A.C. No.

959 July 30, 1971

PEDRO OPAREL, SR., complainant,
vs.
ATTY. DOMINADOR ABARIA, respondent.
R E S O L UT I O N

FERNANDO, J.:
This administrative proceeding was started by Pedro Oparel, Sr., who identified himself as a
pauper in his complaint filed with this Court on August 27, 1970 against respondent
Dominador Abaria, a member of the Philippine Bar. The charge was that respondent, whose
services were retained to assist complainant recover damages from his employer for
injuries suffered, acted dishonestly. Apparently, a settlement was reached, complainant
having been made to sign a receipt in the sum of P500.00 for his claim, out of which was
deducted P55.00 as attorney's fees, when the truth, according to the complaint, was that
respondent did receive the much larger amount of P5,000.00. In a resolution of September
14, 1970, the respondent was required to file an answer within ten days from notice. It was
duly filed on October 19, 1970 with a vehement denial on the part of the respondent,
alleging that the complaint was "irresponsible, baseless and [should] not merit even the
scantiest consideration" of this Court. He further alleged that while complainant was asking
only for P200.00, he was able to secure a settlement from the employer in the sum of
P500.00, admitting that he was given as fees the aforesaid AMOUNT of P55.00. He
accounted for the alleged sum of P5,000.00 by stating that P3,500 was spent by the
employer for plaintiff's operation and medical bills, another P1,000.00 given to
complainant's family during his confinement in the hospital, and then the P500.00 received
in cash by way of additional settlement. He prayed that the complaint be dismissed.
This Court, in a resolution of October 23, 1970, referred the matter to the Solicitor General
for investigation, report and recommendation. Such report and recommendation was
submitted on June 2, 1971. It was therein stated that the city fiscal of Bacolod City, who was
designated to act as investigator, as the parties were residents of the place, submitted on
March 2, 1971 a report recommending dismissal due to the desistance of complainant. It
appeared that when the case was called for investigation on February 17, 1971, the
complainant manifested that he was no longer interested in pushing through his complaint
against respondent. In his affidavit of desistance, he admitted that the administrative charge
arose out of a misunderstanding between him and respondent. He likewise admitted that
there was no deception practiced on him by respondent when he was made to sign the

affidavit of September 20, 1966 wherein it appeared that the amount received by him was
P500.00, no mention being made therein of the other P4,500.00 which, as noted in the
answer of respondent, consisted of P3,500.00 for expenses incurred for complainant's
operation and medical bills and P1,000.00 given to his family for support while he was
staying in the hospital. The Solicitor General agreed with such a recommendation and
prayed that the case be dismissed.
While it would appear that under the circumstances no case lies against respondent
Dominador Abaria, it is not amiss to impress on members of the Bar that the utmost care be
taken to minimize occasions for any misunderstanding between them and their clients. The
relationship being one of confidence, there is ever present the need for the latter being
adequately and fully informed of the mode and manner in which their interest is defended.
They should not be left in the dark. They are entitled to the fullest disclosure of why certain
steps are taken and why certain matters are either included or excluded from the
documents they are made to sign. It is only thus that their faith in counsel may remain
unimpaired.
Where, as did happen here, the client happens to be poor and unlettered, seeking to
enforce what he considers his just demands against an employer, it is even more imperative
that matters be explained to him with all precision and clarity. More than that, no effort
should be spared for him to get fully what he is entitled to under the law. The same zeal
should characterize a lawyer's efforts as when he is defending the rights of property. As it is,
there is even the fear that a lawyer works harder when he appears for men of substance. To
show how unfounded is such a suspicion, he must exert his utmost, whoever be his client.
More specifically, in a case like the present, he should not invite loss of trust by
inadvertence or even by a failure to use the simplest and most understandable language in
communicating matters. For he may lend himself to the suspicion that he is lacking in
candor and may be taking undue advantage of his client for his own profit and advantage in
any dealing with the adverse party. At any rate, with complainant having been satisfied with
the explanation of respondent, he could not be justly charged of being recreant to his trust
for personal gain. The dismissal of this case is therefore warranted.
WHEREFORE, the administrative case filed by Pedro Oparel, Sr. against respondent
Dominador Abaria is dismissed.

G.R. No. 104600 July 2, 1999

RILLORAZA, AFRICA, DE OCAMPO and AFRICA, petitioner,

vs.
EASTERN TELECOMMUNICATIONS PHILS., INC. and PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE
TELEPHONE COMPANY, respondents.

PARDO, J.:
The basic issue submitted for consideration of the Court is whether or not petitioner is
entitled to recover attorney's fees amounting to Twenty Six Million Three Hundred Fifty
Thousand Seven Hundred Seventy Nine Pesos and Ninety One Centavos (P26,350,779.91)
for handling the case for its client Eastern Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. filed with
the Regional Trial Court, Makati, though its services were terminated in midstream and the
client directly compromised the case with the adverse party.
The Facts
In giving due course to the petition, we carefully considered the facts attendant to the case.
On August 28, 1987, Eastern Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. (ETPI) represented by
the law firm San Juan, Africa, Gonzales and San Agustin (SAGA), filed with the Regional
Trial Court, Makati, a complaint for recovery of revenue shares against Philippine Long
Distance Telephone Company (PLDT). Atty. Francisco D. Rilloraza, a partner of the firm
appeared for ETPI.
After ETPI rested its case, it paid SAGA the billed amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P100,000.00). On September 18, 1987, the trial court issued a resolution granting ETPI's
application for preliminary restrictive and mandatory injunctions. During this period, SAGA
was dissolved and four of the junior partners formed the law firm Rilloraza, Africa, De
Ocampo & Africa (RADA), which took over as counsel in the case for ETPI. The latter
signed a retainer agreement with counsel dated October 1, 1987. 1
Petitioners presented the three aspects of the main case in the trial court. First, the traffic
revenue shares which ETPI sought to recover from PLDT in accordance with the contract
between them. Second, ETPI sought preventive injunctive relief against the PLDT's threats
to deny ETPI access to the Philippines international gateway switch. Third, ETPI called this
the "foreign correspondentships aspect" where ETPI sought preventive injunctive relief
against PLDT's incursions and inducements directed at ETPI's foreign correspondents in
Hongkong, Taiwan and Singapore, to break their correspondentship contracts with PLDT,
using the threat of denying them access to the international gateway as leverage.
3

In this connection, ETPI filed with the trial court two urgent motions for restraining order, one
on October 30, 1987 and another on November 4, 1987. As the applications were not acted
upon, ETPI brought the case up to the Court of Appeals by petition for certiorari.
On June 28, 1988, petitioner received a letter from ETPI signed by E. M. Villanueva,
President and Chief Executive Officer. In substance, the letter stated that ETPI was
terminating the retainer contract dated October 1, 1987, effective June 30, 1988.
On June 29, 1988, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court a notice of attorney's lien,
furnishing copies to the plaintiff ETPI, to the signatory of the termination letter and PLDT. On
the same date, petitioner additionally sent a letter to ETPI attaching its partial billing
statement. In its notice, RADA informed the court that there were negotiations towards a
compromise between ETPI and PLDT.
In April 1990, petitioner confirmed that indeed the parties arrived at an amicable settlement
and that the same was entered as a judgment. On April 26, 1990, petitioner filed a motion
for the enforcement of attorney's lien with the Regional Trial Court of Makati and then
appraised the Supreme Court thereof by manifestation. 2 We noted the manifestation in a
resolution dated July 23, 1990.
On May 24, 1990, PLDT filed with the trial court a manifestation that it is not a party to nor in
any manner involved in the attorney's lien being asserted by Atty. Rilloraza for and in behalf
of the law firm, 3 while ETPI filed its opposition thereto on June 11, 1990.
The Lower Court's Ruling
The trial court in its resolution dated September 14, 1990 denied the motion for enforcement
of attorney's lien. Thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court finds that the Notice of Attorney's Lien filed
by the law firm of Rilloraza, Africa, De Ocampo and Africa has no basis in fact and in law,
and therefore denies the Motion for Enforcement of Attorney's Lien.
SO ORDERED.
Makati, Metro Manila, September 4, 1990.
(s/t) ZEUS C, ABROGAR
Judge 4
On October 10, 1990, petitioner filed with the trial court a notice of appeal from the above4

mentioned order to the Supreme Court. On November 6, 1990, ETPI filed a Motion to
Dismiss Appeal contending that the case could be brought to the Supreme Court only via a
petition for review on certiorari, not by a mere notice of appeal. In an order dated January
16, 1991, the trial court dismissed RADA's appeal.
The trial court said:
There is no more regular appeal from the Regional Trial Court to the Supreme Court. Under
the amendment of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act by R.A. 5440, orders and judgments of
the Regional Trial Court may be elevated to the Supreme Court only by petition for review
on certiorari.
xxx xxx xxx
Wherefore, premises considered, the order dated September 14, 1990 is hereby
reconsidered and set aside. The Notice of Appeal filed by movant RADA is dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
Given this 16th day of January, 1991, at Makati, Metro Manila.
(s/t) ZEUS C, ABROGAR
Judge 5
Hence, on February 9, 1991, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court,
which we remanded to the Court of Appeals. The latter dismissed the petition in a decision
promulgated on November 14, 1991, 6 ruling that the judge committed no abuse of
discretion in denying petitioner's motion for enforcement of attorney's lien. Thus:
We therefore rule that respondent judge committed no abuse of discretion, much less a
grave one, in denying petitioner's motion for enforcement of attorney's lien.
Assuming that respondent judge committed an error in denying petitioner's motion for
enforcement of attorney's lien, it cannot be corrected by certiorari.
WHEREFORE, the writs prayed for are DENIED, and the petition is hereby DISMISSED,
with cost against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
(s/t) REGINA G. ORDOEZ-BENITEZ

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
(s/t) JOSE A. R. MELO (s/t) EMETERIO C, CUI
Associate Justice Associate Justice 7
DISCUSSION
A. The Procedural Aspect
There is nothing sacrosanct about procedural rules, which are liberally construed in order to
promote their objectives and assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of every action or proceeding. 8 In analogous case, 9 we ruled that where the
rigid application of the rules would frustrate substantial justice 10, or bar the vindication of a
legitimate grievance, the courts are justified in exempting a particular case from the
operation of the rules.
In A-One Feeds, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, we said
Litigations should, as much as possible, be decided on the merits and not on technicality.
Dismissal of appeals purely on technical grounds is frowned upon, and the rules of
procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense, for they are adopted to
help secure, not override, substantial justice and thereby defeat their very claims. As has
been the constant ruling of this Court, every party litigant should be afforded the amplest
opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of
technicalities. 11
A basic legal principle is that no one shall be unjustly enriched at the expense of another. 12
This principle is one of the mainstays of every legal system for centuries and which the Civil
Code echoes:
Art. 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means,
acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or
legal ground, shall return the same to him. 13
The Code Commission, its report, emphasized that:
It is most needful that this ancient principle be clearly and specifically consecrated in the
proposed Civil Code to the end that in cases not foreseen by the lawmaker, no one may
unjustly benefit himself to the prejudice of another. The German Civil Code has a similar
6

provision (Art. 812). 14

With this in mind, one could easily understand why, despite technical deficiencies, we
resolved to give due course to this petition. More importantly, the case on its face appears
to be impressed with merit.
B. The Attorney's Fees
We understand that Atty. Francisco Rilloraza handled the case from its inception until ETPI
terminated the law firm's services in 1988. Petitioner's claim for attorney's fees hinges on
two grounds: first, the fact that Atty. Rilloraza personally handled the case when he was
working for SAGA; and second, the retainer agreement dated October 1, 1987.
We agree that petitioners are entitled to attorneys' fees. We, however, are not convinced
with the petitioner's arguments that the services RADA rendered merit the amount they are
claiming.
First, petitioner contends that Atty. Rilloraza initiated the filing of the complaint. When a
client employs the services of a law firm, he does not employ the services of the lawyer who
is assigned to personally handle the case. Rather, he employs the entire law firm. In the
event that the counsel appearing for the client resigns, the firm is bound to provide a
replacement. Thus, RADA could not claim to have initiated the filing of the complaint
considering that ETPI hired SAGA. What is more, on September 17, 1987, ETPI paid SAGA
the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,00.00) 15 representing services
performed prior to September 17, 1987. SAGA assigned one of its associates, Atty.
Francisco Rilloraza, to handle the case for the firm. Although Atty. Rilloraza handled the
case personally, he did so for and in behalf of SAGA.
Second, petitioner claims that under the retainer agreement, which provides:
6.2 B.Court Cases:
Should recourse to judicial action be necessary to effect collection or judicial action be
taken by adverse party, our attorney's fees shall be fifteen percent (15%) of the amounts
collected or the value of the property acquired or liability saved. 16
the firm is entitled to the fees agreed upon.
However, the retainer agreement has been terminated. True, Attorney Rilloraza played a
vital role during the inception of the case and in the course of the trial. We cannot also
ignore the fact that an attorney-client relationship between petitioner and respondent no
longer existed during its culmination by amicable agreement. To award the attorneys' fees
7

amounting to 15% of the sum of One Hundred Twenty Five Million Six Hundred Seventy
One Thousand Eight Hundred Eighty Six Pesos and Four Centavos (P125,671,886.04) plus
Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00) paid by PLDT to ETPI would be too
unconscionable.1wphi1.nt

"In any case, whether there is an agreement or not, the courts shall fix a reasonable
compensation which lawyers may receive for their professional services. " 17 "A lawyer has
the right to be paid for the legal services he has extended to his client, which compensation
must be reasonable." 18 A lawyer would be entitled to receive what he merits for his
services. Otherwise stated, the amount must be determined on a quantum meruit basis.
"Quantum meruit, meaning 'as much as he deserved' is used as a basis for determining the
lawyer's professional fees in the absence of a contract but recoverable by him from his
client. 19 Recovery of attorney's fees on the basis of quantum meruit is authorized when (1)
there is no express contract for payment of attorney's fees agreed upon between the lawyer
and the client; (2) when although there is a formal contract for attorney's fees, the fees
stipulated are found unconscionable or unreasonable by the court; and (3) when the
contract for attorney's fee's is void due to purely formal defects of execution; (4) when the
counsel, for justifiable cause, was not able to finish the case to its conclusion; (5) when
lawyer and client disregard the contract for attorney's
fees, 20
In fixing a reasonable compensation for the services rendered by a lawyer on the basis of
quantum meruit, the elements to be considered are generally (1) the importance of the
subject matter in controversy, (2) the extent of services rendered, and (3) the professional
standing of the lawyer. A determination of these factors would indispensably require nothing
less than a full-blown trial where private respondents can adduce evidence to establish the
right to lawful attorney's fees and for petitioner to oppose or refute the same. 21 The trial
court has the principal task of fixing the amount of attorney's fees. 22 Hence, the necessity of
a hearing is beyond cavil.
C. Charging Lien
Petitioner contends that pursuant to Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, it is entitled to
a charging lien. The rule provides:
Sec. 37. Attorney's liens. An attorney shall have a lien upon the funds, documents and
papers of his client, which have lawfully come into his possession and may retain the same

until his lawful fees and disbursements have been paid, and may apply such funds to the
satisfaction thereof. He shall also have a lien to the same extent upon all judgments for the
payment of money, and executions issued in pursuance of such judgments, which he has
secured in a litigation of his client, from and after the time when he shall have caused a
statement of his claim of such lien to be entered upon the records of the court rendering
such judgment, or issuing such execution, and shall have caused written notice thereof to
be delivered to his client and to the adverse party; and he shall have the same right and
power over such judgments and executions as his client would have to enforce his lien and
secure the payment of his just fees and disbursements." (Emphasis supplied).
We do not agree. A charging lien to be enforceable as security for the payment of attorney's
fees requires as a condition sine qua non a judgment for money and execution in pursuance
of such judgment secured in the main action by the attorney in favor of his client 23. A
charging lien presupposes that the attorney has secured a favorable money judgment for
his client. 24 From the facts of the case it would seem that petitioner had no hand in the
settlement that occurred, nor did it ever obtain a favorable judgment for ETPI.
ETPI entered into a compromise agreement when it ended the services of petitioner and
through the effort of ETPI's new lawyers, the law firm Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura,
Sayoc and De los Angeles. Whether there was bad faith in the substitution of the lawyers to
avoid compliance with the retainer agreement could only be determined after a trial of the
case on the merits.
This decision, however, should not be interpreted as to impose upon petitioner any
additional burden in collecting its attorney's fees. The petitioner must avail itself of the
proper remedy in order to forestall the possibility of any injustice on or unjust enrichment of
any of the parties.
The Judgment (Fallo)
ACCORDINGLY, the Court GRANTS the petition, REVERSES the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 24463 and REMANDS the case to the court of origin for the
determination of the amount of attorney's fees to which petitioner is entitled.
No costs.
SO ORDERED