Kenisha Brantley Greg Brantley, On Behalf of Themselves and All Others Similarly Situated v. Republic Mortgage Insurance Company, 424 F.3d 392, 4th Cir. (2005)

424 F.
3d 392
Kenisha BRANTLEY; Greg Brantley, on behalf of themselves

and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v.
REPUBLIC MORTGAGE INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellant.
No. 05-1047.
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Argued: May 24, 2005.
Decided: September 28, 2005.
ARGUED: Benjamin Rush Smith, III, Nelson, Mullins, Riley &

Scarborough, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant. Kathleen Clark
Knight, James, Hoyer, Newcomer & Smiljanich, P.A., Tampa, Florida, for
Appellees. ON BRIEF: Thadeous H. Westbrook, III, Nelson, Mullins,
Riley & Scarborough, Columbia, South Carolina; William L. Kirkman,
Bourland, Kirkman, Seidler, Jay & Michel, L.L.P., Fort Worth, Texas, for
Appellant. Terry A. Smiljanich, James, Hoyer, Newcomer & Smiljanich,
P.A., Tampa, Florida; T. English McCutchen, William E. Hopkins, Jr.,
McCutchen, Blanton, Johnson & Barnette, Columbia, South Carolina, for
Appellees.
Before WIDENER and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and ROBERT E. PAYNE,
United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Virginia, sitting by
designation.
Affirmed by published opinion. Judge WIDENER wrote the opinion, in
which Judge MOTZ and Judge PAYNE concurred.
OPINION
WIDENER, Circuit Judge.
This case arises from alleged violations by the defendant, Republic Mortgage
Insurance Company, of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. 1681-1681t.
Republic Mortgage filed a motion to compel arbitration and dismiss the action
or, in the alternative, stay the action pending arbitration. The district court
denied Republic's motion, finding that Republic Mortgage, as a nonsignatory to
the arbitration agreement, could not enforce the agreement to arbitrate against
the plaintiffs, Kenisha and Greg Brantley. We affirm.
I.
2
In August 2003, the plaintiffs bought a home in Beaufort, SC. Because they
financed the entire cost of the home, their mortgage lender, SouthStar Funding,
L.L.C., required them to obtain private mortgage insurance. The plaintiffs
obtained mortgage insurance from Republic Mortgage, and their mortgage
insurance premium was set at $590.43 per month.1
The Brantleys contend that Republic Mortgage did not give them the lowest
premium available and that Republic Mortgage never informed them that their
premium was increased based on information contained in their consumer credit
reports. Further, the plaintiffs complain that Republic Mortgage never advised
them of the consumer reporting agency from which it received the information,
nor that they could obtain a copy of that report and dispute entries it contained
under the Fair Credit Report Act (FCRA). The plaintiffs allege that when
Republic Mortgage increased their insurance premium based on information in
their credit report, it was required to provide them with an "adverse action
notice" pursuant to the FCRA. 15 U.S.C. 1681m. Finally, the plaintiffs allege
that these actions constituted either willful, or negligent, or both, violations of
the FCRA.
In connection with the mortgage loan transaction, the plaintiffs entered into a
separate arbitration agreement with the mortgage lender, SouthStar, which
provided
Any claim, dispute, or controversy (whether in contract, tort, or otherwise)

arising from or related to the loan evidenced by the Note shall be resolved,
upon the election of either Borrower or Lender, by binding arbitration, and not
by court action, except as provided under "Exclusions from Arbitration" below.
Such claims which shall be arbitrated include, but are not limited to, all:
statutory and regulatory claims; any claim, dispute or controversy that may
arise out of or is based on the relationships which result from the Borrower's
application to the broker or lender for the loan, the closing of the loan, or the
servicing of the loan; or any dispute or controversy over the applicability or
enforceability of this arbitration agreement or the entire agreement between
Borrower and Broker or between Borrower and Lender (collectively "claim").
The agreement further provided that the agreement would apply "no matter by
whom or against whom a claim is made."
The Brantleys filed this suit on March 15, 2004.2 On September 22, 2004,
Republic Mortgage, which had not signed the arbitration agreement, moved to
compel arbitration and to dismiss or stay the plaintiff's action. The district
court, on December 1, 2004, denied Republic Mortgage's motion to compel
arbitration and dismiss or stay the action. This appeal by Republic Mortgage
followed.
II.
8
Republic Mortgage claims that the district court erred in denying its motion to
compel arbitration and dismiss or stay the action. Specifically, it contends that,
despite being a nonsignatory to the arbitration agreement, its insurance contract
is so intertwined with the mortgage and arbitration contracts between the
plaintiffs and SouthStar that it should receive the benefit of the arbitration
agreement. Alternately, Republic Mortgage argues that it is a third-party
beneficiary of the arbitration contract, and is thus entitled to enforce arbitration
on those grounds.
The principal issue in this appeal is whether equitable estoppel allows Republic
Mortgage to claim the benefit of the arbitration agreement between the
plaintiffs and SouthStar.
10
District court decisions determining the scope of arbitration agreements are

generally reviewed de novo since a review of orders compelling or refusing to
compel arbitration is a matter of contract interpretation. United States v.
Bankers Ins. Co., 245 F.3d 315, 319 (4th Cir.2001).
11
However, in cases such as the present one, the arbitration order does not rest on
a term of the contract, rather upon the application of equitable estoppel. See
Int'l Paper Co. v. Schwabedissen Maschinen & Anlagen GMBH, 206 F.3d 411,
417-18 (4th Cir.2000) (holding that a signatory to an arbitration agreement may
be bound by a nonsignatory through the doctrine of equitable estoppel). We
review such equitable estoppel decisions for abuse of discretion. See Grigson v.
Creative Artists Agency L.L.C., 210 F.3d 524, 528 (5th Cir.2000).
12
The district court determined that Republic Mortgage could only estop the
plaintiffs from avoiding arbitration if the case met the intertwined claims test.
See Long v. Silver, 248 F.3d 309, 320-21 (4th Cir.2001). The Eleventh Circuit
has provided a clear statement of the intertwined claims test, which we apply
here:
13
Existing case law demonstrates that equitable estoppel allows a nonsignatory to

compel arbitration in two different circumstances. First, equitable estoppel
applies when the signatory to a written agreement containing an arbitration
clause must "rely on the terms of the written agreement in asserting [its]
claims" against the nonsignatory. When each of a signatory's claims against a
nonsignatory "makes reference to" or "presumes the existence of" the written
agreement, the signatory's claims "arise[] out of and relate[] directly to the
[written] agreement," and arbitration is appropriate. Second, "application of
equitable estoppel is warranted ... when the signatory [to the contract
containing the arbitration clause] raises allegations of ... substantially
interdependent and concerted misconduct by both the nonsignatory and one or
more of the signatories to the contract." Otherwise, "the arbitration proceedings
[between the two signatories] would be rendered meaningless and the federal
policy in favor of arbitration effectively thwarted."
14
MS Dealer Serv. Corp. v. Franklin, 177 F.3d 942, 947 (11th Cir.1999)
(citations omitted).
15
In the present case, as the district court correctly concluded, Republic Mortgage
can satisfy neither of these requirements.
16
The lawsuit in the current case deals with Republic Mortgage's insurance
premiums, and an allegation that these premiums were increased due to
information contained in the plaintiffs' credit histories. This claim is a statutory
remedy under the Fair Credit Reporting Act and is wholly separate from any
action or remedy for breach of the underlying mortgage contract that is
governed by the arbitration agreement. Although the mortgage insurance
relates to the mortgage debt, the premiums of the mortgage insurance are
separate and wholly independent from the mortgage agreement. The district
court correctly found that the mere existence of a loan transaction requiring
plaintiffs to obtain mortgage insurance cannot be the basis for finding their
federal statutory claims, which are wholly unrelated to the underlying mortgage
agreement, to be intertwined with that contract.
17
Likewise, the plaintiffs' claim does not raise allegations of collusion or

misconduct by SouthStar necessary to satisfy the second means of obtaining
equitable estoppel. Instead, the plaintiffs' claim is based entirely on actions
taken by Republic Mortgage, a nonsignatory to the arbitration agreement. The
plaintiffs' claims against Republic Mortgage do not implicate SouthStar in any

wrongdoing.
18
Thus, the district court correctly concluded that the plaintiffs "never
attempt[ed] to rely on the contract to establish their claims, nor [did] they allege
concerted action between Republic and SouthStar." Because this conclusion is
appropriately drawn from the facts presented to the district court, we affirm the
district court's decision that the Brantleys are not equitably estopped from
denying a contractual obligation to arbitrate with the non-party (Republic
Mortgage) to the arbitration agreement.
III.
19
Republic Mortgage also argues that it is entitled to enforce the arbitration

agreement as a third-party beneficiary of the arbitration contract. We reject this
argument. As this court has held, "[i]n order to determine whether the parties
intended [a nonsignatory] to be a third party beneficiary, we must look within
`the four corners of the deed.'" R.J. Griffin & Co. v. Beach Club II
Homeowners Ass'n, 384 F.3d 157, 164 (4th Cir.2004) (citing Gardner v.
Mozingo, 293 S.C. 23, 358 S.E.2d 390, 392 (1987)). We do not differentiate
between a deed and the underlying contract here.
20
Examining this, the district court observed that "the underlying contract makes
no reference to Republic, nor does it mention the mortgage insurance
transaction.... Republic is not entitled to third-party beneficiary status because
`the language of the [contract] does not clearly indicate that, at the time of
contracting, the parties intended to provide [Republic] with a direct benefit.'"
(quoting Griffin, 384 F.3d at 165).
21
We are of opinion the district court correctly decided under Griffin that
Republic was not entitled to arbitration as a third-party beneficiary.
22
The judgment of the district court is accordingly
23
AFFIRMED.
Notes:
1
Mortgage insurance obligates the insurer to underwrite the risk of default

associated with the loan of the borrower, in this case the Brantleys. There is no
contention in the case that the loan is in default

2
The plaintiffs styled this action as a class action. The district court, however,
has not ruled on class certification and only considered the allegations specific
to the Brantleys in its order. Our review does not decide anything with respect
to the claimed class action

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424 F.

Kenisha BRANTLEY; Greg Brantley, on behalf of themselves

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

ARGUED: Benjamin Rush Smith, III, Nelson, Mullins, Riley &

Any claim, dispute, or controversy (whether in contract, tort, or otherwise)

District court decisions determining the scope of arbitration agreements are

Existing case law demonstrates that equitable estoppel allows a nonsignatory to

Likewise, the plaintiffs' claim does not raise allegations of collusion or

plaintiffs' claims against Republic Mortgage do not implicate SouthStar in any

Republic Mortgage also argues that it is entitled to enforce the arbitration

The judgment of the district court is accordingly

Mortgage insurance obligates the insurer to underwrite the risk of default

contention in the case that the loan is in default

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