Hemmings 2005 - Invoking Affect
Hemmings 2005 - Invoking Affect
Hemmings 2005 - Invoking Affect
INVOKING AFFECT
Clare Hemmings
To cite this article: Clare Hemmings (2005) INVOKING AFFECT, Cultural Studies, 19:5, 548-567,
DOI: 10.1080/09502380500365473
INVOKING AFFECT
This article interrogates the contemporary emergence of affect as critical object and
perspective through which to understand the social world and our place within it.
Emphasising the unexpected, the singular or the quirky over the generally
applicable, the turn to affect builds on important work in cultural studies on the
pitfalls of writing the body out of theory. More importantly for this article, the
contemporary interest in affect evidences a dissatisfaction with poststructuralist
approaches to power, framed as hegemonic in their negativity and insistence of
social structures rather than interpersonal relationships as formative of the subject.
The article focuses on the recent contributions of Brain Massumi and Eve Kosofsky
Sedgwick in particular, unpacking their celebration of the difference that affect
makes. The author’s critique of the affective turn focuses on both the illusion of
choice that it offers the cultural critic, and its rewriting of the recent history of
cultural theory to position affect as ‘the new cutting edge’. While affect may
constitute a valuable critical focus in context, it frequently emerges through a
circular logic designed to persuade ‘paranoid theorists’ into a more productive
frame of mind for who would not prefer affective freedom to social determinism?
/
Yet it remains unclear what role affect may have once this rhetoric has worked its
persuasive magic. In addition, and more worryingly, affective rewriting flattens
out poststructuralist inquiry by ignoring the counter-hegemonic contributions of
postcolonial and feminist theorists, only thereby positioning affect as ‘the answer’
to contemporary problems of cultural theory.
needs to be said about them? . . . You cannot read affects, you can only
experience them.
(O’Sullivan 2001, p. 126)
Introduction
In the article from which the above quotation is taken, Simon O’Sullivan
celebrates affects’ capacity to defy deconstruction, and the deconstructionist.
O’Sullivan is writing within the context of art history, where which he claims
that semiotic and deconstructivist approaches have become hegemonic, but he
is far from alone in embracing affect as offering a new critical trajectory for
cultural theory. While not really a school as such, a significant number of
disciplinary and interdisciplinary theorists are currently citing affect as the
privileged ‘way out’ of the perceived impasse in cultural studies. The impasse
needing to be resolved is by now a familiar one, which the attentions of affect
theorists have reshaped into three predominant concerns.
Firstly, post deconstruction we doubt the capacity of constructivist models
of the subject to account fully for our place in the world as individuals or
groups. In a general sense, this concern is indicated by the intensity of current
critical interest in psychoanalytic accounts of the subject, and in particular
Judith Butler’s development of psychoanalysis through her focus on subjection
(1997a). Theorists of affect argue that constructivist models leave out the
residue or excess that is not socially produced, and that constitutes the very
fabric of our being. Thus Brian Massumi (1996) insists that affect is important
to the extent that it is autonomous and outside social signification, and John
Bruns (2000) suggests that affect, and in particular laughter, foregrounds the
unexpected that throws us off balance, that unsettles us into becoming
someone other than who we currently are. Secondly, post deconstruction we
doubt the capacity of both quantitative empirical approaches and textual
analysis to account for the fullest resonance of the social world we wish to
understand. Advocates of affect offer it up as a way of deepening our vision of
the terrain we are studying, of allowing for and prioritizing its ‘texture’, in
Eve Sedgwick’s words (2003, p. 17). This texture refers to our qualitative
experience of the social world, to embodied experience that has the capacity to
transform as well as exceed social subjection. Queer theorists in particular
have taken up Sedgwick and Adam Frank’s (1995) emphasis on the
transformative capacities of shame, insisting that it should not be something
we strive simply to overcome by turning to its dependent opposite, pride.
Shame itself, as David Halperin (2002), Sally Munt (2000) and Elspeth Probyn
(2000) have all argued, has a resonance well beyond its homophobic
generation, enabling queer subjects both to identify the bodily resonances of
550 C U LT U R A L S T U D I E S
Affective territories
I began research for this article as a result of my frustration at seeing affect
mentioned or celebrated but rarely fully explained as either critical tool or
object. So I want to spend some time discussing what is actually meant by
affect. Affect broadly refers to states of being, rather than to their
manifestation or interpretation as emotions. For psychoanalysis affects are
‘the qualitative expression of our drives’ energy and variations’ (Giardini 1999,
p. 150), are what enable drives to be satisfied and what tie us to the world.
Unlike drives, affects can be transferred to a range of objects in order to be
satisfied (love may have many objects, for example), which makes them
adaptable in a way that drives are not. So, affect can enable the satisfaction of a
drive (excitement might prepare the body for the satisfaction of hunger) or
interrupt it (so that disgust might interrupt that satisfaction if you were served
552 C U LT U R A L S T U D I E S
a rotten egg to eat). Discontented by the way affects had been theorized only
in respect to drives, the influential psychologist Silvan Tomkins (1963) was the
first to suggest that they have a singularity that creates its own circuitry. Thus
affects may be autotelic (love being its own reward), or insatiable (where
jealousy or desire for revenge may last minutes or a lifetime). Tomkins’ work
suggests that affects have a complex, self-referential life that gives depth to
human existence through our relations with others and with ourselves.
In terms of our relations with others, Tomkins asked us to think of the
contagious nature of a yawn, smile or blush. It is transferred to others and
doubles back, increasing its original intensity. Affect can thus be said to place
the individual in a circuit of feeling and response, rather than opposition to
others. Further, Tomkins argues that we all develop complex affect theories as a
way of negotiating the social world as unique individuals. An affect theory is all
of our affective experiences to date that are remembered (or better, perhaps,
registered) in the moment of responding to a new situation, such that we keep
‘a trace, within [our] constitution’ of those experiences (Al-Saji 2000, p. 56).
For Tomkins, then, affect connects us to others, and provides the individual
with a way of narrating their own inner life (likes, dislikes, desires and
revulsions) to themselves and others. Thus one of the main reasons affect has
been taken up as the hopeful alternative to social determinism is its positioning
of the individual as possessing a degree of control over their future, rather than
as raw material responding rather passively to cognitive or learned phenomena.
Tomkins is joined by Gilles Deleuze to form an unlikely couple dominating
the contemporary affective imaginary of cultural theory. Deleuze (1997)
proposes affect as distinct from emotion, as bodily meaning that pierces social
interpretation, confounding its logic, and scrambling its expectations. In
contrast to Tomkins, who breaks down affect into a topography of myriad,
distinct parts, Deleuze understands affect as describing the passage from one
state to another, as an intensity characterized by an increase or decrease in
power (1997, p. 181). Deleuze takes two examples from his reading of T. E.
Lawrence’s experiences in the desert to illustrate the body’s capacity to
interrupt social logic. In both examples, he paraphrases Lawrence’s description
of violent events in the desert. The first is the grisly spectacle of ‘the gestures
of the dying, that attempt at raising their hands that makes all the agonizing
Turks ripple together, as if they had practiced the same theatrical gesture,
provoking Lawrence’s mad laughter’ (1997, p. 123). The second is Deleuze’s
account of Lawrence’s experience of being gang raped: ‘in the midst of his
tortures, an erection; even in the state of sludge, there are convulsions that jolt
the body’ (1997: 123). For Deleuze, both instances index the unpredictable
autonomy of the body’s encounter with the event, its shattering ability to go its
own way. In Deleuze’s account, Lawrence does experience shame, but not in
alignment with social prohibition, rather as a judgement on his body’s response
to rape: it is his erection that gives rise to shame. For Deleuze, one cannot do
INVOKING AFFECT 553
suspicion and exposure’ that is at once smug and sour, is not merely an
unattractive trait in a critical theorist, it also makes her or him ill equipped for
analysing contemporary social formations ‘in which visibility itself constitutes
much of the violence’ (2003, p. 140). In current global contexts where
violence is anything but hidden, is disconcertingly proud rather than covert,
Sedgwick asks ‘what use is paranoid theory?’ Part of what makes critical theory
so uninventive for Sedgwick is its privileging of the epistemological, since a
relentless attention to the structures of truth and knowledge obscures our
experience of those structures. She advocates instead a reparative return to the
ontological and intersubjective, to the surprising and enlivening texture of
individuality and community (2003, p. 17). Again following Tomkins,
Sedgwick rather provocatively invites us to consider affect as the key to that
texture, because of its capacity to link us creatively to others. I say
provocatively, because throughout her text, Sedgwick acknowledges that our
learned instinct as cultural theorists is to reject Tomkins for his insistence on
affect as innate. Indeed, this is precisely Sedgwick’s challenge do cultural
/
theorists shy away from affect à la Tomkins for any other reasons than its
essentialism? For Sedgwick, if the answer is ‘no’, as she assumes it is, the
554 C U LT U R A L S T U D I E S
combine these two critiques in their focus on the lived materiality of bodies.
Sedgwick and Massumi’s interest in affect must therefore be seen within the
context of broader challenges to poststructuralist approaches to language,
power and subjectivity, and particularly in line with the second trajectory
detailed here.
Critical chronologies
The critical narrative laid out above is not simply an abstract one; it takes
material form in academic and institutional contexts. In my own institutional
context, where I teach graduate students gender studies, the narrative is
precisely borne out. Each year it seems students grapple with poststructuralist
approaches only to return to the question of how this turn to language is
political. As with both critiques presented above, students identify the political
in an empirically available real world or in the body. Instead of deconstruction,
students are finding themselves drawn to social policy, development theory
and practice, or to psychoanalytic or affective approaches that reframe
questions of sexual and racial difference. What is of interest here, however,
and challenges a simple acceptance of this critical narrative, is that too
frequently such material or ontological judgement is made on the basis of
secondary reading that rejects poststructuralism as entirely rarefied and
/
In positing affect as the critical new for the noughts, both Sedgwick and
Massumi invariably overstate the problems of poststructuralism, as well as and
in order to herald affect’s unique capacity to resolve contemporary critical
dilemmas, much as advocates of poststructuralism overstated the ills of the
seventies and early eighties. In Touching Feeling, the weight of Sedgwick’s
dismissal of poststructuralist epistemology is carried by her reading of only two
texts: Judith Butler’s Gender Trouble and D. A. Miller’s The Novel and the Police.
Published in 1990 and 1988 respectively, despite the fact that both arguments
are ones that their authors have subsequently developed in different directions.
It seems odd to rest the case for needing new theoretical frameworks on texts
that have already prompted just such revisions from their authors, and indeed
that are either side of fifteen years old. Surely if the need for affect is so
urgently felt, the problem could be found in more contemporary texts?
Massumi’s dismissal of cultural theory rests on more slender evidence still. At
no point in Parables For the Virtual does Massumi engage directly with any of the
theorists responsible for what he insists is theory’s terrible state of critical
affairs, although the scattered but persistent references to ‘performance’ could
be taken as similarly implicating Butler. Instead of critical dialogue, Massumi
persuades his reader of the need for restorative attention to affect by
positioning him or her as a co-conspirator who already knows what the
problems of cultural theory are but just needs a little coaxing. Rather than
tracing the thinking of particular authors, Massumi objectifies critical thinking,
referring to it in the third person throughout. The following passage is typical:
Affective freedoms
As contemporary cultural theorists, both Sedgwick and Massumi know that
they cannot simply propose a return to ontological certainty in order to
alleviate the epistemological myopia they identify. For the critical chronology I
have been indicating to remain intact, affect must be both post biological
essentialism and post-epistemology. In this vein, Sedgwick and Massumi use
the notion of affect as free and autonomous respectively, to persuade cultural
theorists of the value of the untrammeled ontological. Sedgwick’s ‘reparative
return’ to the singularity of the ontological hinges on her argument that affect
is free from the constraints of both drives and social meaning. Following
Tomkins, Sedgwick (2003, p. 19) asserts that ‘affects can be, and are, attached
to things, people, ideas, sensations, relations, activities, ambitions, institu-
tions, and any number of other things, including other affects. Thus one can be
excited by anger, disgusted by shame, or surprised by joy’. On the one hand,
then, attention to affect will always be attention to everyday experience rather
than macro abstractions, and even more importantly for Sedgwick, affective
attachments will be unpredictable. Since affect is a ‘free radical’ that can attach
itself to anything, and since we create associations between feelings and
contexts that are unpredictable, ‘anyone’s character . . . is . . . a record of the
highly individual histories by which . . . fleeting emotion . . . has instituted far
more durable, structured changes’ (2003, p. 62) in the self and in
relationships. Sedgwick’s conclusion is that to collect these records would
be a cure of sorts for critical paranoia, creating both a different archive of
experience as well as a different theoretical paradigm. This freedom of affect
combines with its contagious nature, resulting in what Sedgwick understands as
its capacity to transform the self in relation to others.
It is certainly true that affect attaches all over the place. As Sedgwick
suggests, it is hard to think of an arena of life that is not suffused with affect.
However, there is a slippage here, too. Affect’s freedom of attachment, its
ability to attach to any object, becomes evidence, for Sedgwick, of our critical
freedom, should we but attend to its unfolding drama. For affective freedom
to equal critical freedom Sedgwick must insist that affect attaches randomly to
any object, despite the fact that even for her guide, Silvan Tomkins, affective
attachment frequently serves to satisfy drives or social norms. Sedgwick’s
argument (2002, p. 19) is that because affect can be surprising in its
attachments, as cultural theorists we have a duty to attend to the patterns and
effects of such surprise, rather than to the social frameworks that we already
know. The critique of Sedgwick’s insistence here takes two directions: firstly,
560 C U LT U R A L S T U D I E S
what might still be gained by a (healthy?) critical paranoia in tracing affect; and
secondly, which critics are able to turn their location into such celebratory
responsibility?
Let us pursue the example of disgust shame that Sedgwick takes as
/
Tomkins continues the story: the child realizes that it is him that the parent is
disgusted with and through identification with the parent, he becomes ashamed
of himself. So the child finds other objects to be disgusted of, the better to
reduce the likelihood of shame doubling back on him. But the possibility of shit
not being recoiled from if it were not innately disgusting, is only imagined
momentarily in this passage to be summarily dismissed by the insistence that ‘it
would still be relatively easy’ to teach this disgust anyway. Disgust at shit is
thus either innate or inevitable its randomness resides only in which object
/
its displacement will settle on. The scene is profoundly homosocial in that it is
the father’s recoil from the son here (all Tomkins’ children are little ‘heroes’)
that forms the pedagogic site. A father teaches his son by example that his
inevitable recoil from shit is natural. Indeed Tomkins’ book of negative affect
is bursting with children whose affective responses are bound by the early
contexts in which they learn the codes and practices of gender and sexuality. In
Tomkins’ shame-filled world, boys are instructed specifically not to cry like
girls, mumble, gesticulate when speaking, demonstrate enthusiasm in public or
eat like birds; in ways that suggest that no matter how expansive our capacity
to substitute objects of disgust at a later date, the primary affect these refer to
is either learned or if innate, reinforced in heteronormative scenes
/ /
(Berlant 1997). My point here is not that Sedgwick misses the heteronormative
regulation of affect, but that her awareness of this inattention is central to
how her affective logic functions. This logic is governed by three phrases: a.
Of course shame can be normative, but it can also be transformative; b. Shouldn’t we
attend to those transformative possibilities over and above normative ones? c. It is
INVOKING AFFECT 561
simply churlish to make a fuss. This grammar only works because of our
prior knowledge of Sedgwick’s work in a central rather than passing way we /
can trust that Sedgwick of all theorists has already factored power into
the equation. Thus in our own expectations, as in the critical chronology
discussed in the previous section, power belongs to the past, to the
already dealt with, allowing the future to emerge as the epoch of individual
difference.
Against this teleology of old power versus new freedom of choice I want to
continue by suggesting that only for certain subjects can affect be thought of as
attaching in an open way; others are so over-associated with affect that they
themselves are the object of affective transfer. In this vein, Jennifer Biddle
(1997, p. 231) insists that in matters of sexuality it is the woman who carries
the shame of gendered impropriety, and marks its limits: ‘It is, after all, the
prostitute who is shameless, but the gentleman, let us not forget, who is
discreet’. Such transferred affective attachments do not only pertain to gender
and sexuality, but also suffuse critical accounts of the process of affective
racialization. I am thinking here of Franz Fanon and Audre Lorde’s often cited
descriptions of other people’s affective response to their blackness. Fanon
remembers:
While the white boy’s fear, learned within a racist familial and social order,
can attach to an unknown black object, Fanon’s body is precisely not his own,
but is ‘sprawled out’ and ‘distorted’, presented to him via the white boy’s
affective response. Lorde similarly recalls her realization that it is her body that
is disgusting to a white woman sitting next to her on the bus:
When I look up the woman is still staring at me, her nose holes and eyes
huge. And suddenly I realise that there is nothing crawling up the seat
between us; it is me she doesn’t want her coat to touch. The fur brushes
past my face as she stands with a shudder and holds on to a strap in the
speeding train . . . Something’s going on here I do not understand, but I
will never forget it. Her eyes. The flared nostrils. The hate.
(1984, pp. 147 8) /
562 C U LT U R A L S T U D I E S
In discussing the same passage, Sara Ahmed argues that affect thus places
bodies in spatial relation along racially defined lines (2000, p. 85 6). In both
/
of these examples, it is the black body that carries the weight of, and is
suffused with, racial affect, as it is the female body that carries the burden of
the affects that maintain sexual difference in Biddle’s example above.
Biddle, Fanon and Lorde’s narratives testify to the argument that some
bodies are captured and held by affect’s structured precision. Not only, then,
is affect itself not random, nor is the ability to choose to imagine affect
otherwise. My concerns about the centring of the critic in affective discourse
come full circle. In the first instance, the need for a new theory of the
ontological requires displacing marginal theory and histories from a chronology
of cultural theory. Furthermore, the cultural critic has to evidence their desire
to move away from that imagined chronology by choosing choice. Yet, as I
have suggested, the autonomy of the critic to make such a choice is dependent
upon their being the subject rather than object of affective displacement. The
failure of some critics to ‘choose choice’ paradoxically becomes evidence of
their concomitant failure to relinquish an imagined history that they may
already have been erased from.
Affective autonomy
Placing affective attachment in the context of social narratives and power
relations as I have done above similarly runs counter to Massumi’s claim that
affect is critically useful because of its autonomy. For Massumi, the moment
that we ‘make sense’ of a state of being, or more properly becoming, we
freeze it, evacuating it of the very intensity that offered the capacity for
change. Thus:
that I began this article with, ‘you cannot read affects, you can only experience
them’ (2001, p. 126).
Massumi’s invocation to cultural critics to open themselves up to
something that cannot be read may strike us as odd. While many will concur
with Massumi’s scepticism of quantitative research in its inability to attend to
the particular, we are left with a riddle-like description of affect as something
scientists can detect the loss of (in the anomaly), social scientists and cultural
critics cannot interpret, but philosophers can imagine (2002, p. 17). How then
can we engage affect in light of the critical projects we are engaged in, or are
we to abandon the social sciences entirely? In fact, both Massumi and Sedgwick
are advocating a new academic attitude rather than a new method, an attitude
or faith in something other than the social and cultural, a faith in the wonders
that might emerge if we were not so attached to pragmatic negativity. Massumi
is thus suggesting not that we look for something outside culture, but that we
trust that there is something outside culture. This is a useful proposition only if
one’s academic project is to herald the death of the cultural turn, and a return
to the rigour of disciplinarity the visionary sciences, imaginative philosophy,
/
but precisely not the miserable social sciences or defeatist cultural studies.
Much seems to rest on Massumi’s understanding of affect as autonomous.
As befits his participation in a critical chronology departing from biological
essentialism in the first instance, Massumi is careful to note that affect ‘includes
social elements, but mixes them with elements according to different logic’
(1996, p. 223), taking them up as unfinished ‘tendencies . . . pastnesses opening
onto a future, but with no present to speak of’ (1996, p. 224). In making this
claim for affect its movement between past and future, never fixed in the
/
The mind begins by coldly and curiously regarding what the body does, it
is first of all a witness; then it is affected, it becomes an impassioned
witness, that is, it experiences for itself affects that are not simply effects
of the body, but veritable critical entities that hover over the body and
judge it.
(1997, p. 124)
Body and mind are thus linked but detached, potentially developing in
different directions, differently affected. But the mind is the witness to the
body, thus needing the body, while the reverse is not the case, and it is in that
sense that the body and the affects that it distributes are ‘asocial, but not
presocial’ for Massumi (1996, p. 223).
564 C U LT U R A L S T U D I E S
and influencing the individual’s capacity to act in the world. In this context,
reflective or political judgment provides an alternative to dominant social
norms, but not because of affective autonomy. This reading indicates a return
to Tomkins’ affect theory too, where it is the reinvigoration of previous
affective states and their effects, rather than affective freedom, that allow us to
make our bodies mean something that we recognize and value.
To return to my discussion of Fanon and Lorde, it is clear that racially
marked subject are not simply ‘sprawled out’ and ‘distorted’ (Fanon 1952, p.
80), but have a critical and affective life that resonates differently. So that over
time, Audre Lorde’s critical judgement of the ongoing spiral of smaller cycles
of shame in response to her body and to racism is of such intensity that she is
able to remake the relationship between her body, affect and judgement to
inflect the social world with other meanings. In The Cancer Journals, for
example, a text that is almost definitional in tracing maps of intensity that
fashion the individual other in relation to an other social world (1980), Lorde
does not need to think of affect as asocial in order for her investments in
survival to provide a different affective trajectory than the one that would deny
her subjectivity. Lorde reinvents her body as hers not theirs, a body connected
to other bodies by shared judgements of the social. Those judgements
constitute a political history that reshapes social meaning, creating recognizable
and intelligible alternatives to dominant signification. My critical response to
INVOKING AFFECT 565
Massumi and Sedgwick’s work on affect, then, is not one that rejects the
importance of affect for cultural theory. It is one that rejects the contemporary
fascination with affect as outside social meaning, as providing a break in both
the social and in critics’ engagements with the nature of the social. The
problems in Massumi and Sedgwick discussed in this article do not require a
wholesale rejection of affect’s relevance to cultural theory. Instead, affect
might in fact be valuable precisely to the extent that it is not autonomous.
Note
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