Araujo y Martuccelli - La Individuación y El Trabajo de Los Individuos (Inglés)
Araujo y Martuccelli - La Individuación y El Trabajo de Los Individuos (Inglés)
Araujo y Martuccelli - La Individuación y El Trabajo de Los Individuos (Inglés)
Kathya Araujo
Universidad Academia de Humanismo Cristiano (Chile)
Danilo Martuccelli
Universit de Lille 3 CeRIES (Francia)
Abstract
This article starts by recognizing the growing importance of the conception of the
Individual in order to understand contemporary societies, while it focuses on certain
impasses arising when socialization and subjectivation strategies are favoured to
approach this subject matter. After formulating some criticism to both of these
strategies, the article presents and develops the ways in which individuation allows
explaining, at the scale of the individual, the main trials in a specific society, and it
analyzes how individuals are able to build themselves as subjects within this
framework.
Keywords: Individuation Subject Trial Individual Socialization
Subjectivation.
Contact
Danilo Martuccelli
Universit de Lille 3 - CeRIES
Domaine Universitaire du "Pont de Bois"
BP 60149
59653 - Villeneuve d'Ascq Cedex - FRANCE
[email protected]
The thesis that the individual is a relevant path to understand contemporary societies
has acquired growing importance in the social sciences (Martuccelli, Singly, 2009).
The current centrality of the individual in sociology originated in the crisis of the idea
of society, and it is a testimony of a deep transformation of our sensitivity
specifically, the fact that the individual is the threshold of our social perception. It is
in reference to the experiences of the individual that society may acquire meaning.
The central core of this process can be expressed simply. In the same way that, in
the past, the understanding of social life was organized from the notions of
civilization, history, society, nation, state or class, it now pertains to the individual to
occupy this central place of analytical conception. In this context, sociologys main
challenge is to explain societal main changes from an intelligence that places in its
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horizon the individual and his or her experiences Nevertheless, even if the individual
needs to be placed at the apex of the analysis, that does not imply at all a reduction
of the sociological analysis at the level of the actor, but it appears instead as the
consequence of a societal transformation that sets the individual at the base of the
production of social life. In order to understand the new analytical role that is
presently conferred to the individual, we will discuss socialization and subjectivation
theories and see that they present an important set of insufficiencies that beckon us
to follow another strategy that, stemming from the individuation process, may be able
to describe the work of the individual in building himself or herself as a subject.
Let us clarify this point, as socialization has undoubtedly been given great
preeminence in the sociology of education. Socialization is not the only way in which
the formation of the individuals can be conceived. Along with socialization, at least
two other great strategies can be differentiated: subjectivation and individuaiton.
Schematically, socialization studies the social and psychological making of the
individual, while subjectivation considers, within sociology, the making of the subject
as the result of social and political emancipation. Individuation is interested, from a
social and historical perspective, in the in the type of individual structurally formed in
a society (Martuccellli, 2007). In this articled we shall defend the thesis that, in order
to extract all the promises contained in a sociology of the individual, it is essential to
favour individuation as the main strategy to reestablish a macrosociology.
1. A classic model
No other model summarized this project better than the notion of social character
(Martuccelli, 2002). The social character does not only designate the engagement of
an individual in social situations, but to a much deeper level it refers to the will to
make his or her actions and experiences intangible, as a function of his or her social
position, in the form of statistical correlations or by means of an ethnographic
description of ways of life. In both cases socialization was given an important role,
and such perspective defined for a long time the actual sociological grammar of the
individual. Each individual occupies a position, which makes the individual both
unique and typical of the different social layers. The individual is submerged in social
spaces that generate conducts and experiences through a set of social forces (with
little regard to the notion used to describe this process, whether system, field or
configuration) (Parsons, 1951, 1964; Bourdieu, 1979; Elias, 1990). In short,
sociologys most venerable vocation lies in the tireless effort to turn the position
occupied by an actor into the main explanatory factor of his or her conducts.
This articulation between social position and actor type, thanks to the socialization
theory, was so successful that it centered for decades around an idea of society
conceived as an articulation of different levels of social reality, to the extent that actor
and system actually seemed to fuse, like two sides of a same coin. The triumph of
the idea of society that resulted from its functional articulation between systems and
fields or from the ultimate determination of culture by infrastructure and the
attached notion of social character did not mean at all the suppression of the
individual, but the hegemonic imposition of a single perspective. It was around this
pair that sociologys analytical core was forged.
desires that the individuals perceive as expectations, causing a social distance and a
general frustration, as their desires cannot be satisfied by their social situations.
Culture in modern times is no longer just an integration factor between the individual
and society; it is also an active fission factor, increasingly frequent, between one and
the other.
The importance of this process is such that the need for new analytical distinctions
becomes manifest in specialized literature. Evidently, individuals are still being
socialized through cultural factors that shape their personality, but this socialization
operates in a social context in which culture plays an ever growing ambivalent role.
Culture is no longer the guarantee of a long-lasting agreement between actor and
society, as it was in culturally closed or isolated societies, but it appears instead as a
permanent agent of differentiation.
There is no clearer evidence of this inflexion than the progressive and often
surreptitious change of the analytical role given to socialization Through different
stages not only is the idea of the existence of a plurality of cultures at the core of a
single society acknowledged, but more importantly, due to the divergence of cultural
orientations socialization can no longer act as societys integrating pivot. A long
series of interpretations appeared over the last few decades: individuals, depending
on the groups they belong to, their subculture, generation or sex, do not interiorize
the same cultural models; all individuals, on the other hand, are not correctly
socialized; in a society there is a large number of possible conflicts of orientation
between purposes and the legitimate means. In sum, socialization is no longer an
exclusive integration principle, becoming a process that is subdued to social
antagonism.
A detailed presentation of this intellectual history would be very lengthy, but we shall
briefly evoke its analytical core: the growing exploration of socializations plural and
contradictory dimensions. In effect, whereas the acknowledgement of the diversity of
subcultures did not truly question the single nature of the socialization process, this
assumption has progressively been questioned. The true rupture was spurred by
Berger and Luckmann (1966) with their well-known distinction between primary
socialization (from early childhood) and the series of secondary socializations that all
individuals undergo throughout their lives. Socialization is no longer a single process
completed at the end of childhood, but an open and multiple reality instead. The time
individual forming process may become the true axis of sociological analysis.
The reason for the individual to acquire such a centrality lies in the fact that his or her
forming process allows us to describe a new way in which society is formed. The true
reason for the existence of this process is the entry into a new period of history and
society. It is because of the crisis of the idea of society that it is necessary to explain
social processes by looking for sociologys unity at its base, starting from the
bottom, that is, from the individuals, aiming to show other dimensions behind the
purpose of totalizing systemic conceptions. The challenge actually has a double
dimension. On the one hand, against the supporters of the notion of social character,
we must agree with current socialization and the ever greater need of a certain
sociological perspective. But on the other hand, now against the supporters of a
certain sociology of the individual, it is imperative to understand that the present
situation cannot be interpreted exclusively from the inevitable plurality of individual
dispositions, reducing sociology to the level of the sheer individual, or actually, to
cultural transmission and incorporation processes.
The reasons stated above lead us to place the individuation strategy at the center of
the study of the individual forming process, making it independent from works on
socialization. In effect, in the light of the present changes, we need to be able to
explain the individual forming processes on new bases. In this process, sociological
adaptations of psychological categories, such as the use of pathologies of the soul to
describe the present period (Lasch, 1999; Ehrenberg, 1998), the increase in
reflexivity
actually,
in
instrumental
cognitive
competencies
(Beck,
Beck-
socialization theories.
individuation theories (Martuccelli, 1999). How can this link be established on new
bases? As we shall propose, it can be established with a specific mechanism for the
study of individuation, through the notion of trial, with a specific version of the work
carried out by the individual to form into a subject.
more relevant; but in all cases trials will have a specific, distinctive form for each
society. In sum, describing the standardized system of individuation trials is
equivalent to describing a historic society in its unity. An individuation process will
only exist insofar as it is alive in the trial system that creates it.
The study of individuation by means of a standardized set of trials allows building an
analysis strategy capable of describing a social and historical whole based on
coordinates other than those proposed by the idea of society, and especially by the
theory of systems (Luhmann, 1995). In these later versions, as it is known, society
may no longer be described in a unitary way, nor can individuals be described from it,
as society is but a juxtaposition of autopoiesys systems without a central principle.
On the contrary, the standardized set of trials tries to describe, at the scale of the
individual, a historical society.
avoiding
the
direct
inference
of
microsocial
consequences
from
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standardized in modern societies (especially in regard to the bonds school-workfamily). But at the individual level, the inscription under personalized sets of trials is
the fruit of a markedly singular life path: stages that combine errors and successes,
fate and fortune, opportunities and dominations, accidents and conditionings. In this
sense, once more, there is no direct flow among levels. On the one hand, we need to
recognize and respect what appears as contingent at the level of a personal life (the
result of trials for each actor in the singularity of his or her personal experience), and
on the other hand, take into account the standardized social-chronological profile of
the series of trials at the level of society. Its resolution at the individual level will define
his or her individuation process.
Thus conceived, the notion of trial allows us to singularize the sociological analysis
without breaking away from a broad structural view. Indeed, the notion of trial
becomes relevant as it considers the differential resulting from interpersonal
variations. This differential would explain the fact that individuals with same resources
and similar social positions, confront trials in very different ways (Sen, 1992). In an
opposite sense, actors that have disadvantaged social positions from an objective
point of view may manifest, in subjective terms, experiences of greater personal
realization or control as shown, for example, in some studies in Chile regarding
womens experience (Guzmn et al, 1999). In sum, trial-based individuation explains
individual paths in social contexts that are marked by diverging tendencies that
simultaneously cause homogenization and differentiation.
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what that brings to the explanation of the actor's own path. More specifically, we face
the issue of finding out which analytical and conceptual tools will allow us to get closer
to the work of the individual, without psychologizing focusing on deepening our
studies on interiorization or inscription processes and without falling into a
normativism that applies notions produced for certain historical and social realities to
other realities e.g. turning personal autonomy and choice into a general model,, as
proposed in the individualization thesis (cf. for a review, Araujo, 2009a). In all cases, it
is imperative to break away from the sociological analysis tendency of leaving out of
the study the issue of the subject, in the precise sense of the term (Schimank,
Volkmann, 2007). How can we approach this dimension? How can we specifically
approach this work?
1. Subjectivation limits
The issue that we have presented is not new, having received special attention in
studies on the formation of the individual from different subjectivation perspectives.
Foucault (1975, 1976), for instance, emphasized that the subject is a product of power
mechanisms of institutional and discoursive nature. This production occurs by means
of various techniques, historically determined, that contribute to the main goal of
disciplination. Theoricists inspired in Lacans work (iek, 2001; Miller 2005) focused
on the transformations of the Symbolic, especially on its weakening, and on its effects
in the formation of subjects. As long as the subject is conceived as an effect of the
Symbolic (and maintained in the Symbolic, though stimulated by what is Real and
intertwined with the Imaginary), structural variations at this level are considered
directly responsible for the characteristics taken by subjectivities. Finally, the
contributions from a post-modern perspective or with a deconstructivist inspiration
(Butler 2001a, 2001b; Braidotti, 2000; Lyotard, 1979) have stressed on the nonidentical nature of the subject, conceived as a multiple flow in permanent movement,
responding with imitative processes to language games and identificatory offers. In
this view, the subjects movable and performing nature is highlighted.
In all the above important critical perspectives there is, however, a certain limitation.
For Foucault, the analysis is subordinated to an interpretation that assigns an
extremely broad power to historical-cultural production strategies in the formation of
subjectivities, generally placing the subject in a binary game frame, valid but extremely
12
13
14
the idea of the Self of each actor, that is, of the place from which we look at
ourselves in a way that we find ourselves kind, worthy of love (iek, 1992: 147).
Now, just as we cannot assume a linear and mechanical relation between action and
social ideal, neither can we do so in regard to social experiences. Social experiences
deliver the basic supplies for guiding oneself in the world because they contribute to
the interpretative work of the situations, and even more so because they help to
reestablish the context of possibilities and impossibilities from which the individual
may confront the different trials. But not all experiences have a similar weight for the
individuals, nor is each experience enough to guide their actions. What takes part in
guiding individual action are not social actions, but the knowledge about what is
social that is decanted from them.
While for social ideals it is essential to consider their inscription as mediation, when it
comes to experiences we need to take into account the filtering process they are
submitted to. The orientations taken by individual actions are the effect of multiple
and varied experiences. However, and given the profusion of these experiences and
the diversity of their incorporation modes, both conscious and unconscious, it is
impossible to turn this process into the core of the study as dispositional studies on
socialization would propose. Strictly speaking, it is the decantation of these multiple
experiences that will produce a knowledge about what is social, but what must draw
our attention is not the sedimentation of dispositions (that is, the accumulative history
of interiorization or inscription processes, as proposed by socialization), but the work
that from them, and thanks to particular ideals, the individual will carry out to become
a subject.
This way, and aiming to describe the work by which each individual becomes a
subject by confronting trials, we need to account for the simultaneous action of the
inscribed ideal and the social experience decanted into knowledge. The configuration
of the subject is a product of social experiences and of the action of ideals. This
duality explains, on the one hand, the provisional nature of the individual because of
being forced, by social experiences and by variations in the inscription of ideal, to
produce and reproduce the configuration work as a subject, On the other hand, it
accounts for the 'family atmosphere' maintained throughout time -as the ideals
inscribed in the ideal of the individual Self and the sedimentation of the experience
aim at a relative stability. The configuration of the subject is not crystallized, but it is
15
not open either to infinite modifications. In spite of its malleability, we must consider
the resistance of the material, made up by the footprints of experiences and the
action of the ideal. The configurations of the subject are contingent but not at
random, modifiable but not volatile, kaleidoscopic but not formless.
Ideals appropriate consciousness completely and they are not the basic material in
the production of the subject, since experiences, developed in a social world of
elastic consistency, support the function of social reproduction but also act as a
barrier to it. Individuals do not act purely according to the ideal, although their acts
cannot be interpreted as an automatic effect of social experience either. Social
experiences are not enough to explain individual paths, as they are not conformed in
a void, but produced in the horizon of the ideals. Incorporating the variability of
ideals, insisting in the fact that their efficiency depends on their inscription, and
attributing a significant role to social experiences, we can consider this proposal as a
valid option to grasp the individual beyond a normative interpretation, and conceive
the work of the individual in the individuation process as woven by social and
historical reality.
16
reach a dialog procedure. A dialog that is possible and productive, which is worth
highlighting, in the framework of the simultaneous and concrete study of a same
process.
Historically, the adaptation between the individual's ordinary forming process and the
subject's normative horizon was analyzed essentially through the articulation among
various socialization and subjectivation theories. The best efforts in the twentieth
century were marked by this attraction (especially in the articulations between the
works of Marx and Freud, in the framework of the Frankfurt School, or more recently in
the renewal of the discussion between sociologists and psychologists around the
pragmatism and the work by G. H. Mead). Facing the hegemony of this association,
the individuation perspective was not able to propose a sufficiently autonomous and
solid alternative.
What is needed in the following years, and following the crisis of the idea of society, is
to make of individuation the true axis of macrosociology's study, and to describe its
framework, the personalized formation processes of individuals into subjects.
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Received on 27.08.09
Approved on 20.10.09
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