Subject Matter AND Applicability of General Rules: Rule 72

SUBJECT MATTER AND APPLICABILITY OF GENERAL RULES
RULE 72
SUBJECT MATTER
AND
APPLICABILITY OF
GENERAL RULES
ANG~CABRERA~CALDINO~CHUPUNGCO~JOSOL~MARAVILLA~SAGUINSIN~SAN JOSE~SUVA~TOLENTINO~TOLENTINO~UY
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS (SBCA, Monday Class) S.Y 2012-2013
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353

RUFINA LUY LIM vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 124715, January 24, 2000
BUENA, J.:
Digested By: Meric Suva
Facts:
Petitioner Rufina Luy Lim is the surviving spouse of late Pastor Y. Lim whose estate is the
subject of probate proceedings. Private respondents Auto Truck Corporation, Alliance Marketing
Corporation, Speed Distributing, Inc., Active Distributing, Inc. and Action Company are corporations
formed, organized and existing under Philippine laws and which owned real properties covered
under the Torrens system. Pastor Y. Lim died intestate.
Herein petitioner, as surviving spouse and duly represented by her nephew George Luy,
filed petition for the administration of the estate before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
Private respondent corporations, whose properties were included in the inventory of the estate of
Pastor Y. Lim, then filed a motion6 for the lifting of lis pendens and motion7 for exclusion of certain
properties from the estate of the decedent. The Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, sitting as a
probate court, granted the private respondents' twin motions. Subsequently, Rufina Luy Lim filed a
verified amended petition,which resulted to the reinstatement of the said properties back into the
estate of the deceased. The probate court appointed Rufina Lim as special administrator11 and
Miguel Lim and Lawyer Donald Lee, as co-special administrators of the estate of Pastor Y. Lim,
after which letters of administration were accordingly issued. In an order12 dated 12 September
1995, the probate court denied anew private respondents' motion for exclusion.
Private respondent filed a special civil action for certiorari14, with an urgent prayer for a
restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction, before the Court of Appeals questioning the
orders of the Regional Trial Court, sitting as a probate court. the Court of Appeals, finding in favor
of herein private respondents, rendered the assailed decision. Hence, the present petition.
Among other issues, it is being pondered upon on what court has jurisdiction over special
proceedings like the one present in the case at bar.
Issue:
Whether or not the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over a special proceeding lie the
present case.
Held:
YES, it has jurisdiction over such. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction
in all matters of probate, both testate and intestate, where the gross value of the estate exceeds
One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000) or, in probate matters in Metro Manila, where such
gross value exceeds Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000).
Also, Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions and probate proceedings, testate and
intestate, including the grant of provisional remedies in proper cases, where the value of the
personal property, estate or amount of the demand does not exceed One Hundred Thousand
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Pesos (P100,000) or, in Metro Manila where such personal property, estate or amount of the
demand does not exceed Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000), exclusive of interest,
damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs, the amount of which
must be specifically alleged, Provided, that interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's, litigation
expenses and costs shall be included in the determination of the filing fees, Provided further, that
where there are several claims or causes of actions between the same or different parties,
embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the claims in all
the causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of the same or different
transactions.
Simply put, the determination of which court exercises jurisdiction over matters of probate
depends upon the gross value of the estate of the decedent.
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PILAR S. VDA. DE MANALO, et. Al vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, et. al
G.R. NO. 129242, January 16, 2001
DE LEON JR., J.:
Facts:
Troadio Manalo died intestate and was survived by his wife, Pilar S. Manalo, and his
eleven (11) children, namely: Purita M. Jayme, Antonio Manalo, Milagros M. Terre, Belen M.
Orillano, Isabelita Manalo, Rosalina M. Acuin, Romeo Manalo, Roberto Manalo, Amalia Manalo,
Orlando Manalo and Imelda Manalo, who are all of legal age. At the time of his death, he left
several real properties located in Manila and in the province of Tarlac including a business under
the name and style Manalo's Machine Shop with offices at No. 19 Calavite Street, La Loma,
Quezon City and at NO. 45 General Tinio Street, Arty Subdivision, Valenzuela, Metro Manila.
Herein respondents, who are eight (8) of the surviving children of the late Troadio Manalo,
namely; Purita, Milagros, Belen Rocalina, Romeo, Roberto, Amalia, and Imelda filed a petition with
the respondent Regional Trial Court of Manila of the judicial settlement of the estate of their late
father, Troadio Manalo, and for the appointment of their brother, Romeo Manalo, as administrator
thereof.
The trial court issued an order setting the said petition for hearing on February 11, 1993
and directing the publication of the order for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation in Metro Manila, and further directing service by registered mail of the said order upon
the heirs named in the petition at their respective addresses mentioned therein.
On February 11, 1993, the date set for hearing of the petition, the trial court issued an
order 'declaring the whole world in default, except the government," and set the reception of
evidence of the petitioners. However, the trial court upon motion of set this order of general default
aside herein petitioners (oppositors therein) namely: Pilar S. Vda. De Manalo, Antonio, Isabelita
and Orlando who were granted then (10) days within which to file their opposition to the petition.
Several pleadings were subsequently filed by herein petitioners, through counsel,
culminating in the filling of an Omnibus Motion on July 23, 1993 seeking; (1) to seat aside and
reconsider the Order of the trial court dated July 9, 1993 which denied the motion for additional
extension of time file opposition; (2) to set for preliminary hearing their affirmative defenses as
grounds for dismissal of the case; (3) to declare that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over
the persons of the oppositors; and (4) for the immediate inhibition of the presiding judge.
The trial court denied the said motion. Herein petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the Court of Appeals. Finding the contentions untenable, the
Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari in its Resolution. The motion for
reconsideration of the said resolution was likewise dismissed. Hence, the present petition.
Herein petitioners argue that even if the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 were to be
considered as a special proceeding for the settlement of estate of a deceased person, Rule 16,
Section 1(j) of the Rules of Court vis--vis Article 222 of the Civil Code of the Philippines would
nevertheless apply as a ground for the dismissal of the same by virtue of Rule 1, Section 2 of the
Rules of Court which provides that the 'rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their
object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every
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action and proceedings.' Petitioners contend that the term "proceeding" is so broad that it must
necessarily include special proceedings.
Issue:
Whether or not Article 222 of the Civil Code applies as a condition precedent in a special
proceeding of settlement of a deceased persons estate.
Held:
NO, such cannot be applied as a condition precedent. The argument is misplaced. Herein
petitioners may not validly take refuge under the provisions of Rule 1, Section 2, of the Rules of
Court to justify the invocation of Article 222 of the Civil Code of the Philippines for the dismissal of
the petition for settlement of the estate of the deceased Troadio Manalo inasmuch as the latter
provision is clear enough.
The above-quoted provision of the law is applicable only to ordinary civil actions. This is
clear from the term 'suit' that it refers to an action by one person or persons against another or
other in a court of justice in which the plaintiff pursues the remedy which the law affords him for the
redress of an injury or the enforcement of a right, whether at law or in equity. A civil action is thus
an action filed in a court of justice, whereby a party sues another for the enforcement of a right, or
the prevention or redress of a wrong.
It must be emphasized that the oppositors (herein petitioners) are not being sued in SP.
PROC. No. 92-63626 for any cause of action as in fact no defendant was imploded therein. The
Petition for issuance of letters of Administration, Settlement and Distribution of Estate in SP. PROC.
No. 92-63626 is a special proceeding and, as such, it is a remedy whereby the petitioners therein
seek to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. the petitioners therein (private respondents
herein) merely seek to establish the fact of death of their father and subsequently to be duly
recognized as among the heirs of the said deceased so that they can validly exercise their right to
participate in the settlement and liquidation of the estate of the decedent consistent with the limited
and special jurisdiction of the probate court.
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PATRICIA NATCHER vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 133000, October 2, 2001
BUENA, J.:
Facts:
Spouses Graciano del Rosario and Graciana Esguerra were registered owners of a parcel
of land. Upon the death of Graciana, Graciano, together with his six children, namely: Bayani,
Ricardo, Rafael, Leticia, Emiliana and Nieves, entered into an extrajudicial settlement of Gracianas
estate adjudicating and dividing among themselves the real property.
Further, said heirs executed and forged an Agreement of Consolidation-Subdivision of
Real Property with Waiver of Rights where they subdivided among themselves the parcel of land
into several lots. Graciano then donated to his children, share and share alike. Subsequently, the
land was further subdivided into two separate lots. Eventually, Graciano sold the first lot[2] to a third
person but retained ownership over the second lot.
Graciano married herein petitioner Patricia Natcher. During their marriage, Graciano sold
the land covered by TCT No. 107443 to his wife Patricia as a result of which TCT No. 186059 was
issued in the latters name. On 07 October 1985, Graciano died leaving his second wife Patricia
and his six children by his first marriage, as heirs.
In a complaint, it is alleged that upon Gracianos death, petitioner Natcher, through the
employment of fraud, misrepresentation and forgery, acquired TCT No. 107443, by making it
appear that Graciano executed a Deed of Sale in favor of herein petitioner resulting in the
cancellation of TCT No. 107443 and the issuance of TCT No. 186059 in the name of Patricia
Natcher.
In her answer, petitioner Natcher averred that she was legally married to Graciano and
thus, under the law, she was likewise considered a compulsory heir of the latter. Petitioner further
alleged that during Gracianos lifetime, Graciano already distributed, in advance, properties to his
children, hence, herein private respondents may not anymore claim against Gracianos estate or
against herein petitioners property.
Issue:
May a RTC, acting as a court of general jurisdiction in an action for reconveyance and
annulment of title with damages, adjudicate matters relating to the settlement of the estate of a
deceased person particularly in questions as to advancement of property made by the decedent to
any of the heirs?
Held:
NO. An action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is a civil action,
whereas matters relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased person such as advancement of
property made by the decedent, partake of the nature of a special proceeding, which concomitantly
requires the application of specific rules as provided for in the Rules of Court.
Clearly, matters which involve settlement and distribution of the estate of the decedent fall
within the exclusive province of the probate court in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction.
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Corollarily, the RTC in the instant case, acting in its general jurisdiction, is devoid of
authority to render an adjudication and resolve the issue of advancement of the real property in
favor of herein petitioner Natcher, inasmuch as Civil Case No. 71075 for reconveyance and
annulment of title with damages is not, to our mind, the proper vehicle to thresh out said question.
Moreover, under the present circumstances, the RTC was not properly constituted as a probate
court so as to validly pass upon the question of advancement made by the decedent Graciano Del
Rosario to his wife, herein petitioner Natcher.
At this point, the appellate courts disquisition is elucidating: Before a court can make a
partition and distribution of the estate of a deceased, it must first settle the estate in a special
proceeding instituted for the purpose. In the case at hand, the court a quo determined the
respective legitimes of the plaintiffs-appellants and assigned the subject property owned by the
estate of the deceased to defendant-appellee without observing the proper proceedings provided
(for) by the Rules of Court. From the aforecited discussions, it is clear that trial courts trying an
ordinary action cannot resolve to perform acts pertaining to a special proceeding because it is
subject to specific prescribed rules. Thus, the court a quo erred in regarding the subject property
as an advance inheritance.
Analogously, in a train of decisions, this Court has consistently enunciated the long
standing principle that although generally, a probate court may not decide a question of title or
ownership, yet if the interested parties are all heirs, or the question is one of collation or
advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the
rights of third parties are not impaired, then the probate court is competent to decide the question
of ownership.
A perusal of the records, specifically the antecedents and proceedings in the present case,
reveals that the trial court failed to observe established rules of procedure governing the settlement
of the estate of Graciano Del Rosario. This Court sees no cogent reason to sanction the nonobservance of these well-entrenched rules and hereby holds that under the prevailing
circumstances, a probate court, in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction, is indeed the best forum to
ventilate and adjudge the issue of advancement as well as other related matters involving the
settlement of Graciano Del Rosarios estate.
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ERLINDA AGAPAY VS. CARLINA (CORNELIA) PALANG AND HERMINIA DELA CRUZ
G.R. No. 116668, July 28, 1997
ROMERO, J.:
Facts:
Miguel Palang contracted his first marriage on July 16, 1949 when he took private
respondent Carlina (or Cornelia) Vallesterol as a wife at the Pozorrubio Roman Catholic Church. A
few months after the wedding, he left to work in Hawaii. Miguel and Carlinas only child, Herminia
Palang, was born on May 12, 1950. The trial court found evident that as early as 1957, Miguel
attempted to Divorce Carlina in Hawaii. When he returned for good in 1972, he refused to lived
with Carlina and stayed alone in a house in Pozzorubio Pangasinan.
The sixty-three (63) year old Miguel contracted a subsequent marriage with nineteen (19)
year old Erlinda Agapay, herein petitioner. Two (2) months earlier, they jointly purchased a parcel
of agricultural land located at Binalonan Pangasinan. A house and lot in the same place was
likewise purchased. On the other hand, Miguel and Carlina executed a Deed of Donation as a
form of compromise agreement and agreed to donate their conjugal property consisting of six (6)
parcels of land to their child Herminia. Miguel and Erlindas cohabitation produced a son named
Kristopher. In 1979, they were convicted of concubinage upon Carlinas complaint. 2 years later,
Miguel died. Carlina and her daughter instituted this case for recovery of ownership and
possession with damages against petitioner. They sought to get back the land and the house and
lot located at Binalonan allegedly purchase by Miguel during his cohabitation with petitioner.
Issue:
Whether the agricultural land and the house and lot should be awarded in favor of Erlinda
Agapay.
Held:
No. The sale of the riceland on May 17, 1973, was made in favor of Miguel and Erlinda.
However, their marriage is void because of the subsisting marriage with Carlina. Only the
properties acquired by both parties through their actual joint contribution shall be owned by them in
proportion to their respective contributions. If actual contribution is not proved, there will be no coownership and no presumption of equal shares. Erlinda established in her testimony that she was
engaged in the business of buy and sell and had a sari-sari store. However, she failed to persuade
the court that she actually contributed money to but the subjected rice land. Considering his
youthfulness, it is unrealistic how she could have contributed the P3,750 as her share. Thus, the
court finds no basis to justify the co-ownership with Miguel over the same. Hence, the Riceland
should, as correctly held by CA, revert to the conjugal partnership property of the deceased and
Carlina.
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DR. OLIVIA S. PASCUAL, et al vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 120575, December 16, 1998
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Facts:
Don Andres Pascual died intestate on October 12, 1973 and was survived by his widow
and other relatives. On December 11, 1973, Doa Adela (the surviving spouse) filed with the then
CFI of Pasig, Rizal, a petition for letters of administration over the estate of her husband and was
thus appointed by the court. To assist her with said proceedings, Doa Adela hired Atty. Jesus I.
Santos, herein private respondent, as her counsel for a fee equivalent to fifteen (15) percent of the
gross estate of the decedent.
On August 18, 1987, while the settlement was still pending, Doa Adela died, leaving a will
which named the petitioner as the sole universal heir. The latter filed at the Regional Trial Court of
Malabon, Branch 72, a petition for the probate of said will.
Six years after Doa Adela's death, on January 19, 1994, to be exact, Judge Padolina
rendered a Decision which disposed as follows:
One-fourth (1/4) of the properties, personal and real, to the heirs of Don Andres Pascual in
accordance with the provisions of the Compromise Agreement of October 16, 1985.
Three-fourths (3/4) of the properties personal and real to the estate of Doa Adela
Soldevilla Pascual. In accordance with the Compromise Agreement of October 16, 1985.
After said Decision had become final and executory, the private respondent filed on March
25, 1994 a Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Execution insofar as the payment of his attorney's
fees was concerned. Despite opposition from the petitioner, the motion was granted in the April 19,
1994 Order of the intestate court, directing "the issuance of a writ of execution in the partial amount
of P2,000,000.00 in favor of movant, Atty. Jose I. Santos to be implemented against the 3/4 share
of Doa Adela S. Pascual, upon payment by the movant of the prescribed docket fees for the said
partial amount.
Two days later, petitioner moved for the reconsideration and the quashal of the Writ of
Execution which was denied. Petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a petition for
annulment of the award of attorney's fees but was also dismissed.
Issues: 1. Whether or not the trial court have jurisdiction to make the questioned award of
attorney's fees.
2. Whether or not there were factual bases for the awared of attorney's fees.
Held:
1. Yes. Petitioner insistently argues that the January 19, 1994 RTC Decision, insofar as it
awarded attorney's fees, was void from the beginning because the intestate court had lost
jurisdiction over the person of Doa Adela (the attorney's client) due to her death.
The argument is untenable. The basic flaw in the argument is the misapplication of the
rules on the extinction of a civil action 19 in special proceeding. The death of Doa Adela did not
ipso facto extinguish the monetary claim of private respondent or require him to refile his claim with
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the court hearing the settlement of her testate estate. Had her filed the claim against Doa Adela
personally, the rule would have applied. However, he did so against the estate of Don Andres.
Thus, where an appointed administrator dies, the applicable rule is Section 2, Rule 82 of
the Rules of Court, which requires the appointment of a new administrator. The rule does not have
the effect of divesting the instance court of jurisdiction. Its jurisdiction subsists because the proper
party in this case is the estate of Don Andres, which is distinct and separate from that of Doa
Adela who merely served as the former's administratrix. Doa Adela was merely a representative
party. And the claim was an item of the administrative expenses of Don Andres' estate. It is wellsettled that a monetary claim against the person administering an estate, in relation to his or her
acts of administration, in its ordinary course, can be filed at the court where a special proceeding
for the settlement of the estate is pending.
Hence, in spite of the death of the appointed administratrix, it was the duty of the intestate
court to determine whether the private respondent's claim was allowable as administrative expense
if it was obtained in reference to the management of the estate; the performance of legal
services which the administratrix herself could not perform; the prosecution or defense of actions or
suits on behalf of or against the estate; or the discovery, recovery or preservation of properties of
the estate.
2. Yes. The legal and factual bases of the award were stated in the body of the January 19,
1994 RTC Decision. In recounting the "significant events leading to [the] eventual culmination" of
the case, the trial court revealed the importance of the services of private respondent who
represented the estate, argued for the intestate court's approval of the Compromise Agreement,
and rendered legal advice on the final distribution of the properties of the estate.
One must also consider that, unlike in the cases cited by petitioner, the awards of
attorney's fees herein is not in the concept of damages based on Article 2208 of the Civil Code
which, as an exception to the general rule not to impose a penalty on the right to litigate, is but a
compensation for services rendered. Thus, the legal proceedings that took place and the
agreement between attorneys and client were more than sufficient proof of the legality of the
award. These factual and legal bases, unlike in cases where attorney's fees are granted in the
concept of damages, are not unknown to the parties in the case at bar.
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NATIVIDAD P. NAZARENO, MAXIMINO P. NAZARENO, JR. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ESTATE
OF MAXIMINO A. NAZARENO, SR., ROMEO P. NAZARENO and ELIZA NAZARENO
G.R. No. 138842, October 18, 2000
MENDOZA, J.:
Facts:
Maximino Nazareno, Sr. and Aurea Poblete were husband and wife. Aurea died on April
15, 1970, while Maximino, Sr. died on December 18, 1980.They had five children, namely,
Natividad, Romeo, Jose, Pacifico, and Maximino, Jr. Natividad and Maximino, Jr. are petitioners in
this case, while the estate of Maximino, Sr., Romeo, and his wife Eliza Nazareno are the
respondents.
After the death of Maximino, Sr., Romeo filed an intestate case and was appointed
administrator of his father's estate.In the course of the intestate proceedings, Romeo discovered
that his parents had executed several deeds of sale conveying a number of real properties in favor
of his sister, Natividad.
One of the deeds involved six lots in Quezon City which were allegedly sold by Maximino,
Sr., with the consent of Aurea, to Natividad on January 29, 1970. By virtue of these deeds, TCTs
were issued to Natividad for lots 3-B, 3, 10, 11, 13 & 14
Unknown to Romeo, Natividad sold Lot 3-B, w/c had been occupied by Romeo, his wife, &
Maximino, Jr., to Maximino, Jr.Romeo filed the present case for annulment of sale w/ damages
against Natividad & Maximino Jr. on the ground that both sales were void for lack of consideration.
Romeo presented the Deed of Partition & Distribution executed by Maximino Sr. & Aurea in 1962 &
duly signed by all of their children, except Jose, who was then abroad. However, this deed was not
carried out. In 1969, their parents instead offered to sell to them the lots. He testified that, although
the deeds of sale executed by his parents in their favor stated that the sale was for a consideration,
they never really paid any amount for the supposed sale. The transfer was made in this manner in
order to avoid the payment of inheritance taxes.
Allegedly, it was only Natividad who bought the lots in question because she was the only
one financially able to do so. The trial court rendered a decision declaring the nullity of the Deed of
Sale dated January 29, 1970, except as to Lots 3, 3-B, 13 and 14 which had passed on to third
persons.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the decision of the trial court was modified in the sense
that titles to Lot 3 (in the name of Romeo Nazareno) and Lot 3-B (in the name of Maximino
Nazareno, Jr.), as well as to Lots 10 and 11 were cancelled and ordered restored to the estate of
Maximino Nazareno, Sr. Hence, the present petition.
Petitioners argue that the deed of absolute sale executed by the deceased spouses in
favor of Natividad should be upheld & make capital of the fact that in a CA case w/c was declared
final by the SC, the CA upheld the right of Maximino, Jr. to recover possession of Lot 3-B.
Issue:
Whether the judgment in the previous CA case upholding the rt of Maximino Jr to recover
possession of Lot 3-B binds the estate of Maximino Sr.
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Held:
No. That case was for recovery of possession based on ownership of Lot 3-B. The parties
in that case were Maximino, Jr., as plaintiff, and the spouses Romeo and Eliza, as defendants. On
the other hand, the parties in the present case for annulment of sale are the estate of Maximino,
Sr., as plaintiff, and Natividad and Maximino, Jr., as defendants. Romeo and Eliza were named
third-party defendants after a third-party complaint was filed by Natividad and Maximino, Jr. As
already stated, however, this third-party complaint concerned Lot 3, and not Lot 3-B.
The estate of a deceased person is a juridical entity that has a personality of its own.
Though Romeo represented at one time the estate of Maximino, Sr., the latter has a separate and
distinct personality from the former. Hence, the judgment in the CA case regarding the ownership
of Maximino, Jr. over Lot 3-B binds Romeo and Eliza only, and not the estate of Maximino, Sr.,
which also has a right to recover properties which were wrongfully disposed.
Furthermore, Natividad's title was clearly not an issue in the first case. In other words, the
title to the other five lots subject of the present deed of sale was not in issue in that case. If the first
case resolved anything, it was the ownership of Maximino, Jr. over Lot 3-B alone.
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ANGEL T. LIMJOCO vs. INTESTATE ESTATE OF PEDRO O. FRAGRANTE
G.R. No. L-770, April 27, 1948
HILADO, J.:
Facts:
Pedro Fragante applied for a certificate of public convenience with the Public Service
Commission to install, maintain and operate an ice plant. However, he died pending the
application. Under the provisions of section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, a certificate of
public convenience was issued to the Intestate Estate of the deceased Pedro Fragante, authorizing
said Intestate Estate through its Special or Judicial Administrator, appointed by the proper court of
competent jurisdiction, to maintain and operate an ice plant and to sell the ice produced from said
plant in the said Municipality of San Juan and in the Municipality of Mandaluyong, Rizal, and in
Quezon City Hence, he was substituted by his legal representative.
Limjoco opposed the said grant. He contends that it was error on the part of the
commission to allow the substitution of the legal representative of the estate of Pedro O. Fragante
for the latter as party applicant in the case then pending before the commission, and in
subsequently granting to said estate the certificate applied for, which is said to be in contravention
of law.
Issue: Whether or not the legal representative of the deceased may replace him in the aplication
for a certificate of public convenience.
Held:
Yes. Unless otherwise expressly provided by law, any action affecting the property or rights
of a deceased person which may be brought by or against him if he were alive, may likewise be
instituted and prosecuted by or against the administrator, unless the action is for recovery of
money, debt or interest thereon, or unless, by its very nature, it cannot survive, because death
extinguishes the right.
It is true that a proceeding upon the application for a certificate of public convenience
before the Public Service Commission is not an "action". But the foregoing provisions and citations
go to prove that the decedent's rights which by their nature are not extinguished by death go to
make up a part and parcel of the assets of his estate which, being placed under the control and
management of the executor or administrator, ca not be exercised but by him in representation of
the estate for the benefit of the creditors, devisees or legatees, if any, and the heirs of the
decedent. And if the right involved happens to consist in the prosecution of an unfinished
proceeding upon an application for a certificate of public convenience of the deceased before the
Public Service Commission, it is but logical that the legal representative be empowered and
entitled in behalf of the estate to make the right effective in that proceeding.
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ANGELA RODRIGUEZ v. HON. JUAN DE BORJA
G.R. No. L-21993, June 21, 1966
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Facts:
Intestate proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Rizal was filed at 8:00 AM on March
12, 1963 while the petition for probate was filed in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan at 11:00
AM on the same date. Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss contending that the latter court has no
jurisdiction to entertain the petition for probate. Said court denied the motion to dismiss on the
ground that a difference of a few hours did not entitle one proceeding to preference over the other;
that, as early as March 7, movants were aware of the existence of the purported will of Father
Rodriguez, deposited in the Court of Bulacan, since they filed a petition to examine the same; and
that movants clearly filed the intestate proceedings in Rizal for no other purpose than to prevent
the Court of Bulacan from exercising jurisdiction over the probate proceedings.
Issue:
Whether the Court of First Instance of Bulacan has jurisdiction over the proceeding
Held:
Yes. The jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan became vested upon the
delivery thereto of the will of the late Father Rodriguez on March 4, 1963, even if no petition for its
allowance was filed until later, because upon the will being deposited the court could, motu proprio,
have taken steps to fix the time and place for proving the will, and issued the corresponding notices
conformably to what is prescribed by section 3, Rule 76, of the Revised Rules of Court.
As ruled in previous decisions, the power to settle decedent's estates is conferred by law
upon all courts of first instance, and domicile of the testator only affects the venue but not the
jurisdiction of the Court.
The estate proceedings having been initiated in the Bulacan Court of First Instance ahead
of any other, that court is entitled to assume jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts, even if it
were a case of wrong venue, by express provisions of Rule 73 of the Rules of Court.
In our system of civil law, intestate succession is only subsidiary or subordinate to the
testate, since intestacy takes place only in the absence of a valid operative will. Therefore, as ruled
in Castro, et al vs. Martinez, 10 Phil. 307, "only after final decision as to the nullity of testate
succession could an intestate succession be instituted in the form of pre-established action." The
institution of intestacy proceedings in Rizal may not thus proceed while the probate of the
purported will of Father Rodriguez is pending.
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366

Subject Matter AND Applicability of General Rules: Rule 72

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SUBJECT MATTER AND APPLICABILITY OF GENERAL RULES