Bengson v.

House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal

Facts:
The case concerns the citizrnship of respondent Teodoro C. Cruz and his
eligibility for the House of Representatives.
Respondents was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in
San Clemente, Tarlac. Both parents are Filipinos.
On November 5, 1985, Cruz joined the United States Marine Corps and
took oath of allegiance to the U.S. and as a consequence he lost his philippine
citizenship.
Then he reacquired his Philippine Citizenship through repatriation under
the Republic Act No. 2630. then, he ran and was elected as a representative of
the Second District of Pangasinan defeating Petitioner Bengson who was then
running for reeelection.
Bengson file a Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal, claiming that Cruz was not a natural-born
citizen.
HRET dismissed the petition thus, petitiner petitioned with the Supreme
Court.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent Cruz, a natural-born Filipino citizen who bacame an
American citizen, can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon reacquisition
of Philippine citizenship.

Ruling:
Yes. The 1987 Constitution defines natural-born citizens of the Philippines
as those who from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect
their Philippine Citizenship.
And, citizenship may be acquired by birth and by naturalization. Filipinos
who have lost their citizenship may reacquire it through naturalization,
repatriation, or by direct act of Congress as per Commonwealth Act No. 63.
In this case, Cruz was a natural-born citizen before he lost his citizenship
but later restored through repatriation.

TITLE: CO vs. HRET

FACTS:
Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second district of Northern
Samar.
However, the petitioners filed election protests against the private respondent alleging that Jose Ong,
Jr. is not a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.
The records show that the respondent is Jose Ong Chuan's son, born in China in 1905. His father grew
up in Samar since 1915, and married a natural-born Filipino, Agripina Lao.
In the meantime, the father of the private respondent, unsure of his legal status and in an unequivocal
affirmation of where he cast his life and family, filed with the Court of First Instance of Samar an
application for naturalization on February 15, 1954.
Jose Ong Chuan took his Oath of Allegiance; correspondingly, a certificate of naturalization was issued
to him. The respondent was then nine years old.
In 1971, his elder brother, Emil, was elected as a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention. His
status as a natural born citizen was challenged. Parenthetically, the Convention which in drafting the
Constitution removed the unequal treatment given to derived citizenship on the basis of the mother's
citizenship formally and solemnly declared Emil Ong, respondent's full brother, as a natural born
Filipino.
For the elections of 1984 and 1986, Jose Ong, Jr. registered himself as a voter of Laoang, Samar, and
correspondingly, voted there during those elections.
Mr. Ong was overwhelmingly voted by the people of Northern Samar as their representative in
Congress.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not Jose L. Ong, Jr is a natural-born Filipino Citizen?
RULING:
YES. Jose L. Ong, Jr is a natural-born Filipino Citizen.
Section 1 (3), Article IV of the Constitution provides that Filipino citizens are those born before
January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority.
SECTION 2, Natural-born Citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without
having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship
in accordance with paragraph 3 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens.
The Court interprets Section 1, Paragraph 3 above as applying not only to those who elect Philippine
citizenship after February 2, 1987 but also to those who, having been born of Filipino mothers, elected
citizenship before that date.
The provision in question was enacted to correct the anomalous situation where one born of a Filipino
father and an alien mother was automatically granted the status of a natural-born citizen while one born
of a Filipino mother and an alien father would still have to elect Philippine citizenship. If one so
elected, he was not, under earlier laws, conferred the status of a natural-born.
To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing elected citizenship when he came of age is to
ask for the unnatural and unnecessary. The reason is obvious. He was already a citizen. Not only was
his mother a natural born citizen but his father had been naturalized when the respondent was only nine
(9) years old. He could not have divined when he came of age that in 1973 and 1987 the Constitution
would be amended to require him to have filed a sworn statement in 1969 electing citizenship inspite of
his already having been a citizen since 1957. In 1969, election through a sworn statement would have
been an unusual and unnecessary procedure for one who had been a citizen since he was nine years old.
The respondent HRET has an interesting view as to how Mr. Ong elected citizenship. It observed that
"when protestee was only nine years of age, his father, Jose Ong Chuan became a naturalized Filipino.
Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Act squarely applies its benefit to him for he was then a minor
residing in this country. Concededly, it was the law itself that had already elected Philippine
citizenship for protestee by declaring him as such."

TITLE: GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS VS. MONTE DE PIEDAD

FACTS:
In June 1863 a devastating earthquake occurred in the Philippines. The Spanish Government then
provided $400,000 as aid for the victims and it was received by the Philippine Treasury. Out of the
said amount, $80,000 was left untouched; it was then invested in the Monte de Piedad Bank which in
turn invested the amount in jewelries. But when the Philippine government later tried to withdraw
the said amount, the bank cannot provide for the amount. The government then filed a complaint.
The bank argued that the Philippine government is not an affected party hence has no right to
institute a complaint. The bank argues that the government was not the intended beneficiary of the
said amount.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Philippine government is competent to file a complaint against the
respondent bank.
RULING:
Yes. The Philippine government is competent to institute action against Monte de Piedad, this is in
accordance with the doctrine of Parens Patriae. The government being the protector of the rights of
the people has the inherent supreme power to enforce such laws that will promote the public
interest. No other party has been entrusted with such right hence as parent of the people, the
government has the right to take back the money intended for the people.

TITLE: CABANA VS. PILAPIL

FACTS:
Florentino Pilapil insured himself and instituted as beneficiary, his child, with his brother, defendant
Francisco Pilapil, to act as trustee during her minority. Upon his death, the proceeds were paid to him.
Hence this complaint by the mother, with whom the child is living, seeking the delivery of such sum.
She filed the bond required by the Civil Code. Defendant would justify his claim to the retention of the
amount in question by invoking the terms of the insurance policy.
The lower court rendered judgment ordering the defendant to deliver the proceeds of the policy in
question to the plaintiff.
ISSUE: Whether or not the state may interfere by virtue of parens patriae to the terms of the insurance
policy.

HELD: Yes.
The decision is supported by its adherence to the concept that the judiciary, as an agency of the State
acting as parens patriae, is called upon whenever a pending suit of litigation affects one who is a minor
to accord priority to his best interest. It may happen, as it did occur here, that family relations may
press their respective claims. It would be more in consonance not only with the natural order of things
but the tradition of the country for a parent to be preferred.
It is a mother asserting priority. Certainly the judiciary as the instrumentality of the State in its role
of parens patriae, cannot remain insensible to the validity of her plea.
State shall strengthen the family as a basic social institution. If, as the Constitution so wisely dictates, it
is the family as a unit that has to be strengthened, it does not admit of doubt that even if a stronger case
were presented for the uncle, still deference to a constitutional mandate would have led the lower court
to decide as it did.