James Robert Bailey v. Bill Wilson Gale A. Norton, General of The State of Colorado, 10 F.3d 810, 10th Cir. (1993)
James Robert Bailey v. Bill Wilson Gale A. Norton, General of The State of Colorado, 10 F.3d 810, 10th Cir. (1993)
James Robert Bailey v. Bill Wilson Gale A. Norton, General of The State of Colorado, 10 F.3d 810, 10th Cir. (1993)
3d 810
NOTICE: Although citation of unpublished opinions remains unfavored,
unpublished opinions may now be cited if the opinion has persuasive value on a
material issue, and a copy is attached to the citing document or, if cited in oral
argument, copies are furnished to the Court and all parties. See General Order of
November 29, 1993, suspending 10th Cir. Rule 36.3 until December 31, 1995, or
further order.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination
of this appeal. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. Therefore, the case
is ordered submitted without oral argument.
for a writ of certiorari in the Colorado Supreme Court and was denied the writ.
3
Subsequently, on March 18, 1993, Bailey filed two 2254 petitions for habeas
corpus in the District Court for the District of Colorado. Because the petitions
attacked the same conviction and included overlapping issues, the district court
consolidated them. Bailey sought relief on the following grounds: 1) that he
was denied his right to a speedy trial; 2) that his guilty plea was unknowing,
involuntary, and without a factual basis; 3) that discrepancies in the case record
regarding certain evidence denied him due process, undermined his ability to
represent himself, forced him to plead guilty, and prevented effective appellate
review; and 4) that he was denied the right to appeal in the state courts,
including a denial of access to the trial record and appellate counsel. The first
three issues were raised in Bailey's attempt to directly appeal his conviction in
the Colorado courts. Bailey has never before raised the fourth issue in a
Colorado court.
The district court adopted the findings of Magistrate Judge Borchers that all of
Bailey's claims are unexhausted and thus should be dismissed. The magistrate
found that all of Bailey's claims should have been raised in the Colorado courts
pursuant to the Colo.R.Crim.P. 35(c) process. Bailey has never attempted to
obtain relief through Rule 35(c).
We agree with the district court and magistrate that Bailey has failed to exhaust
his state remedies. All claims brought within a 2254 motion must be exhausted
in order to provide the state's highest court an opportunity to review the issues.
Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 522 (1982).
Bailey has not exhausted the available state remedies for the three issues he
attempted to bring on direct appeal. On a direct review of guilty pleas in
Colorado, a defendant can only challenge the propriety of a sentence, not the
underlying conviction. Colo.Rev.Stat. 18-1-409. The proper procedural route
for state review of Bailey's underlying conviction based on the guilty plea is
Colo.R.Crim.P. 35(c)(2). People v. Bailey, No. 90CA2141, slip. op. (Colo.App.
June 25, 1992). See also, Chae v. People, 780 P.2d 481 (Colo.1989). Thus,
Bailey has not followed the proper procedural route to obtain relief in the state
courts, thus depriving the Colorado Supreme Court an opportunity to speak on
the merits of his claim. The Colo.R.Crim.P. 35(c) remedy remains open to
Bailey, allowing him to collaterally attack his conviction.2 Therefore, Bailey
has not properly exhausted possible state remedies for his first three claims.
In addition, Bailey has not exhausted the Colo.R.Crim.P. 35(c)(2) remedy for
his fourth claim, nor did he attempt to obtain review by any other means. See
Colo.R.Crim.P. 35(c)(2)(VI).
8
The order of the district court dismissing Bailey's 2254 petition is AFFIRMED.
This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not be cited, or
used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except for purposes of establishing
the doctrines of the law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir.
R. 36.3
We note, however, that Bailey may only have a short time in which to file his
Colo.R.Crim.P. 35(c) action, since Colo.Rev.Stat. 16-5-402 provides a threeyear limitation on collateral actions from the date of conviction, unless he can
show cause for the delay. It appears that this three-year period may expire in
December