Not Precedential
Not Precedential
Not Precedential
preparing and submitting fraudulent asylum applications. DHS also submitted evidence
showing that Mawarsarys affidavit was identical to an affidavit prepared by CIAS that
had previously been deemed fraudulent.
At Petitioners merits hearing, the Immigration Judge (IJ) gave Mawarsary an
opportunity to withdraw or revise her affidavit in light of DHS evidence. She declined
to do so and Petitioners proceeded to testify on their own behalf. A psychologist, Dr.
Judy Eidelson, also testified on behalf of Petitioners at the hearing.
Mawarsary claimed that, in 1999, a taxi driver took her to an isolated area,
threatened her with a knife, and forced her to perform sexual acts. After he left,
Mawarsary testified that she walked to a nearby home, where she slept overnight. The
next morning, she called Effendi, who picked her up and took her to the police station to
file a report. Later that month, she alleged that the police told her that they had not yet
apprehended her attacker and she did not inquire further about the status of her
complaint.
Effendi also alleged that he was harmed in Indonesia. He claimed that during the
widespread riots that took place in Indonesia in May 1998, he was caught in the middle
of a violent anti-government student demonstration. He alleged that the students pulled
him out of his car, beat him, and threatened to kill him because he is Chinese. Effendi
claimed that he passed out, but later awoke in a hospital with his front teeth knocked out.
The hospital discharged him later that day.
Dr. Eidelson testified that, in September 2003, she interviewed Mawarsary for two
3
hours. Based on that interview, she diagnosed her with Post Traumatic Stress Disorder
(PTSD) stemming from the incident involving the taxi driver, and a previous incident
when she was attacked while riding on a bus in Indonesia. Dr. Eidelson testified that
Mawarsary appeared credible during their meeting.
Following the merits hearing, the IJ denied Petitioners applications for relief and
ordered them removed to Indonesia. She first determined that they were statutorily
ineligible for asylum because they failed to file their applications within one year of
entering the United States. She also determined that Petitioners knowingly filed a
frivolous application for asylum.1
The IJ further concluded that Mawarsarys claim of past persecution was not
credible, and that Effendis experiences in Indonesia did not rise to the level of
persecution. As to both Petitioners, the IJ held that they failed to establish a clear
probability of future persecution, or torture, so as to qualify for withholding of removal or
CAT protection. Finally, she denied their requests for a grant of voluntary departure.
The BIA dismissed in part, and sustained in part, Petitioners appeal. The Board
affirmed the IJs finding that Petitioners were statutorily ineligible for asylum and that
they were unable to qualify for an exception to the filing time-bar. However, the Board
sustained Petitioners challenge to the IJs finding that they filed a frivolous asylum
application. The Board affirmed the IJ in all other respects.
II.
This Court has authority to review final orders of removal. See 8 U.S.C.
1252(a). We will review the immigration judges opinion to the extent it was adopted by
the BIA. See Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 549 n.2 (3d Cir. 2001). We apply
substantial evidence review to agency findings of fact, departing from factual findings
only where a reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to arrive at a contrary
conclusion. Mendez-Reyes v. Atty Gen., 428 F.3d 187, 191 (3d Cir. 2005). We
uphold the findings of the [IJ and] BIA to the extent that they are supported by
reasonable, substantial and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole[.]
Kayembe v. Ashcroft, 334 F.3d 231, 234 (3d Cir. 2003).
III.
Petitioners sole argument on appeal is that the BIA erred when it incorporated
the IJs finding that Petitioners submitted a frivolous finding in its analysis of whether or
not [they] are entitled to withholding of removal despite the fact that the IJ had
exceeded her authority in determining the applications to be frivolous.2 (Petitioners
Brief (Pet. Br.) at 6.) Petitioners suggest that the BIAs ruling ran afoul of our holding
in Luciana v. Atty Gen., 502 F.3d 273, 280 (3d Cir. 2007). After reviewing the record,
We note that Petitioners have waived review of the agencys denial of their
applications for asylum, CAT protection, and voluntary departure. See United
States v. Pelullo, 399 F.3d 197, 222 (3d Cir. 2005) (It is well settled that an
appellants failure to identify or argue an issue in his opening brief constitutes
waiver of that issue on appeal.).
5
Indeed, the IJ explicitly noted that conditions have improved for Indonesian
6
Instead, they appear to argue that the agency was precluded from assessing their
credibility in order to determine their eligibility for withholding of removal. See Pet. Br.
at 10-11. However, we have held that credibility, by itself, may satisfy [an applicants]
burden or doom his claim as to both withholding of removal and protection under the
[CAT]. See Muhanna v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d 582, 589 (3d Cir. 2005). Furthermore, a
finding of adverse credibility is not the same as a finding that that an alien has submitted
a frivolous asylum application. See Luciana, 502 F.3d at 278, Khadka v. Holder, 618
F.3d 996, 1002 (9th Cir. 2010). We discern no error on the part of the BIA regarding its
review of Petitioners eligibility for withholding of removal.
Accordingly, we will deny the petition for review. Petitioners motion to stay the
final order of removal is denied as moot.
citizens of Chinese ethnicity since Petitioners left the country in 1999, and that
Petitioners family members have remained in Indonesia unharmed. (A.R. 28788.) Thus the BIA agreed with the IJs analysis and that there was little likelihood
that Petitioners will be persecuted if returned to Indonesia.
7