God knows that one of the following
conditionals is true:
(8) If s were to obtain, Maurice will freely take the oatmeal.
or
(9) If s were to obtain, Maurice will freely reject the oatmeal.
Now, Plantinga says, let us suppose that (8) is true. Then there is a
possible world which God, though omnipotent, cannot create.
...For consider a possible world w that shares s with the actual world
(which for ease of reference, I'll call Kronos), and in which Maurice does not take
the oatmeal. (We know there is such a world because s does not include
Maurice's taking the oatmeal.) s obtains in w just as it is in Kronos. Indeed
everything in w is just as it is in Kronos up to time t. But whereas in Kronos
Maurice takes oatmeal at time t, in w he does not.
Now w is a perfectly possible world; but it is not within God's power to create it
or bring it about. For to do so he-must actualize s But (8) is in fact true. So if
God actualizes s (as he must to create w) and leaves Maurice free with respect
to the action in question, then he will take the oatmeal; and then, of course, w
will not be actual. If, on the other hand, God causes Maurice to refrain from
taking the oatmeal, then he is not free to take it. That means, once again, that w
is not actual; for in w Maurice is free to take the oatmeal (even if he doesn't do
so). So if (8) is true, then this world w is one that God can't actualize; it is not
within his power to actualize it even though He is omnipotent and it is possible
world. (LaFollette 125-126)
Similarly, Plantinga argues that if (9) is true, then there is a similar result, i.e., there are
worlds which even an omnipotent God cannot actualize. So since either (8) or (9) are true, and
then there are possible worlds that God can't create. If we consider a world in which s obtains
and in which Maurice freely choose oatmeal at time t, we see that whether or not it is in God's
power to actualize it depends upon what Maurice would do if he were free in a certain situation.
Accordingly, there are any numbers of possible worlds such that it is partly up to Maurice
whether or not God can actualize them". Thus, concludes Lafollette, there are many possible
worlds which God cannot create. (LaFollette 126)
Now, going back to the discussion regarding the Free Will Defense and the problem of
evil of Plantinga, the free will defender, one can reacall, insists on the possibility that it is not

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within Gods power to create a world containing moral good without also creating one that
contains moral evil. His atheological opponent Mackie, for instance agrees with Leibniz in
insisting that if (as the theist holds) God is omnipotent, and then it follows that He could have
created any possible world that He is well pleased. Then, the atheologian is right in holding that
there are many possible worlds containing moral good but without moral evil; his mistake now
lies in endorsing Leibniz Lapse. So then, one of his premises that God, if omnipotent, could
have actualized just any world that He pleased is false.
1.1 The Function and Nature of Free Will Defense
The Free Will Defense is designed as a response to the atheologians claim that Christian
belief is illogical and thus absurd, to prove that in fact there is no contradiction between God and
evil is its function.
Similar to what Plantinga said, the function of Free Will Defense is to show that there is
no contradiction between the existence of a perfect God and moral evil in the world. 14 Plantinga
uses several propositions as a form in order to explain his argument as follows:
The Free Will Defense is an effort to show that
(1) God is omnipotent, omniscient, and wholly good
(Which I shall take to entail that God exists) is not inconsistent with
(2) There is evil in the world.
That is, the Free Will Defender aims to show that there is a possible world in
which (1) and (2) are both true. (A. C. Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity 165)
The primary aim or goal of Plantinga's Free Will Defense is an attempt to show that God and
moral evil are logically consistent. Primarily, the Free Will Defense is only dealing with the
logical validity between God and moral evil.
1.2 The Argument
14 The Free Will Defense focuses more on moral evil, less on natural evil.

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Based on Plantinga, the Free Will Defender affirms that the following statement is likely
possible: God is omnipotent (all-powerful), and it was not within His power to create a world
containing moral good but no moral evil. (God, Freedom, and Evil 45) The reason why this is
possible is that God creates free persons who sometimes perform morally evil actions. (God and
Other Minds 136) If a person is free with respect to a given action, then he is free to perform that
action and free to refrain from performing it. (A. C. Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil 29) What
Plantinga is trying to show is this that even if God is omnipotent, He does not want to cause or
determine people to do only what is right because by doing that, then people are not significantly
free after all. To create creatures capable of moral good, therefore, he must create creatures
capable of moral evil. Sometimes God prevents them from doing wrongly because he cannot
leave these creatures free to perform evil, but some of them went wrong in the exercise of their
freedom. And according to Plantinga, this wrong way of exercising their freedom is the source of
moral evil. The very heart of the Free Will Defense is the claim that it is possible that God could
not have created a universe containing moral good without creating one containing moral evil.
(The Nature of Necessity 166-167)
2. Free Will Defense in the Face of Evil
The main point of this topic is not to expose a tradional theodicy that gives the defense on
the agency of God or the source of moral evil. Why? Because traditional theodicy does not
answer why there is evil in the world. Its aim is to defend God and not answer the problem of
evil. Now, where can one point this issue? The discussion about God in the face of evil appears
to be an appeal to higher harmony that reason cant possibly understand. If one cannot point to
theodicy because of this reason, maybe one can study the circumstances pointing on man on the
agency of evil that happens. It is a starting point where one can name it not theodicy but
anthropodicy.
Moral evil now does not owe its existence to God but on man. In this, one may study the

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following circumstances that can give clear manifestation or a trace of truth regarding this
anthropodicy. If moral evil does not owe its existence to a God, does it owe its existence from the
deeds of men? Maybe one may examine the following:
One of the best presentations of the problem of evil comes from Fyodor Dostoevskys
novel, The Brothers Karamozov. At one point the brother Ivan goes through a litany of
observations regarding the depth of evil in humanity in one particular culture. He states:
They burn villages, murder, rape women and children, they nail their
prisoners to the fences by the ears, leave them so till morning, and in the morning
they hang themall sorts of things you cant imagine. People talked sometimes
of bestial cruelty, but thats a great injustice and insult to the beast; a beast can
never be so cruel as a man, so artistically cruel. The tiger only tears and gnaws,
thats all he can do. He would never think of nailing people by the ears, even if he
were able to do it. These (men) took pleasure in torturing children, too; cutting the
unborn child from the mothers womb, and tossing babies up in the air and
catching them on the points of their bayonets before their mothers eyes. Doing it
before the mothers eyes was what gave zest to the amusement. Here is another
scene that I thought very interesting. Imagine a trembling mother with her baby in
her arm, a circle of invading (men) around her. They planned a diversion; they pet
the baby, laugh to make it laugh. They succeed, the baby laughs. At that moment a
(man) points a pistol four inches from the babys face. The baby laughs with glee,
hold out its little hands to the pistol, and he pulls the trigger in the babys face and
blows out its brains. Artistic wasnt it?
By the way, (these men) are particularly found of sweets, they say.
"Brother, what are you driving at?" asked Alyosha.
"I think if the devil doesnt exist, but man has created him, he has created
him in his own image and likeness."
Later Ivan puts the problem of evil more bluntly to his brother.
"Tell me yourself, I challenge you answer. Imagine that you are creating a
fabric of human destiny with the object of making men happy in the end, giving
them peace and rest at last, but that it was essential and inevitable to torture to
death only one tiny creature that little child beating its breast with its fist, for
instanceand to found that edifice on its unavenged tears, would you consent to
be the architect on those conditions? Tell me, and tell the truth."
"No, I wouldnt consent," said Alyosha softly
From the human perspective, the presence of evil does not make sense and no
explanation has ever developed that sufficiently answers or explains it. But still, the evil actions
that took place in the novel were basically done by human beings and not by God. So, does God
create evil?

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Another illustration of evil that is almost present everywhere in each corners of the world
would be killing or massacre. One may still remember the bloody massacre happened in
Maguindanao province in the Philippines way back November 23, 2009. Almost 57 innocent
people were heartlessly killed which were mistakenly recognized by the killers. Here is somehow
a clear summary of what had happened in the said massacre: (Mcindoe)
The Maguindanao massacre, also known as the Ampatuan massacre, occurred in the
morning of November 23, 2009, in Ampatuan, Maguindanao province on the island of
Mindanao, Philippines. This heartless massacre killed 57 innocent people, most of whom were
journalists who were just mistakenly recognized as part of the convoy. Here is a brief story on
what happened on the subject heartless killing. According to reports, when the victims, in a
convoy, were on their way to file a certificate of candidacy of Esmael Mangudadatu who was
then running for vice mayor of Buluan town, they were kidnapped and eventually brutally killed
without hesitation by the Ampatuan men. It was believed that the filing of Mangudadatus
certificate of candidacy as a challenge to the post of then Mayor Andal Ampatuan, Jr., the son of
the current Maguindanao governor Andal Ampatuan, Sr., was the root cause of the brutal
incident. There were 57 people who were killed including the wife of Mangudadatu, his two
sisters, journalists, lawyers, aides, and motorists. (news.bbc.co.uk.)
Two days prior to the incident, the grave yard was allegedly prepared by using a backhoe
with the name Gov. Andal Ampatuan Sr. emblazoned indicating that it was actually owned by the
Ampatuan family.
The Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), a well-known media organization, named the
Maguindanao massacre as the single deadliest event for journalists recorded in history of the
Philippines. There were at least 34 journalists who were killed in the massacre. According to the
group, even before the Maguindanao massacre, the Phillipines was already labeled as the second
most dangerous country for journalists, next to Iraq.

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The exact location of the said massacre was about 10 km from the town of Shariff Aguak,
where the Commission on Elections provincial office was located. Before reaching their
destination, the convoy was impeded by 100 armed men who abducted and afterward killed all of
its affiliates. There were also unverified evidences that five of the female victims, were raped
before being killed and almost all of the other women had been shot in their genitals and were
allegedly beheaded.
On November 24, 2009, a day after the incident, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, in
an immediate act of preventing more violence, declared a state of emergency in Maguindanao,
Sultan Kudarat and Cotabato City. Prospero Nograles, the Speaker of the House called the police
to quickly identify the perpetrators of the massacre and disarm private armies. The Philippines
Department of Justice made a panel of special prosecutors to handle the cases regarding the said
massacre.
The families and relatives of the victims were all shocked with what had happened. The
incident made them angry at the people who committed the merciless murder. By this time, the
families and relatives of the victims started to doubt about the presence of God and his goodness
because of the incident that occurred.
This merciless killing that was allegedly made by the Ampatuans can be seen as a product
of evil and not by God. God has nothing to do with these evil acts because man willed them.
Another example of merciless killing was committed by Edwin John Espinueva from
Vigan City, Philippines, who killed his wife, daughter and two other relatives before he shot
himself in the head last August 3, 2012. Another daughter was wounded who had been shot in
the head and chest. Edwin had written a suicidal note written on a small page of notebook
stating: Mama Weng, Sam and Karla Mahal na mahal ko kayo kaya ko nagawa to Ayaw
kong magkahiwa-hiwalay tayo Love, Papa Bong. And on the other page, he wrote: Happy
15th year to my loving wife, Frances Louella M. Espinueva. I love you. From Papa Bong.

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(Balbin A 18) The moral evil act comes from Edwin who killed his wife and children and other
relatives. The free will defender would say that God is not the source of evil but rather the wrong
doings of men. Edwin willed it. He did it, not God.
Padrica Caine Hill, a former bank teller in Washington D.C., killed her three children.
One morning, she dresses her children and made them breakfast. Then she smoked some cracks
cocaine and lets her children watch cartoons. After then, with a clothesline she strangles her
eight-year-old Kristine and four-year-old Eric, Jr. Then she tries to strangle her two-year-old
Jennifer, but leaves her still breathing softly on the floor. When the policemen came, she said to
them that she loves her children so much. After that they asked her why did she kill them? She
answered in apparently bewilderment, I dont know. She also added, I hadnt planned on it.
(Morrow, Evil 39) With this, Padrica is the source of evil but not God. (Morrow, Evil)
Moreover, how can one justify the existence of God in the midst of torture and
persecution? Why is he not helping those victims of tortures and persecutions? For example, in
the Philippine Daily Inquirer, Bonita Baran, a housemaid who suffered from years of
maltreatment by Reynold and Analiza Marzan whom she worked for. She also cited two
incidents when Analiza allegedly tried to kill her. In the first incident, Analiza stabbed her in the
arm with a pair of scissors while she was doing the laundry inside the bathroom. And in the
second incident, Analiza tried to strangle her while telling her that why is she taking too long to
die. She also said that she had been wounded with a knife, struck her in the head with hard
objects until she bled, punched her in the eyes, singed her with a flat iron, and force-fed her with
dead cockroaches. (Andrade A 25) So, with that, one can say that the source of evil is not God
but rather the couple who tortured and persecuted Bonita. The evil that happened to Bonita was
done by the couple as reported. It clearly drives away the agency of God as the origin of evil.
In the cycle of poverty, a poor person can say that it is the fault of God why he is living in
poverty. But looking at ones capabilities (the poor man) he or she has the ability to work that

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will help him or her to go out from the circle of poverty. So, the source of evil or poverty is not
God but rather, he or she who does not make a move to go out from that circle.
And with all of these events that picture out the faces of moral evil in the lives of human
beings, one can probably question the existence of an omniscient, omnipotent and
omnibenevolent God. How can a free will defender claim that there is a God in the midst of
moral evil?
Anthropodicy, if a free will defender would say, makes sense regarding the problem of
moral evil. He defends the existence of a God who, by his defense, has nothing to do with the
moral evil that happens in the realm of humanity. It is man who creates moral evil and he is
responsible to face them. This is the conviction of a free will defender. A conviction that
challenges man to take responsibly as to what will happen because of his deeds.

CHAPTER V
1. Summary
In this research paper, the researcher presented and exposed the very heart of Alvin
Plantingas free will defense on the problem of evil. The researcher discussed in the second
chapter of this research paper the concept of free will that is, as a unique ability of human beings
that allows them to control their actions. Also, the researcher discussed the plausibility of the free
will of man and the different arguments, in support and opposed to free will, which are the
Consequence Argument, the Origination Argument, Rejecting the Incompatibilist Arguments,
Frankfurts Argument against the Ability to Do Otherwise, and Strawsons Reactive Attitudes.
In addition, it is also discussed on this chapter an exposition of the problem of evil that is, an
argument on the existence of a God who is omniscient, omnipotent and wholly-good and there is
evil in the world. An exposition of the different argument of the existence of God in the face of

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moral evil like Theodicy, Pascals Wager, Ontological Argument, Cosmological Argument,
Design or Teleological Argument, Moral Argument, Argument from Religious Experience,
Argument from Miracles, Monism, and Process Theodicy are also presented by the researcher.
So then, the existence of evil and suffering cannot be separated from the question of the
existence of God. Given the existence of God the claim that evil exists is somehow hard to
reconcile.
In the third chapter of this research paper, the researcher presented a comprehensive
exposition of Alvin Plantingas free will defense. His concept of the free will puts forth a defense
offering a new proposition that is intended to demonstrate that it is logically possible for an
omnibenevolent, omnipotent and omniscient God to create a world that contains moral evil.
Plantinga's approach is different from that of a traditional theodicy, which would attempt to
explain not just that the new propositions are sound but that they are also either true, prima facie
plausible, or that there are good grounds for making them. It is all-inclusive of the origin and the
reshaping of Augustines idea of free will theodicy that led Plantinga to create his own version of
the free will defense.
And in the fourth chapter the researcher presented the relevance of Plantingas free will
defense on the problem of evil. It is an exposition of his free will defense and on how it works in
the face of moral evil. The researcher presented different evil happenings and events that shows
that the agency of moral evil is man and he is responsible to face them. That is now the role of
anthropodicy, as a free will defender would say which makes sense concerning the problem of
moral evil. The free will defender defends the existence of a God who has nothing to do with the
moral evil that happens in the realm of humanity.
2. Conclusion

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Who does not want to experience pleasure? By nature, man seeks pleasure. He always
wants to experience the good things in life. He seeks what is good unless he is a masochist,
unless he wants sufferings. But what if man experiences the other way around? What if suffering,
a reality, happened in his own life? What would be its effects?
The problem of evil and suffering is an ancient problem which philosophers always try to
solve or give plausible arguments. In the existence of evil and suffering, man tends to question
the existence of a divine being who they believe powerful, good and potent. Evil and suffering is
the greatest test for ones faith and may give way to unbelief.
Many philosophers already tried to present plausible theodicies that can somehow solve
the origin of evil and its coherence to the existence of a personal and loving God. It seems that
many believe in the incoherence of this that led to the diversion of its focus to the reality of the
freewill of man. In studying freewill, one may not divert his focus on his deeds. His deeds result
to good or bad outcomes. Now, these bad outcomes may come to its extreme of labelling them as
evil and suffering. Ones deeds result to the very suffering of man. This is known as freewill, the
capacity of man to choose. Choosing seems to entail the virtue of responsibility. If one chooses
evil, then its consequence will be manifested in the humanity of man. One may be enlightened
that this freewill may be the cause of evil and suffering that happen in the world. Evil itself is a
choice and its origin traces the very being of man, this is anthropodicy. The agency of man paves
the way for immoral actions and effects that can become a suffering for him and even for his
fellow human beings. Anthropodicy now becomes a shield of God. Evil now is not contested as a
creation of God but man. God has nothing to do about it. God, for many, is a personal deity who
loves his creation. But what does he do amidst the suffering of his creation?
Still, this question has not yet gained plausible answer. It is still a journey for many to

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find out. After all, evil and suffering- whether it comes from God or not- can be a challenge to a
human being. It is a challenge of taking responsibility over his deeds. It is a challenge to test the
belief of a person but most of all it is a challenge on how does man reach out to help his fellow
sufferer in the world.
It may come from God, if there is. It may come from man. These two propositions are
still contestable. It is a long way to go. What is important is ones attitude towards it. It is a
common experience. In all of these, maybe it is not so important to engage in answering the
origin of evil and suffering. It is a reality to be faced. Maybe, it is also a reality that can be solved
in charity.
3. Recommendations
For all the readers of Alvin Plantinga the researcher would like to recommend his books
and journal articles that will help them to deeply understand his ideas especially on his free will
defense against the problem of evil. Here are the books and journal articles of Plantinga:
God, Freedom, and Evil (1974), this book of Plantinga discusses and explains the
philosophy of religion, or philosophical reflection on central themes of religion and one
important aspect of philosophy of religion concerns this latter belief- the belief that God exists.
This book also offers arguments that Alvin Plantinga used to explain the very reason of the
existence of evil while God who is omniscient, omnipotent and omnibenevolent exists.
God and Other Minds: A Study in the Rational Justification of Belief in God (1986),
Plantinga uses this book to investigate the rational justification of belief in the existence of God.
He had examined arguments like ontological, cosmological, teleological, and natural theology,
which is a very important approach in this problem. He believes that these arguments are worthy
of serious and detailed study. Plantinga also presented his free will defense to explain and

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examine it.
The Nature of Necessity (1974), this book discusses the rational justification on the belief
of Gods existence in the midst of the presence of evil.
The Free Will Defense, in The Analytic Theist (1998), in this article Plantinga discuss
his idea of free will defense regarding the problem f evil to rationally justify Gods existence.
Self-Profile, in Alvin Plantinga (1985), this book was a tribute to Plantinga for being
one of the prominent Christian philosopher of his time. Different ideas of Plantinga was
presented
Ad Hick. Faith and Philosophy 14 (1997), Plantinga presented his rational
justification on Gods existence in the midst of the presence of evil.
A Christian Life Partly Lived, in Philosophers Who Believe: The Spiritual Journeys of
11 Leading Thinkers (1993), through this article Plantinga puts up his argument on the existence
of God by rationally justifying it with his free will defense.
Internalism, Externalism, Defeaters and Arguments for Christian Belief. Philosophia
Christi 3 (2001), in this philosophical journal, Plantinga contributed a big helped to support the
arguments on Christian beliefs especially on the existence of God.
The Foundations of Theism: A Reply. Faith and Philosophy 3 (July 1986), this
philosophical journal presents the basis of theism and as a Christian philosopher; Alvin Plantinga
contributed a good support with his ideas.
On Reformed Epistemology. The Reformed Journal 32 (January 1982), in this journal,
Plantingas reformed epistemology is a flawed epistemological edifice and could be improved
upon if he would incorporate into it some of the same ideas that make his free will defense so
successful.

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Reformed Epistemology Again. Reformed Journal 32 (1982), in this journal,
Plantingas epistemology was presented again to give more justification on the existence of God.
Reason and Belief in God, in The Analytic Theist (1998), Plantingas justification on
the existence of God was discussed here profoundly.
It is recommended for those who always seek pleasure, that when the opposite thing
happens one should be responsible for his deeds. What one should need to do is to find another
way to attain or achieve the pleasure they want to have. Seeking for pleasure is not bad but it
should be balanced.
Also, the researcher would like to recommend this paper for those people who see life as
a mere suffering. The responsibility of man over his deeds is a primary attitude that must be
inculcated. Suffering is a reality and must be treated as a challenge to the self. It is not being a
masochist, but a reality that must be faced to the best of the capacity. It is after all a consolation
when one sees suffering as a way to hope and salvation.
For the theists and the atheists, what is essential is not about the problem of what to
believe in, what is important is that one can be spiritual in his own way without destroying each
individuals belief. Rationality is needed when putting up arguments and at the same time respect
with each others belief. Evil and suffering is a reality that both believer and a non-believer face.
It is a challenge and the greatest test for ones belief and unbelief.
For future researchers of Plantingas free will defense, this can also be a reference for
future researches. It can somehow add clarifications for some ideas that may come out from the
freewill defense of Plantinga.
In all of these, what man chooses makes him. His choices become part of his becoming.
If he chooses evil, it is up to him and it should not be blamed to others. His responsibility over

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what happens is maybe the best choice to take.

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