Co v.

HRET:

Section 1(3) of the 1987 Constitution was interpreted by the Court as applying to
those who elected Filipino citizenship not only after 2 February 1987 but also to those who
elected citizenship before that date. It was intended to correct the anomalous situation where
one born of a Filipino father and an alien mother was automatically granted the status of
natural-born citizen while one born of Filipino mother and an alien father would still have to
elect Philippine citizenship, whereby under earlier laws, he was not a natural-born citizen. [4]

Can the spring soar higher than its source?

In the case of Co vs. Electoral Tribunal[1] the major issue was whether Jose Ong, Jr. is
a natural-born Filipino citizen in contemplation of Section 6, Article VI in relation to Sections 2
and 1(3), Article IV of the 1987 Constitution.

The Courts based its resolution of the issue by tracing Jose Ong, Jr. citizenship to his
mother who was a natural-born Filipina. What is material to the case is whether he elected
Filipino citizenship when he reached the age of majority as provided for by Section 1 (4)
Article IV of the 1935 Constitution which was the operative law when he was born. Under the
1987 Constitution, natural-born status can only be accorded to individuals who elected
citizenship upon reaching majority. In the opinion of the Court it is not necessary for Ong, Jr.
to formally or in writing elect citizenship when he came of age as he was already a citizen
since he was nine by virtue of his mother being a natural-born citizen and his father a
naturalized Filipino.[5]

Records show that Ong Te, the grandfather of Jose Ong, Jr., arrived in
the Philippines in 1895. He established his residence in Laoang, Samar. As such, he was
able to obtain a certificate of residence from the Spanish colonial administration.
Jose Ong Chuan, Jose Ong Jr.s father, was born in China in 1905. In 1915, he was
brought by Ong Te to Samar where he grew up. He was baptized into Christianity. He married
a natural-born Filipina, Agripina Lao. He also established his residence in Laoang, Samar. In
15 February 1954, he filed with the Court of First Instance of Samar an application for
naturalization. He was declared a Filipino citizen on 28 April 1955; the declaration was made
final and executory on 15 May 1957. He took his Oath of Allegiance and was issued a
corresponding certificate of Naturalization.

Furthermore, election can be both formal and informal. In In Re Mallare (59 SCRA 45
[1974]) it was held that the exercise of the right of suffrage when one comes of age
constitutes a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. The rule in the Mallare case was
applied whereby Jose Ongs exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in election
exercises were considered positive acts of electing Philippine citizenship. Entering a
profession open only to Filipinos, serving in public office where citizenship is a qualification,
voting during election, running for public office, and other categorical acts of similar nature
are themselves formal manifestations of choice. These, according to the court, cannot be less
binding than the filing of a sworn statement or formal declaration. [6]

Jose Ong, Jr. was then a minor, nine years of age, and still finishing his elementary
education in Samar when his father took his oath. After completing his elementary education,
he went to Manila to complete his higher education and eventually found employment there.
He, however, frequently went home to Samar where he grew up.
In 1971, his elder brother was elected a delegate of the 1971 Constitutional
Convention. Emils status as a natural-born citizen was challenged. The Convention,
however, declared Emil as a natural-born Filipino.
In 1984 and 1986, Jose Jr. registered and voted in Samar. He ran and won in the
1987 elections for representative in the second district of Northern Samar. His opponents
protested his election to the post on the grounds that he is not a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines. The Court affirmed the decision of the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal declaring Jose Ong, Jr. a natural-born Filipino citizen.

AZNAR vs COMELEC
FACTS:
On November 19, 1987, private respondent Emilio "Lito" Osmea filed his certificate
of candidacy with the COMELEC for the position of Provincial Governor of Cebu Province in
the January 18, 1988 local elections. On January 22, 1988, the Cebu PDP-Laban Provincial
Council (Cebu-PDP Laban, for short), as represented by petitioner Jose B. Aznar in his
capacity as its incumbent Provincial Chairman, filed with the COMELEC a petition for the
disqualification of Osmea on the ground that he is allegedly not a Filipino citizen, being a
citizen of the United States of America.

Article IV Section 2 of 1987 constitution defines natural-born citizens as those who

are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or
perfect their Philippine citizenship,[2] as well as those born before 17 January 1973, of
Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. [3]

On January 28, 1988, the COMELEC en banc resolved to order the Board to
continue canvassing but to suspend the proclamation. At the hearing before the COMELEC,
Aznar presented the following exhibits tending to show that Osmena is an American citizen:
Application for Alien Registration of the Bureau of Immigration dated November 21, 1979;
Alien Certificate of Registration dated November 21, 1979; Permit to Re-enter the Philippines
dated November 21, 1979; Immigration Certificate of Clearance dated January 3, 1980.
Osmea on the other hand, maintained that he is a Filipino citizen, alleging: that he is the
legitimate child of Dr. Emilio D. Osmea, a Filipino and son of the late President Sergio
Osmea, Sr.; that he is a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine Passport issued on
March 25, 1987; that he has been continuously residing in the Philippines since birth and has
not gone out of the country for more than six months; and that he has been a registered voter
in the Philippines since 1965.

By virtue of his being the son of a Filipino father, the presumption that Osmena is a
Filipino remains. It was incumbent upon Aznar to prove that Osmena had lost his Philippine
citizenship however, he failed to positively establish this fact.

On March 3, 1988, COMELEC directed the Board of Canvassers to proclaim the

winning candidates. Having obtained the highest number of votes, Osmena was proclaimed
the Provincial Governor of Cebu. On June 11, 1988, COMELEC dismissed the petition for
disqualification for not having been timely filed and for lack of sufficient proof that Osmena is
not a Filipino citizen.

In the case of Vivo v. Cloribel, 38 the Court held that

Furthermore, being still aliens, they are not in position to invoke the provisions of the Civil
Code of the Philippines, for that Code cleaves to the principle that family rights and duties are
governed by their personal law, i.e., the laws of the nation to which they belong even
when staying in a foreign country.

ISSUES:

In the case of Vivo v. Cloribel[11], the Court held that

1. WON Osmena is a Filipino citizen.

Furthermore, being still aliens, they are not in position to invoke the provisions of the Civil
Code of the Philippines, for that Code cleaves to the principle that family rights and duties are
governed by their personal law, i.e., the laws of the nation to which they belong even when
staying in a foreign country (cf. Civil Code, Article 1[12]5).

Osmena vehemently denies having taken the oath of allegiance of the US. He is a
holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine passport and has continuously participated in the
electoral process in this country since 1963 up to the present, both as a voter and as a
candidate. Thus, Osmena remains a Filipino and the loss of his Philippine citizenship cannot
be presumed.

Vivo vs cloribel

RULING:
YES.
In the proceedings before the COMELEC, Aznar failed to present direct proof that
Osmena had lost his Filipino citizenship by any of the modes provided for under C.A. No. 63.
Among others, these are: (1) by naturalization in a foreign country; (2) by express
renunciation of citizenship; and (3) by subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support
the Constitution or laws of a foreign country. From the evidence, Osmea did not lose his
Philippine citizenship by any of the three mentioned hereinabove or by any other mode of
losing Philippine citizenship.

VIVO vs CLORIBEL

FACTS:

In concluding that Osmena had been naturalized as a citizen of the USA, Aznar
merely relied on the fact that Osmena was issued alien certificate of registration and was
given clearance and permit to re-enter the Philippines by the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation. Aznar assumed that because of the foregoing, Osmena is an American and
"being an American", Osmena "must have taken and sworn to the Oath of Allegiance required
by the U.S. Naturalization Laws.

This is a case of Chinese nationals who came to the Philippines for a visit but who refused to
leave. And one where the improvident issuance of an ex-parte preliminary injunction,
followed by judicial inaction, actually extended the stay of aliens beyond the period
authorized by law, and even beyond what the visitors had asked for.

Philippine courts are only allowed to determine who are Filipino citizens and who are
not. Whether or not a person is considered an American under the laws of the United States
does not concern Us here.

Private respondents are a Chinese mother, and her 2 minor children,

They arrived from Hongkong and were admitted in the Philippines as temporary visitors
on October 1960, with an initial authorized stay of three (3) months.
The husband and father of these aliens applied for naturalization, and CFI granted his
petition in 1961
The said temporary visitors petitioned for an indefinite extension of their stay.
By virtue of a Cabinet Resolution granting aliens concurrent jurisdiction to act on petitions
for extension of stay of temporary visitors, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs authorized (in
1961) the change in category from temporary visitors to that of special non-immigrants
under the Immigration Law for a period of stay extending up to 11 April 1963
The Secretary of Justice approved the extension thus authorized, subject to the condition
that the said aliens shall:
o secure reentry permits to Hongkong valid at least two months over and beyond
their extended stay, and
o maintain their cash bonds filed with the Bureau of Immigration and to pay the
corresponding fees.
But the petitioner, Commissioner of Immigration, refused to recognize the said extension
further than 16 June 1962, and denied acceptance of payment of the extension fees.
The respondents requested the President to extend their stay up to April 1963 in order to
coincide with their hope for and forthcoming oath-taking of allegiance of the
husband/father.
The request was referred to the Immigration Commissioner.
The commissioner informed the respondents that the new Secretary of Justice ruled in
that the Cabinet Resolution had no force and effect, and denied the request for extension
of stay of the respondents and advised them to leave the country voluntarily not later than
June 1962; otherwise, they would be proceeded against, in accordance with law.
The respondents did not leave the country on the date specified, but instead filed a
petition for mandamus with injunction, to restrain the Commissioner of Immigration from
issuing a warrant for their arrest and from confiscating their bond for their temporary stay
and to order the Commissioner to implement the extension.
The court then denied the prayer for preliminary injunction for lack of a prima facie
showing and set the case for hearing on 13 July 1962
On July 1962, respondents re-filed the same petition with the same court. The petition
alleged three grounds therefor, namely: (1) the extension of their stay was authorized and
approved by the Secretaries of Foreign Affairs and of Justice; (2) they were due for
eventual conversion into Filipino citizens by virtue of the granting of the husband/fathers
petition for naturalization, which had not been appealed, and he was due to take his oath
of allegiance on 11 April 1963; and (3) their departure from the Philippines would work
great injury and injustice to themselves.

The judge issued ex-parte and without hearing an order granting preliminary injunction,
and, on a bond of P3,000.00
The Immigration Commissioner filed his answer stating that:
o the visitors authorized stay expired on June 1962; their change in category from
temporary visitors to special non-immigrants and the extension of their
authorized by the Secretaries of Foreign Affairs and of Justice was invalid as it is
the Commissioner of Immigration who is vested by law with power to grant
extensions of stay;
o the petition filed was not the proper remedy;
o the Solicitor General will oppose the oath-taking of the father/husband and even
if he will become a Filipino citizen, his wife would not automatically become a
Filipino citizen, as she has yet to show that she, herself, can be lawfully
naturalized.
On 1965, the Commissioner filed a motion to dismiss the case for the unreasonable
length of time that the petitioners had failed to prosecute their case
But the court denied the motion to dismiss for being not well taken.
On December 1965, the Commissioner filed with the SC an action of certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction against the respondent court

ISSUE:
WON Chua (the mother/wife) automatically became a naturalized Filipino
RULING:
The court ruled that the wife, Chua Pic Luan, does not, under Section 15 of the Revised
Naturalization Law, automatically become a Filipino citizen on account of her marriage to a
naturalized Filipino citizen, since she must first prove that she possesses all the qualifications
and none of the disqualifications for naturalization.
By having misrepresented before Philippine consular and administrative authorities that she
came to the country for only a temporary visit when, in fact, her intention was to stay
permanently; and for having intentionally delayed court processes the better to prolong her
stay, respondent Chua Pic Luan demonstrated her incapacity to satisfy the qualifications
exacted by the third paragraph of Section 2 of the Revised Naturalization Law, that she must
be of good moral character and must have conducted herself in a proper and irreproachable
manner during the entire period of her residence in the Philippines in her relation with the
constituted government.

And, having lawfully resided in the Philippines only from her arrival on 16 October 1960 to 16
June 1962, she (Chua Pick Luan) also failed to meet the required qualification of continuous
residence in the Philippines for ten (10) years, her stay beyond 16 June 1962 being illegal. As
to the foreign born minors, Uy Koc Siong and Uy Tian Siong, our pronouncement in Vivo vs.
Cloribel, L-23239, 23 November 1966, 18 SCRA 713, applies to them:

As to foreign born minor children, they are extended citizenship if dwelling in the Philippines
at the time of the naturalzation of the parent.

Whether Lau Yuen Yeung ipso facto became a Filipino citizen upon her marriage to a Filipino

Issue:

citizen.

Dwelling means lawful residence. Since prior to the time the father of respondents visitors
was supposed to have taken his oath of citizenship their lawful period of stay had already
expired and they had already been required to leave, they were no longer lawfully residing
here (Kua Suy et al. v. The Commissioner of Immigration, L-13790, Oct. 31, 1963).

Held:

Nor can these temporary visitors claim any right to a stay coterminous with the result of the
naturalization proceeding of their husband and father, Uy Pick Tuy, because their authorized
stay was for a definite period, up to a fixed day, a circumstance incompatible with the
termination of the naturalization proceeding, which is uncertain and can not be set at a
definite date.4

MOY YA LIM YAO VS COMMISSIONER GR L-21289 OCT 4 1971

FACTS:

The Court of First Instance of Manila (Civil Case 49705) denied the prayer for preliminary
injunction.
Moya Lim Yao and Lau Yuen Yeung appealed.

On 8 February 1961, Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter the Philippines
as a non-immigrant, for a temporary visitor's visa to enter the Philippines.
She was permitted to come into the Philippines on 13 March 1961.
On the date of her arrival, Asher Y, Cheng filed a bond in the amount of P1,000.00 to
undertake, among others, that said Lau Yuen Yeung would actually depart from the
Philippines on or before the expiration of her authorized period of stay in this country or
within the period as in his discretion the Commissioner of Immigration.
After repeated extensions, she was allowed to stay in the Philippines up to 13 February
1962.
On 25 January 1962, she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto
Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino citizen.
Because of the contemplated action of the Commissioner of Immigration to confiscate her
bond and order her arrest and immediate deportation, after the expiration of her
authorized stay, she brought an action for injunction with preliminary injunction.

Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native
born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina PROVIDED SHE IS NOT
DISQUALIFIED TO BE A CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES UNDER SECTION 4 OF THE
SAME LAW.
Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized here
follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath as Filipino
citizen, provided that she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications under said
Section 4.
Whether the alien woman requires to undergo the naturalization proceedings, Section 15
is a parallel provision to Section 16.
Thus, if the widow of an applicant for naturalization as Filipino, who dies during the
proceedings, is not required to go through a naturalization proceedings, in order to be
considered as a Filipino citizen hereof, it should follow that the wife of a living Filipino
cannot be denied the same privilege.
Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensible in a judicial or
administrative case, Whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority
decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata,
hence it has to be threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand.
Lau Yuen Yeung, was declared to have become a Filipino citizen from and by virtue of
her marriage to Moy Ya Lim Yao al as Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim, a Filipino citizen of 25
January 1962.

Maquiling vs. COMELEC

Facts:
Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen. However, as a consequence of his
subsequent naturalization as a citizen of USA, he lost his Filipino citizenship. Arnado applied

for repatriation under R.A. No. 9225 before the Consulate General of the Philippines in San
Francisco, USA and took the Oath of Allegianceto the RP on 10 July 2008. On the same day
an order of approval of his citizenship retention and re-acquisition was issued in his favour. In
2009, Arnado again took his Oath of Allegiance to RP and executed an affidavit of
renunciation of his foreign citizenship. On 30 November 2009, Arnado filed his certificate of
candidacy for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao Del Norte. Respondent Linog Balua, another
mayoralty candidate, filed a petition to disqualify Arnado and presented a record indicating
that Arnado has been using his US Passport in entering and departing the
Philippines.

Section 5(2) of The Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003 provides:
Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and
political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing
laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:
xxxx
(2)Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding
such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the
filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all
foreign before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.

COMELEC issued an order requiring the respondent to personally file his answer. After
Arnado failed to answer the petition, Balua moved to declare him in default. In 2010 election,
Arnado garnered the highest number of votes and was subsequently proclaimed as the
winning candidate for Mayor. It was only after his proclamation that Arnado filed his answer.

xxx
Rommel Arnado took all the necessary steps to qualify to run for a public office. He took the
Oath of Allegiance and renounced his foreign citizenship. There is no question that after
performing these twin requirements required under Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 or the
Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003, he became eligible to run for public
office. By renouncing his foreign citizenship, he was deemed to be solely a Filipino citizen,
regardless of the effect of such renunciation under the laws of the foreign country.

COMELEC first division ruled for his disqualification. Petitioner Maquiling, another candidate
for mayor of Kausawagan, and who garnered the second highest number of votes, intervened
in the case and filed before the COMELEC En Banc a motion for reconsideration claiming
that the cancellation of Arnados candidacy and the nullification of his proclamation, him, as
the legitimate candidate who obtained the highest lawful votes should be proclaimed as the
winner. COMELEC En Banc held that it shall continue with the trial and hearing. However, it
reversed and set aside the ruling of first division and granted Arnados MR.

However, this legal presumption does not operate permanently and is open to attack when,
after renouncing the foreign citizenship, the citizen performs positive acts showing his
continued possession of a foreign citizenship. Arnado himself subjected the issue of his
citizenship to attack when, after renouncing his foreign citizenship, he continued to use his
US passport to travel in and out of the country before filing his certificate of candidacy on 30
November 2009. The pivotal question to determine is whether he was solely and exclusively
a Filipino citizen at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy, thereby rendering him eligible
to run for public office.

Maquiling filed the instant petition questioning the propriety of declaring Arnado qualified to
run for public office despite his continued use of a US passport, and praying that he be
proclaimed as the winner in the 2010 mayoralty race.
Issue:

Between 03 April 2009, the date he renounced his foreign citizenship, and 30 November
2009, the date he filed his COC, he used his US passport four times, actions that run counter
to the affidavit of renunciation he had earlier executed. By using his foreign passport, Arnado
positively and voluntarily represented himself as an American, in effect declaring before
immigration authorities of both countries that he is an American citizen, with all attendant
rights and privileges granted by the United States of America. The renunciation of foreign
citizenship is not a hollow oath that can simply be professed at any time, only to be violated
the next day. It requires an absolute and perpetual renunciation of the foreign
citizenship and a full divestment of all civil and political rights granted by the foreign country

Whether or not the use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign citizenship amount to
undoing a renunciation earlier made.
Held:
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that the use of foreign passport after renouncing ones foreign
citizenship is a positive and voluntary act of representation as to ones nationality and
citizenship; it does not divest Filipino citizenship regained by repatriation but it recants the
Oath of Renunciation required to qualify one to run for an elective position.

which granted the citizenship. While the act of using a foreign passport is not one of the acts
enumerated in Commonwealth Act No. 63 constituting renunciation and loss of Philippine
citizenship, it is nevertheless an act which repudiates the very oath of renunciation
required for a former Filipino citizen who is also a citizen of another country to be qualified to
run for a local elective position.

With Arnado being barred from even becoming a candidate, his certificate of candidacy is
thus rendered void from the beginning. It could not have produced any other legal effect
except that Arnado rendered it impossible to effect his disqualification prior to the elections
because he filed his answer to the petition when the elections were conducted already
and he was already proclaimed the winner.

When Arnado used his US passport on 14 April 2009, or just eleven days after he
renounced his American citizenship, he recanted his Oath of Renunciation that he
"absolutely and perpetually renounce(s) all allegiance and fidelity to the UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA" and that he "divest(s) himself of full employment of all civil and political rights and
privileges of the United States of America."

Arnado being a non-candidate, the votes cast in his favor should not have been counted. This
leaves Maquiling as the qualified candidate who obtained the highest number of votes.
Therefore, the rule on succession under the Local Government Code will not apply.
FRIVALDO VS. COMELEC (1996)
G.R. No. 120295, June 28 1996, 257 SCRA 727
FACTS:
Juan G. Frivaldo ran for Governor of Sorsogon again and won. Raul R. Lee questioned
his citizenship. He then petitioned for repatriation under Presidential Decree No. 725 and was
able to take his oath of allegiance as a Philippine citizen.

We agree with the COMELEC En Banc that such act of using a foreign passport does not
divest Arnado of his
Filipino citizenship, which he acquired by repatriation. However, by representing himself as an
American citizen, Arnado voluntarily and effectively reverted to his earlier status as a dual
citizen. Such reversion was not retroactive; it took place the instant Arnado represented
himself as an American citizen by using his US passport. This act of using a foreign passport
after renouncing ones foreign citizenship is fatal to Arnados bid for public office, as it
effectively imposed on him a disqualification to run for an elective local position.

However, on the day that he got his citizenship, the Court had already ruled based on his
previous attempts to run as governor and acquire citizenship, and had proclaimed Lee, who
got the second highest number of votes, as the newly elect Governor of Sorsogon.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Frivaldos repatriation was valid.
HELD:
The Court ruled his repatriation was valid and legal and because of the curative nature of
Presidential Decree No. 725, his repatriation retroacted to the date of the filing of his
application to run for governor. The steps to reacquire PhilippineCitizenship by repatriation
under Presidential Decree No. 725 are: (1) filing the application; (2) action by the committee;
and (3) taking of the oath of allegianceif the application is approved. It is only upon taking the
oath of allegiance that theapplicant is deemed ipso jure to have reacquired
Philippine citizenship. If the decree had intended the oath taking to retroact to the date of the
filing of the application, then it should not have explicitly provided otherwise. He is therefore
qualified to be proclaimed governor of Sorsogon.

The citizenship requirement for elective public office is a continuing one. It must be
possessed not just at the time of the renunciation of the foreign citizenship but continuously.
Any act which violates the oath of renunciation opens the citizenship issue to attack.
Citizenship is not a matter of convenience. It is a badge of identity that comes with attendant
civil and political rights accorded by the state to its citizens. It likewise demands the
concomitant duty to maintain allegiance to ones flag and country. While those who acquire
dual citizenship by choice are afforded the right of suffrage, those who seek election or
appointment to public office are required to renounce their foreign citizenship to be deserving
of the public trust. Holding public office demands full and undivided allegiance to the Republic
and to no other.

LABO VS COMELEC

We therefore hold that Arnado, by using his US passport after renouncing his American
citizenship, has recanted the same Oath of Renunciation he took. Section 40(d) of the Local
Government Code applies to his situation. He is disqualified not only from holding the public
office but even from becoming a candidate in the May 2010 elections.

176 SCRA 1 Law on Public Officers Election Laws Citizenship of a Public Officer Dual
Citizenship Labo Doctrine
In 1988, Ramon Labo, Jr. was elected as mayor of Baguio City. His rival, Luis Lardizabal filed
a petition for quo warranto against Labo as Lardizabal asserts that Labo is an Australian

citizen hence disqualified; that he was naturalized as an Australian after he married an

Australian. Labo avers that his marriage with an Australian did not make him an Australian;
that at best he has dual citizenship, Australian and Filipino; that even if he indeed became an
Australian when he married an Australian citizen, such citizenship was lost when his marriage
with the Australian was later declared void for being bigamous. Labo further asserts that even
if hes considered as an Australian, his lack of citizenship is just a mere technicality which
should not frustrate the will of the electorate of Baguio who voted for him by a vast majority.

OH HEK HOW vs REPUBLIC 29 SCRA 94

Facts:
Petitioner Oh Hek How having been granted naturalization through his petition filed a motion
alleging that he had complied with the requirements of Republic Act No. 530 and praying that
he be allowed to take his oath of allegiance as such citizen and issued the corresponding
certificate of naturalization. The Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte issued
forthwith an order authorizing the taking of said oath. On that same date, petitioner took it and
the certificate of naturalization was issued to him. The Government seasonably gave notice of
its intention to appeal from said order of February9, 1966 and filed its record on appeal
among the grounds that the oath was taken prior to judgment having been final
and executory.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Labo can retain his public office.
2. Whether or not Lardizabal, who obtained the second highest vote in the mayoralty race,
can replace Labo in the event Labo is disqualified.
HELD: 1. No. Labo did not question the authenticity of evidence presented against him. He
was naturalized as an Australian in 1976. It was not his marriage to an Australian that made
him an Australian. It was his act of subsequently swearing by taking an oath of allegiance to
the government of Australia. He did not dispute that he needed an Australian passport to
return to the Philippines in 1980; and that he was listed as an immigrant here. It cannot be
said also that he is a dual citizen. Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest
and shall be dealt with by law. He lost his Filipino citizenship when he swore allegiance to
Australia. He cannot also claim that when he lost his Australian citizenship, he became solely
a Filipino. To restore his Filipino citizenship, he must be naturalized or repatriated or be
declared as a Filipino through an act of Congress none of this happened.

Issue:
- Is the oath valid
- Whether or not a permission to renounce citizenship is necessary from the Minister of the
Interior of Nationalist China.
Held:
First issue:
The order of February 9, 1966 (oath-taking) had not and up to the present has not become
final and executory in view of the appeal duly taken by the Government.

Labo, being a foreigner, cannot serve public office. His claim that his lack of citizenship
should not overcome the will of the electorate is not tenable. The people of Baguio could not
have, even unanimously, changed the requirements of the Local Government Code and the
Constitution simply by electing a foreigner (curiously, would Baguio have voted for Labo had
they known he is Australian). The electorate had no power to permit a foreigner owing his
total allegiance to the Queen of Australia, or at least a stateless individual owing no
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, to preside over them as mayor of their city. Only
citizens of the Philippines have that privilege over their countrymen.

2nd Issue:
It is argued that the permission is not required by our laws and that the naturalization of an
alien, as a citizen of the Philippines, is governed exclusively by such laws and cannot be
controlled by any foreign law.
However, the question of how a Chinese citizen may strip himself of that status is necessarily
governed pursuant to Articles 15 and 16 of our Civil Code by the laws of China, not by
those of the Philippines. As a consequence, a Chinese national cannot be naturalized as a
citizen of thePhilippines, unless he has complied with the laws of Nationalist China requiring
previous permission of its Minister of the Interior for the renunciation of nationality.

2. Lardizabal on the other hand cannot assert, through the quo warranto proceeding, that he
should be declared the mayor by reason of Labos disqualification because Lardizabal
obtained the second highest number of vote. It would be extremely repugnant to the basic
concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who has not
acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner and imposed as the
representative of a constituency, the majority of which have positively declared through their
ballots that they do not choose him. Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled
by those who have received the highest number of votes cast in the election for that office,
and it is a fundamental idea in all republican forms of government that no one can be
declared elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority
or plurality of the legal votes cast in the election.

Section 12 of Commonwealth Act No.473 provides, however, that before the naturalization
certificate is issued, the petitioner shall "solemnly swear," interalia, that he renounces
"absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate" and
particularly to the state "of which" he is "a subject or citizen." The obvious purpose of this
requirement is to divest him of his former nationality, before acquiring Philippine citizenship,
because, otherwise, he would have two nationalities and owe allegiance to two (2) distinct
sovereignties, which our laws do not permit, except that, pursuant to Republic Act No. 2639,

"the acquisition of citizenship by a natural-born Filipino citizen from one of the Iberian and any
friendly democratic Ibero-American countries shall not produce loss or forfeiture of his
Philippine citizenship, if the law of that country grants the same privilege to its citizens and
such had been agreed upon by treaty between the Philippines and the foreign country from
which citizenship is acquired."

citizenship without going into the other grounds for cancellation presented by the Solicitor
General.
Philippine citizenship is a pearl of great price which should be cherished and not taken for
granted. Once acquired, its sheen must be burnished and not stained by any wrongdoing
which could constitute ample ground for divesting one of said citizenship. Hence, compliance
with all the requirements of the law must be proved to the satisfaction of the Court and
legislation by Congress.

REP VS LI YAO
FACTS: William Li Yao, a Chinese national, filed a petition for naturalization in 1949. After
hearing, the Court granted the petition and declared Li Yao a naturalized Filipino citizen. Li
Yao subsequently took his oath of allegiance. About fifteen years later, the Republic of the
Philippines, through the Solicitor General, filed a motion to cancel William Li Yao's certificate
of naturalization on the ground that it was fraudulently and illegally obtained. Relying solely
on the ground that William Li Yao evaded the payment of lawful taxes due the government by
under-declaration of income as reflected in his income tax returns for the years 1946-1951,
the lower court granted the petition and cancelled the Certificate of Naturalization of Li Yao. Li
Yao appealed. After the parties had filed their respective briefs, Li Yao died.

NOTTEBOHM CASE
Brief Fact Summary. A month after the start of World War II, Nottebohn (P), a German citizen
who had lived in Guatemala (D) for 34 years, applied for Liechtenstein (P) citizenship.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. Nationality may be disregarded by other states where it is clear that
it was a mere device since the nationality conferred on a party is normally only the concerns
of that nation

ISSUE:
Facts. Nottebohn (P), a German by birth, lived in Guatemala (D) for 34 years, retaining his
German citizenship and family and business ties with it. He however applied for Liechtenstein
(P) citizenship a month after the outbreak of World War II. Nottebohm (P) had no ties with
Liechtenstein but intended to remain in Guatemala. The naturalization application was
approved by Liechtenstein and impliedly waived its three-year. After this approval, Nottebohm
(P) travelled to Liechtenstein and upon his return to Guatemala (D), he was refused entry
because he was deemed to be a German citizen. His Liechtenstein citizenship was not
honored. Liechtenstein (P) thereby filed a suit before the International Court to compel
Guatemala (D) to recognize him as one of its national. Guatemala (D) challenged the validity
of Nottebohms (P) citizenship, the right of Liechtenstein (P) to bring the action and alleged its
belief that Nottebohm (P) remained a German national.

WON the cancellation of the certificate of naturalization made by the government through the
Office of the Solicitor General is valid.
RULING:
Section 18(a) of Com. Act No. 473, known as the Revised Naturalization Act provides that a
naturalization certificate may be cancelled "[i]f it is shown that said naturalization certificate
was obtained fraudelently and illegally." In ordering the cancellation of the naturalization
certificate previously issued to appellant, the lower court sustained the government's motion
for cancellation on the sole finding that Li Yao had committed underdeclaration of income and
underpayment of income tax.
Assuming arguendo, that appellant, as alleged, has fully paid or settled his tax liability under
P.D. No. 68 which granted a tax amnesty, such payment is not a sufficient ground for lifting
the order of the lower court of July 22, 1971 cancelling his certificate of naturalization. The
legal effect of payment under the decree is merely the removal of any civil, criminal or
administrative liability on the part of the taxpayer, only insofar as his tax case is concerned. In
other words, the tax amnesty does not have the effect of obliterating his lack of good moral
character and irreproachable conduct which are grounds for denaturalization.
The lower court based its order of cancellation of citizenship on the finding of evasion of
payment of lawful taxes which is sufficient ground, under Sec. 2 of the Revised Naturalization
Law requiring, among others, that applicant conduct himself "in a proper and irreproachable
manner during the entire period of his residence in the Philippines in his relation with
constituted government as well as with the community in which he is living," to strip him of his

Issue. Must nationality be disregarded by other states where it is clear that it was a mere
device since the nationality conferred on a party is normally the concerns of that nation?
Held. NO. issues relating to citizenship are solely the concern of the granting nation. This is
the general rule. But it does not mean that other states will automatically accept the
conferring states designation unless it has acted in conformity with the general aim of forging
a genuine bond between it and its national aim. In this case, there was no relationship
between Liechtenstein (P) and Nottebohm (P). the change of nationality was merely a
subterfuge mandated by the war. Under this circumstance, Guatemala (D) was not forced to
recognize it. Dismissed.

Discussion. A state putting forth a claim must establish a locus standi for that purpose.
Without interruption and continuously from the time of the injury to the making of an award
been a national of the state making the claim and must not have been a national of the state
against whom the claim has been filed. International law 347 (8th Ed. 1955) Vol.1.

some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual
allegiance is a result of an individual's volition. Article IV Sec. 5 of the Constitution provides
"Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law."
Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike
those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to
the termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon
the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their
status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable
consequence of conflicting laws of different states.

Mercado v. Manzano Case Digest [G.R. No. 135083. May 26, 1999]
FACTS:
Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and Eduardo Manzano were both candidates for Vice-Mayor of
Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections.

By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to
the other country of which they are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual
citizens. It may be that, from the point of view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an
individual has not effectively renounced his foreign citizenship. That is of no moment.

Based on the results of the election, Manzano garnered the highest number of votes.
However, his proclamation was suspended due to the pending petition for disqualification filed
by Ernesto Mercado on the ground that he was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the
United States.

When a person applying for citizenship by naturalization takes an oath that he renounces his
loyalty to any other country or government and solemnly declares that he owes his allegiance
to the Republic of the Philippines, the condition imposed by law is satisfied and complied
with. The determination whether such renunciation is valid or fully complies with the
provisions of our Naturalization Law lies within the province and is an exclusive prerogative of
our courts. The latter should apply the law duly enacted by the legislative department of the
Republic. No foreign law may or should interfere with its operation and application.

From the facts presented, it appears that Manzano is both a Filipino and a US citizen.
The Commission on Elections declared Manzano disqualified as candidate for said elective
position.
However, in a subsequent resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the disqualification of the
respondent was reversed. Respondent was held to have renounced his US citizenship when
he attained the age of majority and registered himself as a voter in the elections of 1992,
1995 and 1998.

The court ruled that the filing of certificate of candidacy of respondent sufficed to renounce
his American citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual
citizen. By declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a
permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the
Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so
without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are
concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have
said before as a dual citizen.

Manzano was eventually proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City on August 31, 1998.
Thus the present petition.
ISSUE:

On the other hand, private respondents oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when
considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education,
practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no
doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.

Whether or not a dual citizen is disqualified to hold public elective office in the philippines.
RULING:

His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made under
oath. Should he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his
Philippine citizenship through expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. DefensorSantiago, the court sustained the denial of entry into the country of petitioner on the ground
that, after taking his oath as a naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his
Portuguese passport and declared in commercial documents executed abroad that he was a

The court ruled that the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. 7160 Sec. 40 (d) and R.A. 7854 Sec.
20 must be understood as referring to dual allegiance. Dual citizenship is different from dual
allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the application of the different laws of two
or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. Dual
allegiance on the other hand, refers to a situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by

Portuguese national. A similar sanction can be taken against any one who, in electing
Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality, but subsequently does some act
constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.

*AS LONG AS STATELESS PERSONS POSSESS ALL THE QUALIFICATIONS,

THEY CAN BE NATURALIZED AS PHILIPPINE CITIZENS W/O THE
REQUIREMENT OF RECIPROCITY.

The petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

VALLES versus COMELEC (337 SCRA 543)

KOOKOORITCHKIN V. SOLGEN (1943)

Facts:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 64 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, assailing Resolutions dated July 17, 1998 and January 15, 1999,
respectively, of the Commission on Elections in SPA No. 98-336, dismissing the petition for
disqualification filed by the herein petitioner, Cirilo R. Valles, against private respondent
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez on citizenship grounds, in May 1998 elections for governor of Davao
Oriental.

FACTS:
-Ermes Kookooritchkin was born in Russia, grew up as a citizen of the now defunct
Imperial Russian Government under the Czars
-during WW1, he was part of Russia's military service
-when the 1917 Russian revolution broke out, he joined the White Russian Army, but
the latter was overwhelmed by the Bolsheviks. He refused to join the Bolshevik
regime so fled to Shanghai and found his way to Manila (arrived under the group of
Admiral Stark in 1923)
-he established permanent residence in Iriga, Camarines Sur since 1925
-he was a guerilla officer during the war
-married a Filipino named Concepcion Segovia, and had a son Ronald, who is
studying at St. Agnes Academy, a school duly recognized by the Government
-he is a shop superintendent and receives an annual salary of P13,200
-can speak and write English and Bicol dialect
(basta, he showed he is qualified and has none of the disqualifications)
-disclaims allegiance to the present Communist Government of Russia
-he filed 1941 petition for naturalization
CFI: granted it
-OSG appealed:
(1) Russian: he failed to show that he has lost Russian citizenship and that Russia
grants to Filipinos the right to become naturalized citizens
(2) failed to establish that he was not disqualified
WON Kookooritchkin should be granted Cert of Naturalization? YES
Kookooritchkin is Stateless: Empire of Russia ceased to exist and he disclaims
allegiance or connection with the Soviet Government now existing in Russia
-It is a "well-known fact that the ruthlessness of modern dictatorships had scattered
throughout the world a large number of stateless refugees or displaced persons, w/o
country and w/o flag. The tyrannical intolerance of said dictatorships toward all
opposition induced them to resort to beastly oppression, concentration camps and
blood purges, and it is only natural that the not so fortunate ones who were able to
escape to foreign countries should feel the loss of all bonds of attachment to the hells
which were formerly their fatherland's."
Don't need to require Kookooritchkin to present evidence that he is stateless and had
no allegiance to Russian republic: He was at war with the said rule, plus acts of
Kookooritchkin show that he does not feel any bond of attachment to the Soviet
dictatorship.

Respondent was born on May 16, 1934 in Australia to a Filipino father and an Australian
mother, who ran for governor of Davao Oriental. In 1998, she applied for an Alien Certificate
of Registration (ACR) and Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR) and was issued an
Australian passport.
Issues:
1. Whether or not respondent is a Filipino.
2. Whether or not, if proven that she is a Filipino, did she, in anyway renounced her citizenship
by applying for ACR and ICR and being issued an Australian passport.
Held:
YES. Respondent is a Filipino since her father is a Filipino.
In 1934, the controlling laws of the Philippines were the Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 and the
Philippine Autonomy Act of August 29, 1916 (Jones Law). Under both organic acts, all
inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899 and resided
therein, including their children, are considered Philippine citizens. Respondents father was
therefore a Filipino, and consequently, her.
As for issue number two, respondent did not lose her citizenship. Renunciation of citizenship
must be express. Applying for ACR, ICR, and Australian passport are not enough to renounce
citizenship. They are merely acts of assertion of her Australian citizenship before she
effectively renounced the same. Holding of an Australian passport and an alien certificate of
registration does not constitute an effective renunciation of citizenship and does not militate
against her claim of Filipino citizenship. At most, she has dual citizenship.
TECSON VS COMELEC
Facts:
Petitioners sought for respondent Poes disqualification in the presidential elections for having
allegedly misrepresented material facts in his (Poes) certificate of candidacy by claiming that

10

he is a natural Filipino citizen despite his parents both being foreigners. Comelec dismissed
the petition, holding that Poe was a Filipino Citizen. Petitioners assail the jurisdiction of the
Comelec, contending that only the Supreme Court may resolve the basic issue on the case
under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not it is the Supreme Court which had jurisdiction.
Whether or not Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that Poe was a
Filipino citizen.
Ruling:
1.) The Supreme Court had no jurisdiction on questions regarding qualification of a candidate
for the presidency or vice-presidency before the elections are held.
"Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal" in connection with Section 4, paragraph 7, of
the 1987 Constitution, refers to contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
the "President" or "Vice-President", of the Philippines which the Supreme Court may take
cognizance, and not of "candidates" for President or Vice-President before the elections.
2.) Comelec committed no grave abuse of discretion in holding Poe as a Filipino Citizen.

SOBEJANA-CONDON VS COMELEC
Facts:
The petitioner is a natural-born Filipino citizen having been born of Filipino parents on August
8, 1944. On December 13, 1984, she became a naturalized Australian citizen owing to her
marriage to a certain Kevin Thomas Condon.
On December 2, 2005, she filed an application to re-acquire Philippine citizenship before the
Philippine Embassy in Canberra, Australia pursuant to Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225 otherwise
known as the "Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003." 5 The application was
approved and the petitioner took her oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on
December 5, 2005.
On September 18, 2006, the petitioner filed an unsworn Declaration of Renunciation of
Australian Citizenship before the Department of Immigration and Indigenous Affairs,
Canberra, Australia, which in turn issued the Order dated September 27, 2006 certifying that
she has ceased to be an Australian citizen.6
The petitioner ran for Mayor in her hometown of Caba, La Union in the 2007 elections. She
lost in her bid. She again sought elective office during the May 10, 2010 elections this time for
the position of Vice-Mayor. She obtained the highest numbers of votes and was proclaimed
as the winning candidate. She took her oath of office on May 13, 2010.
Soon thereafter, private respondents Robelito V. Picar, Wilma P. Pagaduan 7 and Luis M.
Bautista,8 (private respondents) all registered voters of Caba, La Union, filed separate
petitions for quo warranto questioning the petitioners eligibility before the RTC. The petitions
similarly sought the petitioners disqualification from holding her elective post on the ground
that she is a dual citizen and that she failed to execute a "personal and sworn renunciation of
any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath" as
imposed by Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225.
The petitioner denied being a dual citizen and averred that since September 27, 2006, she
ceased to be an Australian citizen. She claimed that the Declaration of Renunciation of
Australian Citizenship she executed in Australia sufficiently complied with Section 5(2), R.A.
No. 9225 and that her act of running for public office is a clear abandonment of her Australian
citizenship.
The trial decision ordered by the trial court declaring Condon disqualified and ineligible to
hold office of vice mayor of Caba La union and nullified her proclamation as the winning
candidate.
After that the decision was appealed to the comelec, but the appeal was dismissed y the
second division and affirmed the decision of the trial court.
The petitioner contends that since she ceased to be an Australian citizen on September 27,
2006, she no longer held dual citizenship and was only a Filipino citizen when she filed her
certificate of candidacy as early as the 2007 elections. Hence, the "personal and sworn
renunciation of foreign citizenship" imposed by Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 to dual citizens
seeking elective office does not apply to her.

The 1935 Constitution on Citizenship, the prevailing fundamental law on respondents birth,
provided that among the citizens of the Philippines are "those whose fathers are citizens of
the Philippines."
Tracing respondents paternal lineage, his grandfather Lorenzo, as evidenced by the latters
death certificate was identified as a Filipino Citizen. His citizenship was also drawn from the
presumption that having died in 1954 at the age of 84, Lorenzo would have been born in
1870. In the absence of any other evidence, Lorenzos place of residence upon his death in
1954 was presumed to be the place of residence prior his death, such that Lorenzo Pou
would have benefited from the "en masse Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected in
1902. Being so, Lorenzos citizenship would have extended to his son, Allan---respondents
father.
Respondent, having been acknowledged as Allans son to Bessie, though an American
citizen, was a Filipino citizen by virtue of paternal filiation as evidenced by the respondents
birth certificate. The 1935 Constitution on citizenship did not make a distinction on the
legitimacy or illegitimacy of the child, thus, the allegation of bigamous marriage and the
allegation that respondent was born only before the assailed marriage had no bearing on
respondents citizenship in view of the established paternal filiation evidenced by the public
documents presented.
But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his
favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to
Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code.

11

Issue: W/N petitioner disqualified from running for elective office due to failure to renounce
her Australian Citizenship in accordance with Sec. 5 (2) of R.A 9225

of Azucenas counsel, allowed her to present evidence ex-parts before the Clerk of Court.
After completion of the testimony, the RTC granted Azucenas petition and declared her
eligible for Filipino citizenship, which the OSG contested, citing as grounds the lack of a
public hearing when the fourt allowed ex-parts presentation of evidence, and the lack of proof
of lawful income/occupation by Azucena. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
judgment of the RTC, hence, the OSG elevated the case to the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court:
Under existing laws, an alien may acquire Philippine citizenship through either judicial
naturalization under CA 473 or administrative naturalization under Republic Act No. 9139 (the
Administrative Naturalization Law of 2000). A third option, called derivative naturalization,
which is available to alien women married to Filipino husbands is found under Section 15 of
CA 473, which provides that:
[a]ny woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines and who
might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.
Under this provision, foreign women who are married to Philippine citizens may be deemed
ipso facto Philippine citizens and it is neither necessary for them to prove that they possess
other qualifications for naturalization at the time of their marriage nor do they have to submit
themselves to judicial naturalization. Copying from similar laws in the United States which has
since been amended, the Philippine legislature retained Section 15 of CA 473, which then
reflects its intent to confer Filipino citizenship to the alien wife thru derivative naturalization.
Thus, the Court categorically declared in Moy Ya Lim Yao v. Commissioner of Immigration:
Accordingly, We now hold, all previous decisions of this Court indicating otherwise
notwithstanding, that under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying
a Filipino, native born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not
disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law. Likewise, an
alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized here follows the Philippine
citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she
does not suffer from any of the disqualifications under said Section 4.[39]
As stated in Moy Ya Lim Yao, the procedure for an alien wife to formalize the conferment of
Filipino citizenship is as follows:
Regarding the steps that should be taken by an alien woman married to a Filipino citizen in
order to acquire Philippine citizenship, the procedure followed in the Bureau of Immigration is
as follows: The alien woman must file a petition for the cancellation of her alien certificate of
registration alleging, among other things, that she is married to a Filipino citizen and that she
is not disqualified from acquiring her husbands citizenship pursuant to Section 4 of
Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. Upon the filing of said petition, which should be
accompanied or supported by the joint affidavit of the petitioner and her Filipino husband to
the effect that the petitioner does not belong to any of the groups disqualified by the cited
section from becoming naturalized Filipino citizen x x x, the Bureau of Immigration conducts
an investigation and thereafter promulgates its order or decision granting or denying the
petition.
Records however show that in February 1980, Azucena applied before the then Commission
on Immigration and Deportation (CID) for the cancellation of her Alien Certificate of
Registration (ACR) No. 030705[41] by reason of her marriage to a Filipino citizen. The CID

Ruling:
R.A. No. 9225 allows the retention and re-acquisition of Filipino citizenship for natural-born
citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship 18 by taking an oath of allegiance to the
Republic.
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of
a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath.
The oath is an abbreviated repatriation process that restores ones Filipino citizenship and all
civil and political rights and obligations concomitant therewith, subject to certain conditions
imposed in Section 5.
Section 5, paragraph 2 provides:
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for
holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of
the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and
all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.
On September 18, 2006, or a year before she initially sought elective public office, she filed a
renunciation of Australian citizenship in Canberra, Australia. Admittedly, however, the same
was not under oath contrary to the exact mandate of Section 5(2) that the renunciation of
foreign citizenship must be sworn before an officer authorized to administer oath.
The supreme court said that, the renunciation of her Australian citizenship was invalid due to
it was not oath before any public officer authorized to administer it rendering the act of
Condon void.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The
Resolution dated September 6, 2011 of the Commission on Elections en bane in EAC (AE).
REPUBLIC VS BATUIGAS
An Alien Wife Married To A Filipino Is Entitled To Filipino Citizenship
Azucena was born to Chinese parents in Zamboanga in 1941. She had never departed the
Philippines since birth. She can speak several Philippine languages and dialects, and studied
in Philippine schools, graduating with a degree in Bachelor of Science in education. She
practiced teaching for five years. In 1968, she married Santiago, a Filipino citizen. They have
five children, who studied in Philippine schools and are now professionals, two working
abroad. She then helped her husband in their business of rice milling, retail business and rice
and corn distribution. As proof of income, she submitted their joint income tax return. On
December 2, 2002, Azucena filed a petition for naturalisation before the RTC of Zamboanga
del Sur, alleging that she possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications
required under CA 473. The Solicitor General filed a Motion to Dismiss, alleging that she did
not posses the lawful income or occupation required for naturalization. Ruling that the matter
is evidentiary, the RTC denied the same. After compliance with jurisdictional requisites, where
no representatives from the OSG or the Provincial Prosecutor appeared, the RTC on motion

12

granted her application. However, the Ministry of Justice set aside the ruling of the CID as it
found no sufficient evidence that Azucenas husband is a Filipino citizen as only their
marriage certificate was presented to establish his citizenship.
Having been denied of the process in the CID, Azucena was constrained to file a Petition for
judicial naturalization based on CA 473. While this would have been unnecessary if the
process at the CID was granted in her favor, there is nothing that prevents her from seeking
acquisition of Philippine citizenship through regular naturalization proceedings available to all
qualified foreign nationals. The choice of what option to take in order to acquire Philippine
citizenship rests with the applicant. In this case, Azucena has chosen to file a Petition for
judicial naturalization under CA 473. The fact that her application for derivative naturalization
under Section 15 of CA 473 was denied should not prevent her from seeking judicial
naturalization under the same law. It is to be remembered that her application at the CID was
denied not because she was found to be disqualified, but because her husbands citizenship
was not proven. Even if the denial was based on other grounds, it is proper, in a judicial
naturalization proceeding, for the courts to determine whether there are in fact grounds to
deny her of Philippine citizenship based on regular judicial naturalization proceedings.
As the records before this Court show, Santiagos Filipino citizenship has been adequately
proven. Under judicial proceeding, Santiago submitted his birth certificate indicating therein
that he and his parents are Filipinos. He also submitted voters registration, land titles, and
business registrations/licenses, all of which are public records. He has always comported
himself as a Filipino citizen, an operative fact that should have enabled Azucena to avail of
Section 15 of CA 473. On the submitted evidence, nothing would show that Azucena suffers
from any of the disqualifications under Section 4 of the same Act.
However, the case before us is a Petition for judicial naturalization and is not based on
Section 15 of CA 473 which was denied by the then Ministry of Justice. The lower court which
heard the petition and received evidence of her qualifications and absence of disqualifications
to acquire Philippine citizenship, has granted the Petition, which was affirmed by the CA. We
will not disturb the findings of the lower court which had the opportunity to hear and scrutinize
the evidence presented during the hearings on the Petition, as well as determine, based on
Azucenas testimony and deportment during the hearings, that she indeed possesses all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications for acquisition of Philippine citizenship.
The OSG has filed this instant Petition on the ground that Azucena does not have the
qualification required in no. 4 of Section 2 of CA 473 as she does not have any lucrative
income, and that the proceeding in the lower court was not in the nature of a public hearing.
The OSG had the opportunity to contest the qualifications of Azucena during the initial
hearing scheduled on May 18, 2004. However, the OSG or the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor failed to appear in said hearing, prompting the lower court to order ex parte
presentation of evidence before the Clerk of Court on November 5, 2004. The OSG was also
notified of the ex parte proceeding, but despite notice, again failed to appear. The OSG had
raised this same issue at the CA and was denied for the reasons stated in its Decision. We
find no reason to disturb the findings of the CA on this issue. Neither should this issue further
delay the grant of Philippine citizenship to a woman who was born and lived all her life, in the
Philippines, and devoted all her life to the care of her Filipino family. She has more than
demonstrated, under judicial scrutiny, her being a qualified Philippine citizen. On the second

issue, we also affirm the findings of the CA that since the government who has an interest in,
and the only one who can contest, the citizenship of a person, was duly notified through the
OSG and the Provincial Prosecutors office, the proceedings have complied with the public
hearing requirement under CA 473.
No. 4, Section 2 of CA 473 provides as qualification to become a Philippine citizen:
4. He must own real estate in the Philippines worth not less than five thousand pesos,
Philippine currency, or must have known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation.
Azucena is a teacher by profession and has actually exercised her profession before she had
to quit her teaching job to assume her family duties and take on her role as joint provider,
together with her husband, in order to support her family. Together, husband and wife were
able to raise all their five children, provided them with education, and have all become
professionals and responsible citizens of this country. Certainly, this is proof enough of both
husband and wifes lucrative trade. Azucena herself is a professional and can resume
teaching at any time. Her profession never leaves her, and this is more than sufficient
guarantee that she will not be a charge to the only country she has known since birth.
Moreover, the Court acknowledged that the main objective of extending the citizenship
privilege to an alien wife is to maintain a unity of allegiance among family members, thus:
It is, therefore, not congruent with our cherished traditions of family unity and identity that a
husband should be a citizen and the wife an alien, and that the national treatment of one
should be different from that of the other. Thus, it cannot be that the husbands interests in
property and business activities reserved by law to citizens should not form part of the
conjugal partnership and be denied to the wife, nor that she herself cannot, through her own
efforts but for the benefit of the partnership, acquire such interests. Only in rare instances
should the identity of husband and wife be refused recognition, and we submit that in respect
of our citizenship laws, it should only be in the instances where the wife suffers from the
disqualifications stated in Section 4 of the Revised Naturalization Law.
We are not unmindful of precedents to the effect that there is no proceeding authorized by the
law or by the Rules of Court, for the judicial declaration of the citizenship of an individual.
Such judicial declaration of citizenship cannot even be decreed pursuant to an alternative
prayer therefor in a naturalization proceeding.
This case however is not a Petition for judicial declaration of Philippine citizenship but rather
a Petition for judicial naturalization under CA 473. In the first, the petitioner believes he is a
Filipino citizen and asks a court to declare or confirm his status as a Philippine citizen. In the
second, the petitioner acknowledges he is an alien, and seeks judicial approval to acquire the
privilege of becoming a Philippine citizen based on requirements required under CA 473.
Azucena has clearly proven, under strict judicial scrutiny, that she is qualified for the grant of
that privilege, and this Court will not stand in the way of making her a part of a truly Filipino
family.
YU VS SANTIAGO
GR # L-83882, January 24, 1989 (Constitutional Law Citizenship, Express Renunciation)
FACTS: In the case at bar, herein petitioner, despite his naturalization as a Philippine citizen, applied
and renewed his Portuguese passport. Moreover, while still a citizen of the Philippines, petitioner also
declared his nationality as Portuguese in commercial documents he signed.

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ISSUE: Whether or not the acts of applying for a foreign passport and declaration of foreign nationality

HELD: Yes, the foregoing acts considered together constitute an express renunciation of petitioners

in commercial documents, constitute an express renunciation of ones Philippine citizenship acquired

Philippine citizenship acquired through naturalization. In a related jurisprudence, express renunciation

through naturalization.

was held to mean a renunciation that is made known distinctly and explicitly and not left to inference or
implication.

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