Rule 73: Venue AND Process

VENUE AND PROCESS
RULE 73
VENUE
AND
PROCESS
ANG~CABRERA~CALDINO~CHUPUNGCO~JOSOL~MARAVILLA~SAGUINSIN~SAN JOSE~SUVA~TOLENTINO~TOLENTINO~UY
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS (SBCA, Monday Class) S.Y 2012-2013
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VENUE AND PROCESS

LIM vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 112229, March 18, 1997
Digested by: Chupungco, Aulaire R.
FACTS: The case is a complaint filed by Maribel Cruz for child support on behalf of her daughter
Joanna Rose against Raymond who, Maribel claims, is Joannas father.
In 1978, Maribel was a part-time student who also worked as a receptionist at Tonight's Club along
Roxas Blvd., Manila where she met Raymond. Petitioner wooed her and she reciprocated his love.
They soon lived together, with Raymond paying the rentals. In July 1981, Maribel left for Japan,
already pregnant that time, and returned to Manila thereafter. The couple never married because
petitioner claimed that he was not financially stable. On January 17, 1982, Maribel gave birth to
their daughter at the Cardinal Santos Memorial Hospital. The bills for Maribel's three-day
confinement at the hospital were paid for by Raymond and he also caused the registration of the
name Joanna Rose C. Pe Lim on the child's birth certificate. After Joanna Rose's birth, the love
affair between Maribel and Raymond continued. Towards the latter part of 1983, Maribel noted
that petitioner's feelings toward her started to wane. He subsequently abandoned her and Joanna
Rose. Maribel tried to support herself but it was never enough. She asked petitioner for support
but, despite promises to do so, it was never given.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is clear and convincing proof that Raymond is the father of Joanna
HELD: Yes. Petitioner has never controverted the evidence on record. His love letters to Maribel
vowing to be a good father to Joanna Rose, pictures of himself on various occasions cuddling
Joanna Rose and the Certificate of Live Birth say it all.
In Alberto v. Court of Appeals, we said:
"When a putative father manifests openly through words and deeds his recognition of a
child, the courts can do no less than confirm said acknowledgment. As the immortal bard
Shakespeare perspicaciously said: 'Let your own discretion be your tutor; suit the action to
the word, the word to the action."
Furthermore, Article 172 of the Family Code adopts the rule in Article 283 of the Civil Code that
filiation may be proven by "any evidence or proof that the defendant is his father."
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HEIRS OF SPOUSES SANDEJAS vs. LINA
G.R. No. 141634; February 5, 2001
Ponente: Panganiban, J
FACTS: On February 17, 1981, Eliodoro Sandejas, Sr. filed a petition praying that letters of
administration be issued in his favor for the settlement of the estate of his late wife, Remedios. A
Letter of Administration was issued and he thereby took his oath as administrator.
On November 19, 1981, the 4th floor of Manila City Hall was burned and the records of the case
was included. Sandejas, Sr. then filed for the reconstitution of the records and the same was
granted.
On April 19, 1983, Respondent Lina filed an Omnibus Pleading for motion to intervene and petitionin-intervention alleging among others that on June 7, 1982, Sandejas, in his capacity as seller,
bound and obligated himself, his heirs, administrators, and assigns, to sell forever and absolutely
and in their entirety the parcels of land which formed part of the estate of his late spouse. This was
evidenced by a Receipt of the earnest money with promise to sell and to buy.
The lower court granted Lina's motion. On January 7, 1985, the counsel for Sandejas filed a
manifestation alleging, among others, that administrator Sandejas, died sometime in November
1984 in Canada. He also alleged, among others that the matter of the claim of Lina becomes a
money claim to be filed in the estate of the late Mr. Eliodoro P. Sandejas Thereafter, the lower court
issued an order directing, among others, that the counsel for the heirs of Teresita R. Sandejas
move for the appointment of a new administrator within 15 days from receipt.
ISSUE: Whether or not jurisdiction over ordinary civil action seeking not merely to enforce a sale
but to compel performance of a contract falls upon a civil court?
HELD: No. The court held that Section 8 of Rule 89 allows this action to proceed. The factual
differences alleged by petitioners have no bearing on the intestate court's jurisdiction over the
approval of the subject conditional sale. Probate jurisdiction covers all matters relating to the
settlement of estates (Rules 74 & 86-91) and the probate of wills (Rules 75-77) of deceased
persons, including the appointment and the removal of administrators and executors (Rules 78-85).
It also extends to matters incidental and collateral to the exercise of a probate court's recognized
powers such as selling, mortgaging or otherwise encumbering realty belonging to the estate.
Indeed, the rules on this point are intended to settle the estate in a speedy manner, so that the
benefits that may flow from such settlement may be immediately enjoyed by the heirs and the
beneficiaries.
In the present case, the Motion for Approval was meant to settle the decedent's obligation to
respondent; hence, that obligation clearly falls under the jurisdiction of the settlement court. To
require respondent to file a separate action -- on whether petitioners should convey the title to
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Eliodoro Sr.'s share of the disputed realty -- will unnecessarily prolong the settlement of the
intestate estates of the deceased spouses.
The suspensive condition did not reduce the conditional sale between Eliodoro Sr. and respondent
to one that was "not a definite, clear and absolute document of sale," as contended by petitioners.
Upon the occurrence of the condition, the conditional sale became a reciprocally demandable
obligation that is binding upon the parties.That Acebedo case also involved a conditional sale of
real property proves that the existence of the suspensive condition did not remove that property
from the jurisdiction of the intestate court.
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BARRETTO REALTY DEVELOPMENT INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-62431-33, August 31, 1984
Ponente: Gutierrez, Jr. J
FACTS: A petition for probate of Nicolai Drepins holographic will was initiated after his death.
Drepin left several parcels of land and the only way to pay the creditors claims is to sell the same.
During Drepins lifetime, a total of 80 hectares had been sold to Moslares. However, it was not
registered yet until the balance of the purchase price has been paid. Subsequently, Moslares and
Drepin entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) which listed Drepin as the registered owner of
the lots and denominated Moslares as developer tasked with the conversion of the lands into a
residential subdivision. Before the JVA could be implemented, Drepin died.
Moslares intimated with the court that he was already the owner of the lots and proposed that he
be permitted to pay the balance on the sale with mortgage in accordance with the terms of his
written proposal. The court granted the same.
Moslares was not able to pay on time, so the probate court issued an order authorizing the
administrator to enter into an agreement with any party interested in buying the properties of the
estate in order to pay Drepins creditors. Moslares filed a motion for reconsideration which was
denied. The lots were subsequently sold to Pio Barretto Realty. Moslares filed an Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration which was again denied. He then filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of
Appeals which issued a temporary restraining in his favor.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent judge acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion in refusing to exclude the subject parcels of land?
HELD: No. The Court held that even with such presumption and refusal, the respondent court still
acted within its jurisdiction and not with grave abuse of discretion. After all, the jurisprudence and
rule are both to the effect that the probate court "may" provisionally pass upon the question of
exclusion, not "should". The obvious reason is the probate court's limited jurisdiction and the
principle that questions of title or ownership, which result to inclusion in or exclusion from the
inventory of the property, can only be settled in a separate action. Hence, even if respondent court
presumed the way that the properties sold by Drepin to petitioner were part of Drepin's estate, that
would not prevent nor defeat petitioner's remedy in a separate suit. Consequently, in reviewing the
exercise of such limited probate jurisdiction, the Court cannot order an unqualified and unqualified
and final exclusion of the properties involved, as prayed for; to do so would expand the probate
court's jurisdiction beyond the perimeters set by law and jurisprudence.
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