1

General introduction: the development of David Bohms ideas from the

plasma to the implicate order
B.J.Hiley and F.David Peat
David Bohm was born in Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania, in 1917. His father ran a successful furniture business, making his way to the USA from what was
then Austria-Hungary. There appears to be no physics whatsoever in the family background. Bohm, himself, became interested in science at an early age,
being urged on by a fascination of finding out how things worked. By the age of eight he had already been introduced to science fiction. This fired his
imagination and generated in him a deep interest in real science. But it was the nature of the real world that fascinated him most. He recalls the profound
effect that a book on astronomy had on him in those formative years. He was struck by the vast order and regularity of the universe. This impressed him
so much that he began to devote a great deal of time to science.
Needless to say, his father became somewhat concerned about the boys future. Being a successful businessman, he could not imagine how anyone
could make a living out of scientism as he insisted on calling it. Young David took this as a challenge and using his earlier interest in redesigning
mechanical devices he decided to try to make money out of inventing. He was rather proud of one invention in particular: namely, a dropless pitcher.
(This ingenious item had nothing at all to do with that great American sporting pastime, baseball. It was a jug or teapot that did not drip!) His principal
concern now became how to make this design pay. After almost giving up in despair, he came across an advertisement in a popular science magazine
offering, for the sum of $5, advice on how to exploit financially a good invention. Off went the $5 and back came some advice on how to obtain a patent.
But that, of course, would cost a few hundred dollars! Would it be worth it? The answer (apparently, included in the $5!) was to do a door-to-door
survey to test market demand! It was at

this point in his life that he determined that he would become a theoretical physicist.
As he began to study physics seriously, he was repeatedly struck by the interconnectedness of what, at a superficial glance, seemed to be totally
unrelated phenomena. As he delved deeper into the substructure of matter and its movement, this characteristic of a rich and highly interconnected
substructure became more and more apparent. Furthermore, as Bohm saw it, these deeper structures seemed to possess properties which did not reflect
the way physicists were talking about the behaviour of matter. In quantum mechanics, for example, it seemed that this interconnectedness was vital, yet the
usual presentation of the subject seemed to minimise this aspect of the phenomena.
In Bohms original perception, this notion of interconnectedness was rather vague and ill-defined but with its continual reappearance in different forms,
the notion slowly took shape, ultimately leading to a very radical and novel way of looking at reality. This view eventually crystallised into what he now
terms the implicate order. But much was to happen before that idea eventually became clear.
The first formal indication of Bohms departure from orthodoxy can be traced to his reformulation of quantum mechanics published in Physical Review
in 1952.1 But the ideas that lay behind that formulation seem to many to be totally against the spirit of his later work on the implicate order, so much so
that they find it hard to see any connection at all. It is true that those papers were more intent on demonstrating that there was another logically coherent
interpretation of the quantum mechanical formalism, other than the usual one. But it is the ideas implicit in this reformulation that have connections with the
notion of the implicate order. Since there has been some interest in this connection, we have asked David to write a short article outlining what he sees as
the essential relationship between the two.2
We would like here to present an overall sketch of the relevant background in which Bohms ideas took shape so that the reader can appreciate the
significance of the various developments in a broader context. This will also enable us to relate the various contributions to this book to the same
background and so see where they fit in. By doing this we hope the book will become more than a collection of isolated contributions.
Bohms interest in the fundamental questions of physics started at high school. Even at that early stage he was beginning to ask how the theories of
physics enable one to build up an understanding of reality. At college he soon quickly became fascinated with quantum mechanics and relativity as he
began to study these subjects in depth for the first time.
After graduating he began his research project under the supervision of Robert Oppenheimer. His dissertation topic involved a theoretical

study of neutron-proton scattering. Yet even while working on this technical problem, he kept up his interests in fundamentals, always probing deeper into
quantum theory and relativity. He remembers his long discussions with Joseph Weinberg, who had made a study of Bohrs point of view. During that
period he admits to becoming a supporter of Bohrs position.
Before receiving his doctorate in 1943 from Berkeley, he moved to the Radiation Laboratory where he worked on problems connected with the later
phases of the Manhattan Project. He was involved in a theoretical study of the ionisation of uranium fluoride in an electric arc which formed part of the
broader study of the problems involved in the separation of 235U from 238U. Thus began his interest in plasma physics, to which he made some
outstanding contributions.
Although much of this work was basically involved in technical problems, Bohm could not help noticing the philosophical implications. The individual
particles in the plasma were highly correlated and behaved like an organic whole rather than a mechanistic system. The plasma constantly regenerated
itself and surrounded all impurities with a sheath so as to isolate them completely. To understand in more detail how the plasma functioned, it was
necessary to study the relation between the individual and the collective modes of behaviour. It was here that he introduced the idea of collective coordinates and developed a general way of handling plasmas.
When he took up the post of assistant professor at Princeton University he extended his earlier ideas to study the behaviour of electrons in metals,
where quantum mechanics played an essential role. It was his innovative work in this area that established David Bohms reputation as a theoretical
physicist.
Neither of the editors knew Bohm in those days, but fortunately Eugene Gross, who was one of Bohms first graduate students, has given a personal
sketch of Bohms thinking in the period he spent at Princeton. This is presented in the introduction to his article on Collective variables in elementary
quantum mechanics which appears in this volume.3 We are particularly grateful for his contribution and find that the final paragraph to his introduction
captures the feeling that many of us, students and colleagues, felt towards David Bohm: a totally unselfish man who shares his latest thoughts on many
topics with his colleagues and students alike. This enthusiasm for the search for order in nature continues unabated today.
The main part of Grosss contribution is an illustration of how collective co-ordinates can provide a useful way of understanding the behaviour of
different systems. He takes as examples the atom-molecule transition, the electron interacting with two lattice oscillators and ends with some remarks
concerning the polaron problem. The following article is by another of Bohms graduate students, David Pines.4 It is a masterful review of some of the
basic ideas involved in

the development of plasma physics. He also outlines the role played by Bohm in developing the concepts needed to deal with the problems, and touches
on the application of the random phase approximation and its use in liquid helium (4He).
While still at Princeton, Bohm was asked to give a course of lectures on quantum mechanics to undergraduates and was faced with the task of
presenting a clear account of the subject that had fascinated him for some time. Here was a theory that had emerged after a long struggle by many
physicists to account correctly for a wide range of experimental results, which the classical theory could not even begin to explain. But the conceptual
structure of this theory was very different from that of the classical theory. It implied a radical change in our outlook on reality. But precisely what were the
nature of these changes did not yet seem very clear. The majority view was (and still is) that the precise nature of the conceptual changes are not
important. All that was needed was to work with the self-consistent mathematical formalism, which, in some mysterious way, correctly predicts the
numerical results of actual experiments.
After lecturing on the subject for three years, Bohm thought that this was not a satisfactory position to adopt so he decided to try to get a better
understanding of the subject by writing a definitive textbook in which the physical aspects of the mathematics would be emphasised. Part of the task
would involve clarifying Bohrs interpretation of the theory by drawing, to some extent, on Bohrs book Atomic Theory and the Description of
Nature.5
It was while writing his book that he came into conflict with what eventually became known as McCarthyism. A year or so after arriving at Princeton he
was called to appear before the Un-American Activities Committee, a committee of the House of Representatives. He was asked to testify against
colleagues and associates. After taking legal advice he decided to plead the Fifth Amendment. A year or so later, while he was in the middle of his book,
his plea was rejected and he was indicted for contempt of Congress. While awaiting trial, the Supreme Court ruled that no one should be forced to testify
if the testimony is self-incriminating, provided no crime had been committed. Since no crime had been committed the indictment against Bohm was
dropped.
During this period the University advised Bohm to stay away, one of the few benefits to emerge from this whole sordid affair. During his enforced
isolation he was able to complete the book far sooner than he had anticipated. After that, however, with his contract at Princeton expired, he was unable
to obtain a job in the USA and was advised by Oppenheimer to leave the country before the full force of McCarthyism took effect. Fortunately he had
some friends in Brazil who were able to offer him a professorship in the University in So Paulo. He held this post from 1951 to 1955.

The textbook Quantum Theory was first published by Prentice-Hall in 1951 and is still in print today. It is generally regarded as one of the best
textbooks of its day. Apart from a clear presentation of the main physical ideas lying behind the formalism, the book has the additional merit of discussing
some of the more difficult aspects of the theory usually omitted from modern texts. For example it contains sections on the approach to the classical limit,
the measurement problem and the Einstein, Podolsky, Rosen (EPR) paradox. The latter was of particular importance since it reformulated the EPR
example in terms of correlated spin one-half systems. This discussion not only clarified the essential issues raised in the debate but also led to the
suggestion of using positronium decay and optical cascades in actual experiments designed specifically to explore the consequences of EPR situations.
These experiments have been significant in moving the continuing debate from what was generally regarded as a realm of speculative philosophy, or even
theology, into hard physics.
All three of the above topics are still the subject of many current research papers. Indeed the contributions of Clark,6 Leggett7 and Penrose8 are
directly concerned with these topics. Terry Clark reports the experimental progress that his group at Sussex University have made in demonstrating
quantum mechanical behaviour over macroscopic distances using SQUIDS. The aim has been to develop experimental techniques that could lead to a
better understanding of macroscopic quantum mechanics and to explore a new approach to the measurement problem.
Tony Leggett presents an excellent review of the measurement problem which he believes to be a glaring indication of the inadequacy of quantum
mechanics as a total world view. He maps out an exploration of the likely direction in which it will break down. His discussion centres around the type of
experiments discussed by Clark. By a vigorous and critical approach in these directions he hopes to provide a better understanding of how pure states
can be converted into mixtures, thus connecting the microworld with our familiar classical macroscopic world. Roger Penrose examines a similar question,
arguing that an essentially new and non-linear physical input to bring about the collapse is needed and that this input should come from a generalrelativistic gravity. He argues that the non-local nature of the collapse of the wave function could be connected with the fact that in general relativity the
energy cannot be defined locally.
These types of difficulties always tend to leave an uneasy feeling that we really have not got to the bottom of quantum theory. As Gell-Mann puts it,
Quantum Mechanics, that mysterious, confusing discipline which none of us really understands but which we know how to use.9 The problem is that we
do not know precisely where the difficulty actually lies. It is quite clear that quantum theory is a statistical theory in the sense that the description of the
individual

particle can only be given in terms of a probability of it being observed at a certain point in space-time. There is no description of the individual process
except in terms of its possible observation by some suitable measuring device. There is no way to understand what is happening: there is no actual fact.
There is only a sequence of results of measurements, with no possibility of discussing what goes on between measurements.
This feature has led some physicists to question the existence of micro-realism. Bernard dEspagnat has given a great deal of attention to this question in
his books on the Conceptual Foundations of Quantum Mechanics10 and In Search of Reality.11 In the present volume he continues the discussion in a
new way that involves a detailed comparison of Wheelers point of view, which is essentially Bohrian, and that of Bell, who assumes there is a microreality.12
In classical physics, of course, any description in terms of probability can ultimately be understood in terms of ensemble averages over a well-defined
individual behaviour. Here the statistical results would have their origins in a collection of well-defined individual events. Is there an underlying individual
behaviour that could account for the statistical results of quantum mechanics? Of course, the individual behaviour would not be classical, but something
different. The existence of such processes would not in any way detract from the present statistical theory which would still be valid and very useful in
dealing with the more common situation involving many particles, such as for example in electron conduction, etc. However, if an underlying process did
exist then an understanding of this process would lead to a better intuitive understanding of the quantum phenomena in general.
If such a process existed then it would require some set of parameters to specify it and traditionally these parameters have been called hidden,
presumably because one is discussing a new, as yet unknown, process. All attempts in that direction were brought to a halt as a result of a theorem
contained in von Neumanns book The Mathematical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics. He writes, after presenting the theorem, It should be
noted that we need not go any further into the mechanism of the hidden parameters since we know that the established results of quantum mechanics can
never be rederived with their help.13 Because of the high (and justified) mathematical reputation of von Neumann, this statement, together with the various
writings of Bohr, Heisenberg, Pauli, etc., gave rise to the dogma that there is no alternative. The wave function had now come to be regarded as the most
complete description of the state of the system, a statement which essentially creates many of the problems of quantum mechanics.
A year or two after completing his book, Bohm produced an alternative approach to quantum mechanics which he published as two papers in the
Physical Review. They were entitled A suggested

interpretation of the quantum theory in terms of hidden variables.1 The original purpose of these two papers was simply to show that there is, in fact, an
alternative interpretation of quantum mechanics contrary to von Neumanns remarks and the prevailing view of that time. As Bohm points out in his
second book, Causality and Chance in Modern Physics, this approach was never intended to be an ultimate definitive statement of what lies behind
quantum mechanics.14 Rather it was simply intended to point out that certain assumptions are made in the usual interpretation which turned out to be too
restrictive. Indeed this alternative interpretation allows certain things to be done which in the ordinary approach are deemed to be impossible. As Bell puts
it, In 1952 I saw the impossible done.15 (Some of the features of this approach had already been anticipated by de Broglie16 in the pilot wave theory
and by Madelung17 in his hydrodynamical approach. However, both theories faced serious difficulties with many-body systems. In fact de Broglie
conceded defeat by an objection raised by Pauli18 and gave up his approach until Bohm showed how Paulis objection could be answered.1)
Unfortunately the physics community did not take very kindly to the appearance of this alternative view. Certainly the physicists who had contributed
most to the evolution of the ordinary interpretation felt there was some fundamental flaw in Bohms argument. Some of the early technical objections
raised were quickly answered as they were based on a misunderstanding of how the approach actually worked. In fact, no sustainable technical
objections against the theory have ever been made. In its primitive form, the approach gives the same statistical results as the quantum theory and
therefore experiment cannot be the arbitrator. Ultimately the objections have their roots in the assumptions one makes about the nature of reality, i.e. what
constitutes a set of reasonable requirements necessary for a physical theory to be acceptable?
Such a question falls outside the normal sphere of discourse of the usual physics journals and it is not surprising to find that nearly all the objections to
the theory appear in books, conference reports or Festschrifts of one kind or another. What we have found remarkable is the emotional nature of the
responses. For example, in his book Physics and Philosophy, Heisenberg tries to sustain the argument that it is logically impossible to develop an
alternative point of view and starts with a quotation from Bohr: We may hope that it will later turn out that sometimes 2+2=5.19 But exactly where the
logical contradictions lie is never made clear. Again in the Born-Einstein letters, Born writes, Pauli has come up with an idea that slays Bohm.20 An
examination of Paulis article21 in Louis de Broglie, physicien et penseur reveals a criticism that can only accuse the alternative approach of being
metaphysical; a word which nowadays, together with the word philosophical, is used as a derogatory euphemism to

condemn a theory which doesnt fit into the common consensus. The situation has been summarised very succinctly by Bopp: We say that Bohms theory
cannot be refuted, adding, however, that we dont believe it.22
But it is not simply a question of belief. Bohms original intention was to show that a consistent alternative does actually exist. This, in itself, is important
since it opens the possibility of exploring new ideas without being trapped into believing there is no possible alternative. As someone once aptly remarked,
I do not know whether quantum mechanics is a beautiful building or a prison with very high walls. With the appearance of an alternative approach at
least a ray of light has appeared through those very high walls!
The emotive terms associated with these arguments led to the implicit view that to mention the term hidden variables was in some sense to commit a
cardinal heresy. Even today the term often provokes a sceptical, if not irrational and antagonistic, response. Bohm now admits it might have been a
mistake to call his theory a hidden variable theory. After all, it only uses positions and momenta, whereas the real drive for the hidden variable approach
was to find additional parameters to describe the underlying process.
One can sympathise with the use of the term hidden in the sense that although a particle can have a simultaneous position and momentum, we still
cannot measure them simultaneously. It is in this sense they were called hidden. But perhaps it would be more appropriate to call the wave function
the hidden variable23 because, although both x and p can be measured (even though not simultaneously), itself only shows up indirectly through the
quantum potential, which is reflected only in the behaviour of the ensemble of particles. In the 1952 work the quantum potential plays a crucial role. The
essential difference between classical and quantum mechanics is accounted for by this potential. We will bring these features out later.
To answer the more general criticisms of his approach, Bohm presented his own ideas in a broader context in his book Causality and Chance in
Modern Physics.14 This book showed that Bohm was not only a master in handling the mathematical tools used in physics but that he could also think
deeply about the philosophical background implicit in the physicists framework. The book begins by analysing the philosophy of mechanism, within which
the nineteenth century physics had developed. It then goes on to discuss the usual interpretation of quantum mechanics within this context and to explain,
in more general terms, the alternative approach that he outlined in his 1952 papers. Here we already see emerging, for the first time, his dissatisfaction with
his 1952 papers. He stressed that his discontent was not with the logical consistency of the approach. Rather he felt that it did not go far enough and
thought that it was in some way a coarse-grained view of something yet deeper underlying quantum mechanics.

In his final chapter he raised the possibility of a more general concept of physical laws that went beyond mechanism. He suggested the notion of the
qualitative infinity of nature in which all theories have limitations on their domains of validity so that every theory must be qualified by its context, conditions
and degrees of approximation to which they are valid. In this way scientific research can be freed from irrelevant restrictions which tend to result from the
supposition that a particular set of general properties, qualities and laws must be the correct ones to use in all possible contexts and conditions and to all
degrees of approximation. This was a clear signal that David Bohm was not going to be tied down by any consensus that insisted that quantum mechanics
was the last word and that all that was left was to obey its rules.
Again this position was not well received in the late 1950s and early 1960s. The physics community in general had made up its mind that the earlier
achievements of quantum electrodynamics, with its successful treatment of divergences through renormalisation techniques, had established the paradigm
for future work. The central problem thus became one of trying to apply the same method to the weak and strong interactions in particle physics. Anyone
attempting to question the conventional approach to quantum mechanics was regarded, to put it mildly, as rather odd. (In actual fact statements made at
that time were often much stronger!)
The prevailing atmosphere therefore was such that development of the ideas along the lines of the 1952 paper were not pursued further. By that time
Bohm had moved from Brazil via Israel to England, where he held a research fellowship at Bristol University from 195761. There he took on a young
research student, Yakir Aharonov. Together they published a paper on what has become known as the Aharonov-Bohm (AB) effect.24 They discovered
that if one confines a magnetic field in the geometric shadow between the two slits of an electron interference device, and ensures that the electrons travel
only in a field-free region, then the resulting fringe pattern is shifted, the shift being a function of the flux enclosed in the inaccessible region. Actually the
effect had been discovered ten years earlier by Ehrenberg and Siday25 at Birkbeck College, where Bohm was to be appointed in 1961 to a chair in
theoretical physics. The Aharonov-Bohm paper is cited as the definitive work on the subject because of its incisiveness. The discussion goes straight to
the point at issue in a very clear and simple way, a feature that has always characterised Bohms work.
The AB effect was quite surprising and initially the work was received with some suspicion. As Weisskopf puts it, The first reaction to this work is that
it is wrong, the second is that it is obvious.26 Indeed it is a direct result of application of the standard rules of quantum mechanics. It is, in fact, the first
example of a gauge theory of the type which today, when generalised, seems to offer the best

possibility of uniting the weak, electromagnetic and strong interactions and, it is hoped, will eventually include gravity.
In spite of the fact that there are at least four independent sets of experimental techniques verifying the existence of the AB effect, papers still appear
arguing that no such effect exists. The problem arises because the vector potential plays a fundamental role in the calculations, whereas in classical physics
this potential is regarded merely as a mathematical device. The classical charged particles respond only to the fields and not to the potentials.
It is a great pity that the stigma of hidden variables has stuck with Bohm. We have often been greeted by physicists with the question, How is David
Bohm getting along with his hidden variables? This shows a very deep misconception of what Bohm is trying to achieve and ignores completely the
radical nature of his ideas. As we have pointed out before, the content of the 1952 papers was intended simply to show that there was an alternative to
the accepted view. They were not intended as an end in themselves, but simply to open the way for further progress. To go beyond hidden variables one
must first see exactly what novel features quantum mechanics introduces, and to do this one needs to consider Bohrs work a little more closely.
Perhaps Bohrs deepest perception was not wave-particle duality, nor complementarity, but wholeness. Bohr writes, The essential wholeness of a
proper quantum phenomenon finds indeed logical expression in the circumstances that any attempt at its well-defined subdivision would require a change
in the experimental arrangement incompatible with the appearance of the phenomenon itself.27 Remember of course that for Bohr the word phenomenon
refers only to observations obtained under circumstances whose description includes an account of the whole experimental arrangement.28 This notion of
phenomenon used by Bohr is different from its more customary meaning. It is based on the assumption that in quantum mechanics, we are not dealing
with an arbitrary renunciation of a more detailed analysis of atomic phenomena, but with the recognition that such an analysis is in principle excluded.29
The sentiments expressed in these quotations are sometimes summarised in the phrase, the inseparability of the observed and the observer. If these
notions are, in fact, correct then quite clearly some very deep questions as to the nature of reality are raised, as is clearly recognised by dEspagnat.11
Unfortunately most physicists either do not know what Bohr wrote or, if they do, they do not quite understand what he is getting at. When various
quotations of Bohrs work are put to them they tend not to believe them, yet continue to defend the usual (Copenhagen) interpretation! They praise Bohr,
but think like Einstein.
As we have remarked already, Bohms early perception when he began thinking seriously about physics was to notice the intercon-

nectedness of the process. When Bohm found Bohr was advocating an extreme form of interconnectedness, he became very fascinated with this notion
and explored it with much more energy. What turned out to be rather surprising was that the quantum potential also contained a notion of wholeness, even
though analysis was still possible. Thus the quantum potential approach, rather than refuting Bohrs position, actually supported it on the question of
wholeness, a feature that was totally unexpected. As this is a very important feature of Bohms ideas, we feel that we should try briefly to outline how
these aspects emerge from the quantum potential approach.
One of the main difficulties in trying to understand the precise changes implied by quantum mechanics lies in the formalism itself. It is very different from
that used in classical physics and consequently a comparison becomes very difficult. In order to bring the formalisms closer together we can do one of two
things. (1) Either we can try to reformulate classical physics in terms of operators in Hilbert space and hence see how the intuitive classical ideas translate
into the quantum formalism. Such an approach has been adopted by Prigogine and his co-workers. Perhaps the clearest introduction to their work is
presented in Physica.30
(2) Or we can try to reformulate quantum mechanics in a language which is closer to that of classical physics. This is the essential feature of Bohms
approach. It is achieved in a very simple way by writing the wave function in the form:

By assuming satisfies Schrdingers equation one can obtain two real equations, one of which is essentially a classical equation of motion supplemented
by an additional potential term (called the quantum potential). It is this additional term alone that is responsible for producing the quantum behaviour. To
understand this equation you have to assume there is an underlying micro-reality in which particles have both position and momentum, although these
cannot be measured simultaneously. The solutions of the equation of motion give rise to an ensemble of individual particle trajectories arising from various
initial conditions. If the distribution of initial conditions agrees with that calculated from the initial wave function, then this ensemble will give rise to the
expected probability distributions found in experiment. This is guaranteed by the second equation derived from Schrdingers equation, which is a
continuity equation corresponding to the conservation of probability.
The details of this approach are presented in the article by Vigier, Dewdney, Holland and Kyprianidis.31 This article contains illustrations of the
calculated trajectories for electrons incident on a two-slit screen (Figure 9.3, page 177). It will be immediately noticed that these trajectories are very
different from those expected on purely classical

reasoning. The differences arise purely from the presence of the quantum potential. The quantum potential approach therefore is not an attempt to return
to classical physics. All the strange features are accounted for by the quantum potential, which is in no way like a classical potential.
Before proceeding to discuss the difference between the classical and quantum potentials we feel it is necessary to point out an essential difference
between Bohms approach and that of Vigier et al. which has caused some confusion. To Bohm the quantum potential arises formally from the
mathematics and, in order to demonstrate the logical consistency of the whole approach, it is unnecessary to seek a deep explanation of the potentials
physical origins. In fact all of the illustrations of how the quantum potential accounts for various quantum phenomena that have been carried through
recently by Bohm and one of us (B.J.Hiley)32,33,34,35 do not require any specific action of the underlying process. In all these cases there are no
differences with the results predicted by the usual approach.
The advantage of the approach even in the absence of a specific underlying process is that one can obtain a sharp picture of what is involved. With the
trajectories, for example, we can see clearly how the interference pattern arises. In transition processes the time of transition for a particular process is
sharp. Aharonov and Albert36 further illustrate this sharpness by raising the question of retrodiction in quantum mechanics, contrasting von Neumanns
collapse postulate with the time-symmetry of the experimental probabilities. These issues are rather unclear in the usual formulation but they show how the
quantum potential approach gives a much clearer picture. This feature of clarity in Bohms approach is quite general and can be regarded as one of its
advantages.
Naturally if one were to take the model as a definitive physical theory of quantum phenomena one must seek a physical explanation of its origin. But
here there are a wide variety of possibilities and Vigier et al. have adopted a particular position in which they argue that the quantum potential has its
origins in non-locally correlated stochastic fluctuations of an underlying covariant ether. However, many of the examples cited in their article do not
require such an assumption.
Bohms position with regard to the underlying process is very different and depends on a much more radical approach. Both ideas stem from the
recognition that the many-body approach exhibits some form of non-locality and the difference arises from the interpretation of what this non-locality
means. For Vigier the explanation must arise from some phase-like process in space-time; it can be regarded as a quasi-mechanical explanation. For
Bohm the quantum non-locality has more of an affinity with Bohrs notion of wholeness, which ultimately calls into question the very notion of an a priori
given space-time manifold.

In order to provide a context in which the latter notions take meaning, we will outline some of the key developments in which the notion of quantum
non-locality emerged. The first clear account of the nature of this quantum non-locality was presented by Schrdinger37, using the usual approach of
quantum mechanics. He developed the line started by Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen38 in their well-known paper where they criticised the completeness of
quantum mechanics. Schrdinger showed that there was what he called an entanglement relation appearing in the quantum formalism. By this he meant
that the states of the subsystems cannot be separated from each other and this implied that, for a certain class of systems, the results of a measurement of
a subsystem A, spatially well-separated from its companion B, depends not only on the results obtained at B but on what one decided to measure at B.
It is this last phrase that contradicts our usual notion of locality. What is done to B should not influence the result of a measurement of A, especially when
they are spatially separated and are not connected through a classical potential. Thus the usual formulation of quantum mechanics showed, in the hands of
Schrdinger, that some notion of non-locality is involved. As Dirac puts it, For an assembly of particles we can set up field quantities which do change in
a local way, but when we interpret them in terms of probabilities of particles we get again something which is non-local.39 However, because the usual
approach cannot discuss the individual actual process, the question of locality becomes rather fuzzy and these questions can be conveniently ignored.
The quantum potential approach shows quite clearly that for a certain class of wave function, particles that are separated in space with no classical
potential connecting them are not really separated but are connected through the quantum potential.40 They are, as it were, together yet apart.
Furthermore the quantum potential contains an instantaneous connection rather than the expected retarded connection. In some ways this is like a
reintroduction of a kind of action-at-a-distance, a feature that goes against the whole historical development of physics. Einstein, of course, could not
accept this way out of the paradox, insisting that physics should represent a reality in space-time, free from any spooky action at a distance.41 In view of
his position, it is not surprising that he did not like the quantum potential approach.
John Bell noticed the non-locality but, rather than reject it outright, he raised the question of whether it was a particular defect of the quantum potential
approach or whether it was true for any model based on locality.42,43 By assuming a pair of particles with dichotomic variables and by proposing a simple
and reasonable definition of locality, Bell was able to produce an inequality involving correlation functions which must be satisfied by a theory which is to
be called local. Under certain conditions quantum mechanics is found to

violate this inequality, a fact that has been confirmed by a series of experiments which culminated in the work of Aspect el al.44 Although the debate
continues, focusing essentially on two questions:
1 whether Bells notion of locality is too restrictive; and
2 whether in fact the experiments actually measure what they intend to measure;
there is a general but somewhat reluctant acceptance of the presence of some form of non-locality in quantum mechanics.
This reluctance is very understandable since the notion that all physical phenomena occur within a local reality is one of those self-evident truths that
seem utterly absurd to contradict. Relativity itself, with its maximum signal velocity, has gone a long way to reinforce this notion. Even Dirac who, as we
have seen, clearly recognised non-locality in quantum mechanics wrote, It (non-locality) is against the spirit of relativity but it is the best we can do.39
No one has yet suggested a way of accounting for the results of quantum mechanics in a theory based on locality. Bohm, himself, with one of us
(B.J.Hiley)45, did propose a tentative local but non-linear theory that could in principle account for quantum non-locality, but the assumptions upon which
it was based implicitly required a radical view of nature in which process rather than particles-in-interaction was taken to be fundamental. But even this
approach is far from satisfactory. Some authors have noticed that one can escape from violating the Bell inequalities in quantum mechanics by allowing
negative probabilities.46 It has generally been regarded that such a notion is meaningless and amounts to replacing one difficulty by another. But it is well
known that negative probabilities arise elsewhere when one tries to obtain quantum mechanical averages using phase-space distributions, so the question
of negative probabilities is not restricted to the question of non-locality. Richard Feynman has thought a great deal about these problems and, indeed, has
admitted to having difficulty in trying to understand the world view that quantum mechanics represents. He has always tried to narrow the problem down
to particular features and explore them in depth to try to learn something new. In this volume he re-examines the notion of negative probabilities and
explores its possibilities.47
It is thus clear that quantum non-locality is one of the most radical features of quantum phenomena and a careful discussion of its full implications is
extremely important. What is its relation to Bohrs notion of wholeness? Can we learn anything more from the quantum potential approach? One
important factor in the discussion is that if the quantum potential were simply a classical potential then there would, indeed, be violations of relativity and
this would be strong grounds for rejecting the whole approach. But the essential point is that the quantum potential is not like a classical potential. And the

pursuit of the quantum potential approach is not a question of jumping out of the frying pan into the fire.48 On the contrary, what this approach does
bring out ultimately is a clearer understanding of what Bohr was referring to when he talked about the essential wholeness of a proper quantum
phenomenon or a closed indivisible phenomenon.
It is vital to bring out these points more clearly as they are a key feature of Bohms thinking. He actually discusses these issues in his own article, but it
is our experience that people do not generally fully grasp the significance of this radical feature of the quantum potential. We therefore make no apologies
for repeating the arguments here.
Unlike a classical potential, the quantum potential appears to have no point-like source. Moreover, since the field from which one derives the potential
satisfies a homogeneous equation, the field is not radiated, as is, for example, the electromagnetic field. But there are two further very important
differences.
1 The quantum potential does not produce, in general, a vanishing interaction between two particles as the distance between those particles becomes
very large. Thus two distant systems may still be strongly and directly connected. This is, of course, contrary to the implicit requirement of classical
physics, where it is always assumed that where two systems are sufficiently far apart, they will behave independently. This is a necessary condition if
the notion of analysis of a system into separately and independent existent constituent parts is to be carried out. Thus the quantum potential seriously
calls into question the notion that all explanations of complexity must be understood by considering independent systems in interaction with each
other.
2 What is even more striking is that the quantum potential cannot be expressed as a universally determined function of all the coordinates of the
particles. Rather it depends on the quantum state (r1rn) of the system as a whole. This means that even if at some time the positions and
momenta of two sets of particles are the same, but they are in different quantum states, then their subsequent evolution can be very different.
All of this implies that the relationship between two particles depends on something that goes beyond what can be described in terms of these two
particles alone. In fact more generally, this relationship may depend on the quantum states of even larger systems, ultimately going on to the universe as a
whole. Within this view separation becomes a contingent rather than a necessary feature of nature.
This is very different from the way we perceive the macroscopic world around us, where separation seems basic. However, it is well known that when
we go to low enough temperatures, bulk matter behaves very differently. Currents flow without dissipation in superconductivity, superfluids flow without
viscosity, etc., but as the

temperature rises, the distant correlations necessary for non-dissipation break up and the particles no longer flow without resistance. If we regard these
long-range correlations as stemming from quantum non-locality, then they seem to be very fragile and can be broken quite easily, simply by raising the
temperature. In fact it is this fragility that makes it impossible to send signals in EPR situations. This is another way of explaining why a conflict with
relativity is by no means necessary.
But this fragility is not always the case. The binding of electrons in atoms, covalent molecular bonds, etc., are much stronger. Nevertheless these, too,
can be broken, provided enough energy is supplied. This could be either in the form of heat or chemical energy. Thus it is in thermodynamic systems that
separability arises. In fact there seems to be a deep connection between irreversibility and the break-up processes, but the details are not clear.
Prigogine and his group have studied the question of irreversibility in physical systems in great depth. Although most of this work has been concerned
with classical systems, very wide-reaching results have been obtained, some of which have deep epistemological consequences. In his paper with Elskens,
Prigogine argues that in making the transition from dynamics to thermodynamics, the introduction of irreversibility at the microscopic level implies deep
changes in the structure of space-time. Here irreversibility leads to a well-defined form of non-locality in which a single point in space-time is replaced by
an ensemble of points giving rise to a geometry which contains a unique time order. Their paper outlines the basic concepts that are involved in the new
dynamics.49
This new dynamics has not yet been used to address the question of how a breakdown of the correlations discussed above can occur. Nevertheless, it
seems likely that it could provide a deeper understanding of the process involved, not only in breaking the correlations, but also in establishing non-local
correlations in systems that are far from equilibrium. Indeed Frhlich has recognised such a possibility and has conjectured that in certain dielectric
systems longitudinal electric oscillations may extend over macroscopic distances, giving rise to quantum non-local correlations.50 These effects are of
particular interest in biological systems and are themselves maintained in equilibrium through a constant supply of energy, i.e. they are, like all living
systems, far from thermal equilibrium. But there are deeper problems for the application of quantum mechanics to biological systems. One such problem is
raised by Frhlich in this volume; namely, can there also be non-locality in time?51
Such questions are already implicit when we extend the notion of wholeness to relativistic quantum mechanics. Here relativity puts space and time on an
equal footing so that non-locality in space suggests the possibility of non-locality in time. Such questions, in fact, have been discussed in Bohms group but
their work in this area has

not been published yet. Any meaningful discussion along these lines cannot take place until the quantum potential approach has been applied to relativistic
quantum mechanics. Some work, particularly by Vigiers group in Paris, has explored the Klein-Gordon52 and Dirac53 equations with some success.
However, the Klein-Gordon equation produces difficulties even before one introduces the quantum potential ideas. Bohm has long felt that the best
generalisation is through relativistic field theories. Thus in an appendix to his 1952 paper, Bohm sketches an approach to the electromagnetic field. Here
the superwave function leads to a generalised Hamilton-Jacobi equation containing a super-quantum potential in addition to any classical potentials. This
equation is a field equation which, when the super-quantum potential is neglected, reduces to the classical dAlembert equation.33
In this approach the quantum field may be non-locally connected, so that instantaneous effects may be carried from one point of the field to another
distant point. As with the non-relativistic case, it can be shown that no signal connecting distant events instantaneously is possible, provided the
measurements that would detect these signals are limited by the statistical nature of the results of quantum theory.
This whole approach through the super-quantum potential offers a new way to explain the quantum properties of fields. Here the energy may spread
out from one source, ultimately to focus on another as a result of the non-local non-linear terms in the super-Hamilton-Jacobi equation. Thus, a quantised
field is not basically a collection of individual quanta (i.e. particles); rather, it is a dynamical structure, organised by the super-quantum potential so that it
gives rise to discrete results, even though the process itself is not discrete.
The relevance of this way of interpreting the theory can be seen even more clearly in the case of an electromagnetic wave that is formed from
interference of weak beams from two independent optical lasers as described by Pfleegor and Mandel.54 The photon picture raises the unanswerable
question: from which laser does the photon come? But in the super-quantum potential interpretation, there is no problem because there are no permanent
photons. There is only a total field of activity arising from both lasers, organised non-linearly and non-locally by the super-quantum potential, and it is this
feature that gives rise to the excitation of a single quantised transfer of energy to the detector.35
All of this deals with boson field systems; nothing has been done with fermion fields. The quantum potential approach itself does not include spin very
happily. Bohm worked on this problem together with Tiomno and Schiller55 during his stay in Brazil. They were able to show that it is possible to obtain a
causal description of the Pauli equation. Bohm, himself, has made some comments on the application of the quantum potential approach to the Dirac
equation but the

details have not been worked out.56 Cufaro-Petroni and Vigier57 have explored a possible approach using the Feynman-Gell-Mann equation for spin-half
particles but, as yet, there is no method for discussing spin-half fields. The first tentative steps in this direction appear in this volume in an article by John
Bell.58 He argues for the exclusion of the notion of observable and the introduction of a beable whose existence does not depend on observation. If we
replace the three-space continuum by a dense lattice and define a fermion number operator at each lattice point, we can regard the fermion numbers as
local beables. The dynamics is replaced by a stochastic development of the fermion number configuration. Bell goes on to discuss the consequences of
this model.
For many years Bohm himself never felt the need for a detailed exploration of these particular aspects of field theory. Rather he felt that the novel nature
of quantum wholeness that emerged both from the quantum potential and Bohrs work required a radical re-structuring of our view of reality, and this
could not be obtained simply by reworking everything in terms of the quantum potential and the super-quantum potential. He has only recently returned to
these topics, essentially for two reasons.
1 There have been considerable advances in experimental techniques which have made possible an exploration of the foundations of quantum
mechanics using single particles or single-atom emitters. These experiments have raised the old issues again and, with the new generation struggling
to make sense of these results in terms of the usual quantum mechanics, Bohm felt that a careful and more detailed explanation of his original ideas
sketched in his 1952 papers was needed.
2 Bohm has found, as he explains in his article, that it is now useful to re-examine those aspects of the super-quantum potential which offer a guide as
to the limitations that must be imposed on the implicate order if it is to produce results that are not contrary to our experience of quantum
phenomena.
None of this should be taken as a return to the old model. On the contrary, it is to be seen as a way of explaining the deep nature of his new view on the
nature of reality that has emerged from different explorations that he has made in the last twenty years.
In order to bring these out, it is necessary to sketch how these views developed from the perception of the holistic view that quantum mechanics
demanded. Since nearly all our habitual thinking involves analysis into independent entities of one kind or another interacting to form complex systems, we
are faced with a very difficult problem. Do we follow Bohr and rule out any possibility of analysis in principle, thus leaving ourselves with an algorism
from which we calculate the outcome of given experimental situations? Do we restrict ourselves to the quantum potential approach trying to explain its
origin in some

deeper underlying process in space-time, as does Vigier and his group? Or can we try something else? If so, what is this something else? Where do we
start?
In order to motivate a point of departure let us look at Bohrs position and try to see why he insisted on unanalysability. One strand of the argument
involved what he called the finite quantum of action. This notion arises from the uncertainty relation

where h has the dimensions of the classical action. Thus the product of the uncertainties cannot be less than this finite quantum of action. Bohr took this
to imply that it was not possible to make a sharp distinction between the observer and the observed. It was like a blind man with a rubber stick exploring
a room. By feeling the reactions to his prodding stick he cannot obtain as sharp an image of, say, the walls of the room than he could have obtained with a
rigid stick. The flexibility in the stick could not be calculated away. There was an indivisible, uncontrollable and unpredictable connection between
subject and object which rendered a sharp separation between the two impossible.
The second strand of the argument involved regarding the concepts of classical physics as refinements of the concepts of daily life and as an essential
part of the language which forms the basis of all natural science.59
Thus, according to Bohr, classical concepts are inherent in all logical thinking. As Bohm writes:
Such a point of view implies that every understandable and describable aspect of experience could in principle be analysed by regarding the
world as made out of various component parts, each having at any moment a definite position and a definite momentum. If we in practice do
not do this in everyday life but use other concepts instead, this means only that we are approximating to the ideal of such a complete
analysis.60

But quantum mechanics is already suggesting that such an analysis is in principle excluded. This, in turn, suggests that our desire to pinpoint precisely, say,
the positions of particles is not necessary. In other words, could it not be that our insistence on the use of a Cartesian co-ordinate system to describe
physical processes is at fault? After all, when we are describing the location of common objects, we resort to phrases like It is on the table or It is on
the shelves between two books etc. We hardly ever use a co-ordinate system but rely very much on topological relations. Could it then be that our
insistence on a co-ordinate description as opposed to a topological description is leading us to the conceptual problems in understanding quantum theory?

It was in the late 1960s that the group at Birkbeck began an exploration of topological methods. This involved excursions into the mathematical
techniques of homology and cohomology. At that stage few physicists studied these mathematical disciplines, although there were notable exceptions,
including John Wheeler, whose lucid explanations of cohomology for physicists were a very great help in clarifying some of the questions involved.61 It
was not difficult to show that many of the main laws of physics, such as the Hamilton-Jacobi theory, Maxwells equations and even the Dirac equation,
could be given a very simple meaning without resorting to the continuous space-time backcloth.
There was one notable exception and that was general relativity, which could not be expressed naturally in this topological language. But clearly a
simple mathematical transcription was not sufficient, so Bohm began to investigate the notion of order in a more general way. One of his main
investigations was to develop new principles of order that would replace those implied in the concept of continuity.62
One such idea was to regard the particle as a break in some background structure. Here one was exploiting the analogy of a dislocation in a crystal.
Frank had already shown that an edge dislocation migrating through a crystal could be regarded as a particle having an effective mass, where the mass
itself varies in the same way as mass varies in relativity, but now the speed of light is replaced by the speed of sound.63 The fields themselves could be
thought of as the stresses arising from the deformations caused by the presence of the dislocations.
Bohm wanted to abandon the traditional notion of particles and fields-in-interaction in a continuous space-time, replacing it by the notion of structure
process. That is to say one analyses all physical processes structurally, using as basic building blocks structures called simplexes (analogues of lines,
triangles, tetrahedra, etc.) which could be ordered, boundary to boundary, forming a structure called a simplicial complex. The failure of perfect fitting
would then correspond to the presence of matter or fields.64
This type of approach through topo-chronology offers the possibility of being able to incorporate some notion of wholeness required by quantum
mechanics. A particle could not be separated from the surrounding structure because what is called a particle is simply a break in the background
structure. Furthermore, two dislocations could not be separated since they are only breaks in the same structure.
Several attempts were made to use matrix representations to describe these structures but it became very cumbersome. Indeed there have been many
papers published in dislocation theory exploiting the analogies with continuum dynamics. In this volume two former research students, Peter Holland and
Chris Philippidis, have exploited

and generalised these ideas to show how classical electrodynamics can be interpreted as a theory of a continuously dislocated covariant space-time
ether. One of the important features of this work is to show in detail how the particle and field are seen as structurally inseparable even in the continuum
limit.65
But in order to get a better understanding of quantum phenomena it was the discrete structure process that offered the better prospects. However, even
here the structure seems too primitive to be carried very far. Time did not seem to be naturally part of the structure. The structure changed in time but was
not of time. The whole approach seemed to be in the category of what Bergson called a cinematographical outlook, a series of stills with no natural
flow.66
A vital clue on how to overcome this difficulty was provided by some experimental work on the human eye. Ditchburn had noticed that the eye was in
continous vibration and that this vibration was vital in order to see.67 To show this he fixed a mirror system to the eye so as to freeze out the vibration.
The result was that the eye could no longer see anything. Thus to see a line or boundary, for example, the eye must scan backwards and forwards across
the line. The difference in the response in the retina as the eye crosses the line enables the brain to reconstruct the line. If the scanning is stopped, no line is
seen, even though there is a static image on the retina. Thus, movement is basic to perception. But, equally, if there are no relatively invariant features for
the eye to scan, then again nothing will be seen. So nothingness does not mean there is nothing there; it could mean simply that there are no features that
remain invariant for a sufficient length of time.
Suppose now we carry through this idea to quantum field theory where the vacuum state plays a basic role. We could argue that the vacuum state is not
empty, but is in fact full of undifferentiated activity. This could then account for things like vacuum fluctuations which strongly suggest a vacuum state is far
from empty. It could be full of activity that is changing so rapidly that it cannot be perceived above a certain level. Could it therefore be that the structure
described by the simplicial complex is merely the relatively invariant features of the basic underlying process or activity or what we call movement? Then in
order to accommodate wholeness we regard this unbroken activity as the basic notion and what our physics discusses are the quasi-stable, semiautonomous features of this underlying holo-movement.
One important feature concerning the holomovement is that it is not described in space-time but from it space-time is to be abstracted. Thus we no
longer start with an a priori space-time manifold in order to discuss physics; rather, we construct space-time from the underlying process. It is not, as
Wheeler and Hawking suggests, a progression from the continuum via fluctuations to the space-time foam; rather, it

is the simplicial description of the relative invariant features of the holomovement that become the foam from which the continuous space-time is
abstracted. Thus locality is no longer a primary concept but is also abstracted so that quantum non-local correlations could be explained as a remnant of
the basic underlying complex. Furthermore staticness is no longer a problem. The relatively invariant features can change as the underlying
holomovement changes. It is like Heraclitus candle flame dancing and flickering, giving the appearance of an autonomous entity but, in fact, being
constantly renewed.
Ideas along these lines have also been suggested by David Finkelstein and we have been very stimulated by his unique way of looking at things.68 He
acknowledges being influenced by Bohms exploration of structure process, and in his article All is flux69 he outlines some of the areas of cross
fertilisation that have taken place. He too proposes a simplicial approach to quantum theory, calling his basic structures quantum simplexes. As we will
see, the simplexes used to describe the holomovement are in fact algebraic and, in consequence, are quantum in origin. Thus both approaches attempt to
abstract classical space-time from an essentially quantum structure.
Given the holomovement, it is now but a small step to the implicate order. We can regard the relative invariant features of the holo-movement as the
explicate order while that which remains in the background is the implicate order. What is missing is the notion of folding and enfolding, and that has its
source in three separate and different developments.
In his book on causality and chance, Bohm had already suggested that the trajectories that emerged from the quantum potential approach were some
kind of average property of a deeper process. He writes:
Thus, we are led to a point of view rather like that suggested in section 2 in connection with the Brownian motion of mist droplets near the
critical point, namely that particle-like concentrations are always forming and dissolving. Of course, if a particle in a certain place dissolves, it
is very likely to re-form nearby. Thus on the large-scale level, the particle-like manifestation remains in a small region of space following a
fairly well-defined track, etc. On the other hand, at a lower level, the particle does not move as a permanently existing entity, but is formed in
a random way by suitable concentrations of the field energy.70

In view of this statement is is not surprising that the unmixing (glycerine) demonstration Bohm saw on television provided a vital stimulus in arriving at the
implicate order (see Chapter 2 in this volume). In this example the folding-unfolding idea emerges very clearly.
Also from this example there appears a further principle; namely, that not everything can be unfolded together. Such an idea is already

present in perception, where a set of lines can appear to give one form or another but never both together. But in physics the Cartesian notion that
everything can be displayed together simultaneously has dominated, albeit implicitly, even though the appearance of quantum mechanics with its sets of
commuting operators calls this into question. There is a continual drive to find models in which all aspects of the process can be displayed
simultaneously. In the new view it is necessary to distinguish between that which could be unfolded together (the explicate order) and that which remains
enfolded (the implicate order). Surely this is the deeper truth that essentially lay behind Bohrs notion of complementarity, although it tended to become
trivialised into wave-particle duality.
Perhaps the most significant stimulus for the folding-unfolding notion came from a mathematical technicality, namely, the Greens function approach to
Schrdingers equation. Feynman first pointed out that in quantum mechanics, one can use the Huygens construction to determine the wave function at a
point y from the wave function at {x}, where {x} is the set of points on a surface at a previous time. Thus:

where M(x,y,t1,t2) is a Greens function. Pictorially this is represented in Figure 1.1. The wave function at all points of the surface S contributes to the
wave function at y. Thus the information on the surface S is enfolded into (y). This (y) determines the quantum potential acting on the particle at y so
that the particle reacts to the enfolded information of a set of earlier wave functions. In turn (y) itself gets unfolded into a series of points on a later
surface S (see Figure 1.2). In this way we see that the quantum potential itself is determined by an enfolding-unfolding process.

Figure 1.1

Figure 1.2

We can now generalise this in the following way: if E and E are two successive explicate orders, then for continuity we can argue that the enfolded E is
equal to the unfolded E, i.e.:

where M1 and M2 are the enfolding and unfolding elements (essentially Greens functions). Then:

If we assume:

we find Heisenbergs form of the Schrdinger equation follows immediately.71 It was a generalisation of arguments of this kind that led Bohm to suggest
that the basic mathematics required to describe the implicate order will involve the use of matrix algebras. Furthermore, although most physicists use the
Hilbert space formalism for quantum mechanics, there is an equivalent formulation in terms of matrices, where the state functions are replaced by
appropriate algebraic ideals. Thus there is a common mathematical structure shared by quantum mechanics and the implicate order. All of this, and a lot
more, is explained in more detail in Bohms Wholeness and the Implicate Order.72
The notion that the space-time continuum should not be taken as basic notion had a number of advocates in the late 1960s. They included Roger
Penrose, who was then a member of the mathematics department at Birkbeck College. He would often take part in the seminars run by the physics
department and explained to us his idea of a spin network73 and how he was hoping the twistor would play a part in generating these ideas.74 At about
the same time we were joined by a research student, Fabio Frescura, who carried out a detailed investigation of the algebraic approach and showed that
if one took the direct product of a suitable Clifford algebra and a

symplectic algebra (essentially the Heisenberg algebra supplemented by the addition of a special element), one could bring about a complete
algebraisation of quantum mechanics without any reference to a space-time continuum.71,75 These algebras are essentially geometric algebras, the Clifford
algebras carrying the rotational symmetries and the symplectic algebra carrying the translational symmetries. Thus they have within their structures all the
required symmetry properties for abstracting the space-time continuum.
Penroses approach through the spin network and twistors can be given an algebraic flavour once one recognises that the non-relativistic spinor is
simply an ideal in the Paul Clifford algebra (C2) while the twistor is a similar ideal in the conformal Clifford algebra (C6). A discussion of the details of how
these similarities can be exploited would not be appropriate here and more details can be found in the papers of Bohm and Hiley76 and Frescura and
Hiley.71 The essential consequence of this approach is that the simplicial complexes used to describe structures in the holomovement are essentially
algebraic and hence can be regarded as quantum in origin, as are the simplexes used by Finkelstein that we referred to earlier.
Clive Kilmister has always been very encouraging in our explorations of the algebraisation of the implicate order and his article in this volume
investigates the automorphism group of C4, the Dirac Clifford algebra, providing some simple geometric insights present in this algebra.77 These results are
quite central to the work described above. In the following paper Frescura and Hiley78 indicate that the algebraic spinor offers a generalization of the usual
approach and suggest how this can be exploited in the extension which allows the algebra to carry a structure equivalent to curvature.
We were very happy to learn that Geoffrey Chews work using an S-matrix approach has found Bohms implicate order a useful general scheme in
which to bring out some of the features of his approach. One of us (B.J.Hiley) still vividly remembers Chews 1963 Rouse Ball lecture The dubious role of
the space-time continuum in microscopic physics which was eventually published in Science Progress.79 There he writes: but a growing number of us
are reaching the conclusion that to make major progress we must stop thinking and talking about such an unobservable (space-time) continuum. The main
theme of the talk was to point out the advantages of the S-matrix over the more usual quantum field approach. (Perhaps today one could argue that the Smatrix describes various structures in the implicate order.) In the original talk the link between macroscopic space-time and the S-matrix was left as a
challenge about which Chew said little except for a rather vague remark concerning the role of photons.
This work has progressed considerably since those early days and Chew explains in a very general way how the soft photons enable the macroscopic
space-time to be made explicate.80 A colleague of Chews,

Henry Stapp, has also done a significant amount of work on questions arising from the S-matrix approach. He has also worked for a long time on the
foundations of quantum mechanics and has contributed significantly to the discussions of quantum non-locality.81 In his article he presents a simple model
that incorporates lessons learned from the S-matrix.82 He shows in detail how the classical concepts emerge from the soft photons which are described
by coherent states.
So far we have concentrated mainly on physics but David Bohms interest and influence extend far beyond physics and embrace biology, psychology,
philosophy, religion, art and the future of society. His contributions are not, however, made in the academic sense of someone who makes additions within
the accepted, historical framework of a discipline but always in a creative way as one working from a new perspective based on the implicate order. It
would be impossible even to summarise his contributions to the discussions over this wide range of topics. Rather we will let the contributors who have
been influenced by him speak for themselves.
Brian Goodwin sees Bohm as working in the same tradition as the Renaissance mage who sought a unification between mind and nature.83 His vision
of nature as an undivided whole could well be applied to biology, Goodwin argues, where it would counteract an atomistic (molecular) fragmentation in
favour of an approach that emphasises the wholeness and relational order of the organism. Goodwin, in his essay, discusses how a revolution in
perspective could be achieved and suggests that our current fragmentary view of the organism as divided between phenotype and genotype involved in
genetic information processing be replaced by a theory of morphogenetic fields.
Robert Rosen also discusses biological systems and raises the question of the relationship of physics to biology.84 Does biology simply require an
application of the general laws of physics to complex systems or will new ideas not already present in physics be required? He argues for the latter,
claiming that physics in its present form is too narrow. This is in no sense a plea to introduce ideas of Vitalism; rather new concepts of order will be
required, a theme that has a close relationship with Bohms own thinking. With Bohm, new orders are required within physics. These new orders
incorporate wholeness and here a more organic view of nature is required. Rosen suggests that the study of the behaviour of macromolecules may
provide a clue as to the nature of these orders. He uses the van der Waals gas to illustrate what he has in mind and shows how this can be re-analysed in
the old Aristotelian categories of causation. This leads him to suggest a novel idea that each category of causation is reflected in a logically independent
aspect of system description, thus implying that it is no longer possible to think of a description purely in terms of states plus dynamical laws.

Maurice Wilkins, working at the macromolecular level in biological systems, found that the complementary aspects of symmetry and asymmetry
seemed to be playing a crucial role. Again, at a different level, in DNA there seems to be a similar relationship of opposites between the precise
replication of genes and the extensive rearrangement that now seems to be necessary for evolution to take place. His article85 explores from a very
general point of view how complementarity arises in a number of disciplines ranging from physics, through biology, to the visual arts. Here
complementarity is taken to imply a specific interaction between the parts that gives rise to wholeness or perfection. He also asks whether any of the
lessons learned can help with the problem of human conflict, a problem that concerns Maurice very deeply in this nuclear age.
In his The Special Theory of Relativity86 Bohm gave considerable attention to the way in which we gain knowledge about the world. But this analysis
was not carried out in a simple positivistic sense of building scientific theories out of sense data but rather in an attempt to understand how our concepts of
reality grow out of the dynamic activity of perception. During the 1960s, while working with one of his students, D.Schumacher, Bohm began to give
emphasis to the role of language and communication in this process; indeed he has more recently chosen to describe it in united, and hyphenated, form as
perception-communication. Following Bohr, Bohm discussed the role of informal languages in scientific theories of nature and investigated what he felt to
be a failure in communication between Einstein and Bohr himself.
Bohms interest in language led to the development of what he called the rheomode, a language of communication more suited to his notions of
enfolded order.72 Alan Ford, stimulated by Bohms writings on physics and language, has attempted to forge a connection between linguistics and
category theory, the latter topic being, in Bohms view, the first step to creating any form of order.87 As we have already seen, Bohms researches came
to fruition in the form of the implicate or enfolded order and, more recently, generative orders. The essence of the implicate order is a form of enfoldment
such that any aspect of the system enfolds and is interior to the whole. Clearly this idea of order is a far reaching one, with implications that extend far
beyond current physics. Karl Pribram,88 for his part, explains how Bohms insights enabled him to construct a holographic theory of the brain that helped
to resolve problems of non-local storage and the way in which spatial frequencies are resolved during vision. Gordon Globus acknowledges the
significance of Pribrams model in changing our perspective on the brain, but attempts to go further with what he calls holonomy.89 While the holographic
approach assumes an essential tabula rasa into which the external environment is folded, Globus assumes that the brain contains a plenum of possibilia.
Such an approach,

Globus feels, makes relevant the traditions of mysticism with its Godhead as well as Western research on altered states of consciousness.
Bohms work has always held a particular fascination for the artist for, while the physics may be inaccessible, Bohms essential approach to nature is
sympathetic to their nature. John Briggs90 explores the relationships between Bohms theories on the ultimate structure of matter and his own views on the
structure of a work of art. Briggs draws attention to a particular aspect of the metaphor, which he calls a reflectaphor, in which each side reflects the other
and meaning lies in a continuing reflexive movement. Through an analysis of poetry, the short story and painting, Briggs concludes that in its deepest
structure a work of art is built not on explicit forms but out of numerous metaphors that are woven together in such a way that each one reflects all others.
Just as each part of nature represents an enfoldment of the entire universe, so each part of a work of art reflects the whole. Clearly Briggs approach gives
insight into Bohms contention that a unity can exist between the artistic, scientific and religious mind.
For Montague Ullman, Bohms notions of enfolded order and the non-local nature of reality have a significant connection to dreams.91 In his paper he
analyses the creative way in which images and events are woven together in the dream and discusses its essential healing nature. Ullman also believes that
dreams have a social nature and, indeed, that they have a survival value for the human race. Again there is evidence from amongst so-called primitive
peoples that dreams fulfil just such a function. Here Ullman touches on one of Bohms current interests, for it is the latters belief that a form of true
cooperation and harmonious society once existed amongst the early hunter-gatherers and such leadership from behind may even be possible amongst
urban society today. To what extent dreams play a role in the creative cohesion of such groups is a matter for further investigation.
This interest in dialogue and the co-operative activity of small groups is also explored by David Shainberg. Shainberg draws attention to the way in
which human consciousness erects fixed barriers to the dynamic process of enfolding and unfolding that is characteristic of the implicate order.
Shainbergs discussion92 of the way in which thought seeks security by fixing the moment in endless repetitions of itself brings us close to the heart of
Bohms dialogues with the late Indian philosopher J.Krishnamurti. Bohm met Krishnamurti in the early 1960s and since that time has held a number of
dialogues in which the two thinkers have explored many issues together including the nature of reality and the urgent need for a change in human
consciousness.
Shainberg traces the origins of these blocks in consciousness and

discusses the various approaches that individuals have adopted when made aware of such a trap. In particular he explores the nature of private meditation
and a form of group dialogue in which no position is fixed but each participant is sensitive to the constant movement of thought and its tendency to seek
security in fixed positions. Within such a dialogue it becomes possible for new insights to develop as relationships are constantly created anew.
The final contribution in this collection of essays takes the form of a dialogue between Rene Weber and David Bohm.93 Rene Weber felt that the best
way that she could contribute to this Festschrift was to try to get David Bohm to explain some of the philosophical ideas that arise in the implicate order.
Recently Bohm has come to realise the importance of information and meaning, not only in the context of the human world, but also in the inanimate
world. For Bohm meaning is being and meaning is the essence of reality. These ideas are very different from our normal way of thinking and seem to be
essential in the context of wholeness. What Rene Weber does in the dialogue is to bring out the thinking that lies beyond these ideas.
David Bohm has argued that the essence of the scientific mind is the ability to see the fact no matter what it says. This fearlessness and passion of the
intelligence characterises all of David Bohms work and explains its far-reaching attraction for so many of the contributors gathered here. For reasons of
space they represent only a small selection of researchers, thinkers, writers and artists who could have contributed to this volume. Clearly David Bohms
ideas have influenced a wide audience and stimulated much discussion which has helped to create new insights and lead to an essentially unified vision of
nature in which artist, scientist and religious thinker are no longer divided. Even more significant, perhaps, is the hope that individuals may come together in
a spirit of creative co-operation to build a world in which undivided wholeness and creative order are an essential ground.

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27 N.Bohr, Atomic Physics and Human Knowledge, Science Editions, New York, 1961, p. 72.
28 Ibid., p. 64.
29 Ibid., p. 62.
30 C.George and I.Prigogine, Physica, 99A, 369 (1969).
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36 Y.Aharonov and D.Albert, The issue of retrodiction in Bohms theory, this volume, p. 224.
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40 D.Bohm and B.J.Hiley, Found, of Phys., 5, 93 (1975).
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46 W.Mckenheim, Lett. Nuovo Cimento 35, 300 (1982).
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48 J.C.Polkinghorne, The Quantum World, Longman, 1984.
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54 R.L.Pfleegor and L.Mandel, Phys. Rev., 159, 1084 (1967); J. of Opt. Soc. Amer., 58, 946 (1968).
55 D.Bohm, R.Schiller and J.Tiomno, Nuovo Cimento Supp., 1, 48 (1955).
56 D.Bohm, Prog. of Theor. Phys., 9, 273 (1953).
57 N.Cufaro-Petroni and J.-P.Vigier, A causal stochastic theory of spin 1/2 fields, Institut Henri Poincar, preprint, 1983.
58 J.Bell, Beables for quantum field theory, this volume, p. 227.
59 W.Heisenberg, ibid., p. 55.
60 D.Bohm, Brit. J. of the Phil, of Sci., 12, 265 (1962).
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Part 2, 279, Calcutta, 1964.
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65 P.R.Holland and C.Philippidis, Anholonomic deformations in the ether: A significance for the electrodynamic potentials , this volume, p. 295.
66 H.Bergson, Creative Evolution, Macmillan, London, 1922.
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68 D.Finkelstein, Phys. Rev., 184, 1261 (1969); 5D, 220 (1972); 5D, 2922 (1972); 9D, 2231 (1974).
69 D.Finkelstein, All is flux, this volume, p. 289.
70 D.Bohm, Causality and Chance in Modern Physics, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1957, p. 120.
71 F.A.M.Frescura and B.J.Hiley, Revista Brasileira de Fisica, Volume Especial, July, p. 49 (1984).
72 D.Bohm, Wholeness and the Implicate Order, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980.
73 R.Penrose, in E.Bastin (ed.), Quantum Theory and Beyond, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1968.
74 R.Penrose, in J.R.Klauder (ed.), Magic without Magic: John Archibald Wheeler, Freeman, San Francisco, 1972.
75 F.A.M.Frescura and B.J.Hiley, Found, of Physics, 10, 7 (1980).
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81 H.P.Stapp, Phys. Rev., D3, 1303 (1971).

82 H.P.Stapp, Light as foundation of being, this volume, p. 255.
83 B.Goodwin, A science of qualities, this volume, p. 328.
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85 M.H.F.Wilkins, Complementarity and the union of opposites, this volume, p. 338.
86 D.Bohm, The Special Theory of Relativity, Benjamin, New York, 1965.
87 A.Ford, Category theory and family resemblances, this volume, p. 361.
88 K.Pribram, The implicate brain, this volume, p. 365.
89 G.Globus, Three holonomic approaches to the brain, this volume, p. 372.
90 J.Briggs, Reflectaphors: the (implicate) universe as a work of art, this volume, p. 414.
91 M.Ullman, Wholeness and dreaming, this volume, p. 386.
92 D.Shainberg, Vortices of thought in the implicate order and their release in meditation and dialogue, this volume, p. 396.
93 R.Weber, Being as meaning in the implicate order philosophy of David Bohm: a conversation, this volume, p. 414.

2
Hidden variables and the implicate order1
David Bohm Birkbeck College, University of London
I have been asked to explain how my ideas of hidden variables tie up with those on the implicate order, and to bring out in some detail how both these
two notions are related. In doing this, it would perhaps be best to begin with an account of how I came to these ideas in the first place.
The whole development started in Princeton around 1950, when I had just finished my book Quantum Theory.2 I had in fact written it from what I
regarded as Niels Bohrs point of view, based on the principle of complementarity.3 Indeed, I had taught a course on the quantum theory for three years
and written the book primarily in order to try to obtain a better understanding of the whole subject, and especially of Bohrs very deep and subtle
treatment of it. However, after the work was finished, I looked back over what I had done and still felt somewhat dissatisfied.
What I felt to be especially unsatisfactory was the fact that the quantum theory had no place in it for an adequate notion of an independent
actualityi.e. of an actual movement or activity by which one physical state could pass over into another. My main difficulty was not that the wave
function was interpreted only in terms of probabilities, so that the theory was not deterministic; rather, it was that it could only be discussed in terms of the
results of an experiment or an observation, which has to be treated as a set of phenomena that are ultimately not further analysable or explainable in any
terms at all. So, the theory could not go beyond the phenomena or appearances. And, basically, these phenomena were very limited in nature, consisting,
for example, of events by which the state of a particle could be ascertained. From a knowledge of this state we could go to a wave function

that predicted the probability of the next set of phenomena, and so on.
On thinking about what all this meant, it began to occur to me that the quantum theory might actually be giving a fragmentary view of reality. A wave
function seemed to capture only certain aspects of what happens in a statistical ensemble of similar measurements, each of which is in essence only a single
element in a greater context of the overall process. Though von Neumann4 had given what purported to be a proof that to go any further would not be
compatible with the quantum theory (which was already very well confirmed indeed), I still realized that mathematical proofs are based on axioms and
presuppositions whose meanings are often obscure and always in principle open to question. Moreover, the theory of relativity, which was also regarded
as fundamental, demanded a space-time process (e.g. one that could be understood in terms of fields) which constituted an independent actuality, with a
continuous and determinate connection between all its parts. Such a process could not be treated solely as a set of fragmentary phenomena that are
related only statistically.
This requirement becomes especially urgent when relativity is extended to include cosmology. It seems impossible even to contemplate the universe as a
whole through a view which can discuss only in terms of discrete or distinct sets of phenomena, for in a cosmological view the observing instruments, and
indeed the physicists who construct and operate them, have to be regarded at least in principle as parts of the totality. There does not seem to be much
sense in saying that all these are nothing more than organized sets of appearances. To whom or to what would they appear, and of what would they be the
appearances?
I felt particularly dissatisfied with the self-contradictory attitude of accepting the independent existence of the cosmos while one was doing relativity
and, at the same time, denying it while one was doing the quantum theory, even though both theories were regarded as fundamental. I did not see how an
adequate way to deal with this could be developed on the basis of Niels Bohrs point of view. So I began to ask myself whether another approach might
not be possible.
In my first attempt to do this I considered a quantum mechanical wave function representing, for example, an electron, and supposed that this was
scattered by an atom. By solving Schrdingers equation for the wave function, one shows that the scattered wave will spread out more or less
spherically. Nevertheless, a detector will detect an electron in some small region of space, while the extended spherical wave gives only the probability
that it will be found in any such region. The idea then occurred to me that perhaps there is a second wave coming in toward the place where the electron is
found, and that the mathematical calculus of the quantum theory gives a statistical relationship between outgoing and incoming waves.

However, to think this way requires that we have to enrich our concepts to include an incoming wave as well as an outgoing wave. Indeed, since further
measurements can be made on the electron, it follows that, as the second wave spreads out, it may give way to a third, and so on. In this way, it becomes
possible to have an ongoing process in which the electron is understood as an independent actuality (which will, of course, give rise to phenomena through
which it may be detected). One is thus implying that the current quantum theory deals only with a fragmentary aspect of this whole processi.e. that
aspect which is associated with a single observational event.
It seems clear that at this stage I was anticipating what later became the implicate order. Indeed, one could say that ingoing and outgoing waves are
enfolding and unfolding movements. However, I did not pursue this idea further at the time. What happened was that I had meanwhile sent copies of my
book to Einstein, to Bohr, to Pauli and to a few other physicists. I received no reply from Bohr, but got an enthusiastic response from Pauli. Then I
received a telephone call from Einstein, saying that he wanted to discuss the book with me. When we met, he said that I had explained Bohrs point of
view as well as could probably be done, but that he was still not convinced. What came out was that he felt that the theory was incomplete, not in the
sense that it failed to be the final truth about the universe as a whole, but rather in the sense that a watch is incomplete if an essential part is missing. This
was, of course, close to my more intuitive sense that the theory was dealing only with statistical arrays of sub-processes associated with similar
observational events. Einstein felt that the statistical predictions of the quantum theory were correct, but that by supplying the missing elements we could in
principle get beyond statistics to an at least in principle determinate theory.
This encounter with Einstein had a strong effect on the direction of my research, because I then became seriously interested in whether a deterministic
extension of the quantum theory could be found. In this connection I soon thought of the classical Hamilton-Jacobi theory, which relates waves to particles
in a fundamental way. Indeed, it had long been known that when one makes a certain approximation (Wentzel-Kramers-Brillouin), Schrdingers
equation becomes equivalent to the classical Hamilton-Jacobi equation. At a certain point Tasked myself: What would happen, in the demonstration of this
equivalence, if we did not make this approximation? I saw immediately that there would be an additional potential, representing a new kind of force, that
would be acting on the particle. I called this the quantum potential, which was designated by Q.
This gave rise directly to what I called a causal interpretation of the quantum theory.5,6 The basic assumption was that the electron is a particle, acted
on not only by the classical potential, V, but also by the quantum potential, Q. This latter is determined by a new kind of

wave that satisfies Schrdingers equation. This wave was assumed, like the particle, to be an independent actuality that existed on its own, rather than
being merely a function from which the statistical properties of phenomena could be derived. However, I showed on the basis of further physically
reasonable assumptions that the intensity of this wave is proportional to the probability that a particle actually is in the corresponding region of space (and
is not merely the probability of our observing the phenomena involved in finding a particle there). So the wave function had a double interpretationfirst
as a function from which the quantum potential could be derived and, secondly, as a function from which probabilities could be derived.
From these assumptions I was able to show that all the usual results of the quantum theory could be obtained on the basis of a model incorporating the
independent actuality of all its basic elements (field and particle), as well as an in principle complete causal determination of the behaviour of these
elements in terms of all the relevant equations (at least in a one-particle system, which is as far as I had got at the time).
I sent pre-publication copies of this work to various physicists. De Broglie quickly sent me a reply indicating that he had proposed a similar idea at the
Solvay Congress in 1927, but that Pauli had severely criticized it and that this had led him to give it up. Soon after this I received a letter from Pauli, stating
his objections in detail. These had mainly to do with the many-particle system, which I had not yet considered seriously. However, as a result of these
objections, I looked at the problem again and came out with a treatment of the many-particle system which consistently answered Paulis criticisms. In
doing this, I also developed a theory of the process of measurement which gave an objective account of this process, without the need for the arbitrary
and unexplained collapse of the wave function that was implied in the usual interpretation of the theory.7
A more detailed consideration of this extended theory led me to look more carefully into the meaning of the quantum potential. This had a number of
interesting new features. Indeed, even in the one-particle system these features showed up to some extent, for the quantum potential did not depend on
the intensity of the wave associated with this electron; it depended only on the form of the wave. And thus, its effect could be large even when the wave
had spread out by propagation across large distances. For example, when the wave passes through a pair of slits, the resulting interference pattern
produces a complicated quantum potential that could affect the particles far from the slits in such a way as to bunch them into a set of fringes equivalent
to those predicted in the usual interpenetration of the quantum theory.8 Thus, by admitting that, even in an empty space in which there is no classical
potential, the particle can be acted on by a quantum potential that does not fall off with the

distance, one is now able to explain the well-known wave particle duality of the properties of matter. And by noting that this quantum potential can
generally have a major effect on the particle, an effect that indeed reflects the whole environment, one can obtain a further insight into the crucially
significant new feature of wholeness of the electron and its relevant experimental context, which Bohr had shown to be implicit in the quantum theory.
When one looked at the many-particle system, this new kind of wholeness became much more evident, for the quantum potential was now a function of
the positions of all the particles which (as in the one-particle case) did not necessarily fall off with the distance. Thus, one could at least in principle have a
strong and direct (non-local) connection between particles that are quite distant from each other. This sort of non-locality would, for example, give a
simple and direct explanation of the paradox of Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen, because in measuring some property of one of a pair of particles with
correlated wave functions, one will alter the non-local quantum potential so that the other particle responds in a corresponding way.
Because the above response is instantaneous, however, it would seem at first sight to contradict the theory of relativity, which requires that no signals
be transmitted faster than the speed of light. At the time of proposing these notions I regarded this as a serious difficulty, but I hoped that the problem
would ultimately be resolved with the aid of further new orders. This indeed did happen later in connection with the application of the causal interpretation
to the quantum mechanical field theory, but as this question is not relevant to the subject of the present paper, I shall not discuss it further here.9
Meanwhile, however, I felt that the causal interpretation was affording valuable insight into a key difference between classical and quantum properties of
matter. Classically, all forces are assumed to fall off eventually to zero, as particles separate, whereas in the quantum theory the quantum potential may still
strongly connect particles that are even at macroscopic orders of distance from each other. In fact, it was just this feature of the quantum theory, as
brought out in the causal interpretation, that later led Bell10 to develop his theorem, demonstrating quite precisely and generally how quantum non-locality
contrasts with classical notions of locality.
As important as this new feature of non-local connection is, however, the quantum potential implies a further move away from classical concepts that is
yet more radical and striking. This is that the very form of the connection between particles depends on the wave function for the state of the whole. This
wave function is determined by solving Schrdingers equation for the entire system, and thus does not depend on the state of the parts. Such a behaviour
is in contrast to that shown in classical physics, for which the interaction between the parts is a predetermined function, independent of the state of the
whole. Thus,

classically, the whole is merely the result of the parts and their pre-assigned interactions, so that the primary reality is the set of parts while the behaviour of
the whole is derived entirely from those parts and their interactions. With the quantum potential, however, the whole has an independent and prior
significance such that, indeed, the whole may be said to organize the activities of the parts. For example, in a superconducting state it may be seen that
electrons are not scattered because, through the action of the quantum potential, the whole system is undergoing a co-ordinated movement more like a
ballet dance than like a crowd of unorganized people. Clearly, such quantum wholeness of activity is closer to the organized unity of functioning of the
parts of a living being than it is to the kind of unity that is obtained by putting together the parts of a machine.
If the whole is such a primary notion in the quantum theory, how do we account for our usual experience of a world made up of a vast set of essentially
independent parts that can correctly be understood in terms of ordinary mechanical notions? The possibility of accounting for this is grounded in the fact
that when the wave function reduces to a set of constituent factors, the quantum potential reduces to a sum of independent components. As a result, the
activity of the whole reduces to that of a set of independent sub-wholes. As explained in detail elsewhere,11 under conditions of temperature commonly
found on the large-scale level, such factorization comes about in an entirely objective way, depending neither on our knowledge nor on the existence or
functioning of any kind of observing or measuring apparatus. Nevertheless, more generally (especially on the small-scale level but, under suitable
conditions, as for example in superconductivity, also on a larger-scale level), it is an equally objective implication of the theory that the wave function does
not factorize, so that the whole cannot then be divided into independent sub-wholes.
To sum up, then, the quantum potential is capable of constituting a non-local connection, depending directly on the state of the whole in a way that is
not reducible to a preassigned relationship among the parts. It not only determines an organized and co-ordinated activity of whole sets of particles, but it
also determines which relatively independent sub-wholes, if any, there may be within a larger whole. I want to emphasize again how radically new are
these implications of the quantum theory. They are hinted at only vaguely and indirectly by the subtle arguments of Bohr, based on the usual interpretation
of the quantum theory as nothing more than a set of mathematical formulae yielding statistical predictions of the phenomena that are to be obtained in
physical observations. However, by putting quantum and classical theories in terms of the same intuitively understandable concepts (particles moving
continuously under the action of potentials), one is able to obtain a clear and sharp perception of how the two theories differ. I felt that such an insight was
important in itself, even

if, as seemed likely at the time that I proposed it, this particular model could not provide the basis for a definitive theory that could undergo a sustained
development. However, a clear intuitive understanding of the meaning of ones ideas can often be helpful in providing a basis from which may ultimately
come an entirely new set of ideas, dealing with the same content.
These proposals did not actually catch on among physicists. The reasons are quite complex and difficult to assess. Perhaps the main objection was
that the theory gave exactly the same predictions for all experimental results as does the usual theory. I myself did not give much weight to these
objections. Indeed, it occurred to me that if de Broglies ideas had won the day at the Solvay Congress of 1927, they might have become the accepted
interpretation; then, if someone had come along to propose the current interpretation, one could equally well have said that since, after all, it gave no new
experimental results, there would be no point in considering it seriously. In other words, I felt that the adoption of the current interpretation was a
somewhat fortuitous affair, since it was affected not only by the outcome of the Solvay Conference but also by the generally positivist empiricist attitude
that pervaded physics at the time. This attitude is in many ways even stronger today, and shows up in the fact that a model that gives insight without an
empirical pay-off cannot be taken seriously.
I did try to answer these criticisms to some extent by pointing out that the enriched conceptual structure of the causal interpretation was capable of
modifications and new lines of development that are not possible in the usual interpretation.12 These could, in principle, lead to new empirical predictions,
but unfortunately there was no clear indication of how to choose such modifications from among the vast range that was possible. And so these arguments
had little effect as an answer to those who require a fairly clear prospect of an empirical test before they will consider an idea seriously.
In addition, it was important that the whole idea did not appeal to Einstein, probably mainly because it involved the new feature of non-locality, which
went against his strongly-held conviction that all connections had to be local. I felt this response of Einstein was particularly unfortunate, both during the
Solvay Congress and afterwards, as it almost certainly put off some of those who might otherwise have been interested in this approach. Although I saw
clearly at the time that the causal interpretation was not entirely satisfactory, I felt that the insight that it afforded was an important reason why it should be
considered, at least as a supplement to the usual interpretation. To have some kind of intuitive model was better, in my view, than to have none at all, for,
without such a model, research in the quantum theory will consist mainly of the working out of formulae and the comparison of these calculated results
with those of experiment. Even more important, the teaching of quantum mechanics will reduce (as it

has in fact tended to do) to a kind of indoctrination, aimed at fostering the belief that such a procedure is all that is possible in physics. Thus new
generations of students have grown up who are predisposed to consider such questions with rather closed minds.
Because the response to these ideas was so limited, and because I did not see clearly, at the time, how to proceed further, my interests began to turn in
other directions. During the 1960s, I began to direct my attention toward order, partly as a result of a long correspondence with an American artist,
Charles Biederman, who was deeply concerned with this question. And then, through working with a student, Donald Schumacher, I became strongly
interested in language. These two interests led to a paper13 on order in physics and on its description through language. In this paper I compared and
contrasted relativistic and quantum notions of order, leading to the conclusion that they contradicted each other and that new notions of order were
needed.
Being thus alerted to the importance of order, I saw a programme on BBC television showing a device in which an ink drop was spread out through a
cylinder of glycerine and then brought back together again, to be reconstituted essentially as it was before. This immediately struck me as very relevant to
the question of order, since, when the ink drop was spread out, it still had a hidden (i.e. non-manifest) order that was revealed when it was
reconstituted. On the other hand, in our usual language, we would say that the ink was in a state of disorder when it was diffused through the glycerine.
This led me to see that new notions of order must be involved here.
Shortly afterwards, I began to reflect on the hologram and to see that in it, the entire order of an object is contained in an interference pattern of light
that does not appear to have such an order at all. Suddenly, I was struck by the similarity of the hologram and the behaviour of the ink drop. I saw that
what they had in common was that an order was enfolded, that is, in any small region of space there may be information which is the result of enfolding
an extended order and which could then be unfolded into the original order (as the points of contact made by the folds in a sheet of paper may contain the
essential relationships of the total pattern displayed when the sheet is unfolded).
Then, when I thought of the mathematical form of the quantum theory (with its matrix operations and Greens functions), I perceived that this too
described just a movement of enfoldment and unfoldment of the wave function. So the thought occurred to me: perhaps the movement of enfoldment and
unfoldment is universal, while the extended and separate forms that we commonly see in experience are relatively stable and independent patterns,
maintained by a constant underlying movement of enfoldment and unfoldment. This latter I called the holomovement. The proposal was thus a reversal of
the usual

idea. Instead of supposing that extended matter and its movement are fundamental, while enfoldment and unfoldment are explained as as particular case of
this, we are saying that the implicate order will have to contain within itself all possible features of the explicate order as potentialities, along with the
principles determining which of these features shall become actual. The explicate order will in this way flow out of the implicate order through unfoldment,
while in turn it flows back through further enfoldment. The implicate order thus plays a primary role, while the explicate order is secondary, in the sense
that its main qualities and properties are ultimately derived in its relationship with the implicate order, of which it is indeed a special and distinguished case.
This approach implies, of course, that each separate and extended form in the explicate order is enfolded in the whole and that, in turn, the whole is
enfolded in this form (though, of course, there is an asymmetry, in that the form enfolds the whole only in a limited and not completely defined way). The
way in which the separate and extended form enfolds the whole is, however, not merely superficial or of secondary significance, but rather it is essential to
what that form is and to how it acts, moves and behaves quite generally. So the whole is, in a deep sense, internally related to the parts. And, since the
whole enfolds all the parts, these latter are also internally related, though in a weaker way than they are related to the whole.
I shall not go into great detail about the implicate order14,15 here; I shall assume that the reader is somewhat familiar with this. What I want to
emphasize is only that the implicate order provided an image, a kind of metaphor, for intuitively understanding the implication of wholeness which is the
most important new feature of the quantum theory. Nevertheless, it must be pointed out that the specific analogies of the ink drop and the hologram are
limited, and do not fully convey all that is meant by the implicate order. What is missing in these analogies is an inner principle of organization in the
implicate order that determines which sub-wholes shall become actual and what will be their relatively independent and stable forms. Indeed, in both these
models, the order enfolded in the whole is obtained from pre-existent, separate and extended elements (objects photographed in the hologram or ink
drops injected into the glycerine). It is then merely unfolded to give something similar to these elements again. Nor is there any natural principle of stability
in these elements; they may be totally altered or destroyed by minor further disturbances of the overall arrangement of the equipment.
Gradually, throughout the 1970s, I became more aware of the limitations of the hologram and ink droplet analogies to the implicate order. Meanwhile, I
noticed that both the implicate order and the causal interpretations had emphasized this wholeness signified by quantum laws, though in apparently very
different ways. So I

wondered if these two rather different approaches were not related in some deep senseespecially because I had come at least to the essence of both
notions at almost the same time. At first sight, the causal interpretation seemed to be a step backwards toward mechanism, since it introduced the notion
of a particle acted on by a potential. Nevertheless, as I have already pointed out, its implication that the whole both determines its sub-wholes and
organizes their activity clearly goes far beyond what appeared to be the original mechanical point of departure. Would it not be possible to drop this
mechanical starting point altogether?
I saw that this could indeed be done by going on from the quantum mechanical particle theory to the quantum mechanical field theory. This is
accomplished by starting with the classical notion of a continuous field (e.g. the electromagnetic) that is spread out through all space. One then applies the
rules of the quantum theory to this field. The result is that the field will have discrete quantized values for certain properties, such as energy, momentum
and angular momentum. Such a field will act in many ways like a collection of particles, while at the same time it still has wave-like manifestations such as
interference, diffraction, etc.
Of course, in the usual interpretation of the theory, there is no way to understand how this comes about. One can only use the mathematical formalism
to calculate statistically the distribution of phenomena through which such a field reveals itself in our observations and experiments. But now one can
extend this causal interpretation to the quantum field theory. Here, the actuality will be the entire field over the whole universe. Classically, this is
determined as a continuous solution of some kind of field equation (e.g. Maxwells equations for the electromagnetic field). But when we extend the notion
of the causal interpretation to the field theory, we find that these equations are modified by the action of what I called a super-quantum potential. This is
related to the activity of the entire field as the original quantum potential was to that of the particles. As a result, the field equations are modified in a way
that makes them, in technical language, non-local and non-linear.
What this implies for the present context can be seen by considering that, classically, solutions of the field equations represent waves that spread out
and diffuse independently. Thus, as I indicated earlier in connection with the hologram, there is no way to explain the origination of the waves that
converge to a region where a particle-like manifestation is actually detected, nor is there any factor that could explain the stability and sustained existence
of such a particle-like manifestation. However, this lack is just what is supplied by the super-quantum potential. Indeed, as can be shown by a detailed
analysis,6,7 the non-local features of this latter will introduce the required tendency of waves to converge at appropriate places, while the non-

linearity will provide for the stability of recurrence of the whole process. And thus we come to a theory in which not only the activity of particle-like
manifestations, but even their actualization, e.g. their creation, sustenance and annihilation, is organized by the super-quantum potential.
The general picture that emerges out of this is of a wave that spreads out and converges again and again to show a kind of average particle-like
behaviour, while the interference and diffraction properties are, of course, still maintained. All this flows out of the super-quantum potential, which
depends in principle on the state of the whole universe. But if the wave function of the universe falls into a set of independent factors, at least
approximately, a corresponding set of relatively autonomous and independent sub-units of field function will emerge. And, in fact, as in the case in the
particle theory, the wave function will under normal conditions tend to factorize at the large-scale level in an entirely objective way that is not basically
dependent on our knowledge or on our observations and measurements. So now we see quite generally that the whole universe not only determines and
organizes its sub-wholes, but also that it gives form to what has until now been called the elementary particles out of which everything is supposed to be
constituted. What we have here is a kind of universal process of constant creation and annihilation, determined through the super-quantum potential so as
to give rise to a world of form and structure in which all manifest features are only relatively constant, recurrent and stable aspects of this whole.
To see how this is connected with the implicate order, we have only to note that the original holographic model was one in which the whole was
constantly enfolded into and unfolded from each region of an electromagnetic field, through dynamical movement and development of the field according
to the laws of classical field theory. But now, this whole field is no longer a self-contained totality; it depends crucially on the super-quantum potential. As
we have seen, however, this in turn depends on the wave function of the universe in a way that is a generalization of how the quantum potential for
particles depends on the wave function of a system of particles. But all such wave functions are forms of the implicate order (whether they refer to
particles or to fields). Thus, the super-quantum potential expresses the activity of a new kind of implicate order. This implicate order is immensely more
subtle than that of the original field, as well as more inclusive, in the sense that not only is the actual activity of the whole field enfolded in it, but also all its
potentialities, along with the principles determining which of these shall become actual.
I was in this way led to call the original field the first implicate order, while the super-quantum potential was called the second implicate order (or the
super-implicate order). In principle, of course, there could be a third, fourth, fifth implicate order, going on to infinity,

and these would correspond to extensions of the laws of physics going beyond those of the current quantum theory, in a fundamental way. But for the
present I want to consider only the second implicate order, and to emphasize that this stands in relationship to the first as a source of formative, organizing
and creative activity.
It should be clear that this notion now incorporates both of my earlier perceptionsthe implicate order as a movement of outgoing and incoming
waves, and of the causal interpretation of the quantum theory. So, although these two ideas seemed initially very different, they proved to be two aspects
of one more comprehensive notion. This can be described as an overall implicate order, which may extend to an infinite number of levels and which
objectively and self-actively differentiates and organizes itself into independent sub-wholes, while determining how these are interrelated to make up the
whole.
Moreover, the principles of organization of such an implicate order can even define a unique explicate order, as a particular and distinguished suborder, in which all the elements are relatively independent and externally related.16 To put it differently, the explicate order itself may be obtainable from
the implicate order as a special and determinate sub-order that is contained within it.
All that has been discussed here opens up the possibility of considering the cosmos as an unbroken whole through an overall implicate order. Of
course, this possibility has been studied thus far in only a preliminary way, and a great deal more work is required to clarify and extend the notions that
have been discussed in this paper.

References
1 This article is an extension and modification of a talk, D.Bohm, Zygon, 20, 111 (1985).
2 D.Bohm, Quantum Theory, Prentice-Hall, New York, 1951.
3 N.Bohr, Atomatic Physics and Human Knowledge, Science Editions, New York, 1965.
4 J.von Neumann, Mathematical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics, R. T.Beyer (trans.), Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey, 1955.
5 D.Bohm, Phys. Rev., 85, 166 (1952).
6 D.Bohm, Phys. Rev., 85, 180 (1952).
7 See reference 6; see also D.Bohm and B.J.Hiley, Foundations of Physics, 14, 255 (1984), where this question is discussed in more detail.
8 For a detailed treatment of this point, see C.Philippidis, C.Dewdney and B.J.Hiley, Nuovo Cimento, B52, 15 (1979).
9 For a further discussion of this point, see reference 7.
10 J.Bell, Rev. Mod. Phys., 38, 447 (1966); see also Foundations of Physics, 12, 989 (1982).
11 D.Bohm and B.J.Hiley, Foundations of Physics, 14, 255 (1984).
12 D.Bohm and J.-P.Vigier, Phys. Rev., 96, 208 (1954).
13 D.Bohm, Foundations of Physics, 1, 359 (1971).
14 D.Bohm, Foundations of Physics, 3, 139 (1973).

15 D.Bohm, Wholeness and the Implicate Order, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1980.
16 D.Bohm, Claremont Conference, in Physics and the Ultimate Significance of Time, ed. David R.Griffin, State University of New York Press,
Albany, 1986.

3
Collective variables in elementary quantum mechanics
Eugene P.Gross Department of Physics, Brandeis University
In the present article I discuss some features of the use of collective coordinates in two systems with a small number of degrees of freedom. In both cases
the utility of collective coordinates is connected with the validity of an adiabatic approximation. The two examples are pedagogical in nature, but are
perhaps appropriate in a volume honoring David Bohm, who has made major contributions to the theory of collective coordinates. First, however, I
present some personal reminiscences of the days when I was a student of David Bohm.
My first recollection is of a seminar given in 1946 by David Bohm, shortly after he arrived in Princeton as an assistant professor. The subject was
plasma physics. The talk was divided into three parts. The first part dealt with the plasma as a distinct state of matter, with an organization different from
the solid, liquid and gas. The charge screening and lack of velocity locking was emphasized. The second part had to do with the widespread occurrence
of plasmas in discharge tube physics, in astrophysics and in chemistry. He touched on the connection with microwave space-charge devices. Particular
attention was paid to plasma oscillations and the frequent occurrence of instabilities. The third part dealt with metals viewed as quantum plasmas. The
main tool of analysis was the linearization of the equations of motion for products of creation and annihilation operators by means of the random phase
approximation.
I was then looking for a thesis advisor. In his low key fashion, Dave Bohm had opened up a vast panorama. It was clear that an enormous range of
problems had to be explored. The intertwining of conceptual and practical problems was very appealing and exciting. How lucky to have the possibility of
doing a thesis which was much more than doing the simple next step in an ongoing research program. I worked hard on my notes, and wrote up the
lecture very carefully. I gave them to Dave and was taken on as a student.
We spent a tremendous amount of time together. There are advantages to having a bachelor as a mentor. We spent some time at the blackboard, but
mainly talked. Then Dave wrote things down on paper. But even more vivid in my memory are the very long walks

through Princeton, with numerous stops for coffee. Dave developed ideas and responded to questions and criticisms. What was remarkable was that one
could do theoretical physics without a blackboard and without pencil and paper. After returning to the office it seemed that the mathematics just settled
into place, with significant results coming quickly.
I slowly realized that there was a hidden background. Dave had been an assistant to W.R.Smythe and had done essentially all of the difficult problems
in Static and Dynamic Electricity. He had written papers on the theory of high energy accelerators and on the velocity distribution of electrons in
nebulae. There was several years of total involvement with the behavior of plasmas in magnetic fields, in connection with his work for the Manhattan
Project. These papers were written with his characteristic lucidity. The physical descriptions stand out and control the mathematical analysis. All of this
work was germane to our research on the classical kinetic theory of plasmas and beams. There is undoubtedly more background that I am not aware of.
Dave was also deeply concerned with quantum problems. He thought about many-electron problems and superconductivity. He was at work on his
text on quantum theory. He reformulated the theory of measurement in quantum mechanics. Most of all, he was fascinated by Bohrs ideas on the role of
complementarity in describing nature.
The problem of the divergences in quantum electrodynamics was very much on peoples minds. Dave worked on self-oscillations of finite-sized
particles and on Kramers theory of non-relativistic electrodynamics. His lectures on advanced quantum mechanics dealt with electrodynamics. He gave
much thought to the hypothesis of a minimum length in physics and to reconciling relativity and quantum mechanics for structures of finite extent. Along
with other physicists such as Bohr, he felt that a really radical change in physical ideas was needed. Instead, Schwingers program of starting with the full
Maxwell-Dirac Lagrangian, insisting on manifest covariance, and quarantining the divergences, represented a different kind of radical change. Feynmans
introduction of diagrams freed the imaginations of theoretical physicists to deal with what had been depressingly complicated formalisms in quantum field
theory and many-body physics.
In the light of this rich background, it is now less surprising to me that one could do physics by talking. The use of analogy is very powerful when there
is a well-defined mathematical basis for the analogies. Still, I continue to marvel at Daves extraordinary manner of expressing ideas and of constructing
coherent intellectual structures. It made possible communication with non-physicists, who appreciated Daves ability to explain the fundamental ideas of
physics. Indeed, this sometimes became ludicrous. I recall a social evening where, tongue in cheek, he constructed an elaborate and convincing theory of
the existence of ghosts and devils.
The reconciliation of collective and individual aspects of behavior

in many-body theory, and of wave and particle aspects in quantum theory, moved to the forefront of Daves thoughts. He was not satisfied with the
equations-of-motion approach to many-body theory. He felt that a description was needed that dealt with collective and individual aspects simultaneously.
This led to the successful auxiliary variable theory of Bohm and Pines.1 A beautiful account of the ideas is found in Daves later (1956) Les Houches
lectures.2
He continued this work with T.Staver and D.Salt, and extended the description in his papers with G.Carmi.3 The ideas of these later papers have not
been sufficiently appreciated by physicists.
On the problem of the foundations of quantum theory, his analysis of the Einstein, Podolsky, Rosen thought experiment gave rise to his causal
reformulations. He continued this work in Brazil, Israel and England. The role of non-locality emerged. This culminated in the celebrated and startling
Aharonov-Bohm analysis of electromagnetic potentials in quantum theory. It now occupies an important position in the physical foundations of gauge
theories.
There is another aspect. It was the non-competitive atmosphere in which Dave did his work. I recall an incident. In our first paper on plasma
oscillations we had independently discovered the phenomenon of Landau damping. We used an orbit-tracing approach and considered the low collision
frequency limit. It was used to understand particle trapping and the limitations of the linear theory. I came upon a copy of the Journal of Physics
containing Landaus solution of the linearized Vlasov equation.4 Due to wartime dislocations it arrived in Princeton after a delay of a year. I rushed to
show it to Dave, who was in the shop constructing a frame for a hi-fi set. He was not at all perturbed at being scooped and simply admired the elegance
and incisiveness of Landaus paper.
Broader philosophical questions were often discussed in the numerous conversations that Dave had with me and others. I had taken courses in
mathematical logic from A.Church and pressed its claims on Dave. We talked about the relation to dialectical modes of thinking. I recall a conversation in
the graduate student library at Princeton. It had a copy of the Catholic Encyclopedia. We looked at the article on the Holy Trinity, and noted how similar
the language was to that of Bohr. However, nothing came of an attempt to generalize Bohrs notion of wave-particle duality. Dave was always concerned
with the philosophical problem of obtaining adequate concepts and modes of thinking to make sense of our experience. He has continued this with his
explorations of the notions of implicate and explicate order.
Finally, I can only use old-fashioned language to describe his impact on me and others. Daves essential being was then, and still is, totally engaged in
the calm but passionate search into the nature of things. He can only be characterized as a secular saint. He is totally free of

guile and competitiveness, and it would be easy to take advantage of him. Indeed, his students and friends, mostly younger than he is, felt a powerful urge
to protect such a precious being. Perhaps the deep affection of his many friends helped to sustain him in the difficult years of the early 1950s.

1 Atom-molecule transition
(a) Introduction
As the first example of the use of collective coordinates, consider a three-particle system, with two of the particles having the same mass M and the other
particle a mass m. The Hamiltonian is:

The Hydrogen molecular (two center) ion corresponds to the attractive:

between an electron (mass m) and the nuclei (mass M).

is the nuclear repulsion, and M m.

The H ion is the atomic (one center) case where m is the mass of the proton and M is the mass of the electrons. The potential energies are the same.
This is the opposite limit of the same Hamiltonian, i.e. M m.
One can choose one of the masses (say m) to set the scale of energy. For example we can choose a Bohr radius
and the energy unit
.
Then the spectrum depends on the ratio m/M. It is interesting that there is a drastic change in the spectrum as the single parameter m/M is varied. The
diatomic molecule is a highly organized system.5 We have a well-defined structure of the atomic, vibrational and rotational low levels whose energies are
in the ratio 1, 1M and 1/M. In the atomic limit m M, the H ion has only a ground state that is 3/4 eV below the continuum. We would like to
understand the concepts that are needed to describe this transition of the level structure.
Cases where the mass ratio is not so extreme do occur in nature, e.g. mesic atoms and molecules. In nuclear physics there are also three-body
problems where all the masses are comparable, but the potential energies are different. We expect the level variation with m/M to be smooth.

To proceed we need a suitable set of new coordinates. Guided by the physics of the molecular limit we choose:

Here is the center of mass of the system as a whole, and is a collective coordinate. (Frequently a collective coordinate is a one-body additive function
of the original coordinates.) is a coordinate of the lone particle relative to the center of mass of the nuclei:

is the relative coordinate of the two nuclei.

Introducing the reduced mass of the electron:

the Hamiltonian takes the form:

The center of mass motion is clearly separated, i.e. is an ignorable coordinate. This expresses the rigorous translation invariance of the Hamiltonian, i.e.
that it is unchanged when there is a common displacement of the original coordinates.
In atomic theory, the standard coordinates for the discussion of the effects of the finite nuclear mass on atomic spectra are:

Since is the coordinate of the heavy particle (mass m) and 1 and 2 the coordinates of the electrons (mass H), it is natural to measure the position of
the light particles (mass M) relative to the heavy particle (mass m) Then:

Again the center of mass motion is clearly separated. We identify the term:

as a perturbation which comes into play when

but not infinite.
We will introduce still another set of coordinates. In the first description we had:
1 a good center of mass coordinate
2
a center of mass coordinate

for the system as a whole;

for the two-particle subsystem.

In the second description we used only the first center of mass coordinate. There are other problems where one cant introduce acceptable collective
coordinates of either kind. In the three-particle system consider:

with the canonical momenta:

Then:

the coordinates are directly expressed in terms of original coordinates and the motion of a center of mass is not introduced. The Hamiltonian still
involves the total momentum , and is an ignorable coordinate, so the translational invariance finds an appropriate expression. This description is also
satisfactory for the m/M 1 atomic limit.
The different coordinate choices correspond to different pictures that are used in obtaining an understanding of the behavior of the system. Usually no
single description is best in the entire parameter space m/M.

(b) The semi-oscillator model-molecular limit

To analyse the qualitative features of the m/M transition, it is useful to first examine a semi-oscillator model. The attractive potential is replaced by an
oscillator potential:

where K is a stiffness coefficient. We lose some important feature of the actual systems, since the oscillator attraction always holds the particles together.
The model does not have ionized, i.e. continuum, states, apart from the center-of-mass continuum states.
The intrinsic part of the Hamiltonian separates in the and variables. We have:

First consider the additional approximation of neglecting the repulsion, i.e. U(y)=0. The spectrum is:

where the nx, v xare integers (including zero). Since each of the sub-Hamiltonians is rotation invariant, we have alternative descriptions in terms of
principal, angular momentum and azimuthal quantum numbers. These are important in discussing perturbations of the systems by external electric and
magnetic fields.
In the molecular limit (M m) there is a triply-degenerate high-frequency branch represented by v x, vy, vz, proportional to
dependence on m/M. The nx, ny, nz branch is proportional to

and with a weak

and is low frequency.

In the atomic limit (m M) the branches coalesce and are described by the single frequency
Next, consider the effects of the repulsion U(q1q2) between the M particles. The modes of frequency:

are unaltered. This is the only place that the mass m enters. These modes are high frequency in both the molecular and atomic limits, with a minimum at
m=2M.
The branches corresponding to nx, ny, nz in absence of the repulsion are now described by the rotation invariant Hamiltonian:

An appropriate set of quantum numbers is the angular momentum l with a (2l+1) azimuthal degeneracy. The radial function Rv.l() also characterized by a
principal quantum number v. They obey the equations:

We find the vibration-rotation spectrum from this equation. One first considers the case l=0. The potential energy is
minimum at:

positive and has a

when U()=e2/. Expanding about this point the energy is:

In the large M limit asymptotic analysis shows that one can ignore the half range of coordinate and the boundary condition at =0.
For l=0 one then has a one-dimensional harmonic oscillator and thus a vibrational spectrum
frequency is
inertia

i.e. proportional to

with a vibrational quantum number v. The

. The rotational spectrum is roughly estimated by taking =* in the term

This gives a moment of

Thus the electronic, vibrational and rotational separations are in the ratios 1,

This is a crude first approximation. It rests on the fact that, for M 1, the minimum * is far from the origin, i.e.
A more precise analysis of
the Rv,l equation yields a theory of the vibration-rotation interaction. If one moves away from the molecular limit to the transition region, where M and m
are comparable, we get increasing distortion and modification of the spectrum. The analysis appears to be complicated but feasible, provided one does
extensive computer calculations. The results should be similar to standard analysis using Morse potentials.

(c) Semi-oscillator model-atomic limit (m M)

Let us return to the standard coordinates used in the discussion of the effect of nuclear motions on atomic spectra. Since m/M 1 we look on the term:

as a perturbation.
For high Z two-electron atoms the interelectronic repulsion can also be treated by perturbation theory. The starting point is then an

independent particle description with hydrogenic wave functions and with the reduced masses
An even better starting point is the HartreeFock independent particle description.
However, when Z is reduced so that one reaches the helium atom (Z=2), this description is not very good. One needs wave functions that, even in the
fixed nucleus limit, give a more accurate account of the correlated motion of the electrons. It is necessary to classify the levels into para and ortho-helium.
The Pauli principle requires that the wave functions are antisymmetric under combined interchange of space and spin coordinates of the electrons. The
perturbations arising from the finite nuclear mass give differential shifts of the energy levels.
By the time one reaches the H ion (Z=1) the independent electron description is completely inadequate. If one does not have the extreme situation
m/M 1, the fact that the momenta are coupled leaves us with an unclear picture of the behavior. For the semi-oscillator model the description in terms of
, , and coordinates appears to be better in the intermediate situation, since the complications are transferred to the coordinates alone, i.e. one has
a one-body problem. But this is not true for the actual V(r)=e2/r problem.

(d) The
transition-actual potential
To solve the molecule problem for the
case where
electronic wave functions for fixed nuclear coordinates. In the ,

we have the adiabatic (Born-Oppenheimer) approximation.6 We look for the

descriptions:

This is a two-center problem with the parameter

only involving the nuclear coordinates. It separates in elliptical coordinates. In the simple
adiabatic approximation
enters as part of the potential for the nuclear wave functions

where n corresponds to additional quantum numbers for the rotation vibration spectrum (l and ml =l,0,l). In fact v depends only on the absolute
value
as does
For the semi-oscillator model:

and the adiabatic approximation is exact. In the actual

molecular ion the electronic wave function is governed by a potential that is
when 0.
So the v (0) are hydrogenic levels for Z=2 with a reduced mass .
On the other hand, for large nuclear separations we have a spectrum which is 1/4 of the 0 spectrum. So the v () curve is slowly varying and
proportional to
The potential for the nuclear wave function also involves U()=e2/ which as 0 and to 0 as . If we fix the units so
that m=1, we see that we lose the minimum as M0, i.e. in the atomic limit. In addition the adiabatic approximation has broken down by the time M~1.
Of course in the atomic region it is better to proceed by doing the perturbation analysis with the appropriate set of coordinates.
It is clear that the destruction of the highly organized level structure as m/M decreases occurs in a very non-uniform manner. Even in the extreme
molecular limit the large quantum number rotational and vibrational states merge into the continuum. As m/M is reduced, only the lowest states retain
identity. They are still satisfactorily described in terms of the collective coordinate. Finally all of these disappear and one is left with the H ion. In the
present problem, where there are only a few degrees of freedom, all of these properties emerge from rather simple familiar mathematical equations. There
is nothing really surprising, but perhaps we obtain a more explicit understanding of the strengths and limitations of the use of collective coordinates. A very
important point is that the failure to satisfy the boundary condition at =0 becomes very serious as one moves away from the domain where the collective
coordinate yields a good approximation. We would like to emphasize that, while it may be possible to give a theory of the ground state energy valid over
the entire m/M range, it is much more difficult to give an account of the level structure.

2 Electron interacting with two-lattice oscillators

(a) Introduction
As a second example of the use of collective coordinates, consider the Hamiltonian:

An electron interacts with two oscillators of wave vector k. Units are chosen so that the common mass and frequency of the oscillators as well as are
unity. This Hamiltonian comes from the polaron problem in a standing wave description. We single out a single pair of wave vectors. By scaling the
coordinate so that q=kq1 and M=(M1/k2) we have a two-parameter dependence of the energy levels on M and g. In addition the levels depend on the
total momentum of the system. We would like to understand the way the low-lying level structure depends on these parameters.
We can describe the system in terms of a pair of travelling waves by introducing new Hermitian coordinates:

and creation and destruction operators by:

It is convenient to put:

Then:

This is a more familiar form for a particle-field Hamiltonian. It has the total momentum G as an exact constant of motion:

In the standing wave description the constant of motion is:

Still another description takes note of the degeneracy of the oscillators. One can introduce polar coordinates Q, by:

The phase will play the role of a collective coordinate for the two-oscillator subsystem. We have:

where:

The constant of motion is:

For this system there is no natural center-of-mass coordinate for the system as a whole. The collective coordinate representation is useful in the strong
coupling domain.
When the interaction is turned off (g=0), the spectrum has a continuous free particle part plus integer excitations. Thus:

in the first two descriptions.

When the mass M is sent to infinity we have a fixed-source problem, i.e. two displaced oscillators. All levels are shifted downward by an amount g2.
The Q, description is unnatural in the fixed-source limit.
The coordinates that we use provide the basis for the language that is needed to describe the behavior. Different coordinates lead to different pictures
of the motion.
It is useful to classify the levels in terms of the exact constant of motion. This leads to still other coordinate choices.
In the running-wave description we introduce new variables by the canonical transformation:

The number operators are na=aa, nb=bb, NA=AA, NB =BB. Then:

Let us consider the case where G=0. Elementary perturbation theory gives for the spectrum to order

This displays the level structure in the weak coupling and heavy source limit. The higher levels are shifted upward more than the lower levels.

We would like to find the level structure in other domains of the parameter space.
The constants of motion can be introduced in other descriptions. With the rotation:

we find:

Finally going to polar coordinates, we have for p=0:

The wave functions are periodic in or , but q ranges from to + . In these coordinate systems it is impossible to violate translation invariance.
One can set up the secular equation for the amplitudes in terms of the non-interacting basis functions. For example insertion of:

in the Schrdinger equation gives a five-term difference equation for the coefficients C. The problem is simple enough so that for given values of g and M
one can truncate the equations and find the level scheme to desired accuracy. This is indeed what Devreese and Evrard have done.7 However one does
not obtain insight into the behavior in the domain g 1,
strong-coupling expansion is possible.

This is the region where collective variables come into play and where a systematic

(b) The adiabatic approximation

We discuss the problem using the collective phase coordinate but we do not introduce the constant of motion explicitly.
The idea of the adiabatic approximation is that when M 1 one first sets up the equation for the electronic surfaces, i.e.:

with Q and as parameters. This is the Mathieu equation. The v are independent of and the wave functions depend only on q. For an extendedzone scheme the spectrum is put into correspondence with the free-particle spectrum. The lowest state is periodic in (q).
The total wave function is now approximated by the product function:

One looks for a band associated with the nuclear (i.e. oscillator) motions
Consider the lowest electronic state. Then 0(Q) forms part of the potential for the oscillator function. It obeys:

where:

This is the extended Born-Oppenheimer approximation. It results simply by making a variational ansatz of the product form and then varying 0 and (0)
independently.
Now we have a number of auxiliary problems within the framework of the adiabatic approximation. None of them can be solved exactly. By
asymptotic analysis of the Mathieu equation we can represent 0(Q) in the form:

Asymptotic analysis also yields:

In the next step we study the vibrations and rotations corresponding to each electronic level. We will examine only the lowest electronic band, i.e. v=0.
Introduce:

Here m=0, 1, and v is a vibrational quantum number. Note that the product functions:

are translation invariant, i.e. exact eigenfunctions of G. We find for the radial functions:

where:

We locate the minimum of the potential energy. In first approximation it is at Q*=g, so that the leading term in the total energy is
approximation:

One sees that the terms T00,

are all of order

The elementary strong-coupling theory requires g 1,

to +. The frequency of the vibration is shifted from 1 to
are:

In the next

so the m dependent levels are separated by

Then the minimum is far removed from the origin and the Q range can be taken to be
Thus the energies of the states corresponding to the lowest electronic band

The constant term

is interesting. It corresponds to the removal of the zero point energy of one of the oscillators. It always occurs in an explicitly
translation invariant theory. We have again found that the adiabatic (strong coupling) theory based on collective variables has a rich spectrum.
The conclusion is the same that we drew from the three-body problem. Even if the adiabatic approximation is accepted, the sys-

tematic strong coupling expansion is not exact. R.E.Langer8 studied the radial equation for a rotating harmonic oscillator. This analysis leads to (logg)/g2
terms in the analysis energy spectrum. The adiabatic approximation breaks down first for the higher electronic states and for fast moving particles.
In more general theories that introduce collective variables it is usually impossible to perform the inverse transformation. The regularity conditions on the
wave functions are defined in terms of the original variables and imply conditions on the wave functions expressed in terms of the new collective variable.
In our simple model they are the periodicity in and the behavior at Q=0. Any of the systematic schemes for working in the collective description uses
wave functions that are, strictly speaking, inadmissible because they violate the conditions. It is usually impossible to do much about this.

(c) Transition theories

Let us now ask whether one can find an analytic theory that goes from strong to weak coupling, e.g. fixed, variable g. From the point of view of adiabatic
theory we imagine solving the Mathieu equation and the vibration equation for any g and M. It is however clear that non-adiabatic effects prevent one
from going to the weak coupling limit with a single-product wave function. On the other hand a simple perturbation calculation (which is easily made
variational) using all the adiabatic states should be adequate. This is of course quite complicated. However, one need not have all the details of the strong
coupling limit. Consider the translation invariant product function:

where is a suitable average, defined by a variationally calculation. One can define an orthonormal set of excited states and proceed to a complete
transition theory. We have not worked out details, but presumably the level scheme will transform smoothly. The main reason for the failure of Hamiltonian
transition theories for the polaron to show a smooth transition is the failure to use manifestly translation-invariant wave functions. We are using translationinvariant states for the two-oscillators model.
On the other hand it is interesting that a transition theory for this problem (for the ground state) can be made with ideas that come from the M limit.
These ideas are intermediate coupling theory or Bloch-Nordsieck transformations and variants of a generalized harmonic approximation. The wave
functions are very different from those involved in using extensions of strong coupling approaches.
Consider the problem of determining the ground state energy in the manifestly translation-invariant representation q e, q 0 that is natural in the weakcoupling and fixed-source limit. We dilate the odd-parity oscillator coordinate by introducing:

Take the expectation value with a wave function:

This gives a quadratic Hamiltonian for the even-parity oscillator. Introduce a dilation and displacement by:

Taking the expectation value with a wave function:

we find the ground-state energy:

where:

Next we vary EG with respect to 0 to find the minimum. It is most convenient to express the resulting condition as:

For given M we let 0 range between 1 and 0, compute e, and find the appropriate value of g2.
In the weak coupling limit

The strong coupling limit is g 1 for fixed M. Then:

and we find the intermediate coupling theory result:

The static shift goes from

to g. The ground-state energy has the expression:

The first two terms agree with the adiabatic theory. The other terms disagree. The adiabatic theory is of course the correct theory for strong coupling.
This type of extension of the weak coupling theory connects to the leading term in strong coupling. In a polaron theory with a fixed lattice cut-off, one
reaches the strong coupling limit with a normal mode transformation and a suitable linear shift in the oscillator variable. The mechanism is the same, i.e. the
static shift of modes of wave vector k goes from
at weak coupling to g for sufficiently large g and wave vector k less than the fixed cut-off.
This means that the dynamic coupling of long wavelength lattice modes to the electron (represented by the normal mode transform) suppresses the recoil
denominator of perturbation theory. On the other hand, for given g, sufficiently short-wave modes couple as in perturbation theory. In the polaron theory
without a lattice cut-off, all modes up to a wave vector k~g2 couple classically, i.e. without a recoil denominator. This explains why the strong coupling
energy for the polaron goes as g4 rather than as g2 for the two-mode theory.
This type of transition theory for the ground-state energy is not very accurate. If the theory is extended to a study of the entire level scheme, the results
are poor in the strong coupling domain. Feynmans path integral calculation of the ground-state energy can also be done for the two-mode model. It gives
more accurate results, but it is not a theory of the level structure. On the other hand it would be desirable to have a theory that gives an account of the
spectrum on the transition region. At present only the adiabatic theory, based on collective variables, gives the spectrum in the strong coupling region.
Within the Hamiltonian scheme, one can probably go to weaker couplings by taking into account the non-adiabatic effects. It would be worthwhile to
extend the path integral approach to a theory of the structure of the low-lying levels.

3 Polaron problem
We add a few remarks on the use of collective coordinates in the polaron problem. Consider the particle field Hamiltonian:

with:

The field (x) corresponds to an optical branch, i.e. constant frequency for all field oscillators. The source function is:

The constant of motion is:

but there is no good associated collective coordinate. In the weak coupling or heavy source limit it is useful to introduce the Jost transform.

This is the analogue of the coordinates introduced in the atomic limit and in the weak coupling limit for the two-mode problem.
In the strong coupling limit collective coordinates can be introduced by writing:

Here we have an orthonormal set Xv (x). Three of the field oscillators are deleted and replaced by the three
by imagining that one can solve:

collective coordinates. These can be fixed

for (). The X are three (essentially p-wave) functions. This is an idea due to Pekar. It makes possible a strong coupling adiabatic theory which can be
carried through without explicitly solving for (See the detailed study by the author.9)
However is not really a good collective coordinate globally. One sees this by examining the elementary soluble fixed-source problem (M) for a
field (x). The solution with the coordinates Qv and is ridiculously complicated. Nonetheless it gives a good strong coupling theory of the low-lying
states when M 1.
This type of theory can also be done by introducing as extra coordinates and imposing three auxiliary conditions on the wave function. This is the
adiabatic theory of Bogolyubov and Tyablikov.10 It is similar in spirit and predates the collective coordinate theories of

Bohm and Pines and of Zubarev for the more difficult electron gas problem. As applied to the polaron it shares the difficulties and successes of the more
explicit Pekar theory.
It is well known that Feynman has given a beautiful path integral theory of the polaron ground state and effective mass.11 It connects the weak and
strong coupling limits and has been used to calculate the mobility, optical absorption and other properties. However, it does not give an account of the
strong coupling level structure. In the light of the analysis of the present paper, it is not likely that one will obtain a simple account of the breakdown of the
level structure as one proceeds from strong to weak coupling. However, it is an interesting challenge to extend the path integral approach to deal with this
type of problem.

References
1 D.Bohm and D.Pines, Phys. Rev., 92, 607 (1953).
2 D.Bohm in The Many Body Problem: Cours donn lcole dt de physique thorique, eds. C.De Witt and P.Nozieres, Dunod, Paris, 1959, p.
401.
3 D.Bohm and G.Carmi, Phys. Rev., 133A, 319 and 332 (1964).
4 L.D.Landau, J. Phys. USSR, 5, 71 (1941).
5 W.R.Smythe, Static and Dymanic Electricity, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1939.
6 H.Bethe and E.E.Salpeter, Quantum Mechanics of One and Two Electron Atoms, Springer Verlag, Berlin, 1957.
7 J.Devreese and M.Evrard, Phys. Lett., 11, 178 (1949).
8 R.E.Langer, Phys. Rev., 75, 792, (1949).
9 E.P.Gross, Ann. of Phys., 99, 1 (1976).
10 N.N.Bogolyubov and S.V.Tyablikov, ZETF, 19, 256 (1949).
11 R.P.Feynman, Phys. Rev., 97, 660 (1955).

4
The collective description of particle interactions: from plasmas to the
helium liquids
David Pines University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Introduction
A plasma, for the physicist, is not a jelly-like substance. It is a gas containing a very high density of electrons and ions. The name plasma for such a gas
was coined by the late Irving Langmuir in the course of his theoretical and experimental investigations of gas discharges at General Electric Research
Laboratories during the 1920s. In a gaseous discharge, such as one finds in a fluorescent light, only a minute fraction of the atoms present are ionized, that
is disassociated into positive ions and electrons; none the less a study of the motion of the ions and electrons shows that many new and interesting
phenomena can take place. In most highly-ionized gases, such as one finds in the ionosphere (the layer of free ions and electrons present toward the top
of our atmosphere), the motion of the electrons and ions is, in fact, organized to a remarkable extent. The organization takes two forms, neither of which is
characteristic of ordinary dilute gases made up of neutral atoms. First, a given particle, ion or electron, does not move independently of its neighbors.
Rather, such a particle is always accompanied by a cloud of other particles, which move along with it in such a way as to screen out the electric field
produced by its charge. Second, the electrons carry out long-wavelength, high-frequency oscillations, which involve the coherent motion of many
thousands of particles. Langmuirs studies of the possibilities for organized behavior in such a system led him to believe that here was a new state of
matterneither solid, liquid or gas. He called it plasma.
A handful of physicists were occupied in studying the behavior of plasmas in the period before the Second World War. For the most

part such investigations could be classified as basic research; in other words, physicists studied plasmas out of a sense of curiosity as to their behavior.
During the war the size of that group increased somewhat; one of the methods of obtaining separated isotopes of uranium, the so-called calutron, invented
at the University of California at Berkeley, involved the use of highly ionized arc sources, i.e. plasmas. Also toward the end of the war, and in the years
immediately following it, physicists began to be interested in plasmas as possible devices for the production and amplification of electromagnetic waves in
the microwave region. Thus in 1950, at the time I received my PhD degree from Princeton University under David Bohm for a thesis entitled The role of
plasma oscillations in electron interactions, there were likely no more than a hundred physicists in this country and abroad who were, in one sense or
another, working on plasmas. Some were electrical engineers, working on electron vacuum tubes; some were still concerned with gaseous discharges.
Others were astrophysicists, interested not so much in the ionosphere as in the plasma of charged particles which surround the sun, or that very dilute
plasma which makes up all of inter-planetary and intergalactic space. Bohm and I were interested in plasmas for yet another reasonas offering a clue to
a fundamental understanding of the behavior of electrons in metals.
Today the number of physicists engaged in working on plasmas is in the thousands. There is a Plasmas Physics Division of the American Physical
Society; it boasts some 2,000 members and represents only a modest fraction of the physicists and electrical engineers in the United States interested in
such problems. This hundred-fold growth in plasma research has been due primarily to the launching of large-scale programs designed to harness the
power liberated in the fusion of light atoms at high temperatures. Such attempts at controlled thermonuclear fusion involve the use of plasmas. At the
temperatures at which a thermonuclear reactor might operate, the matter within would be a plasma; moreover, the screening action of plasmas permits one
to envisage the possibility of a thermonuclear reactor with its interior at millions of degrees centigrade and its walls at room temperature.
Interest in plasmas grew, too, because theoretical physicists came to recognize that an idealized model for a plasma represents a particularly simple,
and often soluble, example of a many-body problem. The many-body problem is one of the problems of principal concern to the theoretical physicist
today. It may be formally defined as a study of the behavior of systems in which the simultaneous presence and interaction of many particles markedly
alters their isolated individual behavior. Less formally, we could describe it as a study of all condensed systems and most gasesthat is liquids, solids,
plasmas and not-too-dilute gases. The kinds of many-body problems the

physicist is interested in range from the behavior of metals to the motion of nucleons in the nucleus and the interior of neutron stars. They comprise the
greater part of chemistry, solid-state physics and nuclear physics.
The theoretical physicist who works on a many-body problem such as the plasma would seem, at first sight, to be faced with an insuperable handicap.
How can someone who is unable to solve precisely any problem involving the interactions between three bodies hope to solve one involving millions of
billions of particles? The theorists first reaction is to make a virtue of necessity; to hope and expect that just this featurethe large number of
particleswill make life simple again. In part it does, in that it makes possible a statistical description of the average behavior of the system; furthermore,
the fluctuations about that average behavior are small. However, the use of a statistical description is not in itself enough; the problems under consideration
are still too complicated to be understood in precise mathematical detail.
In any approach to understanding the behavior of complex systems, the theorist must begin by choosing a simple, yet realistic, model for the behavior of
the system in which he is interested. Two models are commonly taken to represent the behavior of plasmas. In the first, the plasma is assumed to be a fully
ionized gas; in other words, as being made up of electrons and positive ions of a single atomic species. The model is realistic for experimental situations in
which the neutral atoms and impurity ions, present in all laboratory plasmas, play a negligible role. The second model is still simpler; in it the discrete nature
of the positive ions is neglected altogether. The plasma is thus regarded as a collection of electrons moving in a background of uniform positive charge.
Such a model can obviously only teach us about electronic behavior in plasmas. It may be expected to account for experiments conducted under
circumstances such that the electrons do not distinguish between the model, in which they interact with the uniform charge, and the actual plasma, in which
they interact with positive ions. We adopt it in what follows as a model for the electronic behavior of both classical plasmas and the quantum plasma
formed by electrons in solids.
In this article I shall try to put in historical perspective the key physical ideas and mathematical approaches which David Bohm and I used in our
development of a collective description of electron interactions in metals during the period 194853. This work led to the identification of quantized
plasma oscillations as the dominant long-wavelength mode of excitation of electrons in most solids. It justified the application of the independent electron
model to the low-frequency motion of electrons in metals, and made possible a consistent and accurate calculation of metallic cohesion. I shall then
describe briefly how the extension of those ideas to systems of strongly interacting

neutral particles, the helium liquids, has, some thirty years later, enabled us to understand effective particle interactions, elementary excitations and
transport in the helium liquids. As a result we now possess a unified picture of excitations and transport in both charged and neutral strongly-interacting
quantum many-body systems.

From classical to quantum plasmas

Consider a classical plasma; one in which the density and temperature of the electrons are such that their motion may be treated according to the laws of
classical mechanics. As we have mentioned, such an electron system displays a high degree of organization, which is manifested in both its screening
action and in the coherent high-frequency oscillations known as plasma oscillations. Here we have our first glimpse of the quite different electronic
behavior resulting from the many-body character of the problem. We begin with a gas of individual electrons, each of which behaves in isolation as a free
particle. We bring the electrons together in a uniform background of positive charge to form the plasma, with, say, an average density of 100 billion
electrons per cubic centimeter. We find that as a consequence the electrons no longer behave simply as independent particles; their mutual interaction
leads them to screen out any charge disturbance and to carry out the plasma oscillations.
To understand the screening aspect of the plasma, let us imagine that we have established an imbalance of charge distribution over some region in its
interior. We might try to do this by trying to build an artificial cage for the electrons out of the uniform positive charge, since the latter has opposite sign to
that of the electrons and so attracts them. If we have an equal density of electrons and positive charge, we have overall charge neutrality in our cage. Now
we put more electrons into the cage, building up an excess of negative charge. The electrons then experience a strong mutual repulsion, due to their
Coulomb interaction. Their reaction will be a violent one. The excess electrons resent the artificial cage into which they have been put, and lose no time in
breaking out. They may accomplish their cage-break with ease, because the energy to finance it comes readily from the strong repulsive interaction. As a
consequence, any imbalance in the overall charge distribution is unstable, and the electron system will quickly return to the equilibrium state of charge
neutrality.
What we have been describing is the suppression of density or charge fluctuations in the plasma by the Coulomb interactions. The Coulomb interaction
is remarkable in that the suppression is so efficient, extending over large distances in such a way that even quite long-range density fluctuations are sharply
reduced. (In other words, even though we construct a very large cage, a slight imbalance in charge will not be tolerated.) The screening action of the
plasma

occurs because of the availability of many highly-mobile free electrons, which move so as to cut down and screen out any strong electric fields within its
interior.
We have been discussing screening in a macroscopic way; it is also present at the microscopic level. Any given electron in the plasma may, after all, be
regarded as producing an imbalance of charge in its immediate neighborhood; its field, therefore, will also be screened out by the motion of the other
particles. We may say that the electron thus acts to polarize the plasma; when it moves it is accompanied by a polarization cloud of other particles. The
polarization cloud alters the motion of the electron slightly; most important it acts to screen out its field at long distances.
The plasma oscillations come about in the following way. Let us return to our example of the charge imbalance over a given region. When the electrons
burst forth from their cage, in general too many electrons will leave, so that within the cage there is now too much positive charge for the number of
electrons contained within. The cage then becomes a trap, pulling electrons back in to establish charge neutrality. In fact, too many will come in once
more, then go out, back in, etc., corresponding to an oscillation in the density of electrons about the equilibrium position of charge neutrality. In this fashion
a plasma oscillation is born. The oscillation is a longitudinal oscillation since the electron density changes in the direction of motion of the wave. It thus
corresponds to a sound wave, and does indeed resemble the oscillations observed in a slab of jelly or plasma. The frequency of the oscillations is nearly
constant. It is proportional to the electron charge and to the square root of the electronic density. For our plasma of 100 billion electrons per cubic
centimeter the frequency of plasma oscillation is in the microwave range.
Thus far we have discussed only the organized aspects of the plasma behavior. These are the aspects which are revealed to us if we study the plasma
with coarse-grained observational tools, which give us information only about what is going on over long distances. Were these the only instruments we
had available we might conclude that the plasma is a liquid rather than a gas, since it possesses a stable equilibrium state about which it carries out
organized oscillations. Such would no longer be the case when we increase the resolving power of our microscope and study what is going on at distances
comparable to or slightly larger than the average spacing between the electrons. For such distances the screening action of the plasma is no longer perfect;
strong electric fields can and do exist. Further, the organized oscillations are no longer possible, and one merely observes the random effects expected
from a gas of individual particles. The plasma is therefore capable of displaying both organized collective behavior, brought about by the forces between
the particles, and individual particle behavior, of the kind expected if there were no forces between the particles.

We have argued that the organized behavior of the plasma is of considerable interest. What, however, makes the plasma a particularly interesting
object of study is its schizophrenic behavior; depending on the stimulus, it will display either collective or individual particle behavior of the kind we have
discussed. One such stimulus is a probe which transfers momentum and energy to the system in a measurable way. In principle we could think of
accomplishing the momentum transfer by striking the plasma with a hammer. In practice we might use a charged particle as our probe. We then ask what
is the transfer of energy which goes with a given momentum transfer. If we had only a gas of free, non-interacting electrons, the energy transfer would be
proportional to the momentum transfer and to the velocity of the electron which received the impact. For a low-momentum probe, therefore, the energy
transfer is correspondingly low. The interaction between the electrons alters the situation markedly. The energy transfer in the plasma will be proportional
to the frequency of the plasma oscillation and very nearly independent of the momentum, for a small transfer of momentum. The energy transfer is much
larger than that obtaining in a gas of non-interacting electrons. We see that the characteristic excitation energy is increased by the Coulomb interactions.
Because many electrons are coupled together by the long range of this interaction, as a group they can take up much more energy than would be possible
if they acted as individual, uncoupled particles. If, now, we continue to increase the momentum transfer associated with our probe, we eventually reach a
point at which this is no longer the case. The momentum transfer to an individual particle yields an energy transfer which becomes comparable with that
produced by the collective motion induced by the Coulomb interaction. We have arrived at the region for a transition from collective to individual particle
behavior; in such a transition region the system will display a mixture of individual particle and collective behavior which will in general be quite difficult to
describe in detail. When we consider a yet higher momentum transfer, we find that the behavior is simple once more, for now the system displays only
individual particle behavior, and the effects associated with the interaction between the electrons become unimportant.
Actually the behavior of a plasma is still more subtle than I have indicated. Not only are there regions in which we might say it exhibits primarily wavelike behavior, or primarily particle-like behavior, but within a given regime the two forms of excitation are coupled together. Thus there is a transfer of
momentum and energy from the plasma waves to those single particles which move in such a way as to be resonantly coupled to them; we say then.the
plasma oscillations are damped. Moreover, when a single particle in the plasma moves sufficiently rapidly, it will excite a plasma wave in the form of a
wave behind it, in much the same way that a ship leaves a wake which

marks its path. At any time, then, waves decay into particles and particles excite waves; such processes continue until the plasma reaches thermal
equilibrium, at which time there exists a balance between the two phenomena.
Our discussion of the dual aspects of classical plasma behavior has been intended to prepare the way for a description of the developments which took
place in the theory of electron interaction in solids during the decade 195060. As we mentioned earlier, the plasma serves as a useful prototype for the
other many-body problems, notably for the motion of electrons in solids. This possibility was first recognized by David Bohm at Princeton University in
the late 1940s. Bohm had worked on gaseous discharges during the war at the University of California Radiation Laboratory, and came to the conclusion
that the plasma offered real possibilities for an improved understanding of the theory of metals. His belief was based on the fact that in a metal, as in a
plasma, one dealt with a high density of nearly-free electrons moving in the field of positive ions. One might accordingly hope to describe the metal as a
plasma of very high density by replacing the positive ions by a uniform distribution of positive charge. There were two apparent obstacles to the
development of a theory of metals based on the plasma. The first was that the density of electrons in a metal is some ten billion times larger than that found
in gas discharges. As a result the electrons can no longer be described by the laws of classical mechanics, but must be treated by a theory based on
quantum mechanics. We call such a plasma a quantum plasma. Second, the ions in a gas discharge are free to move, while those in a metal oscillate about
fixed positions in a lattice. Their equilibrium positions form a periodic array which defines the crystal structure of the lattice. As a result it is no longer clear
whether the model in which the influence of the positive ions is replaced by a uniform positive charge will be a realistic model for metallic behavior. Such a
simplified model will certainly miss the important role that the periodicity of the ions has upon the electron motion. The question is whether such an
omission would prove disastrous to the physical predictions of the theory.

The theory of metals circa 1948

We can better appreciate the situation if we review the status of the theory of metals as of 1948, the year I began my thesis research with Bohm. Shortly
after the advent of quantum mechanics, in the period 192831, a number of physicists, notably Sommerfeld, Bloch and Wilson, developed a theory of the
motion of electrons in metals which had at its basis a one-electron model. In this model primary attention was paid to the motion of a single electron in the
periodic field of the ions. The many-body character of the problem was allowed for only in a simple, statistical sense. Thus each electron was assumed to
move

quite independently of all the other electrons, and explicit correlations in the positions of the electrons brought about by the Coulomb interaction were
completely ignored. The one-electron model was chosen, then, to emphasize the role played by the periodic potential of the ions in determining the
electron motion. The predictions of the theory turned out to agree well with experiment in a wide variety of instances, including the electrical and thermal
conductivities, specific heat and magnetic properties of metals.
Despite the good agreement with experiment, theoretical physicists were not completely happy with the independent-electron model. First of all, they
could not understand why it worked so well. Moreover, it did not yield a satisfactory result for one of the most basic physical quantities, the binding
energy of electrons in the metal. That it did not do so was scarcely surprising, since the neglect of correlations in the particle positions meant that the
electrons, in this description, would have an appreciable chance of being close together. Such close encounters, in turn, added a large positive energy
arising from the Coulomb repulsion of the electrons. The energy so added was sufficiently large that most metals, in this approximation, would not be
stable, but would disintegrate into individual atoms. The stability of metals therefore had its origin in the correlations brought about by the Coulomb
interactions, and it was necessary to devise a method for taking these into account.
The success of the independent-particle model would lead one to suspect that these interactions could easily be included, since they would appear to
be only a small perturbation on the motion of the electrons. (Otherwise, why would the electrons behave as if so nearly free?) As things turned out,
however, they could not. The first attempts to calculate correction terms led to answers which no longer agreed with experiment for just those properties
for which the independent-electron model worked so well. Attempts at a further improvement in the theory, within the framework of regarding the mutual
electron interaction as a small perturbation, were even less successful. The answers thereby obtained were infinitea strong hint to the theoretical
physicist that his formulation of the problem was not a consistent one.
Looking back on the situation, we might decide that we were not surprised at this turn in events. We have already seen that in the plasma the Coulomb
interactions do modify the motion of the electrons considerably and lead to considerable organization in the overall electronic behavior. We should
therefore not expect that a theory of electron motion in metals which virtually ignores these interactions could succeed. We then find that, despite its
impressive initial successes, the independent-electron model does not work, and for just the reasons which might have led us not to adopt it in the first
placethe interactions between the electrons proved too strong.

Viewed in this light, the attempt to make a plasma theory of metals seems a little less foolish. In a sense such a theory is complementary to the oneelectron theory. In the former theory, the interaction between the electrons is viewed as the determining factor for the electronic behavior, while the
influence of the periodic potential of the ion cores is regarded as a relatively small effect. In the latter, the situation was simply reversed; the periodic
potential of the ions was taken into account, the intereactions being regarded as weak.

The collective description of electron interaction in metals

The plasma theory of metals was developed by Bohm and the writer during the years 194853. Its genesis was the classical plasma, and its results may
be easily understood in terms of the concepts we have already introduced for that system, plasma oscillation and screening. The theory was based on our
recognition that, just as in the classical case, the Coulomb interaction between the electrons gave rise to plasma oscillations. We felt the oscillations played
a decisive role; our problem was how to construct a theory of metals in which their existence was explicitly recognized. Because in the conventional
mathematical formulation the only variables which appear are those which describe the motion of single electrons, it was necessary, first, to find the
collective variables which described plasma waves, and, second, to devise a mathematical formulation in which both collective and individual particle
variables appeared. In other words, we had first to invent a new language and second to find a way to apply that language to the problem at hand.
The clues essential to the development of our theory came from two directions: from an analysis of the behavior of transverse electromagnetic waves in
a quantum plasma; and from a direct examination of the behavior of longitudinal density fluctuations in the quantum plasma. We found that if we
constructed a description of longitudinal electric waves which was the longitudinal counterpart of the conventional treatment of the transverse
electromagnetic wave, we could, in a suitable approximation, solve the resulting problem and obtain a collective mode, the plasma oscillation, which had a
dispersion relation (i.e. dependence of its frequency on the wavelength of the oscillatory mode) which was identical to that we were able to calculate
directly from the quantum-mechanical equation of motion for the fluctuations in the plasma density. We arrived in this way at two independent ways of
constructing a collective description of the quantum plasma: one was an explicit construction of a combination of particle coordinates which would
oscillate collectively; the other was based on a formal problem which appeared, at first sight, to be

quite different from that with which we had started, in that there was present at the outset a collection of waves in interaction with the electrons. The
coordinates of the wave field were chosen as a vehicle for describing the quantum plasma oscillations; the number of such coordinates we introduced and
the way in which these interacted with the individual electrons was chosen in such a way as to render the resulting problem soluble.
In both approaches we were able to see that at very long wave-lengths the collective behavior must dominate, and that the major consequence of the
long-range part of the Coulomb interaction between the electrons was to give rise to collective modes, the plasma oscillations. In both approaches, too,
we could see that at short wavelengths the system would behave as a collection of individual particles which interacted only weakly. The approach in
which wave field coordinates were introduced explicitly was in many ways the more powerful one, in that we could specify quite easily the transition from
collective to individual-particle behavior, and determine explicitly the resulting interaction between the particles once the part of the Coulomb interaction
responsible for the collective modes had been taken into account. It possessed the further advantage that the collective modes (the plasma oscillations)
and the individual electrons were treated on an equal footing; it possessed the disadvantage that it appeared that we had over-described the system by
introducing too many degrees of freedom. We therefore had to devise arguments as to how a set of subsidiary conditions, which related the field
coordinates to the particle coordinates, might automatically be satisfied. Our inability to come up with a simple mathematical proof that these subsidiary
conditions could, in fact, be satisfied (put another way, would not cause any difficulties and could safely be ignored) delayed our publication of this
formulation by some three years. It caused us to devise several other approaches to the problem (such as a method of self-consistent fields for calculating
plasma oscillations which I included in my thesis) before we had sufficient confidence in our physical intuition to write up our results for publication as the
third in our series of papers dealing with the description of electron interaction.
The success of the collective description hinged on two factors. First of all, the new problem had to be easier to solve than the old. There was no point
in inventing a new model problem for a plasma if it were to be plagued by the same difficulties present in the original one. Second, it was important to
show that the solution of the new electron and wave field problem was, in fact, equivalent to a solution of the original problem of interacting electrons
only. Our expectations for the theory proved, in time, correct in both respects.
It was possible, by a series of mathematical transformations, to relate the coordinates which were introduced to describe the wave field to the collective
variables developed to describe the plasmons.

Moreover we could, within a well-defined method of approximation, decouple completely the plasma waves from the electrons so that the longwavelength plasmons represented an independent well-defined excitation mode of the system. The model was thus an independent plasma wave model,
in contrast with the independent electron model discussed above. The introduction and isolation of the plasma waves served to redescribe almost
completely the long-range part of the electron-electron interaction. What remained was a screened interaction with a quite short range, of the order of the
average spacing between the electrons.
Herein lay the beauty and the utility of the approach. It explicitly recognized at the outset the novel feature introduced by the long range of the Coulomb
interaction, the high-frequency plasma waves. Once these were properly accounted for, what was left was comparatively simple to understand and treat
mathematically; namely a collection of individual electrons interacting via a short-range interaction. Indeed, this was just what was required to put the
one-electron model of metals on a more satisfactory footing. Because of the short range of the effective particle interaction, the mathematical
divergences which had haunted previous attempts at constructing a consistent treatment of an electron interaction were no longer present. It was therefore
possible to apply perturbation theory to compute the way the interaction between the electrons altered the ground-state energy of the system. Such a
calculation led directly to a calculation of the cohesive energy of electrons in metals; it was found that simple metals were now stable, and that the binding
energies calculated theoretically were in good agreement with those observed experimentally.
Next, it was possible to compute the effect of electron interaction on the motion of a single electron. What one finds thereby is a quasi-particle; that is,
a particle whose motion resembles that of a free electron, but differs from it in that its various physical properties are somewhat altered as a consequence
of the electron-electron interaction. A simple physical picture of a quasi-particle is that of an electron plus its associated screening cloud of other particles.
The alteration in the electrons physical properties are then to be attributed to the presence of that co-moving screening cloud. Thus, the independent
plasma-wave model leads directly to an independent quasi-particle model. The calculated quasi-particle properties were, for the most part, in good
quantitative agreement with experiment.

Plasmons
The plasma theory of metals predicted the existence of a quite new effect, the excitation of plasma waves by fast electrons passing through a metal. In this
process the quantum character of the plasma waves plays an essential role. According to the laws of quantum mechanics,

the energy in a given plasma-wave mode can change only in discrete amounts, or quanta. It is therefore convenient to go over from a wave description of
the plasma oscillations, in which one thinks of waves with a frequency v and wavelength , to a particle description, in which one specifies the plasma
wave mode by the number of quanta present, of energy, hv, and momentum, h/, where h is Plancks constant.
The basic quantum of plasma oscillation we shall call a plasmon. Because the frequency of the plasma oscillations is high, the energy of a plasmon turns
out to be rather large. It ranges from about 6 electron volts to 25 electron volts, and is always greater than the energy that the most energetic single
electron in the metal possesses. As a result, plasma oscillations will not be internally excited in metals because no internal electron can transfer to the
plasma waves the energy required to excite a single plasmon. Such excitation could, however, occur when a charged particle which has energy large
compared to that of a plasmon passes through a metal. In fact, as Conyers Herring pointed out to us in the early stages of our investigation, the basic
experiments which confirmed our prediction of the existence of plasma oscillations in metals had already been carried out some years earlier. The relevant
experimental data had thus been obtained; all that was required was our interpretation of it in terms of plasmon excitation.
The experiments had been carried out by two German physicists, Ruthemann and Lang, in the early 1940s. Their experimental arrangement was quite
simple. They fired electrons through a thin metallic foil and measured the energy of those electrons emerging almost undeflected by the foil. Similar
experiments on the reflection of electrons by metal surfaces had been carried out some years earlier by the Swedish physicist, Rudberg. The RuthemannLang experiment required a careful measurement of the energy of both the incident electrons and those emerging from the foil, since the incident electrons
had an initial energy some hundred times larger than the energy transferred to the foil. What was surprising about their experimental results was the
sharpness with which the energy transfer to the metallic electrons took place in the case of certain metals, notably aluminum and beryllium. Thus the
characteristic energy-loss spectrum for Be and Al consists of several comparatively narrow lines, in multiples of a basic loss quantum, approximately 19
eV for Be and 15 eV for Al. When we attempted, in the simplest possible fashion, to interpret this data as plasmon excitation, we received a delightful
surprise. The energy transfers were just those to be expected for plasmon excitation, provided we regarded the outermost, or valence, electrons in each
metal as free.
Such good agreement between experiment and the simplest plasma theory was most heartening, and yet it was also a little puzzling. Consideration of
electrical conductivity and allied experimental phenomena

shows that in this latter class of experiments the outermost electrons cannot all be regarded as free. During the next few years, many more such
characteristic-energy-loss experiments produced results that agreed closely with the predictions from this simplest version of our model, including semimetals such as Bi and Sb, semiconductors such as Si and Ge, and compounds ranging from ZnS to SiO2 and mica. For these materials, too, the
outermost electrons could not be regarded at first sight as making up a free-electron plasma. The puzzle is related to the question we raised earlierthat
of whether our replacement of the periodic potential of the positive ions by a uniform positive charge was a realistic model for metallic behavior. For it is
just the influence of the periodic potential which gives rise to the distinction between metals, semiconductors and insulators, and which further causes the
outermost electrons in metals like aluminum and beryllium to seem far from free.
The explanation was provided by Neville Mott during the Tenth Solvay Congress in Brussels in 1954. Mott pointed out that it does make a difference
whether we discuss the electrical conductivity of a solid or its possible plasma behavior. When we talk about the electrical conductivity we are asking a
low-frequency question of the electrons; that is, a question in which the field of the positive ions, which gives rise to comparatively low-frequency effects,
may be expected to play an important role. On the other hand, in discussing electron energy losses, we are asking a question of the electrons at a
frequency of the order of magnitude of the free-electron plasma frequency for the outermost electrons. This frequency is typically quite high compared to
the characteristic frequency associated with the influence of the periodic ionic potential on the electrons. As a result the electrons in responding at such a
high frequency essentially pay no attention to the fact that there is a periodic ion field acting. They are moving too fast to feel the effect of the positive ions,
or, to put it another way, they move so fast that they cannot distinguish between the ions in a periodic array and a uniform positive charge of equal overall
density.
Mott argued that in aluminum and beryllium, in particular, one should expect to find a plasma frequency which is high compared to the characteristic
periodic potential frequencies, so that plasma oscillations at the free-electron frequency should occur. As we have seen, such is indeed the case. One may
easily extend these considerations to other solids. One finds that plasma oscillations at nearly the free-electron plasma frequency should be a quite general
property of solids, since the frequencies that lead to a distinction between metals, insulators and semiconductors are usually all low compared to the
plasma frequency.
By 1956 both the theoretical arguments and the experimental evidence for plasma oscillations as the dominant long-wavelength

mode of excitations in most solids had progressed to the point that at the Maryland Conference on quantum interactions of the free electron I proposed
the term plasmon to describe the associated quantum of elementary excitation, and could demonstrate that characteristic-energy-loss experiments
provided information on plasmon energies, lifetimes and dispersion, as well as the critical wave vector beyond which plasmons could no longer be
regarded as well-defined elementary excitations (an effect usually arising from the decay of plasmons into single-pair excitations). In 1957 Robert Ritchie
proposed the existence of surface plasmons associated with the waves of charge bound at a vacuum-solid interface, and subsequent experiments
provided ample evidence for the existence of these excitations as well. Indeed, with the increasing sophistication of both electron energy-loss techniques
and vacuum techniques, plasmons are now often used as a diagnostic tool to study oxidation and the electronic structure of new materials.
Finally, it should be pointed out that, just as was the case for the classical plasma, there is a continual transfer of momentum and energy between the
plasmons in a solid and quasi-particles; as a consequence the plasmons possess a finite lifetime, which depends on the quasi-particle spectrum of the solid
under consideration. None the less, that lifetime is sufficiently long in most solids that the plasmons are observed, and the plasmon joins the quasi-particle
as a well-defined elementary excitation.

The random phase approximation

The basic approximation which Bohm and I made, both in our studies of the equations of motion of density fluctuations and in our collective description of
plasma waves plus single particles, we called at first the plasma approximation. We later changed the name to random phase approximation (RPA). The
latter name better described what we were doing, which was to neglect the couplings between density fluctuations or plasma waves of different
wavelengths, because such coupling involved the sum over an exponential term with randomly varying phases; a sum which would, on average, vanish,
and which was small compared to the terms of order, the number of particles, N, which we kept in our description. In this approximation, which we were
able to justify rigorously in the limit of long wavelengths (where all the difficulties with the perturbation theory treatment of the Coulomb interaction arose),
the plasma modes could be decoupled from the individual electrons; what remained was a system of electrons interacting via a short-range interaction, a
system which was amenable to a perturbation-theoretic treatment.
The random phase approximation has subsequently been widely used in many-body problems, ranging from studies of oscillations of

particles in the outer shells of atoms to the behavior of quark matter. The first of its many applications in nuclear physics came in work which my student,
Mel Ferentz, and I carried out on a derivation of the giant dipole resonance in nuclei from the basic nucleon-nucleon interaction. (Because Ferentz
developed other interests, only a brief account of this work was published, in a 1953 letter to the Physical Review, written in collaboration with Murray
Gell-Mann, who had suggested to us a useful way of going from oscillations in nuclear matter to finite nuclei; our approach therefore had little impact on
the nuclear physics community until it was reinvented by G.E.Brown and M.Bolsterli some seven years later.) It has proved so useful because, like the
Hartree and Hartree-Fock approximations, it is relatively straightforward to apply. More importantly, it is the lowest-order systematic approximation
which enables one to test whether well-defined collective modes might appear; where these do appear, they are treated on an equal basis with the singleparticle modes.
In all versions of the RPA, the collective behavior arises as a result of the influence of the average self-consistent field of the other particles on the
motion of a given particle. Viewed from this perspective, the RPA can be considered as a time-dependent mean-field theory. It appeared in three very
different guises in the course of work done during the period 19568, a period of especially intense theoretical activity on the quantum plasma. Murray
Gell-Mann and Keith Brueckner used diagrammatic techniques, similar to those employed by Richard Feynman in field theory, to carry out a calculation
of the correlation energy and specific heat that was exact in the high-density limit, while John Hubbard used a similar approach to show how the results
that Bohm and I had obtained could be directly derived from perturbation theory, and went on to develop an alternative approach to the calculation of the
correlation energy at metallic electron densities which yielded results similar to those we had obtained earlier. Although plasma oscillations nowhere
appeared in the calculations of Gell-Mann and Brueckner, Keith Brueckner, K.Sawada, N.Fukuda and Robert Brout subsequently developed yet
another approach, involving a new set of collective modes, and then showed that the Gell-Mann and Brueckner approach contained them implicitly.
Further, their calculation was equivalent to applying the random phase approximation for all momentum transfers, rather than simply the low-momentum
transfers for which Bohm and I had introduced it.
The circle was closed when Philippe Nozieres and I were able to prove that the low-momentum-transfer part of the correlation energy calculated using
the Bohm-Pines collective description gave results identical to those of Gell-Mann, Brueckner and Hubbard, and to demonstrate the way in which the
random phase approximation breaks down if one attempts to use it for large-momentum transfers at

metallic electron densities, a point which had always been emphasized by Bohm and myself. As Nozieres and I subsequently remarked:
The development, frequent independent rediscovery, and gradual appreciation of the random phase approximation for the electron
gasoffers a useful object lesson to the theoretical physicist; it both illustrates the splendid variety of ways that can be developed for saying
the same thing, and it suggests the usefulness of learning more than one language of theoretical physics, and of attempting the reconciliation
of seemingly different but obviously related results.

The helium liquids

Liquids made up of the isotopes of helium, helium-3 and helium-4, are unique in nature. No matter what the temperature to which they are cooled (at
atmospheric pressure), their liquid form is preserved. The physical origin of this behavior is the quantum-mechanical zero-point motion of the low-mass
individual atoms, which is so large as to overcome the physical effects responsible for the solidification of all other liquids at sufficiently low temperatures.
The helium liquids are true quantum liquids, in that one must simultaneously take into account the strong interaction between the individual atoms and the
underlying quantum statistics which the atoms as a whole must obey. Thus, although the particle interactions in 3He and 4He are essentially the same, and
although neutron and X-ray scattering experiments show that the microscopic structure is quite similar, 3He, which obeys Fermi-Dirac statistics, and 4He,
which obeys Bose-Einstein statistics, behave quite differently at temperatures low compared to the quantum temperatures, 34 K, at which the de
Broglie wavelength of a particle becomes comparable to the inter-particle spacing. Thus at 2.19K, 4He exhibits a phase transition from its normal phase
to a new superfluid phase in which its viscosity is essentially unmeasurable, while the corresponding phase transition for 3He occurs only at temperatures
in the millikelvin range.
Soon after our initial work on the quantum plasma (which, because the electrons possess charge and obey Fermi-Dirac statistics, is a charged Fermi
liquid), David Bohm and I sought to apply our approach to understanding the spectrum of density fluctuations in neutral quantum liquids. We were
particularly interested in superfluid 4He, whose spectrum Landau had shown would consist of phonons, a long-wavelength sound-like mode, and rotons,
an excitation found at wavelengths comparable to the inter-particle spacing. We ran into difficulties because we were not able to devise a way of dealing
with the short-range, but very strong, repulsion between the helium atoms. In the random phase approximation the restoring force for an oscillation

at a given wavelength is the corresponding Fourier transform of the bare particle interaction; for liquid 4He the restoring force, as calculated in the random
phase approximation, is unphysically large.
Theoretical work during the 1950s strongly suggested that the physical origin of the restoring force responsible for the elementary excitation in liquid
3He and 4He was closely tied to quantum statistics. Feynman showed how, starting from a ground state described by a condensate (the macroscopicallyoccupied single-quantum state responsible for the superfluid behavior of liquid 4He, the existence of which is a natural consequence of the Bose-Einstein
statistics obeyed by the 4He atoms), one could derive the phonon-roton spectrum proposed by Landau, which was then measured directly in neutronscattering experiments at the end of the decade. Landau, in his Fermi liquid theory, showed that for very long wavelengths and low temperatures, a Fermi
liquid such as 3He would be expected to possess a zero-sound mode (subsequently found experimentally by John Wheatly) as a result of restoring forces
directly tied to the interaction between quasi-particles. Collective modes in the helium liquids thus appeared to be quite different from the long-wavelength
plasma modes, which are not sensitive to quantum statistics. Because the plasma frequency is extremely large compared to those of the single-particle
modes, it is not influenced by whether the underlying single-particle spectrum is that of a normal metal, a superconductor or a high-temperature classical
Maxwell-Boltzmann gas of the same density.
This picture of the helium liquids began to change in 1965, after David Woods, in a neutron-scattering experiment, found that in superfluid liquid 4He
comparatively high-energy (~8 K) phonons not only displayed essentially no change in energy between T=O and T=2.19 K but remained a well-defined
elementary excitation of normal liquid 4He, with comparatively little shift in energy, up to temperatures near 4 K. Hence such excitations did not depend
for their existence on the presence of a condensate. I therefore concluded in 1965 that the physical origin of the phonon-roton excitation in liquid 4He and
the zero-sound mode in liquid 3He was not to be found in the quantum statistics obeyed by the individual atoms, but rather in the strong (and quite similar)
particle interaction. I used linear response theory to show how one could describe that restoring force phenomenologically, and hence generalize the
random phase approximation for the Bose liquid, 4He, and extend Landaus theory to higher temperatures and wavelengths for the Fermi liquid, 3He. I
argued that the restoring forces responsible for the phonon-roton spectrum of 4He must be very nearly the same as those responsible for zero sound in
3He, and suggested that it should prove possible to observe zero sound in 3He as a well-defined elementary excitation at temperatures and wavelengths
for which Landaus Fermi liquid theory would clearly not be applicable.
The key to that explanation (and prediction) was the idea that the

restoring force for the collective modes in both helium liquids should be derived from an effective phenomenological pseudopotential, rather than the bareatom potential which Bohm and I had used in our application of the random phase approximation to neutral quantum liquids. Subsequently, my student,
Charles Aldrich, and I developed a detailed physical model for the configuration space pseudopotentials responsible for these collective modes, a model
in which the very strong, almost hard-core, repulsive bare-atom interaction would, as a consequence of short-range particle correlation, be replaced in the
liquid by a soft-core repulsion, while the long-range part of the bare-atom interaction would be essentially unchanged on going from the gas to the liquid.
We calculated in 1974 and 1975 the phonon-roton spectrum for liquid 4He and the expected zero-sound spectrum for 3He. We obtained agreement with
experiment for the excitation spectrum of 4He, while our predicted detailed dispersion curve for zero sound in 3He was confirmed the following year in
experiments carried out at the Argonne reactor by Kurt Skld, Charles Pelizzari, R.Kleb and G.Ostrowski. Skld and his collaborators then went on to
show that, in accord with my 1965 prediction, the measured zero-sound energy spectrum scarcely changed as the 3He sample was warmed up from 0.04
K (where the 3He is a well-defined Fermi liquid for which Landaus theory is applicable) to 1.28 K (where the Fermi surface is no longer well-defined
and Landaus theory does not apply).
Thus, some twenty-five years after Bohm and I had first proposed that strong particle interaction could, in neutral systems, give rise to a distinct
collective mode, analogous to the plasma oscillation of a charged quantum liquid (and ten years after I had defined the circumstances under which this
might come about, and demonstrated its applicability to liquid 4He), this idea was found to apply to liquid 3He. It has, moreover, proved possible to
develop a unified theory of excitations and transport in both 3He and 4He based on the pseudopotential which Aldrich and I had constructed.
We may therefore conclude that the key to understanding strongly interacting many-body systems, be they plasmas or the helium liquids, is to take into
account at the outset the very strong restoring forces responsible for the existence of well-defined collective modes; what remains are a collection of
nearly independent quasi-particles whose effective interactions can be described by scattering amplitudes which are related to the restoring forces
responsible for the collective modes. We may thereby understand the nature of the collective modes, the transition from collective behavior to singleparticle-like behavior and the interactions between the residual quasi-particles on the same basis for both classical and quantum plasmas and for the
quantum and semi-classical helium liquids 3He and 4He. The vision which Bohm and I shared of a unified collective descriptive of particle interaction in
both charged and neutral strongly-interacting many-body systems has thus been realized.

Afterword
The alert reader may have noticed changes in style and level of presentation as the article unfolds. The disparities are not accidental. The first part of the
article is based on an unpublished chapter of a book I began to write in the mid-1960s. In this chapter I had hoped to describe for the layman how
theoretical physicists actually work, how a unified theory develops out of the interplay between physical concepts and mathematical calculation between
theory and experiment, and between theorist and theorist. I found the task difficult, if not impossible, and put the book aside. The second part of the
article represents a present-day attempt on my part to give the interested reader a sense of recent related developments in the helium liquids and is based
in part on an article, Elementary excitations in quantum liquids, which appeared in the November 1981 issue of Physics Today.
It gives me great pleasure to contribute this article to a Festschrift which honors David Bohm, who taught me so many of the concepts I have described
herein. As teacher, collaborator and friend, David Bohm introduced me to the primacy of physical ideas and physical intuition in physics; he taught me the
importance of examining a given problem from many different perspectives, and of using whatever mathematical techniques are needed to test physical
ideas. I am grateful for his initial guidance not only in doing theoretical physics, but in a way of working as a theoretical physicist.
The support of the National Science Foundation, through grant NSF DMR8215128 during part of the preparation of this manuscript, is gratefully
acknowledged.

5
Reflections on the quantum measurement paradox
A.J.Leggett University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Abstract
Consideration of the classic measurement paradox of quantum mechanics raises the question: What is the relationship between acceptable theories of the
physical world at different levels? It is suggested that it is similar to the relationship between maps of different types and that, while theories at different
levels need not be derivable from one another, they must at least be mutually consistent in their predictions. The relationship between quantum mechanics,
in its standard interpretation, and classical physics fails this test. Existing attempts to resolve the measurement paradox are briefly reviewed, and it is
suggested that one avenue has been insufficiently explored; namely, the possibility that the complexity of a physical system may itself be a relevant
variable which may introduce new physical principles. Possible reasons for this lacuna are discussed, and it is pointed out that some of the relevant
questions are now within the reach of an experimental test.
In this essay I shall try to defend three claims. The first is that the classic quantum measurement paradox, so far from being a non-problem, is a
sufficiently glaring indication of the inadequacy of quantum mechanics as a total world-view that it should motivate us actively to explore the likely direction
in which it will break down. The second is that, as a consequence of ingrained reductionist prejudices and perhaps to some extent of sociological factors,
we may have been looking in precisely the wrong direction. And the third is that we are already at the threshold of some very significant experiments in
what just might turn out to be the right direction. The third claim is one which I have discussed rather extensively elsewhere, so I will deal with it here
rather briefly, without much technical detail.

Let us remind ourselves briefly what the quantum measurement paradox is all about. A quantum-mechanical system drawn from an ensemble in a pure
state is, according to the axioms as presented in most textbooks, most completely characterized by a wave function , which may or may not be an
eigenfunction of any particular quantity we wish to measure on it. Suppose it is not, and that the quantity in question is described by an operator with
eigenfunctions i and eigenvalues ai. Then in the standard way we write as a linear combination of the i (the structure of the theory guarantees that this
can always be done):

[1]

and the prediction is then that, if the measurement in question is actually performed, the probability of obtaining the result ai is
Once the result ai has
been obtained, the system must be assigned (in the case of an ideal measurement) to a new ensemble whose wave function is i. However, it is not
correct to think of the description [1] as implying that before the measurement the system was already in some (unknown) one of the ensembles whose
wave functions are i (i.e., in technical language, that its density matrix corresponded to a mixture of the i). To demonstrate the incorrectness of this
conclusion (or rather its incompatibility with the usual interpretation of quantum mechanics) it is sufficient to consider the results of a measurement of some
quantity which fails to commute with . In general the mixture description will predict a result quite different from that which one would expect on the
basis of the pure-state wave function of equation [1].
There are, of course, a number of well-known thought-experiments which illustrate this feature of quantum mechanics, of which the best-known is
probably the classic Youngs slits experiment. In this case the operator in effect has eigenvalues corresponding to passage through one or the other of
the two slits in the first screen, and the quantity is the position of arrival at the detecting screen. (Or more precisely the operator which evolves into this
under the time evolution of the system; see reference 1, equation [4.4].) Actually, an even more spectacular experiment has been carried out in real life
recently using a neutron interferometer.2 In this experiment a beam of spin-polarized neutrons was split into two beams, well separated from one another
in space; the spins of the neutrons in one beam were flipped and the beams then allowed to recombine. By blocking off one beam at a time it was possible
to examine the properties of the other at the point of recombination, and in this way it was explicitly established that the spin properties of the complete
ensemble (the recombined beams) were quite different from those of the mixture of the two sub-ensembles (the separated beams). Since the average flux
of neutrons was low

enough that the probability of two being close enough to affect one anothers dynamics was totally negligible, this experiment provides rather spectacular
confirmation of the conclusion that one should not think of the neutron as being in one or other beam until it has actually been measured to be so.
So, crudely speaking, even in situations where a measurement will reveal a microscopic system to have one of a set of possible values of a variable,
quantum mechanics forbids us to conclude that it actually had that value before the measurement was made. This picture is no doubt paradoxical (in the
original meaning of the term, against expectation) and might lead us to guess that we will some day obtain a more intuitively pleasing description, but in
itself it is not obviously internally inconsistent, nor does it lead in any obvious way to any discrepancy with our everyday view of the macroscopic
worldprovided that we are prepared to accept the notion of measurement as given from outside the theory. Indeed, Bohr,3 and with greater
sophistication Reichenbach,4 were able to develop an interpretation of the quantum-mechanical formalism which is consistent within its self-imposed limits
precisely by postulating a radically different ontological status for microscopic entities such as electrons or neutrons and the macroscopic apparatus which
performs the measurement. In the words of a famous quotation from Bohr: Atomic systems should not even be thought of as possessing definite
properties in the absence of a specific experimental set-up designed to measure these properties. On the other hand, Bohr also maintains that in order to
secure unambiguous communication of our results, we must describe the macroscopic apparatus and its behavior in the language of classical physics (in
which, of course, the apparatus must possess definite properties). Thus, it is the act of measurement that is the bridge between the microworld, which
does not by itself possess definite properties, and the macroworld, which does. Indeed, according to most textbooks it .is the act of measurement which
causes the collapse of the wave function from a linear superposition into an eigenstate of the measured quantity. Thus, the concept of measurement is,
prima facie at least, absolutely central to the interpretation of the quantum-mechanical formalism.
Now, the problem is not that quantum mechanics itself provides no criterion for when a measurement has taken place. That would not necessarily
matter if we could find some criterion elsewhere (and, as we shall see, some alleged resolutions of the measurement paradox do in effect try to do just
this). The problem is that quantum mechanics absolutely forbids a measurement to take place, if by a measurement is meant a process which has the
features ascribed to it in the standard textbook account. This statement needs some amplification. The point is that, if we believe (as most physicists at
least implicitly seem to) that quantum mechanics is a universal theory, then it applies not only

to single atoms and molecules but to arbitrarily large and complex collections of them, and in particular to the special collections which we have chosen to
use as measuring devices (photographic plates, Geiger counters, etc.). So, although it is not obviously necessary to describe these objects, and their
interaction with the microsystems whose properties are to be measured, in explicitly quantum-mechanical terms, it is at any rate legitimate to do so. Let
us then initially (for the sake of simplicity of exposition only) assume that the measuring device starts in an initial state which is represented by a quantum
mechanical wave function 0. As before, we suppose that the property of the microscopic system which is to be measured is represented by a quantummechanical operator with eigenfunctions i and eigenvalues ai. Suppose, first, that a particular microsystem entering the apparatus is drawn from an
ensemble whose quantum state is represented by the wave function i. Then, if we are to be able to read off the value of ai from the behavior of the
macroscopic measuring device, the interaction between the microsystem and the device must induce the latter to make a transition into a different state,
with a wave function we shall label i. (Itispossiblethat one (but no more than one) of the i is identical to 0, in which case we speak of a negativeresult measurement. This feature in no way affects the general argument.) Moreover, the different states i must be not only mutually orthogonal but also
distinguishable by purely macroscopic measurements (e.g. inspection with the naked eye). (A discussion (considerably more sophisticated than the above
one, cf. below) of how some common measuring devices fulfil this condition is given in reference 5.) At the end of the measurement process the universe
(system plus apparatus) is in a pure state which (for an ideal measurement) is a product of i and i, i.e.:

[2]

The properties of the universe are, as we have noted, macroscopically different for the different values of i. Now, what happens in the case that the
microsystem was drawn from an ensemble whose quantum state is the linear superposition [1]? Quite irrespective of the details of the systems involved, it
is a general feature of the quantum-mechanical formalism that if, under specified conditions, an initial state
evolves into a final state i, then a given
superposition
will evolve into the corresponding superposition of final states, i.e. into cii. Thus, from [2], we have:

[3]

The right-hand side of [3] is a linear superposition of states of the universe possessing macroscopically different properties. If we interpret a linear
superposition at the macroscopic level in the same way as we

have learned to do at the microlevel, then the only possible interpretation of [3] is that the macroscopic state of the universe is not well-defined until some
further, unspecified, measurement is performed. In other words, the notion of measurement has on closer inspection dissolved before our eyes; there
is no magic ingredient in the process of interaction of a microsystem with a measuring device which could lead to the reduction of the wave packet
postulated in the standard textbook discussions of the axioms of quantum mechanics.
It is necessary to remark that the above discussion of the quantum-mechanical description of the measurement process is, of course, quite naive. In the
first place, in real life we rarely if ever know enough about the initial state of the apparatus to assign to it a single pure quantum-mechanical state, and
would need in practice to describe it by a density matrix; the final state of the universe would therefore also be described by an appropriate density matrix.
Secondly, the case where the state of the microsystem is unchanged by its interaction with the measuring device (ideal measurement) is the exception
rather than the rule, and the description of the final state may have to be modified to allow for this. Thirdly, the measuring device is in practice itself an
open system which interacts with outside influences such as the vacuum electromagnetic field, and the universe which is described by the superposition
[3] (or the appropriate density-matrix generalization) contains many other such degrees of freedom. These are technical details which do not (at least in
the present authors opinion) in any way blunt the force of the paradox, and will not be discussed here. (For a conclusive refutation of the conjecture that
taking account of the first feature would resolve the paradox, see reference 6. The second feature has never to my knowledge been exploited in any
alleged resolution. The third, which has, is discussed by implication below.)
The quantum measurement paradox, then, consists in the fact that an extrapolation of the quantum-mechanical formalism to the scale of the macroworld leads under certain circumstances to a description, namely equation [3], which is prima facie quite incompatible with the commonsense everyday
picture we have of the world around us. In a nutshell, in quantum mechanics events dont (or dont necessarily) happen, whereas in our everyday worldview they certainly do: the Geiger counter does or does not fire; the photographic plate is or is not blackened at a definite point; and so on. So the first
question we might ask ourselves is: Why should we find this state of affairs even surprising, let alone intellectually intolerable? To answer this question it is
necessary to make a digression and investigate what we expect of those conceptions of the world around us which we are prepared to dignify by the
name of scientific theories.
The relationship between the external world (however that notion

may be conceived) and what we human beings may say or think about it is of course one of the oldest problems in philosophy, and the particular sets of
thoughts which have come to constitute the subject-matter of the natural sciences as we know them today have no claim to exemption from the rigorous
philosophical questioning to which their less technical counterparts are regularly subjected.7 While most professional scientists, including the present
author, lack the competence (and for that matter the time) to pursue such an analysis in detail, it is clear that their reactions to questions such as the ones
raised by the measurement paradox will be determined by their (often implicit) perception of the basic functions of language in general and scientific
language in particular. So it is appropriate that I should try to make explicit at this point the prejudices with which I myself approach this subject.8
I would suggest that a helpful way of looking at scientific theories is not as something totally divorced from the everyday language in which we describe
our experience, but as an extension of its resources; that, at least in those aspects of language which we would normally be happy to call factual
description, we are trying in some crude sense to build for ourselves and others maps of the world; and that this map-making function of language is
made much more precise and explicit in the language developed in modern scientific theories. This no doubt sounds not only unoriginal but naive; and
indeed, so long as we take the concept of a map as equivalent to that of a picture, it is a view which has deservedly and repeatedly been shot through
with holes by successive generations of philosophers. But let us for a moment experiment with the idea of taking the notion of a map, as such, deadly
seriously. In that case it is obvious after a moments thought that a map is certainly not equivalent to a picture. What kinds of maps do we know? There
are Ordnance Survey (or USGS) maps; there are the road maps put out by the motoring organizations; there are maps prepared for military use; there are
demographic maps; maps of the city subway system; and so on. What do they have in common? In the first place, a negative feature; a map is not a
picture of anything. (On looking down from a low-flying plane, one does not see contour lines twisting around the hillsides, nor does the red or brown with
which Ordnance Survey maps mark the roads designated as A- or B-class by the UK Ministry of Transport bear any relation to the actual color of the
road.) Indeed, while many maps (e.g. Ordnance Survey or military maps) do bear a metric or at least a topological correspondence to the objects they
describe, even this feature is not essential; the maps of the London Underground (subway) system displayed in the stations are certainly not metrically
accurate, and (as far as I remember) maps of Charles de Gaulle airport do not show the complicated topology of the connecting tubes in detail. Why do
we, nevertheless, regard these as adequate and useful

maps? Quite simply, because they fulfil the basic function of a map, which is to convey, in the form of a visual gestalt, an amount of information adequate
to permit us to plan whatever activity we had in mind (the ascent of a mountain, a car journey to Scotland, an airport security operation, or whatever it
was). Since different kinds of maps have different functions, it is not surprising that they have little in common, except for being two-dimensional displays
(though in future we may no doubt get used to holographic maps). Mountaineers do not usually complain because their map fails to show the names of
roads, nor do London subway travellers complain that, if you believe the wall maps, all subway lines travel in one of only eight directions; both maps are
perfectly adequate for the particular purpose for which they are intended. It would be totally ridiculous to complain that a map of one kind is somehow
inadequate because it is not in one-to-one correspondence with a map of a quite different kind. There is not and could not be any ultimate map.
Now, I would like to suggest that in many cases, where two different types of scientific theory apparently cover the same subject-matter and are not
obviously reducible to one another (as for example in the case of statistical mechanics and thermodynamics) we should view their relationship as
resembling that of two different types of map of the same area; that is, they are different because they are trying to answer different types of question, but
they are not therefore mutually incompatible. I believe that this type of relationship between theories at different levels (to use a rather question-begging
word) is much more common in science generally, and even in physics, than one would think if one reads either most physics textbooks or most
philosophers of science. For example, most textbooks of solid-state physics give the impression 9 that the whole goal of the subject is to solve
Schrdingers equation for a collection of, say, 1023 nuclei and associated electrons, and that any models which we may build at an intermediate or
macroscopic level (for example, the Drude model of electrons in metals, the Debye model of an elastic continuum, the Landau-Fermi liquid theory, and so
on) are rather regrettable props which are in essence attempts to cover up our inability to do this by giving approximately valid solutions to the problem.
Popular as this way of thinking may be among solid-state physicists, I believe that it is totally mistaken. In the first place, even if we could solve the
appropriate Schrdingers equation for an arbitrary, specified set of boundary conditions, we should never be able to apply the solution since we should in
practice never be able to determine these boundary conditions with sufficient accuracy. Secondly, and far more importantly, what would be the value in
having a complete and exact solution anyway? We should be rather in the position of the ancient Babylonians, who had (or so it is said) an elaborate
system of recipes which enabled them to predict astronomical phenomena with a high degree of accuracy, but

without any unifying principle or anything which we could call a model. Such a solution would by itself in no way help us to predict qualitatively new
phenomena, for it would not identify for us the qualitatively important features of the physical situation. That is precisely what the intermediate-level models
of condensed-state physics are all about; they are attempts (and, to the extent that they survive, successful attempts) to grasp the relevant features of the
physics and to present them in the form of a mental gestalt. They are not approximations to the microscopic solution of the problem, any more than the
London Transport subway map is an approximation to a 6-inch Ordnance Survey map of the same region.
If the relationship between scientific theories, or descriptions, at different levels is not one of derivability, then does it make sense to impose any
constraints at all on one description in relation to the other? Clearly it does. At the very least, we need the constraint of consistency, that is, it should not
be possible to derive results from one description which are clearly in contradiction to those derived from the other. It is, actually, an implicit recognition of
this requirement which is responsible for much of the current output of theoretical work in condensed-matter physics, though with the ironical aspect that
most of the authors of this work are under the impression that they are doing something quite different. Take, for example, the case of a clearly
macroscopic law of physics such as Ohms law. There must be literally hundreds of papers in the literature which aim (or claim to aim) to derive Ohms
law from microscopic considerations. Yet, if the word derivation is taken literally (in the sense, say, in which it would be understood by a pure
mathematician) they all fail utterly. They can claim success, to one degree or another, only if by derivation is meant a procedure which is familiar to all
working physicists but, oddly enough, little studied by philosophers of science, in which what one actually does is to show that there exists a series of not
implausible auxiliary assumptions which, when added to the microscopic description, will make it explicitly compatible with the required macroscopic
result. (In the case of a derivation of Ohms law, such assumptions might for example relate to the cancellation of off-diagonal elements of the density
matrix, to the irrelevance of the exact shape of the sample, and so on.) In other words, what this kind of work is really seeking to demonstrate is not
derivability but compatibility of the models used at the microscopic and macroscopic (or intermediate) levels. Indeed, it is to my mind no accident that
some of the most important theorems in the history of physics have actually been incompatibility theorems, e.g. the Bohr-van Leeuwen theorem on the
inexplicability of atomic diamagnetism within the framework of classical statistical mechanics, or the famous theorem of Bell on the incompatibility of the
predictions of so-called local hidden-variable theories with those of quantum mechanics.

After this rather lengthy digression, let us return to our original subject, the quantum measurement paradox. Viewed in the light of the above remarks,
the paradox resides not in the fact that the quantum and classical descriptions of the state of the macroscopic world are not derivable one from the other,
but in the fact that they are, prima facie, incompatible. To put it crudely, in appropriate circumstances quantum mechanics not only fails to assert that
macroscopic events (clicking of a counter, etc.) occur, but positively asserts that they dont occur; whereas our ordinary everyday language, which we
naturally think of as embodying our direct experience, asserts with equal firmness that they do. It is as if we had two maps of quite different type but both
guaranteed by their makers to represent topological features accurately, in one of which a certain road crosses a certain river while in the other the two
never get close together. In that case we would certainly say that one of the two maps must be a bad one. Yet already there is a difficulty with the
analogy. In the case of the maps, we could prove that one map (at least) was a bad one, because under suitable circumstances it would lead us
demonstrably to mis-plan our route; that is, its badness would have practical consequences. What makes the quantum measurement paradox, by contrast,
so uniquely elusive is that, as we shall see below, in a certain sense it appears to have no observable consequences. It is no doubt precisely this feature
which allows most professional physicists to dismiss it from their consciousness.
It is now over fifty years since the quantum measurement paradox first made its appearance recognizably in the literature10, and in the intervening halfcentury numerous solutions have been discovered and (much more frequently!) rediscovered. We may classify these attempts into two broad groups,
which are distinguished by whether or not they accept the formal validity of the extrapolation of quantum mechanics to systems of arbitrary size,
complexity, etc., including if necessary the human brain. In the category which in effect refuses to do so, the best-known solution is probably the
Copenhagen interpretation as formulated by Bohr, and, with some differences, Heisenberg; this in effect lays down by fiat that the macroscopic world,
including our preparation devices, measuring instruments, etc., must be described in classical terms, on the grounds that otherwise we should have no
possibility of communicating with one another. While this is no doubt a strong argument, the Copenhagen interpretation as such totally evades the real
question, which is how the quantum-mechanical description at a microscopic level becomes converted into a classical one at the macroscopic level, even
(presumably) in cases of the type described above, where a literal extrapolation of the quantum mechanical formation would lead to a quite non-classical
account of the macroscopic world. It seems to the present author that in so far as this question is addressed at all in the writings of Bohr and Heis-

enberg, it is answered only by implicitly assuming that there really is a qualitative distinction between the microscopic and macroscopic levels of reality,
and in particular that there comes some point on the apparent continuum where one can say that the quantum-mechanical description simply stops (in
effect, when one can apply the standard textbook measurement axioms). But, as numerous detailed examinations of specific measurement procedures
have made clear (see for example references 5, 11, 12), and as we discussed earlier, the physics involved in measurement is no different from any other
kind of physics, and there seems no point at which it is natural to invoke the violent discontinuity of description which the Copenhagen interpretation
would seem to require; nor is it helpful (though it is no doubt true) to remark that in most real-life situations it will not matter where the cut is introduced,
so long as it occurs somewhere. It is the very legitimacy of the cut, not its precise position, that is at issue.
A much more radical approach to the measurement problem is the mentalistic solution espoused by Wigner13 and some other physicists, which holds
that the quantum-mechanical description should be applied right up to the macroscopic level and that the occurrence of specific macroscopic events is a
consequence of an interaction of human consciousness with the physical world which cannot be explained within the framework of the laws of physics
itself. (This view should be sharply distinguished from a version of the statistical interpretation (see below) in which the quantum-mechanical state vector
is a description not of the physical world itself but of our information concerning it, and therefore changes discontinuously when we acquire new
information. In this latter approach there is no question of a causal interaction between consciousness and the physical world.) In the absence of further
amplification of this idea, and in particular of specific experimental predictions, it seems rather difficult to comment meaningfully on it, except perhaps to
remark that the very meaning of consciousness is itself the subject of furious controversy among philosophers, psychologists and others, and that it may
be somewhat dangerous to explain something one does not understand very well by invoking something one does not understand at all!
There is, however, a more conservative way of trying to involve the phenomenon of consciousness in the problem; namely, by speculating that, while it
should be possible in principle (even if not very useful) to describe the physical environment associated with the phenomenon (e.g. the human brain)
without bringing in any extra-physical ingredient, the laws of physics themselves might have to be substantially modified when one deals with systems with
the incredibly high degree of complexity and organization which is necessary to sustain even life, let alone consciousness. In particular, one might speculate
that the basic principles of quantum mechanics, and in particular the principle

of superposition, might break down for such highly organized systems. This hypothesis is actually a special case of a more general possibility which I
return to below, so I will defer discussion of it for the moment.
Let me now turn to those solutions of the quantum measurement problem which accept the universal applicability of the quantum formalism. The most
conservative of these is probably the so-called statistical interpretation (for example reference 14) according to which the formalism is merely a
description of our information about the system in question, or more precisely about the ensemble from which it is drawn, and says nothing about the
actual state of any particular object, even at the macroscopic level. In this interpretation the description [3] of the final state of the universe after a
measurement has been made merely gives us statistical information about the distribution of results obtained in a long series of trials using identical pieces
of apparatus and identical initial conditions, and nothing more; the question In what macroscopic state is this particular apparatus on this particular
occasion? is one which simply does not lie within the competence of quantum mechanics to answer. The formalism is simply a calculus for predicting,
from given macroscopic initial conditions, the probability of various macroscopic outcomes. This interpretation, while no doubt internally self-consistent,
has the very unpleasant feature that under certain conditions it makes it impossible, even in principle, to give a quantum-mechanical description of the state
of a particular macroscopic object; since the theory is claimed to be the most fundamental description of the world which we now have and, according to
many physicists, which we are ever likely to get, this seems rather a high price to pay.
If the statistical interpretation is the most modest of the interpretations of quantum mechanics as a universal formalism, the most ambitious is surely the
Everett-Wheeler15 relative state interpretation (often known, since its popularization by de Witt16, as the many-worlds interpretation). This
interpretation in effect takes a number of simple and unexceptionable theorems of the formal quantum theory of measurement (e.g. the theorem that if,
under suitably ideal conditions, the same microscopic quantity is measured successively by two different macroscopic instruments, the probability of
getting two different results is zero) and superposes on them a novel metaphysical superstructure. The wave function, it is claimed, describes particular
macroscopic objects, not ensembles, and is never reduced by a measurement, even at the level of human consciousness; thus the universe is never
really in a particular macroscopic state at all but is forever in a linear superposition of macroscopically different states. The apparent violent contradiction
with our commonsense view of the macroscopic world is argued away by claiming that, because of the formal theorems mentioned above, we would
never know of the

existence of the branches of the wave function which correspond to outcomes we have not observed, and that all physically observable phenomena would
be the same as if the measurement had reduced the wave function. The problem that bothers critics of the Everett-Wheeler interpretation is not (contrary
to what many advocates of this interpretation seem to believe) that they are unaware or dubious of the formal theorems on which it relies, but that they
see, quite literally, no meaning in the metaphysical superstructure; in the words of Ballentine17, Rather than deny that a state vector can be a complete
model of the real world, Everett and de Witt choose to redefine the real world so that a state vector (like [3]) can be a model of it. In particular, the
Everett-Wheeler interpretation seems totally unable to give an account of my subjective consciousness, on any particular occasion, of observing a
particular outcome; to say that this consciousness is fallacious, even if a meaning can be attached to the words, is not an explanation!
The line of approach to the quantum measurement problem which is probably most favored by the majority of working physicists, and which I will
therefore from now on refer to as the orthodox resolution of the problem, goes roughly as follows. Let us agree that the technically correct description of
the state of the universe following a measurement is a linear superposition of the form of equation [3], or something similar. Nevertheless, it is argued, it
will be impossible in real life to distinguish between the experimental predictions made by equation [3] (supplemented, of course, by the standard
measurement axioms) and those made by a classical mixture description, in which the universe is simply assigned a probability:

of being in the macroscopic state

In more technical language, it is claimed that the off-diagonal elements of the density matrix in a representation
corresponding to the macroscopically distinguishable states i are unobservable in any realistic experiment, and that therefore the technically correct density
matrix, which has elements:

may be safely replaced by the one corresponding to the mixture, namely:

A variant of this approach, which is more or less equivalent, is to point out that realistic measurements are never carried out on the universe as a whole,
but only on some finite part of it (e.g. the macroscopic measuring apparatus), and that after any appreciable time any macroscopic system will have
interacted sufficiently with its environment that by itself it is no longer characterized by a pure state;

in fact, the reduced density matrix corresponding to the system by itself will indeed be of the mixture form
In either version, the argument then
goes on to claim that since the correct quantum mechanical description is equivalent (or equivalent for all practical purposes) to a classical mixture
description, there is no conceptual problem in interpreting it, and in particular no paradox in the fact that we observe, in any given experiment, a definite
result; this is no more puzzling, it is claimed, than the fact that we have to describe a die which has been thrown but not inspected in terms of probabilities,
despite the fact that we know very well that it must in fact be in a definite state which inspection will reveal.
This solution to the quantum measurement paradox (which seems to be rediscovered, and re-published, in some variant or other about once a year on
average) seems to the present author, and many others, to be no solution at all. To be sure, if its only point is to reassure the working physicist that in
interpreting his experiments he may apply the standard measurement axioms at any time after the macroscopic apparatus has been triggered, without the
risk of error, then the argument is unexceptionable. But as a solution of the conceptual problem it is a non-starter; if taken seriously, it confuses the
(usually justified) assertion that the correct quantum mechanical description (supplemented, of course, by the measurement axioms) will give the same
experimental predictions as a classical description in which the system is in a definite state, but our information is such that we can only talk in terms of
probabilities, with the assertion that the macroscopic system actually is in a definite state. The latter statement is in transparent violation of the
interpretation of the quantum formalism as applied at the microscopic level, so unless one is prepared either to modify the interpretation discontinuously
somewhere on the way from the microworld to the macroworld, or to embrace the full-blooded statistical interpretation (see above), the argument
seems internally inconsistent. In fact, it only looks plausible at all because of a fundamental ambiguity in the interpretation of the density-matrix formalism
(see the discussion in dEspagnat18, section 7.2). To repeat: the conceptual (as distinct from the practical) problem is not whether at the macroscopic level
the universe (or the macroscopic apparatus) behaves as if it were in a definite macroscopic state, but whether it is in such a state.
Must we, then, resign ourselves to forever living with a violent conceptual paradox in our most successful, and most cherished, theory of the physical
world? Not necessarily. There is one possible chink in the reasoning which leads to the paradox which is so obvious that it is really rather surprising that in
the debates of the last fifty years or so it has attracted so little attention. It is quite simply that the assumption that the laws of quantum mechanics apply to
macroscopic, complex and possibly highly-organized systems of matter, in the same

way as they do to microscopic objects such as elections and atoms, is just that: an assumption, for which at the time of writing there is no direct and little
circumstantial evidence. Perhaps the easiest way to see this is to note that the only time that the average physicist ever needs to write down a wave
function of the type [3] is precisely when he is discussing the quantum measurement paradox; in his ordinary working life, be he a theorist or an
experimentalist, he never needs to deal with superpositions of macroscopically different states19, and hence never produces any evidence either for or
against their existence. In other words, there is simply no convincing evidence that macroscopic superpositions of the type [3] exist in nature. It is
therefore quite conceivable that at the level of complex, macroscopic objects the quantum mechanical superposition principle simply fails to give a correct
account of the behavior of the system. One alternative possibility, for example, is that as more and more particles are involved in the linear superposition it
gradually and continuously evolves into one or other of its branches, the probability of its ending up in a particular branch being determined by random
factors in such a way that in an ensemble of experiments the statistical predictions of the quantum measurement axioms are verified. However, once one
decides that the formalism is not sacrosanct, there are clearly many other schemes which could be considered, any of which would preserve the
predictions of the quantum formalism at the microlevel while allowing the occurrence of definite events at the macrolevel. It is needless to add that any
concrete proposal of this type would require us to introduce new physical laws which are not contained in the quantum formalism itself and which, while
important at the macrolevel, would presumably have negligible effect at the level of one-, two- or few-particle systems. For some suggestions as to a
possible definition of the property which discriminates cases in which these laws would be important or unimportant, see reference 1, section 3.
Why are physicists as a community so reluctant to consider even the possibility of such a solution to the quantum measurement paradox? I believe that
the answer is to be sought on a number of different levels. At the most technical level, there seems to be a widespread belief that all solutions of this type
have already been refuted by theory or experiment or both. This is quite simply a misconception. As regards theory, the only theoretical consideration
which would invalidate such a proposal is simply the demand that the quantum formalism should apply universally, which merely begs the question;
theorems of the von Neumann type20, which in effect simply state that the notion of objective properties cannot be incorporated within the quantum
formalism, are clearly irrelevant in this context. As regards experiment, the often-repeated claim that experiment has shown beyond reasonable doubt that
quantum mechanics works at the macroscopic level (or applies to macroscopic systems) embodies a

fundamental confusion. I have discussed this point in considerable detail in reference 1, and will merely summarize the conclusion here. Even the most
spectacular of the so-called macroscopic quantum phenomena (Josephson effect, flux quantization, etc.) in themselves give no evidence at all for the
existence of the states of the general form [3] which are necessary to establish the quantum measurement paradox, nor does the detailed agreement (such
as it is) between the quantum-mechanically calculated and the observed properties of macroscopic systems (binding energies, excitation spectra, etc.)
yield any more evidence in this direction. In the technical language introduced in reference 1, all these phenomena can be, and routinely are, explained in
terms of the properties of states with disconnectivity of the order of 1, 2, or at most a few, while the state described by equation [3] has typically a
disconnectivity of order 1023. There simply is no direct experimental evidence, at the time of writing, that such states actually exist.
A second reason for reluctance to consider the possibility outlined above lies at a more philosophical level. With few exceptions (who include David
Bohm21), scientists of the last 300 years or so have been deeply committed to a form of reductionism which holds, in effect, that the behavior of a
complex system of matter must be simply the sum of the behavior of its constituent parts. Whether it is actually profitable to describe it in these terms is, of
course, a different question, and it seems to me that it would be perfectly consistent to subscribe to this kind of weak reductionism while nevertheless
accepting the validity and desirability of higher-level descriptions; in terms of the map-making analogy developed above, this would be like claiming that it
would in principle be possible to make a perfect and complete map which would describe in minute detail every last topological feature, but that there is
no practical purpose for which it would be useful to do so. What is essential to weak reductionism in the sense referred to is the assumption that the
experimental behavior of a complex system such as a solid, a biological organism or the human brain could in principle be completely predicted if one
knew the laws which describe the behavior of the individual atoms (or nucleons, or quarks) which compose it and also the relevant initial conditions on
the equations. (Whether one could in practice ever know all these things is, again, a different question.) What is excluded by this assumption is the
possibility that there are new physical laws which appear only at the level of complex systems, so that the result of a solution of (let us say) Schrdingers
equation for the 1023-odd electrons and nuclei composing a small biological organism might give results which are not only practically useless but are
actually wrong. To put it another way, such a prejudice excludes a priori the possibility that complexity is itself a relevant variable which may require the
laws of physics to be modified or generalized, in the same way as high

velocities require relativity theory and small distances (or high energies) require quantum mechanics.
As a matter of history, the reductionist prejudice has of course had spectacular success. The behavior of gases has been analyzed in terms of the
constituent molecules, that of molecules in terms of atoms, that of atoms in terms of the nucleons and electrons composing them, that of nucleons in terms
of quarks, and so on. Certainly, there is no particular reason to believe that there is any special new ingredient which has to be added to quantum theory
at the level of small or even large molecules which is not already present at the lower levels; if anything, the often spectacular agreement between theory
and experiment leads to the opposite conclusion. Moreover, while the situation regarding bulk systems of condensed matter is inevitably less clearcut (in
that totally rigorous and exact calculations in terms of the microscopic constituents are not usually available, even with the power of todays computers)
there seems no strong reason to believe that, as regards the one- and two-particle correlations which are essentially all (or nearly all) that experiment
usually measures, a quantum-mechanical calculation based on Schrdingers equation as applied to the constituent electrons and nuclei will give misleading
results. (As discussed above, it is quite a different question whether the results will be useful.) However, this situation is not one which we should regard
as totally obvious a priori; a scientist from Mars, unconditioned by 300 years of reductionist science, might well find it a rather remarkable feature of our
current understanding of the world. In any case, the fact that the reductionist assumption does apparently hold (or at any rate does not obviously fail) for
the rather coarse features of the quantum formalism which are reflected in the calculation of one- and two-particle correlations is no evidence at all that it
will continue to hold for the much more subtle features of the formalism which lead to the measurement paradox; as discussed in detail in reference 1,
failure at a certain level of disconnectivity would preserve all the well-established existing agreements between theory and experiment while removing the
paradox. The prejudice that no such failure will occur is no doubt the simplest and (were it not for the measurement paradox) the most elegant
assumption, but we have no a priori guarantee that nature will continue to entertain us with simple behavior as she has seemed to do in the past!
Finally, it may not be totally fanciful to seek part of the explanation at what we might call the sociological or political level. It is commonly believed that
the fundamental areas of research in physics are elementary-particle physics and cosmology, and that all other areas, in particular the physics of
condensed matter, are derivative. Clearly the prevalence of this belief, not merely among the physics community itself but among the general public, is
extremely useful to those who seek hundreds of millions of dollars or pounds of public money to

build the next round of high-energy accelerators, since it enables them to argue not only that particle physics and cosmology are fundamental areas of
scientific research (which they unarguably are) but that they are the only such fundamental area, and that advances in other areas of science (or at any rate
other areas of physics) will not qualitatively change our world-view in the way that may come out of investment in these areas. Were it to become
seriously envisaged that the physics of complex matter need not be, in all respects, reducible to that of its constituent parts, this argument might perhaps be
examined a little more sceptically; one might begin to ask, in fact, for the actual evidence that pushing back the frontiers of physics in the direction of the
very small or the very large will in the end change our basic understanding of the world in a way more fundamental than an equivalent thrust in the direction
of the very complex.
Apart from the three reasons mentioned above, there is, I believe, a fourth reason why many physicists, while admitting the possibility in principle of a
solution to the measurement paradox of the type envisaged, regard the question as not particularly interesting; namely, they believe that the question of the
existence of such a solution is in principle not accessible to experimental resolution. At first sight some of the remarks made above would seem to lead
precisely to this conclusion, since, as I have pointed out, the average experimentalist or theorist, in his everyday work, never comes within a mile of a
wave function of the dangerous type, i.e. equation [3]. In fact, merely by accepting what I have called the orthodox resolution of the measurement
paradox area, one in effect commits oneself to the belief that, at least in the context of a realistic measurement, it will always be impossible in practice to
see any effects of the interference between the different macroscopic states
(and hence, a fortiori, to test the hypothesis that the true description at
the macroscopic level is not of this type). It is evidently this belief which most physicists feel justifies them in relegating questions about the validity and
consistency of quantum mechanics at the macroscopic level to the realm of the philosophical (which, in the loose usage of the physics community,
appears to mean just about anything which at the moment cannot be subjected to direct experimental test).
In the days of the original controversies about the interpretation of the quantum formalism, in the first few decades of its existence, such a belief was no
doubt well justified. In the 1980s, however, I believe that the question looks a good deal more complex. What has changed the situation qualitatively in
the last decade or two is our ability to produce in the laboratory systems where there is a genuine hope of attaining the conditions where not only does
quantum mechanics predict that the state is a linear superposition of macroscopically different states, but where the consequences of such a description
are different, in an experimentally testable way, from the consequences of other

types of assumption such as the scheme suggested above, in which already by this stage the system has evolved into a definite macroscopic state. I have
discussed the conditions necessary to attain this state of affairs, and the systems which are the most promising candidates for it, in detail elsewhere22, and
will here merely review briefly what seems to be the experiment most likely to be feasible. One takes a superconducting ring closed by a Josephson
junction (rf SQUID) and imposes on it a controlled external magnetic flux. The system will then respond by generating currents which circulate in such a
way that the total trapped flux, , is different from that applied externally; in thermal equilibrium it will choose a value of which makes its free energy
F() a local minimum. This allows (at least) two different kinds of experiments. In one kind (known in the literature as macroscopic quantum tunnelling
or MQT) one traps the flux in a metastable minimum and tries to detect its escape into a more stable minimum by a quantum tunnelling process. In the
other (macroscopic quantum coherence or MQC) one chooses the value of the externally imposed flux so that F() has two degenerate minima which
are separated by an energy barrier; the situation then resembles that found in the ammonia molecule, and one looks for the coherent oscillations between
the two states which are the analog of the ammonia inversion resonance. The point of both kinds of experiment is that by any reasonable criterion the
states which are connected by the process of tunnelling through the potential barrier are macroscopically different (in particular, a macroscopic number
of electrons circulate clockwise or counter-clockwise in the two states respectively). Thus, observation of the quantum-mechanically predicted behavior
should constitute at least circumstantial evidence (cf. below) that the quantum formalism still works for such macroscopic superpositions, and conversely
failure of the predictions might suggest the hypothesis that at the macroscopic level quantum mechanics needs to be replaced or supplemented by physical
laws of a qualitatively different type.
At the time of writing a number of experiments on MQT have already been done, though most of these are on a system (a so-called current-biassed
junction) which is related but not identical to the one described above (for a review see references 22 and 23). Most of these experiments have found a
tunnelling behavior which is at least qualitatively consistent with the quantum-mechanical predictions. However, it is difficult to assess to what extent they
exclude alternative hypotheses. The MQC experiment, if it can be done, should be much more informative in this respect. In fact, it can be shown24 that,
provided suitable values of the parameters can be attained, the behavior predicted by quantum mechanics in this experiment is in conflict with the
conjunction of two very basic commonsense assumptions about the macroscopic world, namely that a macroscopic system which has available to it two
macroscopically different states:

1 must always actually be in one state or the other: and

2 can in principle be detected to be so with arbitrarily small effect on the state or its subsequent macroscopic dynamics.
Thus the MQC experiment would discriminate definitively between quantum mechanics and any theory of the alternative class discussed above which
proposed to replace it at the level of a macroscopic superconducting device or below.
Although this experiment of course could not refute (or confirm) alternative theories which predicted a deviation from quantum mechanics only at the
level of systems more complex, or more highly organized in (say) a biological sense, than the rather crude system formed by a superconducting device, I
believe nevertheless that a clearcut result in either direction would constitute a very important input into discussions of the quantum measurement problem.
A result in conflict with quantum mechanics would (after all the loopholes in theory and experiment had been plugged!) obviously throw the whole
question back into the melting-pot. A result in accordance with the quantum predictions would no doubt at first sight be less spectacular; however, I
believe that it should make us even more sceptical about the orthodox resolution of the paradox. For if in this (admittedly very special) case the linear
superposition of two macroscopically different states can be shown experimentally not to be equivalent to a classical mixture of these states, then it
becomes that much less plausible to argue that in all other cases, where we have no direct experimental evidence to the contrary, the pure state has by
some magical process been converted into a mixture (or, rather, has been converted into a definite but unknown macroscopic state). At the very least, it
would force advocates of this resolution to specify with considerably more precision than has been done in the past exactly what aspects of the
macroscopic nature of the system they believe are relevant to the process in question.
Although the above ideas are different in detail from those promoted by David Bohm, I believe they are very much in the spirit of his approach to
physics, and in particular of his long-standing concern with the fragmentation of our world-view imposed by the orthodox interpretations of quantum
mechanics. It is a pleasure to dedicate this essay to him on the occasion of his retirement and to wish him many more happy years of scientific activity.

Acknowledgment
This work was supported through the MacArthur professorship, endowed by the John D. and Catherine T.MacArthur Foundation at the University of
Illinois.

References
1 A.J.Leggett, Prog. Theor. Phys. Supply 69, 80 (1980).
2 J.Summhammer, G.Badurek, H.Rauch, U.Kischko and A.Zeilinger, Phys. Rev., A27, 2523 (1983).
3 N.Bohr, Essays 195862 on Atomic Physics and Human Knowledge, Interscience, New York, 1963.
4 H.Reichenbach, Philosophic Foundations of Quantum Mechanics, University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1944.
5 A.Daneri, A.Loinger and G.M.Prosperi, Nucl. Phys., 33, 297 (1962); Nuovo Cimento, 44B, 119 (1967).
6 E.P.Wigner, Am. J. Phys., 31, 6 (1963).
7 Cf. T.S.Kuhn, in Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (I.Lakatos and A.Musgrave, eds), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1970, p. 231.
8 The discussion which follows has been much influenced by conversations over the years with Aaron Sloman (who is, however, in no way to blame for
its inadequacies).
9 For example, G.Weinreich, Solids: Elementary Theory for Advanced Students, John Wiley and Sons, New York, 1965, pp. 989.
10 E.Schrdinger, Die Naturwissenschaften, 23, 844 (1935).
11 D.Bohm, Quantum Theory, Prentice-Hall, New York, 1952, part VI.
12 K.Gottfried, Quantum Mechanics, Benjamin, New York, 1966.
13 E.P.Wigner, in I.J.Good, (ed.), The Scientist SpeculatesAn Anthology of Partly-Baked Ideas, Heinemann, London, 1961.
14 L.E.Ballentine, Rev. Mod. Phys., 42, 358 (1970).
15 H.Everett III, Rev. Mod. Phys., 29, 454 (1957); J.A.Wheeler, ibid., 29, 463 (1957).
16 B.S.de Witt, Physics Today, April, 1971, p. 36.
17 L.E.Ballentine, Found. Phys., 3, 229 (1973).
18 B.dEspagnat, Conceptual Foundations of Quantum Mechanics, 2nd ed., W.A.Benjamin Inc., Reading, MA, 1976.
19 An exception to this statement is a proposal by V.R.Chechetkin (Fiz. Nizk. Temp., 2, 434 (1976); translation, Sov. J. Low Temp. Phys., 2, 215
(1976)) for a new type of wave function for the ground state of an anisotropic superfluid. However, it has been shown by S.K.Yip, Phys. Letters,
105A, 66 (1984), that the proposed state is in fact not the ground state of the system in question.
20 J.Von Neumann, Mathematical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1955, Chapter 5.
21 D.Bohm, Wholeness and the Implicate Order, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1980.
22 A.J.Leggett, in A.M.Goldman and S.A.Wolf (eds), Percolation, Localization and Superconductivity, Plenum Press, New York, 1984 (NATO
ASI Series B, Physics, V, 109).
23 R.de Bruyn Ouboter, in S.Kamefuchi (ed.), Proc. Intl. Symposium on the Foundations of Quantum Mechanics, Japanese Physical Society,
Tokyo, 1984.
24 A.J.Leggett and Anupam Garg, Phys. Rev. Letters, 54, 857 (1985).

6
Quantum physics and conscious thought
Roger Penrose Mathematical Institute, Oxford
There can be few physicists who have delved as deeply into the philosophical implications of their subject as has David Bohm. It is therefore with some
trepidation that I am paying my respects to him on the occasion of his retirement with an attempt of my own to relate questions of philosophy to those of
the foundations of physics. The viewpoint that I am putting forward here attempts to relate questions that have been two of Bohms major interests over
the years; namely, a possible breakdown of quantum mechanics on a macroscopic scale and the physical basis of conscious thought. It must be evident to
the reader that in both these topics I am venturing into dangerously speculative territory. Moreover others more expert that I (such as Wigner1, as well as
Bohm2 himself) have put forward strongly-reasoned views which relate these topics. Yet I do feel that my own viewpoint is both well worth describing
and sufficiently different from these others that the reader may find something of value here. But my account must necessarily be somewhat truncated, for
reasons of space and of time. It is my intention to expand these thoughts at much greater length elsewhere.

1 Problems with quantum theory

Let me begin by expressing my personal worries and beliefs about the quantum theory. First, let it be said without reservation that the basic scheme, for all
its philosophical difficulties, is an extraordinarily beautiful mathematical structure. The strength of the theory (and here I refer to standard non-relativistic
quantum theory, not to quantum field theory) lies not just in the unbelievable range and accuracy of

its physical predictions, but also in the mathematical elegance of its formalism.
It is here that I have always had difficulties with most hidden-variable theories. To me, it is no help just to improve upon the underlying philosophy of
quantum mechanics by the introduction of hidden variables if the price to be paid is the sacrifice of this mathematical elegance. Yet it must also be
emphasized that, in my view, the standard theory is indeed quite unsatisfactory philosophically. Like Einstein and his hidden-variable followers, I believe
strongly that it is the purpose of physics to provide an objective description of reality.
However, I do not regard indeterminacy, in the ordinary sense of that word, as being necessarily objectionable. We have become accustomed,
through classical physics, to a picture of the world whose future evolution is completely determined by data on an initial Cauchy hypersurface. Yet I find
nothing a priori appealing about the idea. We know from results of general relativity (Penrose3, Hawking and Ellis4) that there are otherwise seemingly
acceptable space-times for which no Cauchy hypersurface exists. More serious are two other objections. In the first place, the accuracy with which one
needs to know the initial data in order to be certain about the qualitative development of a system is absurdly unreasonable (Born5, Feynman et al.6) and
easily swamped by quantum uncertainties (if that is not begging the question). In the second place, there is always the problem of deciding what initial data
one should be choosing. It seems to me to be of little value to know that there is some initial data containing all information if one has no rules for
determining what that initial data is allowed to be or likely to be.
Considering things on the ultimate universal scale, one needs, it would seem, some theory to tell us how the universe actually started off, or at least
which provides probability values for the different possible initial data sets. But if it is the latter, it seems to me that one is not really better off than with a
non-deterministic theory. I see no reason to be happier about feeding probabilities into the universes initial state than peppering them throughout the
space-time, as is done in the standard interpretation of quantum mechanics. If, on the other hand, the initial state is to be determined uniquely by some
new principle, then we have the problem of understanding the extreme complication and curious interplay between precisely-operating physical laws on
the one hand, and the presence of apparent total randomness on the other. The picture is not an entirely hopeless one, however. One is beginning to
become accustomed to the great mathematical complication, variety and apparent randomness that can arise with very simple and precise mathematical
transformations, especially where iterative procedures are involved (cf. Ott7 and references therein). So perhaps all the complication, variety and apparent

randomness that we see all about us, as well as the precise physical laws, are all exact and unambiguous consequences of one single coherent
mathematical structure.
Such a view I would call strong determinism. My guess is that Einstein8 was hinting at such a possibility in his famous remark What Im really
interested in is whether God could have made the world in a different way; that is, whether the necessity of logical simplicity leaves any freedom at all.
Perhaps this view would represent the ultimate optimistic attitude to the goals of science. Yet strong determinism is quite unlike ordinary determinism.
There is not now any question of the future state being determined by data on an initial Cauchy hypersurface. The entire future (and past) is simply fixed
by theory once and for all!
I do not propose to take sides on this grandiose issue. We are clearly extremely far from such a theory, even if eventually a viewpoint of that kind
were to turn out to be correct. My immediate purpose in bringing such matters up is largely to point out that, strong determinism aside, it seems no
worse to feed probabilities into the theory peppered throughout the space-time than to feed them all into the initial conditions. I shall return to strong
determinism later. At this point I should make mention of the many-worlds types of viewpoint9,10,11. Here one may be allowed a form of strong
determinism without determinism. The totality of all possible universes may be thought of as a single structurethe omnium (this terminology was
suggested to me by Peter Derow)and one might take the view that it is the omnium that is completely fixed by mathematical rules. The probabilities (or
randomness) now arise owing to the uncertainties involved in the question of where one finds oneself located within the omnium. This location involves
not only ones spatiotemporal location within a particular universe branch, but also the selection of that particular branch itself.
Unsatisfied though I am by such a world-view, I do not have any really fundamental objection to pictures of this general kind. One problem I do have
with them, however, is that the continual branching of the world and the threading of my own consciousness through it would seem to result in my
becoming separated from the tracks of consciousness of all my friends. This is what I have referred to as the zombie theory of the world12. It seems to
me that one needs a respectable theory of consciousness before the many-worlds view can hang together as a physical theory and as a viable
interpretation of quantum mechanics. This strikes me as a tall order at the present time. I shall have more to say about the many-worlds viewpoint later.
Let us now consider what the standard formalism of quantum mechanics has to say about the evolution of the world. Taking this formalism at its face
value, we have a state vector |> which evolves for a while according to the completely deterministic Schrdinger

equation. (If preferred, one could of course use the Heisenberg picture instead, in which case the state itself is considered not to evolve in time. The
distinction is not important for my purposes. The two pictures are completely equivalent, but I feel that, at least for a non-relativistic discussion, the
Schrdinger picture is less confusing.) Then, at odd times, when an observation is deemed to have been made, the Schrdinger-evolved state vector is
discarded and replaced by another, which is selected in a random way, with specific probability weightings, from among the eigenvectors of the operator
corresponding to the observation. As has been argued on innumerable occasions, this is a wholly unsatisfactory procedure for a fundamental description
of the real world. There are, of course, very many different attitudes to the resolution of this problem, and it is not my purpose here to enter into a
discussion of all of them, but some brief remarks will be in order.
In the first place, it is often argued that |> itself should not be regarded as giving an objective description of the world (or of part of it) but as
providing information merely of ones state of knowledge about the world. This view I really cannot accept. Quite apart from the question as to who the
one might be in this statement (and the one is surely not me!), it seems to me to be perfectly clear that there is (if we accept standard quantum
mechanics) a completely objective meaning to |>at least to the ray determined by |> in the Hilbert space (so that uncertainty
is not
of significance). For we can, in principle (according to the theory), set up a measurement defined by the operator:

and find that |> (assumed normalized: <|>=1) is the unique state (up to phase) corresponding to the eigenvalue unity for Q. This |> is distinguished
from all other states by the fact that it yields the value unity with certainty for the measurement Q. This is an entirely objective property, so we conclude
that (if the theory is correct) the property of being in state |> is, indeed, completely objective.
In practice, however, it may well turn out that the actual performing of the measurement Q is quite out of the question and it is in such circumstances
that I would myself begin to doubt that |> actually describes reality. (There are situations, in the context of relativity or in connection with timesymmetry considerations, where the reality of |> seems to lead to a paradox; cf. Penrose12. I am not concerned with such matters here, but such
paradoxes are part of my own doubts about the complete validity of the quantum formalism.) To reject the objective view requires a denial of one of the
fundamental tenets of quantum theory: any (bounded) Hermitian operator, such as Q, represents a measurement that could in principle be made.
So it seems to me that one must take it that in quantum mechanics

the state vector is actually intended to represent reality. The trouble comes, of course, when a measurement is made for which |> is not in an
eigenstate. Now |> jumps non-deterministically into some new statethis is state-vector reduction. Because of this lack of determinism it is not
possible to consider such behaviour as resulting from the Schrdinger evolution of some larger system which includes the apparatus configuration as part
of the state. (Some attempts have been made to pin the blame for this indeterminism on a lack of knowledge about the environment, the claim being that
when this random environment is taken into account, Schrdinger evolution might hold always. I have not yet found these attempts to be very believable
and I shall ignore this possibility in the discussion which follows.) So it seems that quantum mechanics asserts two quite distinct types of evolution:
deterministic Schrdinger evolution and state-vector reduction.
If we accept that state-vector reduction is a real physical processand the physical objectivity of the state vector itself seems to imply this (leaving the
many-worlds viewpoint aside)then we may ask: at what stage does such a reduction take place? Again there are different views. Perhaps it occurs
quickly and spontaneously at some level just not quite reached by experiments designed to detect violations in Schrdinger evolution. Or perhaps it is
delayed until the latest allowable moment, as the results of the observation finally enter the mind of some conscious observer (Wigner1). As we well know
(von Neumann13) either view, or any other viewpoint according to which the reduction takes place at some intermediate stage between these two
extremes, is equally and completely compatible with all the experiments.
This frustrating and beautiful fact is, at one and the same time, among the greatest strengths and the most disturbing weaknesses of the theory. It is such
a strength because it enables the theory to operateas it does with such extraordinary accuracy and powerwithout our needing to have the remotest
idea of what actually takes place during the reduction process. This strength is also the theorys weakness, since for that very reason it offers us almost
no clue as to what is physically going on during reduction. Moreover, it leads us into endless arguments about interpretation where strange (and, to my
mind, highly questionable) philosophy is often invoked to lull one into thinking that no new physical theory is needed to explain the details of the actual
physics of reduction.
The reader will realize that I am expressing a very personal view here, and that much more discussion and open-mindedness is required than I have
allowed myself in the foregoing remarks. However, my purpose here is not to be open-minded but to make some suggestions, so I hope that the reader
will continue to bear with me and, instead, take upon himself or herself this burden of open-mindedness. I wish

to make some comments concerning the place to look for a new physical theory of reduction, and then to make a speculative suggestion as to how this
might ultimately relate to the phenomenon of consciousness. In bearing with me, the reader must, as a first step, be prepared to envisage that there is
indeed a real physical process of reduction, where the Schrdinger equation and linearity are presumably both violated and where determinism may
perhaps be violated also.
It may seem that, as I am suggesting a connection with consciousness, I propose to follow the Wigner1 extreme, where reduction takes place only at
the level of conscious thought. In fact I am not at all happy with that viewpoint and my suggestions with regard to reduction will be quite different. I share
the discomfort of many others that the Wigner view seems to imply a markedly different physical behaviour in our own small corner of the universe from
that which would be taking place almost everywhere else, in the absence of local conscious observers to keep things under control. Of course, von
Neumann again comes to the aid of that viewpoint to ensure that no contradiction with actual observation (by conscious beings) occurs. Or so it would
seem. In any case, I personally find such a lop-sided picture of a real physical universe too unattractive to be believable.
Alternatively, as quite a number of physicists now seem to argue, perhaps one should go beyond Wigner and say that reduction fails to take place, even
at the level of consciousness. This leads us, instead, to Everetts many-worlds picture. It seems that the main motivation behind this idea is the
understandable desire for economy and uniformity of description. Rather than having to have two seemingly incompatible modes of evolution for the
universeSchrdingers equation and reductionis it not more economical and unified to settle just for the former and discard the latter? A faith in the
elegance of Schrdinger linearity and the strong experimental support for Schrdinger evolution are among the arguments put forward for this view, but in
my opinion both arguments are somewhat misconceived. Linearity seems elegant only when one has not seen an even more attractive, essentially nonlinear, generalization. (Compare the analogy of Newtonian gravity and general relativity.) And the unquestionably impressive experimental support that
quantum theory continues to have is not for the Schrdinger evolution of a quantum state. It is for that absurd concoction of Schrdinger evolution on the
one hand and state-vector reduction on the other which defines the standard Copenhagen interpretation. That is where the support lies and it is that with
which we must come to terms in our attempts toward an improved theory.

2 Quantum gravity and, reduction

What we seek, I am therefore claiming, is a new theory, presumably non-linear and possibly non-deterministic, which:
1 is extremely accurately approximated, for reasonably small or simple systems, by a Schrdinger-evolving state vector; and
2 accords closely, for systems which are large or complicated, with reduction and with the standard replacement of probability amplitudes by the
probabilities of actual alternative outcomes. (See Pearle14,15,16 for a very serious concrete proposal of this kind.)
In various other places17,18 I have put forward arguments to support my own viewpoint that the essential new and non-linear physical input should be
general-relativistic gravity, together with certain considerations about the second law of thermodynamics and the apparently strongly time-asymmetric
constraints on the structure of space-time singularities. I do not wish to repeat the details of my (rather round-about) argument here. My latest thinking on
this question is being presented elsewhere19 and I refer the interested reader to that source for more details. In my opinion there are indeed strong
grounds for believing that for a quantum gravity theory to have any chance of real success it must incorporate among its important features a precise and
objective theory of state-vector reduction. (A different line of thought, also leading to the conclusion that state-vector reduction is a gravitational
phenomenon, had earlier been put forward by Krolyhzy20; see Krolyhzy, Frenkel and Lukcs21 for an up-to-date account of these ideas; cf. also
Komar22.)
There are various reasons for thinking that the structure of quantum mechanics may well have to be modified in the context of general relativity. One of
these concerns the choice of variables with respect to which the process of quantization is to be conducted. In the standard non-relativistic (or specialrelativistic) quantization procedure one has the canonical variables x a, pa of position and momentum which are made into non-commuting operators and
whose (canonical) Poisson bracket relations are replaced by (canonical) commutators. It would not be valid to apply this quantization procedure instead
to some other variables , , obtained from x a and pa by an arbitrary canonical transformation, again replacing the canonical Poisson bracket relations
of and by canonical commutators. It might, for example, be the case that is related to x a by some arbitrary co-ordinate transformation, with
canonical conjugate correspondingly chosen, and then the canonical quantization procedure will not in general apply to and What distinguishes
the standard (xa,pa) from the more arbitrary
(cf. Komar23) is its direct relation to the symmetry group of flat space-time, so that pa indeed
represents the standard (conserved) energy-momentum concept.

It will be noted that this selection principle for preferred canonical variables will not work in a curved space-time. This is a much more immediate
problem than the daunting difficulties involved in trying to quantize the gravitational field itself, since it arises already when gravity is simply taken to be an
unquantized background field. Thus, even at this simplified level, the standard quantum-mechanical procedures run into difficulties. One does not, in fact,
have any clear rules for a quantizing procedure, in the general case. When one is asked the question of whether the incorporation of space-time curvature
into physics in any way affects the general framework and rule of procedure of quantum mechanics, one is forced to reply (if truthful) that one does not
even know what the rules are, in a general curved-space setting!
It seems that in curved space, one must resort to some patchwork formalism and, at best, much of the compelling elegance of quantum mechanics is
removed. It has become fashionable to argue that, in view of the abounding difficulties that have been encountered in attempts to quantize general
relativity, one should replace that theory by some other which might more willingly submit to being forced into the linear framework of standard quantum
theory. Yet it is not often suggested that the quantum framework might itself be forced to yield. I would not dispute that some changes in classical general
relativity must necessarily result if a successful union with quantum physics is to be achieved, but I would argue strongly that these must be accompanied
by equally profound changes in the structure of quantum mechanics itself. The elegance and profundity of general relativity is no less than that of quantum
theory. The successful bringing of the two together will never be achieved, in my view, if one insists on sacrificing the elegance and profundity of either one
in order to preserve intact that of the other. What must be sought instead is a grand union of the twosome theory with a depth, beauty and character of
its own (and which will be no doubt recognized by the strength of these qualities when it is found) and which includes both general relativity and standard
quantum theory as two particular limiting cases.
This is all very well, the reader is no doubt thinking, but what relevance has the extremely weak phenomenon of even classical gravitylet alone the
absurdly tiny and quite undetectable, quantum corrections that one anticipates would result from a quantum gravity theoryto the commonplace
phenomenon of reduction? Whether one contends that reduction occurs early or late in the chain of alternativeswhether reduction has already physically
taken place with the track in a cloud chamber or mark on a photographic plate, or whether it is delayed until it affects the state of a human brainin either
case only tiny amounts of energy are involved, by the standards of gravitation theory. Yet it is my contention that it is this link with gravity which

effects the apparent change in rules that takes place with reduction. When two states of differing energy distribution are linearly superposed, the slightly
differing space-time geometries that these energy distributions produce (according to general relativity) must also be superposed. This is not clearcut
matter since, as we have seen, the geometry is not just a physical state but is something essentially involved in the very determination of the procedure
of quantization (cf. foregoing remarks concerning x a, pa and , ). It is hard to see how quantization procedures are to be superposed.
I would contend, therefore, that when two geometries involved in a linear superposition become too different from one anotherin some yet-to-bedetermined precise sensethen linear superposition fails to hold, and some effective non-linear instability sets in, resulting in one or the other geometry
winning out, the result being reduction. However, the criterion for deciding when such an instability becomes operative cannot depend solely on the
energies or masses involved. The masses involved in cloud chamber droplets, or relevant collections of silver iodide molecules in a photograph, or
configurations in a brain, would appear to be very tinyapparently tinier than the Planck-Wheeler mass of 105 g which seems to characterize the scale
of quantum gravitywhich, in turn, might perhaps be smaller than the total electron mass involved in a coherent quantum state for a large
superconducting coil. Some care will be needed in deciding upon the precise measure of mass-energy distribution difference that is needed to trigger off
the instabilities of reduction.
My earlier arguments17,18 have emphasized the time-asymmetric role of entropy in reduction and the gravitational origin (via time-asymmetry in spacetime singularity structure) of the second law of thermodynamics. For an overall consistency of the physics involved, it is argued that gravity ought also to
be critically relevant to the quantum-mechanical reduction process. But it is gravity in its role of providing a gravitational entropy that enters. In the early
stages of the universe (at the big bang) the entropy content of the matter was high. The second law arises because, at the singularity, something
constrained the entropy of gravity to be extremely low, whereas the potential for entropy content of (conformally) curved space-time was enormously
high.
As the universe evolves, this unused potential of gravitational entropy is gradually taken up (clumping of gas into stars, etc.) and is directly or indirectly
taken advantage of by systems requiring a low entropy reservoir (e.g. plants making use of degradable photons from the sun, which is a hot spot in the sky
by virtue of its gravitational clumping). The ultimate high value of entropy for a gravitationally clumped object is achieved by the black-hole state. This
entropy can be given in precise terms by the Bekenstein-Hawking formula (cf. Wald24) and we find that for an ordinary black hole, resulting from

the collapse of, say, a ten solar-mass star, the entropy per baryon is some twenty orders of magnitude larger than even the seemingly huge value of 108 or
so (taking units with Boltzmanns constant as unity) for the thermal black-body radiation left over from the hot big bang.
Even when this maximum entropy value is not achieved, the gravitational entropy can be quite sizable, though as yet no precise determination of this
entropy has been suggested. In a rough way, we can say that this entropy is intended to estimate (the logarithm of) the number of quantum states that go
to make up a given classical geometry. Such an entropy measure would have to be very much a non-local expression. But this is not surprising in general
relativity, where even energy must be given by a non-local expression (cf. Penrose and Rindler25).
The idea is that, for reduction to take place, we must be in a situation where, such as in the localization of a photon on a photographic plate, the
lowering of entropy that this reduction would seem to entail must be at least compensated by a corresponding increase in the gravitational entropy, this
gravitational entropy being higher for clumped localized energy distributions than for those which are spread out more uniformly. (This cannot be just the
quantum-mechanical entropy, which remains at zero so long as one uses a pure-state description, but is some more commonsense, though somewhat
ill-defined, entropy concept which increases as more and more degrees of freedom become involved. I am grateful to P.Pearle for illuminating discussions
concerning this. Quantum reduction must be a non-local process, and the hope is that this non-locality can be matched with the non-locality involved in the
gravitational entropy concept.
It will be clear to the reader that there is much speculation and lack of precision in this picture. (For more clarification, see Penrose19.) But my purpose
here is not to spell out in detail how the reduction procedure might work (which I cannot do, not having a proper theory) but merely to attempt to
persuade the reader of the plausibility of there being some new physical process going on which has a perfectly objective character, even though we do
not understand how this process works in detail. I would certainly anticipate, however, that the process is likely to defy any meaningful local description in
ordinary space-time terms. But any speculation involved in the details of this process will, I suppose, pale to insignificance by comparison with the
speculative aspects of what I have to suggest in the next sectionwhere I turn to what will (at first) seem to be a totally different topic!

3 Concerning the physics of conscious thought

There has been a great deal of discussion in recent yearssince the emergence of modern high-speed computersof the question as to

whether human thought can be adequately understood in terms of computational algorithms. There is a rather prevalent school of belief (cf. Hofstadter26)
which maintains that an algorithm (or perhaps the end-product of an algorithm) is itself all that counts in determining whether thoughts, or even
conscious feelings, have been achieved during the implementation of that algorithm. According to this view, the actual physical nature of the device which
carries out the algorithm is of no consequence. The point of view is a strongly operationalist one and springs, to a large extent, from a well-known and
penetrating discussion due to Turing27, according to which an experimenter has to decide, merely by means of questions and answers (transmitted
impersonally with, say, keyboard and display screen), which of two subjects is a human being and which is a computer, the computer having been
programmed to imitate human responses as closely as possible. This has become known as the Turing test, and the point of view to which I have
referred (strong AI) would maintain that once a computer has satisfactorily passed this test (i.e. has become able to imitate human responses closely
enough to be able to fool a perceptive experimenter), then all the normal terms such as thought, understanding, awareness, happiness, pain,
compassion, pride, etc., could be as meaningfully and as truthfully applied to the computer as to the human subject.
I do not believe that it would be strongly disputed that computer technology (both at the hardware and software ends) is some good way from attaining
this avowed goal. Nevertheless, at a much more restrictive level, there are already computer programmes which can respond to extremely simple types of
stories in the English language. The computer can provide answers to elementary but slightly indirect questions about the story, these answers seeming to
indicate some very primitive understanding of the content of the story by the computer. However, Searle28 has argued impressively that answers of this
sort need in no way imply that any kind of understanding has actually been achieved by such a mechanism since, in place of the electronics of the
computer, one could use human beings blindly following instructions and they need have no inkling of the meaning of the story in order to carry out these
instructions successfully.
It seems to me to be clear that in this essential respect Searle is correct and we have no reason to apply such a word as understanding to the
operations of a mechanism, electronic or otherwise, of this kind. It appears that Searle is willing to concede that at some stage computers (of present-day
type, but improved in speed, storage capacity and logical design) may be able to pass the Turing test proper (let us say, by 100 years from now) but that
we would still have no reason to attribute to them such human qualities as I have mentioned. Most particularly, we would have no reason to attribute to
them any form of conscious awareness. Thus, according to Searle, the actual physical

material and detailed construction of a computer (i.e. the hardware) may, for such qualities, be of crucial importance.
My own personal view is very much in sympathy with this, though it remains what I believe to be a highly significant difference. I would agree that the
actual physical construction of the proposed thinking device is likely to be crucial, but not merely with regard to the appropriateness of such terms as
conscious awareness. I think that the physical (or biological) nature of the device is likely to be crucial also in determining the effectiveness of its very
operation. I would contend that the evolutionary development, through natural selection, of the ability to think consciously indicates that consciousness is
playing an active role and has provided an evolutionary advantage to those possessing it. For various reasons I find it hard to believe that conscious
awareness is merely a concomitant of sufficiently complex modes of thinkingand it seems to me clear that consciousness is itself functional.
People behave quite differently while in the states of full conscious awareness from when they are not properly conscious of what they are doing (such
as while daydreaming, sleepwalking or in a state of epileptic fugue). Indeed, if consciousness had no operational effect on behaviour, then conscious
beings would never voice their puzzlement about the conscious state and would behave just like unconscious mechanisms untroubled by such
irrelevancies! Moreover, I am very much aware that, in my own thinking, there are certain kinds of problem for which conscious appraisal is essential,
whereas there are othersthose which are automatic, there being a clearly defined algorithm which I have previously learnt (like walking or driving a car
in very familiar circumstances)for which conscious action is not needed.
Why do some kinds of thinking seem to need consciousness while others seem not to? What is the crucial distinction between tasks that require (or at
least benefit from) conscious thought and those that appear to have no real use for it? I do not suppose that very clear answers to these questions can be
given at present, but at least there seems to be something very suggestive about the kind of terminology that most readily springs to mind. Terms such as
automatic, following rules mindlessly, programmed and even algorithm seem appropriate for various kind of mental processes that are not
necessarily accompanied by conscious awareness. These are the kind of activities that most closely accord with the actions of computers as we presently
understand them. On the other hand, common sense, judgment of truth, understanding and artistic appraisal are among the terms one might use to
describe mental activities that can seemingly be carried out effectively only when consciousness is present. For these, one is much more in the dark in
attempting to imitate human thinking with computers. It seems not unnatural to suggest,

therefore, that unconscious mental processes (perhaps such as can be carried out by the cerebellum) may indeed be effectively imitated by computers
which do not differ in principle from those already in existence, but that conscious thinking may be essentially non-algorithmic in its nature and
qualitatively different from that which can in principle be carried out by such computers.
The matter is perhaps not so clearcut as this, however. In the first place it is evident that many unconscious ingredients are present in our artistic
appraisals, in our studied judgments and in our common sense. Though we form our judgments with consciousness as an apparently necessary ingredient,
we do so by bringing together innumerable factors of logic, experience and prejudice, a good proportion of which we are probably not aware. Perhaps
conscious appraisals are no less algorithmic in nature than unconscious, automatic actions, but are simply incomparably more complicated and subtle in
their operationas many would argue. Perhaps, then, consciousness is simply a concomitant of these higher-level and more sophisticatedbut still
algorithmicoperations of mental machinery.
This is a view that gains support from the kind of picture that is now most commonly presented for the essential workings of the brain. A complicated
network of neurones and synapses is envisaged, where electrochemical signals propagate, indulging in elementary logical switching
processesapparently similar to those of an electronic computer, though with a probabilistic ingredient. This all seems to be something that could be
imitated closely by a computer, at least in principle. The additional probabilistic ingredient would seem to present no real problem. Computers can, after
all, easily generate sequences of numbers which to all intents and purposes behave as random sequences. Or, if preferred, (effectively) random sequences
can be produced by suitable physical processes (e.g. decays of radioactive atoms) which could easily be additionally incorporated into the computer.
In any caseapart from the fact that the storage capacity is finite rather than being unlimitedis one not simply providing an instance of a Turing
machine? Any computational procedure whatever (in the normal sense of that term) comes under the heading of a procedure attainable by a Turing
machine. To perform a computation, one is using a piece of physical apparatus, so the common argument goes, be it a human brain or an electronic
computer or whatever, which is subject to the normal physical laws. These laws are of the usual deterministic type (classical, or else Schrdinger, timeevolution) or entirely probabilistic (state-vector reduction) and, as it would seem at first sight, are of the type which could be carried out by a Turing
machine (with a limited store) with, if need be, an additional random input.
However, the question of computability, with ordinary deterministic

laws, is not quite so straightforward as it might seem. Indeed, according to Pour-El and Richards29,30, there is one sense in which evolving even so simple
a deterministic system as the wave equation in flat space can be regarded as a non-computable procedure. But this particular sense is probably not the
appropriate one in the present context. As they point out, sufficiently smooth solutions of the wave equation are indeed quite adequately computable from
initial data (say by means of the Kirchhoff formula) and the same may be basically true also of the other main deterministic equations of physics, even
though there will be the problems of stability, etc., that I mentioned in section 1.
On the other hand, there is a critical assumption built into this discussion that the operative physical laws are indeed of the type referred to, where
deterministic classical (or Schrdinger) evolution is maintained, except where punctuated by the random procedure of state-vector reduction. As I have
been arguing in the earlier sections, one needs some replacement for this unhappy combination, the evolution and reduction being seen as approximations
to some more accurate and precise grand scheme. It seems to me to be quite on the cards that this sought-for grand scheme contains an effectively noncomputable time-evolution. It would be my view that the brain in its conscious state (or the mind?) is able to harness these effects and make use of
whatever subtleties are involved at that delicate borderline between linear Schrdinger evolution and the apparent randomness of reduction, thereby
achieving effects far beyond those attainable by the ordinary operations of algorithmic computers.
Non-computability of some kind seems also to be a necessary ingredient of strong determinism. If one could compute the full space-time state of the
universe, one could in principle compute ones own future. Then, of course, one might simply choose to do something differentan incompatibility with
the feeling of free will.
These ideas are, of course, matters of considerable speculation, as present physical and physiological understandings go. Yet there are very many
instances where biological systems have been able to make extraordinarily effective use of subtle physical or chemical effects. Surely the greatest of
evolutions achievements, the development of conscious awareness, must have needed to call upon physical processes even more profound and delicate
than any we have yet understood. Any world in which minds can exist must be organized on principles far more subtle and beautifully controlled than
those even of the magnificent physical laws that have so far been uncovered. At least, that is my own very strong opinion.

Added in proof
I am now of the opinion that the criterion for reduction referred to in Section 2 should not be phrased as though it referred to a gravitational entropy
but rather to a longitudinal graviton number. See the postscript in reference 19 for further clarification.

References
1 E.P.Wigner, Remarks on the mind-body question, in I.J.Good (ed.), The Scientist Speculates, Heinemann, New York, 1961; also in J.A. Wheeler
and H.Zurek (eds.), Quantum Theory and Measurement, Princeton Univ. Press, Princeton, NJ, 1983.
2 D.J.Bohm, Wholeness and the Implicate Order, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980.
3 R.Penrose, Revs. Mod. Phys., 37, 21520 (1965).
4 S.W.Hawking and G.F.R.Ellis, The Large Scale Structure of Space-Time, Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, 1973.
5 M.Born, Nature, 119, 354 (1927).
6 R.P.Feynman, R.B.Leighton and M.Sands, The Feynman Lectures on Physics, Vol. III, Addison-Wesley, Reading, Mass., 1965.
7 E.Ott, Strange attractors and chaotic motions of dynamical systems, Revs. Mod. Phys., 53, 65571 (1981).
8 A.Einstein, letter to Ernst Straus; cf also A.Pais, Subtle is the Lord, Oxford Univ. Press, Oxford, New York, 1982.
9 H.Everett, Relative state formulation of quantum mechanics, Revs. Mod. Phys., 29, 45462 (1957).
10 B.S.DeWitt and R.D.Graham (eds.), The Many-Worlds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics, Princeton Univ. Press, Princeton, NJ, 1973.
11 D.Deutsch, Three connections between Everetts interpretation and experiment, in R.Penrose and C.J.Isham (eds.), Quantum Concepts in Space
and Time, Oxford Univ. Press, Oxford, 1985.
12 R.Penrose, Singularities and time-asymmetry, in General Relativity: An Einstein Centenary Survey, S.W.Hawking and W.I.Israel (eds.),
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1979.
13 J.von Neumann, Mathematical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics, Princeton Univ. Press, Princeton, 1955.
14 P.Pearle, Phys. Rev., D13, 857 (1976).
15 P.Pearle, Phys. Rev., D29, 235 (1984).
16 P.Pearle, Models for reduction, in C.J.Isham and R.Penrose (eds.), Quantum Concepts in Space and Time, Oxford Univ. Press, Oxford, 1985.
17 R.Penrose, Singularities and time-asymmetry, in S.W.Hawking and W.Israel (eds.), General RelativityAn Einstein Centenary Survey,
Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, 1979.
18 R.Penrose, Time-asymmetry and quantum gravity, in C.J.Isham, R. Penrose and D.W.Sciama (eds.), Quantum Gravity 2, Oxford Univ. Press,
Oxford, 1981.
19 R.Penrose, Quantum gravity and state-vector reductions, in R.Penrose and C.J.Isham (eds.), Quantum Concepts in Space and Time, Oxford
Univ. Press, Oxford, 1985.
20 F.Karolyhazy, Nuovo Cimento, A42, 390 (1966).
21 F.Karolyhazy, A.Frenkel and B.Lukacs, On the possible role of gravity in

the reduction of the wave function, in C.J.Isham and R.Penrose (eds.), Quantum Concepts in Space and Time, Oxford Univ. Press, Oxford, 1985.
22 A.B.Komar, Int. J. Theor. Phys., 2, 157.
23 A.B.Komar, Semantic foundation of the quantization program, in M. Bunge (ed.), Studies in the Foundations, Methodology and Philosophy of
Science, Vol. 4, Problems in the Foundations of Physics, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1971.
24 R.Wald, General Relativity, Chicago Univ. Press, Chicago, 1984.
25 R.Penrose and W.Rindler, Spinors and Space-Time, Vol. 2; Spinor and Twistor Methods in Space-Time Geometry, Cambridge Univ. Press,
Cambridge, 1986.
26 D.R.Hofstadter, Gdel, Escher, Bach: an External Golden Braid, Harvester Press, Hassocks, Sussex, 1979.
27 A.M.Turing, Computing machinery and intelligence, Mind, 59 (1950); also in A.T.Anderson (ed.), Minds and Machines, McGraw-Hill, New York,
1978.
28 J.R.Searle, in D.R.Hofstadter and D.C.Dennett (eds.), The Minds I, Harvester Press, Hassocks, Sussex, 1981.
29 M.B.Pour-El and I.Richards, Adv. in Math., 39, 21539 (1981)
30 M.B.Pour-El and I.Richards, Adv. in Maths., 48, 4474 (1983).

7
Macroscopic quantum objects
T.D.Clark School of Mathematical and Physical Sciences, University of Sussex
I first met David Bohm in the early spring of 1976. At the time I had the idea that, given suitable experimental conditions, certain kinds of superconducting
circuits should display manifestly quantum mechanical behaviour over macroscopic length scales. I hoped that such circuits would provide a new
experimental vehicle for investigating quantum mechanics. David Bohm was, and is, one of the great authorities on the foundations of quantum mechanics
so it seemed natural that I should seek his advice. I found him very approachable and he listened with great patience to my attempts to explain my still
rather rudimentary physical views of these circuits. His encouragement then was a great morale booster for our group at Sussex. Eventually we were able
to justify that encouragement. We now have superconducting circuits roughly a centimetre across which behave as single quantum objects. I would like to
think that in due course these circuits will be of use in testing some of David Bohms remarkable ideas concerning the nature of quantum mechanics.

The superconducting state

In 1956 Cooper1 demonstrated that the existence of an arbitrarily small net attractive interaction between the conduction electrons of a metal leads
inevitably to the formation of states of bound pairs of electrons. Subsequently Bardeen, Cooper and Schrieffer2 showed that such an attractive interaction
could indeed exist in a metal. Pairs of electrons can interact attractively via the lattice ions. This attractive interaction is maximised when the pairing
process occurs between

electrons of opposite momenta and spin. Although single electrons are fermions, paired electrons can be treated as bosons. These Cooper-pair bosons
can, through Bose-Einstein statistics, occupy a single quantum state extending over a macroscopic distance. In this state, which we identify with
superconductivity, all the electron pairs have the same centre of mass momentum. It is useful to consider the creation of the superconducting state in terms
of pair overlap. The electron-lattice-electron interaction which leads to the formation of Cooper pairs is very weak and only has observable consequences
at low temperatures. The very small binding energy means on average the paired electrons are a large distance apart, roughly 105 cm in a typical
superconductor. Compared with a single electron in a normal metal, an electron pair in a superconductor occupies a large volume. However, it can only
do so by co-existing in that same volume with approximately 106 other pairs3. Obviously there exists a large overlap of the wave functions of the Cooper
pairs. This dictates that the phases of these wave functions should be locked together over macroscopic length scales. This macroscopic phase coherence,
which forces different points in a superconductor to have built-in phase relations, has far-reaching consequences.

Multiply connected superconductors

One consequence of macroscopic phase coherence in superconductors appears to be that a state which is, in principle, many-bodied can be represented
by a single particle wave function, i.e. a single macroscopic wave function for a very large number of particles. This can be written as4:

[1]

The concept of a macroscopic single-particle wave function describing the correlated behaviour of a very large number of superconducting pairs leads
directly to the requirement for lossless diamagnetic screening currents to flow in the surface region of a superconductor in the presence of an external
applied magnetic field5. The characteristic distance over which external magnetic fields are screened in a superconductor is known as the London
penetration depth (L)6.
With the simple wave function [1] in mind, it is instructive to consider the case of a superconducting ring with a thickness large compared with L. In
order to keep the wave function single-valued at every point within the ring the phase () of the wave function [1] must change by zero or integer (n)2
along a path around the ring inside the bulk superconductor. This integer n is known as the winding number of the superconducting ring.
Given the single-particle wave function [1] and the quantum-mechanical probability current density equation expressed in terms of

an effective charge of 2e, an effective mass of twice the electronic mass (me) and the vector potential

of any ambient magnetic field :

[2]

it is easy to show3 that if the above phase-quantisation condition holds, then any magnetic flux () threading the ring must be quantised as:

[3]

where 0=h/2e is the superconducting flux quantum.

Flux quantisation in thick superconducting rings is now a very well established experimental fact7. As a phenomenon, however, it is of limited use since,
for the case of a uniformly thick ring, the flux state can only be changed by warming the ring through its superconducting transition temperature, followed
by cooling in a different ambient magnetic field. Fortunately another method exists for changing flux states which avoids this tedious procedure.
In 1962 Josephson invented what is now known generically as the superconducting weak link8. In its simplest form the weak link consists of a tapered
constriction roughly a few hundred angstroms across at its narrowest section. This corresponds closely to the penetration depth L in a superconductor.
With dimensions as small as this, it is relatively easy for magnetic flux to leak across the weak link and, as we have shown9,10, this leakage takes place as
a quantum mechanical process. Thus, in this context, we can consider a weak link as a device which couples together quantum mechanically different flux
states of a superconducting ring.
From the above discussion it is clear that the integer (n0, n=0, 1, 2) flux states exist in a quantum mechanical sense as macroscopically
different states of a thick superconducting ring. These states, which have no classical analogue, are a consequence of the macroscopic quantum behaviour
of the ring. In describing the behaviour of the thick ring it is useful to define the total included flux, which must be quantised as n0, in terms of an
externally applied magnetic x so that:

[4]

where is the geometric inductance of the ring and Is is the super-conducting diamagnetic screening current flowing in the ring.
The magnetic energy storage in the ring is just:

[5]

so from [4]:

[6]

Thus we can write a time-independent Schrdinger equation for the thick ring:

[7]

where Dn is the amplitude for the ring to be in the n0th flux state. As can be seen from Figure 7.1, the energies En(x) are a set of intersecting, but nonconnecting, parabolas. Since for a thick ring there exists no mechanism for coupling different n states together, no transitions can occur between these
parabolas, even at the points where they cross one another. The situation changes radically when a weak link is included in the ring. In this case two
limiting regimes can be discerned, depending on the strength of the coupling between integer flux states provided by the weak link. We will consider each
in turn.

Figure 7.1 Plot of external magnetic flux (x) dependent energy levels for a thick superconducting ring with trapped flux 0, 0 ,
20 n0 .

The flux mode regimeweak coupling between nearest-neighbour flux states of a superconducting
weak link ring
It is convenient to consider a thick superconducting ring incorporating a weak link constriction as an inductor enclosing a weak link capacitor C, as
shown in Figure 7.2(a). In this model it is assumed that charge can move through the weak link in integer units of q=2e and flux can move across the
weak link in integer units of 0, both processes being quantum mechanical in nature. For this weak link ring treated as a single macroscopic quantum
object, the canonically conjugate variables are the magnetic flux threading through the ring and
effectively the charge at the weak link11. Thus:

Figure 7.2 (a) Idealised representation of a weak link ring, (b) Leaky inductor/capacitor circuit model of a weak link ring.

[8]

which implies the uncertainty relation:

[9]

The role of these conjugate variables can best be explained by example. Let us again consider the thick superconducting ring. Here, the flux is extremely
well defined and localised at discrete values of n0. To see what has happened to the charge we can imagine making a cut across the ring of infinitely
narrow section (Figure 7.2(b)) such that C. It follows that charge on either side of this cut must be ill-defined since quantum-mechanical pair transfer
processes (0, q, 2q Nq) can occur across the cut up to extremely high order in N. This is equivalent to saying that macroscopic screening
supercurrents can flow in the ring. Thus, from a quantum-mechanical viewpoint, as implied by [9], precise quantisation of flux in units of

0=h/2e will only be observed in circumstances where charge can be completely delocalised around the ring; that is, for the case of the thick
superconducting ring.
Rigid quantisation of flux cannot be maintained when a weak link constriction is incorporated in the ring since, by definition, this constriction is made
small enough in section to allow quantum-mechanical coupling between different flux states of the ring. For a relatively large cross section constriction we
can arrange for nearest neighbour coupling [n0(n1)0] to be dominant. If we assume that the matrix element for this nearest neighbour coupling is
where /4 is the quantum-mechanical frequency for the transfer of 0 bundles of flux across the weak link, then, for small , we can write a
matrix equation for all such nearest-neighbour couplings of the form:

[10]

which yields the x-dependent ground-state energy of the weak link ring.

Figure 7.3 (a) Ground-state energy band E versus x in the flux mode shown for
dependence dE/dx versus x for the ground-state energy band (a).

(b) Screening current

In Figure 7.3(a) we show the ground-state energy, periodic in 0, as a function of x, computed using a small value of
As can be
seen, the introduction of a weak link into the ring creates a splitting at the crossing points of the energy parabolas in Figure 7.1. It can also be seen that for
small coupling between adjacent flux states is only important close to the maxima in E versus x, at which points an amplitude superposition (e.g.
) exists between these macroscopically different quantum-mechanical states of the ring. In any one of the almost parabolic sections
between these maxima the flux state of the weak link ring is rather well defined and localised about a particular value of n0. As implied by [9], this
requires that the weak link constriction is large enough in cross-section to accommodate a macroscopic screening current; that is, quantum-mechanical
pair-charge transfer processes Nq can take place through the weak link up to very high order in N. This is demonstrated very clearly in Figure 7.3(b),
where the screening super-current
is plotted as a function of the external applied flux x, as calculated from the ground-state
energy E(x) of Figure 7.3(a). The screening current response Is(x), shown in Figure 7.3(b), is necessarily the sum of harmonics12 such that:

[11]

In terms of the uncertainty relation [9], if the flux threading the ring inductor is relatively well defined about discrete values of n0, the charge on the weak
link capacitor must be a superposition of a large number of integer pair-charge states. This is clearly not in the limit of weak link behaviour, as defined by
Josephson8, where only nearest-neighbour superpositions
are considered. In the flux mode limit (small
couplings) we can therefore treat the charge Q as continuous (i.e. no longer discrete) and write a wave function in terms of an angular displacement
=2Q/q as:

[12]

which, from [1], yields for the ground-state energy a Schrdinger equation of the form:

[13]

We note, first, that [13] is not the Schrdinger equation, based on the Josephson definition of weak link behaviour, which has been used previously to
calculate the properties of weak link rings operating in the flux mode regime10, and, second, that [13] contains just one cosine in the potential.
Equations [10] and [13] yield only the ground-state energy. To find the weakly-excited states we must consider the quantised oscil-

lator modes of the weak link ring. If the effective capacitance of the weak link is C then these oscillator modes are created at a frequency:

[14]

Thus, neglecting the zero-point energy, we can introduce a new energy (from [6]):

[15]

If, in the flux-mode limit, flux can move in or out of the ring in units of 0 while at the same time the photon number can change from m to m, with
coupling Cmm, the matrix equation for all possible nearest-neighbour flux-state couplings now becomes:

[16]

where:

[17]

is a dimensionless parameter, and the combinatorial factors arise because photons are identical bosons.
The energies calculated from [16] form a set of bands in x space, with periodicity 0 and band number . It can be seen that n and m are no longer
good quantum numbers and are replaced as such by the band number . The ground state and first two excited state energy bands (E(x) versus x,
=1, 2 and 3) are shown in Figure 7.4 for a choice of small and c
and =0.5. The effect of the ringoscillator mode photons is to create ever more complex band patterns as the band number is increased. Again, the expectation value of the
macroscopic screening super-current flowing around the ring is just:

[18]

and the ring magnetic susceptibility for a particular band is given by:

[19]

Observation of the flux-space band structure of a weak link ringquasi-static method

Although it is apparent that an observation of flux-space energy bands, examples of which are given in Figure 7.4, would constitute incontrovertible
evidence for the operation of quantum mechanics on

the macroscopic level, the actual experimental techniques required to make such an observation have turned out to be very demanding in terms of
electronic technology. The principal technical problem is easy to appreciate. We are dealing with an electronic device, the weak-link ring, which displays
quantised energy levels with separations of a few hundred GHz. In order to probe this energy level structure electronically the measurement system (i.e.
the electronics external to the weak link ring) noise temperature must be reduced to ~ few K over a large band-width (nominally DC to 1012 Hz).
Fortunately, with modern liquid-helium cooled electronics, based on gallium arsenide (GaAs) devices, this is now a perfectly practicable proposition.

Figure 7.4 Energy bands E versus x for the ground state and first two excited states (=1, 2 and 3) of a superconducting
weak link ring with
and A=0.5.

The experimental techniques we have devised to look at flux-space band structure do not require transitions to be made between bands. Instead, we
have been able to use very low energy methods which allow us, in effect, to monitor the first and second derivatives of a particular band energy as a
function of x, while the weak link ring remains in this band. This can be achieved because the quantum object (the weak link ring) can be made larger
than the measurement apparatus to which it is coupled. In this section we describe a quasi-static technique which allows us to monitor the in-band
magnetic susceptibility (x), proportional to the second derivative
of the band energy.
Consider, first, a coil inductor, of inductance Lt, at a generalised temperature T. For convenience electronically, this inductor is narrow-banded by
means of a capacitor connected in parallel. If the centre frequency of this tuned (tank) circuit is R, such that
then the magnetic flux noise in
the inductor, integrated over the band pass of the tank circuit, is just:

[20]

If the tank circuit inductor is coupled to the weak link ring through a mutual inductance Mts, such that, as usually defined, the coupling coefficient between
tank circuit and ring is:

then the flux noise in the inductor is now given by9,10

[21]

In practice we always measure a mean-square noise voltage across the tank circuit. From [18], [19] and [21] this is given by:

[22]

Figure 7.5 Block diagram of the UHF (430 MHz) receiver used for noise spectroscopy (magnetic susceptibility) experiments.

The extremely low noise receiver we use to monitor such voltage fluctuations is shown in block form in Figure 7.5. For technical reasons concerned with
the fabrication of transistors and diodes which can operate effectively at liquid helium temperatures, we have chosen 430 MHz as the centre frequency for
this receiver. Using state-of-the-art microwave GaAs field-effect transistors (GaAs FETs) and variable-capacitance diodes, we have been able to achieve
an in-band noise temperature at the tank circuit of a few K; that is, comparable with the condensed-matter temperature of the weak link ring (4.2 K). The

receiver consists of a chain of three UHF amplifiers, operating at temperatures of 4.2 K, 77 K and room temperature ( 300 K), respectively. Each
amplifier has electronically-adjustable matching networks, incorporating GaAs varactor diodes, on the input and output. The power gain and approximate
in-band noise temperature of each amplifier stage is given in Figure 7.5. As can be seen, UHF circulators are provided for in-band isolation (40 dB)
between the second- and third-stage amplifiers and the third-stage amplifier and the UHF mixer. Broad-band attenuation is provided between each
amplifier stage (not shown) and between the third-stage amplifier and the mixer. Very careful attention is paid in this receiver system to properly
terminating, in a broad-band sense, the output terminal of the mixer. Without due care being taken over this detail, we find that the noise temperature of
the receiver can easily increase by an order of magnitude. In addition, we arrange for both the cryogenically-cooled and room-temperature receiver
electronics to be extremely well-shielded electromagnetically, effectively from ~ 1 Hz upwards. As a further precaution against unwanted external noise
being injected into the tank circuit (and hence the weak-link ring), all active devices used in the receiver system (e.g. GaAs FETs and GaAs diodes) are
powered by very-low-noise FET-based power supplies, operated from car batteries. This combination of broad-band (roughly a few MHz to > 3 GHz)
reverse isolation, very-low-noise amplifiers and effective electromagnetic shielding and power-supply noise-reduction techniques leads to an all-up broadband receiver-noise temperature at the tank circuit of approximately a few K. In practice this receiver-noise temperature is only maintained if we use an
extremely stable UHF local oscillator, with a few parts in 1010 frequency stability.
The experimental method used by us to monitor the magnetic susceptibility of the weak link ring is very simple. We adjust all the matching stages and
GaAs FET gate-bias voltages in the UHF amplifier chain for minimum noise temperature. We then plot the mean-square noise voltage
developed in the tank circuit as a function of a very-slowly-varying external applied flux, XDC. Typically, this flux will increase (or decrease) by one flux
quantum over a time scale of 10 to 30 seconds. The UHF-receiver output is displayed in a small bandwidth (DC to a few Hz) on a standard X-versustime plotter. Susceptibility patterns extending over 10 to 20 0 of external bias flux, both positive and negative, are then plotted over time periods of up to
10 minutes.
In Figures 7.6(a), 7.6(b) and 7.6(c) we show noise-voltage data for the ground state and first and second excited-state bands (=1, 2 and 3) taken
using a niobium point-contact weak link constriction ring9,10. As XDC is changed it can be seen that these susceptibility patterns, which are observed on
a larger static noise-voltage background, repeat themselves with 0 periodicity. Experimentally, these

Figure 7.6 Experimental noise

spectroscopy patterns (band-magnetic susceptibilities) for the ground state (=1) and
first two excited state (=2 and 3) flux-space bands; receiver centre frequency is 430 MHz; post-detection
bandwidth is DC to a few Hz and T=4.2 K; periodicity=0 . Scale for the mean square voltage shown in units of
1011 V2 .

susceptibility patterns display no hysteresis; that is, when XDC is reversed, even over large ranges in bias flux, these patterns super-impose up
themselves. This must be the case if the weak link ring is maintaining itself in a single band. Within the practical limitations imposed by our existing UHF
receiver system, we find that the weak link ring can remain stably in a particular band for a period as long as 10 minutes, although this time may be much
shorter (~30 seconds). A transition is then made to an adjacent band. We assume that such transitions are caused by the absorption or emission of
millimetre wave photons of energy comparable to the separation between the low-lying weak link ring bands
. Even with all the care we have
taken in shielding, isolation and low-noise amplification, and given the poor coupling configuration of the weak link ring to millimetre-wave radiation, the
stability of the ring in these first few energy bands is remarkable.
In Figures 7.7(a), 7.7(b) and 7.7(c) we show the theoretical best-fit band-susceptibility patterns for the ground state and first two excited states of the
ring. This best fit is achieved for
and =0.5. The energy bands corresponding to the magnetic susceptibilities of
Figure 7.7 have already been presented in Figure 7.4. The correspondence between the experimental and theoretical susceptibility patterns is striking. We
note that quite substantial changes in (0.50.2) have little effect on the theoretical susceptibility patterns of Figure 7.7 For each pattern
and
which means that we can observe the ring in one of its eigenstates without causing a transition between states. This is a direct consequence of the
essential measurement apparatus; that is, the tank circuit, being smaller than the quantum object, the weak link ring. In a practical arrangement the tankcircuit coil inductor is actually placed inside the weak link ring13. As far as we are aware, this non-invasive probing of a single-quantum mechanical object
by a macroscopic apparatus constitutes a radical departure from conventional approaches to the problem of measurement in quantum systems. In this
context it is apparent from the susceptibility patterns of Figure 7.6 that, using non-invasive measurement techniques, it is perfectly practicable to observe a
macroscopic quantum object in an amplitude superposition of macroscopically different states. For the case of the weak link ring of Figure 7.6, these
macroscopically different states are the quantised magnetic-flux states which we deliberately do not choose to measure. This, therefore, provides one
experimental retort to the often-posed paradox of Schrdingers cat14, although, of course, a superconducting weak link ring is an extraordinarily
coherent object compared with a room-temperature cat.

Figure 7.7 Theoretical =1, 2 and 3 in band magnetic susceptibility patterns (a), (b) and (c) calculated from [16] using
and =0.5. Susceptibility scale for each band as indicated.

Observation of the flux-space band structure of a weak link ringdynamical method

The circuit shown as a block diagram in Figure 7.5 can form the basis for a particular version of the well-known AC-biased superconducting quantum
interference device (SQUID) magnetometer13. The only requirements for turning this system into a SQUID magnetometer are, first, that a high-frequency
(AC) current IIN be injected into the tank circuit from an external current source and, second, that this current source be frequency- and phase-locked to
the local oscillator source. AC in this context is generally taken to mean a frequency range from a few MHz to roughly 0.5 GHz. The system now
operates as a phase-sensitive detector (PSD) at the frequency of the AC input. The response of the coupled weak link ring-tank circuit combination to the
injected current IIN is monitored via the AC voltage VOUT developed across the tank circuit. In a PSD SQUID magnetometer the phase difference
between VOUT and IIN can be adjusted by means of an AC phase shifter incorporated into the local oscillator arm of the system. In simple AC-biased
SQUID magnetometers the PSD system is dispensed with and the amplified SQUID signal VOUT is displayed directly after diode detection15,16.
When a high-frequency current is injected into the tank circuit a high-frequency magnetic flux is generated in the tank-circuit coil. This flux couples to
the weak link ring, which in response sets up a circulating screening supercurrent. If we know the form of this screening current, that is, its dependence on
the external flux with the weak link ring in a particular energy band, it is possible to calculate quantum mechanically the dynamical (VOUT versus IIN)
characteristics of the ring-tank circuit combination. This requires that the current IIN be amplitude-modulated so that its peak amplitude increases linearly
with time. In a practical magnetometer IIN cannot increase without limit, so a triangular amplitude modulation is invariably adopted. The frequency of this
amplitude modulation is always kept very small compared with the AC carrier frequency.
To take one example, the quantum-mechanical expression for the rf cycle average in-phase VOUT versus IIN characteristic (VOUT at zero phase with
respect to IIN) with the ring operating in a single-flux mode band ( small) is given by17:

[23]

where Is is the x-dependent screening current in a given flux mode band, Q is the quality factor of the unloaded tank circuit, and =Mts/Lt . For a static
applied flux XDC and an AC flux XAC coupled to the ring, the argument of the screening current
is

where XAC is the flux felt by the ring due to the rf current in the tank circuit. The interaction between the tank circuit and the ring re-normalises the
impedances of both, changing to
and shifting the resonant frequency of the tank circuit from R to
In [23] is the
phase of the unrenormalised tank circuit impedence at frequency r.

Figure 7.8 Theoretical dynamical flux mode in phase VOUT versus IIN characteristics calculated from [16] and [23] for: (a)
XDC=n0 ; and (b)
.

In Figures 7.8(a) and 7.8(b) we show the ground-state flux-band dynamical characteristics for the two DC flux states (XDC=n0 and
) with the weak link ring ground-state (=1) energy band as given in Figure 7.4(
and =0.5). In
this calculation we have used a value of
which is very typical for the inductances (, Lt and Mts) and quality factor found in practical AC13
biased SQUID magnetometers . The screening current
used in this calculation is shown in Figure 7.3(b). The effect of the DC flux XDC is to shift
the origin for the amplitude modulated AC flux, XAC. For the
state this leads to a cusp in VOUT appearing at

the origin in IIN, corresponding to the weak link ring biased on one of the maxima in E versus X (Figure 7.3(a)).
In Figures 7.9(a) and 7.9(b) we show experimental lowest band in phase VOUT versus IIN characteristics for an ultra-low-noise SQUID
magnetometer, operating at 430 MHz, with an amplifier chain frequency bandwidth of 50 MHz, and based on the circuit of Figure 7.5. This
magnetometer uses a niobium point-contact constriction weak-link ring13,15 which is maintained at a helium bath temperature of 4.2 K. The effect of
changing the DC bias flux from n0 (Figure 7.9(a)) to
(Figure 7.9(b)) is:
1 to invert the triangular features in the characteristic; and
2 to create a cusp feature in VOUT at the current origin following closely the theoretical characteristics of Figure 7.8.
Although the features displayed in the VOUT versus IIN characteristics of this very high performance magnetometer are roughly triangular in shape, as is to
be expected if the flux transitions in the weak-link ring take place quantum mechanically, the more familiar SQUID steps are easily recovered18. This can
be achieved in two ways. First, if the frequency bandwidth of the UHF SQUID electronics is restricted sufficiently, the higher harmonics associated with
the triangular features are lost and all that can be seen experimentally are positively-sloped steps. Second, if noise of sufficient amplitude is injected into
the tank circuit the triangular features are again washed out into steps. This arises because, from an electrical-circuit model viewpoint, these noise
fluctuations create jitter in the times at which flux transitions occur in any particular cycle of the externally generated AC flux19. It is noteworthy that within
the quasi-classical treatment of the AC-biased SQUID magnetometer, where quantum mechanical flux transition processes are not taken into account, the
concept of a shunt resistor R, in parallel with the weak link super-current channel, has to be introduced in order to generate these step features20,21. Thus,
in this treatment the dynamical behaviour of the weak link ring is described in terms of a quasi-classical non-linear equation of motion:

[24]

where the potential is:

[25]

Ic is the critical current of the weak link (that is, the current required to drive the link normal) and is the included flux in the ring.

Figure 7.9 Experimental in phase VOUT versus IIN characteristics for a flux mode 430 MHz bias SQUID magnetometer at
T=4.2 K for: (a) XDC=n0 ; and (b)
. Amplifier chain bandwidth 50 MHz, rf amplitude
modulation frequency 100 kHz.

The resistively-shunted junction (RSJ) model, where the shunt resistor R acts as a Nyquist noise source, has played a very important role in the
development of weak link physics22. However, from the viewpoint of weak link rings, this electrical-circuit model really only parameterises the limitations
in the performance of the SQUID magnetometer electronic system. The normal dissipation occurs in the finite Q-tank circuit and this is included in the
quantum mechanical expression [23] for the magnetometer VOUT versus IIN characteristic.
It is worth comparing the lowest-band dynamical characteristics of Figure 7.9 with the experimental susceptibility patterns of Figure 7.6. Again, we are
making a radically different kind of measurement on a single-quantum object simply because this object is larger than the classical circuit measurement
apparatus. In this dynamical experiment we monitor the screening current in the weak link. We do not, at any time, make a measurement to decide which
macroscopically different flux state the ring is in. What we are seeing in both the SQUID magnetometer and susceptibility experiments is the effect of a
macroscopic quantum object on a classical measurement apparatus while this objectthe weak link ringremains in an eigenstate of the system.

The charge mode regimecoupling between all possible flux states of a superconducting weak link
ring
We have seen that it is possible to incorporate a weak link in a thick superconducting ring so that, to lowest order, quantum transitions are only made
between nearest-neighbour flux states of the ring [n0(n 1)0]. This requires that macroscopic screening currents should be able to flow around the
ring and, as we have pointed out, this cannot correspond to the Josephson limit of weak link behaviour. We now consider the conjugate mode of a
superconducting weak link ring, where the link is small enough in cross-section to couple all possible flux states of the ring together; that is, couplings
n0(n, 1,2, 3)0 are allowed up to very high order in the number of flux quanta transferred. The ring is now in an amplitude superposition of all
possible flux states so that the flux in the ring is extremely ill-defined. From the uncertainty relation [9] this implies that charge, in units of q=2e, should
become well defined (localised) at the weak link. This limit, which we shall term the charge mode, constitutes the macroscopic quantum-mechanical state
of a weak link ring conjugate to the flux mode described by the matrix equations [10] and [13]. By comparison with the quantised flux states of a
superconducting ring, we can imagine the weak link capacitor possessing instantaneous polarisation states of different integer (N)q

charge, where N=0, 1, 2etc., from which we can build up a matrix description of the charge mode by analogy with [10]. If we assume
1 to lowest order, only weak nearest neighbour Nq(N1)q coupling between the localised pair-charge states on the weak link capacitor need be
considered;
2 an amplitude AN for the weak link to be in the Nqth polarisation state;
3 a quantum-mechanical transition frequency between these polarisation states of v/4; and
4 an energy storage on the weak link capacitor of:

[26]

where:

[27]

Given that Qx is the displacement charge on the capacitor, so that:

[28]

then the matrix equation for all nearest-neighbour couplings is just:

[29]

For relatively small values of (compared with q2/C), equation [29] yields a ground-state charge band in displacement charge (Qx) analogous to the
flux-space (x) ground-state band of Figure 7.3(a)23,24. This ground-state charge band, calculated from [29] for
is shown in Figure
7.10(a). The screening voltage for this band, defined as:

[30]

with electric susceptibility:

[31]

is shown in Figure 7.10(b).

By analogy with the screening current in the flux mode (equation [11]), the screening voltage response on the weak link capacitor, due to an externally
generated Qx, is the sum of harmonics:
as is obvious from Figure 7.10(b).
Again, by analogy with [12] and [13], in this charge mode limit (small v, Nq(N1)q couplings) we can treat the flux as continu-

Figure 7.10 (a) Ground-state energy band E versus Qx in the charge-mode shown for
dependence dE/dQx versus Qx for the ground-state energy band (a).

(b) screening voltage

ous (no longer discrete) and write a wave function in terms of an angular displacement =27/0 as25,26:

[33]

which generates, through [29], a Schrdinger equation for the ground state in this charge mode of the form:

[34]

When Qx is set to zero, [34] is just the quantum mechanical form of the well-known Josephson pendulum equation8,10,24. As with [13], equation [34]
contains just one cosine in the potential. This cosine, together with the magnetic energy storage term (x)2/2, constitute the potential adopted in the
quasi-classical description of a superconducting weak link ring, as given by [24] and [25]. We can

rewrite [34] explicitly in terms of flux, including a magnetic energy storage term and, again, with Qx=0, as27,28:

[35]

It is possible to solve [35] to yield energy levels E(x), =1,2,3..., and magnetic susceptibilities:

which correspond to the patterns shown in Figure 7.6, for a particular choice of v 10. Now, from a quantum mechanical viewpoint [34], and hence [25],
can only be arrived at by assuming an amplitude superposition of all possible flux states of the ring; that is, in the charge mode or the Josephson limit of
weak link behaviour. This is a contradiction in terms since flux-mode descriptions, either quantum mechanical (equations [10] and [13]) or quasi-classical
(equations [24] and [25]) are concerned with the situation where the flux states of a weak link ring are relatively well-defined about the values n0 (n=0,
1, 2etc.) and macroscopic screening supercurrents can flow around the ring. From our previous arguments a better description of a flux-mode weak
link ring should develop, starting with charge-mode equation [34], if we introduce higher harmonics into the potential. Our trial flux mode Schrdinger
equation then takes the form:

[36]

We are now actively investigating solutions of [36].

Observation of the charge space band structure of a weak link ringdynamical method
The analogy between equations [10] and [29], which yield, respectively, the ground-state energy bands in external flux and displacement charge space,
leads directly to an experimental method for investigating the charge-band behaviour of a weak link enclosed by a superconducting ring. In the chargemode limit we can treat the ring simply as an inductive element to couple a time-dependent magnetic flux across the weak link. We can then use a SQUID
magnetometer system as we have already described (Figure 7.5) to probe charge-band behaviour dynamically. Assuming that the weak link is operating
in a single charge mode band, the quantum mechanical expression for the rf cycle average in phase VOUT versus I1N characteristic is given by 17,29:

[37]

Here, Lt, , R, r and have the same meanings as in [23]. The coupling coefficient is, as before:

Vs is the (Qx-dependent screening voltage in a given charge band (see [30]), with an argument:

where
is the static bias displacement charge corresponding to the magnetic flux x in [23]. As in this flux-mode dynamical expression, the coupling
of the quantum mechanical weak link ring to the dissipative external-circuit oscillator mode of the tank circuit is taken into account rigorously in the
charge-mode equation [37].
Examination of [23] and [37] shows that a scaling factor of R0:q/C exists between the flux mode and the charge mode. Thus, although for =v both
[23] and [37] yield precisely the same features in the ground-state band VOUT versus IIN characteristics, the scale of these features in voltage and current
are very different. For example, with C=1015 F10,30 and R/2 in the 10 to 100 MHz

Figure 7.11 Large dynamic range rf SQUID electronics system for charge-mode dynamics with diode detector and static-bias
displacement-charge subcircuit shown.

range, this sets the charge-mode features (that is, triangles) approximately 100 to 1,000 times larger in voltage and current than the conjugate flux mode
features.
Charge-mode effects have only been observed very recently29,31 and the experimental problem in their realisation appears to have been one of scale,
as we have just described. We have, in fact, found it very easy to set up niobium point contacts with small enough cross sections (L)29 to exhibit
charge-mode behaviour. However, the standard arrangement of AC-biased SQUID electronics13,18,30 lacks the dynamic range required to observe this
behaviour. In practice the dynamic range of both the input rf current source and the output amplifier stages of the SQUID system must be increased by a
factor

Figure 7.12 Diode detected charge-mode VOUT versus IIN characteristics for: (a)
Qx=q/2 with T=4.2 K, R/2=30 MHz and flux-mode scalings as indicated.

(b) Qx=q/4; and (c)

Figure 7.13 (a) Radio frequency ( R /2=30 MHz) in phase VOUT versus IIN charge mode characteristic for Qx=q/2 plotted at
T=1.5 K showing ground-state behaviour, (b) Theoretical in-phase VOUT versus IIN charge-mode characteristic for
Qx=q/2 calculated from [29] and [37] with

of up to 1,000. The design of a SQUID electronics system, developed for charge-mode work, is shown in block form in Figure 7.11. This electronics is
set up for diode detection but can easily be rearranged to become a phase-sensitive system. The static bias displacement charge
is provided by
means of the 3 H coil coupled to the weak link ring.
In Figure 7.12(a), (b) and (c) we show charge-mode characteristics for
set at 0, q/4 and q/2, respectively29,31. The scale corresponding
to flux mode features is as indicated. The niobium point contact, set in a two-hole niobium block 15, is of the usual mechanically-stabilised and thermallyoxidised variety13. The actual adjustment of the point contact weak link is made in situ in the cryostat at 4.2 K. The weak link ring is coupled to an rf
tank circuit at 30 MHz. The output signal from this tank circuit is amplified and then diode detected. This detection technique is well known to be
noisy13,30,31; it also provides no phase information. The outcome is that the triangular features predicted by [37] are washed out into steps19,31. Even so,
knowing the inductance (3 H) of the static-bias displacement-charge coil and the amplitude and modulation frequency of the current input to this coil, we
can estimate the capacitance C of the weak link29,31, provided the charge mode periodicity in Qx space is q=2e. For a range of input current modulation
frequencies we find C (average)=1.11015 F. We have used this technique, at various cryostat temperatures, to determine the capacitance of a whole
series of charge-mode limited point-contact weak link. We find capacitances ranging from a few 1016 F to a few 1015 F.
In Figure 7.13(a) we provide one example of what can be achieved in terms of VOUT versus IIN charge-mode characteristics using a well-defined lownoise phase-sensitive detection system, again operating at an rf frequency (R/2) of 30 MHz, but this time at a cryostat temperature of 1.5 K. The
characteristic shown corresponds to a staticbias displacement-charge of q/2. In Figure 7.13(b) we show the inphase VOUT versus IIN characteristic
calculated from [37], assuming that the weak link is operating in the ground-state charge band. Here, Qx=q/2,
and
as
shown in Figure 7.10(a). The expression [37] predicts a spike at the origin of the Qx=q/2 characteristic in Figure 7.13(b). This appears not to be resolved
in Figure 7.13(a) (cf. Figure 7.9(b) for the
flux-mode characteristic) but the origin does move up and down weakly and periodically on the
VOUT axis with changing Qx.

Charge-mode effects in a normal ring containing a superconducting weak link

Although we have chosen to consider the canonically conjugate roles of magnetic flux and charge in a thick superconducting ring containing a weak link,
this quantum mechanical description can be carried over to the case of a superconducting weak link enclosed in a normal metal ring. The concept still
holds that for small enough cross sections flux can be transferred quantum mechanically back and forth across the weak link in units of 0,
20n0. Thus equation [29], which yields the ground-state charge-band energy, is not dependent on the weak link being contained within a
superconducting ring. Magnetic flux is still confined when the ring is normal, at least on a time scale short compared with the circuit time constant of the
ring (/R, where R is the resistance of the normal section).
We have started to investigate the rf behaviour of niobium point-contact weak links incorporated in normal copper rings. We find that these hybrid
rings, operated at frequencies between 17 and 30 MHz, display perfectly good SQUID charge mode VOUT versus IIN characteristics which are split in
the usual way by a static bias displacement charge (Qx). We have not observed flux mode behaviour in these hybrid rings. The obvious difference
between the normal copper and superconducting niobium ring devices is that for the former the Qx-bias cannot be generated by currents of too small a
modulation frequency. When the inverse of this frequency becomes comparable with /R, the time-dependent bias fluxx, which is required to generate
Qx, simply leaks out through the copper ring and does not cut across the weak link.
As an example of the behaviour of hybrid rings we show in Figure 7.14 the result of our first attempt to monitor directly the ground-state charge band
of the superconducting niobium weak link. We plot the mean square noise voltage across the tank circuit coupled to the ring as a function of increasing
bias displacement charge with no rf current drive applied to the tank circuit and, from [31], observe the second derivative pattern
versus Qx
with the weak link operating in the ground-state band. This is the charge mode analogue of the noise spectroscopy technique used to plot the flux-mode
magnetic susceptibility (
equation [19], Figures 7.6 and 7.7) as a function of external applied flux x. The susceptibility spikes in Figure
7.14 , which were recorded using a linearly increasing and decreasing (triangular modulation) Qx at a frequency of 3 kHz, are somewhat truncated in height
due to band-width limitations in the charge-mode receiver system. Nevertheless, the power of the noise spectroscopy technique and the correspondence
between flux-mode and charge-mode susceptibility data (Figure 7.6(a) and Figure 7.14) are obvious.

Figure 7.14 Plot of mean square noise voltage

as a function of linearly increasing
triangular modulation
frequency to generate
set at 3 kHz; frequency band-pass for measurement 10 kHz to 100 kHz; T=1.5 K;
periodicity=q/C.

Conclusions
We have attempted to provide a systematic description of weak link ring devices treated as single macroscopic quantum objects. We have demonstrated
that within this description even these simple objects display a remarkably rich macroscopic quantum-mechanical structure. However, the usefulness of
these devices in any future study of quantum mechanics itself, and its relationship to relativity, is an area still to be explored.

Acknowledgments
I would like to thank my friends and fellow researchers at the University of Sussex, Drs R.J.Prance, J.E.Mutton, H.Prance and T.P. Spiller for making all
this work possible. I am also grateful to Dr R. Nest of the University of Copenhagen for his much appreciated collaboration with us and to Professor
A.Widom of Northeastern for his unique contribution to this subject. Our special thanks to Dr J.

Gallop of the National Physical Laboratory, Teddington, for keeping our spirits up in hard times.

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Constriction Ring, Phys. Lett. 115A, 125 (1980).
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8
Meaning and being in contemporary physics
Bernard dEspagnat Laboratoire de Physique Thorique et Particules Elmentaires, Orsay, France

1 Introduction
Anybody who intends to ponder on the foundations of contemporary physics and who feels a need for a starting point should read in parallel two
remarkable recent articles by Wheeler1 and Bell2. No experience can show more clearly than this the fact that the foundation problem does not simply
merge into what we normally call physics. For, in this latter field, we never get the impression that two mutually incompatible standpoints are both valid,
whereas this is just the queer feeling that can easily emerge from the experience in question. Indeed, although the contents of these two articles are
mutually exclusive, the articles themselves are so persuasive that we must think hard before we find an acceptable way not to take up unreservedlyat
the same timethe views expressed by both of them.
This thinking adventure differs from day-to-day physical research also in the fact that it calls for no recourse to highbrow mathematics or to long sets of
elaborate formulae. It essentially consists in trying to bring some more light into the question of the implicit views, assumptions, concepts and the like that
tacitly underlie our way of thinking and that make us agree in succession with the arguments of each article. In other words it makes us aware of the force
of Einsteins assertion that what is most basic in physics is not the mathematics but rather the set of the underlying concepts.
It is of course clear that David Bohm ranks first among the physicists of our generation who illustrated through their example the deep truth of Einsteins
maxim. Many of usincluding the present writerwere awakened from a kind of dogmatic slumber (to take up

Kants words) by reading his 1952 papers. But most certainly (as his later work shows) Bohm would, more emphatically than anybody else, advise us not
to just jump from one dogma to another. This is why we feel entitled to dedicate to him the discussion presented here.
In a way, the first of the quoted articles (although the developments of the present paper are inspired by the two authors quoted, we are quite far from
giving here a mere transcription of what they assert; hence their responsibility is not in the least involved in any statements given here which would be
unpalatable to the reader) may be considered as an explication of the main ideas of the Copenhagen group or, more precisely, of a way in which these
ideas may be given manifest internal consistency. As is well known, some of the most significant of these ideas were left in a not-completely-explicit and
even somewhat ambiguous stage by their authors. Moreover, some of them were obliterated to some extent by the considerable development of the
quantum formalism. This is because this formalism was essentially rooted in Diracs and von Neumanns works and laid thereforecompared to the
Copenhagen viewsa greater emphasis on the notion of a (microscopic) quantum state (or equivalently on that of a state preparation procedure) and
correspondingly a smaller emphasis on the consideration of the experimental conditions under which such and such a particular proposition (bearing on a
physical system) can be tested. Because he neither shuns nor conceals behind general statements the most baffling consequences of the undiluted
Copenhagen views, Wheeler gives us in his recent articles (and particularly in the one quoted) extremely valuable clues as to what the basic ideas are, on
which the view in question should be anchored if we want them to be non-ambiguous and to constitute a fully self-consistent set.
As for the Bell article, it offers both a concise and extremely clear description of what requirements a theory of independent reality can reasonably be
expected to fulfill and the basic outline of a quantum field theory which, in line with Bohms 1952 papers, actually satisfies them. As already stressed,
Wheelers and Bells conceptions and conclusions, as to what the world is and as to our relationship with whatever may be called reality, are opposite
and mutually exclusive. This, in a way, is fortunate because a challenge is thereby presented to us. Each of these two articles should help us to discover
what in the other one are the apparently obvious ideas that we too quickly took for granted.

2 A view of Wheelers article

It is not the case that every physicist who considers himself as being a supporter of the Copenhagen views will necessarily agree with the content of
Wheelers article. In the opinion of many among these

scientists, the Copenhagen views are based on the assertion that the classical or macroscopic objects and events exist in some absolute sense which is
in no need of being defined. Indeed, trying to define it, or even trying to speak about it, would (so they think) be idle talk. Or if it is not, if such a task is
not entirely meaningless, at least it is one which, in their opinion, can and should be entirely left to the philosophers. They then claim that we should not try
to speak of the quantum objects by themselves and that any valid description of the quantum phenomena must be anchored on the notion of these
obviously existing objects and events (and in particular on the two closely related notions of complete experimental set up and of conditions of
observation so often appearing in Niels Bohrs works). Such a conception may conveniently be called macro-objectivism; and we may then assert that
many theoretical physicists identify the Copenhagen view with a special case of macro-objectivism.
Now, macro-objectivism is a view which works very well in practice but which meets with conceptual difficulties that are actually quite serious. The
most conspicuous of these is that it seems unavoidable to consider macroscopic objects as ultimately composed of microscopic, i.e. quantum, ones. And
one of the notions which one was trying to discard, namely the notion of quantum objects existing in some absolute sense independently of the conditions
of observation, seems thereby to be inescapably creeping back. Closely related with this difficulty is the one that macro-objectivism seems to require a
rather sharp distinction to be made between classical and quantum objects (and events), whereas physics proper does not seem really to give us any clue
as to how such a distinction could be made objective in any sense that would be in harmony with the basic ideas of, precisely, macro-objectivism.
Admittedly irreversibility hasat least as regards eventsbeen considered by many authors as a good candidate for playing the role of a criterion in that
respect. But, again, it seems difficult to define irreversibility in a way which would make no reference whatsoever, not even an implicit one, to the
limitations of the abilities of the community of observers. In fact, the proposals that have been made along these lines do not seem to comply with the
requisites that, for consistency, a macro-objectivist must have in mind when he considers an objective macroscopic event. An alternative possibility,
namely the idea that quantum mechanics should only be an approximate theory, remains open. But it is not substantiated by any experimental fact and it
would be quite a new thing if a momentous scientific change were initiated neither by new findings nor by new theoretical developments but just by
considerations that can well be called philosophical about the nature of reality.
Under these conditions it seems that whoever wants to remain faithful to the letter of the Copenhagen conception should preferably not identify the
latter with macro-objectivism. Moreover it seems that

he will thus remain closer to the real spirit of the Copenhagen founding fathers. In his book Physics and Philosophy, Heisenberg, for instance, considers
that a statement can be made objective if we may consistently claim that its content does not depend on the conditions under which it can be verified.
And when he then defines several varieties of realism, he dismisses as meaningless any metaphysical realism (this is the expression he used) that would
not reduce either to what he calls practical realism or to what he calls dogmatic realism; that is, to a conception asserting that most or, respectively, all of
our meaningful statements about the material world can be made objective, in the sense just specified. Now what is most significant in this standpoint of
Heisenberg is not the distinction he makes between practical and dogmatic realisms (although this, of course, is important too). It is the very fact, first, that
this author does define what he calls objectivity and realism instead of considering that these are primary concepts and, second, that he defines them by
referring to what can actually be done. By choosing to define these terms and to define them in this way, Heisenberg in fact makes verification the
primary concept; that is, he chooses as a primary concept in science one which basically refers to the actions of men. This choice has implications which
are in fact so momentous that most of the physicists who consider themselves as agreeing with the Copenhagen viewpoint seem somehow not to have
dared taking them quite fully into account.
This however is not the case with John Wheeler. In Wheelers paper the ultimate referent is meaning, a concept for which Fllesdals definition
Meaning is the joint product of all the evidence that is available to those who communicate is taken. Another key word of this paper is phenomenon.
However let us not be abused by the fact that in current scientific language the word phenomenon is very often understood as just signifying a type of
event taking place within a reality whose concept is tacitly understood as being the ultimate referent. Wheelers sentence no phenomenon is a
phenomenon until it is an observed phenomenon very clearly dismisses this commonsense view. Indeed his phenomena should be understood in the
etymological sense (which is also the one in which Kant used the word); namely, what is observed and about which an agreement gets established
amongst the community of all people in their right mind. It is important to stress that in Wheelers paper there is no primary concept other than these two
(or just meaning if we consider that phenomenon refers to meaning). In particular, we shall not understand this article if we consider that there is
another primary concept, namely reality, tacitly underlying it. The article in question makes no use of such a concept but if it did there is no doubt that
reality would be defined relative to one of the aforenamed two concepts or to bothagain, just as is the case in Kants work. Consequently, Wheeler
urges us to abandon for the foundation of existence a physics hardware located out there

and to put in instead a meaning software located who knows where.

There is no point in reviewing Wheelers article further, except to notice that the qualitative ambiguities and difficulties mentioned above are of course
removed by such a drastic approach. In particular it is clear from the whole content of this paper that its author does not give any basic status to the
concept of irreversibility. (He does mention the notion of an irreversible act of amplification however, but it seems that he considers it as a mere
potential phenomenon, unless it is put to use to make the meaning.) For example, the splitting of a uranium nucleus, though it is called irreversible, could
be undone in principle. It then would not count as a phenomenon. Indeed, if we are right, his way of solving the well-known quantum riddle How is it
possible that mere information (that is, software) should in some cases (e.g. that of the Schrdinger cat) modify the real state of macroscopic things
(hardware)? is as follows. He answers by just denying to this postulated hardware any existence of its own. This way of solving the problem will be
analysed and discussed in the next section.

A dividing line: modal logic (necessity, counterfactuality)

It is well known that in order to make explicit and to formalize our familiar (valid or invalid, this is another question) way of thinking a number of logicians
considered that they had to supplement ordinary logic (and in particular its most elementary part, namely the propositional calculus) by introducing the
notions of necessity and of possibility, for which ordinary logic has no symbol. This gave rise to the so-called modal logic, the need of which,
although it is questioned by some, is made plausible by the observation that in ordinary logic the relation ifthen (called material implication, symbol
) does not actually play the role it is intuitively expected to play. For example it does not make it possible to identify the definition of the word
magnetic, applied to some object x, to the sentence If small iron specks are in the vicinity of x, they get attracted, for according to ordinary formal logic
this sentence is true, in particular, whenever it is the case that no small iron specks are in the vicinity of x, whatever substance x is composed ofOne
way of removing this difficulty (it is not the only way, see below) is obviously to introduce a new relation, called strict implication or entailment and
reading ifthen necessarily. We can then define magneticand more generally all the properties that can be identified to dispositional terms
(aptitudes)by sentences of the form If small iron specks are in the vicinity of x, then necessarily they are attracted.

Should all the properties of material objects be, in the last analysis, considered as dispositional terms? This is a debatable point but it seems that the
choice of a positive rather than a negative answer is the less metaphysical option since, at least, it defines properties through a reference to experience.
Unquestionablyand this is particularly obvious in quantum physicswe do not have any direct knowledge that an object has or does not have a given
property. To gain such a knowledge we must make a measurement; so that it seems appropriate to identify a property of an object with an aptitude this
object has of inducing a given definite result when subjected to a definite test (measurement). This observation has the consequence that if we choose the
strict implication procedure for defining the dispositional terms, then it is the whole realm of all the properties of objects (including even their very
existence) that must be defined this way.
This is not the proper place for describing the details and in particular the formalism of this method (see, for example, reference 3 and the references
given in reference 4). Let it be mentioned however that, in order to define in a precise way the notion of strict implication, modal logic has to introduce the
notion of possible situations (or, as they are often called, possible worlds) differing from the actual situation (or world), and has to specify that the
implication under study holds not only in the actual situation but also in all these possible situations. When applied to the definition of properties this
method obviously implies that measurements which, actually, are not done, should be considered. For example, if it is asserted that a photon has some
definite momentum p, because it has been so prepared, what is meant, according to this method, is that if a measurement (of the photon momentum),
which actually is not made, were made with the help of some appropriate instrument (which actually is not present) it would give result p. For that reason
the strict implications considered here may also be called counterfactual implications. But one point should be stressed. We must specify what the set is
of all the possible situations used in the definition. Technically this set is sometimes called the sphere of accessibility associated with the actual situation
under study. Clearly a great many physically conceivable situations should not be included in it. In classical physics, for example, if we want to
counterfactually define the fact for a system to have some given energy, quite obviously we must exclude from the corresponding sphere of accessibility all
the conceivable physical situations in which the system in question interacts with other systems in such a way that its energy is not definable.
Whenexplicitly or, more often, implicitlywe try to apply this procedure of definition to quantum mechanics (see section 4 below), the restrictions we
must impose on the sphere of accessibility are even more stringent (to avoid misunderstandings, let it be mentioned right away that the thus-obtained
description of quantum mechanics is nevertheless nearer to von Neumanns than to Bohrs views).

It should be observed that the counterfactual implication method here under study is a mere explication of a process which quite naturally and
spontaneously takes place in our mind when we speak of properties of systems, including their very existence. In fact (and in this section this is the first
point we want to make) our usual notion of a reality existing out here is essentially based on our unconscious use of the counterfactual method. My car
really exists since, even when I lie in my bed at night, I could (though I do not) look through the window and see it parked in the street. Consequently we
assert here that counterfactuality is at the root of the (almost universally held) world-view that may be called physical realism.
Now the second main point we want to make is that the Copenhagen view can (and probably should) be understood as not making any use of
counterfactual implications whatsoever, and that Wheelers approach indeed makes no use, not even an implicit one, of the implications in question. The
possibility of defining properties without any resort to counterfactuality is technically known (to the epistemologists) as the partial definition procedure.
For brevity let us simply note here that if this alternative is chosen then, properly speaking, a system S may have property A only when the experimental
set-up is such as to allow for a measurement of A. Otherwise the sentence S has property A is worse than false, for it is simply meaningless. Although a
few isolated sentences of the Copenhagen founding fathers seem to refer to a kind of macro-objectivism which, in turn, would tacitly refer to
counterfactuality in the macroscopic domain, it remains true that in the microscopic domain, at least, the method of partial definition of properties is
actually the one which is in agreement with the hard core of the Copenhagen standpoint (and, in particular, with the substance of Bohrs reply to
Einstein). It can be considered that in Wheelers articlein which no sharp distinction between these two domains is made and in which the notion of a
hardware reality out here is banned, as we saweven the physical properties of the macroscopic objects are supposed to be defined by this mancentred method (it is man centred because in it the instruments can only be defined as the things that serve to measure).
At this stage we can draw a provisional conclusion, which is that Wheelers standpoint, although it is most baffling (except to some followers of Kant),
cannot nevertheless be rejected right away on technical grounds since a method (the partial definition procedure) does indeed exist for defining properties
(and therefore for doing physics) without having to rely conceptually on the pair counterfactuality-physical realism. Moreover we understand somewhat
more precisely the root of our vague feeling that this conception is baffling. It lies in the fact that we are not used to defining properties (and existence) by
the partial definition method. As we said, without being even aware of the fact, we always conceive of them as though they were defined by the
counterfactual method.

The best way we have of grasping how and to what extent a given conceptual approach removes the conceptual difficulties raised by quantum physics
is to look at the way in which the approach in question can help solve the central riddle of this physics, whichagainmay be formulated as follows.
While it is conceivable that a measurement may modify a small object, the idea that a measurement of the co-ordinates of the moon may grossly affect
these co-ordinates should be avoided at all costs. Similarly we should avoid at all costs being trapped into the conclusion that the fact of ascertaining
where the pointer of an instrument lies (thus making a measurement of this position, either with the naked eye or with some second instrument) may in
some cases do something appreciable to this physical quantity. But in the Schrdinger cat paradox (in which, for simplicity, we may replace the cat by a
pointer) how is it possible to avoid the conclusion in question? How is it possible to remove the simple objection which reads After we look the pointer
has a given definite position. Before we look it has not. Hence by looking we do something to the pointer?
This is not the proper place for discussing whether or not any of the numerous attempts at building up a quantum measurement theory succeeded in
solving this riddle. What is of immediate interest to us is whether and how the two mutually exclusive views adopted by Wheeler and Bell, respectively,
succeed in doing so. Bells view is discussed below, but we may right away make the qualitative remark that, since this author accepts the notion of
hidden variables, his prospects of removing the difficulty seem at first sight to be quite good. At first sight, on the contrary, since Wheeler does not
accept the hidden variables notion, his prospect of removing the objection looks bad.
But we claim the thesis can be upheld that this is just an appearance. Again, the objection seems insuperable to us because, without being even aware
of the fact, we systematically think in terms of a counter-factually-defined reality (here the reality of the wave function; that is, the reality of the state in
which the object-plus-pointer composite system was prepared or happened to be). If we are really willing to take the major conceptual step that the
Copenhagen founding fathers, somewhat ambiguously perhaps, invited us to take and that Wheeler, frankly rejecting this ambiguity, explicitly claims we
should takethat is, if we give up altogether any idea of a knowable hardware reality existing per se out herethen the very basis of the objection
disappears. It just has no meaning to say, for example, that before we look the pointer has no definite position. To understand why this is so we may
compare the complex situation under study with a simpler one. For example, let us replace the whole composite system (measured quantum system plus
apparatus) by a spin one-half particle P and let us replace the fact of looking at the pointer by that of

measuring its spin component Sz. In the case in which the preparation procedure consisted in passing P through a Stern-Gerlach device directed along 0x,
we then normally tend to say that before the measurement P has an Sx which has a definite value so that Sz can have no definite value on P. But actually, if
we decide to define properties exclusively by means of the partial definition method, we cannot even assert the premise since P is not associated with an
apparatus capable of measuring Sx. Be it only for this reason, we then cannot derive from the axioms of quantum mechanics any falsification of the
assertion that before the measurement Sz already has some definite but unknown value.
Of course, this argument can be carried over in a straightforward way to the actual problem under study. Hence we are right in asserting it is only the
fact of the human mind spontaneously not following the partial definition method and tacitly thinking instead in terms of a counterfactually defined external
reality that gives to the objection under study the appearance of being valid. In fact it is not. Its validity is restricted to the elementary conceptual
description of quantum mechanics which we hinted at above, and which counterfactually defines the state of the system before measurement. To repeat: if
we hold fast to the prescription of using exclusively the partial-definition procedure we cannot meaningfully say that we do something to the pointer by
looking at it (and we cannot say either that we are acting on the past by inducing it to have taken a definite position when it interacted with the quantum
system).

Remark
This conclusion can also be reached by criticizingin the objection under studythe use made of the phrase after we look, the pointer has a definite
position for establishing the role of the observer as a cause. At least, this is true if we accept the definition of the (controversial) notion of cause which
restricts its use to the case of events that, although they may just happen in nature without any involvement of man, nevertheless can also be induced by
mans free will. This definition5 reads: If A is such an event and if it is the case that event B takes place (after A) in all the cases in which we made A to
happen, and does not take place in the cases in which we refrained from doing so, then A is the cause of B. To apply this definition to our problem we
must, of course, say that A is the fact of looking at the pointer. But what is B? B (the effect) cannot be that the pointer co-ordinate takes a value within a
given interval (say, between 4 and 5 on the scale) since it is not true that in all the cases in which we do look we observe that special result. Hence the
effect can only be the pointer has some definite position (by opposition to the pointer has a given definite position). But in ordinary formal logic the
sentence

the pointer has some definite position is a mere tautology. It can acquire a non-tautological meaning only through a resort to modal logic (a V is a
tautology but a V is not, where a means necessarily a). Hence in the approach considered here (no modal logic accepted) it is false to say
that this sentence only became true when we looked.
Is it claimed here that Wheelers approach removes all the conceptual difficulties of quantum physics? Certainly not. In fact the present author, for one,
pointed out6 that non-local indirect measurements of the EPR variety raise difficult questions in the partial definition approach; and, more generally,
Wheeler himself warns us that what he is trying to do is mainly to indicate a direction, and that major difficulties still remain to be settled. Our purpose in
this section is merely to point out the way in which, within the approach in question, a particularbut puzzlingquestion can be settled.

4 Some comments on Bells views

Before leaving (for the time being at least) Wheelers article, it is appropriate to mention a highly illuminating analogy therein contained. It consists in
comparing the work of the scientific community to a very peculiar type of the well-known game of guessing a word by asking a group of friends questions
such as Is it an animal? Is it blue?, and so on. We say a very peculiar type because, in the analogy proposed by Wheeler, the friends of the guesser
have decided not to choose a word in advance. Everyone could answer as he pleased, with the only proviso being that he had to have a word in mind
compatible with all the previous answers. As Wheeler points out, we used to think of the electron as having a definite position, whether we observe it or
not, just as the guesser thinks the word exists in his friends minds even before he starts asking questions. The analogy consists in the fact that both these
ideas are wrong. And it is clear from the whole contextin the quoted articlethat the analogy is supposed to hold just as well for a pointer position as
for an electron position.
In this analogy the guesser obviously corresponds to the scientist. But to what, may we ask, do the guessers friends correspond? Wheeler answers:
They play the role that nature does in the typical experiment.
Now, up to this point we were happy. We were somehow in the state of mind of a student who reads a textbook in mathematics or physics; who
grasps the transitions from one equation to the next; who sometimes, for better understanding, makes explicit for his own use some intermediate
calculations that the writer left implicit; and who, apart from this, has no questions and no worry. But now, with this word nature appearing just in this
role which Wheeler assigns to

it, suddenly ahighly non-technical but all the same highly worryingquestion does appear. For is not physics the science of nature? Is it not true that its
aim is to try to know at least some features of nature itself? But then how can we escape the following remark? The just-recalled analogythe fitness of
which we do not questionshows just the contrary. It shows that, if Wheeler is right, the scientist actually does no more increase his knowledge of
nature than the guesser increases his knowledge of his friends. They both build up a knowledge, but just not that one.
Does this objection destroy our previous opinion that Wheelers argument is strong? Not at all, but nevertheless, and particularly if we recently read
some of the very explicit statements (presumably inspired in part by David Bohm and at least consonant with important ideas of the latter) contained in
some of Bells articles (see, for example, reference 7), we must be specially receptive to the objection in question; for in several of these texts Bells views
link up with those of Einstein in that they both consider that a satisfactory physical theory should tell us about what is, instead of endlessly playing with
such concepts as observables, measurements, state preparation procedures, and so on.
In a number of classical, very general, assertions of philosophy (such as ideas can only be related to ideas, and so on) some may see grounds for a
priori rejecting this requirement. But such arguments do not look binding since, as we saw, a technically respectable meansnamely counterfactual
implicationexists for defining the properties of at least the macroscopic objects (and their existence as well) in such a way that, although the definitions
do involve mans experience, nevertheless the reality of their described union may without any contradiction be considered as independent of mans mind.
On the other hand, as soon as this latter view (commonsense realism) is accepted as regards the macroscopic objects it is, as we saw, difficult to reject
the requirement that it should be extended to physics in general. Indeed, so natural is this requirement that most of the physicists (including even quantum
theorists) who have not given special attention to these problems implicitly believe that somehow it is fulfilled as regards contemporary physics.
If we try to follow these lines explicitly, a priori two possible ways seem to be open for our query. One of them is to try to dispense with
supplementary (or hidden) variables; the other is not to exclude the existence of the latter. It may be said that the first way is the one which is followed
by most physicists (without them always being fully aware of it). It consists (commonsense realism again) in systematically using the counterfactual
implication method of definition, in extending it, therefore, also to the properties of the quantum systems, and in trying to avoid the well-known
conceptual difficulties (two-slits experiment and so on) by restricting in some suitable way the relevant

sphere of accessibility. Technically this is achieved by specifying that the sphere of accessibility corresponding to (a given value of) a given property of the
system does not include possible situations (worlds) in which an instrument capable of measuring a quantity incompatible with the property in question is
associated to the system. Practically, this way of thinking leads very directly to the view that the quantum states (as described by state vectors) are
physically real in the sense explained in the foregoing section.
The advantages of this conceptual approach (which we may call the conventional one, since it is in the minds of so many working physicists) lie in its
formal simplicity and in its practical efficiency. Nevertheless, its inconveniences are serious. First of all it should be noted that it does not entirely fulfill the
Einstein-Bell requirement as defined above, since it defines a property by means of a sphere of accessibility, the specification of which incorporates the
use of the man-centred concept of an instrument. But even if this special difficulty can be removed, other ones remain. As soon as the state vector is
considered as being physically real, the Schrdinger cat paradox reappears. In a sense it may be said that the whole content of the so-called quantum
measurement theory (or theories) is nothing but an effort to remove this paradox. But, as we briefly noted above, it seems that the price these theories
have to pay for success is always the same. It consists in making somewhere (preferably at some not-too-conspicuous place) some reference to the
practical inability of mankind at making particularly difficult measurements. Hence these theories cannot be said to satisfy the Einstein-Bell requirement.
Another inconvenience of the conceptual approach under study was pointed out by Aharonov and Albert8. These authors could show that in quantum
theory there exist some non-local physical quantities that are measurable in principle, at least in the restricted sense that it can be checked whether or not
the physical system under study is in an eigenstate of the considered quantity. Moreover, the measurements in question are non-demolition measurements;
that is, they leave the system in this state. They can thus be repeated as often as desired. The point then is that we can monitor such a non-local eigenstate
(that is, we can continuously check that the system still is in it) in any referential we choose. Under these conditions an ordinary local measurement of
some other quantity pertaining to the system cannot reduce the state other than on the hyperplane defined by the time of this measurement in this chosen
referential (any other assumption would lead to a contradiction between two sets of predictions which are both verifiable in the referential in question).
Hence the collapse of the quantum state cannot be considered as being a covariant process. This does not imply a violation of relativity conceived of as an
operational theory since, as several authors including the quoted ones have shown, relativistic causality in this sense is not violated. However

it would imply a violation of this same relativistic causalitybut now conceived of in a realistic senseif we were to assume that the non-local state under
consideration is physically real (in the sense made precise by the counterfactual method) and is reduced by the ordinary measurement considered above
(the Everett approach, in which no collapse takes place, is thereby immune to this criticism). Now the necessity of reducing the state vector upon
measurement has always been viewed as an unpleasant feature of the conception discussed here that state vectors of micro-systems are, by themselves,
elements of reality. But now we see that this necessity implies the existence of an actual contradiction between such a conception and relativity, also
understood in some realistic sense. We are therefore confronted, within this conception, with a difficulty which can no more be reduced to the status of a
mere unpleasant feature.
A difficulty complementary to the one just described emerges if we choose to remove the latter by just deciding that no state vector reduction ever
appears, for we then are led to one or other of the different versions of the Everett theory. And these versions all have features (such as superposition of
macroscopically distinct states of consciousness, multiplication of universes and so on), the discussion of which must, for the sake of brevity, be omitted
here but the acceptance of which is, at any rate, a heavy price to pay for regained consistency.
If we have all these difficulties of the conventional approach in mind, we are well prepared to listen to Bells assertion that professional theoretical
physicists ought to be able to do better, and to appreciate his proposal for doing so in the spirit of the de Broglie-Bohm version of non-relativistic
quantum mechanics. This is of course not the proper place for describing the thus-obtained theory. Let it just be mentioned that it works and that it is free
from the following defects which mar the conventional approach: necessity of dividing the world into two parts, system and instrument; absence, in the
mathematics, of any clue telling us what is system and what is instrument; and, correspondingly, the non-existence of any objective criterion
distinguishing, among the natural processes, those which have the special status of measurements. Moreover, the fact that theories of the de BroglieBohm type have supplementary variables (supplementary means, here, present in addition to the state vector) entails of course that the Schrdinger cat
paradox is far less acute there than in the conventional approach. In its gross features at least, the objective state of the pointer was the same before we
looked as it is after we did.

5 Veiled reality?
The first of the conclusions to be derived from this comparison between Wheelers and Bells approaches is, I think, that as regards self-consistency and
definiteness (absence of ambiguity) both are far

superior to what we called the conventional approach. Moreover, the foregoing analyses show that these superiorities stem from the fact that the
conventional approach applies ill-defined rules for specifying the cases in which counterfactual implication should be used in the definition of properties. By
contrast, both Wheelers and Bells approaches have clearcut prescriptions in that respect. In fact, Wheelers answer is never and Bells answer
implicitly is always, unless of course the alleged property under consideration is but a secondary quality, not to be taken into account in the formulation of
the basic rules of physics. In his theory, many of the observables of ordinary quantum mechanics are in fact reduced to this low status of secondary
qualities, but the positions of the particlesor, more precisely, the numbers of fermions at any point in spaceare not, and in the last analysis we must
indeed consider that these quantities are there implicitly defined, just as in classical physics, through the counterfactual implication method (since, at any
rate, it is clear they are not defined through the partial definition method). This is why we may say that Bells approach is openly in agreement with
physical realism, while Wheelers approach is openly not (and the conventional approach makes unsuccessful efforts at trying to make us believe it is).
Shall we then choose between these two theories and, if so, which one of them will have our preference? If we were pure positivists (and if pure
positivism could actually be consistently maintained, a hypothesis which now seems doubtful) we would have to choose Wheelers, or, more precisely
(but this specification is important), we would have to choose Wheelers approach while at the same time refraining, in our comments concerning it, from
any allusion to what he calls nature in the quotation commented on above. This is because, as we observed, the entity which he designates there by this
name (the name independent reality would be a more precise one since the word nature has many different interpretations) cannot be operationally
defined and is in fact unknowable in his theory; and strict positivism has idealist connotations in that it instructs us to deny any meaning to such entities.
Since Wheelers allusion to this independent reality is merely incidental we feel we would not thereby substantially deviate from his views. Nevertheless, if
we are neither pure positivists nor pure idealists we can hardly dispense with the notion of a reality which somehow is more than just a product of mans
mind. But, as already noted, we may then be seriously worried by the unknowability of nature (of independent reality) in Wheelers approach. For that
reason we may, at first sight, be tempted to choose Bells theory.
However, along with their nice formal approaches, all the theories of this type also have well-known drawbacks. One of these is their lack of predictive
power as regards original experimental results. Another, and probably more serious, one has to do with relativistic covariance and corresponds in fact to
the Aharonov-Albert difficulty

in the conventional approach. As Bell himself points out, although his theory agrees with the observable predictions of (operational) relativity theory, it
relies heavily on a particular division of spacetime into space and time, a fact we can express by saying that, in this theory, relativistic covariance has, for
a realist, the low status of a mere appearance. Correlatively it implies the presence of non-observable but nevertheless existing non-local influences (nonseparability).
Now, an important point is that such non-local features do not constitute just a particular defect of this special theory, of which we could hope other
realistic theories to be free. The well-known Bell theorem shows indeed that any theory which correctly reproduces some elementary (and
experimentally well verified) quantum predictions and in which reality (matter, things) is considered as being in spacetime (so that it views spacetime as
existing independently of ourselves) must have the very peculiar non-local features in question. These, however, are worrying in two respects. First, in
spirit at least (not in the equations), they somehow run counter to the very assumption (of space and time embedding of reality) on which the theory is
based. Indeed it would seem that the basic motivation for constructing a theory such as Bells, in which the positions of things are considered as being
more real than anything else, is that we do observe things as occupying definite positions in space and that we consider our theory will be simplest if it
allows us to interpret this as corresponding to reality instead of just being an appearance. But then, the fact that in the theory under study:
1 we find highly non-local influences and fields (in particular the beable |t>); and
2 these influences and fields manage to be completely unobservable except in highly sophisticated indirect ways;
certainly constitutes both a surprise and a disappointment since, to a large extent, it re-introduces in the relationship between observation and reality that
very distance that we tried to suppress.
And, of coursethis is the second pointsurprise and disappointment are even amplified by the (related) fact that relativistic covariance is, in this
theory, just an appearance. For, again, it seems to be in the spirit of this approach to try to identify as much as possible appearances and reality (or, in a
more philosophical language, phenomena and reality) and, at this point, the result obtained is the contrary (some physicists9 claim they can reconcile
relativity with a variety of superluminal action at a distance but it is doubtful10 that the type of action they consider can account for the correlations
observed in the EPR experiments).
Under these conditions, although we cannot disprove Bells theory, we may be justified in suspecting that after all there is perhaps a sign of some great
truth in the mismatch between the quantum rules and

the notion of locality; a mismatch that keeps showing up in various aspects of physics. If this were the case, it would mean that we are wrong when we
believe the notions we have of space, of time, of spacetime, of the positions of things and of events, are faithful descriptions of features possessed by
independent reality.
This is not a view that I, for one, would have taken a priori. In other words, methodologically I am not a Kantian. But, a posteriori, I feel somehow
forced, by the foregoing analyses, to take up a standpoint, some features of which are not very far from some views expressed by Kant. More precisely, I
think we should make a sharp distinction between empirical realitythe set of the phenomenaand independent reality. Empirical reality is all to which
we have a strictly cognitive access. Kant would have said It is in space and time but this is essentially because space and time are the ways we have of
describing our experience. Modern physicists tend to say instead It is in spacetime, and the followers of Einstein point out that, since spacetime is not an
a priori mode of our sensibility, the very fact that physics forces us to this assertion shows that spacetime is real, quite independently from us. I do not go
as far as this. In view of the results of the foregoing discussion I feel inclined to consider that even spacetime (and locality, and events and so on) is a
notion that owes much to the structure of our mind and that independent reality is in no way embedded in it. However, the argument of the Einsteinians
remains impressive. Notions such as that of spacetime and everything that goes with it are not primitive modes of thought. They therefore must have come
to us from somewhere, and it is natural to think that they reflect something of independent reality. But, again, in view of the foregoing analyses, it seems
that they reflect this something in such a distorted way that it is impossible for mankind to reconstruct with full clarity, from such a poor information, what
independent reality really is. In short, independent reality isand will remainveiled to us.
Again, within this conception, empirical reality is all that is scientifically (i.e. precisely) knowable. Basically, it is what our present-day quantum physics
describes for us. Now, if this is true, a question arises as to whether, within the realm of this empirical reality, which after all corresponds to the whole of
our scientific experience, such difficulties as the Schrdinger cat paradox, non-separability and the rest are not still present. If they are, and if they remain
as acute as when the distinction between empirical and independent reality is not made, then this distinction should be considered as useless and therefore
as irrelevant.
The answer to this last question is that to some extent these difficulties are still there but that they are not as acute as they were before. In its strict form,
for example, non-separability is merely the assertion that the principle of separability is not valid, and this principle cannot

even be formulated in terms of empirical reality alone since it makes references to the objective states of the systems. Within a description of physics
centred on the partial definition method it is replaced by a kind of indivisibility between system and instrument which is also non-local in some cases, but
this non-locality is then hardly more surprising than the very restriction to the partial definition method in which we saw that a consistent description of
empirical reality may be based.
Similarly, as we saw, the central conceptual difficulty of quantum physics, which is How can we avoid being forced to say that it is the observer, when
he looks at the pointer, who fixes it up in one definite macro-state?, can be removed in principle just by giving up what we called the conventional
approach and its dual reference to the partial definition method and to the counterfactual implication method of definition. In particular the difficulty
disappears (at least as long as only local measurements are considered) in the approach (to which we believe that Wheeler holds fast) which consists in
defining properties and states exclusively by means of the partial definition method and which therefore allows no counterfactual interpretation whatsoever
to be given of the so-called initial state of the system (or, in better words, of the state preparation procedure to which this system was subjected). On
the other hand, as we said, the indirect, non-local measurements of the EPR type raise, in this approach, some problems of their own6 that can hardly be
considered as being solved and that could, therefore, create some doubts concerning the internal consistency of any physics of the phenomena. This
comes in addition to the difficulty that empirical reality is of course the one we have to deal with both in scientific and ordinary life. Especially in ordinary
life, we are so accustomed to think of macroscopic systems in terms of the counterfactually defined properties they have that we find it extraordinarily
difficult to think of them and of their properties within the exclusive framework of the partial definition approach.
It is at this stage that I consider that the notion of independent reality (even of an unknowable one) may help us. For example, althoughfor the above
described reasonsI do not believe in Bells description of independent reality (in the sense that I would not swear it is true), I must observe that it is a
contradiction-free model of what could conceivably be. And the mere existence of one such self-consistent possibility makes it clear that some (knowable
or unknowable but at least contradiction-free) structures of independent reality may produce the observed features of empirical reality so correctly
predicted by quantum physics. It shows therefore that the meaning-centred approach of empirical reality which is so characteristic of modern physics is, at
least, not hopelessly inconsistent. But it shows this under the condition that empirical reality, even if it is final for usdue to the limited powers of human
mindis not considered as the ultimate thing. This, I think, backs up my conception that a distinction

between empirical reality and a knowable or unknowable independent reality is relevant11.

To those readers who would consider that this way of thinking is too peculiar to be respectable, I would like to point out that a somewhat similar one
was used a long time ago by Epicurus, when he tried to convince his contemporaries that the phenomena could be accounted for rationally, without
referring to a pandemonium of deities and of good and evil spirits. At the time of Epicurus an enormous number of simple questions could not be
answered scientifically and in the course of showing that deities were unnecessary Epicurus therefore had to point out that we must sometimes make
specific hypotheses. For example, concerning the respective sizes of the earth and the sun he advocated the choice of the more natural assumption, which
is of course that the sun is smaller, and he stressed that, qualitatively at least, it is possible to explain many phenomena this way without having recourse to
the notions he did not like. Now, clearly he was too daring in putting forward the idea that the sun is smaller than the earth, as we might perhaps be too
daring if we claimed that Bells theory is correct. But we shall understand this philosopher somewhat better if we observe that the point he really wanted
to make was just that at least one solution to his problem could be consistently thought to exist (my thanks are due to Miss Anne Richard for drawing my
attention to this aspect of Epicurus assertion). It is a similar idea I am trying to convey here. Let it be pointed out moreover that Epicurus argument
would be considered as correct even if a decision as to which one of the two heavenly bodies is larger finally turned out to lie outside human intellectual
abilities, and that the analogy with what I have in mind concerning the present problem would then be even closer.

References
1 J.A.Wheeler, Bits, quanta, meaning, in the Caianiello Celebration volume, A.Giovannini, M.Marinaro, F.Mancini and A.Rimini (eds), to be published.
2 J.S.Bell, Beables for quantum field theory, this volume, p. 227.
3 B.dEspagnat, In Search of Reality, Springer, New York, 1983.
4 B.dEspagnat, Nonseparability and the tentative descriptions of reality, Physics Report, 110, 201 (1984).
5 G.H.von Wright, Causality and Determinism, Columbia University Press, New York, 1974.
6 B.dEspagnat, Epistemological Letters, 22, 1 (1979).
7 J.S.Bell, report to Istituto Italiano per gli Studi Filosofia, Amalfi, 11 May 1984.
8 Y.Aharonov and D.Z.Albert, Phys. Rev., D21, 3316 (1980); D24, 359 (1981).
9 J.-P.Vigier, Lett. Nuovo Cimento, 29, 467 (1980); Astron. Nachr., 303, 55 (1982).
10 A.Shimony, Proc. Int. Symp. Foundations of Quantum Mechanics, Tokyo, 1983, p. 225.
11 B.dEspagnat, Une incertaine ralit, Gauthier-Villars, Paris, 1984. English translation forthcoming, Cambridge University Press, 1987.

9
Causal particle trajectories and the interpretation of quantum mechanics
J.-P.Vigier, C.Dewdney, P.R.Holland and A.Kyprianidis Institut Henri Poincar.

1 Introduction
The fundamental disagreement between Bohr and Einstein at the 1927 Solvay conferences concerned not only the interpretation of quantum mechanics
but also general philosophical orientations as to the nature of physical theory. Although these two aspects of the debate can never be fully separated, it is
clear that, since quantum mechanics is after all a theory about the behaviour of matter, specific claims of the various interpretations can be more or less
adequate in the face of experimental evidence, and even shown to be false in certain cases1,2.
In relation to this debate perhaps the greatest significance and contribution of Bohms causal interpretation of quantum mechanics3 is that it not only
exposes the arbitrary philosophical assumptions underlying the claims of the Copenhagen interpretation but also brings into relief the essentially new
content of quantum mechanics, which is reflected in different ways in Bohrs interpretation. Indeed the claim that the quantum formalism itself requires us
not only to abandon the quest for explanation of quantum phenomena but also the concepts of causality, continuity and the objective reality of individual
micro-objects, is shown to be false. However the existence of the single counter-interpretation proposed by Bohm constitutes sufficient grounds for
rejecting the absolute and final necessity of complementary description and indeterminacy, along with the inherent unanalysable and closed nature of
quantum phenomena.
This in itself was a major contribution, but further than this, since the possibility of alternative interpretations is not ruled out, specific models may be
proposed which allow a space-time description of individual micro-events and the possibility of a deeper understanding, perhaps leading to an approach
which transcends current perceptions.

Although the causal interpretation has in effect been in existence since the very beginnings of quantum mechanics, in the form of the pilot-wave model
proposed by de Broglie, it has not been widely adopted in the physics community, perhaps for reasons more ideological and metaphysical than physical,
and many people remain ignorant of it.
In this contribution we wish to reconsider Bohms interpretation in the light of recent developments and to return to the question of the interpretation of
quantum mechanics. In particular we examine the adequacy of the Copenhagen interpretation (CIQM), the causal stochastic interpretation (SIQMan
extension of Bohms original approach) and the statistical interpretation in accounting for quantum interference phenomena and quantum statistics. We
further demonstrate that the assumption of the existence of particle trajectories entails the elimination of negative probabilities from quantum mechanics.
Such phenomena are at the heart of quantum mechanics and interference experiments were crucial in the early stages of the Bohr-Einstein debate, in
which the discussion was centred on the two-slit experiment. In fact they have become of central concern once again since the recent neutron
interferometry experiments present more strikingly the same puzzling behaviour, and offer wider possibilities to examine the adequacy of the various
interpretations. However, let us consider first the three interpretations of the two-slit experiment.

2 Interpretation and the two-slit experiment

(i) Bohr and the Copenhagen interpretation
Although several versions of this approach to quantum mechanics exist, the most consistent and coherent version was formulated by Bohr.4 For Bohr
science is only possible through unambiguous communication of results. A necessary condition for this is that a clear distinction be possible between
subject and object (system and instrument). The concepts and language of classical physics automatically entail such a distinction and we have to
communicate within its framework. If in any situation the subject/object distinction can be made in alternative ways, then the descriptions arising are to be
termed complementary rather than simply contradictory. Bohr regarded complementarity as a general relationship evident in all areas of knowledge. The
similarity between diverse domains regarding complementary description was not based on a more or less vague analogy, but on a thorough investigation
of the conditions for the proper use of our conceptual means of expression. Complementarity, then, is not derived from quantum mechanics; it simply has
a well-defined application in this area of knowledge where the existence and indivisibility of the quantum of action implies the unanalysability of

the interaction between system and instrument. The placing of the division between system and instrument becomes arbitrary and unambiguous
communication impossible. From Bohrs philosophical position the only possibility is to retreat to the classical description of the results of experiments.
Their classical nature is taken as given, but then quantum phenomena become hermetically sealed. The fundamental unit for description in these terms is
then the whole phenomenon constituted by the system and experimental apparatus which together form an indivisible and unanalysable whole. Altering a
part of the apparatus in order to define more closely the quantum process, by elucidating a conjugate quantity, simply produces a complementary
phenomenon. In this view, There is no quantum world, there is only an abstract quantum physical description5.
Quantum mechanics only concerns the statistical prediction of the results of well-defined experiments and nothing more; it represents an ultimate limit to
our knowledge. The wave function is the most complete description of an individual state; it is merely a probability amplitude which states the odds on
various results and is subject to instantaneous changes during measurement. If some preparation device (source, shutter, collimator) is designed to
produce a wave packet, then all we can say is that the wave packet represents the fact that a single particle has a probability of appearing at a position x
given by |(x)|2, if a measurement is made. Until such a time it is not legitimate even to conceive of a particle, let alone its properties.
In the specific case of the two-slit experiment (see Figure 9.1), what happens between source and screen when interference is observed cannot be
described, even in principle. In fact the quantum system, detected at the plate, cannot even be said to have an existence in the usual sense. There is no
possibility of defining the process giving rise to the interference pattern. Either we design an apparatus to observe interference, and hence the wave
properties of matter, and forgo the

Figure 9.1 The two-slit experiment

description in terms of space-time co-ordination, or we design an incompatible arrangement to determine more closely the space-time motion, particle
properties, and forgo the possibility of observing interference. The two are complementary phenomena.
When Einstein6 proposed a gedanken experiment which would enable the path of the particle to be determined by measuring the momentum it
transfers to the slits, Bohr argued that if a screen is to be used in this way then its own momentum must be controlled with such a precision that by
application of the uncertainty relations its position becomes uncertain by an amount sufficient to destroy the interference. It is a curious fact that in order to
arrive at this conclusion Bohr must assume rectilinear particle trajectories between source and slits and slits and screen. The quantum object behaves
classically whereas the macroscopic slit system behaves quantum mechanically. Indeed, to be consistent it must be said that the screen actually has no
position; its existence has become fuzzy, not that its definite position is just unknown. Greenberger7 has shown in detail how the interaction with such a
fuzzy object (in the neutron case) destroys the coherence of the overlapping wave functions.
In proscribing the possible in quantum physical description, Bohr has ruled out explanations in terms of determinate individual physical processes taking
place in space and time. This is not the task of physics; the quantum theory is just an algorithm for predicting results and its theoretical entities need no
interpretation. In this way, by epistemological re-definition, Bohr can avoid all the problems and paradoxes which arise when an attempt is made to
provide the formalism and its rules with a physical interpretation in terms of the behaviour of matter. In Bohrs view the observer plays no more special a
role in quantum mechanics than in any other area of knowledge, and his or her consciousness of a given situation has no special effect. This is the core of
Bohrs position and the unambiguous basis of the Copenhagen interpretation. Many other versions of the Copenhagen interpretation exist and these have
led to extended discussions as a result of attempting to provide a physical, or psycho-physical, interpretation of the entities and laws of quantum
mechanics, in terms of which the phenomena and the interphenomena may be described and explained. These should really be distinguished from Bohrs
position, which does not constitute a physical interpretation in the usual sense.
In the following we separate Bohrs position from those versions of CIQM which attempt to interpret the formalism physically.

(ii) The statistical interpretation

As emphasized by Ballentine8, the statistical interpretation is to be distinguished from the Copenhagen interpretation. He asserts that the

wave function simply represents an ensemble of similarly prepared systems and does not provide a complete description of an individual system: In
general, quantum theory predicts nothing which is relevant to a single measurement.8
The interpretation of a wave packet is that, although each particle has always a definite position r, each position is realized with relative frequency
|(r)|2 in an ensemble of similarly-prepared experiments. It follows that each particle has a well-defined trajectory, but its specification is beyond the
statistical quantum theory; probabilities arising in the predictions of the theory are to be interpreted as in classical theory.
In the two-slit experiment this means that each particle in fact goes through one or other of the slits. Clearly the interference of particles is something
new in quantum theory which this model must reproduce. If the particle goes through one or other of the slits, the two possibilities are in principle
distinguishable; we should write a mixture instead of a pure state and the interference disappears. In order to explain the persistence of interference in this
interpretation Ballentine refers to the work of Duane9 in 1927, more recently revived by Land10. The result is obtained by considering the possibilities for
momentum transfer between the individual particle and the screen containing the slits. The matter distribution of the screen is Fourier analysed into a
three-fold infinity of sinusoidal elementary lattices of spacings l1, l2, l3and amplitude A(li). According to an extension of the Bohr-Sommerfeld
quantum conditions, each such lattice is capable of changing its momentum in the direction of the periodicity only by amounts;

The intensity of an l component in the harmonic analysis is proportional to the statistical frequency of the corresponding momentum transfer. Thus each
particle does not simply interact locally with the screen but non-locally with the matter distribution of the screen as a whole. Now a change in this matter
distribution, e.g. closing a slit, results in an instantaneous change in the components of the harmonic analysis and thus in a corresponding change in the
possible momentum transfers, resulting in a single-slit distribution of intensity. We are bound to ask what, in this analysis, determines which of all the
possible momentum transfers actually occurs in the individual particles passage. There is no answer and so individual events are inherently statistical.
It is not clear in this model why the matter distribution consisting the screen should be Fourier analysed but not the matter distribution which constitutes
the particle. The screen is, after all, made of particles. The physical status of the Fourier components which exist with certain amplitudes is also unclear.
Einstein originally denied that the wave

function gives a complete description of an individual because he saw that this assumption contradicted the notion of locality11. If we assign the wave
function only a meaning in a statistical ensemble and resort to the above arguments to explain interference and diffraction, then clearly non-locality is
introduced, but in a way which is not intuitively clear.
If we reconsider Einsteins modification of the two-slit experiment in this model then we see that the meaning of the uncertainty in the position of the
slits, resulting in the loss of interference, is to be interpreted differently. In each experiment the screen has a definite position (this position has a statistical
dispersion in the ensemble, x) and so in each individual case the particle is forbidden to land in the positions of the minima of the pattern. (This incidently
is a definite prediction for the outcome of an individual experiment, in contradiction to Ballentines statement above.) However, because the position of the
maxima and minima in each case is different, in the ensemble interference is losta different explanation to that of the Copenhagen interpretation but with
the same results.
The statistical interpretation claims to be a minimal interpretation which removes the dead wood of the Copenhagen interpretation. However, nothing
is gained in the understanding of the quantum world and the mysteries remain complete.

(iii) The causal interpretation

This interpretation was originally proposed by de Broglie12 and independently by Bohm3. It has recently been extended by Vigier13 to include a subquantum Dirac ether as an underlying physical model.
In fact it is the only known interpretation of quantum mechanics in terms of which all quantum effects can be explained on the basis of causal continuous
motions in space and time. The quantum mechanical description of an individual through the wave-function is held to be incomplete in the sense of
Einstein. The description may be supplemented with real physical motions of particles, without ambiguity or contradiction, but in a manner which
introduces severely non-classical features. Bohrs epistemological position is set aside and the task of physics is held to consist not only of the attempt to
predict the statistical frequency of results in ensembles but also to provide explanations and descriptions of the individual processes between source and
detection. No problems arise in the analysis of phenomena into constituent parts, as the essential feature of their unity is now manifested by the quantum
potential which arises from the non-locally correlated stochastic fluctuations of the underlying covariant ether (see Introduction). The quantum potential
exhibits radically new properties. In the single-particle case its form depends on the state of

the system as a whole, a feature which is the analogue of its non-local character in the many-body system14.
Clearly if we consider that individual particles really exist in the interphenomena between source and screen and follow determinate trajectories, then
the motion of each particle must be inextricably linked with the structure of its environment. Any change in the apparatus affects the whole ensemble of
possible trajectories. This undivided connection is mediated by the quantum potential which arises as an extra potential term in the Hamilton-Jacobi-like
equation, which may be derived by substituting
in the Schrdinger equation and separating the real and imaginary parts, as Bohm did in
1952. In addition to the Hamilton-Jacobi equation:

[1]

one finds a continuity equation with P=R2:

[2]

R and S are interpreted as the amplitude and phase of the real field. The possible real average motions of a particle may be represented by trajectories
derived from the relation that the particle momentum is given by:

[3]

In the many-body case, particle motions are correlated by the quantum potential in a non-local way, although in the scalar case this action at-a-distance
does not give rise to any special problems. Even in the relativistic case, where non-locality may be thought to conflict with the requirements of relativistic
causality, it can be shown that this connection is mediated superluminally, yet causally, and cannot lead to any results conflicting with the predictions of
special relativity15,16.
An exact calculation has been carried out in detail by Philippidis et al.17 in the causal interpretation of the one-particle Schrdinger equation description
of the two-slit experiment. Here we represent the form of the quantum potential and the associated trajectories in Figure 9.2 and Figure 9.3 respectively.
The intensity distribution at the screen depends on the density of trajectories along with their occupation probability, and of course agrees in the
Fraunhoffer limit with that expected from the usual considerations.
The precise form of each trajectory is sensitive to changes in variables describing the particles environment. The distribution of trajectories
demonstrates that each particle travelling in the apparatus

Figure 9.2 The quantum potential for two Gaussian slits viewed from a position on the axis beyond screen B.

knows about or responds to the global structure of its environment (e.g. the presence of two slits, not one) and so exhibits a wholeness completely
foreign to mechanistic models in classical conceptions.
The quantum potential approach provides a way of understanding the feature of the quantum wholeness of phenomena emphasized by Bohr. Yet we
are not required to relinquish the attempt to explain the interphenomena in terms of space-time co-ordination and causal connection simultaneously.
The unity of system and environment, so clearly demonstrated in the double-slit trajectories, is then revealed as the essentially new non-classical feature
of quantum mechanics. Of course the single-particle description is an abstraction and this unity is really a reflection of the non-local character of the
correlations that arise in the many-body case. The non-separability of quantum systems had been emphasized by Schrdinger18 and Einstein, Podolsky
and Rosen11 in 1935. That such non-local correlations exist can no longer be doubted, as the

Figure 9.3 Trajectories for two Gaussian slits with a Gaussian distribution of initial positions at the slits.

results of Aspects experiment demonstrate19. Indeed these experiments find a perfectly causal explanation through the quantum potential20.
Reconsidering Einsteins modified two-slit experiment, the explanation of the loss of the interference pattern upon path determination in an ensemble of
results is similar to that of the statistical

interpretation, but now with precisely-definable individual particle trajectories determined by the quantum potential. None of the trajectories crosses the
line of symmetry (a point confirmed by Prosser, who calculated lines of energy flow in the electromagnetic case21) and this is a new macroscopic
prediction.

(iv) Wave-packet collapse

In the Bohr-Einstein debate, Bohr was able to defend the complementarity principle by showing that attempts to use detailed energy or momentum
conservation in individual processes to determine particle trajectories more closely requires a change of the experimental arrangement which results in a
loss of interference and the wave aspect. Bohr never referred to wave-packet collapse in these arguments. However, many of his supporters did and the
concept is associated with his interpretation. Using the concept of wave-packet collapse to provide a physical interpretation of the quantum formalism is
contrary to the spirit of Bohrs epistemological position. Nevertheless the argument is often put in the following way in CIQM. The introduction of a
device capable of determining through which slit a particle passes induces a collapse of the wave function in the apparatus and a consequent loss of
interference. Such a collapse follows from the assumption that the wave function provides a complete description of an individual system. In fact it is an
hypothesis added to the quantum formalism and not an integral part of that formalism, although this is not the impression given in most texts. Arguments
demonstrating the redundancy of this ad hoc postulate in quantum theory have existed for a long time.
Bohm, followed more recently by Cini22, have argued that wave packet collapse does not correspond to any objective real physical change in the state
of a system. By including the interaction with the measuring device in the quantum description, it can be shown that the interference between the
components of a pure state is destroyed as a result of the interaction between the system and the macroscopic instrument, which is in effect irreversible.
That is, there are no observable differences between the description of the composite in terms of the pure-state density matrix with vanishing interference
terms and that in terms of the mixture density matrix (with wave-packet collapse). If we find out which component of the pure state is actualized in the
process, the others may be disregarded as they can have no further influence on the behaviour of the system after the (irreversible) interaction with the
macroscopic instrument has taken place. Wave-packet collapse is now simply a matter of convenience. The physical interpretation of individual quantum
processes in terms of particle trajectories excludes the necessity of introducing wave packet collapse.

Consider the general case of particle interference with two wave functions I, and II (this could be a two-slit experiment with I from slit 1 and II
from slit 2 or an interferometer with I in path 1 and II in path 2). Also let the wave function of an apparatus introduced only in path II be i initially and
f finally, then we have:

[4]

If, through its functioning the states, i and f become orthogonal then interference is destroyed:

[5]

and the system (neutron, photon, electron) acts as a particle that goes either on path I or path II. Observation of the measuring instrument merely tells us
which alternative took place and thus we replace f by iI or fII. This is a collapse of the wave function which simply represents a change of our
knowledge and does not correspond to any real physical changes in the state of the system. If i and f are not orthogonal then interference persists:

[6]

and the system acts as a wave in both paths.

If by observing the apparatus we could still in fact determine the path of the particle, then in CIQM the act of observation would have to cause real
physical changes in the particles state as a consequence of a wave-packet collapse, since, if neutrons, electrons and photons are conceived as particles
that go one way or the other, equation [6] should reduce to equation [5].
Thus CIQM concludes that all measurements capable of determining the particles path imply orthogonality of the apparatus wave functions initially and
finally. In SIQM, determination of particle path need not imply orthogonality of apparatus wave functions in order to exclude the intervention of
consciousness in physical processes. What appears as a pseudo-collapse is the action of a macroscopic measuring device which makes the interference
terms negligible, as is consistently shown by Cini in a detailed application of the time-dependent Schrdinger equation to the interaction between a system
and a measuring device. Thus there is no a priori impossibility of path determination and persisting interference; one has only to find an appropriate
measuring device that during an interaction with the micro-system does not undergo a change to an orthogonal state, i.e. preserves the interference terms,
and still offers a possibility to decode this small quantum-number change. The use of SQUIDS and no-demolition measurements could be considered in
this context.
The possibility to go beyond CIQM was known to Bohm, in his original paper3, albeit in a different context. He remarks, in relation to the loss of
interference properties on measurement: In our inter-

pretation, however, the destruction of the interference pattern could in principle be avoided by means of other ways of making measurements.

3 Neutron interferometry
We propose now to take up these questions in relation to another specific quantum interference situation, neutron interferometry23. Neutron interferometry
has the advantage that it reproduces the double-slit configuration with massive particles and introduces new possibilities for interaction through the neutron
spin, thus essentially altering the situation.

(i) Spatial interference

To this purpose consider the experimental arrangement of Figure 9.4 with both spin flippers turned off. A simple calculation shows24 that if an originally
spin-up polarized beam =|z > enters the interferometer, it is subdivided in two partial beams I=eix|z> and II=|z > that successively recombine and
yield an intensity interference behind the interferometer modulated with the phase shift factor :

Figure 9.4 The neutron interferometer with a spin-flip coil in each arm.

[7]

while the polarization remains in the z-direction, i.e.:

[8]

Let us now turn to consider the interpretation of the results. For Bohr, the concept of the interphenomena cannot be unambiguously applied; the
phenomenon is unanalysable. All we can do is calculate the interfering probability amplitudes associated with each path through the apparatus. Neutron
paths and neutron waves are equally ambiguous for Bohr. He states that descriptions in terms of photons and electron

waves have the same ambiguity as other pictorial descriptions of the interphenomena; only the classical concepts of material particles and electromagnetic
waves have an unambiguous field of application. However, if we wish to discuss the interphenomena we must set Bohrs position aside (as in fact most
physicists actually do). Then a clear choice exists between two possible explanations. Either:
1 we say the neutron does not exist as a particle in the interferometer; or
2 we say the neutron actually travels along path I or II only, but is influenced by the physical conditions along both.
(a) The CIQM Suppose, with the usual interpretation of the quantum formalism, a particle were actually to travel along one path, then the existence of
the other would be irrelevant and interference cannot occur. Interference arises not from our lack of knowledge of the path but from the fact that the
neutron does not have one. Any attempt to reveal the particle between source and detector induces a wave-packet collapse, i.e. localizes the particle in
one beam, and interference effects disappear. The wave and particle nature of matter are complementary aspects. Since in this view the neutron is not to
be conceived of as a particle before detection localizes it, questions concerning which beam a given neutron enters at the region of superposition cannot
be formulated and the question of explanation is summarily closed.
(b) The causal stochastic interpretation If, contrary to the usual interpretation outlined in (a), we believe with Einstein25 and de Broglie12 that
neutrons are particles that really exist in space and time, then Rauchs statement, ruled out in the CIQM, can be made; namely that: At the place of
superposition every neutron has the information that there have been two equivalent paths through the interferometer, which have a certain phase
difference causing the neutron to join the beam in the forward or deviated direction26.
It is then possible to suggest physical models to explain the causation of individual events, a non-existent option in CIQM. In the SIQM neutrons can
be thought of as particles accompanied by waves simultaneously; the particle travels along one path through the interferometer whilst its real wave is split
and travels along both. The waves interfere in the region of superposition and give rise to a quantum potential which carries information concerning the
whole apparatus and determines the particle trajectories. The changing phase relations between the waves in I and II lead to a changing quantum potential
structure that determines which beam each individual neutron enters according to its initial position in the wave packet and phase shift . The detailed
explanation provided for the two slit experiment and square potential phenomena27 may be easily extended to this case. The details may be found in
reference 28; here we simply

represent the form of the effective potential (quantum potential plus classical barrier) and the associated trajectories. The results of the numerical
calculation show that varying the phase shift factor between 0 and 2 produces the correct type of interference figure. When =0, , the effective
potential (quantum+classical), as shown in Figure 9.5, is symmetric about the barrier centre. A series of violent oscillations develops on each side of the
barrier potential. These arise when the incident wave interferes with the combination of its own reflected wave and the in-phase transmitted wave from the
other side. Figure 9.6 shows the associated trajectories.

Figure 9.5 The effective potential at the last set of crystal planes with phase shift . Corresponding to region x=0.6 to x=0.9,
T=4.0 to T=12.0 on trajectory plot.

With =/2 the situation is very different. In this case the quantum potential oscillations are greatly reduced on one side of the potential barrier, in the
region where the density of trajectories is large, and this allows the particles to be transmitted (see upper section of Figure 9.7). In the lower section notice
that the quantum potential oscillations are enhanced and occur at an earlier time, ensuring that all the trajectories constituting beam II are reflected (Figure
9.8). Those constituting beam I now enter the potential barrier and emerge after the reflection of those in beam II, both forming the single emerging beam.
In this case the reflected wave from beam I is (almost completely) cancelled by the anti-phase transmitted wave from beam II.

Figure 9.6 Trajectories associated with =.

Figure 9.7 The effective potential at the last set of crystal planes with phase shift /2.

Figure 9.8 Trajectories associated with =/2.

When =3/2 the situation is essentially reversed (see Figures 9.9, 9.10), all the trajectories and any neutron emerging in the upper section. The few
trajectories which do not follow the others come from the extreme tails of the packets and so have very low probability; here they represent the effect of a
finite potential width.

(ii) Time-dependent spin superposition

Now according to Badurek et al.29 a completely different physical situation arises in the case of the time-dependent superposition of linear spin states
using a radio-frequency spin-flip coil. Indeed, in that case the total energy of the neutrons is not conserved. The detailed experimental arrangement can
be schematically represented as follows. The incident neutron beam containing one neutron at a time is subsequently divided into beams I and II. On beam
I acts a nuclear phase shifter represented by the action of a unitary operator eix on . Beam II is subjected to the following combination of magnetic fields:
1 a static magnetic field in the +z direction B= (0,0,B0);

Figure 9.9 Effective potential with phase shift =3/2.

Figure 9.10 Trajectories associated with =3/2.

2
a radio-frequency time-dependent magnetic field B=(B1 cos rft, B1 sin rft, 0) rotating in the xy plane with a frequency rf obeying the resonance
condition,
where is the magnetic moment of the neutron, i.e. it yields exactly the Zeeman energy difference between the two spin
eigenstates of the neutron within the static field.
Neutrons passing through such a device (a spin flipper) reverse their initial +z polarization into the z direction, by transferring an energy E=2B0 to the
coil whilst maintaining their initial momentum
The wave function in beam I after passing through the phase shifter is:

[9]

The corresponding wave function in II after the coil should be written:

[10]

since the rf-coil is shown to be almost 100 per cent efficient30.

Let the wave function of the coil initially be i and finally be f. Then initially the wave function of the whole (neutron and coil) is:

and the final state is:

[12]

and the condition for the observation of interference is if; that is, the state of the coil is virtually unaltered and no measurement in the usual sense takes
place. Then:

and intensity:

with polarization:

[13]

entirely in the xy plane. These are the well-known results of Badurek et al.29 which are experimentally verified.
(a) The Copenhagen interpretation Now how are these results encompassed within the CIQM? The observation of interference implies the wave
aspect; hence the particle cannot even be said to exist during the time between emission and absorption in the detector. A particle cannot exist in one
beam (or pass through one slit in the double-slit experiment) and take part in interference. However in order to describe the functioning of the coil we
must use the complementary

localized particle aspect. The energy transfer that takes place giving rise to the change of II is described by Rauch in terms of photon exchange between
the neutron and the field in the coil. Thus the neutron is conceived as a particle in one beam to explain energy transfer and simultaneously as a wave
existing in both to explain interference. The complementarity of wave and particle descriptions is broken; both aspects must be used simultaneously in one
and the same experimental arrangement. Complementary description is thus incomplete, or can energy be exchanged with a probability wave?
(b) The causal stochastic interpretation In the SIQM we use the Feynman-Gell-Mann equation for spin half-particles as a second-order stochastic
equation for the collective excitations of the assumed underlying covariant random vacuum, Diracs ether31,32. A spin half-particle is conceived as a
localized entity surrounded by a real spinor wave due to perturbation of the vacuum. While the particle really travels one way (path I or II), the spinor
wave propagates in both paths. In path II the interaction with the rf spin-flipper inverts the spinor symmetry of the wave while in path I the initial state is
maintained. What happens in the interference region can be now represented by the action of a spin dependent quantum potential Q and a quantum torque
which can be shown to produce a time-dependent spinor symmetry in the xy plane. The particle travelling, for example, in path I is constrained by the
spinor symmetry in the interference region and its +z spin is twisted into the xy plane by the quantum torque. If it travels along path II it suffers an
additional spin inversion due to the rf coil, yielding this energy to the coil while in the intersection area its z spin is twisted again to the xy plane.
Consequently, a coherent picture is established which accounts for both particle and wave aspects.

(iii) Measurement and time-dependent spin flippers

Now, Badurek et al., who performed the experiment, have stated: This experiment has shown explicitly that the interference properties of beams can be
preserved even when a real energy exchange takes place, which is intuitively a measurement29. But does it constitute a measurement? The situation must
be analysed carefully.
Clearly if the functioning of the coil is a measurement in the quantum mechanical sense, then i would be orthogonal to f and interference would
disappear. The reasons for considering such an interaction as a quantum measurement process are the following. First, there is an energy exchange taking
place unidirectionally from the passing neutron to the rf-circuit, since the energy of the initial state differs by E from that of the final state. This energy
exchange, if decoded and extracted from the resonator circuit, could reveal

the passage of the neutron. Second, this energy transfer in the form of a photon transition establishes a one-to-one correspondence between the change of
the neutrons spin state from spin up to spin down.
If i and f are not orthogonal, then interference and spin superposition persist, but in order to demonstrate the coexistence of particle path and
interference some means must be found to decode the small quantum number change involved between i and f.
If, in spite of the non-orthogonality of i and f, the particle path could be observed, then in CIQM the act of observation itself (i.e. our knowledge)
would have to destroy the interference terms (wave-packet collapse), whereas this is not ruled out a priori in the quantum potential approach, in which
particle path and interference are not exclusive and the wave function of the apparatus does not provide a complete description of an individual apparatus.
Within the quantum potential approach one could consider, as we have suggested, the possible adaptation of quantum non-demolition measurements to
detect the passage of a neutron.
Does the possibility exist of detecting the passage of a neutron from the energy it transfers to the rf coil? For Bohr the question of an individual energy
transfer to the coil when it is part of the interferometer set-up cannot arise, as this amounts to an attempt to subdivide the experiment. Actually changing
the experiment to allow the detection of the energy transfer results in a complementary phenomenon in which interference would not be observed. In the
quantum potential approach there is no contradiction between energy transfer and interference. Consider the following possibilities.
1 If the single energy transfer is detectable with certainty by inspecting the coils state, then its final state must not overlap with the initial state.
However the addition of a single photon to the field in the coil does not, even under the most favourable assumptions concerning the state of this coil,
lead to any observable change (consider the field to be in a coherent state, for example).
2 If it is possible, by introducing a superconducting quantum interference device (SQUID)33, to detect the exchange of a single photon, then according
to the usual application of the quantum formalism the implied orthogonality of SQUID states destroys the interference. This experiment, if performed,
would, if interference is not observed, confirm the non-separability of neutron and SQUID states. If on the other hand interference persists, then the
experiment would contradict quantum non-separability; the SQUID state would be decoupled from the neutron state.
3 If a single energy transfer is not detectable, can some device be added that stores the individual unidirectional energy transfers eventually leading to a
detectable amount? Is so then this energy can only have come from the passage of individual neutrons

through the coil, which implies that each individual neutron actually travels along one or the other of the paths through the interferometer and takes part in
interference.

(iv) Energy conservation and the double-coil experiment

Consider now the situation with two time-dependent rf coils, one in each beam34. In this proposed experiment the doubts raised by Badurek et al.29
concerning the phase-number uncertainty do not apply at all34, since the resulting interference pattern is stationary. No theoretical objection arises for a
possible detection of single photon transitions in the field of the rf spin flipper on this count.
Ignoring all common phase factors, the wave functions of the superposed beams are:

[14]

[15]

with polarization:

[16]

and:

[17]

Spatial interference is recovered. The results of this single apparatus are:

1 each emerging neutron has lost an energy E; its spin is now down in the guide field;
2 each neutron takes part in interference.
In order to explain the measured loss of energy, the neutron must pass as a particle through one or the other coil and exchange a photon with the field. In
the quantum potential approach this is consistent with the observation of interference; in a description based on wave/particle duality it is not, as both
particle (loss of energy) and wave (interference) properties must be manifest simultaneously in one and the same experimental arrangement.
A measurement of the polarization of the neutron behind the interferometer reveals that each neutron has suffered a spin flip. Each emerging neutron has
lost an amount of energy E where E=2B represents the Zeeman splitting. If energy is to be conserved this energy must have gone to one or other of
the coils. This is only possible if the neutron passes as a particle through one or other and gives an indivisible photon of energy
to the rffield. The spatial interference can only be explained by assuming that the neutron does not pass through one or other of the coils.

Since here both interference and spin direction can be measured simultaneously, according to CIQM the neutron actually travels path I or II and at the
same time does not exist as a particle at all.
In the Bohr-Einstein debate the application of particle momentum conservation in individual events always led to the consistency of CIQM. Here the
energy conservation leads to the inconsistency of CIQM, since wave and particle aspects must be used together to explain the observed results. If it is
insisted in CIQM that neutrons do not travel one way or the other in this experiment, no energy can be transferred to the coils and then there is no
conservation of energy in individual events. Further, if a statistical ensemble of individual neutron passages is considered, we see that, even there, there is
no conservation of energy in CIQM when the interference is observed.
We are confronted by a stark alternative. Either:
1 we renounce any possibility of describing what happens in the neutron interferometry experiments; there exists then no possibility of explaining
quantum phenomena, not even in terms of a wave/particle duality which only leads to ambiguity; individual quantum phenomena are in principle and
irreducibly indeterminist in character and there can be no form of physical determinism appropriate in the quantum domain; or
2 we adopt the quantum potential approach as the only known consistent manner in which the quantum world can be conceived and explained in
terms of a physically determinist reality; then, even if the quantum potential approach is not taken as the finally satisfactory description of quantum
mechanical reality, it at least shows in a clear way the features that such a description must entail.
Consider the question of energy conservation in a more general way in SIQM and CIQM. In CIQM, as emphasized by Bohr, we may only consider the
energy of a system to be definite when the system is in a stationary state. The system may only be in a stationary state in the absence of perturbing forces,
such as those necessarily introduced in a measuring process. Such interactions are necessary to localize the system in order to allow a space-time
description. Thus, in a transition between stationary states, energy conservation can be applied to the initial and final states but this excludes the conditions
necessary for a space-time description. Bohr would say that when we are in a position to speak of space-time location there can be no question of energy
conservation and, when energy conservation can be applied, the concepts of space-time co-ordination lose their immediate sense.
In SIQM a stationary state means the particle energy given by S/t is a constant. The quantum potential is time independent and the particles motion
is conservative in that:

The particle can gain or lose kinetic energy at the expense of quantum potential energy. For example in an S state of an H atom, the particle is stationary
with energy E, this energy being held as quantum potential energy whilst the quantum force Q balances the Coulomb force V. In a different
example, when is a plane monochromatic wave, the particle energy is a constant since the quantum potential vanishes. A more complex case is that of
the double-slit experiment discussed above.
For stationary states and systems which undergo changes between them, conservation of energy may be established in both SIQM and CIQM, but
SIQM can also provide a space-time description.
The case in which is a superposition of stationary states is rather different, as discussed by Bohm3,35 and de Broglie12,36. Consider the state:

[18]

where is a sum of stationary states with energy Ek .

In CIQM we simply say that the energy of the individual system is not well defined but that upon measurement the value En will be found with
probability |Cn|2. Thus any individual process that includes (as part of its initial or final state) a superposition of states of different energy cannot be
described in terms of energy conservation. If we insist that infinite plane waves represent an excessive abstraction and the more realistic description of a
free particle is a wave packet or superposition of plane waves of different momenta, then we are led to conclude that energy conservation cannot be
applied even to the motion of an individual free particle. The particle, in so far as it exists in CIQM, has potentially all the energies Ek with probabilities
|Ck |2.
In SIQM a particle represented by a superposition of stationary states with different energies has a well-defined energy at each moment (dependent on
its initial position) in the wave packet but this energy is continuously variable with time. (However, the mean particle energy averaged over the ensemble is
equal to the usual quantum mechanical result for the energy operator.) The variation of energy is due to the influence of the quantum potential which
fluctuates with time. Thus in a wave-packet representation of the free particle we find that energy is not conserved for an individual particle since
S/tconstant.
Let us reconsider from this point of view the neutron interferometer experiment with one rf-coil in path II. Before entering the interferometer the neutron
has a well-defined energy E corresponding to
On leaving it is a superposition of states of different energy E(z) on path I and (EE)(z) on path II.
Thus the spin can be found in the xy plane, by the measurement procedure described above, clearly demonstrating the principle of spin superposition
(interference), i.e. the state is not a mixture of z and z. However this interference

observation requires us to relinquish the possibility of a description in terms of energy conservation. The attempt to apply energy conservation would
require the use of a definite spin state in the guide field; that is, the state would have to be either z or z (a mixture). In that case energy conservation
could apply in individual processes since superposition and interference is lost. A neutron in beam I with z retains its original spin energy whilst one beam
II exchanges E with the coil. Thus we may choose to measure the z component of the spin and apply conservation of energy or observe the
superposition and deny energy conservation. The two are complementary.
A similar situation exists in the two-slit experiments. If we wish to consider conservation of momentum of an individual electron, then it must be
described as passing through one slit or the other in order to exchange momentum. If it passes through one slit, or the other, then interference is not
possible.
In SIQM the particles have definite positions, momenta, energy and spin at all times, their associated (spinor) waves producing interference properties
through the action of the (spin-dependent) quantum potential. In the neutron interferometer experiment described above there are then two possibilities
depending on the path taken at the first crystal plane when interference is observed, i.e.:

If we choose to measure the z component no superposition effects can be observed and energy is conserved on both paths.
If interference is observed then a neutron which travels in path I has an overall loss of energy E/2 while a neutron which travels path II has an overall
gain of energy of E/2 (E transfer to coil). Thus for SIQM, in an ensemble, energy is conserved when interference occurs. This is not the case in
CIQM. Also in SIQM when we include the possibility of energy exchange with the ether, through the action of the quantum torque which rotates z and z
to xy it is seen that energy may be conserved even in the individual case.
In general we see that in CIQM there is no possibility of recovering energy conservation in non-stationary situations; indeed, individual processes have
no real independent existence.
Such a possibility does exist in SIQM if we assume that the particle exchanges energy with the sub-quantum Dirac ether. Indeed the recovery of
conservation of energy in real individual processes is a strong reason for accepting the existence of such an ether.

We should note that the prediction of variable or non-constant energy made by SIQM does not contradict any experimental results of quantum
mechanics. Indeed all the results of quantum mechanics can be reproduced by SIQM. Thus, as Bohm points out, when describing the scattering of a
particle wave-packet by an atom whilst the interaction is still taking place and the wave packets overlap the particle and atomic electron energies fluctuate
violently and it is only when the packets separate that the energies obtain a constant value. The corresponding feature in CIQM is given by the uncertainty
relations
and the energy of each system can only become definite after a sufficient time has elapsed to complete the scattering.
Thus the prediction of the existence of variable energies in SIQM does not contradict any result of quantum mechanics. In fact the SIQM can provide
detailed information concerning the energy variation along well-determined trajectories in space-time in particular experimental situations. CIQM simply
does not deny the possible existence of such energies if they are measured. The implication of this is that SIQM can make predictions which do not
contradict CIQM but, in going beyond what CIQM allows to be possible, in the sense of being more precise, clearly demonstrates its incomplete
character. In particular, some effects in non-linear optics experiments, i.e. the ejection of a photo-electron37, photo-ionization of a gas38 and
fluorescence39, occur even when the laser frequency is in fact below the necessary threshold for the process (provided the beam is put in a non-stationary
state by focusing or by creation of a pulse). These effects can be interpreted in both CIQM and SIQM. However, by providing a detailed description of
the individual trajectories and particle energies involved, SIQM can make testable predictions which are not possible in CIQM. In SIQM it is possible to
predict at which points the particles of increased energy will be found and hence exactly where the effects should be observed40. If such predictions can
be confirmed the CIQM would be shown to be incomplete in the original sense of Einstein.

4 Quantum statistics
In orthodox theory the wavelike density fluctuations of collections of like particles are described using Bose-Einstein or Fermi-Dirac statistics based solely
on the notion of indistinguishability and the symmetry or antisymmetry of the wave function. However any interpretation of quantum mechanics which
asserts the existence of individual particle trajectories is faced with a problem when the question of quantum statistical behaviour arises. Brillouin41 had
already in 1927 considered this problem. He argued that even if particles are identical a priori, it is easy nevertheless to distinguish them by their history.
He then finds the auxiliary assumptions that enable quantum

statistics to be obtained with distinguishability of elements. When the elements are assumed to be independent classical statistics result, in order to obtain
quantum statistics some correlation between the distinguishable elements must be assumed. Further, as has been more recently emphasized by Feynman42,
no classical model with local interactions between the elements can ever reproduce all the results of quantum mechanics. This represents a serious
problem in the statistical interpretation, and in SIQM.
In the derivation of the formulae of classical statistics with distinguishability, the assumption that the elements are free between random local collisions
and that each distinct state has equal probability leads, for N elements distributed among M available discrete states, to the result that the probability of a
set of occupancies {ni} i=1M is proportional to the number of distinct configurations corresponding to {ni}:

[19]

However, Tersoff and Bayer43 have shown that Bose-Einstein statistics can be recovered with distinguishable particles if the assumption of equal
probability distribution among available states is replaced by that of arbitrary probability weighting. It has also been shown44 that such an arbitrary
probability weighting is a natural consequence of the causal interpretation. In this interpretation the assumption of random local collisions and independent
particles no longer holds. The average motions of N particles given by:

[20]

are determined from the non-local action at-a-distance quantum potential:

[21]

This potential acts instantaneously in the centre of mass rest-frame and also implies that the interaction is causal (since the individual Hamiltonians
satisfy the causality constraints {Hk ,Hj}=0) so that all colliding particles are permanently correlated and can never be considered
free. This implies that each individual state is not identical with all others, so that we should attribute to each one a different probability weighting i of
course requiring 0i1 and
This weight depends on all former possible different real subquantal random motions in phase space, so that the
total statistics results from an averaging over all possible i in all possible configurations. Thus we should write:

[22]

which, as shown by Tersoff and Bayer43, leads to the Bose-Einstein result:

[23]

Fermi-Dirac statistics can also be reproduced45 in a similar way with the constraint that ni=0 or 1.
As an illustration we now show in a particular physical situation how the individual motions of particles under the influence of the many-body quantum
potential lead to different statistical results according to the type of wave function assumed46. The causal interpretation of quantum statistics can thus be
shown to provide an intuitive understanding of quantum statistical results (in terms of correlated particle motions), classical statistics arising as a special
case when the particles are not correlated by the quantum potential. The case examined here is the following. Consider a harmonic oscillator potential:

and construct, by solving the Schrdinger equation, a wave-packet solution35:

[24]
This wave-packet solution is non-dispersive and, depending on the time parameter t, defines in the causal interpretation a set of possible
trajectories for a particle located at the position x, where x 0 is the centre of a wave packet.
Now consider the case of two particles, one in each of the wave packets A(x 1 ,t) and B(x 2 ,t) in the harmonic oscillator potential. The packet
A(x 1 ,t) is assumed to be centred at x 0 and, in order to simplify the calculations, the packet B(x 2 ,t) centred at x 0 .
It is clear that, depending on the assumed statistics (MB, BE or FD), three wave functions can be written. These are:

[25]

[26]

[27]

where the s are renormalization constants to be determined by the condition

A standard quantum mechanical calculation yields the
mean squared separation of the particles and it can be shown that the mean squared separation of the particles is in the BE case decreased and in the FD
case increased with respect to the MB case.
In SIQM individual pairs of trajectories can be calculated from suitable initial positions in the wave packets and the results are shown in Figure 9.11.
This figure provides us with the basic physical features of the process. The MB particles, being independent, possess trajectories that cross one another.
They propagate undisturbed and produce no interference. This is not the case for BE or FD particles. They do not cross but form interference patterns in
which the two particles are on the average closer together in the BE case than in the FD case.
The correlation effects mediated by the quantum potential between the two particles determines their physical behaviour and conditions their different
statistical averages of physical variables or observables. This can be easily understood in the SIQM, where particles obeying quantum statistics are
constantly submitted to the stochastic random motions of the underlying subquantal medium, the Dirac ether. The symmetric or antisymmetric character of
the systems wave function is a consequence of the existence (or not) of local repulsive gauge fields and not a first quantum mechanical principle.
Thus it can be seen that MB statistics (and independence) arise as a special case of the more general quantum statistics (and correlation) when the
many-body quantum potential is separable in the particle variables.

5 Negative probabilities
We have seen how accepting the physical idea of particle trajectories in the quantum domain can lead to the formulation of new physical questions which
one would not be led to on the basis of the CIQM. We end this paper by discussing an interpretative problem raised by relativistic quantum mechanics,
namely the mathematical existence of negative probability density and negative energy solutions to second-order wave equations, which, as in all other
quantum processes, we argue can only be coherently treated by assuming the real physical existence of paths. Indeed, this is an important issue in the
SIQM since the very existence of paths in space-time implies positive pro-

Figure 9.11 Ensemble of two particle trajectories x 1 (t), x2 (t) with initial positions such that x 2 (0)=x 1 (0) and a concentration of
particle trajectories around the packet maxima, (a) Maxwell-Boltzman (b) Bose-Einstein (c) Fermi-Dirac.

bability distributions and, moreover, in accordance with Einsteins basic principles, all material drift motions should be timelike and propagate positive
energy forward in time.
It is sometimes erroneously stated that the only way out of the problem of negative probability solutions to the Klein-Gordon (KG) equation is to reject
the first quantized formalism in favour of second quantization. In fact, this is not so and it is possible to show by a

Hamiltonian method due to Feshbach and Villars47,48 that for certain well-behaved external potentials the KG solutions may be split into positive and
negative energy parts associated respectively with positive and negative probability.
To see this, let us start from the charged scalar wave equation:

[28]

where D=ieA, e and m are the charge and mass of the particle moving in the external field A, the metric has the signature ( + + +) and the units
are chosen so that
[28] may be expressed in the form:

[29]

where is a two-component wave function and H is a 22 matrix Hamiltonian. One can show that for the inner product

where:

[30]

is the conserved current, the mean value of H in any state is positive: <,H> > 0. It follows that, with H=E, the space of solutions of equation [29]
splits into two disjoint subsets: {E>0, <.> >0} and {E<0, <,> <0}. The latter subset of solutions may be mapped into positive-energy positiveprobability anti-particle solutions by means of the charge conjugation operation:

since from equation [29]:

Thus, within the CIQM, one can show formally how, for stationary states, the signs of energy and integrated probability are correlated and that negative
probability solutions may be physically interpreted. Note though, that the local values of probability density may become negative and that such motions
remain interpreted. We shall now show how in the causal interpretation we are able to prove a stronger result than that just given, and in a way which is
technically easier and physically clearer. Our approach extends some brief remarks of de Broglie49 concerning this problem.
Substituting =ep+is, where P, S are real scalars, in [28] yields the Hamilton-Jacobi and conservation equations:

[31]

[32]

where

is de Broglies variable rest mass and:

is the current (equation [30]).

The assumption of the SIQM is that the KG particle has a drift velocity

where is the proper time along paths parallel to j . In terms of the momentum
Defining a scalar density =Me2P we may express equation [32] in the form50:

with

from equation [31].

From this it follows that along a line of flow:

[33]

where is a volume element of fluid and K is a real or pure imaginary constant (which, however, varies from one drift line to another). If on an initial
spacelike surface the motion is timelike, then from equation [31] M is real and so is K. Now, in the rest frame, u0E=M where the particle energy
E=0SeA0.It follows that if initially the motion is future-pointing, with E>0, then M>0 which implies K>0 (since e2P>0 and >0 always) and we see
from equation [33] that the timelike and positive energy character of the motion is preserved all along a trajectory. Moreover, the sign of the probability
density j 0=2e2P E is correlated with the sign of E and will remain positive along a line of flow if the initial motion has E>0.
Identical arguments lead to an association of past-pointing negative-energy motions with negative probability densities and this coupling is preserved
along a line of flow if initially E<0. Such solutions may be mapped on to positive energy, positive probability density anti-particle solutions by the charge
conjugation given above: c=*.
These results, proved in the rest frame, evidently remain valid under orthochronous Lorentz transformations.
We have thus succeeded in separating the solutions to the causal

KG equation into two disjoint subsets {E>0, j 0>0} and {E<0, j 0<0} and shown that the causal laws of motion prevent the development of one type of
solution into the other. This reasoning holds for all external fields A which maintain the timelikeness of the momentum P. Should the external potential be
strong enough, pair creation may occur and the separation of the solutions breaks down. In addition, we assume that the initial motion is associated with a
wave packet so that the initial total probability is unity. This is an important point, since de Broglie12 has shown how, with a plane KG wave incident on a
partially reflecting mirror, superluminal motions apparently occur in the region of the Wiener fringes. It seems that these unphysical motions are a
consequence of the excessive abstraction implied by the use of plane waves.
It is emphasized that we have only been able to overcome the difficulty of negative probabilities by assuming that particles possess well-defined spacetime trajectories, and that they are subject to action by the quantum potential (contained in M). With these assumptions, we can immediately associate the
sign of particle energy with the sign of local probability density, an energy moreover which is well-defined and continuously variable for all possible particle
motions (and not just for stationary states). The initial character of these motions is preserved for all time by the Hamilton-Jacobi and conservation
equations.
If one accepts that the quantum mechanical formalism is complete then one must accept Feynmans statement51 that there is no way of eliminating
negative probabilities from the intermediate stages of, for example, an interference calculation. The problem of their physical interpretation then cannot be
avoided.
However, if one accepts the introduction of trajectories in the description, then our demonstration above shows how the positive character of
probability is preserved at every stage of the calculation. The association of positive probabilities with positive energy is of course in accordance with the
principles of relativity theory.
We note finally that, although our discussion here has been confined to a single KG particle52, our method may be applied to the elimination of negative
probabilities from the theory of the many-body KG system, the spin-1 Proca equation, and the spin- Feynman-Gell-Mann equation53.
Finally, we wish to stress that the causal interpretation does not reinstate the mechanistic classical world view. Particles may be described as possessing
definite values of physical variables but these variables depend, through the quantum forces arising from the quantum potential and torque, on the whole
quantum state which includes the influence of the environment.
The lessons of Bohms work are clear. We can adopt Bohrs idealist epistemology and deny the very possibility of analysing what happens

within quantum phenomena, such as neutron interference. However we should then be consistent and refuse to speak of the quantum world as if it actually
exists. The only other known alternative, which is capable of reproducing all the results of quantum mechanics in terms of a physically determinist reality, is
the non-classical causal interpretation. Far from returning to classical mechanics it shows exactly how radical a revision of our concepts quantum
mechanics entails. Even if it is not taken as a fully satisfactory description of quantum mechanical reality, it at least shows in a clear way the features that
such a description must entail. The interpretations of Bohr and of de Broglie-Bohm-Vigier both emphasize that the fundamentally new feature exhibited by
quantum phenomena is a kind of wholeness completely foreign to the post-Aristotelean reductionist mechanism in which all of nature in the final analysis
consists simply of separate and independently existing parts whose motions, determined by a few fundamental forces of interaction, are sufficient to
account for all phenomena. The difference arises in the methods for dealing with the situation. One thing however is clear; the organization of nature at the
fundamental level is far more complex than mere mechanistic models can encompass. The ghost cannot be exorcized from the machine.

Conclusion
Throughout this contribution we have discussed various interpretations of the quantum formalism, and what has emerged is that the problem is not simply
one of interpreting the same results in various ways. In fact there are good reasons for the argument that CIQM and SIQM are essentially different
theories between which a choice can be made in a no arbitrary manner. Moreover:
1 They have different ontologies since the real existents are different. In SIQM individual processes are real, take place in space and time and have
well-defined properties. In fact SIQM can account for all the quantum properties of matter, including all the so-called paradoxes, within this
framework without conflicting with the requirements of special relativity. Further it does this in terms of a model which is immediately intuitively clear
and which allows a visualization of the actual processes taking place.
2 All events occurring in space and time can be attributed to material causes which are also processes taking place in space-time, albeit non-locally. In
CIQM the behaviour of matter is irreducibly indeterminate; for example, nothing causes the decay of an unstable nucleus.
3 In some versions of CIQM the behaviour of matter depends on the cognizance of observers. Such a possibility does not exist in

SIQM in which the material world has an existence independent of the knowledge of observers.
4
Since SIQM allows a description of the causation of individual events, it enables a deeper analysis and understanding of phenomena with the possibility of
developing more penetrating theories of these events which CIQM shrouds in mystery by the dogmatic insistence in the absolute and final character of
complementarity and indeterminacy.
5
The possibility exists in SIQM to make testable predictions which go beyond, by being more precise, but nevertheless do not contradict those of quantum
mechanics.
6
Complementarity is inadequate in the description of time-dependent neutron interferometry and requires the renunciation of energy conservation in
interference situations, whereas the description of SIQM is consistent and apparent non-conservation of energy may be explained through the possibility
of energy exchange with the ether.

Acknowledgements
The authors C.Dewdney, P.R.Holland and A.Kyprianidis wish to thank the Royal Society, the SERC and the French government respectively for financial
support which enabled the work reported here to be completed, and the Institut Henri Poincar for its hospitality.

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10
Irreversibility, stochasticity and non-locality in classical dynamics
Ilya Prigogine and Yves Elskens
Universit Libre de Bruxelles and Center for Statistical Mechanics and Thermodynamics, University of Texas at Austin
It is a privilege to contribute to this volume honouring David Bohm. There is no need to enumerate his basic contributions to modern theoretical physics;
these are well known to the scientific community. What is however unique about David Bohm is his deep involvement in epistemological problems. In this
perspective, there is probably no single concept more fundamental than time in its connection with cosmology. As Karl Popper beautifully writes1: There
is at least one philosophic problem in which all thinking men are interested. It is the problem of cosmology: the problem of understanding the
worldincluding ourselves, and our knowledge, as part of the world.

1 The problem of time

It is interesting to recall that one of the deepest analyses of the concept of time is due to Aristotle2,3 and dates back twenty-three centuries. Aristotles
analysis, as developed in his Physics, is very subtle, and introduces the idea of a radical polarity in time; the celebrated definition of Physica iv, 219a-b
says that time is something connected with motion, in the perspective of the earlier and the later. This can lead to divergent interpretations; the
distinction of the earlier and the later may be an objective feature of the cosmos, or it may be due to the counting activity of the soul. We then have two
different viewpoints: one which unites us with the universe; and one in which it is man who introduces time in a timeless universe. This problem is still with
us. However, the reconceptualisation which physics is presently undergoing places the problem in a new perspective.

It is well known that the formulation of modern science by Isaac Newton occurred in a period of absolute monarchy, under the sign of an Almighty
God, supreme garant of rationality. The Western concept of law of nature can simply not be separated from its judicial and religious resonances; the
ideal of knowledge is patterned according to the omniscience we may ascribe to a Ruler. For Him, there would be no distinction between past and future.
Therefore, in this perspective, in which the scientist represents the human embodiment of a transcendental vision, Time could indeed only be an illusion, in
the words of Einstein4.
However, the atemporal world of classical physics was shaken by the industrial revolution. One of the greatest intellectual novelties5,6 of that period
was the formulation of the laws of thermodynamics by Rudolf Clausius in 1865: Die Energie der Welt ist constant. Die Entropie der Welt strebt einem
Maximum zu. In this view the world has a history. But beware: this history is a history of decay, of degradation; a history expressed by the increase of
entropy.
At present, physics is in search of a third time, reducible neither to repetition nor to decay. One of the major developments of this century is associated
with the study of non-equilibrium systems. We have already mentioned the second law of thermodynamics, which expresses the increase of entropy for
isolated systems. For a long time, the interest of thermodynamics was limited to equilibrium systems; today, interest shifts to non-equilibrium systems
interacting with their surroundings through an entropy flow. Let us emphasise an essential difference with the description of classical mechanics. In
thermodynamics we are dealing with embedded systems; interaction with the outside world through entropy flow plays an essential role. This
immediately brings us closer to objects like towns or living systems, which can only survive because of their embedding in their environment.
The inclusion of dissipation leads to a drastic change in the concept of stability. If some foreign celestial body approached the earth, this would lead to a
modification of the earths trajectory, which would remain for ever; conservative dynamical systems have no way to forget perturbations. This is no longer
the case when we include dissipation; a damped pendulum will reach a position of equilibrium, whatever the initial perturbation. We can now also
understand in quite general terms what happens when we drive a system far from equilibrium. The attractor which dominated the behaviour of the system
near equilibrium may become unstable, as a result of the flow of matter and energy which we direct at the system. Non-equilibrium becomes a source of
order; new types of attractors, more complicated ones, may appear, and give to the system remarkable new space-time properties (in phase space).
We cannot go further into these questions, which are now the

subject of an extensive literature7,8,9,10. Let us only mention that, because of the constructive role of irreversibility, we need to reappraise the role of
irreversibility on the fundamental level, be it classical or quantum.
Here a confrontation with the traditional point of view becomes unavoidable. Indeed, the conventional viewpoint is that the fundamental laws of physics
being symmetric with respect to the time-reversal transformation, there can be no fundamental physical basis for oriented time. The appearance of
irreversibility in physical processes and the related arrow of time are only the result of statistical averaging (or coarse graining), which is necessitated
not by any objective aspect of physical phenomena but simply to take into account our ignorance (or lack of interest) of the exact dynamical state of the
system. Thus Born, for instance, asserts11 that Irreversibility is a consequence of the explicit introduction of ignorance into the fundamental laws. This
would make a chemical or biological structure the outcome of our personal ignorance, which is paradoxical.
However, the difficulties in introducing irreversibility on the fundamental level are obviously very serious, as they lead us to question the meaning of
trajectories in the case of classical dynamics, as well as the relevance of fundamental theorems such as the Liouville theorem12,13. In this note, we want to
emphasise that, in spite of such difficulties, the programme initiated by Boltzmann 100 years ago can now be rigorously worked out for well-defined
classes of unstable dynamical systems.
As a result, we now begin to decipher the message of the second law of thermodynamics: we are living in a world of unstable dynamical systems (in a
sense to be specified later); moreover, our physical world has a broken temporal symmetry. There exist classes of initial conditions which are admissible
while their time-inverse is not. To some extent these considerations apply also to quantum theory and relativity; for lack of space we limit ourselves here to
classical systems.
Probably the most fascinating aspect involved in the transition from dynamics to thermodynamics is the deep change in the structure of space-time
which the introduction of irreversibility requires on the microscopic level. Irreversibility leads to a well-defined form of non-locality14,15 in which a point is
replaced by an ensemble of points according to a new space-time geometry determined by the inclusion of the privileged arrow of time. We cannot hope
to present a extensive account in this paper, but we intend to describe some of the basic concepts involved in this new approach to dynamics.
It is interesting to note that the need to go beyond the dynamical concepts, to include among the fundamental notions those of randomness and
irreversibility, has been recognised recently by various

authors in all fields of physics16,17,18,19. It is also the direction which our group is pursuing for more than two decades20, but the novelty of the subject
required for forging of appropriate mathematical tools and framework, which were not available at the start 7,21,22.

2 Classical and modern dynamics

Classical dynamics rests on the notion of trajectories in phase space. If we let =(1n)
evolution is represented by a one-to-one mapping:

describe the state of a physical system, the systems

[1]

from to itself. For Hamiltonian systems, and more generally for flows, the mapping St is invertible: St1=St is also defined as a one-to-one mapping of
onto itself; the present configuration (0) uniquely defines all the past and future configurations (t), <t<. Modern analysis developed an
alternative approach to classical dynamics with the description of the systems state by a set of symbols s, taking values in an alphabet according to
the following rule. Let us first choose a partition of , i.e. a set of subsets Ps, s , covering , such that
if sr. Then we say that a
state is described by a symbol s if Ps (s is a coarse-grained description of ). If we make sequential observations, say at every time
the
systems evolution defines the sequence s=(st),
of the successive symbols for the successive states (t). Then the dynamics of St induces on the
sequence s a symbolic dynamics in the form of a shift mapping:

[2]

This description expresses clearly the reversibility of classical mechanics: the sequence (sn) exists once and for all, and the flow of time leads to a mere
relabelling of the symbols sn.
In the study of complex systems, involving many degrees of freedom, a description of the systems state by a single point in phase space is
unrealistic. We thus resort with Gibbs to a statistical description, by a probability measure d=()d over . The physical interpretation of this
ensemble (through this paper, when speaking of the classical ensemble theory of Gibbs, we do not refer to Gibbs invariant ensembleswhich play a
fundamental role in the statistical mechanics of ergodic systems7,23but rather to his presentation24 of the concept of an ensemble as a collection of
systems: this presentation takes no account of time asymmetry) is an assembly of identical systems with the same macroscopic properties; the evolution of
the ensemble is induced by the microscopic motion as:

[3]

If the mapping St is invertible, the evolution operators

, <t <, form a unitary group:

[4]

This Koopman description of the dynamics in terms of distribution functions or ensembles evolving by the action of the operator
is only a formal
extension of the microscopic view of points moving on trajectories in phase space, as the action of
is conjugate to the point transformation St on .
Moreover, for Hamiltonian systems in canonical co-ordinates, Liouvilles theorem states that:
1 the evolution operator

preserves the measure d

[5]

2 for any measure ()d and function f(x):

[6]

In particular, the Boltzmann H-functional:

[7]

is constant in time. However, while the volume (the measure) of sets in phase space is preserved, their shape may be highly deformed or they may even
fragment (see Figure 10.3 below). This deformation or fragmentation gives the appearance of an approach to equilibriumwhere all points would be
uniformly distributed in the phase space. But this is only an appearance, as H[1]=0, whereas for any non-equilibrium distribution:

[8]

In the classical view, the world is thus similar to a museum in which information is stored once and for all. Time could then be compared to a patient
demolition of artefacts into pieces, which are preserved and could be used to reconstruct the artefacts in full detail.
For nearly three centuries after Newton, classical dynamics appeared as a closed method enabling one to compute whatever physical quantity from first
principles and well-defined initial data. This holds true, but only for a limited class of dynamical systems, for the recent developments in dynamics show
(see examples in section 3) that many dynamical systems are unstable; in such systems, each region of phase space (whatever its size) contains many
diverging

trajectories, so that the assimilation of a finite region of phase space (however small) to a single point becomes ambiguous22.
In this context, it is interesting to recall the classification of dynamical systems recently proposed by Ford, Eckhardt and Vivaldi25,26:
1 for algorithmically (A-)integrable systems, the action of St is coherent enough for the trajectory of a point to be computable with arbitrary precision
over any time lapse quite easily from prescribed initial data; the orbits of neighbouring points are (marginally in general) stable; examples of such
systems include all analytically integrable systems, rational planar billiards, etc.;
2 to the opposite, Kolmogorov (K-) systems exhibit a complex behaviour of individual trajectories, like exponential divergence, to the effect that no
finite algorithm (including its data) can reliably compute the motion of phase points sensibly faster than the dynamics itself; systems of this kind
include geodesic flow on surfaces with negative curvature, hard spheres in three dimensions, the planar Lorentz gas model, etc.
The essential difference between the two classes is that the concept of the phase-space trajectory of the system is operational in A-integrable systems
and useless in Kolmogorov systems. It becomes therefore natural to look for a formulation of dynamics which eliminates for the K-systems the
unobservable concept of a trajectory. One may expect that this elimination would also permit us to include in the frame of dynamics the concept of
irreversibility; accordingly, we consider that the natural theoretical framework for unstable dynamical systems is a theory of semi-groups rather than
groups.
The main object of this paper is to provide an elementary presentation of this transition from dynamical groups to semi-groups in the framework of
statistical mechanics and ergodic theory. Before showing this construction, let us give two simple examples of K-systems.

3 The baker transformation and the hard-point gas

To clarify the mathematical properties involved in this discussion, let us introduce two simple K-systems. We first consider the baker transformation of the
unit square27: on the phase space
we define the mapping S1:
where (see Figure 10.1):

[9]

Figure 10.1 The baker transformation of the unit square is a piece wise linear, area-preserving mapping.

This mapping is invertible, and it preserves the measure d=dx dy. As it expands along the x-direction by a constant factor 2, neighbouring points diverge
exponentially in time, so that the value of St(x, y) can be computed to a number N of binary digits only from data giving x with N+t digits. Hence,
according to the classification of section 2, this system is not A-integrable and is a K-system. In particular, it has a finite Kolmogorov-Sinai invariant hK.
(The KS invariant (or entropy) gives the rate at which an algorithm, required to give a specified precision at time t, must grow as t. In the case of the
baker transformation one finds hK=ln 2.)
A symbolic description of the baker model is provided by the partition ={P0,P1} with alphabet ={0,1}, and P0 (resp. P1) is the left (right) half of
the square. It is easily seen that the symbolic sequence (st),
corresponding to a point =(x, y), is given by the binary expansions:

[10]

The measure dx dy translates on the sequence space into a Bernoulli measure B(1/2, 1/2), i.e. the probability measure for whichall symbols st of a
sequence s are independent and P(st=0)=P(st=1)=1/2 for any t. The baker dynamical system is therefore said to be (isomorphic to) a Bernoulli
shiftwhich is the simplest realisation of K-systems.
For a more physical example28, consider the one-dimensional lattice of integers . Each site of can accommodate at most one particle with
velocity +1 and one particle with velocity 1 (we exclude states

where two particles would have the same position and velocity). The particles are distributed, at time t=0, according to the Bernoullian rules (with
0<<1):
1 no odd site is occupied by a particle;
2 at any even site, there is a probability 2 for finding two particles (with opposite velocities), (1) for finding only a particle with v=+1, (1) for
only a particle with v=1, and (1)2 for no particle at all;
3 the sites occupations are independent.

Figure 10.2 If we embed the hard-point model in a continuous space-time, the motion of a typical particle (thick line) is a
succession of free flights, with instantaneous velocity reversals at collisions. In the model, collisions can only happen
at integer instants.

The systems state is determined from the initial data of all particles positions and velocities (xk , vk )(0).
Let x k (t) denote the position of a particle, labelled k, at time t. Each particle moves freely at constant velocity until it meets another particlein which
case it reverses its velocity (see Figure 10.2). The motion of particle k is thus completely specified by the data of its initial position x k (0) and velocity
v k (0), along with a sequence (Ck (t)),
where Ck (t)=1 (resp. +1) if the particle suffers a collision (resp. no collision) at time t.
It can be shown that the motion of a single particle (say k=0) for all times <t<, determines completely the initial data (x k (0), v k (0)),
and
hence the motion of all particles for all times. Besides, the evolution of the sequence C0(n),
under the dynamics St reduces to a shift
The Bernoullian distribution of initial positions and velocities translates in this picture to a Bernoulli distribution B(, 1) for the
sequence C0(n),
on
and an independent distribution P(v 0(0)=1)=P(v 0(0) =+1)=1/2. In particular, if =1/2, the use of x 0(0), v 0(0)
and C0(n), <n<, maps our lattice gas model onto the abstract baker model. The hard-points model is also a K-system, and the explicit determination
of a particles trajectory during a lapse (t) requires an information about initial data of incoming particles over a spatial interval with length (2t).
Examples of unstable dynamics appear today in many fields of physics. In celestial mechanics, for instance (the paradigm of classical mechanics!), a
statistical approach has facilitated the study of the parabolic restricted three-body problem8,29, and of the distribution of asteroids in the solar system30,
for which orbital perturbation methods prove insufficient.
These examples illustrate the inadequacy of the concept of a trajectory for unstable dynamical systems. For such systems it proves impossible to verify
by a computer experiment the validity of Liouvilles theorem or the invariance of Gibbs H-functional over arbitrary time intervals. Classical dynamics thus
appears as an idealisation which cannot be reached experimentally, be it in real world experiment or through a computer experiment. Furthermore, the
breakdown of classical mechanics occurs on an intrinsic time scale (inversely proportional to the K-S entropy or the Lyapunov exponents), which can
only decrease if in addition computational errors are taken into account.
One of the reasons for introducing a new conceptual frame at the basic level of description of dynamics is to develop methods able to deal with realworld situations without introducing unobservable concepts (such as initial data known with infinite precision) in the theoretical scheme. In this sense, our
approach follows the trails of quantum theory and relativity.

4 Irreversibility and probability

Boltzmanns pioneering work in statistical physics is based on his relation:

[11]

for the entropy S of a macroscopic state with probability P. The appearance of this concept of probability in the context of deterministic dynamics can
only have two possible causes: it may result from our ignorance of some relevant variables or functions; or from the actual inadequacy of the fundamental
concepts of classical dynamics. The analogy with the problem of hidden variables in quantum theory, to which David Bohm has so much contributed, is
obvious.
For time-dependent phenomena, a basic probabilities description may be formulated in terms of Markov processes. These are characterised by a
transition operator
acting on densities () over :

[12]

whose kernel is given by transition probabilities. The transition operators

for a Markov process form a semi-group:

[13]

Most physical Markov chains have a single invariant probability measure

[14]

Let
||||:

for simplicity. Then the action of

on a non-equilibrium distribution

relaxes it towards equilibrium, as measured in a natural norm

[15]

[16]

Thus Markovian processes contract the discrepancies between the non-equilibrium function and the invariant equilibrium function 1, whereas classical
dynamics does not damp non-equilibrium discrepancies but only hides them by mixing pieces of phase space more and more intimately as time proceeds
(see Figure 10.3); the relaxation to equilibrium (equations [15] and [16]) can only be obtained by means of a non-local description of the systems
evolution.

Figure 10.3 The illusion of approach to equilibrium for t in the baker model is caused by the fragmentation of the region
supporting the non-equilibrium density in ever smaller pieces and by the ever more intimate mixing of high-density
and low-density pieces over the whole phase space, (a) The initial density 0 is uniform over the upper half of the
square, (b) Its first image under the transformation, (c) Its third image under the transformation.

5 Non-equilibrium ensembles and the second principle in statistical physics

The fundamental problem in the microscopic description of irreversible phenomena is thus mathematically expressed as the passage from a one-to-one
dynamical system (, d, St) to a non-local Markov process (, d, Wt). Clearly, such a passage cannot follow from a universal construction, as we
expect it to be possible for K-systems but not for integrable systems. Moreover this breaking of locality can only occur at the level of distribution
functions. We thus associate with any distribution function () over another distribution function:

[17]

obtained from by a linear deformation.

The deformation operator depends on the dynamics as to ensure that:

[18]

under the actual evolution of the system. The evolution of

St ; this implies an intertwining relation:

itself must also be consistent with the deterministic evolution of as imposed by the dynamics

[19]

between the unitary operator

and the contracting operator

describing the systems evolution in its two representations:

[20]

The role of in the transition from deterministic to Markovian dynamics deserves more physical considerations. First, such a deformation is meaningful
only for dynamically unstable systems, in which the notion of a trajectory is inadequate; this suggests that must be non-local, which validates the
introduction of the probability concept into

dynamics. Second, it must guarantee the decay of distribution functions to equilibrium in the future, with no restrictions on their past behaviour; must
break the dynamics symmetry under time-reversal. We shall return to these points in sections 7 and 8 after presenting an explicit construction of such
a deformation.
Transformation operators, leading from classical or quantum mechanics to Markov processes, were first introduced in 1973 by our group31,32 in
connection with kinetic theory, but there the large number of degrees of freedom causes supplementary complications21,13. We therefore restrict ourselves
in this paper to situations first considered by Misra, Courbage and one of us (I. Prigogine), where the mathematical construction can be worked out with
full rigour33,34.

6 Markov processes equivalent to deterministic dynamics

For K-systems, non-local deformation operators can be constructed naturally as follows. The phase space of a K-system can be partitioned in a family
={Ps}, s , of disjoint subsets, which:
1 is generating: two points , almost surely visit different cells for at least one moment in their motion;
2 has trivial tail: the motion of a point (t) across the partitions cells for t>T bears no correlation, as T, with its motion across the cells for t<0.
This characteristic enables one to construct an operator

conjugate to the evolution operator35,22:

[21]

which is interpreted as an internal time or age operator on the Hilbert space

The existence of an age operator also yields an orthonormal basis
unique decomposition:

[22]

In terms of eigenfunctions:

[23]

[24]

of functions with vanishing sum

in which any distribution function in L2 admits a

The coefficients ati express how much the non-equilibrium distribution function () differs from the equilibrium 1, to the extent that can be determined in
observing the system through the partition for times t. A non-equilibrium ensemble is thus equivalently described by a phase-space distribution ()
or by an infinite sequence (ati), <t<, i I. With this decomposition, the evolution of under the unitary group [3] becomes a shift mapping:

[25]

and the L2-distance between and the equilibrium distribution remains constant:

[26]

The classical view of decay to equilibrium as the effect of the mixing of trajectories in phase space (see Figure 10.3) is realised by the square-integrable
distribution functions, as for them

[27]

but it necessarily holds equally well for the future and the past evolutions. There is no room for an intrinsically irreversible evolution of distribution functions
in the classical description.
On the other hand, the L2-distance may decay to zero under a non-unitary evolution. Consider the deformed distribution function:

[28]

with coefficients 1(t)0. In operator language, we define:

[29]

where
and is a prescribed function. The deformation (equations [28] and [29]) associates a semi-group of transition operators
to the unitary evolution group
, in the form:

[30]

[31]

Then the squared distance

[32]

is a decreasing function of t if (t) is decreasing, and it vanishes for t if (t) does. We actually require that (t) decrease monotonically from ()=1
to (+)=0, and that it be log-concave ((t+n)/(n) is a non-increasing function of n, for any t). A genuine form for this function is c(t)=min(1,ct) with
0<c<1; the constant c depends on the dynamics under consideration. This exponential decrease of (t) for t plays an important role in the physical
interpretation of the operator , which we discuss in the next section.
The meaning of the profile function (t) is easily derived from the simple example:

[33]

i.e.:

[34]

In this case, for any non-equilibrium ensemble, one observes only the coefficients ati for t0 and not ati (t>0). As the initial conditions on involve all the
experimental knowledge on the ensemble, no reference to idealised data such as Dirac distributions (for which all coefficients ati are needed with a
precision inaccessible at initial time) can be made in our formulation.
However, the choice (t)=0(t) in equation [33] is particular as the resulting deformation =F0 is not invertible; in general, (t)>0 t, so that 1 is
defined densely over L2. Both and
are non-local operators, because the functions and
are computed through the coefficients ati, which
depend on the values of over the whole phase space and whose values affect and
over the whole .

7 Geometrical aspects of the -transformation

The construction and the action of -deformations are best presented for dynamical systems satisfying Anosovs conditions, like our two examples27,36.
For simplicity, we only discuss the baker model.
The baker transformation (equation [9]) contracts all vertical segments by a factor 2 and dilates horizontal ones by the same factor. Therefore, two
points , ' differing only by their ordinates move along converging trajectories, but the slightest difference in their abscissae would make them diverge
exponentially. For any point , one defines the contracting (stable) and dilating (unstable) fibres (see Figure 10.4):

[35]

where (si),

is the doubly infinite binary sequence associated to

Figure 10.4 Some components of the contracting and dilating fibres of a point in the baker model.

by equation [10]. These fibres form the stable and unstable manifolds of :

[36]

It can be shown37 that the age eigenfunctions for this dynamical system are constant along contracting fibres:

[37]

and take values in the finite set {+1, 1}. Thus, given a distribution function p(), a -transformation disperses the weight carried by each point over its
contracting fibres14. This is natural, since the points of a contracting fibre share the same behaviour for increasing time.

The radical change in scope, which our theory introduces, is best realised by studying the entropy functional38,39:

[38]

which measures the amount of information contained in the non-equilibrium distribution in comparison with eq=1. It is easily seen34 that, under the
action of the semi-group
, the entropy [t] increases with time t towards its equilibrium value like a macroscopic entropy. In this context, the
second law of thermodynamics appears as a selection principle, excluding ensembles with an infinite (negative) entropy like a Dirac distribution D(,
0) or a distribution s(, 0): supported by the contracting fibres of the point 0. These distributions (though not belonging to L2) are admitted by the
classical extended Gibbs-Koopman formalism and do not decay to equilibrium.
On the other hand, a classical coarse-graining40,24 would replace D or s by a distribution uniform over a finite cell of phase space, whose points
generally belong to different stable manifolds; the asymptotic evolution of the coarse-grained ensemble is then very different from that of the original one.
As we see, the classical coarse-grained ensembles approach to equilibrium results from the mixing of images of the partitions cells (see Figure 10.3) and
does not follow from a definite dynamical scheme, since it corresponds to no group or semi-group description41.
We would like to add a few more technical remarks. We already saw that the action of -transformations on phase-space distributions is non-local.
This non-locality can be expressed in a more precise way for systems like Anosovs27 where one introduces a metric over the phase space and the
instability is characterised by Lyapunov exponents, which measure the rates of exponential divergence of trajectories along all directions; for a metric
adapted to the dynamics, the stronger the instability, the shorter the typical distance between the points (for an infinitely strong instability, all points would
be mixed instantaneously). The interval of time over which the motion can be predicted is inversely proportional to the Lyapunov exponents; they are also
related to the K-S entropy. For the baker example, the Lyapunov exponents are = In 2, associated to the horizontal and vertical directions at each
point.
For these dynamical systems, our theory suggests36 the definition of a distance (adapted to the topology) such that for any ,

[39]

with =hK. An interesting consequence of introducing this distance

is that the -transformation, which remained to some extent arbitrary, can now be completely specified as we find that (t) is then

[40]

The -transformation acts as an effective cut-off for non-equilibrium states on a time-scale ~1/. For the hard-point model, this is just the collision timescale.

8 The fundamental entities of dynamics

The development of modern dynamics invites us to reconsider the traditional view that the microscopic description of irreversible phenomena should be
justified by our ignorance of the exact microscopic states of physical systems. To the opposite, it is the very property of instability in dynamical systems as
realised in Kolmogorov flows that leads to the construction of Markov chains, with their probabilistic and time-irreversible character. The statistical
ensembles on which these Markov chains act differ radically from Gibbs ensembles, because of their non-locality and their broken temporal symmetry
leading the system to equilibrium in the future.
Indeed, the classical ensembles admit as a particular case the Dirac distribution, and the unitary group propagates it in time, following a single trajectory
in phase space. In contrast, our Markovian equations do not propagate Dirac distributions and, as we saw, do not even admit them for initial conditions.
In this sense, the basic objects of (unstable) dynamics are no longer phase points and trajectories, but extended distribution functions with broken timesymmetry evolving under non-local semi-group relations.
For Anosov systems, the instability of the dynamics is expressed by the appearance of new geometrical structures in phase space, relating the temporal
concepts of past and future to the spatial ones of contracting and dilating manifolds. The flow of time, which was often considered as a macroscopic
notion that eluded the microscopic laws of nature, here appears as intrinsically determined by the (microscopic phase-space) directions along which the
instabilities manifest themselves, e.g. by non-zero Lyapunov exponents.
The example of abstract K-systems shows how deeply dynamics is changed when instability is taken into account in the theoretical frame-work. We
expect that similar considerations hold in general relativity and quantum physics, whose traditional formulations do not distinguish between stable and
unstable systems. As this distinction is now universally accepted in the frame of the phenomenological description of nature, the solution to the fundamental
problems encountered by these theories today should come from the incorporation of new concepts in their formulation, as the ones discussed in this
paper42,43,44

Acknowledgments
The authors are indebted to their colleagues for many fruitful discussions, especially with M.Courbage, S.Martinez, B.Misra, G. Nicolis, L.E.Reichl and
E.Tirapegui.
I.Prigogine thanks the Robert A.Welch Foundation for sponsoring this research. Y.Elskens gratefully acknowledges the support of the Instituts
Internationaux de Physique et de Chimie, fonds par E. Solvay, and of the Belgian National Fund for Scientific Research.

References
1 K.Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, London, Hutchinson, 1960, p. 15.
2 Aristotle, The Physics, tr. P.H.Wicksteed and F.M.Cornford, London, Heinemann, 1929 (2 vols).
3 M.Heidegger, Die Grundprobleme der Phnomenologie, Frankfurt am Main, Klostermann, 1975; part two, passim.
4 A.Einstein and M.Besso, Correspondence (tr. P.Speziali), Paris, Hermann, 1972, p. 538.
5 R.Clausius, Ueber verschiedene fr die Anwendung bequeme Formen der Hauptgleichungen der mechanischen Wrmetheorie, Ann. Phys. Chem.,
125, 353400 (1865).
6 I.Prigogine and I.Stengers, La Nouvelle Alliance, Paris, Gallimard, 1979.
7 J.P.Eckmann and D.Ruelle, Ergodic theory of chaos and strange attractors, Rev. Mod. Phys., 57, 61756 (1985).
8 C.W.Horton, L.E.Reichl and V.G.Szebehely (eds.), Long-Time Prediction in Dynamics, New York, Wiley-Interscience, 1983.
9 G.looss, R.H.Helleman and R.Stora (eds.), Chaotic Behaviour of Deterministic Systems (Les Houches, 1981), Amsterdam, North-Holland, 1983.
10 G.Nicolis and I.Prigogine, Self-Organisation in Non-Equilibrium Systems, New York, Wiley, 1977.
11 M.Born, Natural Philosophy of Cause and Chance, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1949, p. 72.
12 R.Balescu, Equilibrium and N on-Equilibrium Statistical Mechanics, New York, Wiley-Interscience, 1975.
13 O.Penrose, Foundations of statistical mechanics, Rep. Prog. Phys., 42, 19372006 (1979).
14 S.Martinez and E.Tirapegui, A possible physical interpretation of the -operator in the Prigogine theory of irreversibility, Phys. Lett., 110A, 813
(1985).
15 B.Misra and I.Prigogine, Irreversibility and non-locality, Lett. Math. Phys., 7, 4219 (1983).
16 J.Ford, How random is a coin toss?, Phys. Today, 36, 407, April, 1983.
17 O.Penrose, Foundations of Statistical Mechanics, Oxford, Pergamon, 1970.
18 R.Penrose, Singularities and time-asymmetry, in S.Hawking and W. Israel (eds), General Relativity, Cambridge University Press, 1979, pp.
581638 .
19 J.A.Wheeler and W.H.Zurek (eds.), Quantum Theory and Measurement, Princeton University Press, 1982.

20 I.Prigogine, Non-Equilibrium Statistical Mechanics, New York, Wiley-Interscience, 1962.

21 J.L.Lebowitz, Exact results in non-equilibrium statistical mechanics: where do we stand?, Suppl. Prog. Theor. Phys., 64, 3549 (1978).
22 I.Prigogine, From Being to Becoming, San Francisco, Freeman, 1980.
23 Y.G.Sinai, Gibbs measures in ergodic theory, Russian Math. Surveys, 27, 4, 2169, July-August, 1972.
24 J.W.Gibbs, Elementary Principles in Statistical Mechanics, Woodbridge, Connecticut, Ox Bow Press, 1981, p. 5.
25 B.Eckhardt, J.Ford and F.Vivaldi, Analytically solvable dynamical systems which are not integrable, Physica, 13D, 339356 (1984).
26 J.Ford, How random is a coin toss?, in reference 8 pp. 7992.
27 V.Arnold and A.Avez, Problmes Ergodiques de la Mcanique Classique, Paris, Gauthier-Villars, 1967.
28 Y.Elskens, Nonunitary deformations and hydrodynamic limit in the one-dimensional hard-point gas, to be published.
29 T.Petrosky, Chaos and cometary clouds in the solar system, Phys. Lett. 117A, 32832 (1986).
30 J.Wisdom, The origin of the Kirkwood gaps: a mapping for the asteroidal motion near the 3/1 commensurability, Astron. J., 87, 57793 (1982).
31 I.Prigogine, The statistical interpretation of non-equilibrium entropy, Acta Phys. Austr. Suppl, X, 40150 (1973).
32 I.Prigogine, C.George, F.Henin and L.Rosenfeld, A unified formulation of dynamics and thermodynamics, Chemica Scripta, 4, 532 (1973).
33 S.Goldstein, B.Misra and M.Courbage, On intrinsic randomness of dynamical systems, J. Stat. Phys., 25, 11126 (1981).
34 B.Misra and I.Prigogine On the foundations of kinetic theory, Suppl. Prog. Theor. Phys., 69, 10110 (1980).
35 B.Misra, Non-equilibrium entropy, Lyapunov variables, and ergodic properties of classical systems, Proc. Natl Acad. Sci. USA, 75, 162731
(1978).
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11
The issue of retrodiction in Bohms theory
Y.Aharonov and D.Albert
Tel Aviv University and University of South Carolina
Bohms pathbreaking hidden variable theory of 19521 is often accused of artificiality and inelegance, and doubtless it is guilty of both. But to make such
accusations, and to leave it at that, is to entirely miss the point. What Bohm was after in his theory was not elegance and not naturalness; Bohms
intentions were simply to produce a theory which, whatever its other characteristics, had logically clear foundations. It is for that clarity which Bohms
theory is highly and rightly praised.
We should like to point to one very straightforward example of that logical clarity here, one which is related to an ancient debate within quantum
mechanics, and to some recent work of ours2,3,4. It concerns the question of retrodiction.
The question of retrodiction might be posed like this. Can we know more of the past history of a quantum-mechanical system than we can in
principle predict about its future? Or, more time-symmetrically and more precisely, like this. Can we know more of quantum-mechanical systems within
the interval between two complete measurements than can in principle be known about the past or the future of any single complete measurement?
The conventional quantum-mechanical answer, the answer which follows from von Neumanns non-time-reversal-symmetric collapse postulate, is
No. That postulate dictates that the quantum state of any system at any time is determined (via the equations of motion) entirely by the result of the most
recent complete measurement of that system. Upcoming measurements, whatever they may be (according to this view), determine nothing whatever
about the state of the system now; they, rather, produce information about the state of the system subsequent to their execution.

On the other hand, the probability that a given experiment, carried out within the interval between two other complete measurements on the same
system, will produce a given result, is known to depend symmetrically on the results of the measurements at the beginning and at the end of that interval
(see references 24). Albeit that all this can be derived from the non-time-symmetric formalism, the time-symmetry of the experimental probabilities
suggests that the correct underlying description of the quantum-mechanical systems ought to be time-symmetric as well; that the results of experiments on
both ends of a given time-interval ought to be regarded as producing information about the system within that interval.
This question, the reader is doubtless aware, has been and continues to be the subject of a long convoluted and mirky debate; but, within Bohms
theory (and this is the point of the present note), this question can be posed and answered definitively, and with stunning clarity. Can we know more of the
past than of the present or the future? Bohms answer is yes. A very simple example will suffice to make the point.
Suppose that a small impenetrable box is located at the point x 1, and that another such box is located at the point x 2. A single-particle system is
prepared at time t 0 in the state:

(where
is a state wherein the particle is located within the box at x 1, etc.) by means of a measurement of some complete set of commuting
observables A at that time, and that at some later time t 2 the particle is found to be in the box at x 2.
According to the conventional quantum-mechanical account, the state of such a particle as that within the interval t 0< t<t 2 is
and its
position (within that interval) is undefined. The fact that any measurement of X within that interval would with certainty have produced the result X=x2 has
a very different explanation, within this account, than the fact that any measurement of A within that interval would with certainty have produced the result
A=. According to the retrodictive (or, rather, the time symmetric) picture of references 24 both A and X are well-defined within the interval (A= and
X=x2 there); within that picture it is in some sense the case that either of two quantum states (or, in some other sense, both of them) can be associated
with the particle within that interval.
Within Bohms account, all this is splendidly clear and definite. The quantum state, the wave-function of the particle within the interval t 0<t<t 2, is
certainly and unambiguously and the
position of the particle is clearly and unambiguously x 2 (it is hoped, by the way, that the reader will find
this somewhat perplexing; and this

perplexity will serve as the readers invitation to become familiar with Bohms brilliantly clear, if inelegant and artificial, theory).
It ought to be pointed out that there will in general be many particulars about which Bohms picture and the time-symmetric retrodictive one do not
agree; but there is at least one profound generality about which they surely do: more can be known of the pasts of quantum systems than of their futures.

Acknowledgments
This work was supported in part by the National Science Foundation grant number PHY 8408265.

References
1 D.Bohm, Phys. Rev., 85, 166 (1952).
2 Y.Aharonov, P.G.Bergmann and L.Lebowitz, Phys. Rev., 134, B 1410 (1964).
3 Y.Aharonov and D.Z.Albert, Phys. Rev., 24, D 223 (1984).
4 D.Z.Albert, Y.Aharonov and S.DAmato, Phys. Rev. Lett., 54, 5 (1985).

12
Beables for quantum field theory
J.S.Bell
CERN

1 Introduction
Bohms 1952 papers1,2 on quantum mechanics were for me a revelation. The elimination of indeterminism was very striking. But more important, it
seemed to me, was the elimination of any need for a vague division of the world into system on the one hand, and apparatus or observer on the
other. I have always felt since that people who have not grasped the ideas of those papers (and unfortunately they remain the majority) are handicapped in
any discussion of the meaning of quantum mechanics.
When the cogency of Bohms reasoning is admitted, a final protest is often this: it is all non-relativistic. This is to ignore that Bohm himself, in an
appendix to one of the 1952 papers2, already applied his scheme to the electromagnetic field. And application to scalar fields is straightforward3.
However, until recently4,5 to my knowledge, no extension covering Fermi fields had been made. Such an extension will be sketched here. The need for
Fermi fields might be questioned. Fermions might be composite structures of some kind6; but they also might not be, or not all. The present exercise will
not only include Fermi fields, but even give them a central role. The dependence on the ideas of de Broglie7 and Bohm1,2, and also on my own simplified
extension to cover spin8,9,10 will be manifest to those familiar with these things. However, no such familiarity will be assumed.
A preliminary account of these notions was entitled Quantum field theory without observers, or observables, or measurements, or systems, or
apparatus, or wave-function collapse, or anything like that. This could suggest to some that the issue in question is a philosophical one. But I insist that my
concern is strictly professional. I think that conventional formulations of quantum theory, and of quantum field theory in particular, are unprofessionally
vague and ambiguous.

Professional theoretical physicists ought to be able to do better. Bohm has shown us a way.
It will be seen that all the essential results of ordinary quantum field theory are recovered. But it will be seen also that the very sharpness of the
reformulation brings into focus some awkward questions. The construction of the scheme is not at all unique. And Lorentz invariance plays a strange,
perhaps incredible, role.

2 Local beables
The usual approach, centred on the notion of observable, divides the world somehow into parts: system and apparatus. The apparatus interacts
from time to time with the system, measuring observables. During measurement the linear Schrdinger evolution is suspended, and an ill-defined
wave-function collapse takes over. There is nothing in the mathematics to tell what is system and what is apparatus; nothing to tell which natural
processes have the special status of measurements. Discretion and good taste, born of experience, allow us to use quantum theory with marvellous
success, despite the ambiguity of the concepts named above in quotation marks. But it seems clear that in a serious fundamental formulation such concepts
must be excluded.
In particular we will exclude the notion of observable in favour of that of beable. The beables of the theory are those elements which might
correspond to elements of reality, to things which exist. Their existence does not depend on observation. Indeed observation and observers must be
made out of beables.
I use the term beable rather than some more committed term like being11 or beer12 to recall the essentially tentative nature of any physical theory.
Such a theory is at best a candidate for the description of nature. Terms like being, beer, existent1113, etc., would seem to me lacking in humility. In
fact beable is short for maybe-able.
Let us try to promote some of the usual observables to the status of beables. Consider the conventional axiom: the probability of observables (A,
B), if observed at time t, being observed to be (a,b) is:

[1]

where q denotes additional quantum numbers which together with the eigenvalues (a, b) form a complete set.
This we replace by: the probability of beables (A, B) at time t being (a, b) is:

[2]

where q denotes additional quantum numbers which together with the eigenvalues (a, b) form a complete set.
Not all observables can be given beable status, for they do not all have simultaneous eigenvalues, i.e. do not all commute. It is important to realise
therefore that most of these observables are entirely redundant. What is essential is to be able to define the positions of things, including the positions of
instrument pointers or (the modern equivalent) of ink on computer output.
In making precise the notion positions of things the energy density T00(x) comes immediately to mind. However, the commutator

is not zero, but proportional to derivatives of delta functions. So the T00(x) do not have simultaneous eigenvalues for all x. We would have to devise some
new way of specifying a joint probability distribution.
We fall back then on a second choicefermion number density. The distribution of fermion number in the world certainly includes the positions of
instruments, instrument pointers, ink on paper and much much more.
For simplicity we replace the three-space continuum by a dense lattice, keeping time t continuous (and real!). Let the lattice points be enumerated by:

where L is very large. Define lattice point fermion number operators:

where summation over Dirac indices and over all Dirac fields is understood. The corresponding eigenvalues are integers:

where N is the number of Dirac fields. The fermion number configuration of the world is a list of such integers:

We suppose the world to have a definite such configuration at every time t:

The lattice fermion numbers are the local beables of the theory, being associated with definite positions in space. The state vector
a beable, although not a local one. The complete specification of our world at time t is then a combination:

[3]

It remains to specify the time evolution of such a combination.

also we consider as

3 Dynamics
For the time evolution of the state vector we retain the ordinary Schrdinger equation:

[4]

where H is the ordinary Hamiltonian operator.

For the fermion number configuration we prescribe a stochastic development. In a small time interval dt configuration m jumps to configuration n with
transition probability:

[5]

where:

[6]

[7]

[8]

provided Jnm>0, but:

[9]

From equation [5] the evolution of a probability distribution Pn over configurations n is given by:

[10]

Compare this with a mathematical consequence of the Schrdinger equation [4]:

or:

[11]

If we assume that at some initial time:

[12]

then from equation [11] the solution of equation [10] is:

[13]

Envisage then the following situation. In the beginning God chose three-space and one-time, a Hamiltonian H, and a state vector
. Then She chose a
fermion configuration n(0). This She chose at random from an ensemble of possibilities with distribution D(0) related to the already-chosen state vector
. Then She left the world alone to evolve according to equations [4] and [5].
It is notable that, although the probability distribution P in equation [13] is governed by D and so by
the latter is not to be

thought of as just a way of expressing the probability distribution. For us is an independent beable of the theory. Otherwise its appearance in the
transition probabilities (equation [5]) would be quite unintelligible.
The stochastic transition probabilities (equation [5]) replace here the deterministic guiding equation of the de Broglie-Bohm pilot wave theory. The
introduction of a stochastic element, for beables with discrete spectra, is unwelcome, for the reversibility (I ignore here the small violation of time
reversibility that has shown up in elementary particle physics; it could be of spontaneous origin, and, moreover, PCT remains good) of the Schrdinger
equation strongly suggests that quantum mechanics is not fundamentally stochastic in nature. However I suspect that the stochastic element introduced
here goes away in some sense in the continuum limit.

4 OQFT and BQFT

OQFT is ordinary orthodox observable quantum field theory, whatever that may mean. BQFT is de Broglie-Bohm beable quantum field theory. To
what extent do they agree? The main difficulty with this question is the absence of any sharp formulation of OQFT. We will consider two different ways of
reducing the ambiguity.
In OQFT1 the world is considered as one big experiment. God prepared it at the initial time t=0, and let it run. At some much later time T She will
return to judge the outcome. In particular She will observe the contents of all the physics journals. This will include of course the records of our own little
experimentsas distributions of ink on paper, and so of fermion number. From equation [13] the OQFT1 probability D that God will observe one
configuration rather than another is identical with the BQFT probability P that the configuration is then one thing rather than another. In this sense there is
complete agreement between OQFT1 and BQFT on the result of Gods big experimentincluding the results of our little ones.
OQFT1, in contrast with BQFT, says nothing about events in the system in between preparation and observation. However adequate this may be from
an Olympian point of view, it is rather unsatisfactory for us. We live in between creation and last judgmentand imagine that we experience events. In this
respect another version of OQFT is more appealing. In OQFT2, whenever the state can be resolved into a sum of two (or more) terms:

[14]

which are macroscopically different, then in disregard for the Schr dinger equation, the state collapses somehow into one term or the other:

[15]

where:

[16]

In this way the state is always, or nearly always, macroscopically unambiguous and defines a macroscopically definite history for the world. The words
macroscopic and collapse are terribly vague. Nevertheless this version of OQFT is probably the nearest approach to a rational formulation of how we
use quantum theory in practice.
Will OQFT2 agree with OQFT1 and BQFT at the final time T? This is the main issue in what is usually called the quantum measurement problem.
Many authors, analysing many models, have convinced themselves that the state vector collapse of OQFT2 is consistent with the Schrdinger equation of
OQFT1 for all practical purposes14. The idea is that even when we retain both components in equation [14], evolving as required by the Schrdinger
equation, they remain so different as not to interfere in the calculation of anything of interest. The following sharper form of this hypothesis seems plausible
to me: the macroscopically distinct components remain so different, for a very long time, as not to interfere in the calculation of D and J. In so far as this is
true, the trajectories of OQFT2 and BQFT will agree macroscopically.

5 Concluding remarks
We have seen that BQFT is in complete accord with OQFT1 as regards the final outcome. It is plausibly consistent with OQFT2 in so far as the latter is
unambiguous. BQFT has the advantage over OQFT1 of being relevant at all times, and not just at the final time. It is superior to OQFT2 in being
completely formulated in terms of unambiguous equations.
Yet even BQFT does not inspire complete happiness. For one thing, there is nothing unique about the choice of fermion number density as basic local
beable; we could have others instead, or in addition. For example the Higgs fields of contemporary gauge theories could serve very well to define the
positions of things. Other possibilities have been considered by K.Baumann4. I do not see how this choice can be made experimentally significant so long
as the final result of experiments are defined so grossly as by the positions of instrument pointers or of ink on paper.
And the status of Lorentz invariance is very curious. BQFT agrees with OQFT on the result of the Michelson-Morley experiment, and so on. But the
formulation of BQFT relies heavily on a particular division of space-time into space and time. Could this be avoided?

There is indeed a trivial way of imposing Lorentz invariance4. We can imagine the world to differ from vacuum over only a limited region of infinite
Euclidean space (we forget general relativity here). Then an overall centre of mass system is defined. We can simply assert that our equations hold in this
centre of mass system. Our scheme is then Lorentz invariant. Many others could be made Lorentz invariant in the same way; for example, Newtonian
mechanics. But such Lorentz invariance would not imply a null result for the Michelson-Morley experimentwhich could detect motion relative to the
cosmic mass centre. To be predictive, Lorentz invariance must be supplemented by some kind of locality, or separability, consideration. Only then, in the
case of a more or less isolated object, can motion relative to the world as a whole be deemed more or less irrelevant.
I do not know of a good general formulation of such a locality requirement. In classical field theory, part of the requirement could be formulation in
terms of differential (as distinct from integral) equations in three-plus-one-dimensional space-time. But it seems clear that quantum mechanics requires a
much bigger configuration space. One can formulate a locality requirement by permitting arbitrary external fields and requiring that variations thereof have
consequences only in their future light cones. In that case the fields could be used to set measuring instruments, and one comes into difficulty with quantum
predictions for correlations related to those of Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen18. But the introduction of external fields is questionable. So I am unable to
prove, or even formulate clearly, the proposition that a sharp formulation of quantum field theory, such as that set out here, must disrespect serious
Lorentz invariance. But it seems to me that this is probably so.
As with relativity before Einstein, there is then a preferred frame in the formulation of the theorybut it is experimentally indistinguishable19,20,21. It
seems an eccentric way to make a world.

References
1 D.Bohm, Phys. Rev.,, 85, 166 (1952).
2 D.Bohm, Phys. Rev., 85, 180 (1952).
3 D.Bohm and B.Hiley, Foundations of Physics, 14, 270 (1984).
4 K.Baumann, preprint, Graz (1984).
5 J.S.Bell, report to Istituto Italiano per gli Studi Filosofici, Amalfi, 11 May, 1984.
6 T.H.R.Skyrme, Proc. Roy. Soc., A260, 127 (1961); A.S.Goldhaber, Phys. Rev. Lett., 36, 1122 (1976); F.Wilczek and A.Zee, Phys. Rev. Lett., 51,
2250 (1983).
7 L.de Broglie, Tentative dInterpretation Causale et Nonlineaire de la Mechanique Ondulatoire, Paris, Gauthier-Villars, 1956.
8 J.S.Bell, Rev. Mod. Phys., 38, 447, (1966).
9 J.S.Bell, in Isham, Penrose and Sciama (eds), Quantum Gravity, Oxford, 1982, p. 611 (originally TH.1424-CERN, 27 Oct 1971).

10 J.S.Bell, Foundations of Physics, 12, 989 (1982).

11 A.Shimony, Epistemological Letters, Jan. 1978, 1.
12 B.Zumino, private communication.
13 B.dEspagnat, Physics Reports, 110, 201 (1984).
14 This is touched on in references [15] and [16], and in many papers in the anthology of Wheeler and Zurek17.
15 J.S.Bell, Helvetica Physica Acta, 48, 93 (1975).
16 J.S.Bell, International Journal of Quantum Chemistry: Quantum Chemistry Symposium, 14, 155 (1980).
17 J.A.Wheeler and W.H.Zurek (eds), Quantum Theory and Measurement, Princeton University Press, 1983.
18 J.S.Bell, Journal de Physique, Colloque C2, suppl. au no. 3, Tome 42, p. C241, mars 1981.
19 J.S.Bell, in M.Flato et al. (eds), Determinism, Causality, and Particles, Dordrecht, Holland, D.Reidel, 1976, p. 17.
20 P.H.Eberhard, Nuovo Cimento, 46B, 392, (1978).
21 K.Popper, Foundations of Physics, 12, 971, (1982).

13
Negative probability
Richard P.Feynman
California Institute of Technology
Some twenty years ago one problem we theoretical physicists had was that if we combined the principles of quantum mechanics and those of relativity
plus certain tacit assumptions, we seemed only able to produce theories (the quantum field theories) which gave infinity for the answer to certain questions.
These infinities are kept in abeyance (and now possibly eliminated altogether) by the awkward process of renormalization. In an attempt to understand all
this better, and perhaps to make a theory which would give only finite answers from the start, I looked into the tacit assumptions to see if they could be
altered.
One of the assumptions was that the probability for an event must always be a positive number. Trying to think of negative probabilities gave me a
cultural shock at first, but when I finally got easy with the concept I wrote myself a note so I wouldnt forget my thoughts. I think that Prof. Bohm has just
the combination of imagination and boldness to find them interesting and amusing. I am delighted to have this opportunity to publish them in such an
appropriate place. I have taken the opportunity to add some further, more recent, thoughts about applications to two-state systems.
Unfortunately I never did find out how to use the freedom of allowing probabilities to be negative to solve the original problem of infinities in quantum
field theory!
It is usual to suppose that, since the probabilities of events must be positive, a theory which gives negative numbers for such quantities must be absurd. I
should show here how negative probabilities might be interpreted. A negative number, say of apples, seems like an absurdity. A man starting a day with
five apples who gives away ten and is given eight during the day has three left. I can calculate this in two

steps: 510=5; and 5+8=3. The final answer is satisfactorily positive and correct, although in the intermediate steps of calculation negative numbers
appear. In the real situation there must be special limitations of the time in which the various apples are received and given since he never really has a
negative number, yet the use of negative numbers as an abstract calculation permits us freedom to do our mathematical calculations in any order,
simplifying the analysis enormously and permitting us to disregard inessential details. The idea of negative numbers is an exceedingly fruitful mathematical
invention. Today a person who balks at making a calculation in this way is considered backward or ignorant, or to have some kind of mental block. It is
the purpose of this paper to point out that we have a similar strong block against negative probabilities. By discussing a number of examples, I hope to
show that they are entirely rational of course, and that their use simplifies calculations and thought in a number of applications in physics.
First let us consider a simple probability problem, and how we usually calculate things, and then see what would happen if we allowed some of our
normal probabilities in the calculations to be negative. Let us imagine a roulette wheel with, for simplicity, just three numbers: 1, 2, 3. Suppose, however,
the operator, by control of a switch under the table, can put the wheel into one of two conditions, A, B, in each of which the probability of 1, 2, 3 are
different. If the wheel is in condition A, the probabilities of 1, p1A=0.3 say, of 2 is p2A=0.6, of 3 is p3A=0.1. But if the wheel is in condition B, these
probabilities are p1B=0.1, p2B=0.4, p3B=0.5, say, as in Table 13.1.
Table 13.1 Probability table for roulette wheel with two conditions
Condition A
1
0.3
2
0.6
3
0.1

Condition B
0.1
0.4
0.5

We use the table in this way: suppose the operator puts the wheel into condition A 7/10 of the time and into B the other 3/10 of the time at random
(that is, the probability of condition A, PA=0.7, and of B, PB=0.3.), then the probability of getting 1 is Prob. 1=0.7 (0.3)+0.3 (0.1)=0.24, etc. In general,
of course, if are conditions and pi is a conditional probability (the probability of getting the result i if the condition holds), we have (pi=Prob (if
then i)):

[1]

where P are the probabilities that the conditions obtain, and Pi is the consequent probability of the result i. Since some result must occur in any
condition, we have:

[2]

where the sum is that over all possible independent results i. If the system is surely in some one of the conditions, so if:

then:

[3]

meaning we surely have some result, in virtue of [2].

Now, however, suppose that some of the conditional probabilities are negative; suppose the table reads so that, as we shall say, if the system is in
condition B the probability of getting 1 is 0.4 (see Table 13.2). This sounds absurd, but we must say it this way if we wish that our way of thought and
language be precisely the same whether the actual quantities pi in our calculations are positive or negative. That is the essence of the mathematical use of
negative numbersto permit an efficiency in reasoning so that various cases can be considered together by the same line of reasoning, being assured that
intermediary steps which are not readily interpreted (like5 apples) will not lead to absurd results. Let us see what p1B=0.4 means by seeing how we
calculate with it.
Table 13.2 Probability table with negative probability
Condition A
1
0.3
2
0.6
3
0.1

Condition B
0.4
1.2
0.2

We have arranged the numbers in the table so that p1B+p2B+p3B=1, in accordance with equation [2]. For example, if the condition A has probability
0.7 and B has probability 0.3, we have for the probability of result 1:

which would be all right. We have also allowed p2B to exceed unity. A

probability greater than unity presents no problem different from that of negative probabilities, for it represents a negative probability that the event will not
occur.
Thus the probability of result 2 is, in the same way:

Finally, the probability of result 3 presents no problem for:

The sum of these is 1.00 as required, and they are all positive and can have their usual interpretation.
The obvious question is what happens if the probability of being in condition B is larger; for example, if condition B has probability 0.6, the probability
of result 1 is negative
But suppose nature is so constructed that you can never be sure the system is in condition B.
Suppose there must always be a limit of a kind to the knowledge of the situation that you can attain. And such is the limitation that you can never know for
sure that condition B occurs. You can only know that it may occur with a limited probability (in this case less than 3/7, say). Then no contradiction will
occur, in the sense that a result 1 or 2 or 3 will have a negative probability of occurrence.
Another possibility of interpretation is that results 1, 2, 3 are not directly observable but one can only verify by a final observation that the result had
been 1, 2 or 3 with certain probabilities. For example, suppose the truly physically verifiable observations can only distinguish two classes of final events.
Either the result was 3 or else it was in the class of being either 1 or 2. This class has the probability P1+P2, which is always positive for any positive
PA,PB. This case corresponds to the situation that 1, 2, 3 are not the finally observed results, but only intermediaries in a calculation.
Notice that the probabilities of conditions A and B might themselves be negative (for example, PA=1.3, PB =0.3) while the probabilities of the results
1, 2, 3 still remain positive.
It is not my intention here to contend that the final probability of a verifiable physical event can be negative. On the other hand, conditional probabilities
and probabilities of imagined intermediary states may be negative in a calculation of probabilities of physical events or states.
If a physical theory for calculating probabilities yields a negative probability for a given situation under certain assumed conditions, we need not
conclude the theory is incorrect. Two other possibilities of interpretation exist. One is that the conditions (for example, initial conditions) may not be
capable of being realized in the physical world. The other possibility is that the situation for which the probability appears to be negative is not one that can
be verified directly. A

combination of these two, limitation of verifiability and freedom in initial conditions, may also be a solution to the apparent difficulty.
The rest of this paper illustrates these points with a number of examples drawn from physics which are less artificial than our roulette wheel.
Since the result must ultimately have a positive probability, the question may be asked: Why not rearrange the calculation so that the probabilities are
positive in all the intermediate states? The same question might be asked of an accountant who subtracts the total disbursements before adding the total
receipts. He stands a chance of going through an intermediary negative sum. Why not rearrange the calculation? Why bother? There is nothing
mathematically wrong with this method of calculating and it frees the mind to think clearly and simply in a situation otherwise quite complicated. An
analysis in terms of various states or conditions may simplify a calculation at the expense of requiring negative probabilities for these states. It is not really
much expense.
Our first physical example is one in which one usually uses negative probabilities without noticing it. It is not a very profound example and is practically
the same in content as our previous example. A particle diffusing in one dimension in a rod has a probability of being at x at time t of P(x,t) satisfying
Suppose at x=0 and x= the rod has absorbers at both ends so that P(x,t)=0 there. Let the probability of being at x at
t=0 be given as P(x,0)=f(x). What is P(x,t) thereafter? It is:

[4]

where pn is given by:

[5]

or:

[6]

The easiest way of analyzing this (and the way used if P(x,t) is a temperature, for example) is to say that there are certain distributions that behave in an
especially simple way. If f(x) starts as sin nx it will remain that shape, simply decreasing with time as
Any distribution f(x) can be thought of as a
superposition of such sine waves. But f(x) cannot be sin nx if f(x) is a probability and probabilities must always be positive. Yet the analysis is so simple
this way that no one has really objected for long.
To make the relation to our previous analysis more clear, the

various conditions a are the conditions n (that is, the index a is replaced by n). The a priori probabilities are the numbers pn. The conditions i are the
positions x (the index i is replaced by x) and the conditional probabilities (these do not satisfy equation [2], for we have particles lost off the end of the
rod, and the state of being off the rod is not included among the possibilities i) (if n then x at time t) are:

Equation [4] is then precisely equation [1], for the probabilities pi of having result n is now what we call P(x,t). Thus equation [4] is easily interpreted as
saying that if the system is in condition n, the chance of finding it at x is exp (n2t) sin nx, and the chance of finding it in condition n is pn.
No objection should be made to the negative values of these probabilities. However, a natural question is: What are the restrictions which ensure that
the final probability for the event (finding a particle at x at time t) are always positive? In this case they are simple. It is that the a priori probabilities,
although possibly negative, are restricted by certain conditions. The condition is that they must be such that they could come from the Fourier analysis of
an everywhere positive function. This condition is independent of what value of x one wishes to observe at time t.
In this example, the restrictions to ensure positive probabilities can be stated once and for all in a form that does not depend on which state we
measure. They are all positive simultaneously.
Another possibility presents itself. It can best be understood by returning to our roulette example. It may be that the restrictions on the conditions A, B
which yield a positive probability may depend on what question you ask. In an extreme example, there may be no choice for the p that simultaneously
make all pi positive at once. Thus, although certain restrictions may make probability of result 1 positive, result 3 under these circumstances would have a
negative probability. Likewise, conditions ensuring that p3 is positive might leave p1 or p2 negative. In such a physical world, you would have such
statements as: If you measure 1 you cannot be sure to more than a certain degree that the condition is A; on the other hand it will be all right to think that
it is certainly in condition A, provided you are only going to ask for the chance that the result is 3. For such a circumstance to be a viable theory, there
would have to be certain limitations on verification experiments. Any method to determine that the result was 3 would automatically exclude that at the
same time you could determine whether the result was 1. This is reminiscent of the situation in quantum mechanics in relation to the uncertainty principle. A
particle can have definite momentum, or a definite position in the sense that an experiment may be devised to measure either one. But no experiment can
be devised to decide what the momentum is, to error of

order p, which at the same time can determine that the position x is within x unless
It is possible, therefore, that a closer study of the relation of classical and quantum theory might involve us in negative probabilities, and so it does. In
classical theory, we may have a distribution function F(x,p) which gives the probability that a particle has a position x and a momentum p in dx and dp
(we take a simple particle moving in one dimension for simplicity to illustrate the ideas). As Wigner has shown, the nearest thing to this in quantum
mechanics is a function (the density matrix in a certain representation) which for a particle in a state with wave function (x) is:

[7]

(If the state is statistically uncertain we simply average F for the various possible wave functions with their probabilities.)
In common with the classical expression, we have these properties.
1 F(x,p) is real.
2 Its integral with respect to p gives the probability that the particle is at x:

[8]

3 Its integral with respect to x gives the probability that the momentum is p:

[9]

where (p) is the usual Fourier transform of (x).

The average value of a physical quantity M is given by:

[10]

where wM is a weight function depending upon the character of the physical quantity.
The only property it does not share is that in the classical theory F(x,p) is positive everywhere, for in quantum theory it may have negative values for some
regions of x,p. That we still have a viable physical theory is ensured by the uncertainty principle that no measurement can be made of momentum and
position simultaneously beyond a certain accuracy.
The restriction this time which ensures positive probabilities is that the weight functions wM(x,p) are restricted to a certain classnamely, those that
belong to hermitian operators. Mathematically, a positive probability will result if w is of the form:

[11]

where X is any function and X* is its complex conjugate. Generally, if w(x,p) is the weight for the question What is the probability that the

physical quantity M has numerical value m?, w must be of the form equation [11] or the sum of such forms with positive weights. With this limitation, final
probabilities are positive.
To make the analogy closer to those previously used, we can take two systems a, b, in interaction, such that measurements on b can provide
predictions of probabilities for a. Thus, using the one-dimensional case again, we have a two-point correlation function F(xa,pa; xb,pb) defined via an
obvious generalization of equation [7] to two variables. This corresponds to the conditional probability pi. Then if a quantity M is measured in b, the a
priori probabilities for various x b,pb are given by an appropriate wM(xb,pb) (the analogue of P in equation [1]). The probability that system a has
position and momentum x a,pa is (the analogue of Pi), then:

the analogue of equation [1]. As an example, we may take the strong correlation possible arising from the two-particle wave function
which is:

which means that the particles a, b, have the same position and opposite momenta so that a measurement of bs position would permit a determination of
as and a measurement of bs momentum would determine as (to be the opposite). This particular F is entirely positive and classical in its behaviour, so
that letting wM(xb,pb) be
would not lead to negative probabilities directly, for equation [1] gives
in this case, but further use of such a P in subsequent interactions has the danger of producing negative probabilities.
We have become quite used to the rules of thought and limitations of an experiment, which ensures that they never arise in quantum mechanics.
It is not our intention to claim that quantum mechanics is best understood by going back to classical mechanical concepts and allowing negative
probabilities (for the equations for the development of F in time are more complicated and inconvenient than those of ). (The classical equations for F
for a particle moving in a potential are:

while the quantum equations are:

so instead of the momentum changing infinitesimally during an infinitesimal time, t, it may jump by an amount Q with probability when it is at x:

which is a real, but possibly negative probability.) Rather we should like to emphasize the idea that negative probabilities in a physical theory does not
exclude that theory, providing special conditions are put on what is known or verified. But how are we to find and state these special conditions if we have
a new theory of this kind? It is that a situation for which a negative probability is calculated is impossible, not in the sense that the chance for it happening
is zero, but rather in the sense that the assumed conditions of preparation or verification are experimentally unattainable.
We may give one more example. In the quantum theory of electrodynamics, the free photon moving in the z direction is supposed to have only two
directions of polarization transverse to its motion x,y. When this field is quantized, an additional interaction, the instantaneous Coulomb interaction, must
be added to the virtual transverse photon exchange to produce the usual simple:

[12]

virtual interaction between two currents, j and j. It is obviously relativistically invariant with the usual symmetry of the space j x,jy,jz and time j t
components of the current (in units where the velocity of light is c=1). The original starting Hamiltonian with only transverse components does not look
invariant. Innumerable papers have discussed this point from various points of view but perhaps the simplest is this. Let the photon have four directions of
polarization of a vector x,y,z,t, no matter which way it is going. Couple the time component with ie instead of e so that the virtual contribution for it will be
negative, as required by relativity in equation [12]. For real photons, then, the probability of a t-photon emission is negative, proportional to
the square of the matrix element of j t between initial and final states, just as the probability to emit an x photon is
. The total probability of
emitting any sort of photon is the algebraic sum of the probabilities for the four possibilities:

[13]

It is always positive, for by the conservation of current there is a relation of j t and the space components of j, k j =0 if k is the four-vector of the
photon. For example, if k is in the z direction, k z=, and k x=ky=0 so j t=jz and we see equation [13] is equal to the usual result where we add only the
transverse emissions. The probability to emit a photon of definite polarization e is (assume e is not a null vector):

This has the danger of producing negative probabilities. The rule to avoid them is that only photons whose polarization vector satisfies

k e=0 and ee=1 can be observed asymptotically in the final or initial states. But this restriction is not to be applied to virtual photons, intermediary
negative probabilities are not to be avoided. Only in this way is the Coulomb interaction truly understandable as the interchange of virtual photons,
photons with time-like polarization which are radiated as real photons with a negative probability.
This example illustrates a small point. If one t photon is emitted with a negative probability (>0), and another t photon is emitted say independently
with probability (>0), the chance of emitting both is positive ()()=>0. Should we not expect then to see physical emission of two such
photons? Yes, but (if these photons are moving in the z direction) there is a probability to emit z photons and also, and there are four emission states:
two t photons with probability +; two z photons with probability +; the first z and second t probability (+)() = and the first t second z with
probabilities so again, for total emission rate only the transverse photons contribute.
Although it is true that a negative probability for some situations in a theory means that that situation is unattainable or unverifiable, the contrary is not
true; namely, a positive probability for a situation does not mean that that situation is directly verifiable. We have no technique for detecting t photons
which is not similarly sensitive to z photons, so that we can only always respond to a combination of them. Likewise, no direct test can be made that the
two t photons are indeed present without including the additional probabilities of having z photons. The fact for example, that F(x,p) is everywhere
positive:

for the ground state of an oscillator does not mean that for that state we can indeed measure both x and p simultaneously.
As another example we will give an analogue of the Wigner function for a spin half system, or other two-state system. Just as the Wigner function is a
function of x and p, twice as many variables as in the wave function, here we will give a probability for two conditions at once. We choose spin along
the z-axis and spin along the x-axis. Thus let f + + represent the probability that our system has spin up along the z-axis and up along the x-axis
simultaneously. We shall define the quantity f + + for a pure state to be the expectation of
where x,y, and z are the Pauli
matrices. For a mixed state we take an average over the pure state values. Likewise f + is the expectation of
f + is the
expectation of
and f is the expectation of
Understanding that this probability can be negative, we shall train

ourselves to deal with it otherwise as a real probability and thus dispense with the warning quotes hereafter. Analogously f + is the probability that the
spin is up along the z-axis and down along the x-axis (that is pointing in the negative x direction). Likewise f + and f give the probability that the spin
is along the negative z-axis and along the x-axis in the positive or negative sense, respectively. These are all the possible conditions so we have
As an example, we might have
and f =0.2.
Now the probability that the spin is up along z is simply the sum of the probability that it is up along z and up along x, and the other possibility, that it is
up along z but down along x; that is simply f + ++f+ or 0.6 +(0.1)=0.5 in our example. The probability the spin is down along z is f ++f , also 0.5.
In the same way the probability that the spin is along the positive x-axis, independent of its value along z is f + ++f + or 0.9. We, of course, cannot
measure simultaneously the spin in the z and in the x direction, so we cannot directly determine f + and there is no difficulty with its negative value.
These four numbers give a complete expression of the state of the system, and the probability for any other question you can ask experimentally is
some linear combination of them. For example, the probability that a measurement of spin along the y-axis gives up is f + ++f or 0.8, and that it gives
down is f + +f+ 0.2. In fact, for a two-state system any question is equivalent to the question Is the spin up along an axis in some direction? If that
direction is defined by the unit vector V with components Vx, Vy, Vz then we can say the probability that the spin is up along this direction if the condition
of the electron is + + is
For the other conditions we have
and
In the general case then where the fs give the a priori probabilities of each
condition the probability of finding the spin up along V is the sum on a of pa(V)fa or
In order that this always gives positive results, in addition to the condition that the sum of
the fs is unity, there is the restriction that the sum of the squares of the four fs be less than. It equals for a pure state.
If there are two electrons in a problem we can use classical logic, considering each of them as being in one of the four states, + +, + , +, . Thus
suppose we have two electrons, correlated so their total spin is zero, moving into two detectors, one set to determine if the spin of the first electron is in
the direction V and the other set to measure whether the second electron has its spin in the direction U. The probability that both detectors respond is
Thus if one is found up along any axis, the other is surely down along the

same axis. This situation usually causes difficulty to a hidden variable view of nature. Suppose the electron can be in one of a number of conditions a, for
each of which the chance of being found to be spinning up along the V-axis is pa(V). If the second electron is in condition b, its probability of being found
along U is pb(U). Suppose now that the chance of finding the two electrons in conditions a,b, respectively, is Pab. This depends on how the electrons
were prepared by the source. Then the chance of finding them along the V and U axes is
which is equal to
This is well
known to be impossible if all the probabilities Pab and p are positive. But everything works fine if we permit negative probabilities and use for a our four
states with the pa(V) as defined previously. The probabilities for the correlated states in the case that the total spin is zero are Pab equal if a and b are
different states, andif they are the same.
For another example of a two-state system, consider an electron going through a screen with two small holes to arrive at a second screen (see Figure
13.1 ). We can say there are four ways or conditions by which the electron can go through the holes, corresponding to the + +, + , +, and
conditions. If we take up spin to correspond to going through hole number 1 and down spin to represent going through hole 2, then the other variable
corresponding to spin in the x direction means going through the two holes equally in phase. Ordinarily we cannot say which hole it goes through and what
the phase relation is (just as ordinarily we do not say which way the z-spin is and which way the x-spin is) but now we can and do. For example, f
gives the probability of going through hole 2 but 180 degrees out of phase (whatever that could mean). For each of these conditions we can calculate
what the chance is that the electron arrives at a point x along the screen. For example, P+ +(x), the probability for arrival at x for the condition + +
(through 1 in phase) and P+ (x), the probability for + (through 1 but out of phase) are sketched roughly in Figure 13.1 as the curves (b) and (c)
respectively. The independent probabilities are negative for some values of x. The functions through hole 2 are these reflected in x; P +(x)=P+ +(x)
and P (x)=P+ (x). The total chance to go through hole 1, P+ ++P+ , the sum of the two irregular curves shown in the figure, is just the smooth
bump, the solid line at (a), with its maximum under hole 1, not showing interference effects. But the total probability to arrive with holes out of phase, P+
+P , shows the typical interference pattern at the bottom of the figure at (d).
Obviously the particular choice we used for the two-state system is arbitrary, and other choices may have some advantages. One way that generalizes
to any number of holes or of states, finite or otherwise, is this. Suppose an event can happen in more than one way, say ways A, B, C, etc., with
amplitudes a, b, c, respectively, so that the probability

Figure 13.1 A two-state system in which an electron goes through a screen with two small holes to arrive at a second screen,
(a) The total chance to go through hole 1. (b) The probability of going through hole 1 in phase, (c) The probability of
going through hole 1 but out of phase, (d) The total probability to arrive with holes out of phase.

of occurring is the absolute square of a+b+c+This can be described by saying the event can happen in two ways at once. For example we can say
that the event happens by coming in way A and going in way B (or, if you prefer, by looping via A and B) with a probability
where a* stands for the complex conjugate of a. The probability of coming and going by the same way A is
and is the conventional positive probability that the event would occur if way A only

were available to it. The total probability is the sum of these P for every pair of ways. If the two ways in P, coming and going are not the same, P is as
likely to be negative as positive.
The density matrix, ij, if the states are i is then represented instead by saying a system has a probability to be found in each of a set of conditions.
These conditions are defined by an ordered pair of states coming in i and going in j, with probability p(i,j) equal to the real part of (1+i)ij. The
condition that all physical probabilities remain positive is that the square of p(i,j) not exceed the product p(i,i)p(j,j) (equality is reached for pure states).
Finally, suppose that, because of the passage of time, or other interaction, or simply a change in basis, the state i has an amplitude Smi of appearing as
state m, where S is a unitary matrix (so the new density matrix is given by S1S). We then discover we can find the new probabilities p'(m,n) by
summing all alternatives i,j of p(i,j) times a factor that can be interpreted as the probability that the state coming in i, going in j turns into the state
coming in m, going in n. This probability is:

With such formulas all the results of quantum statistics can be described in classical probability language, with states replaced by conditions defined by a
pair of states (or other variables), provided we accept negative values for these probabilities. This is interesting, but whether it is useful is problematical,
for the equations with amplitudes are simpler and one can get used to thinking with them just as well.
My interest in this subject arose from many attempts to quantize electrodynamics or other field theories with cut-offs or using advanced potentials, in
which work apparently negative probabilities often arose. It may have applications to help in the study of the consequences of a theory of this kind by Lee
and Wick.

14
Gentle quantum events as the source of explicate order
G.F.Chew
University of California, Berkeley
Bohm1 has introduced a notion of implicate order to complement the classical Newtonian-Cartesian real-world view of separable objects moving
through a space-time continuum. In the present note this classical view will be characterized as explicate order. Quantum-mechanical and relativistic
considerations preclude a satisfactory overall world picture based on explicate order; at the same time explicate order is for many purposes accurate and
usefulbeing the underpinning of hard science. What is the source of such accuracy? We propose in this note that explicate order together with spacetime is an approximation emerging from complex but coherent collections of gentle quantum eventsthe emission and absorption of soft photons.
It is well known that order can emerge from complexity; the laws of thermodynamics and hydrodynamics constitute examples. We suggest that spacetime and the attendant explicate order emerge from soft-photon complexity in a sense analogous to the emergence of temperature, pressure, heat content,
etc., from the complexity of atomic collisions. The complexity responsible for objective reality within an apparently-continuous space-time we propose to
associate with multitudes of coherent low-energy electromagnetic quanta. Immensely-large numbers, stemming from the combinatorics of soft-photon
event patterns, are conjectured to be responsible for the notion of separately-moving objects. We shall identify special properties that endow the photon
with unique capacity to generate explicate order.
Underlying our thinking is the Heisenberg matrix representation of quantum mechanicswhich associates a complex number Sab with a discrete event
ba.2 The event might be a particle decay such as that of Figure 14.1, or it might be a collision between particles, such as that of Figure 14.2. The
probability that the event shall occur is given by the absolute-value squared of the complex number Sab:

[1]

One does not speak, in the matrix picture, of space or time but only of a sudden event. There is a before and an after but no continuous evolution
therebetween. We start with the premise that our world is built from such discrete quantum events. We conjecture that our sense of continuous spacetime is to be understood through collections of certain special gentle events in which an initial electrically-charged particle emits or absorbs a photon and
a final charged particle appears with attributes almost the same as those of the initial particle. Figure 14.3 gives an example. The events of Figures 14.1
and 14.2 are, by contrast, violent. The situation after the event is totally different from that before.

Figure 14.1 Particle decay as a discrete event.

Figure 14.2 Collision between particles as a discrete event.

Figure 14.3 An example of a gentle event.

Violent events provide no basis for the approximate continuity essential to explicate order. What endows the photon with its unique capability for gentle
(almost continuous) events? The zero photon

rest mass is one essential. A photon may carry an arbitrarily small amount of energy and momentum and thereby, in its absorption or emission, disturb the
charged particle to an arbitrarily slight extent. Particles with non-zero rest mass lack this capability; a minimum kick accompanies their emission or
absorption. A second essential photon characteristic is its failure to carry any non-zero conserved quantum numbers; photon emission or absorption by a
charged particle leaves the type of charged particle unchanged (e.g. electrons are not changed into protons). A third necessary characteristic involves spin;
the photon is able to avoid disturbing the spin of the charged particle with which it interacts. A gentle eventsynonymous with soft-photon emission or
absorptionleaves a charged particle unaffected except for an arbitrarily tiny momentum impulse.
The classical notion of electric field corresponds to a coherent superposition of large numbers of soft photons. The language of explicate order
describes a charged particle moving through an electric field as subject to a force which continuously changes the particles momentum. From the
quantum point of view, however, momentum impulses are discreteassociated with individual photons. The illusion of continuity stems from the very large
number of gentle quantum events. What I am proposing in this note is that another consequence of a multitude of gentle events is the classical notion that
the charged particle follows a trajectory in space-time.
There is no a priori continuous space-time in the matrix representation of quantum mechanics, but Feynman discovered that the superposition aspect
of quantum mechanics allows the complex number Sab, associated with a discrete event, to be evaluated through an infinite summation over terms, each of
which associates with a graph:3

[2]

In this Feynman series, the symbol G stands for graph. Each graph corresponds to a pattern of intermediate events that might intervene between a
(after) and b (before). The violent event of Figure 14.2, for example, admits the intermediate event patterns of Figure 14.4, where the wiggly lines denote
soft photons. Indefinitely-large numbers of intermediate soft-photons can be emitted and reabsorbed by the charged-particle lines of a Feynman graph.
Feynmans rules for the complex numbers SabG belonging to a graph G are such that large collections of violent intermediate events associate with such
small complex numbers SabG as to be relatively unimportant; a multitude of gentle intermediate events dominates the Feynman graphical-series.2 The
problem of summing the gentle-event series has taxed the ingenuity of two generations of particle theorists.
Although Feynman-Heisenberg rules make no reference to space-

Figure 14.4 Intermediate events: the wiggly lines denote soft photons.

time, they do attribute energy and momentum to particles. Through Fourier transformation, energy-momentum variables can be replaced by formal
space-time variables, but there is no a priori physical significance for these latter. It was recently discovered by Stapp4, however, that summing the
intermediate gentle-event Feynman series leads to a result interpretable through a notion of approximate space-time localization. Stapp shows that the
coherent superposition of a multitude of soft intermediate photons can approximately place charged particles on trajectories and also approximately
localize their violent events. (Stapp also makes a precise distinction between soft photons and hard photonsthat can change spin and deliver
substantial increments of momentum in violent events.) Fourier transformation becomes physically relevant.
I propose that the space-time of explicate order arises from Stapps mechanism. One should not accept a physical space-time continuum as an a priori
notion but rather as an approximation emerging from large numbers of coherent but discrete gentle quantum events. My expectation is that such an
understanding of space-time will allow the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics to be replaced by a quantum theory of measurement. The
approximate isolation of observer from observed entity will be related to the gentleness of intervening soft-photon connections. Electric screening will
be importantrelated to the photons coupling to a conserved charge and to the tendency of complex particle systems to be electrically neutral. One will
not describe measurement as occurring within space-time but rather as generating an approximate meaning for space-time.
I close this note with some remarks about implicate order and hidden variablesterms which Bohm has invoked.1 The foregoing speculations about
explicate order have arisen in connection with an attempt to understand particle properties through the consistency of their graphically-expressed
relationships.5 Analysis of consistency depends on classifying Feynman graphs according to complexity. Photons and electrons do not occur at the lowest
level of complexity, even though these particles dominate development of explicate order. At the lowest level of graphical complexity there occur hidden
vari-

ables (in the literature of graphical-particle theory the adjective inaccessible rather than hidden has been used) which have disappeared at the photonelectron level but which are responsible for the existence and properties of elementary nuclear particles which precede photons and electrons in the
hierarchy of complexity.6 (Graphical-particle theory5 makes a distinction between elementary particles and particles accessible to hard-scientific
observations interpreted through explicate order, but explanation of this distinction will not be attempted here. Suffice it to say that there is a connection
with hidden variables.) An example of a hidden variable is a feature of graphical order called color. The property of color is not exhibited by any
particles accessible to the hard-scientific measurements based on explicate order, but a full picture of graphical order demands recognition of color and
other hidden variables. At the level where such variables function there has not yet developed the degree of complexity prerequisite to the space-time on
which explicate order relies. Theorists who use graphical complexity to understand particles do not employ the term implicate order, but where color
and other hidden variables occur such a term may be appropriate.
It should be apparent from the foregoing that the author envisages areas of contact between graphical particle theory and the ideas of Bohm.1 The
advantage of graphs is their providing an unambiguous and unprejudiced languagefree from the semantic traps of ordinary language that stem from
explicate-order roots. I anticipate graph language gradually to yield detailed understanding of how the continuity of explicate order, with the attendant
space-time, relates to the discrete world of quantum events. It is furthermore not ruled out, in the authors opinion, that graphs with gentle links will
illuminate the meaning of life and consciousness and also cosmologyincluding gravitation. Supplemented by Feynman superposition and by distinction
between violent and gentle vertices, graph language has immense untapped capacity.

Acknowledgments
I am grateful to Ralph Pred for a critical reading of this manuscript.
This work was supported by the Director, Office of Energy Research, Office of High Energy and Nuclear Physics, Division of High Energy Physics of
the US Department of Energy under contract DE-AC03-76SF00098.

Note added in proof:

Since this article was written, the author has come to believe that the gentle events building space-time involve quanta other than soft photons, even though
soft photons are essential to measurement and

objective reality. A paper now being written with H.P.Stapp describes space-building quanta which we call vacuons.

References
1 D.Bohm, Wholeness and the Implicate Order, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1980.
2 D.lagolnitzer, The S Matrix, North Holland, Amsterdam, 1978.
3 See, for example, J.D.Bjorken and S.D.Drell, Relativistic Quantum Fields, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1965.
4 H.P.Stapp, Phys. Rev. Lett., 50, 467 (1983); preprint LBL-13651, Berkeley (1982).
5 Two recent reviews of topological particle theory have been written by F.Capra, preprint LBL-14858, Berkeley (1982) and by G.F.Chew,
Foundations of Physics, 13, 217 (1983).
6 G.F.Chew, Phys. Rev., D27, 976 (1983); Foundations of Physics, 13, 217 (1983).

15
Light as foundation of being
Henry P.Stapp
University of California, Berkeley
According to Niels Bohr quantum theory must be interpreted, not as a description of nature itself, but merely as a tool for making predictions about
observations appearing under conditions described by classical physics:
Strictly speaking, the mathematical formalism of quantum theory merely offers rules of calculation for the deduction of expectations about
observations obtained under well-defined conditions specified by classical physical concepts.1
There can be no question of any unambiguous interpretation of the symbols of quantum mechanics other than that embodied by the wellknown rules which allow to predict the results to be obtained by a given experimental arrangement described in a totally classical way.2
This necessity of discriminating in each experimental arrangement between those parts of the physical system considered which are
treated as measuring instruments and those which constitute the object under investigation may indeed be said to form a principal
distinction between classical and quantum description of physical phenomena.2
Indispensable use of classical conceptseven though classical physical theories do not suffice.2

This indispensable use of the invalidated classical concepts is a troublesome point. So is the intrusion into the theory of the scientist himself; the scientist
must make a somewhat arbitrary division of a single unified physical system into two separate parts, and describe them according to mutually incompatible
physical theories.
The aim of the present article is to show how recent technical developments in the quantum theory of light may allow quantum theory

to be formulated as a unified theory of the physical world itself. The classical aspects of nature would then emerge automatically from the evolution of the
fully quantum mechanical system, with no intrusion of observers or scientists. In this theory the electromagnetic field (i.e. light) plays a central role: it is the
carrier of both classical properties and actual being itself.
The model presented here has elements of arbitrariness that render it unsatisfactory as a true model of the universe: it is a rudimentary form of such a
model, not a finished product.
The technical development mentioned above arose in connection with the famous infrared catastrophe: the contributions of infinite numbers of very
low-energy photons had led to apparent infinities in the calculation of many physical quantities. The essential feature of the resolution of this problem was
discovered in 1937 by Bloch and Nordsieck: one must separate out the classical aspects of the problem. The original work3 dealt only with simple cases,
and involved approximations, but it was developed and extended in an immense collection of works by many authors. But there remained until recently the
basic problem of understanding how the observed classical results emerged in all of the appropriate macroscopic limits.
This problem was resolved recently by recognizing that there was an exact separation between the classical and quantum parts of the electromagnetic
current.4 The coordinate-space Feynman path of each charged particle has one set of vertices for the quantum interactions with light, and a different set
of vertices for the classical interaction. The radiation from each classical vertex depends only on its own location, and those of the two neighboring
classical vertices; it is independent of what happens between these classical vertices. Furthermore, an arbitrary number of classical photons, all identical,
can be emitted from each classical vertex. These classical photons, whose character depends only on the locations of the classical vertices can be
summed. The sum is a unitary operator that creates precisely the unique coherent quantum state that corresponds to the light radiated by a classical charge
moving on a space-time path defined by the sequence of classical vertices.
Before showing how this identification of the classical part of the electromagnetic field provides the basis for a unified self-governing quantum universe,
with automatic emergence of classical reality, some peripheral questions will be addressed.
The first question is whether there is any need for unified formulation of quantum theory. Bohr gave convincing arguments that, in the realm of atomic
physics, no theory could give predictions going beyond those attainable from his observer-based formulation of quantum theory. However, the
experimental situation encountered in atomic physics is far from universal. It involves large preparing and detecting devices, which are considered to be
parts of the full classi-

cally-described macroscopic environment, plus a tiny quantum system. This quantum system must be small enough so that during the interval between its
preparation and detection its influence upon the macroscopic environment is negligible. For if the quantum system influences the macroscopic environment
then phase information is transferred to this environment, and the Schrdinger equation fails. The macroscopic environment must then be described
quantum mechanically, which contradicts the requirement that it be described classically. Consequently, as the quantum system is increased in size it must
eventually reach the stage where neither the classical nor quantum description is adequate. To deal with such intermediate situations it would appear
necessary to treat in a unified way the full physical system of macroscopic environment plus quantum object.
It has been claimed that most physicists accept Bohrs interpretation of quantum theory. Of course, any physicist who uses quantum theory in a
practical way in atomic physics is probably interpreting quantum theory as a useful tool, in the way Bohr suggested. But at the level of basic principle the
dissenters include most of the founders of quantum theory: Einstein, Schrdinger, de Broglie, Pauli, Heisenberg, Wigner, and von Neumann, to name a
few. Gell-Mann said Niels Bohr brainwashed a whole generation of physicists into believing that the problem had been solved fifty years ago.5 Pauli6
said: I think the important and extremely difficult task of our time is to try to build up a fresh idea of reality.
I doubt if any physicist can be completely comfortable injecting human observers and invalid classical concepts into atomic theory, and giving up the
ideal that basic physical theory should describe the world itself. The two overriding considerations are rather that Bohrs interpretation works fine in
atomic physics, and that even Einstein himself, in spite of intensive effort, was unable to propose any alternative.
The present proposal is based on two results that did not exist in Einsteins day. The first is the above-mentioned development of our understanding of
the classical part of the electromagnetic field, and the second is the refinement in our ideas of locality and causality that have grown out of Bells theorem.7
The present proposal is in line with some ideas of David Bohm8 and Werner Heisenberg9 that will be described next.

Bohm-Heisenberg idea of events

The wave function of quantum theory has many similarities to the probability function of classical statistical mechanics. This latter function represents the
probability for the various particles of the system to be in certain states at specified times. But if we were to place detectors in certain locations then it
could also represent the

probability for something to happen, i.e. for the detectors to detect something.
The square of the absolute value of the wave function of quantum theory has an intuitive significance similar to this happening or event interpretation
of the classical probability function, and Heisenberg was willing to say that the detection event actually occurs at the level of physical device.9 Then the
probability for finding the particle can be interpreted as the probability for this physical detection event to occur, quite apart from any human participant
or observer.
The difficulty with this idea is to know how to describe in a precise way what has happened. If we consider the event to be the observation by a
human observer, then we know by education and training how to judge whether this observation conforms to certain specifications. And these
specifications have, quite naturally, a certain impreciseness, which allows for the necessary quantum fluctuations. But if we are going to consider the event
to be something in the external physical world itself, then we need some sort of mathematical description of what is happening. But what is the precise
form of the description of device plus quantum object before and after the event?
If one tries to use only the wave function and the Schrdinger equation of quantum mechanics then one finds that the event never occurs. Rather,
every possible event occurs: there is no singling out of the one event that actually occurs from the myriad of possible events that might occur.
The origin of this problem is precisely that the wave function has mathematical properties appropriate to a representation of probabilities, rather than
actualities. For a system of n particles the wave, at fixed time, is a function in a space of 3n dimensions. But we live in a space of only three dimensions.
Thus, the wave function, like a classical probability function, represents all things that possibly can happen; it does not single out the one thing that actually
does happen.
To represent the actual thing one appears to have three options:
1 introduce object-like (or field-like) entities to represent the actual things;
2 introduce idea-like entities to fill up all the mindful possibilities corresponding to the multi-branched wave function;
3 introduce action-type entities to collapse (i.e. eliminate) the unrealized branches of the wave function.
The first alternative leads to the de Broglie-Bohm8 pilot-wave idea, in which the part of the wave function representing all of the unrealized possibilities
awkwardly continues to exist in an objective sense. The second leads to myriads of parallel worlds10 that are all interpreted as objectively real, but which
seem to be simply the consequence of insisting that the wave function represent objective reality itself rather than merely the probabilities for events. The
third possibility is the one to be pursued here. It is in general accord with ideas

of Bohm,11 Heisenberg,9 and von Neumann.12 The problem with this idea has been the unavailability of any objective way to single out the various
classically allowed possibilities. Lacking any objective mechanism for making this selection, physicists have assigned this task to themselves.

Time and quantum process

The model to be proposed here is the embodiment of a process conception of nature. By process I mean nature conceived as a progressively growing set
of things that are fixed and settled. This growing body of accumulating facts is considered to increase in discrete steps; at each step some unsettled things
become fixed and settled.
Before Newton the history of the world could have been regarded as a growing body of facts, with the factual content of the region t<T representing
what is fixed and settled at time T, and the region t>T representing the realm of the unfixed possibilities. However, Newtons laws altered this picture:
they fixed the complete space-time story, once the initial conditions were fixed. Hence the idea of process was effectively banished.
This banishment of process made way for Einsteins theory of relativity. For if the entire space-time story is fixed, then choices of coordinates become
purely matters of scientific convenience: there is no need for a scientist to worry about the questions of what exists now or what has already taken
place. In a deterministic world the whole notion of becoming becomes so nebulous and shadowy that it drops completely out of the physicists stock of
operative ideas.
The non-deterministic character of quantum theory reopens the whole question of the connection of space and time to the ontological categories of
existence, being, becoming, etc. For if initially unsettled things can eventually become fixed and settled, then the order in which different things become
fixed might have conceptual and dynamical significance. To expand the structural possibilities we go beyond the pragmatic confines of Bohrs
interpretation: we distinguish human knowledge from general existence, and base physical theory on the latter.
As regards the relationship between order as defined by process (i.e. the order in which things become fixed and settled) and temporal order (as
defined by space-time coordination) we are, ab initio, completely free. The theory of relativity says nothing at all about the order in which things become
fixed and settled, because it was set in a framework in which no such order occurred.
As regards causal influences it now recognized7 that quantum theory requires that what appears in one space-time region cannot in general be required
to be independent of what is done (i.e. is chosen) in spatially separated regions. However, this necessity for non-local

influences need not provide any possibility for sending signals faster than light.

Coherent states and classical concepts

The model to be proposed here makes essential use of the coherent states of the quantized electromagnetic field. These states play a role in the model
similar to those played by the observer in Bohrs formulation of quantum theory.
These coherent states are, as is well known, the quantum-mechanical counterparts of the fields that occur in classical electromagnetic theory. I shall
briefly review here this connection between coherent states and classical physics, and then describe some properties of coherent states that will be used in
the model. Further details about coherent states, and their uses in quantum electrodynamics and quantum optics, can be found in articles by Kibble13,14
and Glauber.15
The classical electromagnetic field in a cavity can be decomposed into eigenmodes i. Each such mode has an eigen frequency i, and a complex
amplitude ai(t), which is related to the real canonical variables qi(t) and pi(t) by the equation:

where mi is a characteristic mass. Thus the real and imaginary parts of the complex amplitude ai(t) are associated with the canonical variables qi(t) and
pi(t) respectively.
The possible free motions of the classical electromagnetic field in the cavity are represented by taking each variable ai(t) to be of the form:

Thus, the complex variable ai(t) moves with velocity i in a circle about the origin in the complex plane. The real and imaginary parts of ai(t)
correspond to the magnetic and electric parts of the electromagnetic field, and the circular motion corresponds to the familiar oscillation of the energy of
the radiation field between the electric and magnetic fields, both in the standing-wave modes, and in the circularly-polarized traveling-wave modes.
Upon quantization the complex amplitude ai(t) becomes an operator i(t). The operators i(t) obey the familiar commutation relations:

Each mode i has a discrete set of eigenstates |ni>, ni, (0, 1), where ni is the number of photons in mode i. The eigenmodes of the full electromagnetic
field itself are represented as products over the states |ni> of the individual oscillators.
One may, however, consider also the state |ai(t)> obtained by

shifting the ground-state wave-function of oscillator i from its original position centered at the origin of phase-space to a new position centered at point
ai(t). The equations of motion of the quantum system dictate that this state develop in time according to the classical equations of motion:

A coherent state |A(t)> of the electromagnetic field is constructed as a product of these displaced ground states:

This state is defined by the set of amplitudes {ai(t)} for the various modes i, and hence by a positive-frequency solution A(+)(x) of the classical
electromagnetic field equations. The coherent state |A(t)> in the interaction representation can be labelled by:

The expectation value in the state |A(x)> of the quantum operator (x) corresponding to the vector potential of electromagnetism is:

More generally, if ()(x) and

represent the creation and annihilation operator parts of the quantum operator (x) then:

Consequently, by virtue of the Dyson-Wick expansion, the S matrix in a coherent state is equal to the S matrix in the corresponding classical
electromagnetic field:

The right-hand side is a vacuum expectation value, the C( ) and B( +) are particle (i.e. non-photon) operators, and S(A(x)) is the S matrix in the presence
of the classical electromagnetic field A(x). This result consolidates the close connection between coherent states and classical fields.
A key formula for us will be the matrix element between two coherent states. For a single mode the formula is:

where:

is the square of the distance between the two complex numbers, considered as points in a two-dimensional space.

This formula generalizes immediately to the coherent states:

where:

and

Thus two coherent states |A> and |B> can be said to be separated from each other by a distance |AB|, and a phase , both of which vanish if A=B.

Observers and classical concepts

In the Bohr (Copenhagen) interpretation of quantum theory the observer plays a central role; he distinguishes between the classically distinct results of
measurements. If before the measurement the state of atomic object plus measuring device is a pure quantum state , then after the measurement the state
must (if the environment is ignored) still be a pure state. If the experiment has, for example, two possible results then this pure state ' will have two
classically distinguishable components, which correspond to the two distinct possible results of the experiment. Thus the process of measurement
produces a change.

where |1> and |2> represent two (non-normalized) classically distinguishable results.
The state ' can, however, be written in an infinite number of ways as a sum of two non-normalized vectors. So the problem is this: What distinguishes
this particular separation from all of the other possibilities?
In the Copenhagen interpretation this separation is defined by means of conditions specified by classical concepts. These conditions are reasonably
well-defined in terms of what human observers can see and do, but they are not precisely defined in terms that are either completely compatible with
quantum theory itself, or are objective in the sense that they do not refer in any way to human observers.
Once the decomposition of into its classically distinguishable components |1> and |2> has been specified, then the quantum rules say that
observed state will be either |1> or |2> and that the probability that it will be |1> is <1|1>, whereas the probability that it will be |1> is <2|2>.
The idea of the present model is to replace the observer by an objective mechanism based on coherent states. This mechanism

produces events with probabilities specified by the quantum formalism.

Mechanism of event generation

The mechanism of event generation is constructed as follows. Each event i corresponds to the specification of the Schrdinger state vector i on a
spacelike surface i. The region lying between i1 and i is a cell i that is bounded in both time and space. The spatial extent of cell i defines a cavity that
specifies the modes that participate in the temporal development of the state from i1 to i.
The operator U(i, i1) that takes the quantum system from i1 to i can be written4:

Here P represents a multi-particle Feynman classical path, and U(P) is a unitary operator that creates from the vacuum the coherent state corresponding
to the classical electromagnetic field radiated by the charged particles moving along the multi-particle set of classical paths P.
The summation over all Feynman paths P tends to wash out these coherent states, but if there is a large-scale collective motion of matter then some of
the coherent states having characteristic distances similar to those of the collective modes should remain prominent.
Suppose that in the unitary development generated in cell j the coherent states in the modes i (1, 2n) remain prominent. Then the full Hilbert space
can be separated into a product of two spaces, one, Sj1 corresponding to the modes i (1, 2n), and the other, Sj2 corresponding to both the rest of the
electromagnetic field plus the matter fields.
The coherent states are an overcomplete set of states: any state in the subspace Sj1 can be expressed as a linear combination of coherent states in Sj1.
Thus the state
can be expressed as
with all |A> in Si1. The corresponding density matrix is
where the dot is placed between a ket and a bra to indicate no summation.
The mechanism of event generation is represented as follows. Let |A> represent a coherent state in Si1 (a Schrdinger state on i). Then define:

The ith event is then represented by the following transformation:

The probability density for this event is:

This probability density is defined relative to the measure that appears in coherent state theory:

Relative to this measure the coherent states satisfy a completeness property:

where the sum over a means an integral over d(Re a) d(Im a)/. This completeness property entails that:

where Tr represents trace in the full space and tr represents trace in Si2.
To see how this mechanism works in a traditional measurement situation consider the simple example:

Here |1> and |2> correspond to the two possible results of the measurement discussed earlier, and |A1> and |A2> represent the coherent states
generated by the interaction of these two states with the electromagnetic field.
The event-generation mechanism takes the normalized state to some normalized state |A> |A>. The probability density P(A) associated with
|A>|A> is:

If the two coherent states |A1> and |A2> are very different, so that

|A1A2| is very large, then the exponential factors in P(A) and the triangle inequality, ensure that A will, with very high probability, lie very close to either
A1 or A2. Furthermore, the total probability that |A>|A> will be approximately |A1>|1> is <1|1>, and the total probability that |A>|A> will be
approximately |A2>|2> is <2|2>. Thus in this case the event-generation mechanism gives results that conform to the Copenhagen interpretation rules.
Note, however, that the mechanism produces a classical state |A>|A> also in the cases where |A1> and |A2> and |1> and |2> are not very
different. And it gives the probability density P(A) also in these more complex situations where the Copenhagen rules would not apply.
More generally, suppose that:

and that the set of |Ak > can be separated into N subsets such that all of the |Ak > in each subset are far away from all of the |Ak > in each of the other
subsets. This separation of the |Ak > induces a separation:

The event mechanism will cause the state to jump into some state i that is close to one of the state. And the total probability that the state will
jump to a state close to
is
So the result is again compatible with the Copenhagen rules, but more general.
The essential point behind this mechanism is that, generally, linear combinations of coherent states are not coherent states. Consequently, for example,
the second of the two following decompositions does not give states into which the quantum state can jump:

Thus the special role played by coherent states in the event-generation mechanism has the effect of specifying very special modes of decomposition of
into its classically distinct components.
To convert the properties described above into a complete theory one needs to specify the rules for determining (statistically at least) the placement of
the surfaces i. And one must specify the precise rule for identifying the subspace Si1 associated with i. However, by introducing even arbitrary rules one
generates at least a conceptual framework for replacing the human observers of the Copenhagen interpretation by an objective mechanism (based on
light) that could give precision to the Bohm-Heisenberg idea of objective events as the foundation of classical reality.
In the specifications of the sequence of surfaces i, and the subspaces

Sj1, it is important to recognize that the principles of the theory of relativity pertain to the general laws, and hence to descriptions of the probabilities,
rather than the actualities: the actual situations do not possess the general symmetries. Thus one should not specify the sequence of surfaces i
independently of the developing actual situation; that would give preferences to certain space-time structures, independently of the actual. Rather, each i
should be specified by the prior actualities. Then there is no conflict with the general relativistic principle that different frames and coordinate systems are
intrinsically equivalent.
This work was begun as a contribution to this volume honoring David Bohm. The deadline has now arrived and the task is unfinished. I hope, however,
that even in its present rudimentary form the model described herein will serve to clarify and stimulate the thinking of readers of this volume about a
subject that has filled a great part of the scientific life of David Bohm, and to which he has contributed immensely.

Acknowledgment
This work was supported by the Director, Office of Energy Research, Office of High Energy and Nuclear Physics, Division of High Energy Physics of the
US Department of Energy under contract DE-ACO3-76SF00098.

References
1 Niels Bohr, Essays 1958/1962 on Atomic Physics and Human Knowledge, Wiley, New York, 1963.
2 Niels Bohr, Phys. Rev., 48, 396, p. 701 (1935).
3 F.Bloch and A.Nordsieck, Phys. Rev., 52, 54 (1937).
4 Henry P.Stapp., Phys. Rev., D26, 1386 (1983).
5 M.Gell-Mann, in The Nature of the Physical Universe, the 1976 Nobel Conference, Wiley, New York, 1979, p. 29.
6 W.Pauli, letter from Pauli to Fierz 12 Aug 1948, quoted by K.V.Laurikainen, Wolfgang Pauli and Philosophy, Theoretical Physics Preprint HU-TFT
836, University of Helsinki.
7 H.P.Stapp, Amer. J.Phys, 53, 306 (1985).
8 David Bohm, Phys. Rev., 85, 166 (1952); L.de Broglie, An Introduction to the Study of Wave Mechanics, Dutton, New York, 1930; D.Bohm and
B. Hiley, Foundations of Physics, 14, 255 (1984).
9 W.Heisenberg, Physics and Philosophy, Harper & Row, New York, 1958, ch. III.
10 H.Everett III, Rev. Mod. Phys., 29, 454 (1957).
11 David Bohm, Quantum Theory, Prentice-Hall, 1951.
12 J.von Neumann, Mathematical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics. Princeton University Press, 1955.
13 T.W.B.Kibble, J. Math Phys., 9, 315 (1968).
14 T.W.B.Kibble, in S.M.Kay and A.Maitland (eds), Quantum Optics. Academic Press, London and New York, 1970.
15 R.J.Glauber, in S.M.Kay and A.Maitland (eds) Quantum Optics. Academic Press, London and New York, 1970.

16
The automorphism group of C4
C.W.Kilmister
Gresham College, London

1 Introduction
One of the most pressing mathematical problems thrown up by the highly original work of David Bohm1 is to construct numerous detailed examples that
will help in the understanding of the important concepts of implicate and explicate order. Recently Bohm and Hiley2 have themselves stressed the
important role played by the Clifford algebras Cn here, since the automorphisms of the (even) Clifford algebras C2r are all inner and any theory based on
an algebra can always be put in an implicate order by an inner automorphism of the algebra3. To make the notation precise, I am using Cn for the algebra
generated by n anticommuting elements, which I usually denote by Ei(i=1n), but in the case of quaternions, C2, I use e1, e2, and set e3=e1e2. Thus Cn
has a basis of 2n elements, including the unit, which I call 1. Unless explicitly stated otherwise, the algebra is over the field of reals, R.
The simplest example of this is C2 which, since Hamiltons original paper4, is known to fit three-dimensional space perfectly (as was intended) and in
which the automorphism group G2={Tq}:

is exactly O+(3), the proper orthogonal group. This fact is easily proved since, on the one hand, for any vector (i.e. 3-vector) v , v2 is minus the square of
the magnitude of v , and is evidently invariant under G2 and, on the other, G2 is evidently a 3-parameter group and so is the whole of O+(3). But it is to
some extent a surprise, and another way of looking at quaternions makes it more natural. This

will be studied in the present section. In section 2 the next case, C4, is introduced and the corresponding theorems are stated with explanations in section
3. Proofs follow in section 4 and a new geometrical picture is to be found in section 5. This second aspect of quaternions was found later by Hamilton5
and is developed at some length in his Lectures6 and in his Elements7; it is also very clearly stated by Tait8.
The method is to look on a quaternion q as a quotient q=vul of two 3-vectors. In an obvious modification of Hamiltons original notation, I write:

for any quaternion, with

and
Here
Two 3-vectors v, u involve 6 degrees of freedom, but
since both can be multiplied by the same constant without affecting q, this number is reduced to five. Since a quaternion involves only four, there is some
redundancy and this can be made explicit by asking when two quotients are equal:

Choose any u and calculate the corresponding v=vu1u, which will usually be a quaternion, not a 3-vector. If it is to be a 3-vector, then S.vu1u=0,
i.e. S.vuu=0 which implies that u must be chosen coplanar with v, u. Any such choice gives a corresponding v. Also, because:

where e is a unit vector and is the angle between u and v, any other pair u, v contains the same angle . This therefore gives rise to Hamiltons
representation of quaternions by arcs of great circles on the unit sphere. Since any two great circles intersect, the product of two quaternions q=vu1,
q1=v 1u11 can always be written as:

by choosing the factor v 1 of q1 as u; hence Hamiltons representation of the product of quaternions in terms of the three sides of a spherical triangle. The
connection with the orthogonal group is then hardly surprising.

2 E-numbers
As is well known, the odd algebras present certain peculiar features which can be avoided for most purposes by noting the isomorphism:

Accordingly the next example to consider is C4, the Dirac algebra or Eddingtons E-numbers. To fix notation, I define the four generating elements to be
normalised by:

where ab is the usual diagonal Minkowski metric tensor and I adopt the + sign convention. This normalisation is an appropriate one when E1, E2,
E3, E4 are intended to correspond to four directions in space-time. (Notice, however, that this is a different use of the algebra from the quaternion
example, since here the dimension of space-time is equal to the number of generators.) Again to fix notation, I write:

and

so that

Also

Then it is easy to see that:

defined by raising suffixes in the usual definition, so
The proper Lorentz group is now a subgroup of G4={Tq}:

and so on, and:

where abcd is the usual epsilon symbol. (Warning: abcd is

that:)

where q, r are any two elements of C4 (or E-numbers, for short). In fact, using the convenient notation:

If we interpret ra as a standard space-time vector, then the proper Lorentz group is generated by the following six values of q:

Under such transformations, rab is a bivector and r5, ra5 are pseudoscalar and pseudo-vector respectively, when improper transformations are permitted.
It is convenient to extend Hamiltons notation for quaternions in an obvious way, writing:

when it also follows that:

It is useful to have a brief symbolic multiplication table for the parts S, PS, V, PV, B of an E-number (see Table 16.1).
Table 16.1 Symbolic multiplication table
S
S
S
PS
PS
V
V
PV
PV
B
B

PS

PV

S
PV
V
B

S+B
PS+B
V+PV

S+B
V+PV

S+PS+B

3 Decomposition of G
From the analogy with quaternions two problems suggest themselves at once. A ratio of two vectors involves eight degrees of freedom, of which one is
redundant, leaving sevenfar too few for the sixteen of a general E-number, but we are concerned particularly with the Lorentz group. This is a sixparameter group, but a q representing a transformation of the group may be multiplied by a constant, making seven degrees of freedom. But counting
degrees of freedom is only an indication and in fact the situation is a little more complicated, as we shall see. The other associated problem is to determine
which qs correspond to Lorentz transformations. Both of these problems are solved by the following seven theorems, whose proofs follow in section 4.
Consider first E-numbers of the simple form:

which evidently form a sub-algebra of dimension 8. I shall call such a one of bivector type. If we define:

it follows at once that:

say, where I1(w), I2(w) are the usual two invariants of the bivector w, defined by:

and
is the dual bivector,
If A(q)=B(q)=0, I shall call q singular, otherwise non-singular. Since E5. commutes with q, it follows that
1
the reciprocal q of any non-singular E-number of

bivector type is given by:

We can define A(q), B(q) for any E-number q as the corresponding A, B for the part of q of the form above. Then:

Theorem 1
If q is non-singular, it can be factorised uniquely in the form q=q vq B , where q B is of bivector type, and q v has the form:

which I shall call of vector type. (There are corresponding results for a factorisation as q B q v.)

Correspondingly, any automorphism can be factorised into one which transforms E5 into other elements (qv ) and one which leaves E5 invariant (qB). In
what follows I shall be mainly concerned with the group of transformations of the bivector type, which contains the Lorentz group. The physical
interpretation of the vector type is not completely clear. But some idea of it can be obtained by looking at two special cases.
1 Let q=1+uaEa, so that the automorphism:

leaves invariant the component of Vr parallel to ua, and rotates the component perpendicular to ua into the part of Br satisfying
The
a
rest of Br, satisfying
is left invariant, as are the components of the pseudo-vector perpendicular to u . Finally, the remaining component of
the pseudo-vector is rotated into the pseudo-scalar, r5.
2 Similarly, if
the conclusions are similar, with u, v interchanged and
written for rab.
3 Another special case forms a warning against too glib an acceptance of non-singular qs as all that concern us. The E-number q=cos +E1 sin is
non-singular according to the definition, so long as
and the decomposition is trivially:

The singular case then gives rise to the automorphism:

which leaves invariant the part of r commuting with

E1 (i.e. r0, r1, r23, r24, r34, r25, r35, r45) and changes the sign of (r2, r3, r4, r31, r12, r14, r15, r5). It is therefore a Lorentz transformation of determinant
1. In fact, combining it with the transformation:

which is in L+, gives a space-reversal in the direction. Similarly:

is a straightforward time reversal. In other words, G4 contains not only the proper Lorentz group L+, but the whole group, although the improper
transformations are exhibited in this analysis as singular cases.
The set of non-singular automorphisms of bivector type is a seven-parameter group G (since one can divide through by any one magnitude).

Theorem 2
G is a direct product G=HL+, where H is the set of automorphisms produced by:

and L+ is the proper Lorentz group.

The transformations of H may be called phase rotations. They are in fact two-dimensional rotations linked and of the form:

It remains to determine the elements of L+.

Theorem 3
A non-singular q of bivector type:

is a Lorentz transformation if and only if:

This completes the analysis of how L+ is contained in G4, and I turn to the question of representing elements of L+ by ratios of E-numbers.

Theorem 4
If q=uv 1 , where u=u a Ea , v=va Ea , then:

so that I2 (w)=0 and so, by theorem 3, q is a Lorentz transformation. But the set of such qs has only five degrees of
freedom, and does not, of course, form a subgroup of L+. However there is a more useful geometrical picture, which is
suggested by the following.

Theorem 5
Any q in G can be written as q=uv 1 , where u, v are bivectors,

This result is a very direct analogy with the corresponding quaternion result (with which, as we shall see in the next section, it is closely connected), but it
does not help in the visualisation in space-time. It is more useful to consider a seven-dimensional space with homogeneous co-ordinates to represent the
elements of G.
Theorem 5 immediately suggests the question of which pairs u, v give Lorentz transformations. The answer is provided by:

Theorem 6
uv 1 gives a transformation of L+ if, and only if:

i.e.:

Of course, even with this condition, 6+611=10, which is much greater than 7, a redundancy of 3 being indicatedin fact very much in line with the
quaternion case.

Theorem 7
If

then:

with a corresponding result for uab . There are four parameters rather than three because u, v may be multiplied by a
common factor.

A similar result now holds for multiplication to the one in the quaternion case; that is,

4 Proofs of theorems
There are various ways of proving the results of the last section, but perhaps the shortest is to recognise them as fairly direct generalisations of quaternion
results by means of the following (partial) isomorphism.
1 Since E23. E31=E12 and the symbols anticommute and square to 1, we can take (E23, E31, E12)=(e1, e2, e3)as a quaternion set.
2 Then E14=E1234E23=E5E23. Since E5 commutes with e1, e2, e3 it is convenient to write it as i and to set:

In this notation, the bivector part of an E-number:

becomes:

which can be seen simply as a quaternion over the complex field C and

is then the usual conjugate quaternion. Also, as usual:

To continue with this analysis:

3 Choose a generating element (the most convenient one is E4) and set E4=k. Clearly k commutes with e1, e2, e3 but not with i. Putting this in terms of
the quaternion algebra over C, qk=kq*, where q* is the complex conjugate quaternion. Then the remaining elements are given by:

Any E-number can therefore be written as:

where a, b are complex quaternions, and a is the part of q of bivector form, whilst b is the part involving the vector and pseudo-vector. The proof of
theorem 1 is then simply to notice that:

and theorems 2 and 3 re-state a well-known isomorphism between the proper Lorentz group and complex quaternions of unit norm. (Here, though, the
identification is slightly different from the usual one. A standard space-time vector has the form

where r is a physical quaternion, i.e. satisfies r+=r, where r+ is the complex conjugate of the quaternion conjugate. Then the Lorentz transformation
corresponds to:

so that:

if |s|=1.)
It is easier to prove theorem 4 directly, but in this notation it also follows easily since q=(ku)(kv)1 where u, v are physical, and so
Since
and since u, v are physical, |u|2,|v|2 are real. On the other hand, theorem 5 is much easier in the quaternion
notation, since it is indeed the direct extension of the result of section 1 to the complex case. Here u, v are general complex 3-vectors. The condition
(theorem 6) for a Lorentz transformation is |u|/|v|=m, a real number, so that:

is real. Finally, in the same way as in the real case, theorem 7 is a restatement of:

where f, g are complex numbers.

5 Another geometrical picture

These results are more transparent in a different geometrical interpretation, in the formation of which I have had considerable assistance from J.A.Tyrrell.
The condition:

on an E-number of bivector type, for the automorphism which it generates to be a Lorentz transformation has a ready geometric interpretation in terms of
the seven-dimensional projective space V7 of co-ordinates:

For the condition is exactly that the point x lies on a certain quadric hypersurface, , of rank 8 and signature zero:

Now a quadric in three dimensions contains (two systems of) gene-

rating lines, real if the signature is zero. Consider then a quadric hypersurface in five dimensions. A tangent hyperplane cuts it in a three-dimensional cone,
lying therefore in the surface. Such a cone is the join of a quadric surface to a point outside its 3-space. This quadric has generators and so the cone, and
therefore the original quadric, contains the planes which arise from joining the vertex to them. Finally, then, the quadric is cut by a tangent hyperplane in
a five-dimensional cone; that is, the join of a four-dimensional quadric to a point not in its 5-space. This quadric contains planes and so the cone, and
therefore , contain solids; that is, three-dimensional linear spaces lying altogether in the surface.
The existence of these linear spaces is a new aspect of the Lorentz group. They are not, in general, subgroups, though in one or two well-known cases
they happen to be so. For example, the group of spatial rotations, generated by cos +E23 sin , and similar terms in E31, E12, has the general member:

or, in terms of the representation, it is the solid:

Similarly the group generated by, say, terms in E24, E34, E23, which could occur in an investigation of the electrons Thomas precession, is the solid:

In terms of this geometrical picture, consider now the expression of a Lorentz transformation q as a ratio, q=uv1. Here u, v are bivectors satisfying:

As bivectors, u,v lie in the five-dimensional subspace, V5, say,

and so the ratio expression represents a (many: one) mapping of pairs of points, U,V in V5 on to points Q=Q(U,V) in V7. In fact the redundancy
discussed above means that a solid of possible Us, each with its appropriate V (and these Vs also forming a solid) give the same Q. For any U in V5 the
condition on u,v represents a quadric hypersurface U on which V must lie, in order that the resulting Q should lie on the quadric . And every such U
contains planes, as noted aboveand all of this comes out of David Bohms astonishingly fertile idea.

References
1 D.Bohm, Wholeness and the Implicate Order, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1980.
2 D.Bohm and B.J.Hiley, Revista Brasileira de Fisica, July, 1984.
3 D.Bohm, Foundations of Physics, 3, 139 (1973).
4 W.R.Hamilton, Proc. Roy. Irish Acad., 2, 42434 (1844).
5 W.R.Hamilton, Proc. Roy. Irish Acad., 3, Appendix, xxxixxxvi, 1847.
6 W.R.Hamilton, Lectures on Quaternions, Dublin, 1853 (see especially pp. 601 of the preface).
7 W.R.Hamilton, Elements of Quaternions, Longmans, London, 1866 (Book II, Chap. I, especially sections 36).
8 P.G.Tait, Quaternions (second ed.), Oxford, 1873 (especially paras. 5362).

17
Some spinor implications unfolded
F.A.M. Frescura and B.J.Hiley
Birkbeck College, London

1 Introduction
One of the more puzzling features of contemporary relativistic quantum mechanics is the enforced retreat into the concepts of external and internal
spaces that are locally independent. Here the elementary particles are not thought of as extended structures in space-time but are regarded primarly as
point objects with internal variables such as spin, isospin, hypercharge, charm, etc., together with the usual external space-time properties like
momentum, mass, etc. This way of proceeding seems inescapable and is forced on us, not so much by physical considerations, but by technical difficulties
arising from the mathematics itself. Nevertheless, this approach has received considerable impetus with the realisation that the mathematical theory of fibre
bundles, a theory developed for very different reasons, provides a natural descriptive language for these ideas.
The question of spin is particularly puzzling since it arises most naturally in the Clifford algebra, a geometric algebra constructed from space-time itself.
Yet spin is most easily handled through the spin bundle which, of course, treats spin as an internal variable, independent of the local space-time structure
itself. Although we do not deny the fruitfulness of this approach, we feel that it is worth investigating another which arises essentially from an algebraic
study of spin.
This alternative approach was stimulated by the general considerations from David Bohms notion of the implicate order. Consequently the ideas
presented will differ in many respects from those used in the fibre bundle theory even though there is a good deal of common ground. In fact, we shall be
guided at least part of the way by results obtained in that theory. The fundamental difference arises because we

do not give a basic role to field-in-interaction on a space-time manifold. Rather we start by taking the notion of process as fundamental; not a process in
space-time, but a process from which we hope eventually to abstract basic relationships that will allow us to reconstruct our present notions of spacetime. Thus, space-time can be regarded as an order of relationships. Such an idea is not new. It was proposed, circa seventeenth century, by Leibniz,
who regarded space as the order of coexistence and time as the order of succession.
In relationship theory of space-time, the notion of locality should not be given a priori, but it too should emerge from a distinguished relationship.
Bohm1 has already indicated how this particular feature can be understood in analogy with the hologram, which stores non-locally in itself information
defining local relationships. Of course, in this case, the notion of a local order is provided by the material object being hologrammed. In the more general
situation that we are considering, however, there are no material objects and therefore no obvious notion of locality. The reason why there are no objects
in the usual sense is because the fundamental order is not a regular arrangement of objects, but rather a process in which the objects appear as quasistable semi-autonomous structures. These are made manifest in the explicate order which, in some approximation, corresponds to the usual Euclidean or
Reimanian geometry. It is therefore in the explicate order that locality emerges. Any appearance of non-locality would then arise from the fact that not all
processes can be made local together. The total order must therefore contain within itself the relationship of locality needed to explicate this geometric
order. Such a relationship will require some special principle which is at present unknown. However, a similar problem arises in Chews2 S-matrix
approach and, as he shows in this volume, it is the soft photons that provide the physical basis for such a relationship.
Our own approach does not use the S-matrix but instead is based on the relationship between algebras and the holomovement. This relationship has
already been discussed in general terms by Bohm1 and in more detail by Frescura and Hiley3,4,5. In the more detailed papers, we discuss at length how,
when process is regarded as a fundamental notion, the dynamical variables must be given a primary role, while the concept of a state vector as a
fundamental entity must be abandoned. This does not mean, however, that the state vector disappears entirely from our view. Rather, in all the physically
relevant algebras the state vectors of the usual theory can be identified with certain special entities within the algebra itself; namely, the minimum left ideals.
Thus the old state is now a special kind of process by which the system transforms into itself in such a way as to change none of its observed properties.
In this paper we shall do no more than simply to illustrate this idea in terms of the Dirac theory. Here the state vectors of the system are

the four-component spinors ordinarily used in the description of spin one-half fermions and can be identified with the minimal left ideals of the CliffordDirac algebra, C4. However, these ideals are richer structures and have properties that go beyond those of the ordinary spinor, a feature that is briefly
touched upon in this paper. It is important to realise that these ideas can be extended not only to higher-dimensional Clifford algebras, but also to the case
of bosons through what we call the symplectic algebras. While the Clifford algebras carry the rotational symmetries algebraically, the symplectic algebras
carry the translation symmetries.
Our discussion in this paper necessarily touches only on a limited aspect of the general approach outlined above. Nevertheless, we can throw some
light on the constraints that must be placed on the algebraic relations between neighbouring ideals in order to obtain a consistent algebraic approach when
curvature is present. To do this, we assume an a priori given locality relation. But, of course, our purpose is to find an algebraic characterisation of this
relation that will allow us ultimately to drop the space-time scaffold on which the structure was originally erected and replace it with a purely algebraic
prescription for a neighbourhood relation.

2 The spinor structure of the algebra

By the spinor structure of the algebra we mean the reduction of the algebra into constituent spinor spaces. The Wederburn structure theorems guarantee
that the algebras of interest to us are fully reducible into spinor structures. The reduction in fact can be carried out in two distinct ways, each of which is
useful in its own right and each providing a different insight into the nature of the underlying processes which it describes.
Suppose P is an irreducible idempotent of the Dirac algebra. Then we can project out of the algebra two linear subspaces P and P. If we identify
the first as the spinor space, then the second can be identified as the space dual to P , since we can define:

where ,K
and (P)(KP)=zP.
Our first decomposition of into a composite of spinor substructures uses this fact in reverse. The set:

is an ideal in . But

is simple and so contains only the ideals

and {0}. However 1

, so 1P1=P 0 is in

p , so

P = . Hence:

We shall see in fact in a moment that this product may be identified as the tensor product of the spinor spaces
and
Every element
of can thus be considered as a rank two spin tensor
It is this decomposition that is normally exploited when anti-symmetric tensor quantities are
constructed as bilinear invariants of spinors:

so that:

The second decomposition is not one that has commonly been used, though some interesting suggestions have been made which depend upon it (Bohm
and Hiley6, Khler7, Graf8, Benn and Tucker9). It relies on the fact that any given primitive idempotent
on can always be supplemented by
three other primitive idempotents P2,P3,P4 satisfying:

and:

Then each Pi generates its own spin space Si and dual space

and

can be written as a direct sum:

or:

This means that every element of can be uniquely decomposed into the sum of four spinor fields. Under normal circumstances (action from the left by
same operator H in ), these spinor fields remain uncoupled. But mixing of the four fields can be achieved in more general situations. Such mixing is made
essential, for example, when this algebra is globalised in a non-flat manifold. The action of gravity may then be interpreted as a coupling of four fermion
fields in the manner required by this structure. Bohm and Hiley6 have used this second decomposition of the spinor structure of in their discussion of a

phase space description of relativistic phenomena. The process of regarding the density matrix AB(x,x) as a vector in a higher-dimensional vector space
corresponds to treating it as the direct sum of four algebraic spinors. The introduction of a full set of operators on this higher space is the equivalent to
allowing transformations of the kind:

in , which can be considered in two parts:

which maintains the spinor fields distinct, and:

which induces a mixing of the four fields together.

3 The spinor structure in component form

The two spinor structures described in the last section are not entirely unrelated to each other, even though they look quite different at first sight. Their
relationship is best understood in terms of a special class of basis that can be defined for the algebra.
In the direct sum decomposition, the primitive idempotents Pi can be used to construct the 42 sub-algebras:

of

. Each of these is non-trivial and so contains at least one non-zero element, Eij say. In fact, the structure of

ensures that we have:

where is some complex number. We can use this fact to normalise the Eij chosen as bases for these algebras in such a way as to obtain:

and:

We then have:

and:

Thus the decomposition of into the direct sum of spinor spaces corresponds to choosing a matric basis for .
This same matric basis determines simultaneously also the decomposition of into a product of spinor spaces. Take as the generating idempotent of
the ideals P and P the primitive idempotent P1. Then the Pi can be used on the ideals P1 and P1 as projection operators which project out a total
of eight one-dimensional linear subspaces. If we choose from each of these subspaces a non-zero element, we can use these to span each of these
subspaces. We thus obtain a basis for each of the two ideals. Denote the basis of P1 by A and that of P1 by A. Then for some A and A in , we
have:

and:

(no sum on A), and:

The same matric basis of

, up to a multiplicative factor, thus defines also its decomposition into the product of spinor spaces.

4 Reconstruction of the algebra from a knowledge of the spin spaces

The above process can obviously be partially reversed. A matric basis Eij may be constructed purely from a knowledge of the spin space S. Suppose S
has a basis A. Let SD be the linear dual of S and suppose A is the basis of SD dual to A, i.e.:

Then defining:

yields in an obvious way the desired matric basis for . This however is not sufficient to allow the full reconstruction of . What we have obtained is an
algebra isomorphic to . But how the EAB are related to the original generators of is left undetermined. Now, we must have:

for some AB. Hence

is fully specified by S only when the AB are fixed for a given basis of S.

5 The effect on the spinor structure of a change of idempotents

The spinor structure Eij of was determined by choosing arbitrarily a complete system of mutually orthogonal primitive idempotents Pi. Suppose now
that we choose a different system Pi of idempotents. How is the new spinor structure Eij related to Eij?
The structure theorems on determine that any two primitive idempotents P and P' are related by an inner automorphism. Thus there is some
such that for each Pi:

Hence the two spinor structures Eij and Eij will be similarly related:

This brings out an important difference between the two spinor decompositions of

that we have considered. In the product decomposition of

the transformation law of the spinors becomes:

The fact that in this decomposition the factor SS1 can be either eliminated or retained without affecting the final answer means that we have a choice in
the transformation law of the spinors under a change of generating idempotent. We can choose either:

or:

The first corresponds to the usual spinor transformation law, with all its well-known properties. The second puts the spinor on an equal

footing with all other quantities contained in and is more a natural requirement on spinors in the algebraic framework.
The freedom of choice permitted in the product decomposition of is not permitted in the direct sum decomposition. The choice of transformation law
in this case has to be:

For suppose that is an algebraic spinor. Then:

The transformed spinor ' must satisfy:

But if we put

this gives:

which, in general, is inconsistent with

6 Reflections on the algebraic spinor

The considerations of the last section virtually force on us the transformation law:

for algebraic spinors. This is rather surprising, but the implications are obvious; the notion of an algebraic spinor does not coincide exactly with the older
notion of a spinor. What began as an attempt to redefine the spinor in a manner more suitable to the framework of the implicate order has produced a
new entity. The task that faces us now is that of establishing precisely the overlap and the differences between the old notion of the spinor and the new,
and what bearing this has on the physics of the fermion. Here we make only a few preliminary observations.
The first and most striking feature of the algebraic spinor is that the spinor space does not remain invariant under a change of idempotent (and hence
also under Lorentz transformation). This is in direct contrast to the spinor space normally considered, which is defined to remain invariant under
transformation by the requirement:

This lack of invariance makes no difference, as we have noted, when bilinear invariants are constructed from the S in the usual way. But if we are to
give a meaning in its own right, rather than through quadratic functions of its components, then the transformation of the spin space becomes an
important and unavoidable feature of the

system. This is especially evident in the work of Khler7, Graf 8, and Benn and Tucker 9.
Let us consider more closely this transformation of the spin space. Suppose we vary the generating idempotent P infinitesimally to get P'. Then writing
dP=PP and
we have:

[1]

Now, P' is still idempotent, so:

or, to first order:

[2]

From this it follows that:

Figure 17.1 In a representation in which P is diagonal, the dP is anti-diagonal.

In a representation in which P is diagonal, this means the dP is anti-diagonal, as in Figure 17.1. This can be seen explicitly from [1] if we choose a spinor
structure for in which P=E11. Putting =ABEAB we obtain:

[2(a)]

or:

[2(b)]

The contributionP to dP corresponds exactly to the usual infinitesimal increment undergone by a spinor in such a transformation, but the term P is
not normally present. It is this that takes P' outside the original spinor space generated by P. The form of equation [2] shows that the new spinor structure
E'AB, when referred to the old EAB, contains a mixture of all four original constituent spinor spaces. This mixing is not a problem in a flat space-time since
we can use the integrability of the manifold to establish a path-independent idempotent transportation law which will enable us to identify unique spin
spaces at each point. But when the manifold is not integrable, such a

procedure is no longer possible and the mixing of these fermion fields becomes an inescapable feature of the system.
The fact that a universal idempotent cannot be defined in general on a curved space-time forces on us yet another feature not normally present in the
usual spinor theory; we must allow the spinor-vector conversion factors AB to vary from point to point. This means that the tensor fields constructed
from the s will have an additional variation from point to point, due to the variation of the AB:

The spinor structure connection coefficients

defined by:

replace the spinor connection

of the ordinary spinor calculus and contain all the information in them.
Another feature of the algebraic spinor not shared by the ordinary spinor is that not all spinor spaces are physically equivalent. In the usual theory, all
spinor structures are allowed, subject only to the condition that in the representation of the generated, we have
and
This means
that bases may be chosen for the spin space which are not related to each other by a Lorentz transformation. Yet the physics described by the spinors is
independent of the structure generated. This of course is due to the way that the spinor is used and interpreted ordinarily. The attempt to use an algebraic
spinor in the way suggested by Khler, however, forces upon us a physical inequivalence among the spinors not present in the Dirac theory.
This is perhaps best illustrated by a simple example. Consider the ideal generated by the idempotent
where
and
This idempotent is not primitive and the spinors it generates are the direct sum of two ordinary spinors, but it suffices to illustrate the point in
hand. The algebraic spinors of the left ideal generated by P are defined by the requirement:

[A]

If we write =S+V+B+T+P, then we obtain from [A]:

[B]

so that defines a complex of anti-symmetric tensor fields whose components are restricted a priori by relations [B]. The Dirac-Khler9 equation for
thus defines the variation of coupled tensor fields satisfying [B]. The fields in this case are obviously duals in pairs:

and B is self dual:

All spinors ' which are Lorentz-related to will obviously have the same properties. Now consider the spinors defined by
vector with u2=1. The defining relation [A] then gives for :

where u is a

[C]

This defines an altogether different set of coupled tensor fields, not equivalent to the first by a Lorentz transformation.
The essential difference between the algebraic spinor and the ordinary spinor is that the algebraic spinor is in reality a spinor of rank two. This feature
was forced on us through the transformation law:

that we were forced to adopt. But this does not mean that we are back to ordinary tensor physics. The point is that we have been forced to abandon the
notion that only anti-symmetric tensors of given rank are relevant to the system. The algebraic spinor provides a framework for coupling together tensors
of different ranks in a simple way. It also provides a framework in which this coupling may be altered by a continuous transformation.

References
1 D.Bohm, Wholeness and the Implicate Order, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1980.
2 G.Chew, Gentle quantum events as the source of explicate order, this volume, p. 249.
3 F.A.M.Frescura and B.J.Hiley, Found, of Physics, 10, 7 (1980).
4 F.A.M.Frescura and B.J.Hiley, Found, of Phys., 10, 705 (1980).
5 F.A.M.Frescura and B.J.Hiley, Revista Brasileira de Fisica, Volume Especial, p. 49 (July, 1984).
6 D.Bohm and B.J.Hiley, Revista Brasileira de Fisica, Volume Especial, p. 1 (July, 1984).
7 E.Khler, Deutsches Akad. Wissenschaften zu Berlin K. fr Math. Phys. and Techn., No. 1 and No. 4 (1961).
8 W.Graf, Ann. Inst. Henri Poincar, XXIX, 85 (1978).
9 I.M.Benn and R.W.Tucker, Commun. Math. Phys., 89, 341 (1983) and 98, 53 (1985).

18
All is flux
David Finkelstein
Georgia Institute of Technology

1 Introduction
Kepler and Einstein struggled to share in Gods creative thoughts; in the early 1950s, the prevalent philosophy was more smug. The goal was a covariant
renormalizable quantum field theory of each of the forces, analogous to quantum electrodynamics. By the time I finished school I was somewhat
disheartened by the contrast between the ideal of physics as a branch of philosophy, engendered by many popular accounts, and the dominant practice of
specialized physics. At about that time, George Yevick shared with me some notes he had brought back from a stay with David Bohm, concerning a
classical guiding wave theory of relativistic spinning particles. While I have reservations about that work, touched upon below, I still recall the stimulus I
derived from it, and the feeling that I was being directed towards truly fundamental questions by it, at an important time for me. I have experienced this
stimulation often with Bohms writings. In several basic matters, some of which I touch upon below, Bohm has been years or decades ahead of the rest of
us in his intuition for the proper path, at least in my opinion. It is a pleasure to thank him for years of enlivenment.

2 The nature of physics

It seems to me that Bohms conception of the goal of physics, formulated in the appendix to his book on relativity,1 deserves more attention than it has
received.
Some traditions define physics categorically; for example, as the study of matter and energy. Such definitions do not keep well. The concept of energy
is itself one of the triumphs of physics, an accom-

plishment of the mid-nineteenth century. Newton did not study matter and energy; ergo, Newton did not do physics. This reductio ad absurdum makes
the definition absurd. It is quite possibleeven likelythat neither of these formerly popular concepts of matter and energy are important in the extreme
conditions prevailing at the creation of the universe or in the deep core of the constituent parts of matter. So the increasingly many students of these
conditions may be leaving physics behind them, according to this definition. Any definition of physics that itself uses a concept of physics may thereby limit
itself to a chapter in the story. Physics is too protean to be pinned down neatly. It must be so in order to follow the even more surprising transformations
of Mother Nature.
The description David Bohm gives of physics in the appendix to his Relativity makes physics nearly coextensive with humanity. For him, science is a
mode of perception before it is a mode of obtaining knowledge of the laws of nature.
When I started doing physics I thought it was the search for the laws of nature, Bohm to the contrary notwithstanding; then, for the law of nature; and
only quite lately have I been able to see it as a search for a perception of nature.
The physicist forming the concept of the electron, or any other part of matter, is extending the process by which he or she formed the concept of
mother; a process of reification followed by conservation. The law of conservation of matter, still asserted in the early 1900s, is like the childs belief,
Mommy back soon. This belief works in a broad range of circumstances, but the maturing child eventually learns the limits of validity of this conservation
law, and ultimately transcends the reification that precedes it. Bohm expects that every reification and every conservation law are likewise reflections of a
certain calmness of the environment, and will eventually be outgrown by the maturing human race.
Thus Bohm is sure there are no elementary particles or any other permanent matter. In one of his researches he studies how cooperative vibrations of
electrons in a gas behave like a new non-elementary particle, the plasmon. I think that Bohm was disappointed that this work was taken so literally, and
that he meant it metaphorically too; to illustrate how every particle will ultimately be found to be the reification of a collective vibration of still finer
structures.
Some have faith that an ultimate law of nature exists. For example, Einstein is such a believer. Perhaps most of us are agnostics. Bohm is a skeptic. No
great Enlightenment is coming to answer all our questions. The quest is endless. Though the laws of physics generally last longer than the tablets of Moses
did, what might be called the Moses syndrome has now struck too consistently for physicists to ignore. Many physicists take it for granted that laws are
discovered today to be broken tomorrow. Physics presently functions with many of its

practitioners simultaneously seeking and doubting the existence of what they seek. I believe the antinomian position taken by Bohm yesterday will be the
common sense tomorrow.
But even if the game of nature knows no Law, physics need not come to an end but may once again redefine itself. If there is no Final Answer it is
simply because there is no Final Question.

3 Quantum theory
It seems that Bohm became disillusioned with quantum theory in the course of writing his well-known text2 on the subject, in which the theory is stoutly
upheld. According to Bohr, the language we use to describe our experiments must be classical physics, and, at the same time, classical physics is not
adequate for this purpose. We cannot and should not improve our concepts in this respect, according to Heisenbergs statement of the permanent
paradox of the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum theory.
This seems like too much protest; if we cannot then the should-not is surely otiose, and if we should not then we probably can. The exhortation
resembles the Non fingo of Newton: appropriate in its time, but ultimately a challenge and a signpost to seek further. The path that Bohm took, when he
set out to cross this frontier, has remarkably old and honorable precedents. The idea that quanta are guided by a pilot or ghost wave has been clearly
expressed, though each time with characteristic variations, by de Broglie before Bohm; by Einstein decades before de Broglie; and by Newton centuries
before Einstein. Since I have not seen Newtons work on quantum mechanics mentioned lately, I would like to remind us here of how it runs.
On the one hand Newton is an expert in the interference of light; the interference rings between two glass surfaces still bear his name. On the other, he
is remarkably sure that light is a stream of particles; let us call them photons. (One wonders how he knew; the argument he gave, that light does not bend
into the shadow, could not have convinced him for more than a minute, since it merely sets an upper bound on the wavelength. I suggest that the
phenomenon of vision itself, combined with the kinetic theory of heat, makes a wave theory of light intuitively unacceptable. Territoriality may also be at
work: Newton ruled over the particles, Descartes over the waves; perhaps Newton made light corpuscular to make it his.)
In his Opticks, he proposes that besides photons there are guide waves, much faster than the photons, which on striking a partially reflecting surface,
cause it to have fits of easy and difficult transmission. The same guide waves are held responsible for the other quantum superposition phenomena
confronting Newton, such as the splitting of a polarized beam of photons when it strikes a second polarizer in general position. His polarizers are Island
crystals, Iceland spar. As

Einstein fits his guide waves into a unified field theory, Newton fits them into a particle theory. Each to his own. Newtons ether is buzzing with fasterthan-light particles and the guide waves are density waves in this gas of invisible tachyons.
Bohms quantum potential is the furthest refinement of the pilot wave doctrine, and the cause still seems hopeless. There is first the technical many-body
problem. Each of the electrons in a uranium atom requires its own individual guide wave. In unified field theories, which have progressed amazingly since
Einstein, we add fields to go from one to many particles (or solitons, or kinks, or the like.) The field gets more complicated but still depends on the same
three variables x, y and z. But the psi waves of quantum theory combine like probabilities. They multiply, each keeping its original variables. The guide
field for the electrons of uranium is a field in a space of thrice ninety-two coordinates. It is not an occupant of our time space.
A second difficulty with all such programs is that a quantum system does not have a unique wave-function according to quantum theory. At the very
least, every experiment is symmetrically described by two wave-functions, one describing the initial preparation of the system and one the final detection.
For example, they may describe the initial polarizer and the final analyzer on an optical bench. At any instant during the experiment we may equally well
ascribe two wave functions to the system, by propagating the initial one forward in time or the final one backward. Neither is specially the property of the
quantum system.
I would like to add some of my own thoughts about wave functions. To speak about the wave function of the system is a syntactic error. A wave
function is not a property of the system in any classical sense, but gives far more information about the experimenter. For example, a wave function
representing vertical polarization conveys only one bit of information about the photon, that it passed through a certain tourmaline crystal in the ordinary
way, not the extraordinary. (The number of bits is the logarithm of the number of possibilities to the base 2; two possibilities make one bit.) But it gives
infinite information, ideally, about the orientation angle of the tourmaline crystal. Indeed, the wave-function may be taken to be the orientation vector of the
crystal. This information has no counterpart in classical physics, where we imagine one complete experimental set-up capable of making all possible
measurements at once. With only one significant choice for the experimental arrangement, no matter how complex, the number of bits is zero. The new
kind of information about the experimenter provided by the wave function is the result of complementarity, which forces us to choose which measurements
we make. A wave-function tells us more about the act of measurement than about the result. It is a verb, not a noun; to treat it as a thing is a mistake in
syntax. Having committed this error, one is forced to follow it with another, the idea

of the collapse of the wave function. It is not that the wave function collapses. It is, rather, that first we do one thing, and then another.
The attempt to replace a theory of the quantum kind by one of a more classical kind seems at odds with Bohms Heraclitean tendencies. He has, for
example, suggested a language of verbs. Moreover, the role of the law of nature is taken in quantum theory by a kind of gigantic wave-function, the
Feynman amplitude, giving a probability and phase for each possible history. The quantum philosophy suggests that, being a wave function, the Feynman
amplitude too is more descriptive of the environment of the system, including the experimenter, than of the system; and thus that there is no place in
quantum theory for an absolute law of the classical kind. The quantum kind of law is so much closer to the lawlessness that Bohm sees in the universe than
is the classical kind, that one expects him to seek still more quantum anomalies beneath the ones we already know. This is the tendency of his later work
on the foundations of quantum mechanics, to which I turn now.

4 Quantum time space

Bohm may have been the first physicist to take seriously the possibility that the world is not a continuum but a simplicial complex. An n-dimensional
simplex or n-simplex is a figure defined by n+1 vertices. A concrete n-simplex consists of the vertices and all the points between them in an ndimensional linear space. An abstract n-simplex is defined merely by the vertices, which may be objects of any kind; the points between them being
weighted statistical mixtures of the vertices, defined by assigning a probability to each vertex with total probability 1. A subset of the vertices of a simplex
defines a simplex called a face of the given simplex. Finally, a simplicial complex is a collection of simplices intersecting only in faces of the same simplices.
The operations of the differential and integral calculus, particularly the ones entering into Maxwells equations, have exact counterparts in simplicial
complexes. Moreover, one may think of a simplex as a kind of multiplication of its vertices and set up an algebraic theory of simplicial complexes which
turns out to have an uncanny resemblance to the quantum theory of a Fermi-Dirac ensemble. Thus simplicial complexes may be the natural language for a
quantum theory of time space itself. Regges later translation of Einsteins theory of gravity into substantially the same language has undoubtedly led other
physicists to take up this possibility, though Regge presents it as an approximation technique, not as an approach to a more exact theory.
We may regard the points of the abstract simplex already described as incoherent or classical mixtures of the vertices, and introduce a quantum
simplex, whose points are coherent quantum superpositions of its vertices, in order to quantize the theory. The fundamental quanta

of time space may be such quantum simplices, and the topology we usually assign to time space may be a coarse approximation to one defined by the
relations of mutual incidence between such quantum simplices. Most likely, what corresponds to a point (or cell) of time space with all its fields is a
simplex of the quantum complex; to a vector at a point, the product of two simplices that share a face; to a spinor at a point (paraphrasing a well-known
theory of Leonard Susskind), the product of a simplex with one of its faces; and to the operation of taking a derivative (more precisely, a curl, an antisymmetrized derivative), the (dual to the) operation of taking the boundary of a simplex. Bohms strong intuition about this interesting line of exploration
may yet be justified.

References
1 D.Bohm, The Special Theory of Relativity (Benjamin, New York, 1965).
2 D.Bohm, Quantum Theory (Prentice-Hall, New York, 1951).

19
Anholonomic deformations in the ether: a significance for the
electrodynamic potentials
P.R.Holland
Institut Henri Poincar, Paris, and
C.Philippidis
Bristol Polytechnic

1 Introduction
It is now generally accepted that the Aharonov-Bohm (AB) effect1 demonstrates that in quantum mechanics the electromagnetic potentials A play a much
more significant role than the one they occupy in classical physics. Wu and Yang2 have emphasized this by pointing out that while the field strengths Fv
underdescribe electrodynamic processes (quantum mechanical), the phase factors exp (ieAdx ) give a more complete description.
The question we wish to raise in this paper is whether the potentials A are irrevocably subordinated to Fv in the classical domain, acquiring an active
role only in the quantum domain, or whether they have fundamental significance in both domains. It seems that the latter possibility is worth considering
seriously since in the AB effect the structure of A is not affected by quantization. This follows from the fact that in the first quantized theory of a charged
particle in an electromagnetic field, the field itself does not undergo any alteration. It would thus be surprising if quantization of the particle trajectory alone
introduced new structural properties into the potentials. Rather, we feel that these properties must be, in a perhaps primitive form, already in existence in
the classical regime.
In attempting to discover the classical significance of the A we have at our disposal several clues. Bohm3 has suggested an analogy between the AB
effect and the dislocation of a crystal lattice. In this analogy the potentials A define sets of parallel planes which can be dislocated, the line integral of A
representing the dislocation strength. By representing the phase of the particle wave function as a super-lattice, Bohm was able to show how a dislocation
in the base lattice would produce AB type shifts of the super-lattice.

The close parallel between the AB effect and dislocation theory was later noted in a different context by Kawamura4. In developing a Schrdinger
equation for scattering off a dislocation in a discrete lattice, Kawamura obtains the same equation as for the AB effect but with the dislocation strength in
place of the flux parameter. A similar result has been found by Berry et al.5, who show that the phase of the AB wave function exhibits singularities which
are analogous to dislocations of atomic planes in crystals.
Now, in addition to these clues from the quantum theory, it has been known for a long time that there exist deep analogies between the continuum
theory of dislocations and classical electromagnetism. Yet, to the authors knowledge, no work has been produced which takes these analogies as a
foundation on which to build a theory of electrodynamics. Rather, they have been proposed in order to elucidate dislocation theory by reference to the
more familiar electromagnetic case. Consequently, the observations alluded to above, though useful pointers to an alternative understanding of the
relationship between charges and fields and the role of the potentials, remain confined to the level of comparisons. We propose in this paper to develop a
re-interpretation of the theory of a classical charged test-particle moving in an external electromagnetic field through the differential geometric language of
continuous dislocation theory. Our aim is to bring out the fact that, even in the classical theory, if this is suitably formulated, the potentials have an
important physical significance. In particular we begin to see why the above analogies work, although they only have observational significance on the level
where the phase is meaningful.
In order to do this in a physically natural and intuitive manner we make the hypothesis that the Hamilton-Jacobi phase function is a real physical field
and introduces into space-time a medium (or ether) the deformation states of which are determined directly by A (rather than Fv, say). The
appropriateness of this notion is reinforced by the fact that our theory has the mathematical form of the continuum theory of defects, in particular in the
appearance of the anholonomic mapping of frames.
That the assumption of an ether may be compatible with the principles of relativity was pointed out by Einstein6, who noted that special relativity does
not compel us to deny the existence of an ether altogether, only that we must give up ascribing a definite state of motion to it. In general relativity spacetime itself, insofar as it is endowed with physical dynamical qualities, may be treated as a medium (refraction of light), albeit one to which the notion of
motion is inapplicable (see also reference 7). Later Dirac8 showed how an ether which at each point has a distribution of velocities which are all equally
probable would be consistent with relativity, and alternative approaches to the quantum theory by Bohm9,10 and Vigier11,12 have

indicated that a suitably fluctuating ether can contribute to an understanding of the microdomain.
We recall that much effort was expended in the nineteenth century in trying to understand electromagnetic processes in terms of stresses set up in an
ether treated as an elastic solid13. However, what may have prevented an adequate ether theory being developed (aside from problems of invariance)
was, firstly, that an analogy was set up with a theory (elasticity) too limited in scope to deal with the complexity of the physical process and, secondly, that
attention was fixed primarily on the fields which tended to exclude consideration of particles as being relevant to the analogy.
The main point we make in this paper is that the context in which the significance of the potentials becomes manifest is actually one which involves a
quite different picture of electrodynamical processes to that of the Maxwell-Lorentz point of view (for which the ether is not a relevant concept). Our
method raises questions which could not be coherently understood in the usual approach (e.g. electrodynamic Burgers vector) and forces us to abandon a
rigid distinction between field and particle in favour of notions more akin to those of the wholeness of the quantum domain.

2 The role of the frame in the theory of deformations

It was shown in the 1950s by Kondo14,15,16 and by Bilby17,18 (see also references 1922 for reviews) that if the granular structure of an imperfect
crystalline material can be neglected and the material approximated by a continuum, then the tensor which defines the density of dislocation lines is
precisely the differential-geometric torsion tensor which is associated with the continuum when considered as a manifold.
Let x , =1n, be the holonomic co-ordinates of a material point of a continuum embedded in a space whose structure is, for example, Euclidean.
The a posteriori standpoint is adopted so that all fields are functions of the final co-ordinates of a material point after deformations have set in (for a
comparison with the a priori point of view see Kondo23). To study the nature of the deformation we should note firstly that there is no invariant way of
uniquely mapping the deformed state as a whole back to some perfect state from which it may be presumed to have come. Rather, following Kondo, we
must tear from the medium a deformed element dx , which is then allowed to relax so that all strains vanish and the element coincides with a perfect
lattice. The failure of many torn local elements, so relaxed into this natural state, to mesh to form a global perfect lattice is then a manifestation of the
deformed state. We have now an amorphous collection of small pieces of perfect lattice which cannot be patched together to form a continuum of perfect
lattice in the embedding space.

Attached to each material point is a local tangent space with a reference-vielbein basis of 1-forms hi(x), i=1n, i.e. a local perfect lattice basis. When
a small element is torn from its environment and relaxed we have a linear Pfaffian relation:

[1]

where the frame coefficients are functions of the final co-ordinates. For the reason just outlined, equation [1] is non-integrable and this local natural frame
defines a set of anholonomic functions. Further details of the theory of defects will be introduced as we need them. We shall now explain the relevance of
such notions to the electrodynamics of a charged particle.

3 Electrodynamic deformed and natural states

In considering electrodynamics the notions of medium and deformed and natural states have to be defined in a way which is consistent with the physical
system under discussion and its accepted theoretical description. Our treatment of the ether is based on the following consideration.
We start by supposing that the classical Hamilton-Jacobi phase function associated with the system is a real physical field (limit of the quantum phase
when the quantum potential9,10,11,12 vanishes) and note that it defines a line element. In order to study the deformation structure of this wave, we require
for the purposes of comparison two space-time metrics at a point24 (cf. bimetric general relativity25,26).
Consider a flat space-time which is a four-dimensional manifold whose points are labelled by holonomic world co-ordinates x , = 0,1,2,3. Such a
manifold endowed with a metric v (a general coordinate version of the Minkowski metric ij=(1, 1, 1, 1)) will be denoted M4 and this plays the
role of an embedding space for the wave. Referring to section 2, we suppose that the medium has already been brought to a state of deformation so that
any infinitesimal element dx of it is of length
since the medium inherits the metric of the space in which it lies. It is our task to uncover
the nature of the deformation. This we do by defining the natural state in terms of the line element:

[2]

where L is the Lagrangian per unit mass of a test particle in the field A in M4. (We shall not be concerned here with the source of A or Maxwells
equations, and we treat only the one-body problem.) L is a homogeneous function of x of degree one, given by:

[3]

where k=e/m and

lies in the tangent space at each point

of space-time ( being an arbitrary parameter). Thus there exists a Randers line element27:

[4]

which can be understood as arising from cutting out locally from the deformed medium in M4 an element dx and allowing it to relax, thereby changing its
length from ds to dS. This is of course a fully relativistic procedure in that the infinitesimal time displacement dx 0 is relaxed concurrently with the space
displacements. Equation [2] thus expresses the elastic properties of the medium. That a plastic deformation is also implied by equation [2] will be shown in
section 4.
The functions gv represent the metric associated with the natural state referred to the world frame and we see that space-time with such a geometry
(denoted F4) is a Finsler space28 so that the metric is a function of both particle and field parameters: gv(x, ). The deformation of the ether therefore
depends not only on where we are in the field but also on which direction is singled out by the particle in the tangent space at each point.
A consequence of equation [2] is that the Lorentz force law trajectories in M4 obtained by varying the right-hand side, that is:

[5]

are the Christoffel symbols of v and Fv=Av v A, may be written equivalently as geodesics in F4 (on varying the left-hand side):

where

[6]

where
are the Christoffel symbols of gv. This result shows clearly how the disparate elements of orthodox electrodynamics (v, A, ) may be
united in a single geometrical description in F4. The relative acceleration of neighbouring trajectories in M4 is expressed in F4 by the equation of geodesic
deviation.
Note that unless otherwise stated the geometrical structures studied in the remainder of this paper exist independently of the extremum assumption [5]
or [6].
The unit tangent vectors u and V associated with the deformed and natural states respectively satisfy the following relations:

[7]

where Y=kAu.

The metrical coefficients of a Finsler space are defined by:

from which we deduce equation [4] by homogeneity. Equation [3] then gives:

[8]

The strain tensor of the deformed ether is defined by:

[9]

and vanishes if, and only if, either A=0 or k=0. Thus if the potentials are pure gauge (A= and k0) so that the trajectories (equation [5]) reduce to
geodesics in M4 (and gv and v are equivalent from this perspective) there is nevertheless a non-trivial strain (equation [9]) present in the medium.
The covariant vector P=mV in the co-tangent space associated with the natural state is given by equation [8] as:

[10]

in accord with the usual definition of canonical momentum

using equation [3]. Note that, unlike the case of a Riemanian space, one cannot
28
find at a point in F4 normal co-ordinates (in the sense of Rund ) for which the Christoffel symbols in equation [6] vanish. These symbols are not present
solely to maintain general covariance (rather they reflect an absolute property of the deformed ether) and we have not discovered a principle of
equivalence for electromagnetism.

4 Anholonomic local natural frames

In the previous section we have established that the notions of deformed and natural states in an electrodynamic context arise naturally when one
formulates the theory in terms of line elements (equation [2]). Our introduction of the natural state was carried out locally by considering the deformed and
natural separations between two infinitesimally close points. In order to examine the global structure of this state, we have to find out the manner in which
the flat local naturalizations fail to fit together globally to form a continuum. For this purpose we require local natural frames whose distribution will
determine properties like the torsion of the natural state.
Now, as shown by one of us elsewhere24, the existence of such natural frames is guaranteed by a structural property of the Finsler

metric, no separate hypothesis as to their existence underpinning the F4-geometry being necessary. That is, the metric (equation [8]) factorizes as:

where the hi(x, ) are the components of a field of Finsler tetrads, i= 0,1,2,3 labelling each Lorentz vector and =0,1,2,3 the component with respect to
the world frame. Explicitly:

[12]

and zi are global Lorentz co-ordinates in M4 and:

where

[13]

so that ui is a Lorentz vector tangent to the deformed manifold. It follows from equation [11] that:

[14]

Thus the factorization (equation [11]) of the metric introduces a field of local Minkowskian natural frames given by the Pfaffian (equation [1]):

[15]

so that the naturalized separation (equation [4]) is given by:

[16]

When the element dx lies along the direction

find:

these frames are proportional to ui, as may be verified by substituting equation [12] into equation [15] to

[17]

Equation [17] is intuitively obvious in that ui is a unit vector lying in the tangent space with metric ij at a point in the deformed manifold, and naturalization
merely consists in removing this vector and allowing it to relax. We continue to denote by F4 the geometry having an underlying field of such frames.

5 Parallelism in the natural state

The hi frames given by equation [15] constitute an amorphous ensemble of elements of the medium rather than a congruent field. The reason for this is a
two-fold indeterminacy: first, in the orientation of the natural frames; and, second, in their location.
The orientational indeterminacy arises from the invariance of the

natural metric gv under local Lorentz transformations of the Finsler tetrad; that is, given equation [12], the general solution to equation [11] is:

[18]

On the other hand the locational indeterminacy is a consequence of the non-integrability of the Pfaffian equation [15]. These indeterminacies are the
fundamental expression of the existence of internal deformations in the ether.
It is well known1423 that the indefiniteness due to equation [18] is responsible for the curvature of F4 while the anholonomy of hi gives rise to torsion.
The former is associated with defects such as disclinations and the latter with dislocations. In this article we shall concentrate on the study of dislocations
only by supposing that the affine curvature vanishes. This has the effect of restricting the theory by eliminating the orientational degrees of freedom implied
by equation [18]; that is, we fix the relative orientation of the hi frames to yield distant parallelism in F4, choosing to work with the solution (equation [12])
to equation [11].
A world vector X(x, ) at a point in F4 has a covariant derivative 28 (note that the connection transformation laws given by Amari29 do not appear to
be correct):

[19]

(d includes derivatives in both x and ) The two sets of linear connection coefficients appear as a result of displacements dx and d in both x and
components of the world vector with respect to the natural frame at a point are:

The

[20]

World vectors at two neighbouring points x (with associated direction ) and x+dx (with direction +d ) are parallel if their world scalar components
(equation [20]) in the natural frames at the two points are equal, i.e. if:

[21]

Then comparing with the condition DX=0 for parallelism referred to the world frame, we deduce that the connection coefficients for the natural state
represented in the world frame, under the imposition of distant parallelism, are:

[22]

Observe that DV is a tensor and that v does not transform with the usual law of connection coefficients.
In general a Finsler space has associated with it three curvature tensors. It is straightforward to confirm that these all vanish when evaluated using
equation [22] and so parallel displacements are independent of path30. The torsion vector of F4 on the other hand is non-vanishing and gives rise to
closure failures which we examine in the next section.
It follows from equations [11] and [22] and the Leibnitz rule that:

[23]

i.e. lengths are preserved under parallel transport in F4, as is equation [11]. The length of an arbitrary vector X(x, ) in the natural state is defined to be
For related work on the geometry of electrodynamics see also references 304.

6 Electrodynamic torsion and Burgers circuits

The connection coefficients (equation [22]) of the natural state imply the presence of torsion in F4. This may be seen by considering the parallel transport
of two infinitesimal 1-form displacements dx , dx v along each other to form a parallelogram which it is found fails to close. Using equation [19] with
equation [22] we find that the closure failure is given by:

[24]

which is Cartans torsion vector generalized to a Finsler space. Despite its appearance, the object

given by:

[25]

is not a world tensor, although it is a tensor under linear transformations. In the case that hi is independent of
equation [25] reduces to the object of
anholonomity, which is a world tensor. Noting that
is not a vector element, we see that equation [24] is a non-covariant decomposition. We can

rewrite b as a sum of tensor quantities by substituting for

in terms of
from equation [19], or in terms of dx if the geodesic law (equation [6]) is
imposed, although we shall not do this here.
The procedure leading to equation [24] coincides with that which defines the local Burgers vector for a continuum18. Here we execute an infinitesimal
closed Burgers circuit of lattice steps in the real medium and pursue the corresponding steps in a perfect reference lattice to discover the real Burgers
vector. Since the lattice bases (i.e. the natural frames) are everywhere parallel, the resultant displacement is the algebraic sum of the components of dx
with respect to the lattice

bases, i.e. hi. Recovery of equation [24] then requires using Stokes theorem and letting the circuit area tend to zero. Our coefficients of torsion thus
describe the local density of lines of dislocation and their components can be classified into edge and screw dislocations.
In order to clarify fully the nature of this closure failure, and also to arrive at a correct application of Stokes theorem, it is convenient to take a broader
view and suppose that the Finsler space F4 is a subspace of relativistic velocity phase space when the latter is endowed with a suitable geometrical
structure (which we denote V8). Let us first show that such a construction is possible. Suppose that
are co-ordinates in velocity phase space
where we have written
and A,B,C=07; =0,1,2,3; =4,5,6,7. Introduce into this space a vielbein field:

[26]

where i=0,1,2,3; =4,5,6,7 with inverse hIA(xA). The covariant differential of a vector XA in this space V8 is given by:

[27]

If we suppose V8 admits distant parallelism then:

with

[28]

with

and a supertorsion tensor exists:

[29]

Choose the following form for equation [26]:

[30]

where
and
are undetermined but non-vanishing in general. We wish to show that in the resulting geometry the subspace spanned by the set of four
i
V8 1forms h A is F4. F4 has as invariance group the following co-ordinate transformations which are a sub-group of the V8 general co-ordinate
substitutions

[31]

which yields:

Under equation [31], hi and

transform as space-time vectors, transforms inhomogeneously, and equation [30] maintains its form. For the metric
gAB in V8 we make the assumptions
these conditions being invariant with respectto equation [31]. Assuming that:

[32]

the length of an infinitesimal element becomes:

with gv given by equation [11]. Similarly, substitution of equation [30] in equations [28] and [29] yields:

[33]

where we have used equation [22] and

There are analogous relations for
which we shall not be concerned with
here. Applying equation [31] to equation [28] then gives the expected transformation laws for the right-hand sides in equation [33].
It is clear how the apparently distinct distant parallelism connections v, Dv associated with F4 are actually just components of a superconnection
PABC in a higher dimensional non-Riemannian space (V8) with distant parallelism. To complete our demonstration that F4 is a subspace of V8 under the
restriction of equation [30] we show how the F4 torsion vector arises. To this end define the infinitesimal supertorsion vector in V8 to be:

[34]

where

Substituting equation [33] in equation [34] then yields:

[35]

which agrees with our previously derived result equation [24], where bi=hib.
Note that the supertorsion tensor in V8 obeys Bianchi identities dbI=0, i.e. (CTIAB)=0, and these induce the following identities in

[36]

It should be clear that our notion of a space-time ether can be consistently extended to relativistic velocity phase space, and that is what

we shall do. The geometry V8 described above is then interpreted as the natural state of a deformed eight-dimensional continuum, the vielbein coefficients
defining an anholonomic map between deformed and natural states
the supertorsion defining a density of dislocations (see below), etc.
We now discuss the application of Stokes theorem in the phase space ether. Following our remarks above concerning the Burgers circuit, we define
the Burgers vector of the natural state to be:

[37]

and is the boundary of a surface in the deformed state of the phase space ether. Stokes theorem then yields:

where

[38]

and letting the circuit become infinitesimal we deduce equation [34], showing that the supertorsion tensor represents the density of dislocations threading
an infinitesimal area in velocity phase space. Note that although the vielbein field may be subject to local super-Lorentz transformations LII(xA) which
leave the phase space metric (equation [32]) invariant, in equation [37] we have fixed the frame (so that this relation is globally super-Lorentz covariant
and generally covariant).
Returning to our space-time subspace we find by substituting equation [35] in equation [38], or using equation [30] in equation [37], that the Burgers
vector associated with a finite closed circuit in the deformed ether is given by:

[39]

If we utilize the relation [17] we obtain finally for our electrodynamic Burgers vector:

[40]

Consider the case where the Burgers vector vanishes for all circuits in phase space, i.e. the case of no dislocations. Then from equation [29]:

and if there are no topological obstructions (all cycles are bounding) this holds globally (de Rhams theorem). In the F4 geometry (equation [30]) this
means:

i.e. the tetrad is independent of the particle characteristics. One may show from the vanishing of the dislocation density Div that A=0 or k=0 and so the
strain tensor (equation [9]) vanishes. The converse is also true, so that we have the result: there are no dislocations if and only if there are no strains, the
necessary and sufficient condition for this being Au=0 or k=0. In this case we see from equation [12] that
and the is above are a
constant translation from the global Lorentz co-ordinates zi. It is not possible for the ether to support a pure strain without a corresponding distribution of
dislocations. Note that pure gauge potentials (A=) therefore generate both kinds of deformation (see section 7).
We make two further remarks. Firstly, we may deduce from condition [23] the following expressions for the F4 connection coefficients:

where
is a totally symmetric tensor. These formulae show how the affine properties of the natural state are determined by the distribution
of dislocations and strains. Secondly, the analysis of this section can be just as readily carried out in (x, p) phase space if we make a Legendre
transformation in the usual way. A contact tensor calculus has been developed by Yano and Davies35.

7 On the physical conception of classical electrodynamics and the significance of the potentials
We have revealed a considerable amount of geometrical information which is latent in the Lagrangian (equation [3]). Indeed our approach may be seen as
a means of bringing out the significance of the Lagrangian method, which goes deeper than just the Euler-Lagrange relations.
If we treat the Hamilton-Jacobi phase as a real field, or continuous medium, permeating the background space-time M4, the presence and interaction of
field and particle in M4 may be represented by the natural state F4 of the medium. This idea makes sense since we have available to us two metrics at
each space-time point which allows a comparison to be made between two states, a notion that is essential to the theory of deformed media. We
emphasize that it is not that the field and particle are in some way embedded in a medium so that they bring about its deformation in a direct physical sense
but rather that the state of deformation represents, or is an alternative way of thinking about, their interaction. Moreover, the deformation representing the
potentials only occurs if there is a test particle present. Conversely the test particle may also potentially be represented by a deformation, but only when
the field is present. Thus, the actual

deformation representing A depends irreducibly on the presence or absence of a particle acted on by the field and cannot be thought of in any
other way. It is in this way that we treat the interaction which in the ordinary theory is expressed through the velocity dependence of the Lorentz force.
This conception is rather close to the notion of wholeness introduced by Bohr, and elaborated by Bohm36 in terms of real physical processes, in the
quantum theory. Here a complete account of physical phenomena requires not only consideration of the observed system (e.g. a particle) but also
detailed knowledge of the environment, the observing apparatus, and these two aspects form an irreducible wholeit would be meaningless to think of
one without reference to the other. The implications of the present theory for quantum mechanics will be considered elsewhere, but we consider it
significant that our approach readily generalizes to the notion of continuously dislocated phase space, as described in section 6. We already have built into
our theory therefore the idea of irreducible closure failures in phase space, which may imply a geometrical basis for the uncertainty relations.37
On the level that is testable (Lorentz force law) our theory is experimentally indistinguishable from the Maxwell-Lorentz theory. However we have
achieved more than a mere mathematical rewording of the Maxwell-Lorentz scheme. Rather, by slanting our perspective towards geometry, we have
brought to light the following facts.
1 A new approach to electrodynamics is possible based on entities (hi) which have no counterpart in the Maxwell-Lorentz view.
2 This new viewpoint depends on an irreducible coalescing of field and particle attributes and it is in this context that the potentials play a central role in
classical electrodynamics.
The situation is analogous to the relation between the causal and Copenhagen interpretations of quantum mechanics38, which are mathematically
equivalent. However, the causal approach is able to account for quantum phenomena in terms of real physical processes whereas the orthodox view
denies such an attempt. Such an alternative physical perspective may then suggest changes in the formalism and hence domains where the competing
theories lead to different predictions.
We now examine the above two points. The uncovering of the natural frames effectively increases the degrees of freedom of electrodynamics. Thus we
may think of our scheme as replacing the potentials and velocity by tetrad coefficients, the field strengths by torsion tensors and the scalar electromagnetic
flux integral by a vectorial quantity, the electrodynamic Burgers vector (equation [40], with equation [2] substituted). Correspondingly there is a change in
concept, the reduction of force to geometry entailed in the transformation from equation [5] to equation [6] being equivalent to dropping Faradays notion
of lines of force in the background space-time M4 in favour of the notion of lines of dislocation in the space-time ether.

Whereas we would normally think of Fv, as the density of electromagnetic lines of force threading an area which a particle may traverse and be acted
upon, this idea is replaced by that of a density of electrodynamic lines of dislocation, which do not act in the sense of exerting a force on some particle but
whose distribution represents the particle along with the field. Identities [36] state that lines of dislocation never end.
Each of the entities of the Maxwell-Lorentz theory can be obtained from our new functions by a kind of averaging process which yields them as a
result of contracting the internal Lorentz index along a tangent vector. Thus:

[41]

[42]

[43]

[44]

[45]

where equation [41] follows from equation [17], equation [42] is essentially the canonical momentum equation [10] and equation [43] follows from
equation [14]. Relations [44] and [45] indicate the manner in which Faradays lines of force are in a sense included in our theory but in a way that is
related to the particle characteristicsdislocation lines represent their presence on equal terms with the field. The magnitude of the Burgers vector
measures the total number of lines of dislocation linking a surface in the space-time ether.
Within the framework proposed here we have shown that treating the field strengths as the only physically meaningful entities would be analogous to
attempting a description of a dislocated medium by treating its natural frame field as incidental. In reality the latter is the carrier of all the relevant structural
properties. To bring this out more clearly, let us consider the classical system which is relevant to the experimental set-up of the AB effect. From the point
of view of M4, which we now describe with the aid of a global system of Lorentz coordinates
consider a multiply-connected

region in which Fv=0 so that A= locally. It follows from equation [5] that in this region the particle velocities u , i.e. the tangent vectors in the
deformed state, are constant along trajectories (which, of course, are geodesics in M4). From the standpoint of the dislocated ether model in the natural
state F4 the implications of these conditions are the following: the tetrad frame and metric are given by equations [12] and [8] respectively, with
u=constant, A= and
the Lorentz torsion tensor (equation [25]) is given by:

the torsion tensor Div is a non-differential function of A which we do not give; and there is a non-vanishing Burgers vector (equation [39] or [40]). We
thus have strains, dislocation densities and a non-vanishing Burgers vector in the ether where, throughout the relevant region in the deformed state, the
potentials are locally pure gauge and the velocities constant.
This implies that the present theory considerably over-determines classical electrodynamic processes. We have shown in section 3 that the Lorentz law
may be interpreted as a gauge-independent example of ether observability through the strain tensor (equation [9]). We might speculate that the structures
we have revealed may provide a broad enough perspective to anticipate effects observable only in the quantum domain. Also, it is even possible that there
are effects which go beyond those conceivable within the current quantum theory. We might suggest that the element in the present theory most relevant to
the quantum theory is the line integral:

and that the Burgers vector (equation [39]) may imply gauge-invariant (or even gauge-dependent) effects. This would generalize Wu and Yangs2
contention that electromagnetism is a gauge-invariant manifestation of a non-integrable phase factor.
Having been motivated by the AB effect we have in this article concentrated on analysing the dynamics of a particle in a given field. We shall discuss
elsewhere Maxwells equations which, according to the present approach, will be related to field equations in the tetrad coefficients, and also the
implications of relaxing the condition of distant parallelism imposed on F4, thus allowing non-vanishing affine curvature.

Acknowledgments
The authors wish to thank Professors G.S.Asanov, H.Rund, E. Krner and H.J.Treder for valuable correspondence. One of us (P.R.Holland)
acknowledges the financial support of the SERC and the other (C.Philippidis) the partial support of the SERC.

References
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quantum mechanics, this volume p. 169.

20
Can biology accommodate laws beyond physics?
H.Frhlich
The University of Liverpool
We assume that the laws of physics are never broken in biology. Basic statements beyond physics can, therefore, be made only in situations in which
physics does not offer a definite answer. Such situations can arise in systems that are far from thermal equilibrium, as is the case in active biological
systems.
Modern physics offers two basically different possibilities. One is connected with quantum mechanics, where individual processes are predicted with
certain probabilities only. The other arises in open systems to which energy is supplied and where configurations connected with so called bifurcations
arise where two or more possibilities for the development of the system exist.
Consider in quantum mechanics the transmission of a beam of electrons through a metal foil. This gives rise to the well-known diffraction patterns. For a
single electron this pattern represents the probability of being deflected through a particular angle. Experimental test of quantum mechanics thus requires
many electrons; the experiment with single electrons thus must be repeated many times, keeping the general arrangements unchanged. This experiment can
be carried out successfully, although strictly speaking the arrangements will not remain the same owing to their interaction with the surroundings.
Nevertheless the relevant features, distances, potentials, etc., can be kept unchanged.
Consider now, however, a biological system and assume that single processes may lead to big consequences. Assume, for instance, that a proton in the
brain has two possibilities for tunnelling, as a consequence of which far-reaching nerve processes are initiated, different for the two possibilities. Quantum
mechanics, in principle, can predict the relative probabilities of the two, but the experiment cannot be

repeated as the initial structure may have basically been changed by the nerve processes.
We might now postulate that an agent exists that influences the tunnelling probabilities. In the present experiment this would not lead to a contradiction
with quantum mechanics as it cannot be repeated. If such an agent would be assumed to exist, then one would be tempted, of course, to assume that it
also can act on single electrons in the transmission experiment mentioned above, which can be repeated. In this case, however, the statistical predictions
of quantum mechanics must not be influenced by the agent, which would require its influence to have properties that are non-local in time. The action of
the agent could then be described as a fluctuation that in the long run is evened out if the non-local property of the agent would prevent it from repetitious
action. The agent would then influence higher-order fluctuations only and thus be hardly noticeable.
A more radical hypothesis would restrict the possibilities of such an agent to living systems only. In that case one would be tempted to connect it with
the possibility of the existence of free will. Experiments of a completely new type would have to be devised to establish the existence and properties of
such a concept. This might be a task for David Bohm.

21
Some epistemological issues in physics and biology
Robert Rosen
Dalhousie University, Halifax

Madness in great ones

Must not unwatched go.
Hamlet

I am very pleased to have been invited to contribute to this Festschrift in honor of David Bohm. Although I have never personally met or corresponded
with Dr Bohm, his writings were well known to me since I was a graduate student. Moreover, the epistemological struggles into which he has been drawn
as a theoretical physicist have their counterpart in epistemological struggles into which I have been drawn as a theoretical biologist. I would like to address
some of these latter in the considerations which follow, especially as they bear on the material basis of biological processes.
The fact is that the relation between theoretical physics and biology has, historically, never been close. For a long time, theoretical physics has
concerned itself with the articulation of universal and general laws. From that perspective, biology seems limited to a rather small class of very special
systems; indeed, inordinately special systems. Clearly, then, organisms were not the sort of thing that physicists seeking universal principles would look
at. To a physicist, what makes organisms special is conceived as a plethora of constraints, initial conditions and boundary conditions which must be
superimposed upon the true general physical laws and which must be independently stipulated before those laws bear directly upon the organic realm.
Physicists rightly felt that the determination of such supplementary constraints was not their job. But no physicist has ever doubted that, since physics is the
science of material nature in all of its manifestations, the relation of physics to biology is that of general to particular.
This view, which is a weak form of reductionism, is so commonplace

that it is almost banal to state it explicitly. To suggest that it might not be true is viewed as a retreat to the most primitive kind of vitalism or animism. And
yet, the facts are these.
1 At present, even in these days of molecular biology, there is not one single inferential chain which leads from anything important in physics to
anything important in biology, despite decades of concerted effort by some very clever people.
2 In every direct confrontation between universal physics and special biology, it is physics which has had to give ground.
Facts of this kind have led me to the position I am going to develop in these pages: that the basis on which theoretical physics has developed for the past
three centuries is, in several crucial respects, too narrow and that, far from being universal, the conceptual foundation of what we presently call
theoretical physics is still very special; indeed, far too much so to accommodate organic phenomena (and much else besides). That is, I will argue that it is
physics, and not biology, which is special; that, far from contemporary physics swallowing biology as the reductionists believe, biology forces physics to
transform itself, perhaps ultimately out of all present recognition.
Let me give a few examples to illustrate the assertions made above.

1 The open system

Biological phenomena of morphogenesis, especially in embryology, but also even at the molecular level, as in the folding of proteins into their active
conformation, have always been deeply troubling to physicists. The inexorable emergence of successive waves of increasingly organized structures from
an initially rather featureless zygote seems perversely to go the wrong way, and flies insolently in the face of all physical intuition. Indeed, contemplation
of the regulatory processes involved in even the earliest phases of embryonic development led the celebrated embryologist Driesch to deny that purely
physical laws could ever comprehend them, and to embrace a rather vivid form of vitalism.
In the middle 1930s, von Bertalanffy and others noticed that the dynamics of open systems exhibited, of themselves, many parallels with the
morphogenetic phenomena of biology. The stable steady-states of such systems manifested many inherent regulatory properties (e.g. equifinality), quite
different in character from the equilibria of the closed systems which were the habitat of thermodynamics. In 1942, Rashevsky showed explicitly how a
combination of chemical reaction and mechanical diffusion could make a spatially homogeneous steady state unstable; in such a system, any deviation from
homogeneity would grow autocatalytically to generate spontaneously a gradient where none had been before, something which absolutely cannot happen
in a closed system. In 1952 Turing proposed an independent

and simpler version of the same basic situation. In the mid-1960s the physicist Prigogine, among others, realized how such perfectly plausible and
commonplace physical situations transcended available physical theory, and had to set furiously to work extending the physics in order to accommodate
them.
Although the dynamical study of such open systems is presently of great interest (variously called stability theory, bifurcation theory, catastrophe
theory, etc.), the physical basis of the phenomena they manifest is still, in my opinion, in an extremely unsatisfactory state. This is largely because, in
physics, the closed system is still taken as primary, and opening the system is regarded as some kind of perturbation. But a closed system is, in dynamical
terms, so extremely non-generic that there is not much which can be said in general along this line. It seems much more reasonable, rather, to regard the
closed system in its proper light, as an extremely degenerate case of open ones. But if we do this, all the conventional theoretical tools, both of
thermodynamics and statistical mechanics, fail irretrievably, and we must start anew. So we see here how the most elementary situations can transcend the
concerted power of centuries of accumulated physical law, without being in any sense unphysical or vitalistic.
With protein folding, the situation is even worse because, in physical terms, the folding of an initially-random polypeptide chain into an active
conformation seems to be nothing more than a simple free-energy minimization. Unfortunately a typical polypeptide chain may involve hundreds of
individual amino-acid residues, and each of these involves ten atoms or so, so the writing of an appropriate free-energy function and, even more, its
minimization, is technically very difficult. It is known, from denaturation-renaturation experiments, among other things, that the free-energy surface for such
a system should have a single deep minimum; the transition from random to biologically active (folded) structure is rather fast and very accurate. On the
other hand, the more refined the free-energy computations become, the flatter are the surfaces so generated, with many local, shallow minima in which the
structures get trapped. If this discordance is not resolved, once again a most serious challenge will be presented, not to biology but to physical theory.

2 Active sites, specificity, recognition

Let us stay at the molecular level, for it is here that one would expect physical theory to have its most immediate direct impact on biology. And yet even
here the most elementary considerations force us outside the reach of the most powerful theory physics knowsquantum mechanics.
In some of my own earliest published work1 I considered the problem of what the microphysical basis for specificity would have to be

like. In that work (which considered explicitly the vehicle for carrying primary genetic information) it was straightforwardly supposed that such an
information-carrying active site would consist of a family of quantum-mechanical observables in a standard way. The mathematical properties of this family
are constrained by the biological prerequisites for the stability and accessibility of the information; basically a form of the measurement problem with which
Dr Bohm has dealt at such great length. Under these conditions it turned out that this family of observables. which in an abstract sense describes a
perfectly good microphysical system, does not have a Hamiltonian; hence no Schrdinger equation, no wave functions, etc. It is thus immune to study by
conventional theoretical means. We may interpret the relation of this sub-system of observables to the entire molecule in which it is embedded in the
following way; the active site is an example of a sub-system which is not physically fractionable from the molecule. That is, there is no physical
procedure which can separate the molecule into two parts or sub-systems, one of which is the active site and the other of which is everything else. We
can describe the whole molecule in standard quantum-theoretic terms (at least in principle; in fact, I believe the hydrogen molecule is still technically
unconquered), but we cannot recover the site from this description. In this connection it is ironic to note that, long ago, the famous chemist Willsttter
refused to accept the conventional identification of enzyme with protein; it was his contention that protein was simply an unavoidable contaminant of
enzyme. In a sense, the above considerations support this view; enzyme is active site, not entire molecule, but the site is not fractionable from the molecule
in which it is embedded.
The idea that every sub-system is fractionable is basic to a stronger form of reductionism common among biologists (especially molecular biologists). It
is an embodiment of an analytical philosophy going back to the idea that mixtures or heterogeneous phases could always be resolved into pure phases,
and that the properties of any mixture could be inferred from those of the constituent pure phases. This idea, in the form of superposition, survives in an
essential way even in modern quantum mechanics. The above very elementary considerations indicate that it is generally false and, thus, theory based upon
it is at best of circumscribed validity.
Before leaving this subject, let us consider another of its practical implications. In a certain sense, the importance of a Hamiltonian is that, knowing it,
the dynamics of any arbitrary observable is also known, through a classical or quantum version of the relation:

where E is the Hamiltonian and [] is the Poisson bracket. If there is no Hamiltonian, then the dynamics of arbitrary observables is decoupled from any a
priori principle; in particular, there is no reason

any more to believe that the observables which characterize, say, the specificity of an active site are related to, or functions of, any of the conventional
observables used in physics, or directly measurable by means of the physical instruments we conventionally use.
This point, although tangential to the considerations which follow, is worth pursuing a bit further. We may illustrate by means of a simple and artificial
example, of a purely classical kind. Consider the Hamiltonian:

i.e. the classical one-dimensional harmonic oscillator. In this situation, an observable u=u(x, p) is any numerical function of phase. Thus, u=x5, to pick
something simple at random, is an observable. It inherits an equation of motion:

Here v=v(x, p)=5x4p/m is just another observable. It too inherits an equation of motion, which can be readily verified to be:

That is, if we were to measure the observables (u, v) of the harmonic oscillator, instead of the conventional observables (x, p), we would see a very
different system, of the form du/dt=f(u, v), dv/dt=g(u, v).
Thus, the observables of even an apparently simple system, like the harmonic oscillator, can realize many different kinds of dynamics, depending on
which observables we interact with. There are even simple Hamiltonian systems which are universal, in the sense that they possess observables which
inherit any arbitrary prescribed dynamics (cf. reference 2); that is, among the observables of such a system we can find anything. Such a system
possesses, in a sense, an infinity of natures, and which one we see depends entirely on how we look at the system. Universal systems thus are ready-made
universal simulators or analogs.
Mathematically, the above can be looked at as simply applying some non-canonical transformation to the true variables of phase. But in a system like
an organism, or even an active site, we have no idea of what the true variables are, or even if there are any. The important thing in understanding
specificity is to determine how the systems involved see each other, and there is no reason to believe that this is simply related to how we see them
individually. In short, such considerations suggest that biological recognition mechanisms (which, as we noted previously, manifest a form of the
measurement problem) may involve observables quite different from those with which physics has conventionally dealt. Once again, there is nothing
unphysical about them, except that physics has unduly neglected them.

3 Relational biology
This was the name given by N.Rashevsky to a kind of holistic approach to organisms which he initiated in the early 1950s. Rashevsky, himself trained as a
theoretical physicist, had spent the preceding quarter-century pioneering the idea that there could be a theoretical biophysics, related to experimental
biology in the way theoretical physics is related to experimental biology. He did this by constructing explicit physical model systems for biological
phenomena. We have already mentioned one; his model for the autonomous generation of a gradient on the basis of reaction and diffusion of chemical
species. This in turn was a corollary of his general approach to cytokinesis (cell division). He had also developed the first workable theory of excitable
tissue, culminating in the first comprehensive theory of the brain and of brainlike behavior (memory, learning, discrimination, and the like). He developed,
together with his many students, pioneering approaches to the physiology and architecture of cardiovascular dynamics, the forms of organisms, and
literally dozens of other topics.
But, around 1950, Rashevsky himself became dissatisfied with what he was so successfully doing. As he himself had realized, somewhere along the line
he was taking he had lost the organism. To get it back he recognized that something radical would have to be done. What he did, basically, was to invent
a whole new approach to the theory of biological systems, which was the inverse or dual of the one which he had been using as a physicist. As a physicist,
he had abstracted away all organizational, integrative aspects of organic phenomena, leaving behind only a material system, to be treated in the same way
as any other material system. The faith was that such an abstraction was only apparent; that the organizational properties would re-emerge from the
underlying physics. But this seemed to be at best only partially true.
So Rashevsky asked, in effect, what would happen if we were to throw away the physics and keep only the organization. This is not as strange a thing
to do as might first appear. We recognize an unlimitedly large number of different kinds of material systems as being organisms; between an amoeba and a
man, say, there is hardly a molecule in common. If we persist in taking an overly simplistic material view, we must confront the basic question of how
material systems of such vastly different kinds can behave so similarly, while at the same time being doomed to do biology an organism at a time.
Similarity of organization, of function, is indeed at the root of what we really want to know and understand about organisms, as it is at the basis of our
deeply-held conviction that we can recognize an organism when we see one. This subjective conviction is what underlies biology as a separate science,
and it has always resisted a facile reductionistic characterization. That is why all attempts to define life

have failed, and that is how we know that they have failed. So what Rashevsky sought was a kind of universal bauplan of functional organization, which
must be manifested by anything we would want to call an organism, but which could be executed concretely, or physically, in many different ways. Thus,
instead of starting with a particular organism as a material system and trying to discover its organization from its physics, Rashevsky suggested starting with
an abstract organization, and recovering the physics through material realizations of this organization. That was what he called relational biology.
Behind these apparent simplicities lies a plethora of the deepest and most profound epistemological questions. Starting from a conviction that relational
descriptions of organisms are equally valid, and equally real, as conventional physical ones, the fundamental problem was how to fit the two together. By
their very nature, relational descriptions fall outside conventional physics. So once again, in a different way from before, we find that the most elementary
biological considerations force us to do things that physics has never done, and thus cannot provide the merest hint how to proceed. Indeed, it was the
attempt to provide a material basis for my own early work in relational cell models that forced me to confront epistemological problems of this kind. More
than that, it forced me to the conviction which I have tried to motivate above; that biology has infinitely more to tell the physicist than physics presently has
to tell the biologists. In the remaining pages, I will try to sketch a few of these things.
I have stated above that, in my opinion, the conceptual framework within which physics has historically developed is too narrow to accommodate
organic phenomena. Indeed, it is inadequate in several distinct and independent ways. I shall briefly discuss two of them; the first, while of basic
importance, is not truly radical; the second is both important and radical.
Both of the problems I shall discuss go to the very heart of theoretical science. No one, be he observer, experimentalist, or theoretician, can do science
at all without some conviction that natural phenomena are orderly; that they obey laws which can be, at least in part, articulated and grasped by the
intellect. This basic belief is generally summed up in a single word: causality. But there is more to it than this. In brief, we also believe that this causal
order relating events in the external world can be imaged formally, in terms of purely logical relationships between propositions describing these events.
Indeed, this is precisely what natural law means; that causal relations in the external world can be made to correspond precisely to implications in some
appropriate logical (i.e. mathematical) system.
Attention is thus drawn to the logical or mathematical systems which can image events in the external world. It is the main task of theoretical science to
construct and interrogate such images. The deepest parts of theoretical science are all concerned, at root, with the

class of mathematical systems which can be images of physical reality, and with the relations which exist between such images. The thrust of mechanics,
either classical or quantum, is to construct canonically such classes of images, and to establish homomorphisms between them which are mainly interpreted
reductionalistically. On the other hand, the thrust of the laws of thermodynamics, or of relativity, is to circumscribe the class of mathematical systems which
can be images of physical reality.
The most familiar kind of mathematical image of physical events is that of a mathematical function or relation involving a sequence of arguments
belonging to some manifold or set. Let me consider a particular example, which clearly illustrates the points I wish to make; the relation:

This is an equation of state describing the equilibrium points of a class of non-ideal gases (the van der Waals equations). Here p, v, T are the state
variables of the gas (pressure, volume, temperature), and a, b, r are parameters.
Mathematically, this is a single relationship:

among six arguments. There is thus nothing available mathematically to distinguish any of these arguments from any other; the distinction we have
informally drawn between state variables and parameters has no mathematical counterpart. And yet, intuitively, there is the greatest possible distinction
between them; the parameters determine for us the species of gas we are dealing with, while the state variables determine the secular features which this
species manifests under given conditions.
Even the state variables must be given differing interpretations. Basically, the van der Waals equation says that if two of them (p, T, say) are specified,
then at equilibrium the volume v is determined thereby. But these values of p, T are set by the nature of the external world; they are determined by
processes which do not obey the law (i.e. the van der Waals equation) governing the system itself. Thus, their values are determined, not by the system
law, but by the system environment. Once these are set, the law says that, at equilibrium, the remaining argument v must have the value mandated by the
law.
Thus we have partitioned the undifferentiated arguments of the van der Waals equation into three utterly distinct classes:
1 the system genome (a, b, r);
2 the system environment (p, T);
3 the system phenotype (v).
I have deliberately chosen this rather provocative terminology to suggest a biological parallel I wish to stress.

As noted previously, the above distinctions disappear if we interpret the van der Waals equation simply as a mathematical relation involving six
arguments. The mathematics has abstracted away these distinctions and, to recapture them, we must augment the mathematics. We will do this in two
stages.
First, let us rewrite the van der Waals equation, formally, as:

This is now a three-parameter family of relations, each involving three arguments. The distinction we have informally drawn between parameters and state
variables is now reflected mathematically as follows: the parameters a, b, r now act as coordinates in a function space; they identify or pick out a
particular function from a family of functions. The state variables are now the common arguments of the functions of this family.
The distinction between environment and phenotype must now be embodied mathematically. We will do this by rewriting the three-parameter family of
relations as a genome-parameterized family of mappings from environments to phenotypes:

We claim3 that every linkage between physical observables, every equation of state, can (and in fact must) be written in this way.
The apparently straightforward rewriting we have exemplified with the van der Waals equation is far from trivial, either mathematically or
epistemologically. From the mathematical standpoint, we have turned the arena of discourse from a six-manifold into a more structured mathematical
object; something like a fiber space (for the van der Waals equation, exactly a fiber space) with a base space of genomes, and a fiber of state variables. In
our special case, the equation of state (i.e. the van der Waals equation) defines a family of cross-sections which, physically, are corresponding states for
every different species of gas; we have shown elsewhere how general questions of similarity and scaling are posed in terms of the stability of the genomeparameterized family {abr}, and how they bear on major biological problems of evolution and development, but we cannot touch on this matter here.
Epistemologically, there are two issues raised by the above considerations. First, the rewriting shows explicitly that we never construct mathematical
images of single systems, but of classes or families of systems, with the same states but different genomes. For each individual system in the class, the
entire class creates a context; different ways of embedding a single system into such a class create different such contexts. By concentrating on individual
systems and forgetting the context, the mathematical images we have been using have become too abstract; they have neglected or forgotten certain
crucial features

of physical reality. By considering a system devoid of any particular context, we have in effect identified such a system with a whole class of contexts; in
mathematical terms, we have identified a space of states with the class of all fiber spaces of which it can be a fiber. Naturally, much is lost in this process.
Let us see exactly what is lost. The partition of the arguments of an equation of state into genome, environment and phenotype turns out3 to be closely
related to the old Aristotelian categories of causation; genome can be identified with formal cause, environment with efficient cause, and state itself with
material cause. These categories are distinct and non-interchangeable; neglect of this fact has been responsible for endless mischief in theoretical biology
and elsewhere. Our rewriting, then, serves to re-introduce a definite causal structure into the mathematical description of a system; a causal structure
which disappears when we revert to the standard description. That is, our familiar way of describing physical reality in terms of relations on manifolds uses
the same mathematical object to describe distinct systems of entirely different causal structures; it cannot therefore discriminate these structures. This is
just another way of saying that the old language can only describe equivalence classes and that, to probe these equivalence classes, we must introduce
more mathematical structure from the outset; change our epistemology at the very root.
Let us give a single illustration of the importance of making these causal distinctions. In his attempts to construct a self-reproducing automaton, von
Neumann4 argued that, because a universal computing machine must exist5, a universal constructor must also exist. Basically, his argument was that since
construction (following a blueprint) and computation (following a program) are both algorithmic processes, whatever is true for computation must be true
for construction. However, in the terminology we have been using, it is not hard to show that computation involves efficient cause, while construction (if it
is to mean anything at all) involves material cause. The inequivalence of the categories of causation invalidates this argument, and indeed makes it very
risky to extrapolate from computer models to anything in biological development or evolution (as is often done).
We may note a parallel between the considerations sketched above, and the idea of hidden variables in quantum theory. Essentially, both argue that a
certain level of mathematical description of physical reality only characterizes equivalence classes. In our case, however, what is needed to penetrate the
classes is more mathematical structure, not more variables.
The above considerations are important, in my opinion, but not truly radical. In my concluding remarks I will in fact suggest something which is radical
indeed. Once again, I will be concerned with the class of mathematical or formal systems which can be images of

physical reality, and with the epistemological significance of choosing such a class.
At the moment, every mode of system description which we possess in physics, biology, human sciences, technology, or anywhere else, is at heart the
same as the one which Newton propounded in the seventeenth century. However much these modes of system description differ technically among
themselves, they all share a fundamental dualism, which can be thought of as a separation between states and dynamical laws. In some sense, the states
represent what is intrinsic about a system, while the dynamical laws reflect the effects of what is outside or external.
In terms of the Aristotelian categories of causation, which were mentioned earlier, the separation into states and dynamical laws amounts to a
corresponding segregation of causal categories. This state, which as we have argued, corresponds to material causation, is partitioned off as an
independent chunk from formal and efficient cause; if we look more closely at the concept of dynamical law, we will see that in writing equations of motion
the categories of formal and efficient cause are likewise fractionated from each other. I would in fact argue that the paradigm of system description which
we inherit essentially unchanged from Newtonian times is at heart precisely this: that each category of causation is reflected in a logically independent
aspect of system description.
It has always been taken as absolutely axiomatic that systems must necessarily be described in a dualistic language of states plus dynamical laws.
However, when this axiom is expressed as in the preceding paragraph, in terms of the independence it imposes on the categories of causation, it perhaps
no longer appears so self-evident.
I would like to suggest that the class of material systems which can be described in this way is in fact a limited class, which I have called the class of
simple systems, or mechanisms. Thus, in this language, a simple system is one to which a notion of state can be assigned once and for all; or more
generally, one in which the Aristotelian causal categories can be independently segregated from one another. Any system for which such a description
cannot be provided I will call complex. Thus, in a complex system, the causal categories become intertwined, in such a way that no dualistic language of
states plus dynamical laws can completely describe it. Complex systems must then possess mathematical images different from, and irreducible to, the
generalized dynamical systems which have been considered universal.
Let me briefly suggest a candidate for such a language, originally suggested by an attempt to provide a physical basis for certain ideas of biological
information (for fuller details, cf. reference 6) using concepts of stability. Suppose for the sake of argument we are given a dynamical system description of
the form:

where the x i are state variables, the j are parameters. From these, we can form the observables:

If this quantity is positive in a given state, it means that a (virtual) increase in x j will increase the rate of change of x i (or equivalently, that a virtual decrease
in x j will decrease the rate of change of x i). It thus makes sense to say that x j activates xi in the given state. Likewise, if uij is negative in a state, we can
say that x j inhibits xi in that state. We can form analogous quantities using the parameters as well, but we will omit this for the time being.
The n2 functions uij constitute what I have called an activation-inhibition pattern. The terminology suggests an intrinsically informational significance for
these quantities; at the same time, they are closely related to the stability properties of the dynamical system from which they came. The question we may
pose now is: suppose we know the quantities uij; that is, suppose we know the pairwise informational interactions between the state variables which these
quantities represent. Can we reconstruct the dynamical equations themselves?
The way to do this is obviously to construct differential forms:

For each i, this form must be df i, the differential of velocity or rate of change of the state variable x k . Thus we recapture the original dynamics by putting f i
equal to dx i/dt.
However, this works only if the differential form df i is exact. And exactness is a highly non-generic situation. By presupposing that we must always start
with states plus dynamical laws, we place an incredibly severe restriction on what an activation-inhibition pattern can be.
The necessary conditions for exactness of the differential forms df i are:

Now a quantity like /x k (uij) also has an informational significance; it represents the effect of a (virtual) change in x k on the degree to which x j activates
or inhibits x i; that is, it expresses the degree to which x k agonizes or antagonizes the effect of x j on x k . In this language, the conditions for exactness of
df i become: the agonist-antagonist relation and the activator-inhibitor relation are interchangeable or symmetric or commutative. Once again, this is a most
non-generic situation. Thus, if we characterize a system in terms of its informa-

tional interactions of which we have in effect only specified two layers so far, we are most unlikely to find that these arise from a dynamical system.
By iterating considerations of this type, we can provide a new class of candidates for the mathematical images of physical reality, which contain the
conventional dynamical systems as a very special case. There are good reasons for believing that many material systems have images in this extended
class, and are hence complex. From this perspective, what we now call physics is seen as the special situation it is; it is the science of simple systems or
mechanisms.
There are many corollaries of adopting this point of view. Let us mention a few of them.
1 Traditional modes of reductionism, or of mathematical modelling of biological activities, have among other things the effect of replacing a putatively
complex system by a simple sub-system. It can be shown, using the above considerations, that a complex system describable by a web of
informational interactions as above can be approximated, but only locally and temporarily, by such a simple system. Indeed, this is apparently why
we have been able to do so much science in the conventional dynamical frame-work. But as we watch a complex system over long times, our
approximating simple systems become increasingly inadequate. Depending on the circumstances, this appears to us as emergence, or error, or a
variety of other similar phenomena traditionally associated with complexity.
2 If organisms, say, are in fact complex systems, and if physics is in fact the science of simple systems, it follows that the relation of physics to biology
is not that of general to particular. This reinforces the point made earlier; that to encompass organic phenomena it is physics which will have to be
modified, perhaps in ways even more radical than can now be imagined. Indeed, one can even question whether there are any simple systems at all;
if there are not, then our traditional universals evaporate entirely.
3 Complex systems can allow a meaningful, scientifically sound category of final causation; something which is absolutely forbidden within the class of
simple systems. In particular, complex systems may contain sub-systems which act as predictive models of themselves and/or their environments,
whose predictions regarding future behaviors can be utilized for modulation of present change of state. Systems of this type act in a truly anticipatory
fashion, and possess many novel properties7 whose properties have never been explored.
My intention, in the above discussion, has been to give some idea of the epistemological issues raised when we consider seriously how to attack the
material basis of organic phenomena. I have tried to touch on a great many issues in a short space. I hope that the resultant

telescoping and abbreviation have not resulted in any appearance of dogmatism; although I believe the problems I tried to raise are real and basic, all
possibilities remain wide open. In a certain sense, my contribution is only an elaboration of a remark which Einstein made to Szilard: One can best
appreciate, from a study of living things, how primitive physics still is. I have often found myself wishing, in fact, that Einsteins uncle had given him a
beetle instead of a magnet.

References
1 R.Rosen, A quantum-theoretic approach to genetic problems, Bull. Math. Biophysics, 22, 22755 (1960).
2 R.Rosen, On analogous systems, Bull. Math. Biophysics, 30, 48192 (1968).
3 R.Rosen, The role of similarity principles in data extrapolation, Amer. J. Physiol, 244, R5919 (1983).
4 A.Burks, Theory of Self-Reproducing Automata, University of Illinois Press, Urbana, Illinois, 1966.
5 A.Turing, On compatible numbers, Proc. London Math. Soc., Ser. 2, 42, 23065 (1936).
6 R.Rosen, Some comments on activation and inhibition, Bull. Math. Biology, 41, 42745 (1979).
7 R.Rosen, Anticipatory Systems, Pergamon Press, Oxford, 1985.

22
A science of qualities
B.C.Goodwin
The Open University, Milton Keynes, UK

This work did not belong to the class of austere, strictly objective enquiry; it was of that fantastical kind which often gropes
far ahead into the future and which originates in some stimulus outside the scope of everyday scientific activity. However, it
was built on sound foundations and there was much plausibility in its deductions, which pointed to there being a unity of
experience hidden behind the ultimate nebulosity of our feeling and perception.
ROBERT MUSIL, The Man Without Qualities

Introduction
One of the more curious aspects of the history of Western science is that the dominant scientific world-view of the sixteenth century assumed a deep unity
between nature and gnosis (knowledge), hidden but accessible to imaginative thought and feeling; whereas what emerged in the seventeenth century was a
science based upon a profound division between mind and the nature it contemplates, so that an ontological gulf exists between consciousness and its
object such that the real is, for the mind that relates to it cognitively, truly an object, that which stands over against the thinking mind, appearing to it but
not in it1. This dramatic change of perception emerged from a fierce and fateful struggle for legitimacy and power between the members of groups
championing radically different programmes of development and reform in Europe at the end of the sixteenth and the beginning of the seventeenth century.
Francis Yates identified the monk Mersenne as a key figure in the demise of what he saw as a threatening, reforming and transforming Renaissance
conception of

the cosmos: Mersenne attacks and discards the old Renaissance world; his Universal Harmony will have nothing to do with Francesco Giorgi, of whom
he strongly disapproves2. Giorgi, the Franciscan friar whose De harmonica mundi of 1525 had incorporated the unifying themes of the thirteenthcentury philosopher and mystic, Ramon Lull, was one of the major figures in developing and articulating the tradition of Renaissance nature philosophy.
Within this tradition, all of reality was a single co-ordinated domain, every region of which was intrinsically related to every other region, so that to know
the region called nature entailed knowing the whole sphere of Being within which nature was embedded1. Furthermore, this union of the knower and the
known had the consequence that a change in one resulted in a coordinated change in the other, mind and nature therefore undergoing a co-operative
transformation. But to achieve this knowledge and insight, the seeker had to make a commitment to spiritual enlightenment so as to experience gnosis,
knowledge that transforms both self and other, mind and nature then simultaneously changing to states of greater harmony and unity. In alchemy, this dual
transformation was described as golden illumination for the mind (or soul) of the practitioner of the art; while gold emerged in the crucible, nature
undergoing simultaneous transmutation with spiritual illumination. Neither could occur without the other.
It was to this process of unified and unifying change that the Renaissance magi such as Francesco Giorgi, Johannes Reuchlin, John Dee and Giordano
Bruno were committed in their science; while in social and political action, it involved them in commitment to radical change and reform. Mersenne
correctly perceived this powerful sixteenth-century movement as a threat to what he considered to be the path of intellectual and political rectitude and
stability. The science which he helped to shape in the seventeenth century, and which has come down to us as the dominant tradition of Western scientific
and philosophical thought, is based upon dualisms which split the unified world of the Renaissance magi into separate domains of power, particularly that
between mind and nature, and the threads of these dualisms can be found running through individual sciences as well as through our social and political
structures. The struggle for unification continues against the power of established interests and habits of mind. I tend to see David Bohms efforts to bring
intelligibility and experiential unity into physics as a part of this struggle; and his intellectual and spiritual vision continues the tradition of the Renaissance
magi, a tradition that has never died despite the apparent victory of Mersenne and Bacon in the seventeenth century. In this essay I shall briefly describe
the roots and the main characteristics of this tradition, following closely Frances Yates lucid and illuminating treatment2, and the ways in which it still lives
in biology, where it continues to challenge received dualist wisdom. Science, committed to

unification and intelligibility, achieves its objectives in bizarre and historically tortuous ways.

The science of union

The Catalan philosopher and mystic, Ramon Lull (12321316) worked out a theory and practice of astral science and medicine which was based upon
common components of the three dominant cultures of thirteenth-century IberiaMoslem, Jewish and Christian. The common scientific principle was the
theory of the elements (earth, air, fire, water) on which he based an astral science of correspondence between different levels of beingterrestrial,
celestial and super-celestial. These were linked by their possession of similar elementary properties, developed in the principle of correspondences such
that the near and the far, and three levels of being, were united by virtue of sharing basic characteristics. However, Lull rejected the one-way determinism
of astrology, for his system involved active participation by the practitioner of his art in mounting the ladder of creation to, potentially, the greatest heights
of insight and knowledge. Here was an early articulation of what was later expressed in the Renaissance as the miracle of humanity, capable of prodigious
development within the appropriate context of ethical and intellectual effort. The religious basis of the art was also common to the three religious traditions,
namely the nine divine attributes or dignities of God: bonitas (goodness), magnitudo (greatness), eternitas (eternity), potestas (power), sapientia
(wisdom), etc. To these Lull assigned letters, A being the ineffable absolute, while B to K (without J) signified the nine manifest qualities. Since Gods
attributes are manifest on all levels of creation, we have here another unifying principle which allowed the practitioner to ascend and descend with the
letters of the art throughout the universe. Lull linked the elements, designated ABCD, to the letters of the attributes, suggesting a kind of algebra which
was connected also to a symbolic geometry in the form of triangle, circle and square for each of the levels of being, from top (super-celestial) to bottom
(terrestrial), respectively. These abstract symbols assist the artist in moving through the complex levels of being and organization which are to be explored
and experienced through a contemplative method which owes much to the mystical traditions associated with the different religions, particularly Sufism
(Moslem) and cabala (Jewish). What Lull created was a remarkable culturally synthetic art-science, a precursor of scientific method which had an
immense influence in Europe for centuries. It was a major stimulus to the great radical, reforming movements of the Renaissance.
One of the earliest manifestations of this influence appeared in the brilliant circle associated with the Medici court in Florence, where what is known as
Renaissance neoplatonism was developed. This was

a synthetic product of ancient wisdom and modern insight which incorporated both hermetic and cabalistic teaching. The great German humanist,
Johannes Reuchlin (14551522), also known as Capnion, travelled in Italy as a young man and absorbed this teaching, developing it in his most famous
work, De arte cabalistica (1517), the first full cabalist treatise by a non-Jew. It takes the form of a conversation between a Pythagorean, Philolaus, a
Moslem, Marranus, and a cabalist, Simon ben Elieser, who meet in an inn in Frankfurt. From their discussion emerges a synthesis of cabalistic
numerology, Pythagorean mathematics, and Moslem mysticism, a structure allowing the discovery of all that can be known which aids the co-operative
transformation of mind and nature.
However, social and cultural synthesis is not so easily achieved as synthetic vision. The growth of Catholic power in Iberia in the fifteenth century led to
a simpler form of religious unity than that envisioned by Lull, with the expulsion of the Jews in 1492 and of the Moors in 1505. And Reuchlin was the
focus of a fierce anti-Semitic attack in Germany because of his espousal of Jewish scholarship and cabalistic teaching as elements in his transformational
system of knowledge and action. German humanists succeeded in turning this attack against the perpetrators by the publication of a brilliant satirical work,
Letters of the Obscure Men, and the wave of anti-Semitism subsided. The forces of reaction and division had nevertheless made an ominous
appearance, and the witch-hunts against those seeking transforming experiential insight, labelled black magic or illicit knowledge, broke out repeatedly in
the sixteenth century. Reuchlin was a reformer, seeking a mystical resolution of religious problems. Luther, his contemporary, sought a political solution.
The fragmentation that followed Luthers attempts at reform in religion was matched by an equivalent fragmentation of scientific knowledge which
followed upon the establishment by Mersenne and Bacon of science from which the astral linkings of Giorgis universal harmony were banished, cutting
off at the roots the connection of the psyche with the cosmos2. Bacon was deeply suspicious of the active, imaginative mind, advocating the superiority of
the disciplined mind as the surer way to scientific truth, which was to be patiently collected as objective knowledge from empirical data.
That the radical impersonalism of Bacons method applies as well to Galilei, Descartes, Newton, and Leibnitz, for example, is clear once one
recalls the essentially deductive and intellectualistic character of the methods espoused by those four. Their focus on rigorous discursive
reasoning as the medium for the articulation of truth eventuated in a universe whose atomic constituents were only extrinsically correlated
with one another, obeyed generic laws of interaction that made no provision for individual

characteristics, and was held together by a mysterious yet clearly non-anthropomorphic force: gravity. In startling contrast to this world-picture, the
world-picture of the Renaissance nature philosophy was of a Cosmos composed of intrinsically correlated elements, hierarchically ordered in accordance
with anthropomorphic values, and held together by a force called love.1
There was no intrinsic necessity for science to have the characteristics which it assumed in the seventeenth century, resulting in the predominantly atomistic
and mechanical components that characterize scientific descriptions, and leading to a world-view in which separate identity is primary and connected
relationship is secondary. A choice was made, with particular consequences regarding the relations between part and whole, between the intelligible and
the real, among the individual and society and the cosmos. As Bohm3 has argued:
It is proposedthat the widespread and pervasive distinctions between people (race, nation, family, profession, etc., etc.) which are now
preventing mankind from working together for the common good, and indeed, for survival, have one of the key features of their origin in a
kind of thought that treats things as inherently divided, disconnected, and broken up into yet smaller constituent parts. Each part is
considered to be essentially independent and self-existent.

However, he also points out that:

Science itself is demanding a new, non-fragmentary world-view, in the sense that the present approach of analysis of the world into
independently existent parts does not work very well in modern physics. It is shown that both in relativity theory and quantum theory, notions
implying the undivided wholeness of the universe would provide a much more orderly way of considering the general nature of reality.3

I shall now consider how the analytical tradition, resulting in a biology dominated by atomistic (molecular) fragmentation, results in problems whose
resolution lies also in concepts based upon wholeness and relational order in organisms, similar in certain basic respects to those proposed by Bohm3 for
physical reality in his remarkable book Wholeness and the Implicate Order.

The biology of Humpty-Dumpty

Humpty-Dumpty was, before his great fall, what biology is basically all about: an egg, embodiment of the potential for reproduction with transformation,
which makes the creative process of evolution poss-

ible. After the fall, which started in the seventeenth century and was completed in the nineteenth only the pieces remained to baffle all the Kings horses
and all the Kings men. What has emerged from twentieth century biology is that there are many more pieces than anyone ever dreamed of, and more are
being discovered every day; rather like elementary particle physics, one might say, only more so. How are we to make sense of this molecular profusion,
to construct an intelligible conceptual unity and so to understand organisms and their evolution? Following the traditional dualism of the mind-nature split,
there is a strong tendency in biology to assume that organisms have an intelligent controlling aspect and a passive, quasi-inanimate, controlled aspect.
The controlling part embodies the essential principles of the biological state; the capacity to reproduce, to keep the parts working in relation to one
another, to evolve and to adapt. The organism is thus seen as a dualistic mechanism, like a computer with its intelligent software (programme) and its
passive hardware which responds to instructions coded in the programme. And this is precisely the metaphor used in biology to explain the relationship
between the DNA with its hereditary instructions, which are intelligently translated into proteins via the genetic code; and the organism which is made out
of these proteins and their products. This computer metaphor for organismic structure and function has proved extremely useful in the analysis of the
relationships between the different types of macromolecule (DNA, RNA and protein) which are distinctive to organisms, and in describing changes of
molecular state during embryonic development and evolution. This is the successful face of molecular biology, based upon ingenious techniques of
molecular analysis, many of which exploit basic macromolecular processes distinctive to organisms themselves, such as immunological (antigen-antibody)
reactions, DNA replication (gene cloning) and DNA-RNA interactions (hybridization). There is absolutely no doubt about the extraordinary analytical
power of these techniques, and the value of descriptions arrived at in relation to understanding the detailed molecular processes involved in reproduction
and in evolution. However, what remains very elusive is precisely what these techniques and the associated conceptual structure are unable to address
directly; namely, the nature of the integrated spatial and temporal order that gives organisms their distinctive attributes, particularly their morphology and
their behaviour.
Here we face a rather subtle problem of causal analysis which is more familiar to physicists than to biologists. The situation is a bit like that arising from
the following imaginary discourse. Suppose you were to ask somebody to explain why the earth travels around the sun in an elliptical trajectory; and you
were told that it does so this year because last year it followed an elliptical trajectory and nothing has happened to change the situation. Now, despite the
deficiency of

this answer relative to the way we have become accustomed to thinking about this process, the statement is none the less correct as far as it goes, for it
says that one of the components determining the trajectory of a body, namely its initial position and velocity (at some arbitrary point in the cycle if the
motion is in a closed periodic orbit), must remain unchanged if the periodic orbit is to remain unchanged. What the statement ignores is the other part of
the explanation, the laws governing the process (gravity and the inverse square law) which are required, together with the initial conditions, to define
sufficient, rather than simply necessary, conditions for the process.
Biological explanations tend to ignore any reference to such laws of organization of biological systems, and so describe only necessary conditions. For
example, one often finds statements to the effect that mutant genes cause particular types of change of form or morphology in organisms. An example is
a homoeotic mutant called antennapaedia in the fruit fly, Drosophila, in which legs appear during the embryonic development of the fly where antennae
would normally arise. However, this is cause in neither a specific nor a sufficient sense. It is not specific, because the effect of the mutant gene can be
produced in normal (non-mutant) flies by a non-specific stimulus, such as a transient change in the temperature to which the embryo is exposed at a
particular time in its development; and it is not sufficient, because knowledge of the presence of the mutant gene is not enough to explain why the
morphology changes as it does, just as a knowledge of last years elliptical orbit is insufficient to explain elliptical planetary motion. A sufficient explanation
requires a knowledge also of the way the mutant gene product acts upon the developmental process such that a particular morphological change occurs in
a particular part of the organism, i.e. it requires a sufficiently articulated theory of morphogenesis to identify those changes in particular parameters which
result in one morphology (leg) rather than another (antenna) in a particular region of the organism. Such a theory must obviously be a field theory of some
kind, since we are dealing with functions with space as one of the variables. Once such a field theory of reproduction and morphogenesis is articulated
(and there are promising developments in this direction4,5), the laws of organization of developmental processes will be embodied in the field equations in
terms of the particular relational order in space and time that characterize developmental dynamics, and the organized context (the organism) within
which genes and environmental stimuli act as partial causes of particular developmental trajectories will become evident. The space-time organization of
the morphogenetic field will then define some constraint on the set of possible morphogenetic trajectories and transformations which are possible, just as
Newtons equations define the set of trajectories which are possible for bodies acted upon by gravitational fields. (More detailed treatments of this type of
de-

scription in relation to specific morphologies can be found in Goodwin and Trainor6,7,8.)

None of this is news: any exact description of a space-time process must be in terms of particles (usually molecules in biology) and fields, and biological
reproduction is no exception. However, the particular metaphor that biologists have used to describe this process, namely that the reproductive process is
directed by a programme written in the nucleic acid message9, has tended to have two unfortunate consequences. First, it implies that genes and the
information they contain constitute specific, sufficient explanations of reproduction, in the sense that a computer programme explains the behaviour of a
computer (i.e. knowledge of the programme is sufficient to explain the behaviour of the computer), so that biologists seek solutions to the problem of
reproduction in terms of hierarchies of regulator or control genes, and the sub-routines they control, i.e. in managerial, instructional and information-flow
terms. This splits the organism into genotype (instructions) and phenotype (the form produced by the instructions). The second consequence is that this
metaphor not only divides organisms into a dominant controlling part (a mind or a soul) and a subordinate controlled part (a body), as did Weismann in
189410, the originator of this dualism; it also makes it look as if biology is in some sense basically different from physics, being primarily a science of
information processing and transmission rather than one characterized by particular types of organization of matter and distinctive fields of force.
It seems clear that the time has come to pass on from what was a useful metaphor in deciphering the genetic code and the processes of DNA
replication, RNA transcription and translation of the nucleic acid message into protein, the great and enduring achievements of molecular biology, to a
more rigorous and exact theory of the reproductive process, without which there can be no satisfactory theory of evolution. The failure of molecular
biology, the science of biological particles, to solve the problem of biological form and transformation (reproduction and taxonomy) is not simply due to a
lack of sufficiently detailed molecular knowledge; it is a failure to conceptualize reproduction in appropriate terms. This requires a unitary treatment of the
process in terms of the space-time dynamics of morphogenetic fields and their ordered transformations. These fields are made out of gene products,
organized spatially in particular ways (cytoskeleton, membranes, extracellular matrix) and diffusing over domains defined by permeability barriers, ion
fluxes generating electrical currents, cells and cell sheets and adhesive, viscous and elastic properties, and other characteristics which, when taken
together, define space-time behaviour distinctive to the living state. The study of this state and its transformations may be described as either biology or
physics. It can be divided for convenience in various ways, according to spatial or

temporal dissections. But the revolution in molecular genetics of the 1970s and 1980s, which has demonstrated that there is no stable molecular
organization (site of the instructions for the genetic programme) carrying invariant packets of information through the developmental process from
fertilization of the egg to the adult organism, means that the genotype/phenotype dualism has broken down and been replaced by the concept of a fluid
genome that participates dynamically, and equally, with the rest of the developmental process in the generation of the organism from the egg. And in
general, the eggs of the next generation are not separated out from the dynamics of the developmental process, as Weismann described in his germ plasm
concept (although some species do follow this strategy); rather, the gonads and their reproductive cells are generated as part of the same developmental
process that the rest of the organism undergoes. There are no privileged parts; everything undergoes flux, flow and transformation, though it is all
organized. And the continuity of the living state from generation to generation, via this organized dynamic, results in a view of evolution as also a field of
flow and transformation subject to both internal and external perturbation. This image is consonant with Bohms concept of undivided wholeness in
flowing movement, which he proposes as the primary state from which entities may be considered to arise, like vortices in a stream. This image of flow,
movement and transformation as the essence of the living state, with various forms or morphologies as transient expressions of an on-going process, was
forcefully described by Goethe, who introduced the term morphology in the eighteenth century and gave an enormous stimulus to the study of living
form. What has been formed is immediately transformed again, and if we would succeed, to some degree, to a living view of Nature, we must attempt to
remain as active and as plastic as the example she sets for us.11
Thus we return to the vision of the Renaissance magi, in which subject and object, the known and the unknown, can relate and participate in an
appropriate unity, made possible by the fact that reality is a single co-ordinated domain. As Bohm3 has put it:
There is a universal flux that cannot be defined explicitly, but which can be known only implicitly, as indicated by the explicitly definable forms
and shapes, some stable and some unstable, that can be abstracted from the universal flux. In this flow, mind and matter are not separate
substances. Rather they are different aspects of one whole and unbroken movement.

References
1 S.L.Goldman (1984), From love to gravity: Renaissance nature philosophy versus modern science, unpublished manuscript.
2 F.A.Yates, The Occult Philosophy in the Elizabethan Age, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1979.

3 D.Bohm, Wholeness and the Implicate Order, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1980.
4 Odell, G.F.Oster, B.Burnside and P.Alberch, The mechanical basis of morphogenesis, Devel. Biol, 85, 44662 (1981).
5 H.Meinhardt, Models of Biological Pattern Formation, Academic Press, London, 1982.
6 B.C.Goodwin and L.E.H.Trainor, A field description of the cleavage process in embryogenesis, J. Theoret. Biol., 85, 75770 (1980).
7 B.C.Goodwin and L.E.H.Trainor, The ontogeny and phylogeny of the pentadactyl limb, in B.C.Goodwin, N.J.Holder and C.C.Wylie (eds),
Development and Evolution, Cambridge University Press, 1983, pp. 7598.
8 B.C.Goodwin and L.E.H.Trainor, Tip and whorl morphogenesis in Acetabularia by calcium-induced strain fields, J. Theor. Biol., 117, 79 (1984).
9 F.Jacob, The Logic of Living Systems, Allen Lane, London, 1974.
10 G.C.Webster and B.C.Goodwin, The origin of species: a structuralist approach, J. Soc. Biol. Struct., 5, 1547 (1982).
11 R.H.Brady (1984), Form and cause in Goethes morphology, in Goethe and the Sciences: A Reappraisal, Boston Studies in the Philosophy of
Science, Reidel. Boston. 1986.

23
Complementarity and the union of opposites
M.H.F.Wilkins
Kings College, London
The main tradition of thinking in the West has concentrated attention on distinct things of fixed nature which are separable from each other. From this,
basic science has grown. But there has been a less well-recognised philosophical tradition which has concentrated on the relations between things, and
how these relations produce changes in things and in their relations. Thus Heraclitus in ancient Greece and, at about the same time, philosophers in China
saw the essence of reality in change and renewal. Opposition was the relation which produced change. Thus opposite principles such as yin and yang
pervaded everything, and change came about by opposed things forming a unity. As Pan Ku said in the first century AD Things that oppose each other
also complement each other. In the West these ideas were kept alive by thinkers like Nicholas de Cusa (who saw God as the coincidence of opposites),
Giordano Bruno, the mystic Jacob Boehme, and also the alchemists who saw in chemical reactions the union of opposites giving rise to new substances.
These ideas were developed into a philosophical system by Hegel. He argued that if one thought about opposed concepts, for example being and notbeing, one was led to think of their unity in the concept of becoming. To define being one has to refer to not-being, and vice-versa; logically the two
concepts are interdependent, inseparable and, in many respects, the same. But to say that being and not-being are the same is a contradiction. To avoid
this, thought makes a leap and resolves the contradiction by thinking of the higher-order concept of becoming, which contains and unites both being and
not-being. This type of argumentthesis, antithesis and then synthesis is reasonable enough, but Hegel went further. As an idealist, he saw ideas as the
primary reality which gave rise to all phenomena. He therefore

extended the idea of the unity of opposites from the world of thought to all aspects of the natural world and of human life, especially history. Thinkers
today are more doubtful about this extension, especially to the natural world; and the fact that Hegel was obscure adds to the uncertainties. In any case, I
shall make use of a very simplified1 view of Hegel.
In his lifetime Hegels ideas were widely accepted in Germany, but afterwards his philosophy was little used, with the notable exception that Marx and
Engels, though materialists, enthusiastically took up his ideas which provided them with a dynamic philosophical basis for their revolutionary political ideas.
Marxism is of special interest because it is the clearest example we have of an attempt at practical application of Hegels philosophy2. Marx saw historical
change arising primarily from the opposition of social economic classes in society. Thus it was historically inevitable that the opposition between the
capitalist and working classes would ultimately lead to the unity of a classless society. Lenin emphasised that the transition from a state of inherent
continual opposition to the unity of opposites only took place under suitable conditions. Thus, under the right conditions, opposition ceased to be negative
or destructive and, instead, gave rise to positive construction. This view gave a somewhat different emphasis to that of Hegel, who seemed to imply that
unity of opposites was achieved almost automatically by the movement of thought; he saw in contradiction the negativity which is the inherent pulsation of
self-movement and vitality2. Lenin3 emphasised that the most essential thing in Marxism [is] the concrete analysis of concrete situations and stressed the
need for Marxists to study with great care and objectivity the particularities of the contradictions at each stage in a process of change. Thus Lenin, like
Hegel, saw opposition in things themselves and not merely in abstractions created by the mind.
C.G.Jung, the analytical psychologist, has used somewhat similar ideas about the unity of opposites in describing processes which take place during
psychoanalysis; a destructive opposition between mental functions may, as a result of psychoanalytical work, be replaced by positive healthy
complementarity4. Jung drew a parallel between these therapeutic processes and those which alchemists described as taking place in their work. He
regarded the symbols of alchemy as corresponding to aspects of the psyche: for example, in alchemy the incestuous union of God the Father and the Son
(the supreme union of opposites)5 gave rise to the dove which represented the Holy Spirit; and, if I understand Jung correctly (his writings are at times
obscure), this holy union corresponds to the complementary union of the intellect and feeling. Jung and the Marxists both claimed to be working in a
scientific manner and both stressed that, in order to achieve a union of opposites, it was necessary to make careful objective observation and detailed
analysis of the phenomena involved.

I first became interested in complementarity as a result of contact with Jungs ideas. Later, in teaching molecular biology, I had to consider the relation
of symmetry and asymmetry in macromolecular assemblies. I concluded that it was useful to regard this relation as an example of complementarity, and I
began to look for other examples of complementarity and to compare them. Hegel considered all kinds of different pairs of opposites as being basically
similar, e.g. pairs of concepts like being and not-being, geometrical opposites like left and right, the physical opposites of positive and negative electricity,
opposed social classes in society, or the highly asymmetric pair of seed and soil which unite to give rise to a new plant. Is a similar principle of opposition
or contradiction operating in these very different situations and giving rise to particular forms in the natural world (for example, as the opposition of
symmetry and asymmetry in a crystal can give rise to forms like dislocations)? Or is one, as some philosophers imply6, merely playing with words when
one uses terms like contradictions, conflict, antagonism, opposition and mutual exclusion in very different situations?
Even if we do accept that it is valid to apply the idea of the unity of opposites to a very wide variety of situations, we may still ask the question: How
useful is it to do so? Marxists and Jungians are convinced of the usefulness of such ideas, but many others do not think that way. Clearly, the best way to
find an answer to this question is to consider practical examples and see, in that context, to what extent the idea of unity of opposites is illuminating. In the
present study I take examples from physics, molecular biology, psychology, music and visual arts. I also consider the nature of human creativity and have
been especially interested to see if any new light can be cast on the problem of human conflict. I have used complementarity to mean the same as unity of
opposites. To complement means to form something complete, whole, perfect, fulfilled or consummated. This implies a specific interaction between the
parts (two in our case) which gives rise to the wholeness or perfection, and I have taken this interaction to be the creative interaction which gives rise to
the unity of opposites. I have not, as is often done, used complementarity in the sense of completing but not interacting; for example, it is often said that art
and science are complementary without meaning that they interact significantly.
What I have written is best regarded as a report on work in progress. Possibly it will help to stimulate interest in this subject, or will readers agree with
Jantsch, in his account7 of the important new ideas about order developing through fluctuations, where he dismisses unity of opposites as a clumsy
western attempt at making a rigid structure of notions move? I would be glad to have comments. (Since this was written I have found relevant ideas in
the very practical study of negotiations8.)

Niels Bohr and complementarity in modern physics

Niels Bohr was an outstanding scientist with a strong philosophical interest which focused on problems of paradox, ambiguity and limits to knowledge.
Before he met complementarity in physics, Bohr was, for example, interested in the complementary relation between the strictness of definition of a word
and its practical usefulness. The meaning depends on context and can be defined more clearly if the context is limited; but, in limiting the context, the word
loses some of its usefulness. In classical physics such limits do not exist; for example, the motion and position of a body can be measured independently of
each other and, in theory, without limit to the accuracy. But when very small particles of matter such as electrons are studied, it is found that they behave
differently from everyday bodies, such as billiard balls, which obey classical laws. It was found that an electron, depending on how it was observed,
behaved either like a particle or, in another experiment, like a wave. It thus appeared that an electron had two, seemingly contradictory, natures which
combined to form a complementary whole. The nature of this paradoxical whole can only be comprehended in terms of quantum mechanical theory.
Roughly speaking, one could say in Hegelian terms that the opposite concepts of particle and wave have united to produce wave mechanics, though,
historically, wave mechanics did not arise simply from opposing the two concepts.
The complementarity implicit in wave mechanics expressed itself in another way that particularly interested Bohr. In contrast to the classical case, the
measurement of the motion (or momentum) of an electron cannot be made independently of measuring its position. The two measurements are inextricably
connected. This is a consequence of the fact that observing the electron alters its momentum. To try to see the exact position of an electron we shine light
on it. But, in line with quantum mechanics, light behaves both like a train of waves and like particles which possess momentum. When the light meets the
electron, it behaves like a particle and the collision alters the motion of the electron. To reduce this effect so that we can determine the momentum of the
electron more exactly, we can use light of longer wavelength and less momentum, but the result is that the position is then seen less clearly. Depending on
how we make the measurement, we can either measure position accurately and motion inaccurately, or position inaccurately and motion accurately; if we
focus on one the other becomes blurred. In fact, if we measure motion very exactly, the electron appears to extend over all space; that is, it has no
position. Thus momentum and position are mutually exclusive. This mutual exclusion is defined by Heisenbergs indeterminacy principle, which expresses
the fact that the total information in terms of momentum and position is limited. Bohr regarded the mutually exclusive mo-

mentum and position measurements as forming a complementary limited whole. Because momentum and position are mutually exclusive, we can regard
them as opposites; but we cannot recognise in the complementary whole a set of relations other than mutual exclusion.
With our present thinking we cannot distinguish in these phenomena a Hegelian pair of opposites which leads to a unity of opposites. I have found no
evidence that Bohr ever referred to Hegel either in writing or in conversation. Possibly this is because Bohr never dealt explicitly with change arising from
opposition, though he chose the motto opposites are complementary and the taigitu (yin-yang) sign for his coat of arms9 when he was awarded the
Danish Order of the Elephant.
It is also not possible to distinguish a pair of opposites from a unity of opposites in the relation of exactness of meaning of a word and its usefulness.
The same applies to the complementary relation of compassion and justice10 which Bohr mentioned, and the relation of thoughts and sentiments as
presented by Bohr10. However, this last example can be put into Hegelian terms. Bohr regarded thoughts and sentiments simply as mutually exclusive.
Looking at this in more detail we see that thought is by no means autonomous; it requires sentiments, emotion or feeling to motivate it and to help decide in
what direction it goes. It would seem that thought and sentiments are never completely separable but are always to some extent interdependenteven a
series of deductive thoughts requires some motivation to keep it going, and sentiments are always associated with some kind of thought. The idea of
mutual exclusion derives from the fact that strong emotions like anger obstruct clear thought, leaving only simple repetitive angry thoughts. And, vice versa,
concentrated clear thought drives out all sentiment except cool quiet intellectual enthusiasm. Thus, like the momentum-position complementarity, the
opposition of mutual exclusion does not seem capable of being transformed into a unity. However, Jungs ideas4 about thought-feeling relations are
different. According to Jung the state of mutual exclusion and opposition is not the optimum state, because thinking and feeling are then upsetting each
other; for example, a neurotic person might find that thought was disturbed by the upsurging of uncontrollable emotions or, alternatively, intense intellectual
activity could suppress all feeling and concern for others. Jung sees the optimum state of the mind as being a complementarity in which thinking and feeling
interact constructively and form a unity. With such an optimum state of mind one could act with great energy, being both fired by strong feeling and guided
by clear thinking; or one might react to a work of art by fusing incisive intellectual analysis with the strongest emotion. Probably, human limits will always
leave us with some degree of mutual exclusion of thought and sentiment, but we can distinguish

between a state of marked opposition and a state of partial coordination and unity. By making such a distinction, Bohrs complementarity of thoughts and
sentiment acquires a Hegelian form of unity of opposites.
Bohr emphasised that the analysis of what happens when an electron is observedthe fact that the observer (including the means of observing)
interacts with the observed electronhas the important implication that no clear demarcation can be made between observer and observed10: one has to
recognise an essential unity between them. By analogy, one could argue that this suggests that there is an essential unity between self and non-self and
therefore between self-interest and altruism. There is no record that Bohr made this ethical speculation specifically, but I suggest that his deep interest in
philosophy which had holistic tendencies, was connected with his unusually strong concern that scientific knowledge should benefit humanity.
Bohr spent much time and energy trying to ensure that nuclear energy would not become a threat to the future of humanity9. His efforts did not succeed
and, as a result, he was most concerned about the dangers of international tension. When Bohr compared complementarity in different areas, he wrote:
We are not dealing with more or less vague analogies, but with examples of logical relations which, in different contexts, are met with in wider fields. But
of human conflict Bohr wrote10: The mutually exclusive character of cultures, resting on tradition fostered by historical events, cannot be immediately
compared to those met with in physics, psychology and ethics, where we are dealing with intrinsic features of the common human situation. He goes on to
say that contact between nations has often resulted in the fusion of cultures retaining valuable elements of the original national traditions, and he refers to
the most serious task of promoting mutual understanding between nations. Evidently Bohr did not see resolution of the opposition between nations as
involving inevitable logical barriers of the kind he saw in the examples of complementarity he described.
L.Rosenfeld, a close collaborator of Bohr, has presented11 a rather different view of Bohrs philosophy from that gained from Bohrs limited writing on
the subject. Rosenfeld brings Bohr more into line with Hegel. For example, he claims that Bohrs interest in complementarity began with his father
emphasising the complementarity of seemingly irreconcilable approaches in biology; that is, those in terms of function or purpose and in terms of physical
and chemical analysis. Similarly, Rosenfeld attributes the view to Bohr that, when people hold seemingly irreconcilable points of view, the concept of
complementarity can help them to get rid of prejudices which could foster intolerance. Rosenfeld also describes a discussion with Bohr about the guidance
people sought in religion: Bohr declared with intense animation, that he saw the day when complementarity would be taught

in the schools and become part of general education; and better than any religion, he added, a sense of complementarity would afford people the guidance
they needed. It would seem that Bohr had something in mind which he felt was very important and went beyond what he had written about ambiguity and
limits to communication. Bohr is said to have regarded his philosophy as being at one with that of ancient China. I cannot avoid the thought that Bohr saw
the paradoxical aspect of complementarity having an importance in the same way as the paradoxes of Zen Buddhism. This relates ethics and unity of
opposites as discussed in my last section.

Complementarity and molecular biology

The rapidly developing new science of molecular biology exhibits many complementary features. The great challengeto make a synthesis of the physical
and biological sciencesrequired uniting the seeming opposites of the non-living and the living. For example, this science has revealed structures which
combine the properties of crystals, which epitomise static non-living matter, with the properties of micro-organisms which, of all living things, proliferate
with the greatest rapidity. Evolution involved the relation of the opposite properties of inheritance of defined characteristics and the capacity of these
characteristics to be modified.
How could evolution and inheritance be interpreted in terms of physical sciences? The main idea, often considered by biologists, was that the gene, the
unit of inheritance, had to possess a material basis. But what was the structure of this material gene? The quantum mechanics physicist Erwin Schrdinger
answered12 this question in 1944 when he suggested that the gene was an aperiodic crystal or solid in which a defined arrangement of atoms encoded
the genetic message which passed from one generation to the next. Schrdingers use of the term aperiodic crystal could suggest that regularity and
irregularity were combined in one structure, but he probably did not mean that. However, this is what one does find in the actual genetic material, the
DNA double helix.
In this structure there is a regular arrangement of atoms along the outside of the two helix chains, but inside there is an irregular arrangement of chemical
groups. These groups join one chain to the other and are of four different kinds, each with a different shape and size. There is a complex sequence of
these groups along each chain. This sequence encodes the genetic message and constitutes the basic structure of the genes. But how can the DNA double
helix, which is a tightly-packed structure, be very regular on the outside when the inside is irregular? This paradox was brilliantly resolved by the idea of
Watson and Crick of the so-called complementary13 pairing (the complementarity being both geometrical and chemical). They dis-

covered that the four different groups in DNA could be joined together to form two pairs which had the remarkable property that the exterior dimensions
of the pairs were exactly the same, and the positions of the chemical bonds at the ends of the pairs were exactly equivalent. As a result, if the two chains
were joined by the pairs, the outer parts of the chains would be exactly regular and independent of the sequence of groups along the inside. The exact
geometrical and chemical relations in the pairs enabled the two parts of DNA to come together to form a well-defined whole. Since different groups are in
special relation in this well-defined structure or whole, we may properly describe it as complementary. In Hegelian terms we could say that the opposites
of regularity and irregularity have formed a unity, this unity involving a special, specific relation of the opposites. Recently, other relations of regularity and
irregularity have been found in DNA. For example, the double helix is not rigid; it can stretch, compress, bend and twist. It is possible that this flexibility of
the double helix may take special forms which are related to its functioning. It has also been found that the irregular sequence of groups inside the double
helix produces slight irregularities on the outside. These are not so great that they hinder the processes which depend on the outside being regular, but they
seem to provide a guide to protein molecules which need to find particular sequences of groups inside the double helix.
The double helix is regular on the outside probably because of biological requirements, though evidence on this is not yet clear. If the outside is regular,
the double helix could fit into various kinds of molecular machinery and pass through them with mechanical regularity. Thus DNA would be like a cine film
which has regularly-spaced holes on its sides (which engage with sprockets) and yet carries on it a complex sequence of pictures.
In molecular biology one is studying interacting components which do not contain a very large number of atoms. As a result, the variety of different
forms is somewhat restricted. It is not surprising, therefore, that the components interact in much the same way as clockwork which, for simplicity of
design and manufacture, also has a restricted variety of forms and which, like most machinery, operates in a regular repetitive way. In the DNA double
helix the complementarity appears mechanical; even so, the unity of opposites in the double helix structure seems to illustrate Hegels thinking.
Does the complementarity in the DNA structure give rise, as one might expect, to some special new property? Watson and Crick immediately saw that
the structure provides a mechanism13 for self-replication of genes. If the two chains are separated, each can act as a template on which a new double
helix, identical with the original, can be constructed. In theory, genes might be replicated by a group on one chain pairing with an identical, rather than a
different, group on the

other chain. But the geometrical and chemical possibilities of linking like with like are very restricted indeed compared with the possibilities of
complementary linking of like with unlike. In fact, almost invariably, the highly specific binding of one kind of biological molecule to anothera
phenomenon fundamental to living processesis somewhat complementary in nature. Such mechanical complementarity is not of great interest; it is almost
unavoidable because the molecules must, for energy reasons, fit closely together.
Very precise replication of DNA is necessary in order both to preserve the structure of those genes which function satisfactorily and to avoid damaging
mutations. On the other hand, some capacity for modifying or mutating genes is required so that living things can survive by adapting to changing
environment, and also so that evolution of improved forms can be possible. Originally, it was believed that a single mistake in forming one pair of groups
in DNA would be the main mechanism of mutation; but recently it has been found that most genetic changes are produced by a much more radical
change. Breaks are produced in the DNA chain and whole sections of chain containing large numbers of chemical groups are removed bodily and
reinserted in a new position in the chain. This natural process of breaking and reforming of DNA chains is carried out by the same chemical means as are
used by genetic engineers in their artificial rearranging of genes. Thus we have a relationship between opposites: the precise replication of genes and their
extensive rearrangement. Such a relationship is biologically necessary, and is an example of complementarity which characterises life.
DNA acts as a store of biological information. With the aid of complicated molecular machinery, this information is read and used to build protein
macromolecules which form the main structure of living things and perform the multitude of special actions which keep us alive. Most proteins are compact
structures which are highly specific, both in their shapes and in the arrangements of chemical groups on their surfaces.
In the case of muscle, one kind of protein forms filaments which interdigitate with filaments composed of another protein. Bridges form between the two
kinds of filaments but the bridges have mobile ends which can travel along the filaments so that the filaments slide between each other. This sliding
increases the interdigitation and thus shortens the length of the muscle. When many filaments lie side by side, the most efficient arrangement will be one in
which the optimum relation between neighbouring filaments is repeated throughout the structure. It is not surprising, therefore, that most muscles have a
highly periodic, almost crystalline, structure. On the other hand, for motion to take place, the bridges apparently move asymmetrically. In somewhat the
same way, the human body is symmetrical from side to side, but the symmetry is destroyed in walking.

Asymmetry in crystals
Let us consider the relation between symmetry and asymmetry in the apparently simple case of crystals. The chemical and physical forces between the
molecules in a crystal cause the molecules to arrange themselves in a regular periodic way, the symmetry corresponding to the state of minimum energy.
Thus a crystal exists in a symmetric form, but can it grow symmetrically? In the best known way that crystals grow, the answer is no. A crystal grows by
molecules attaching themselves to its surface. But the attachment of a molecule to a flat surface is less strong than the attachment to an indentation or
crevice which can partly surround the molecule. Such an indentation exists at the edge of a single layer of molecules which spreads as the molecules
deposit on the flat crystal surface. Thus we can understand why crystals grow by deposition of molecules at the edge of such layers; but such growth
would stop as soon as the layer covered the whole face of the crystal. However, if there is a local break in the regular structure of the crystal, distortion in
the crystal can be such that the growing edge of the layer can gradually rotate, thus building up a continuous spiral succession of layers. Apparently the
energy loss produced by the break in symmetry is outweighed by the gain in attachment energy at the edge of the layer.
Even when they are not growing, crystals always have an asymmetric aspect; though they may be very regular indeed, they can never be perfect.
Breaks in symmetry give metals greatly increased strength and contribute to many of their special properties, and local imperfections in insulating crystals
give rise to many very important and special electronic properties, e.g. those of semiconductors and transistors, which are the basis of microelectronics.
Where there is irregularity in a crystal, the symmetry and asymmetry do not just add together or oppose each other in an unorganised way. Energy
requirements cause special new structural forms to develop; for instance, special types of dislocation or disinclination which retain some regularity but also
have specifically related breaks in regularity. This is an example of Hegelian interaction of opposites which give rise to new higher-order forms.
Schrdinger knew that the coming together of symmetry and asymmetry in a crystal could give rise to special new phenomena. I have wondered whether
this was why he suggested that genes were aperiodic crystals, but probably this is not so because he also likened the gene to a very large molecule, and he
may have used the term crystal merely to express the stability of the structure. However, Schrdingers use of the term aperiodic crystal stimulated me, as
a solid-state physicist, to become interested in studying gene structure; and, of course, I was by no means the only physical scientist who was stimulated
by his writing to move into biology.

Symmetry and breaking of symmetry in the self-assembly of simple living systems

Many biological structures are, like muscles, built up from assemblies of sub-units which are identical protein molecules of one type or a small number of
types. This is economical in that a large structure may be built using only the relatively small amount of genetic information required to define the few types
of protein. However, the sub-units need to be very cleverly designed if they are to fit together to build a unique structure, unless that structure is very
simple. Providing the structure is symmetrical, the assembly of the whole structure can proceed automatically by a process which is essentially the same as
crystallisation. As is the case with crystals, symmetry aids assembly and provides stability. Spherical virus particles are a simple example; they may contain
only one type of protein. This forms a spherical shell which surrounds and protects the nucleic acid (like DNA) which carries the genetic message which
codes for the virus protein. In such simple cases the form of the whole is determined by the properties of the parts. Tubular shells formed from a helical
array of identical sub-units are also common, tobacco mosaic virus studied by Klug and Butler14 being an interesting example. In this case, assembly
proceeds in ordered steps separated by a break in symmetry. First the protein sub-units crystallise to form discscircular, flat, symmetrical assemblies of
thirty-two sub-units. Next the nucleic acid interacts with the discs; it does not interact with unassembled protein. The nucleic acid interaction causes the
individual protein molecules in the disc to change their shape so that the circular flat assembly is no longer stable; it breaks, changes its symmetry and curls
up into a short segment of helix. Then other discs interact with the nucleic acid and the resulting helical segments join together to build up the completely
helical assembly. The length of the whole assembly is limited by the length of the nucleic acid molecule which fits inside it. An advantage of this rather
complex mode of assembly is that the nucleic acid does not have to be added separately to the assembly and the protein shell cannot be assembled
completely without the nucleic acid being in it. Also, assembly should be faster if preassembled protein discs are used instead of single protein molecules.
It is important to note that the breaking of symmetry during assembly is not random; it gives rise to a specific dislocation at a particular stage in assembly.
It seems proper, therefore, to describe the relation of regularity and irregularity as a complementarity. We may note that the change of symmetry results
from the individual molecules undergoing a structural or conformational change which, in similar cases, is often an abrupt change from one well-defined
conformation to another.

Molecular switching with change of symmetry is probably also the key to how much more complex bacterial viruses assemble themselves. These
viruses, if greatly magnified in the electron microscope, look like little creatures, their various parts being called, head, tail, middle piece, collar, etc. Each
main part is composed of a fairly small number of different proteins, but there are about forty different kinds of protein in the whole virus. At first all these
proteins may float about separately in solution. Then, in the first step of assembly, one type of protein aggregates to form one part of the virus, e.g. a disc,
tube or shell. When this assembly is completed, the constituent protein molecules become able to bind to a second type of protein. By analogy with the
assembly of tobacco mosaic virus, it would appear that the molecules which aggregate undergo a change in structure when the assembly is completed, this
change being switched on by the completion of the assembly. The second protein cannot assemble or bind to the first protein until the first protein has
completed its own assembly process. We get, therefore, an ordered sequence of assembly steps. This sequence is self-generating. In the same way, the
main parts of the virus, such as head and tail, cannot join together until the assembly of both head and tail is complete. Clearly, the constituent proteins are
very cleverly designed indeed, so that they can switch their structures and thereby themselves control the assembly process, presumably by changing or
breaking symmetry.
The way in which these viruses assemble suggests that, at the molecular level, life necessarily involves both symmetry and breaking of symmetry. This is
an expression of the fact that in life there is not only order, but also change and mobility; the breaking of symmetry can introduce mobility which may
correspond to Hegels pulsation of self-movement and vitality.
There is also a combination of symmetry and asymmetry in the static structures of many virus particles and other biological assemblies of protein
molecules. In the case of a virus protein shell there is a geometrical limit to the number of protein molecules which can be arranged in an exactly regular
way. In order to build larger shells, an irregular small group of molecules (e.g. three molecules) is repeated exactly over the surface of the shell.
Furthermore, a greater variety of forms is possible when asymmetry is introduced; for example, the head of a bacterial virus may be longer than it is
broad. As well as helping structures to be stable, symmetry can provide a basis for amplification of biochemical changes. Enzymes, which are biological
catalysts, often consist of a number of protein molecules arranged symmetrically in a group. If one of these molecules receives a chemical signal which
produces a conformational change in the molecule, the enzyme activity of the molecule can be switched on. As a result the group of molecules becomes
asymmetric. The forces between the molecules then cause the other molecules in the group to change their conformation so that

symmetry is restored. Thus one chemical signal switches on the activity of all the molecules in the group.

Breaking of symmetry in music and art

The emergence of special qualities from the interplay of symmetry and the breaking of symmetry is seen in many fields of art. In music and dance the
powerful, even hypnotic, effect of regular beat is related to bodily rhythmheart-beat, breathing and walking. The breaking of the regularity, the
unexpected and surprising element, has a further higher-level impact and introduces a more complex level of expression, syncopation of rhythm being a
simple example. It is the same with harmony and discord, and also with the building up of a theme and breaking or modifying it. The basic rhythm,
harmony or theme is a reference system which is an essential part of the higher structure; and, therefore, the breaking of symmetry must not go so far that
one loses contact with the reference system. In the same way children enjoy playing games which scare, but the scare must not go too far. It is important
to note that music will not result from mere mixture or addition of regularity and irregularity. The composer needs to create a meaningful combination of
both; in fact, a complementarity. Then, quoting Arnold Schenberg, Dissonances are only the remote consonances;15
In visual arts regular periodicity produces very strong effects. Regular flashing lights intoxicate at discotheques and, as not control agents, severely
disorient. Soldiers marching, e.g. slowly at a funeral or goose-stepping aggressively, have a strong effect on those who watch them. The marching together
gives the soldiers a feeling of comradeship and, of course, an obedient uncritical mechanical attitude of mind. The strong effect of the marching derives
from the complementary relation of the machine-like aspect of the body and its opposite, the unique nature of an individual. Similarly, the impact of a
chorus line of dancers is strengthened when one can recognise dancers as individuals. The inhuman/human complementarity is also, presumably, the basis
of fascination with automata and puppets, and the strong and strange effect of masks in theatre and ballet. The coming together of the mechanical and
non-mechanical evidently gives rise to new qualities.

Human creativity as a complementary process

Creativity is concerned with the bringing into being of something new. Since something new must be essentially unpredictable we cannot hope to follow
the whole process of creation. If we could follow each step precisely it would mean that the product was not new but merely a rearrangement of
previously existing components. An example of an elusive step in the process of creation, outside logic, is the inductive

leap in science. But even though creativity has its mysterious side, we can expect that many aspects of creativity may become fairly clear.
Many thinkers, in line with a long tradition, have claimed that all innovation derives from complementarity. For example, Jung wrote every creative
person is a duality or a synthesis of opposite or contradictory attitudes15, and Coleridge16 saw that the power of the poet reveals itself in the balance or
reconciliation of opposite or discordant qualities. Similarly it has been claimed17 that the basis of poetry is in paradox, and that metaphor is based on
verbal opposition. Recent studies by psychologists of creativity often refer to dualities of some kind being involved in creativity, and sometimes these are
complementarities, for example the duality of convergent and divergent thinking. A fair proportion of studies, however, do not refer at all to
complementarity or to related ideas, although in view of the obscure nature of creativity we may expect many psychologists to be reluctant to speculate
about it.
Psychologists who believe that creativity is based on complementarity agree that it involves, on the one hand, the intellect, which corresponds to
activities in the cortex of the brain and, on the other hand, mental functions such as intuition, emotion and instinct, which correspond to activities in parts of
the brain which are sometimes regarded as developmentally more primitive and animal-like. Henri Bergson believed that the mental function which
complemented the intellect was intuition, which could provide knowledge by direct immediate perception independent of reasoning. Intuition, somewhat
instinctive and empathic, gave a broad, rather unspecific, overall impression or feeling which would then be refined and articulated by the intellect. This
idea is supported by Einsteins impression that he was guided by his nose (like an animal)18, and that he became aware of a solution to a scientific
problem at first in the form of visual or muscular images19 which he then had to transform into mathematics.
Many scientists seem, like Einstein, to be guided by hunches. But others have found that, following much careful study, a clear idea suddenly appears in
the mind. It would seem then that two levels of the mind interact. A thought which moves in the unconscious mind passes into the upper levels, which
Freud called the preconscious, and then into consciousness20. There it has to be selected and recognised by conscious thought. When that has been done,
a flash of insight is completed. Probably there is no unique pathway for creativity; it may differ from person to person. Jung believed that, in the creative
fantasy of the artist, intuition was not necessarily dominant4 and that the fantasy could partake of any of the four basic mental functions that he recognised.
But, whether it is in science or art, the creative person must make the most careful, thorough and intent study of the world, becoming immersed in it
empathically and yet keeping some objective detachment.

One of the greatest barriers to creativity is the existence in the mind of firmly embedded conventional patterns of thought from which one cannot
escape. This inability to escape and to explore other possibilities may be due to the very existence of the pattern not being recognised (does a goldfish
recognise the existence of the walls of the bowl which confine it?), or it may be due to inability to question the correctness of the pattern because it is seen,
not as thought, but as reality itself. Psychic regression from cortical activity may provide a way to escape from domination by such patterns. Thus, some
psychologists see free reversible regression as important in the creative process. But such regression may alarm the subject because the intellect is no
longer in control and there may be a feeling that, like a psychotic, he is losing touch with reality, whereas in fact he may be moving closer to reality. Thus
the subject may retreat from creativity. Frank Barron21 noted that creative writers are friendly to the unconscious. Schiller22 wrote of a non-creative
man: You are ashamed or afraid of the momentary and passing madness which is found in all creators.
Thought patterns are very important because they can provide real practical security; but they can also produce illusions of psychological security. As a
result, to think of questioning or giving up patterns may produce strong feelings of insecurity and fearif I give up my beliefs what will remain of me? Such
fear may be a major obstacle to creativity. Added to it can be fear of failing, which gives rise to rationalisations that a creative approach would be
unreasonable. Brainstorming is a technique for overcoming such fears. There is also the fear, possibly unconscious, of adopting an unconventional
approach which may lead to our becoming socially isolated. We are, in effect, exposed to the anxieties of brainwashing which is applied by ourselves and
by society. As a result, it is only courageous people who will seek out and accept a great creative challenge; most people prefer the safety of mediocre
conventionality. Einstein23 said I have little patience with scientists who take a board of wood and look for the thinnest part and drill a great number of
holes where the drilling is easy. Einstein had not only the audacity to seek the thick parts, but also the ability to choose those thick parts which were
drillable and, moreover, the energy to persist and find the ways to drill them.
Arthur Koestler suggested24 that the basis of creativity is the perceiving of a situation or an idea in two self-consistent but habitually incompatible
frames of reference. Here again we have the complementary union of opposites; the mind vibrates, so to speak, on two wavelengths. The main obstacle
to creativity then lies in the fact that the mind finds it much easier to operate at one time in one frame rather than in two.
Although conventional thinking is an obstacle to creativity, convention can also play a role in creativity. For example, Thomas Kuhn25 has made clear
how commitment to convention aids exchange of ideas

between scientists and provides a framework in which anomalies may be recognised by open-minded scientists. He described the complementary relation
of commitment and open-mindedness as an essential tension which led to creativity. Clearly, in this complementary union of commitment and
uncommitment, we are not guided by Aristotelian logic (A cannot be not-A) which would lead to the scientist being in a mere state of partial commitment.
Such a state would not provide creative energy. Instead, an apparently paradoxical logic permits the scientist to combine strong commitment with
questioning and openmindedness. Similarly, when a creative scientist explores an unconventional idea, passionate faith in the idea must be combined with
the energy and humility to question it.
According to the discussion above, the creative state of mind has several main characteristics. We must be prepared to accept the limitations of
conscious thought and to seek guidance in the depths of the mind. We need to look and listen with total attention, making the fullest use of all our faculties.
We must be prepared to persist in the face of all kinds of discouragement, anxiety and fear. As a result, we have the possibility of becoming free from
domination by conventional patterns of thought and images. Seen in this way, the creative state is needed, not only in special areas like art and science, but
in all forms of living. Those who lead a virtuous life will be frequently making creative acts, often small ones, which are added to the inevitable background
of mechanical reflex actions which are much of living. For example, in human relations we need to pay the closest attention to the needs of others, and of
ourself, by observing how a living being is constantly changing and giving signs, however small, of some new potentiality. In these terms, love is a creative
human relationship.
Thinking more broadly, we may relate creativity to the general nature of life itself. Life has two opposite aspects, one of homeostasis and regularity of
routine established patterns, the other of exploration and successful breaking of routines. Thus an amoeba is filled with homeostatic mechanisms, but needs
to explore to find food and a good environment in which to live; and a human being needs the security of the familiar, but also seeks the tonic effect of
variety and change. And, at the simplest level of life, genes need to copy themselves repeatedly and exactly but also, from time to time, need to mutate.
Thus human creativity is a special, extreme, example of the ability of life to transcend its repetitive nature.
The creative state, though it is most evident at special times, is in fact present always in some degree in all living. For example, a scientist may become
most aware of the creative process when there is a flash of insight; but that flash has not come out of nothing, it has come out of a mass of experiences and
thoughts assembled and related by the scientist during years of work. During that preparative work the scientist has often been in a continuous state of
creativity, observing

carefully, selecting and rejecting facts, choosing and rejecting directions to follow, and all the time keeping an open and enquiring state of mind. As a
result, observations and ideas are woven together to form somewhat new relationships. These may dissolve away, but, at a critical stage, they may reach
the point where they suddenly click together to a much greater degree than before.

Mechanical and non-mechanical aspects of the human mind

The comments about music and art relate to the way the human mind works. On the one hand, the mind works like a machine, and we need that, e.g.
when we drive a car or, rather differently, when we engage in simple logical thought. But, on the other hand, life is full of situations where a mechanical,
robot-like response is quite inappropriatewe need a non-mechanical, creative response which not only includes thinking but also emotion, feeling,
intuition and sensation. The robot and non-robot mental activities can be regarded as complementary, each being dependent on the other. Jung saw the
activities of the mind as consisting of the conscious and unconscious parts which, in the healthy integrated psyche formed a complementary synthesis;
additionally, the mutually exclusive complementary functions of thought and feeling, and of intuition and sensation, were fused together in balanced
relationship and activity.4
Because the human mind has a well-developed mechanical aspect we have little difficulty in dealing with well-defined situations of a kind we have
already experienced. Our minds have been programmed by that experience and we can meet the situation with a suitable mechanical response. But what
can we do when we face a situation which is difficult to define or has unprecedented aspects? If the difficulty and newness of the situation are small, we
may have sufficient energy and creative courage to face the problemwe may, in fact, enjoy the challenge. But if the challenge is great, it is easy for us to
be overwhelmed by it. We may lack the courage to face the fact that we do not understand the situation. The unknown can be frightening and we may not
have the energy and ability to think new thoughts. As a result, we may regress psychologically and unconsciously seek comfort and security by adopting
without question some ready-made thought pattern such as that of convention or authority (e.g. the belief that Soviet disarmament proposals cannot be
trusted). Such regression is negative and compulsive and differs from the positive free exploratory regression involved in creativity. The regression may
also prevent us thinking clearly, with the result that we deceive ourselves and force the situation into a well-known category, although we really

should see that it does not fit (e.g. like the general who always prepares to fight the next war like the last).
Thus our minds become fixed and narrow; we are, like Shakespeares man, most ignorant of what he is most assured (or vice versa). If we are
intellectual people we may try too much to solve problems by logical thought, because we have the feeling that logic is reliable and gives security. Thus we
try to solve complex social economic problems by a technological approach, e.g. we may think that more efficient crops will solve the problem of Third
World starvation (they do not). And governments may seek to stabilise society by using science-based force, or try to resolve or contain international
tensions by military technology of mass destruction. And, of course, if we fail to persuade ourselves that conventional attitudes can solve the serious
problems we face, we may simply retreat into a feeling of helplessness, which is the state of very many people today, e.g. in relation to nuclear war.
Alternatively, if we do not retreat into apathy, our fear and frustration may be converted into hatred and aggression. This, in the context of conflict, gives
rise to the greatest dangers.

Psychology of human conflict resolution

Let us consider in what specific ways the principle of unity of opposites can operate in human conflict resolution. The psychological factors involved are
much the same for all kinds of human conflict. Therefore, although I shall refer to conflict between two individuals, I shall also use the East/West
confrontation to illustrate principles.
The main characteristics of confrontational conflict are as follows. Each party in the conflict of course regards his own behaviour as reasonable, but the
behaviour of each mutually reinforces in the other the unreasonable and psychologically regressive tendencies which, as described above, develop in
difficult and threatening situations. There is a lack of ability to observe the opponent objectively. Threats and fears cause each side to exaggerate the faults
of the other. By projecting ones own faults on to the other, the faults in ones own system seem less important; and by condemning others one feels
virtuous. Each party forms a fixed image of the other and of the certainty of opposition between them. Also, fixed ideas develop about what appear to be
final self-evident principles of freedom, justice, democracy, socialism, etc. Thus illusions of certainty instilled by society set limits to thinking. Accordingly,
people in the US have a simplified and distorted picture of the USSR as being opposed to freedom and threatening the US, which they see as the bastion
of democratic liberty. And, like a mirror image, the USSR sees itself as the stronghold of socialist justice which is threatened by an unjust aggressive US.
Dependence on a simplified stereotyped image of the partner in conflict leads to misperceptions of his attitudes and intentions.

With such firmly-established confrontation we are not likely to resolve the conflict by merely appealing to reason and pointing out that both sides have
many interests in common. Strong emotions have created unreasonable attitudes which prevent the opponents observing the whole situation with care and
objectivity and analysing it productively. For reason to prevail we need to remove the blocks of unreason. To do this we need the same frame of mind as
is needed for creativity. In fact, we have to be creative. So long as the blocks operate, intellectual analysis merely strengthens rigid defensive attitudes. We
need to achieve a creative freedom where the mind can explore new possibilities and where a creative regression replaces the negative regression which
locks the mind in confrontation. This creative freedom involves complementarities like the unity of opposites of commitment and non-commitment which
we discussed in relation to scientific creativity.
The basic difficulty in conflict resolution is that each opponent concentrates attention on his own requirements and does not have the freedom of mind to
put himself in the others shoes and be objective about the others requirements. How to transcend such unreasonable self-centredness is, of course, an
age-old problem to which religions have given much attention: How can human beings free themselves from undue attachment to self and learn to behave
altruistically? The problem is often seen as one of choosing between attachment to self or to non-self or choosing between being either self-centred or
helping other people. This is a false separation because, as Spinoza emphasised, we cannot, in the wider sense and longer term, separate the interests of
ourselves from those of others. We need to pay attention to the total situation, thus including ourselves in a unity of opposites of self and non-self. This is
especially necessary in a conflict situation. In Christian terms this is made clear by Meister Eckhart26: He is a righteous person who loving himself loves
all others equally. Thus we should love ourselves as we should love others or, in a more limited form, we should treat others as we would have them treat
us. This is in recognition of the fact that we and our opponent have the same basic psychology, share the same joys and sorrows and the same
fundamental human needs. It will not help therefore to resolve the conflict if, instead of being self-centred, we direct attention away from our own needs
and towards those of our opponent. We must pay attention to both, and this requires that we are practical and effective in asserting and articulating our
own interests.
In practice it is difficult to focus on both sets of needs. This is partly because the mind finds it easier to follow one train of thought than to follow two, or
to operate in one mode rather than two (for example, thought and emotion tend to be mutually exclusive). But probably the most important difficulty arises
from the fact that when we focus on our own needs, fears and anxieties arise which tend to run out of control, and we then see our opponent as providing
a threat which

reflects our fears. Since most of our fears are unconscious it is difficult to resist their effects. By not recognising the basic similarity between ourselves and
our opponent we create opposition. In this respect, a unit of opposites would be achieved if we quite simply recognised our essential similarity, though in
practice that can be very difficult. But opposition also arises because we and our opponent have differences as well as basic similarity. For example, we
may have opposed economic interests or ideologies. In that case, much patient persistent creative work would be needed to resolve the conflict.
In such work we need to hold two points of view in one mind at the same time. But that alone will not necessarily lead to creativity; it may instead give
rise to destructive mental conflict, indecision or mere sitting on the fence. An active open-mindedness coupled with intelligent discrimination is needed to
help the opposition of views to produce a creative tension. We may gain some idea of the state of mind needed if we recognise in conflict resolution a
unity of opposites in the way the mind works.
For example, consider the way in which we make moral judgments in a conflict. Such judgments can either add to conflict or help to resolve it. Clearly
we need, as always, to have a strong moral sense (for the moment I shall ignore conflict of moral values); we also need to observe closely the behaviour,
not only of our opponent but also of ourselves, and we need to recognise in what ways that behaviour is moral or immoral. We cannot do any of this
properly if we are made unreasonable by our emotions about our self-interests. If we are unreasonable in that way we are likely to make self-righteous
moral condemnations which have a finality about them which lacks compassion and which discourages improved behaviour in the future. Selfcongratulatory or self-apologetic judgments can have similar inhibitory effects. What we need is a unity of opposites of judging and not judging. This unity
is achieved when we are able to make suitable discriminations in how to judge. The capacity to discriminate requires that we have a realistic image of
ourselves and not an image which is unrealistically good or bad.
We can also perceive a unity of opposites in the way in which we should provide encouragement and opportunity to our opponent and to ourselves to
behave well, but should, on the other hand, not impose our expectations so that we put unreasonable trust in the ability of either party to behave well.
Further, the encouragement to behave well may not be only a matter of providing positive encouragement and opportunities, but also of discouraging and
restricting behaviour. For example, it is desirable that we establish mutual understanding of how certain behaviour will raise the level of conflict rather than
reduce it, that understanding being likely to discourage such behaviour. Thus in conflict resolution we may need to adopt attitudes which are both hard and
soft; while we may overflow with generosity in certain re-

spects, we should not allow ourselves to be swept away indiscriminately by a naive sense of the goodness in all things. In line with this, it has been said
that St Anthony of Egypt regarded prudence as the greatest of the virtues.
What I wish to bring out in this discussion is the need for an essential duality or paradoxical quality in the way our minds work. We need to develop the
capability to move freely out of one kind of mental operation into another and to engage in two (or possibly more) mental processes at the same time. In
that way we can avoid mental blocks and achieve a free and open state of mind. This desired state of mind presumably resembles that engendered by
studying the paradoxical koans of Zen Buddhism.
If we can escape from our emotional blocks we can begin to pay attention to all aspects of the conflict situation. As Sun Wu Tzu said in the fifth century
BC: Know the enemy and know yourself. Such close attention is often described as objective, which is correct in that we should not be swayed by
prejudice. But our discussion of creativity showed that creative attention involves empathywe need to feel ourselves into the situation. Thus our state of
mind may be described as a union of the opposites of subjectivity and objectivity.
We need to observe and analyse all aspects of the conflict. For example, in the East/West confrontation there is a whole spectrum of factors ranging
from material facts, e.g. military, geographical, etc., to psychological and spiritual factors which include our ideals and values and those of our opponent.
To examine critically our own ideals and values is especially difficult because we depend on them so much to give meaning to our lives. It is also
important, though not so difficult, to recognise what we have in common with our opponent; for example, in the international case, both sides have similar
needs for economic and cultural co-operation.
The possibility of resolving conflict depends very much on the general way the opponents think about the conflict. Can they grasp the possibility that
there may be a resolution which benefits both sides but which cannot yet be conceived? In the East/West confrontation the opposing governments and the
majority of their people see the conflict continuing, with consequent danger and economic waste (possibly alleviated by dtente and arms control), or
ending either in war or economic collapse of the opponent. The idea that the conflict might be ended by agreement or reconciliation is unattractive because
it is only thought of in terms of a degrading and impractical compromise with evil. Such attitudes are the result of mechanical thinking. We see the world as
being like a giant mechanism of parts which interact but remain fixed in nature. But if we see the components of the world changing their nature as they
interact, and changing their mode of interaction, creative and unforeseen possibilities may be opened up. It is not easy to keep our minds open to such
possibilities

of something new emerging, because our minds tend to slip back into established lines of thought which rule out such possibilities. In the same way the
majority of physicists would have ruled out the possibility of a credible relativity theory before Einstein had actually created it. Scientists create new ideas
not only by observing natural phenomena very closely, but also by playing about freely with ideas so that new ideas can grow and sort themselves out.
When the leaders in the governments of the US and USSR face each other with the almost unimaginably destructive threat of nuclear war hanging over
them, it might seem too much to ask of them that they should play about freely with ideas. None the less, this is what has to be done if the future of the
world is to be made safe. We need to escape from the clear, but somewhat limited, thinking which takes place in the cortex and to let the mind regress
creatively into intuitive and imaginative activity. Then, as in all creativity, the results of such free play can be examined critically by the intellect.
Dialogue encourages a free movement of mind and is, of course, essential in conflict resolution. In dialogue each mind learns from the other. The
thinking of both parties unites and helps to create, in effect, one common mind which can achieve more than two separate minds. Empathy is then
replaced by sympathy; opponents are transformed into partners who work together to solve what they have come to regard as common problems.
Let us not be deterred if new possibilities and new ways of thinking seem strange; the new is at first almost always strange or even alien. But
I.A.Richards27, describing complementarity in metaphor and poetry, wrote; It can seem to be the most peace-bringing liberation ever. And Heraclitus
said Out of discord comes the fairest harmony. This harmony, which may seem strange at first, is not a static or passive harmony but is filled with
creative potential and life. Thus creative potential may arise from the transformation of destructive potential. But how are we to survive as the destructive
potential of science-based weapons comes nearer to being enough to destroy all life on earth? The Russell-Einstein manifesto said that to avoid nuclear
doom humanity needed a new kind of thinking. In facing this gigantic and horrific challenge let us have courage. If we have the courage to make creative
dialogue between East and West, we may then achieve a new kind of thinking.

Acknowledgments
This article is a development of a lecture I gave at Wichita State University as Watkins Visiting Professor in 1982. I am grateful for helpful advice from
David Bohm and Basil Hiley, especially on Bohrs philosophy, and from Barrie Paskins, especially on Hegel and on conflict. Mistakes are, of course,
mine.

References
1 M.C.Sturge, Opposite Things, Burleigh, Bristol, 1927.
2 R.Norman and S.Sayers, Hegel, Marx and Dialectic, Harvester Press, Brighton, 1980.
3 V.I.Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 38, On the Question of Dialectics, Lawrence & Wishart, London, 1961.
4 J.Jacobi, The Psychology of C.G.Jung, 5th edition, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1951, p. 43.
5 C.G.Jung, Collected Works, Vol. 14, Mysterium Coniunctionis, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1963, p. 465.
6 H.B.Acton, The Illusion of the Epoch, Cohen & West, London, 1955.
7 E.Jantsch, The Self-Organising Universe, Pergamon, Oxford, 1980.
8 R.Fisher and W.Ury, Getting to Yes, Hutchinson, London, 1983.
9 S.Rozenthal (ed.), Niels Bohr, North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1967.
10 Niels Bohr, Essays 195862 on Atomic Physics and Human Knowledge. The Unity of Human Knowledge, Interscience, New York, 1963.
11 L.Rosenfeld, Physics Today, 16, October (1963) p. 47.
12 E.Schrdinger, What is Life?, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1944.
13 J.D.Watson, The Double Helix, Atheneum, New York, 1968.
14 P.J.G.Butler and A.Klug, Scientific American, November (1978).
15 A.Rothenberg and C.R.Hausman (eds), The Creativity Question, Duke University Press, Durham, NC, 1976.
16 S.T.Coleridge, Fancy and imagination, in A.Rothenberg and C.R. Hausman (eds), The Creativity Question, Duke University Press, Durham, NC,
1976, p. 61.
17 Monroe Beardsley, On the creation of art, in A.Rothenberg and C.R. Hausman (eds), The Creativity Question, Duke University Press, Durham,
NC, 1976, p. 305.
18 Einstein, A Centenary Volume, ed. A.P.French, Heinemann, London, 1979, p. 31.
19 A.Einstein, Ideas and Opinions, Alvin Redman, London, 1954, p. 26.
20 Frank Barron, Creativity, in Encylopaedia Britannica, Vol. 6, 1972, p. 709.
21 Frank Barron, The psychology of creativity, in A.Rothenberg and C.R. Hausman (eds), The Creativity Question, Duke University Press, Durham,
NC, 1976.
22 Morris I.Stein, Stimulating Creativity, Vol. I, Academic Press, New York, 1974, p. 25.
23 Einstein, A Centenary Volume, ed. A.P.French, Heinemann, London, 1979, p. 23.
24 A.Koestler, Bisociation, in A.Rothenberg and C.R.Hausman (eds), The Creativity Question, Duke University Press, Durham, NC, 1976, p. 108.
25 T.S.Kuhn, The Essential Tension, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1977.
26 Meister Eckhart, trans. by R.B.Blakeny, Watkins, London, 1955.
27 I.A.Richards, Complementarities, Carcanet New Press, Manchester, 1976.

24
Category theory and family resemblances
Alan Ford
University of Montreal
The particular aim of this paper is to draw attention to the epistemological importance of a well-established but sadly neglected principle of semantics
which finds its origin in the thinking of Ludwig Wittgenstein1. The principle, which I will henceforth refer to as the family resemblance principle because
of the example chosen by Wittgenstein to illustrate its existence, can be stated as follows.
In order for two members of the Jones family to be typical Jones, it is not necessary for them to have anything at all in common; in fact they
may be totally different in every respect; they must merely each have something in common with another Jones.

The principle becomes semantic when we make the analogy between family resemblances and words. It then becomes semantic principle no. 1:
In order for a word to be used in a particular way there must be a precedent in the family to which it belongs, i.e. there must be some word in
the same category that is already used in this way.

1 Following the pragmatists tradition, I will refrain from the temptation to use the word meaning when referring to aspects of semantic interpretation
and instead refer only to a set of interpretive strategies known as uses, thus respecting Wittgensteins advice: Dont look for the meaning, look for
the use.
2 The word category is here being used in the way that I hope will be interpretable after reading this article.
This principle is particularly well illustrated in semantics in the field of naming, which is a fundamental aspect of the use of language in the expression of
ideas. When one extends the referential field of a

word by using it to refer to a newly (first time for the speaker) named object B, one follows a general principle which holds that X may be used as a
name for B if B has something in common with A, a unit which X is already used to name.
Let me illustrate the application with the way in which the word hold is used in English. Hold is used to refer to a particular sort of manual contact
with an object: Having the object in the hand. An extension of the use of the word hold is its use to refer to bodily or even mental contact in general
illustrated by the use in expressions like holding an opinion or an idea. A further extension from this use is to go beyond physical or mental contact
completely and to refer only to physical proximity or location. This is how we understand holding a dinner, holding a party or holding a meeting. This
is the sort of reasoning that led Wittgenstein to the conclusion that the search for meaning was illusory, to the extent that the hope of finding a common
property for three different uses of the same word was not necessarily a logical possibility.
Suppose now we apply the family resemblance principle to categorization, for the latter implies necessarily the act of naming; you cant, I would think,
invent a category cognitively without giving it a name.
In fact according to the emphasis that I would like to get across here, categorizing is simply a cognitive extension of the process of naming. It may seem
to some readers that I have got this relationship back to front, but it is a feeling among contemporary semanticists that the classical idea that language is a
portmanteau for meaning la vision ferroviaire du langage, as Fauconnier2 so aptly names it, is an obstacle in semantics, in the same way that David
Bohm3 has suggested that the mind-body distinction has inhibited the growth of scientific thought in general.
Once it has a name, then the word that designates the category takes on life and goes on naming related concepts. Inevitably the category that sparked
its existence continues to be associated with its name, but it is easy to see how all the objects to which the name applies havent necessarily the property
which may at the origin have given birth to the category. Perhaps I can illustrate this with an example from the field of syntax, a good example being the
category referred to as adverb.
Adverbs, we are told at school, often not without an etymological reference in support, are words used to modify or qualify verbs. Thus we achieve
the effect of communicating something more than the fact that John ate the porridge when we say John ate the porridge slowly. But John ate the
porridge twice or Only John ate the porridge or Amazingly John ate the porridge dont tell us more about Johns way of eating his breakfast unless we
are particularly flexible in our use of way. Yet amazingly, twice and only would all gen-

erally be classified as adverbs. If we try to find a satisfactory definition of adverb in terms of sufficient or necessary conditions that slowly, amazingly,
twice and only would all meet, we run into the family resemblance problem that Wittgenstein first alluded to. It is quite easy to show that all four
members of the set have, individually, at least one property in common with another member but it is not necessarily the same one in each case. It is thus
perhaps equally conceivable that they do not in fact have any properties in common at all.
The family resemblance principle is also active when words are borrowed or transferred from one language to another. For example a speaker of
English learning French may learn at one stage that an object which in English he would refer to as ball is referred to as balle in that language. He
immediately proceeds do refer to all objects called ball in English as balle in French, running into all the difficulty one can imagine when he is trying to
refer to boulette (meat balls, ballon (balloons and other inflatable balls), couille (testicle), and so on.
The fundamental aspect of the fact that categories are in fact designated by words is that they are believed to be basic to reasoning. At least argument
structure in formal debates, and certainly a lot of informal ones as well, can be reduced to the general structure of a syllogism:
1 Token a must have property A because it is a member of category X.
There are also often many conclusions of the general form:
2 Token a is not a member of category X because it does not have property A.
The latter in particular is often rendered more palatable by making the same demonstration for several properties.
Principally for this reason there has been a lot of linguistic discussion over categories and this is probably true of many other sciences as well.
Curiously, in contemporary linguistics the nature of categories and their properties have not been of interest or concern. They are simply assumed and
attention, which largely reflects the syntactic preoccupation that has dominated the subject since the publication of Chomskys Syntactic Structures in
19574, has been focused upon their internal ordering and relationships in what has been offered as a hypothesis concerning the cognitive level.
What is to my mind of greater interest is the status of the category as a form utilized in thought or reasoning and the influence of its formal properties
upon the latter. It is of course difficult to pursue this because of the particular status of the category in occidental thought, a status which it continues to
occupy today despite the decline of the syllogism. The work in generative linguistics in particular bears witness to this fact.

The whole question is, do we reason with the aid of categories, i.e. is the establishment of a cognitive categorial level a prerequisite to abstracting
information via reasoning, or are they in fact something which in the wake of Aristotle we have learned to impose upon reasoning in order to give it some
formal weight. I would like to offer some non-category-based arguments in favour of the latter hypothesis.
Pragmatists, ergotherapists, writers of detective novels and the scripts for whodunnit films are all concerned, in part at least, with this question.
Experience has taught us all that doors wont necessarily open if we have the key, yet this same experience makes us aware of the fact that they
usually do if we do. How many potential suspects are eliminated by Sherlock Holmes readers because they didnt have access to a critical key and so
could not have been on the scene of a particular crime, even though they could have got through the window like any imaginative burglar? How many
potential scientific discoveries are not made because a prerequisite postulate was unavailable? There is something about the usually or the could which
leads me to think that human reasoning is inevitably linguistically conditioned and that the use of categories is indelibly impregnanted with the quality of the
name which has all the properties of a family resemblance.

References
1 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, German with English translation, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1953; 2nd edition (revised), 1958.
2 Gilles Fauconnier, Espaces Mentaux, Editions de Minuit, Paris, 1984.
3 David Bohm, Wholeness and the Implicate Order, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1980.
4 Noam Chomsky, Syntactic Structures, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1957.

25
The implicate brain
K.H.Pribram
Stanford University

Initiation
At Christmastime 1975 the issues of quantum physics became relevant to my explorations of how the brain works. I had come to an impasse with regard
to two aspects of brain function. One impasse was the dilemma of whether to think about the events which occurred at the junction between, and in the
fine branches of, nerve cells as wave forms or as statistical aggregates. This dilemma appeared to me to be similar to that faced in quantum physics where
electrons and photonsparticlesat times displayed the characteristics of waves.
The second impasse had to do with perception. Evidence was accumulating to show that the nerve cells of the part of the cerebral cortex connected to
the retina responded to a transform of the retinal image, a transform which yielded what Fergus Campbell and John Robson of Cambridge University1
called spatial frequency. Since the same transformation also occurred in the formation of the retinal image by the pupil and lens of the eye, the question
arose as to whether the spatial frequency domain also characterized the physics of the visual world which we perceive.
I took these issues to my oldest son, a physicist and superb teacher, who gave me an intensive course in quantum physics over the Christmas holidays.
Toward the end of his really excellent briefs, and having completed some of the essential readings such as Physics for Poets2 and the like, I remarked
how happy I was to be a neuroscientist and not a physicist; we have our problems but, by comparison to what seems to be the conceptual muddle of
quantum physics, were doing all right.
My son replied, as have many other physicists (and also Karl Popper the philosopher when I faced him with the same issue) that modern

physics is not interested in concepts; the mathematical formulations are so precise and have had so much predictive value that conceptualization is not only
not necessary but gets in the way. However, he added, there are a few physicists who dont agree to this. They are far out types who would appeal to
you. And he gave me some names such as Max Jammer and David Bohm, and references to the books they had written.

Synchronicity
Back at Stanford, not a week had elapsed before I was asked whether I had heard of David Bohm. My reply was professional. Had I not just
graduated? Of course I had heard of David Bohm. Despite my hubris, I was gently advised of two papers which Bohm had written and which had been
published in Foundations of Theoretical Physics in 1971 and 19733,4.
This was on Friday afternoon. Saturday morning I awoke early and read the two papers. Bohm, in simple clear language, declared that indeed there
were conceptual problems in both macro- and microphysics, and that they were not to be swept under the rug. The problems were exactly those which
my son had pointed out to me. And, further, Bohm suggested that the root of those problems was the fact that conceptualizations in physics had for
centuries been based on the use of lenses which objectify (indeed the lenses of telescopes and microscopes are called objectives). Lenses make objects,
particles.
Should one look through gratings rather than lenses, one might see a holographic-like order which Bohm called implicate, enfolded (implicare, Latin to
fold in). He pointed out that in a hologram the whole is enfolded into every portion and therefore the whole can be reconstructed from each and any part.
I was exuberant. Bohm held the answers which I had been seeking. I had for years5,6 maintained that part of the puzzle of brain functioning, especially
the distributed aspects of memory storage and the transformation into the spatial frequency domain, resembled the process by which holograms are
constructed. My hunch that perhaps the physical input to the senses shared this transform domain seemed to be sufficiently realistic to be shared by one of
the major contributors to theoretical physics.
That Saturday morning I was performing some surgery and my secretary had asked to be present since she had never seen me perform a brain
operation. During the surgery (which went without difficulty) I explained not only what I was doing to the assembled team, but also told them of the good
news contained in David Bohms two theoretical articles. My secretary asked Is this the same David Bohm who has invited you to a conference at
Brockwood Park to meet with Krishnamurti?

I had not registered that invitation in my memory, but we looked it up later that morning and indeed there was my third encounter with David Bohm that
week! Obviously we were meant to meet.
Meet we did and often over the next decade. I went to London even before the Brockwood Park conference and have returned there often to hash out
specific problems with David Bohm and his close associate, Basil Hiley. Always, both were gracious and patient in the face of my ignorance, and
explained everything to me in great detail.
Only once did Bohm become impatient. I challenged him when he expressed the belief that the universe was all thought and reality existed only in
what we thought. I expressed dismay with such nonsense. Why, if that were so, would I need to perform experiments and why would they so often come
up with results contrary to what I had been thinking? Bohm answered that that was because my thoughts were probably muddledto which I
unfortunately had to agree. But then I noted that the experimental results were usually very clear and not muddled at all, and therefore reality seemed not
to reflect my muddled thoughts.
The argument became somewhat heated and I decided that, since Bohm had not been feeling too well, I had better not push too hardbut none the
less Bohm had to go to hospital to have heart bypass surgery a few weeks later. Since I did not win the argument, I seem not to bear responsibility for this
turn of events. After all, my thoughts could not have determined Davids difficulties with his heart since I was not aware of them. Bohm has recovered
fully, and neither he nor Hiley have blamed me for the episode.

The plenum
Are the events occurring at the junctions between, and in the fine dendritic branches of, nerve cells to be considered as waves or as statistical aggregates?
What makes electromagnetic energy manifest as particles under some circumstances and as waves under others? Is Niels Bohrs complementarity
formulation7 the best we can do?
An answer to these questions took the following form and was reached in several steps. Bohm indicated to me that it was inappropriate to ask these
questions in the form that I did. The question could not be framed in terms of either/or; rather, waves and particles (statistical events) mutually imply each
other. In this formulation, Bohrs complementarity was replaced by implication, an entirely different conception. Bohr had invented complementarity to
indicate that at any one moment, with any specific technique, only one aspect of a totality could be grasped. Heisenberg8, addressing the same issue,
proposed the uncertainty principle: we can never be completely objective in our knowledge because knowing involves the techniques by which we make
our observations. As Wigner, Heisenbergs pupil,

has pointed out9, modern physics no longer deals with observables but with observations.
Bohms alternate conceptualization of the wave/particle implication demonstrated that indeed both aspects of the totality could be grasped in one
setting. I noted that physics had made conceptual sense in the days of Clerk Maxwell when the universe was filled with an ether and particular events
made waves in that medium. The modern era of conceptual confusion seemed to arise with the abandonment of the ether by Einstein in his special theory
of relativity, and by Michelson and Morley10 on the basis of their failure to demonstrate a distorting drag on the presumed ether produced by the earths
rotation.
So why not reinvent the ether? Perhaps give it a new name so as not to confuse the concept with the one now discredited. Dirac11 and others had
already made the same proposal. In fact, Bohm had suggested this solution to Einstein in 1953 and Einstein had replied that such a solution was a cheap
shot, meaning that it simply replaced one set of problems with another. None the less, Bohm and Hiley pursued the idea and proposed12 the existence of
a medium which they called the quantum potential. Events, particles, perturbed the medium in such a way as to account for the wave aspects of quantum
mechanics.
Philippidis et al.13 then demonstrated in a computer simulation how to account simultaneously for both the particle and the wave aspects of the singleand double-slit experiments. These experiments had epitomized the conceptual dilemma of quantum physics as expressed in the infamous Schrdingers
cat (which seemed to be both alive/dead) and the collapse of the wave function (which indicated that when the cat was actually observed, the observer
decided that the cat was indeed dead or alive).
The mutual implication of particle and wave was thus demonstrated. True, the quantum potential as a medium had to have some special properties. It
certainly could not produce drag. It had to be a potential which was manifest to observation only when perturbed (by a particular event). But is this any
worse than ignoring infinities in equations when it is necessary to do so in order to make predictions?
The concept of a quantum potential does indeed rationalize not only quantum physics but also cosmology. When a plenum composed of
electromagnetic energy and plasma rather than an empty vacuum characterizes the universe, there is no longer any need for someone with a pea-shooter
on Andromeda to shoot particles (photons) toward the earth so that we might see them. Rather, a perturbation of the quantum potential occurs on
Andromeda, the perturbation is transmitted as a wave form to us, where it reaches the shores of our visual receptors. Here the wave breaks into particles
and the breakers are perceived as light.

Non-local processes in the brain

Non-locality was one of the basic issues which had stimulated my initial foray into physics. When patients suffer damage to their forebrains they do not
lose particular memory traces: they may not be able to speak or to identify objects visually or tactilely; they may even lose the ability to recall a whole
mnemonic category14; but individual specific memories seem to be sufficiently distributed so that they may be recalled despite extensive damage. The
memory traces may, of course, be located elsewhere in the brain than in the damaged part, but then the mechanism by which the traces are recalled must
to some extent be distributed or else there would be at least an occasional instance where some single isolated memory loss would be produced.
The invention of holography seemed to hold the key to understanding this distributed non-local aspect of memory storage and retrieval, as well as the
constructive aspects of perception. If indeed the input to the pupil of the eye came in the form of wavefronts of electromagnetic potentials, such potential
orders had the distributed non-local enfolded characteristics which were also captured in the process of holography. As well, certain aspects of brain
physiology, such as the fact that single cells in auditory somatosensory and visual cortices resonate to limited bandwidths of the energy spectrum,
appeared to share the attributes of the holographic process15. These tuning curves reflect the dendritic non-propagated slow potentialsthe hyper- and
depolarizationswhich characterize the dendritic patterns in receptor surface and cortex which are constituted in response to the sensory input.
On the basis of Bohms s conception, it is the wrong question to ask whether these slow potentials (hyperpolarizations and depolarizations) occurring in
the receptors and in the nerve cell structures of the brain are to be conceived as statistical events or as waves. Polarizations occur in a medium provided
by such cells as the Mueller fibres in the retina and the oligodendroglia cells in the brain (cells which envelope the fine branches of neurons). This medium
can be conceived as a manifold within which the polarizing events are produced.
Mutual implication, rather than either/or, best describes the microneural relationship. Thus the mathematical formulations which have been developed
for quantum field theory should go a long way toward explaining such phenomena as the saltitory effects which occur in dendritic networks and are
responsible for influencing nerve cell output in an apparently non-local fashion.

Space-time and the implicate order

An equally important step in understanding came at a meeting at the University of California in Berkeley in which Henry Stapp and

Geoffrey Chew of the Department of Physics pointed out that most of quantum physics, including their bootstrap formulations based on Heisenbergs
scattermatrices16,17, were described in a domain which is the Fourier transform of the space-time domain.
This was of great interest to me because Russel and Karen DeValois of the same university had shown that the spatial frequency encoding displayed by
cells of the visual cortex was best described as a Fourier transform of the input pattern18. The Fourier theorem states that any pattern, no matter how
complex, can be analyzed into regular waveform components of different frequencies, amplitudes and (phase) relations among frequencies. Further given
such components, the original pattern can be reconstructed. This theorem was the basis for Gabors invention of holgoraphy19.
At a subsequent meeting Bohm agreed that in his concept of an implicate order (at least at a first level) the enfolding was of space and time, and that at
this level the implicate and the explicate (space-time) domains were related by a Fourier transform.
Sensory experience is in space-time. When we say that we wish to make sense of something we mean to put it into space-time termsthe terms of
Euclidean geometry, clock time, etc. The Fourier transform domain is potential to this sensory domain. The waveforms which compose the order present
in the electromagnetic sea which fills the universe make up an interpenetrating organization similar to that which characterizes the waveforms broadly cast
by our radio and television stations. Capturing a momentary cut across these airwaves would constitute their hologram. The broadcasts are distributed and
at any location they are enfolded among one another.
In order to make sense of this cacophony of sights and sounds, one must tune in on one and tune out the others. Radios and television sets provide
such tuners. Sense organs provide the mechanisms by which organisms tune into the cacophony which constitutes the quantum potential organization of
the electromagnetic energy which fills the universe.

Coda
This is my understanding, thanks to my son John; to Henry Stapp and Geoffrey Chew; and to Basil Hiley and to Eloise Carlton, who often served as
creative interpreter for our deliberations. But above all, I am indebted to you, David Bohm, for providing the inspiration to pursue these ruminations and to
give substance to them.

References
1 F.W.Campbell and J.G.Robson, Application of Fourier analysis to the visibility of gratings, J. Physiol, 197, 5516 (1968).

2 R.B.March, Physics for Poets, McGraw Hill, New York, 1978.

3 D.Bohm, Quantum theory as an indication of a new order in physics. Part A. The development of new orders as shown through the history of physics,
Foundations of Physics, 1, 35981 (1971).
4 D.Bohm, Quantum theory as an indication of a new order in physics. Part B. Implicate and explicate order in physical law, Foundations of Physics,
3, 13968 (1973).
5 K.H.Pribram, Some dimensions of remembering: Steps toward a neuropsychological model of memory, in J.Gaito (ed.), Macromolecules and
Behavior, Academic Press, New York, 1966, pp. 16587.
6 K.H.Pribram, Languages of the Brain: Experimental Paradoxes and principles in Neuropsychology, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1971;
2nd ed., Brooks/Cole, Monterey, Ca., 1977; 3rd ed., Brandon House, New York, 1982.
7 N.Bohr, Atomic Theory and the Description of the Universe, Cambridge University Press, 1934.
8 W.Heisenberg, Niels Bohr and the Development of Physics, McGraw Hill, New York, 1955.
9 E.P.Wigner, Epistemology of quantum mechanics: Its appraisals and demands, in M.Grene (ed.), The Anatomy of Knowledge, Routledge & Kegan
Paul, London, 1969.
10 G.Holton, Thematic Origins of Scientific Thought, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1973, Chap. 9, pp. 261352.
11 P.A.M.Dirac, Is there an aether?, Nature, 168, 906 (1951).
12 D.J.Bohm and B.J.Hiley, On the intuitive understanding of non-locality as implied by quantum theory, Foundations of Physics, 5, 93109 (1975).
13 C.Philippidis, C.Dewdney and B.J.Hiley, Quantum interference and the quantum potential, Nuovo Cim., 52B, 15 (1979).
14 E.Warrrington and R.McCarthy, Category specific access dysphasia, Brain, 106, 85978 (1983).
15 K.H.Pribram, M.Nuwer and R.Baron, The holographic hypothesis of memory structure in brain function and perception, in R.C.Atkinson,
D.H.Krantz, R.C.Luce and P.Suppes (eds), Contemporary Developments in Mathematical Psychology, W.H.Freeman, San Francisco, 1974.
16 H.P.Stapp, S-matrix interpretation of quantum theory, Physics Review, D3, 1303 (1971).
17 G.F.Chew, The bootstrap idea and the foundations of quantum theory, in T.Bastin (ed.), Quantum Theory and Beyond, Cambridge University
Press, 1971.
18 R.L.DeValois and K.K.DeValois, Spatial vision, Ann. Rev. Psychol., 31, 30941 (1980).
19 D.Gabor, Theory of communication, J. Inst. Elec. Engrs., 93, 429 (1946).

26
Three holonomic approaches to the brain
Gordon G.Globus
University of California, Irvine
The relation between technology and thought has been penetratingly discussed by Bolter1. Technology shapes thought. Pottery, for example, was a
defining technology for the Greek philosophers. The potter holds an ideal image of the pot to be producedthe eidosand molds the clay accordingly
to produce an imperfect approximation of the ideal. Platos doctrine that ideal a priori forms are the true reality, which the manifest things of the world
but imperfectly realize, reflects this technology. The clock was a defining technology for pre-twentieth century physics. Thus Laplace conceived of the
entire universe as a mechanistic clockwork following completely deterministic Newtonian laws. Descartes thought of animals and La Mettrie included man
as clock-like. The contemporary Turings man, as Bolter calls us, takes the computer as defining technology and even conceives man in the image of the
computer. Similarly, the technological achievement of holographic image production, based on Gabors Nobel-Prize-winning work in microscopy
(reprinted in Stroke2), has played the role of defining technology for late-twentieth century holistic thinkers.
As applied to brain science, holography suggests this rough line of thought: The brain somehow produces images, constructs the perceptual world.
Maybe the brain produces these images something like the holographic system produces images. [Direct realists, of course, would deny that the brain
produces images (see, e.g. Gibson3,4 and Neisser5). For them the brain supports direct perceptions of the world without any mediating images. For some
difficulties with this view, see my discussion of methodological

solipsism6.] The holographic line of thought is a highly revolutionary notion (see, e.g. van Heerden7, Pribram8, Westlake9), since the ardent mainstream
belief wasand remainsthat the brain is a wet computer, a biological instantiation of a universal Turing machine. (In this mainstream belief we have the
brain scientist as Turings man.)
I want to carry forward this rough line of thought by considering two alternatives to the holographic model of brain functioning. I think alternatives are
worth considering: perhaps the defining technology of holography has held our imaginations captiveholography may be but one technological exemplar
of holonomic principlesand it might prove salutary to consider other possibilities, pursuant to the fundamental idea that the brain qua image-producing
system follows the law of the whole. So my strategy is broadly holonomic rather than narrowly holographic. This strategy roughly goes: The brain
somehow produces images. Maybe it follows holonomic principles in so doing.
I briefly summarize the main theme of what follows. In the holographic version of image-producing system the system is initially empty, like a tabula
rasa, and information is loaded in by input (through experience). This is a weak holonomy in that the enfolded wholethe implicate order
(Bohm10)is entirely derivative of input, not the primary reality. In a second strong version, the holonomic system initially is full with existence; there is
an a priori plenum of enfolded existentia that is the fundamental reality. In the third very strong version, the holonomic system is initially full with all
possible worlds; there is an a priori plenum of enfolded possibilia that is the fundamental reality. So for the three versions of brain functioning, the a
priori plenum is empty, full with existence, and full with possibility, respectively. I especially focus on the third version in what follows.

The originally empty plenum

We recall that in holography the apparatus is set up initially with blank photographic film. Order is then loaded into the blank film in a special way, such
that the whole order is (to use Bohms terminology) enfolded or implicated to each and every region of the film. Then when the developed film (the
hologram), or even a small piece of it, is illuminated in a certain wayvoil!out pops the original order (with loss of resolution and decrease in
window of observation as the piece gets small). So each point of the film becomes full when the holographic apparatus enfolds the whole order of some
object to the film, or enfolds the order of many objects to it, but initially the film is blank. Thus in taking holography as technological exemplar of
holonomic image-producing systems, the system must be considered initially empty, a kind of holonomic tabula rasa. The holographic brain retains
traditional roots.

Holographic theories of brain follow holography closely (see especially Pribram, Nuwer and Baron11). The essential idea is that the brain performs a
Fourier (or Fourier-like) transformation on input which enfolds the input order into the neural equivalent of the wave interference pattern recorded in the
hologram. In the case of perception the enfolded order is then processed in enfolded form. Finally, the order is unfolded by inverse Fourier transformation
into perceptual information. For this theory the perceptual system is an indelible tabula rasa, awaiting order to be loaded in along the world line of
experience.
I say this holographic version of holonomic image production by machine or brain is based on weak holonomy because the implicate order does not
have primacy, but is derived from the explicate order inputed to the system. As we shall see, the other two versions of holonomic image-producing
system give primacy to the implicate order, but for the holographic system the whole is not primary creator of images but is dependent on input.

The holoplenum of existentia

The existentially full system is best understood against the background of Bohms strong version of holonomy. (Bohms Wholeness and the Implicate
Order10 provides a profound and wide-ranging development of the holonomic paradigm.) He begins the last chapter by stating:
Throughout this book the central underlying theme has been the unbroken wholeness of the totality of existence as an undivided flowing
movement without bordersIn the implicate order the totality of existence is enfolded within each region of space (and time). So, whatever
part, element, or aspect we may abstract in thought, this still enfolds the whole and is therefore intrinsically related to the totality from which it
has been abstracted. Thus, wholeness permeates all that is being discussed, from the very outset, (p. 172, emphasis added)

Again, with regard to the interference pattern of the light that is present in each region of space:
In each such region, the movement of the light implicitly contains a vast range of distinctions of order and measure, appropriate to a whole
illuminated structure. Indeed, in principle, this structure extends over the whole universe and over the whole past, with implications for the
whole future, (p. 148)
Such movement of light waves is present everywhere and in principle enfolds the entire universe of space (and time) in each region (as
can be demonstrated in any such region by placing ones eye or a telescope there, which will unfold this (content), (p. 177)

So there is a plenum that contains existentia, the totality of what is. To emphasize that existentia are in enfolded form, I shall call this plenum the
holoplenum.
This existentially full holoplenum that enfolds the totality of existence is the primary reality for Bohm. Objects are secondary, derived by unfolding from
the enfolded totality. More precisely, there is a continuous movement of enfolding and unfolding. Bohm uses here the image of a turbulent mass of
vortices in a stream (p. 18). The flowing stream qua plenum creates, maintains, and ultimately dissolves the totality of vortex structures. (p. 19).
Similarly:
The things that appear to our senses are derivative forms and their true meaning can be seen only when we consider the plenum, in which
they are generated and sustained, and into which they must ultimately vanish, (p. 192)

So the totality of existence is primarily enfolded; and recurrent, stable and separable forms of existence are secondarily unfolded, like vortices in the
stream of total existence. The totality of reciprocal enfoldings and unfoldings is called by Bohm the holomovement or the holo-flux.
It should be noted that it is not the enfolding-unfolding process that gives rise to the implicate order carried in the holomovement. The enfoldingunfolding process has to do with world creation and nihilation, where the world is generated from and sustained by the holoplenum and ultimately vanishes
into the holoplenum. The implicate order in contrast arises from total existence, or better, the implicate order is total existence. So the fundamental reality
is the implicate order carried by the holomovement, and the explicate order is derivative of the implicate order. The fundamental case of real existence is
total interpenetration, complete convolution, which is the ground for everyday existentia, the ground that generates the ordinary world.
Bohms (briefly presented) discussion of the brain, seen against this background, expands the holographic model. (Bohm does not seem especially
concerned with the brain theory quoted just below, since it does not come up in his discussion of the enfolding-unfolding universe with Rene Weber12.
When Weber asks him about holographic brain theory at the start of the interview he advises her, You should really do an interview with Pribram for
that (p. 44). I think Bohms conjecture about the brain is not crucial to his larger theory.) The body, Bohm says, enfoldsin some sense the entire
material universe (p. 209).
Various energies such as light, sound, etc., are continually enfolding information in principle concerning the entire universe of matter into each
region of space. Through this process, such

information may of course enter our sense organs, go on through the nervous system to the brain. More deeply, all the matter in our bodies, from the
very first, enfolds the universe in some way. Is this enfolded structure, both of information and of matter (e.g. in the brain and nervous system), that which
primarily enters consciousness? (p. 197, emphasis added)
So there is information coming in through the senses as in holographic brain theory, but also, in a deeper sense, the entire universe is enfolded from the
very first. Thus, the brain is always already filled with the order of universal existence prior to input. The totality of existentia are a priori implicate to
brain matter.
What distinguishes Bohms suggestions about the brain in the final chapter of Wholeness and the Implicate Order10 from holographic brain theory is
the idea that the brain might directly unfold the existentia of the holoplenum from its own matter. Now, all matter in principle enfolds total existence for
Bohm; the brain is nothing special in this regard. But for Bohms conjecture to go through, there has to be a mechanism by which the brain, unlike the
stone, can unfold existentia from the holoplenum both brain and stone share. However, this would violate a basic principle of Bohms holonomy, for the
following reasons.
The fundamental law of unfolding lies within the holomovement. Out of the primordial holomovement, the perceptible world is continuously unfolded.
The holomovement has ontological primacy over the world in virtue of generating the world. (The things that appear to our sense are derivative forms and
their true meaning can be seen only when we consider the plenum (p. 192).) It is the holomovement itself that exclusively determines what is to be
unfolded. The world is hoist on the holomovement. But then, to give the power of unfolding to the brain would be to put the holonomic cart before the
horse. The brain is no more able to get at the information enfolded within each of its small regions than the rock is able to get at the same enfolded
orders. Unfolding is the sovereign province of the holo-movement, and not of the holomovements secondary derivatives, lest the ontological primacy of
the holomovement be sundered. Thus Bohm emphasizes that what is is the holomovement.
It is the implicate order that is autonomously active while, as indicated earlier, the explicate order flows out of a law of the implicate
order, so that it is secondary, derivative, and appropriate only in certain limited contexts. Or, to put it another way, the relationships
constituting the fundamental law are between the enfolded structures that interweave and inter-penetrate each other, throughout the whole of
space, rather than between the abstracted and separated forms that are manifest to the senses (and to our instruments), (p. 185, emphasis
added)

The fundamental law of unfolding is of the holomovement, not the abstracted and separated brain. It is the holomovement that is un folder and enfolder;
the world is unfolded and enfolded. Thus:

But then a worldly brain that has the power to unfold would be completely anomalous, tearing the fabric of the theory. So the brain cannot get at
information enfolded to its matter any more than a stone can, for if so the fundamental law of unfolding would be taken from the holomovement and given
to its derivatives.
Furthermore, the role of input to the system now becomes problematic. On the one hand, the inputs information is redundant, since the brains matter
always already enfolds the totality of existentia. (Or the holistic totality is irrelevant, since input tells existence specifically.) If inputs role is determinative
rather than informative on the other hand, i.e. if explicate input functionally selects from the totality enfolded to the brain matter, selects order for unfolding,
then the whole loses primacy with respect to the power to unfold, and holonomy is thereby severely weakened. A problem of levels also arises: the input
order is at the level of the system, whereas the implicate order is at the level of the systems components, yet these vastly disparate levels are supposed
to come together in consciousness. So Bohms conjecture regarding brain functioning does not seem to be viable.

The holoplenum of possibilia

We recall that in the first version of holonomic image-producing system the enfolded order was originally dependent on, derivative of, input. Holonomy
here is weak, in that the whole does not have primacy. The explicate order of input is more fundamental than the implicate order, which does not exist in
the absence of explicate input. In the second version, the enfolded order was a priori implicate. Here the enfolded whole does have primacy, but a
number of problems arise, as just discussed. For the third version (Globus13,6,14) the enfolded whole is neither primary nor secondary to explicate input,
but is ordinarily of complementary status to it. This third version of holonomic image-producing system will next be elaborated.
Enfolding and unfolding here become cooperative processes. The enfolding process that creates the holoplenum is non-specific; there are randomlygenerated waves of all frequencies, phases and amplitudes which are superposed. There results an interference pattern of infinite richness, all possibilities
of explicate order being enfolded to it

by random mechanisms. So the non-specific process generates a holoplenum of possibilia. The unfolding process, on the other hand, specifically selects
a possibility for actual explicate existence. Brain action thus includes a continuous indiscriminate generative process and simultaneously a discriminate
selection process. The selection process unfolds particular orders to explicate existence and the generative process provides all possibilities of enfoldment.
The enfolding process can be thought of as in a certain sense passive and the unfolding process as active. By passive I mean that the process has
no discrimination, no order, only blind random activity that generates the holoplenum of possibilia. The active process in contrast discriminates, selects
specifically. Ordinarily these processes are cooperative, but extraordinarily, as in meditation, the active selection process ceases operation, the unfolded
world accordingly collapses, and there remains the passive non-dual void, a holoplenum of possibilia.
Now I have argued above that the brain cannot unfold the existentia enfolded to its matter any more than a rock can, and by parity of argument the
same would hold true for possibilia. What we are to conceive instead is that the brain in its unsurpassed complexity generates its own holoplenum of
possibiliaa virtual holoworld of possible worlds. The holoplenum of possibilia is thus a system property. The brain matter might enfold a plenum, like
all matter, as Bohm says, but also, and uniquely, the brain system upholds, constitutes, generates its own plenum.
To unpack this idea, consider the immensely rich, continually fluctuating, electrochemical field in a small brain region. The natural mathematical
description of this field of fluctuating points utilizes complex numbers, treating the field as if a number of waves of different frequency, phase and amplitude
are interfering. This electrochemical field would be a function of spontaneously generated neural activity coursing through densely interconnected neural
networks, whose wiring logic is such as to create an electrochemical interference pattern of such richness that all possible world orders would be enfolded
to it. Whatever the brains matter enfolds (whether existentia, or even possibilia) at its highest level the brain generates its own plenum governed by the
law of the whole, a virtual holoworld of enfolded possible worlds.
At the same time that the brain continuously generates a holoworld, there is a holonomic mechanism for unfolding particular worlds from the holoworld.
The concept here is that the brain generates neural filters on input that are mathematically complex and continuously tunes these filters; that is, the battery
of complex filters on input is tuned, moment to moment, to pick up this or that. Thus the tuned filter on input physically realizes certain abstract
specifications or concepts, sets up abstract conditions of satisfaction. (On inten-

tionality and conditions of satisfaction, see Searle15.) On passing the suitably transformed input through such a complex filter, an instantaneous crosscorrelation is performed. (Holonomic systems are especially adept at instantaneously computing cross-correlation, auto-correlation and convolution (see
Stroke2).) When the abstract conditions of the filter are matched by abstract properties of the input fluxwhen reality satisfies the filter conditions as
indicated by the high correlationthose abstract conditions attain a special status, and specify unfoldings of particular worlds from the autonomously
generated holoworld. So enfolding and unfolding are cooperative, simultaneously generative of all possibilia and selective of particular existentia.
The reciprocity in the holographic system, rather than cooperation, is striking; there is a Fourier transformation that enfolds order to the hologram, and
inverse Fourier transformation unfolds that same order. Again, in Bohms several illustrations of ink drops in turning glycerin10, the glycerin is turned and
the ink drop is distributed to the whole medium; on reverse turning, the ink drop is unfolded out of the medium. In Bohms stream illustration, vortices are
created (unfolded) from the stream and dissolved (enfolded) into the stream. In all these illustrations, the dominating image is that of back-and-forthwithin-a-primary-whole. But these images do not fit the third version of holonomic image-producing system; that which is unfolded for this version is not
again enfolded. Instead all possibilities are continuously enfolded and one actuality is continuously unfolded. The passive principle governs enfoldment
and the active principle governs unfoldment. The brain indiscriminately generates a holoworld of all possible worlds and, based on the match between
the abstract specifications of its continuously-tuned holofilters on input and the abstract properties of the input flux, worlds are discriminately unfolded
from the holoworld.
The difference in conception between the holoplenums of existentia and possibilia is reflected also in the theory of mind (as applied to perception, in
the present discussion). For Bohm, both mind and matter are unfolded from a common higher-dimensional ground (p. 209). This is Spinozan in spirit,
the common ground providing a neutral monism (a nature beyond both) from which both mental and material aspects are unfolded.
The more comprehensive, deeper, and more inward actuality is neither mind nor body but rather a yet higher-dimensional actuality, which is
their common ground and which is of a nature beyond both. Each of these is then only a relatively independent sub-totality and it is implied
that this relative independence derives from the higher-dimensional ground in which mind and body are ultimately one (rather as we find that
the relative

independence of the manifest order derives from the ground of the implicate order), (p. 209, emphasis added)
For the holoplenum of possibilia version, in contrast, mind is not unfolded like matter, but mind is the very action of unfolding. In the case of
perception, mind is a process of selecting worlds from the holoworld constituted by autonomous processes. (Or we might say in phenomenological terms
that intentional action is selective unfolding.)
To summarize the third version of holonomic image-producing system, there are complementary neural processes at work under ordinary conditions.
The randomly functioning passive process continuously generates a neural holoplenum of possibilia, a holoworld of possible worlds, a plenum filled
indiscriminately. The discriminative process continuously selects the perceived world by unfolding from the holoworld. The two processes thus
complement each other in generating the world. The worlds status is accordingly derivative and is illusory (as in a kind of holonomic rendition of the
doctrine of maya). Under extraordinary conditions, in great contrast, the discriminate process ceases, and there remains the indiscriminate process that
generates the holoplenum of possibilia, a dynamic distinction less void that enfolds all possibilia.

Discussion
We have seen that the strong holonomy of Bohms conjecture regarding the brain runs into difficulty. The alternatives are either reversion to the weak
holonomy that looks to holography as defining technology or modification to a very strong holonomy with its holoplenum of possibilia. The alternative
weak and very strong versions are next considered with respect to the empirical findings of brain science. Since available data is not rich enough to
discriminate them, my discussion of this point is limited to the general prospect for holonomic brain functioning.
There is excellent evidence that the brain Fourier transforms input, which means that the brain has the capacity to deal with wave forms and follows, as
Pietsch16 says, a wavy logic, or what Yevick17 calls a Fourier logic. (For a review of this evidence, see Kent18 (4.I and 5.VI) and DeValois and
DeValois19.) The evidence suggests that:
The brain employs Fourier analysis in the domain of spatial frequencies in its analysis of visual input. Thus, visual exposure to a square wave
grating fatigues the brains ability to respond to odd harmonics of the square wave grating, even when these are subsequently presented
individually in the form of pure spatial sine wave gratings. Even harmonics are not affected. The only easy explanation of this is that the brain
processes the spatial

frequency components of the spatial square waves by some Fourier-like process which separates them into independent frequency channels. (Kent18, p.
114)
So the brain perceptual system is doing the right kind of thing if the brain is to be considered a holonomic system at a fundamental level.
It should be noted in this regard that the brain might compute a Fourier transform in the cumbersome serial fashion that the computer does. (Cf. the
Blackman and Tukey20 algorithm for calculating the fast Fourier transform.) But it is also conceivable11,18 that an instantaneous Fourier transform might be
gracefully accomplished, as in optical information-processing systems21. The available data is not rich enough to resolve this issue.
When we turn from the lower-level processing in the perceptual system to higher brain functions, such as conscious perception, there is even less data.
Higher brain functions remain a vast terra incognita for brain science. The mainstream has confidently assumed that the brain is a wet computer, a
biological instantiation of a universal Turing machine, and mainly ignored the alternative holonomic version put forward by Pribram8 and others. There has
been little felt sense of crisis about the brain model that takes the computer as technological exemplar, and accordingly little motivation to embrace
scientific revolution. As already mentioned, the computer is a defining technology1 for the contemporary Turings man. Turings man just shrugs off the
brilliant existential, essentially Heideggerian, critique of artificial intelligence by Dreyfus22, who argues in effect that computers cant do what Dasein does.
To summarize the empirical situation, in so far as we know, the data available is consistent with the brains functioning significantly at lower levels
according to holonomic principles (Fourier logic), in addition to or rather than functioning according to analytic principles (Boolean logic). The data is not
yet in with regard to higher levels of brain functioning. Holonomic speculations accordingly remain of heuristic value.
It must be admitted that holonomic theories of brain functioning sound implausible, and especially so for the a priori holoplenum of possibilia, but this
might be said of any revolutionary paradigm in relation to the consensus paradigm. There is, however, biological precedent for a priori theories.
As Jerne23 has discussed, an analogy can be drawn between the central nervous system and the immune system. (See also Conrad24, Young25 and
Edelman26.) The immune system is faced with the task of matching antibody to an infinite variety of antigen, including antigen produced technologically. It
was once thought that antigen somehow instructed the immune system to produce matching antibody, but it is now known that there is an a priori set of
antibody, and antigen

selects the best matching antibody for amplified production. There is a many-to-one mapping of antigen on to antibody such that a priori antibody covers
the entire a posteriori antigen domain. Thus the immune system, implausibly to traditional belief, continuously generates what I have called an a priori
plenum of possibilia. Jerne23 argues that there is a basic principle of biological nature at work here which is relevant to brain functioning. The a priori
holoplenum of possibilia embodies this principle.
There is another line of evidence that bears on the alternative versions of holonomic image-producing systems. (See Globus13 for a more extensive
discussion of this evidence.) It appears that under special circumstances (altered states of consciousness) human beings have the creative capacity to
constitute de novo perfectly authentic worlds in the absence of input, worlds which have never previously been experienced. If this is so, then the weak
version cannot account for it, since the world for this version is derived from input. The very strong version, in which all worlds are a priori implicate, is
consistent with this creative capacity, however; in altered states of consciousness novel worlds (Castanedas27 separate realities) might be unfolded from
the holoworld.
The special circumstances in which this creative capacity becomes manifested include both ordinary dreaming and extraordinary sorceric practices. In
the latter28,29, the sorceric adept has the waking ability to hurl himself or herself (or the disciple is hurled by the master sorcerers power) into the nagual,
where strange yet fully authentic worlds are constituted. For example, a well-timed shove by Don Juan pushes Carlitos from the tonal into the nagual,
and Carlitos immediately finds himself removed from an airline office to a marketplace miles away where there are some bizarre goings on29. In ordinary
dreaming, the same kind of authentic novelty occurs. We dream worlds we have never before seen, and the lucid dreamer can do so at will.
It is of course true, per Freud30, that the dream world somehow resembles past worlds, indeed specific past worlds pointed to by the dreamers free
associations. This led Freud to consider the dream world to be second-hand, a composition of memory traces of past experience. Since the second-hand
dream world is dependent on past input, this would be consistent with the holographic model. I have argued elsewhere31 however, that the resemblance
between the dream world and past waking worlds is entirely abstract, and not based on concrete memory traces. Concepts operative during various
waking experiences become simultaneously re-operative during dreaming, where the concepts generate their own fulfillments.
Another kind of evidence relevant to the alternative versions of holonomic image-producing system comes from the mystical tradition (the perennial
philosophy). (For a wider discussion of holonomy and mysticism, see the Weber interview of Bohm on the physicist and the

mystic12 and also my defense of Bohm against Wilber33.) It is clear that in the perennial philosophy the non-dual whole (the Godhead, Brahman) has
ontological primacy over existentia. The Godhead is an infinitely full plenum, the original source of all explicate existence. This is inconsistent with the
holographic version, where the plenum is originally empty, but consistent with the idea of the a priori holoplenum of possibilia.
To illustrate further, consider the succinct paradox formulated by Sri Ramana Maharshi (discussed by Wilber31 (p. 250)):
The world is illusory.
Only Brahman is real.
Brahman is the world.

Interpreted holographically, the illusory world is the world unfolded by the brain, a world that models the true reality (Brahman). But the claim that joins
the paradox (Brahman is the world) must remain paradoxical on the holographic interpretation, since a model is not the same as that modeled.
Interpreted according to very strong holonomy, the world is illusory in the sense that the primary reality (Brahman) is a holoworld from which the
world is secondarily derived by unfolding. That Brahman is the world is interpreted to mean that Brahman enfolds all possible worlds. Thus the paradox
is resolved: the true reality of brain is an a priori holoworld enfolding all possible worlds and from which particular illusory worlds are unfolded. When
unfolding actionwhich is tantamount to intentional actionceases, there remains the void of the holoplenum that enfolds all possibilities. The resolution
of the mystical paradox in terms of very strong holonomy, and that paradoxs persistence in terms of weak holonomy, supports the very strong version of
holonomic image-producing system.

Summary
Three versions of holonomic brain theory have been discussed. The first version11 takes holography as defining technology. Here the holoplenum is
originally empty, and loaded by explicate input, and accordingly holonomy is weak. The second version, based on a conjecture by Bohm10, has the
holoplenum originally full with existentia. This versions strong holonomy is flawed, since the explicate brain system is anomalous, having the power to
unfold what otherwise belongs to the holomovement. The third version13,14,32 finds the holoplenum originally full with possibilia. This version is supported
by consideration of altered states of consciousness and the perennial philosophy.

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27 C.Castaneda, Separate Realities, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1971.
28 C.Castaneda, Journey to Ixtlan, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1972.
29 C.Castaneda, Tales of Power, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1974.
30 S.Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams (trans. J.Strachey), The Hogarth Press, London, 1953 (1900).
31 K.Wilber, Reflections on the new-age paradigm: a conversation with Ken Wilber, in K.Wilber (ed.), The Holographic Paradigm and other
Paradoxes, Shambhala, Boulder, 1982.
32 G.Globus, Dream Life, Wake Life, State University of New York, New York, 1987.
33 G.Globus, Physics and mysticism: current controversies, Re Vision, 8, 4954 (1986).

27
Wholeness and dreaming
Montague Ullman, M.D.
It is a decade since my first encounter with David Bohm and his way of thinking about reality. My concern then, as now, is with the nature of our dreaming
experience. His views set up a certain resonance that subtly, but insistently, helped me move to a new way of looking at dreams. I say new because it
departs radically from the views I held as someone brought up in the psychoanalytic tradition. To mention one such radical departure, to which I will come
back later, I no longer look upon dreaming primarily as an individual matter. Rather, I see it as an adaptation concerned with the survival of the species
and only secondarily with the individual. I refer to this as the species-connectedness aspect of dreaming. In this presentation I will try to relate two aspects
of Bohms thought to dreaming; namely, the notion of unbroken wholeness and his concept of the implicate order.
Bohm postulates an underlying order, not directly knowable, but constituting the ground of all being, the implicate order1. Out of this a manifest order
arises. Through the way we perceive this manifest order we ourselves create a perceptual order, otherwise known as consensus reality or middle-order
reality2. As a result of long conditioning our perceptual order takes discreteness as the primary given, despite our ever-deepening understanding of field
interrelationships. Bohm suggests, and I think rightly so, that this approach to understanding the nature of reality has played an important role in fostering
the degree of alienation and fragmentation that now exists among the members of the human species.
Bohms contributions offer some leverage to set in motion a counter-force. What if we were to turn things upside down and emphasize connection and
wholeness instead of discreteness? And if each

of us were to re-examine the givens in our individual disciplines? Might the perceptual order we arrive at then move closer to the manifest order and, in so
doing, become more attuned to the implicate order? In what follows I will try to illustrate what I mean by reformulating a way of looking at our dreaming
existence.
There are two ways of knowing the world and our relationship to it. They are quite different and serve different needs of the organism. The first is the
way of scientific knowledge, with its down-to-earth counterpart, common sense. This is knowledge of the world as object. Its function is to separate,
compartmentalize, fragment, analyze the world into bits and pieces small enough for us to handle and use for our own ends. This mode of knowledge has
resulted in mastery but not wisdom. It is incomplete and therefore false. Despite the heroic proportions to which it has evolved it can no longer stand alone
as the measure of mans potential.
Whatever dreaming is, and we are far from understanding its true nature, it is a regular feature of the sleep phase of our existence. Properly
appreciated, our dream life can be seen as an example of a second mode of knowledge that stands, not in opposition to, but in a complementary
relationship to what we ordinarily regard as knowledge. I am referring to the aesthetic-creative approach to knowledge which is probably older than our
strivings for mastery. It seeks to create and maintain meaningful contact between men. It helps man to transcend himself and experience himself as part of
a larger whole. In the formulations of Andras Angyal3 it serves mans homonomous need, the need to connect with a larger supporting environment, just
as the mastery over objects serves his autonomous need, the need to maintain ones own boundaries. In its manifestations it is immediate, sensuous,
ineffable and infinite. It is the wave counterpart to the particulate notions of science. It serves mans need for unity, togetherness and harmony. When
scientific knowledge is developed in a one-sided way it results in the separation of subject and object and becomes divisive in character. When the
creative-aesthetic way of knowing is misapplied it results at best in the cult of an aesthetic lite, at worst in impractical arrangements. Regardless of which
mode is used, a poor fit between the mode of knowing and the context to which it is applied will result in misfiring and unintended consequences. We are
all familiar with the unintended ecological consequences of the indiscriminate application of the first mode of knowing and the misuse of art for political
purposes in the case of the second mode.
Our dreams relate to the aesthetic-creative mode and in that sense have something in common with art. The task of the artist is to enter into the life of
another human being and, working with the residual plasticity that exists, to come up with the most aesthetically pleasing result. The fund of knowledge in
the world has not increased objectively but the world has become a better place in which to live.

Before I examine this question of fit and context more specifically around the issue of dream consciousness I want to call attention to something we
often pay lip service to but fail to appreciate fully; namely, that we are all much less separate than we think we are. The preoccupation with separateness
has come about by the way our personal lives have been booby-trapped by the failures of history. We go about our daily tasks with a limited and often
expedient view of our connection to all other members of the human species. Were we to allow a truer vision of this underlying state of
interconnectedness we would be more inclined to remedy rather than increase the fragmentation and separateness among members of the human species
that has been our heritage and that we so blindly perpetuate.

Dreaming
Our dreams provide us with an accurate and reliable way of monitoring the mishaps and difficulties we experience in maintaining collaborative and
affective bonds with others. Throughout our lives we fight a war on two fronts. On the one hand are the personal assets and limitations shaped by our
unique life history that we bring to this issue of connectedness. On the other hand we are caught up in the mix of both supportive and destructive fallout
from the way our social institutions and arrangements relate to this issue.
The play of these forces provides the battleground that appears in our dreams. Failures and frustrations in maintaining positive bonds form the subject
matter of our dreams. It is as simple as that. It becomes more clear if we disengage from the way we have been taught to look at our dreams and review
them with freshness and curiosity. The little knowledge we have acquired, in its emphasis on the personal, has obscured the essence of what dreaming is
all about. If we were to take dreams seriously we would have at hand a reliable monitoring system that informs us in a precise way just where our unifying
trends were at. Few of us are fortunate enough to fulfill our creative, loving, relating needs in the course of our day. Our failures and shortcomings, as well
as our successes in these areas, are what we dream about.
Dreaming is an example of the sensuous, immediate, embracing mode of knowing that we spoke about earlier. Dreams are expressive, visionary and
ineffable. They lead us from the present to infinity without seeming to traverse either time or space.
Our dreams arise out of recent and remote feeling residues. That part of us which is linked to others through feeling is more real, more enduring and
more significant than other dimensions of our existence. It compels belief. It dissolves distance, creates unity and links us to the real world. This is the stuff
of reality. On the surface our dreams are a seemingly anarchic play of images that descend upon us uninvited. As metaphorical expositions, however,
these images reflect the

core of our being and the place we have made for ourselves in the world. I use the term descend advisedly because, for too long, we have been misled
into thinking that dream content ascends into consciousness from a primitive substratum of our personality. I believe the opposite to be the case.
We live our lives as fragmented individuals, seeking self-realization through our connections to a larger whole. By the feelings they generate and by the
information they contain, our dreams can further our effort to live in harmony with a universe of which we are only a very small part and to which we are
connected or disconnected by very small acts. Dreams come to us uninvited and unannounced. They involve us whether we want to be involved or not.
They are to be reckoned with, providing we allow ourselves to recognize their importance and do the work necessary to transform information mobilized
while dreaming into information useful to us in the waking state. Our waking mentality sometimes finds it difficult to encompass certain truths about
ourselves, about others and about society at large. When awake our need for security and concern with our discreteness some-times results in a
protective cocoon that obscures our vision. Dream work can prod us into facing issues a bit more honestly. Such work has a way of confronting us with
our blind spots and enhancing our capacity for involvement.
Dreams deal with facts, but facts of a most particular kind. They can be recognized later as facts, even though they are expressed in a strange language
that is borrowed from the realm of our visual experiences. This can best be illustrated by a simple analogy. If you were working with an array of colours
and wished to convey the impression they made to someone else and had the choice of describing them in words or presenting them visually, the
likelihood is that you would choose the visual form as the more effective. The dreamer is in much the same position. He deals with an array of feelings that
have not yet been clearly sorted out and that defy verbal expression. They do lend themselves to visual display where their source in life experience and
their connections can be seen at once. The visual metaphor is a most natural and effective mode of expression of feelings. For the dreamer the visual
metaphor is best suited to his need to say a great deal in the limited time available during active dreaming.
What is the agency that provides this unending source of unerringly apt visual presentations? I think that we honestly do not know the answer. It is easy
to gloss over our ignorance by attributing the source to some reified internal demon variously known as primary process, the unconscious or, simply, the
Id. The basic question has to do with the nature of the process involved in the selection and organization of the visual images with which we build the
content of our dream consciousness. If we look at this without allegiance to deeply embedded

theoretical biases we seem to be involved in a rather intriguing process. We bring together a selected array of bits and pieces of past data pertaining to our
lives. We rearrange these in a spatial and temporal ordering that bears no relationship to their original time-space frame of reference. The rearrangement
enables us to express precisely, dramatically and effectively the particular interplay of feelings mobilized by a current unresolved life situation.
Socially available images provide us with the special kinds of building blocks needed to capture and express one or another aspect of our subjective
life. It takes a rather high level of creative and organizational ability to tap our internal computer for the appropriate bits of information with which to
achieve this end and then to rearrange them in a way that can be used as emotional templates to highlight a current significant aspect of our life. In this
respect the powers displayed by our dreaming selves seem to exceed the scope of our waking faculties. The comparison is unfair, of course, since each is
supreme in its own domain. Each is a useful way of grasping different aspects of our existence. However, we do tend to pay more attention to the one
than to the other.
This view of dreams suggests that we are capable of looking deeply into the face of reality and of seeing mirrored in that face the most subtle and
poignant features of our struggle to transcend our personal, limited, self-contained, autonomous selves so as to be able to connect with, and be part of, a
larger unity. As someone once remarked, our eyes are the instruments that nature created in order to see itself. So may dreams be seen as an instrument
that enables us to view our human nature and the vicissitudes it has been subjected to in the course of our unique life history. In the interest of reaching out
toward a sense of unity each of us tunes our psyche to an exquisitely sensitive pitch in order to store and use what we have seen, heard and learned about
the world and our place in it. At night we draw upon this store and shape it to our immediate purposes. There is a level and range of creativity in our
dreams, which for some of us come out only at night, but for all of us are more discerningly honest at night.
This point of view is congruent with the basic phenomenologic aspects of dreaming. Put simply, these have to do with our ability, while dreaming, to
realign our waking view of ourselves and others to bring it more in line with the reality of our historical existence. Our dreams confront us with what is.
They offer us a deeper insight into the truth about ourselves.
This approach to knowledge gives us powerful tools with which to effect change and transformation. Any system, including a given personality system,
becomes more than it conceives itself to be when, in fact, it is shown to be more by the exposure and identification of these connecting channels to a larger
reality.

Dream work
What I should like to consider next are those features of dreaming that I have come to know and appreciate through the group dream work I have been
engaged in since the mid-1970s. A description of the process has been given elsewhere4. In brief, it consists of structuring a small group arrangement so
that it can be of maximum help to the dreamer without being intrusive. Eschewing the theoretical and technical strategies of formal therapy, its sole purpose
is to help the dreamer appreciate, to the extent of his own readiness and desire, all that the images can convey about the current emotional context of his
life. The members of the group are oriented to meeting the two basic needs of the dreamer. The first need is to feel safe. In order to feel free to share the
dream with others and to engage in the self-disclosure necessary, an atmosphere of trust and safety has to be generated. This is brought about in a number
of ways. The control of the process lies completely in the hands of the dreamer. No one in the group assumes the role of the therapist and the dreamer is
the final authority as to what in the dream fits into the context of his life. The process respects the dreamers privacy as well as his individuality. There is no
imposition of any a priori system of symbolic meanings so that there is respect for the dreamers ability to use any image in highly idiosyncratic ways.
Trust is further generated by the sharing that goes on at several different levels. In the course of ongoing dream work everyone, including the leader, has
the option of sharing a dream and, in due course, everyone becomes known to each other at this deeper level of communication.
The dreamer has another need which the group must fulfill; namely, to help him make discoveries about himself that are difficult for him to make alone.
Various strategies are pursued toward this end. The first involves the group members making the dream their own, projecting their own feelings and
thoughts into the images and thus creating a reservoir of possibilities in the hope that some may have meaning for the dreamer. At a later stage the group,
through its questions, helps the dreamer reconstruct the emotional climate that led to the dream. Then, working with the context thus elicited, they help the
dreamer build further bridges between the images in the dream and his life situation. The questions are put in an open-ended way that leaves the dreamer
free to deal with them in any manner he chooses. The dreamer is helped to contextualize the dream, i.e. to relate the imagery to those aspects of his life
and personality that they metaphorically point to. The group is functioning as a catalytic agent in trying to make explicit what is implicit in the imagery. The
reality captured in the dream is explicated into the waking mode through a social process that offers both support and stimulation to the dreamer. This
leads to significant and helpful readjustments in the perceptual

order. By sharing their own projection, the group adds to the mutuality of the process and deepens the feeling of safety and trust.

Dreaming and wholeness

Dreams offer an opportunity to set in motion a natural healing process, providing the dreamer has a supportive, stimulating and non-intrusive social milieu
in which to explore the connections between dream imagery and life context. The essence of this natural healing potential derives from the dreamers
ability, while dreaming, to produce imagery that reflects recently exposed areas of dis-connection with others or with himself. By this I mean that the
dreamer concerns himself with any ongoing events or experiences that, in significant ways, impinge on his felt sense of connectedness to others. Some
vulnerable area is touched off by a recent happening. This, in turn, sets off reverberations at different levels. It is the recent event that defines the issue to
be explored in the dream.
The quality of connectedness emerges clearly in the course of group dream work. In the presence of a safe atmosphere generated by the non-intrusive
nature of the process, social defenses melt away or, at any rate, dont interfere with the deep-level sharing and sense of communion that is generated.
Group members are able to respond at a feeling level to someone elses imagery. This is understandable in terms of sharing a similar social milieu, but it
may also point to a deeper way that imagery has of linking people together; something more akin to a shared aesthetic response.
While dreaming we affect a figure ground reversal. Awake and tied to the perceptual order we allow ourselves to see things in their discreteness. The
important part played by connectedness, Bohms notion of the unbroken wholeness, is like an insistent Greek chorus, dimly heard or not attended to at
all. The reversal that takes place while dreaming brings aspects of that unbroken wholeness, at least as it applies to our relationships with others, more
closely to our attention. We confront ourselves with the state of our connections, the strategies we use to undermine these connections and the social
pressures that place obstacles in the way of connections.
This ability to reflect the dreamers concern with the maintenance of connections has led me to the speculative notion that, while asleep and dreaming,
we engage with a much broader aspect of our human nature, one that goes beyond the concern of the individual. Group dream work discloses an agency
that works against fragmentation. Trust, communion and a sense of solidarity develops rapidly in a dream-sharing group. This concern with connections
links dreaming to a larger issue; namely, the survival of the species. There has been an unfortunate emotional fallout from the fragmentation of the human
race that has come about historically, that continues into the present

and to which we continue to contribute. It is as if, while dreaming, we are displaying this from our personal and immediate point of view. If unchecked this
fragmentation carries within it the seed for the potential destruction of the human species. Only through constructive and effective bonding can this
fragmentation be overcome and the species endure. It is in this sense that dreams may be looked upon as that part of our nature that is concerned with the
survival of the species. The individuals concern with the maintenance of his sense of connectedness to others is part of this larger concern; namely, that of
species-connectedness. The preservation of the individual is necessary, of course, for the preservation of the species but, while dreaming, we seem able to
transcend individual boundaries to move toward our place in a larger whole.
How do these considerations about dreaming enter more specifically into the constructs emphasized by Bohm? In a general and analogous way the
view of dreaming presented here is more intrinsically related to notions of inter-connectedness and unbroken wholeness than are dream theories
designating reified psychic entities at war with each other. Awake, we are mired in our own discreteness and, by the language we use, trapped by the
seeming discreteness of all else about us. Asleep and dreaming, we forsake linguistic categories as a primary mode of expression and risk feeling our way
back into an underlying connectedness. While dreaming we explore both internal and external hindrances to flow and unbroken wholeness.

Dreaming and the implicate order

The concept of the implicate order and the concept of other orders that follow from it provide us with some admittedly speculative ideas about the
relationship of dreaming to the question of species-connectedness. The implicate order represents in a sense an infinite information source. The manifest
order represents the way things are, free of perceptual and conceptual limitations and distortions. The perceptual order represents our limited grasp of the
manifest field and, in turn, our indirect tie to the implicate order. Might our dreaming experience, with its capacity to zero in on a more real or truthful
version of ourselves, be closer to the manifest order? Might it be, in effect, a bridge between the perceptual and the manifest order and be closer to the
natural transformation of the implicate into the explicate?
As Bohm points out we need a new language to talk about these transformational processes. Might the language of the dream, its direct sensory
approach as a way of expressing the nature of our existence at the moment, be closer to such a language than our reliance while awake on more abstract
ways of talking about our relation to the world? Might it be a way of bringing us back to our connection to

the manifest order? Our senses have the ability to bring us into direct contact with the manifest order but our personal and cultural conditioning have set up
a perceptual screen separating us from the manifest order. The language of the dream is unique in that it is expressed in a sensory mode primarily but
without any loss of our remarkable and creative abstract abilities. It is the language of the sensory (predominantly visual) metaphor. Dreaming may be a
way of monitoring our distance from the manifest order, from the reality behind the way we look at ourselves, at others and at the social order in which we
live our lives. When, awake, we invest the time and energy to retrieve the information in those images. We are, in effect, closing the gap between the
perceptual and the manifest orders. We come closer to the actuality of our historical existence and, in that way, free it of some of the perceptual and
conceptual distortions that have accrued to it.
When we realign an aspect of our perceptual order with its middle-order correlate, we are simply replaying this selected aspect of our life, using a
different operator. The result is strange and unfamiliar to the program we are immersed in while awake. What makes dream work rewarding is the
promise it holds for enriching that program through this exposure to the manifest order. It is as if our dreams have brought us closer to a deeper sense of
connectedness than comes through in the perceptual order.
Using these concepts the task becomes one of defining where the position of the dreamer is in relation to each of these three orders of reality. What has
been called condensation (the ability of a single image to have many references), for example, may be viewed as a superposition5 arising in an order not
directly comprehensible in the waking state. The ability of the dreamer to link past and present into a sense of the immediate present may also derive from
the more temporal and spatial fluidity that characterize these more basic orders. Imaging is therefore not simply a primitive mode. It is a necessary mode
of staying closer to manifest-order reality.
By bringing us closer to the manifest order our dreams may bring us closer to the mystery of the implicate order. It is interesting to further speculate
about this possible connection and the light it may shed on the nature of paranormal phenomenon. But that is another story.

References
1 D.Bohm, Wholeness and the Implicate Order, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1980.
2 A.Comfort, The implications of an implicate, J. Social Biol. Struct., 4. 36374 (1981).
3 A.Angyal, Foundations for a Science of Personality, The Commonwealth Fund, New York, 1941.

4 M.Ullman and N.Zimmerman, Working with Dreams, Delacorte/ Eleanor Friede , New York, 1979; reprinted J.P.Tarcher, Inc., Los Angeles, 1985.
5 A.Comfort, personal communication.

28
Vortices of thought in the implicate order and their release in meditation
and dialogue
David Shainberg, M.D.
According to Bohm1 there is an underlying order in the universe which he calls the implicate order. The universe is filled with energy and light and
electromagnetic waves travel throughout the whole of it. These waves are constantly crossing and interrelating with each other. As these waves each
encode information, their interweaving creates contrasts and connections that generate further information. Matter is also energy, encoded waves; it is the
same as the energy and it reflects it. All forms of matter-energy affect each other through their participation in the whole. The implicate order is
articulated in the movement of this energy which unfolds and enfolds information. The explicate order is what we see as form. Thus the flowing unfolds into
the explicate order which expresses the implicate which has unfolded what was enfolded in it.
In this new paradigm mind is implicated because it is an expression of the ordering implied in the whole. Mind is not in the brainit is enfolded over the
whole of matter. Consciousness and language, like will and attention, are movements of the whole, parts of the explicate reflecting that implicate. The
order is expressed in the fact that there are mindsand in the fact that these minds organize reality. It is also expressed by the fact that matter is. Its
existence is organization of energy. The unity of this order is displayed in the core processes we know as the relationship between mind and matter. Both
mind and matter are projections of a higher order of reality. Briggs and Peat2 write:
Thus as these energies enter consciousness through the sense organs, it is, in each instant, the whole which consciousness encounters, which
consciousness (and perception) isand

processes of the brain are a holographic imprint of the whole. Therefore both the order of consciousness and the order of matter, observer and observed,
are projections and expressions of the implicate order where the two are one and the same. Each is a mirror reflecting itself. Mind is a subtle form of
matter, matter is a grosser form of mind.
The essence of the implicate order is an enfolding and unfolding movement of the whole which Bohm calls the holomovement. It is happening in the
invisible movement that produces all forms in the universe and it is seen in the particular forms we see with our naked eye. There are trees and birds and
microorganisms, as well as millions of other forms. Bohm refers to these particular forms as relatively autonomous subtotalities. By this he means forms
that persist in themselves despite changes in their surroundings. But they continue to be in relationship to the greater order. Human consciousness and
language are relatively autonomous subtotalities, but we find that they also create fixed points in this universal forming which block further transformations.
We see the blocks in the inner conflicts of human beings and the difficulties of human relationship on both the personal and the group levels. As a result of
these fixations in consciousness, relationships between human beings dont seem to unfold or enfold in the manner that Bohms ideas of the implicate order
imply. Instead these points become like rocks around which the stream of life moves. By definition these fixations are part of the explicate as well as the
implicate order. Therefore we need to take a look at how such blocks relate to the essential movement that is supposedly characteristic of the implicate
order.
From the moment of its appearance on the earth, the human organism has a connection with the many different processes on the planet. Consider, for
example, the process of respiration. The lungs are structurally capable of taking in oxygen and excreting carbon dioxide. The hemoglobin molecule is able
to carry the oxygen molecule from the alveoli of the lungs to the muscle tissues. The oxygen that the lungs incorporate is produced by the photosynthetic
process of the plants, which make use in turn of the carbon dioxide the lungs excrete. When the oxygen taken in by the lungs reaches the muscle tissues in
the blood stream that carries the transformed hemoglobin molecule, the muscle tissue is able in turn to receive that substance and to incorporate it into the
adenine triphosphate molecule. That molecule is capable of operating in the Krebs cycle which will break down the glucose molecule, which in turn
transmits energy in a form that the protein actinomysin is capable of using in order to contract. The glucose has been obtained from the foodstuffs in the
environment. The contraction of muscles expresses and transforms the relationship of the organism with other material forms in the universe.

We could analyze many different systems in the human organism and other biological forms and find that they also are functioning in an integrative
network with what is outside the individual and with what is inside. The kidneys, for example, adjust the fluids in the body so that they can continue to
do their tasks in the brain and other organs. But they are also adjusting the fluids so that the balance of electrolytes is favorable for oxygen consumption
and muscle contraction. The kidney is a form that establishes its definition by what it does. What it does is relationship. In fact all the forms that appear in
our universe express relationships; their shape signifies a specific connection to others, and in their process they define their positiontheir meaning.
Griffin3 has written:
A thing in the basic sense is an occasion of experience. Each occasion of experience begins with a whole host of prehensions or feelings of
other things (previous occasions of experience). It creates itself out of this web of relations. Hence, the relation to other things is constitutive
of the very essence of a thing. Far from needing nothing but itself, it needs everything elseGod and the entire past universe. It pulls some
aspect of everything into itself as the raw material out of which it creates itself.

Form, which we distinguish as a separate object with our eye, is not an isolated definitive outlined thing which relates to other such objects. Its structure is
the active process, a structuating event, that is making a relationship to all other active processes. That seems like an obvious point, but I think we pass
over it much too quickly. We look at forms as the things we, the well-defined subjects, observe as if the thing is there in its pristine completeness; as if it is
only what we see, and when we dont see it it remains as we think of it until we return to see it again. In this process we lose sight of the fact that our
observations delineate only particular kinds of relationships and that we do not see the different levels in the relationships of any one thing to everything
else in the universe. When we delineate our level of observation we have found the meaning for us of the thing we see. That meaning fits our level of
perception. If we look at a tree under a microscope we find a whole different set of meanings. If the poet looks at the tree he finds a meaning that is
different from the wood-cutters meaning. Each form, however, is a complex set of processes, each of which is in connection to everything else in the
universe. The relationships to other things are expressed by the very nature of the form itself.
But when we come to the human brain we come upon a more mysterious and complicated occasion of experience. As a thing it is a set of
relationships. But it is also a process of making more relationships. It is part of the human organism but its part is specifically to make connections to all the
other parts as well as all other aspects of the

universe. For example, when the brain registers a perception of a tree the neurological impulses are the result of the interrelationship between the energies
of the tree that have become matter and the energies that have become matter in the form of the structure of the brain. There is a compatibility in those
processes and forms so that the brain can register the response. It displays the nature of what it is when it registers perceptions and forms an image of tree
which it compares to other images that it has labelled as tree.
When we register that we have seen a tree that image has been assembled out of the several different responses; the proprioceptive resonance with
another standing object, the sensations of vision, touch, smell, taste and hearing in the wind. We repeatedly have these same sensations when we are in the
arena of the energy that is arranged as a tree. The form of the tree stays the same thru storms, changes of season, and it often regrows after its destruction
by fire. We see it again and again in the same place so we assume that what we are seeing is really there and then we share these sensations with others
who seem to have similar images. When we see the tree again we remember the previous response. So the responding process seems to have stayed the
same, despite the fact that we have had many different experiences. We assume then that we are a continuous being, a capacity to respond, which we
think of as our self. This self we feel to be in connection with the other continuous forms like the tree.
This brain also connects different images that appear out of memory. It creates images such as paintings or books which it projects into the world in
material forms which other brains respond to. The response of others to forms that are projected by our brain demonstrates that other brains make similar
connections. This adds to the sense that we share a communal reality with other brains.
While the lungs and other such tissues are forms of relating like the brain, they are more specific in their kind of connection to the rest of the body and
the universe. The lung tissue, for example, organizes to perform a definite task, the transport of oxygen and the excretion of carbon dioxide. We might say
that we change our ways of breathing, fast, slow, depending on the needs of the tissues for oxygen, but breathing has a well-defined kind of relationship in
the reality of physiological process. The brain, however, does something different from other organs when it connects different perceptions and when it
sets up new realities; while using the repetitive neuronal mechanism it uses those repetitions to make relationships between many different forms. It is
responsive both to the relationship between its own memories and its creations and to the relationships between those creations and perceptions. It is the
active process by which the organism is known to be an extended relationship beyond its contiguous boundaries.
These extended relationships of the human organism, along with its flexibility, make it capable of participating in the flow of ordering that

seems to reach beyond the defined states of much of the explicate order. As a structure it is light energy, like all other forms in the universe. As light
energy it interacts with and is responsive to the emanating light energy of other forms. It is like a photographic plate, responsive to the ambient light in the
universe; its process also involves a transmission of its own waves of energy which interact both with what it interacts with and within its own energy
system. The movement of the brain unfolds these new connections in a reality that is greater than itself and enfolds others back into their place in a
memory where there is a hierarchy of relationships as well.
Despite the apparent flexibility in the brain and nervous system of human beings we find, however, that there are numerous conflicts in human beings.
These conflicts raise the question as to whether there is something about the human brain which creates blocks in the flow of ordering that is inherent in the
implicate order. Certainly human beings are not alone in nature in showing conflict. Trees fight for space and light, animals kill each other over territory,
weeds suffocate other plants. Yet, there appears to be a balance in the system. Perhaps the conflicts that we note in human beings and between human
beings are the same sort of process. But in our case at least two factors are different. First, we are aware of these conflicts and engage in various activities
which would appear to want to reduce them, although these activities could in a wider perspective be seen to be part of the same overall movement of
nature where organisms in conflict find cooperative connections in response to their difficulties as well as more violent ones. But the second factor is that
we have developed the capacity to extinguish our species and perhaps the planet itself. This makes our conflict more ominous and spurs us on to try to
understand how conflict happens and how we can find more adequate solutions to our situation. We know that numerous species have not survived in the
course of evolution because they were unable to integrate in a changing environment4. But the new question of our species is whether we can live through
the environmental changes brought on by our own thought.
The obstructions in human process seem to be part of the basic problems that our thought creates. Thought is at the core of our response in reality and
out of those thoughts come all kinds of further ramifications. For example, the responses and recognitions of the brain are often stored in memory. When
we meet a new situation we usually take that part of it we perceive and make a quick test to see which category in memory it fits. Then we project that
old model on the present to see if it is indeed the same kind of experience. Comparing and adjusting the two models, consciousness arrives at its image of
the new situation and then checks that image against the image in memory of how similar such situations have been met in the past.
This basic process of consciousness is a moderately flexible response

to new moments. But built into its structure is a less flexible feature; it becomes fixed on ideas or images of good situations that have occurred in its
experiences. It then attempts to replay them in the present because they worked (gave pleasure) in the past. A perception is compared to the memory but
the perception is not given the weight of past experience because the latter is more comfortable, fits into whole systems of concepts, or has a program of
action which we know and do not want to change. In a human relationship we might meet someone who reminds us of someone in our past and we
instantly assume that this someone is exactly like the other and we react to him as if he were exactly like him. Thus when consciousness meets new
situations and checks with memory for help in defining the nature of the new situation, it often depends more on memory for determining what is in front of
it than it does on the perception of reality.
This tendency to live in terms of memory is most serious in human beings whose life since childhood has been tense and conflicted, and who have not
been able to integrate the uncertainties of their reality. These people continue to focus on an image that once in childhood they were completely satisfied
and filled. This may be a memory from the earliest days when as infants they were without language and were primarily sensory motor organisms. Perhaps
they knew a feeling of bliss in the state of physical closeness to their mother in which they were merged with her in a symbiotic oneness. Then when they
come into their daily life and realize its imperfections, trials and uncertainties they are driven by the desire to recover that fulfilment they had when they
were infants. To secure that security they have in their minds they will do whatever is necessary. They will kill, steal, build nuclear weapons, try to
accumulate as much money as possible in order to assure themselves of what they think will be security. Operating in that way consciousness becomes a
block to the unfolding-enfolding movement of the brain that connects the explicate order to the implicate.
While thoughts, images and feelings are processes which connect things in the movement of relationship, they can also fix the relationships into specific
old forms. In this they seem to be doing what nature does when it repeats itself by making the same form over and over. It makes many trees, many dogs,
many insects and many human beings. It makes many different individual varieties of those species. The implicate order seems to unfold templates which
are as uniquely different as trees and humans but these templates are unfolded into the explicate order in a repetitive way. The fixation into repetitive
behavior that is characteristic of human beings is part of what we might think of as the form of repetition in nature. We observe that the repetition forms
in consciousness when it consistently meets the present with the past. Whether it is in the form of repeating an old relationship or attempting to obtain the
goal of a particular desire,

consciousness uses the same mechanism to engage the present. And that mechanism is itself a repetition of a past event. So, at many levels, and among
them human consciousness, nature is expressing the form of repetition.
When compared to the uncertainty of the present and all that might unfold from a spontaneous response, these events of consciousness appear to be
quite conservative. The basic uncertainty of life calls for a brain to respond, but the brain seems to prefer the security of its old plans and programs. The
explicate formthe memory imagebecomes a nodal point which demands that a new situation becomes like an old one. In the case of our daily activity
and the necessities of conducting our life this is an extremely useful function, but in our human relationship it seems to be an obstruction.
Human relationships are a new form of process in evolution because they bring together two or more of the potentially most flexible processes in
nature. The human brain is able to move beyond the repetitious structure of nature into novel interactions in which new events occur. At those moments
the way of nature is extended, for the human process involves a relationship to what is greater than the isolated units of self that consciousness had
previously defined. But when a particular thought or focus in consciousness dominates a persons behavior, this flow in human relationship is inhibited.
Such foci force relating processes into a vortex by insisting that the movement of relationship stay in its orbit. Look at the nuclear arms race as such a
vortex arising out of the greed of human beings who are isolated in their separate selves and do not feel the connection to other human beings. In their
isolation they are also feeling a peculiar emptiness and they become greedy for everything they can get to fill themselves. Hence nuclear industries
proliferate because they provide large amounts of money and the greed is so extensive that such people do not care about the ways they obtain their
money or what might happen from their actions5.
The matrix of thoughts creates a focus around which there are relationships that form a vortex and make up a fragmented subsystem, a relatively
autonomous subtotality which, in contrast to other subtotalities, brings about conflict with the larger whole. The vortex fragments off from the movement
that is occurring in the other aspects of the universe. It is not receptive to information from those aspects. The fixed ideas organize the relationships in the
present and bring about a system of relationships that keep the vortex operating in a way which, to some extent, separates the system from the larger
whole. A particular way of relating to other human beings does not separate the human being from his organic connections to oxygen and carbon dioxide,
but it may curtail his capacity to share the symbolic communications with the rest of the world. For instance, professional groups who do not recognize
they are part of the whole human

enterprise are cut off from their connection to the creative process that comes with their relationship to what is beyond themselves.
In this response of the brain it repeatedly unfolds a form which restricts the movement in the implicate. But why doesnt this restriction get
communicated back to the brain and why doesnt the brain respond to the disorder between itself and the ordering of the implicate? We might guess that
if this form were connected with the flow of the implicate its characteristics would be transformed by the integration with that flow and the block would be
released and more open relationships would unfold. But that doesnt happen with much regularity. More often than not the form maintains itself and there
is no action by the brain to create a more harmonious relationship with reality. Apparently the agreement brought about by this subsystem has provided
pleasure and security which is communicated to the brain as more satisfactory than the alternatives memory promises beyond the repetition of these safety
measures. Despite psychological conflicts or psychosomatic illnesses the security in the repetition is read as preferable to any change.
To gain some purchase on this difficulty, consider the development of the human child. He is faced with a wide range of responses in his newlydeveloping nervous systems; often he has difficulty in bringing them together in adequate relationship to each other and to the other forms in the world.
Unless he is exposed to the process of interaction in which these responses are sifted out, his nervous system does not develop properly6. If his mother is
respectful of her own participation in the flow of such responsiveness he develops a capacity for that kind of ordering in himself. If, however, the mother,
as so often happens, is caught up in some fixed form herself, his vitality throws her into anxiety by demanding that she face every new situation. He isnt
yet caught up in repeating the remembered forms and is able to respond in a more flexible manner. His aliveness expresses the essence of the unfoldingenfolding order, but at the same time he is faced with the mothers encouragement toward a more focussed organized form. In a sense she is a welcome
assistance as it provides him with an aid in ordering. But if she makes it seem that such a focus will protect him from the uncertainty that she finds in the
implicate order, and which she thinks everyone needs to be protected from, she blocks his participation in that larger order.
As part of his organization in reality every child comes to his own focussing7. Indeed he naturally forms a self, a center, which focusses his relationships.
But that focus naturally dissolves when each ordered condition opens new relationships to other foci around him. That changing moving process of relating
is after all the essential insecurity of human existence. The self is then a relatively autonomous subtotality that unfolds in the implicate and is displayed in the
explicate, only to be dissolved again into the implicate. The childs brain

is another subtotality and the responses that flow thru it are part of the explicate order as well. The thoughts and images construct the self but, as we have
said, that flow of responses in the brain includes the seductive offering which comes with the promises of security in the repetitions of memory and the
mothers support for his identifying with some fixed way of living. The propaganda of consciousness seems to be that if he chooses one identity, one self,
one set of plans for how to be in the world, he might find security and pleasure. Under the influence of the mother, the child takes up with the offering and
assumes that the self will be a haven of security from the insecurity which is inherent in the implicate order movement.
Many people describe the fact that during the early phases of their life, when their mothers could not understand their flowing responsiveness, they felt
alone and isolated and thought the world a hostile place. The anxiety of their mother made them feel that something was wrong with their responding and
therefore something was wrong with their self. As a result of that inner feeling in their life they could not develop a well-grounded faith in their own
capacity to respond spontaneously to the world, moment to moment. Meanwhile they observed that if they acted in certain ways, their mother responded
to them in ways that made them feel better. Although they knew they could not trust their mother to comprehend their essential being they found that if
they acted in these ways the anxiety would, at least, be lessened. The forms of behavior which pleased the mother and others in their family became an
image in their mind for how to find what little solace they could in a world that was not geared to the appreciation of the flow that their brain expressed.
They dedicated their lives to the realization of this state of being which promised, if achieved, to give a measure of relief from their uncertainty8.
The dedication to the achievement of that image fixes a persons relationship in the explicate order and in some sense curtails his flow in the implicate
order. This fixation occurs in the explicate order when genetic programming repeats itself in the formation of trees, turtles, or whatever organism. But most
such fixations maintain a balance with the whole movement of the implicate order and its connections. Operating in that fixation, however, the human being
will assume that he is a perfect lover or a great writer. But paradoxically he feels he should be doing certain things so he can prove that he is what he
assumes that he is. And he expects other people to treat him according to that image. He is no longer open to the flow of whatever new connections
appear. Instead he has definite ideas of what he needs to do for his life to be perfect. When those ideas fail to achieve the predicted results there are
intrapsychic repercussions in which self-hate and self-contempt are his main thoughts. As he thinks that he is already in a state of being equivalent to the
image, he is enraged at any evidence that he is not. For example, one man felt that he was a

gifted writer and that he could write a good paper with only a first draft. When he found that his first drafts were not what he wished he would become
enraged at himself and say he was an idiot. Clearly he assumed that he was, in fact, that brilliant person who could write a perfect first draft because
otherwise he would not have been humiliated by the difficulties of the writing. He was not interested in learning different ways of working on his writing.
Nor was he interested to know why he did not communicate with his audiences. When he received a rejection of a manuscript he railed at the editors
because they could not understand that his work was profound. He focussed on the limitations of the editors and what he was entitled to from them.
So the life process of people caught in such an image is a circular form that operates inside its own criteria and does not connect with the elements of
the reality outside of its defined fragment. In this form the human being is an explicate focus and the relationships that occur in the carrying out of the
program of this focus create a vortex between the explicate and the implicate ordering.
What is most astounding in this image process is the way the individual commits himself completely to the virtues of thought. Moreover, in much of his
other cognitive operations he not only gives great weight to his thoughts, he believes the thinking process to be the central reality. When he names and
describes something he feels that he has grasped its essence. He has more respect for what he organizes in thought or what thought offers him than for his
direct sensations. The repetitive use of thought acts like a rock in a stream. The vortex is formed as a result of forces exercised by the form of repetition in
consciousness. The pull to repeat the desirable memories draws all other relating processes of the implicate order into the orbit of the explicate focus. The
man who is absorbed by the fixation of his image responds to those aspects of reality which will enable him to execute that image.
But individuals who are caught in the repetitive process that makes a vortex do occasionally become aware that their fragmented condition is
inadequately related to the greater whole of the implicate order. Responding to the contrast between the constriction of their prison and the flows of
enfolding and unfolding that they find in some relationships with other human beings, or in art or nature, they are stimulated to try to find more freedom.
Some seek this freedom in perverse behavior. Generally in perverse states relationships are less well-defined and offer different connections from the
images programs. They also offer a diversity of form that moves more freely than the image with less which is bounded. They do not have the necessity
that their images had and they feel that they can move into realms that are not controlled by thought. In that form their fixation on one image is dissolved
when their behavior opens into relationships of a

more formless nature. Such perverse states are sought after and found through the use of drugs, sex of certain kinds, masochistic practices, alcoholism,
and other perversions.
When we talk to people who have acted perversely we often find that they feel their life has not been what it should be. They felt trapped in a vortex
which was based on the premise that their image would give them certainty and security. But the contradiction between their attempt to realize a fixed
image of what life should be and the movement of the implicate order created a deep strain at the core of their being. They wanted to be relieved of that
strain.
In the perverse state they feel that they have achieved an image of a state that they had projected as a relief from the strain. That image they have had in
their memory as a wonderful way to be and the relationships projected by that image promised them the recreation of the time when they were infants and
felt organized in their merger with their mothers in a kind of connecting that obliterated all separations, differentiations and tensions of being. The goal of
the perversion was to bring them back into the state of being which once existed before they became fixated in the vortex created by the self and its
images. Whereas they had some glimpse of moving into a freer realm in which they would be able to flow, in the sense of the implicate order, into many
different relationships, they are actually caught in another image and another vortex.
People who use perversion to deal with the dilemma of the vortices of thought are forced to keep repeating the same behavior again and again. They
have to keep repeating their efforts to relieve themselves of the tension because they do not understand the image-making process and the way they are
still cutting themselves off from the enfolding and unfolding of the larger order.
Sometimes, however, the people who are trapped in the necessities of realizing their image understand the wider implications of their narrowed frame of
mind. They know that they are fragments that have broken off from a relationship to something larger. They sense that their actions are always getting
caught up in the image process and that they must somehow find a way to change the situation, but that it must be a way that doesnt get caught in the
tangle of their own doing. They see that the fixation must be dissolved or they must be transformed by something that is larger than their self.
Some people will take a trip to the seashore, others to the mountains or to some other natural setting that enables them to see the difference between
their fixation in the vortex and the flow of movement in nature. For people who live in cities, where the buildings and houses are all man-made and
permanent, nature offers a contact with change and variety of movement that is more flexible and clearly flowing than is the explicate in the city. In the city
the lines are mostly vertical and horizontal, while in nature there are curves, diagonals and other

unusual shapes. In nature there is a direct sense of the cycles of organic growth: the flowers bloom; leaves change color and come out again in the spring;
fish move in the pond; the variety of living processes shows the diversity of form in nature and the continual movement of its producing of forms.
There are many different ways in which human beings sense the limitations of their thought and manage to find connections to the implicate order
beyond, but here I want to focus on two processes which seem to me to point at some of the essential ways the fixation in the vortex of the explicate in
human relationship moves to the openness of relating that is possible in the implicate. These two activities are models for how that process works.
Perhaps a person has experienced moments when his mind was quiet. Perhaps he has been with another person in a particular way and knows that
quiet of connection. Perhaps he reads a book about the ways to quiet his mind, but in one way or another he gets a whiff of the knowledge that he is
trapped and that there may be a way to get beyond these limitations. Perhaps encouraged by someone who seems to him to be free, or as a result of
other influences, he decides to start watching his thoughts. There are many ways to do this in various techniques of meditation. As a model consider zazen,
Zen meditation.
In Zen meditation a person is told to watch his breath with his thought9. Attentive to that breathing, he is not trapped by thoughts or the vortex around
them because the thinking just keeps coming and going and there is a flow of observations which seem to come without his holding to his self as the
observer. In the midst of this insight a person finds that a quiet acceptance comes over him. He knows somehow, without being a he that knows, that the
responses of thoughts, feelings, breathing are all that he has thought of as himself and that they are his self so much as the happening that is a continual
event in nature. They simply appear. His body itself seems to appear continually as energy turned into matter which will disintegrate back into energy
(nothingness) so he knows he isnt his body. It is a mass, a presence in an unfolded order; the responses seem to originate in the domain of that order
which is not graspable by any thought or image because they are all in a different realm. Yet they too seem to be part of that larger order, which we would
call the implicate order. He feels that he is some-thing that has been enfolded into the implicate order as part of the vast energy domain and has unfolded
as a material form which is the explicate relationships he perceives. But then he knows too that his perception of thingness and the conceptualization of his
self as enfolded-unfolded is itself part of the explicate order and he suspects any of his attempts at formulation. In the totality of his events in meditation the
meditator breaks out of the fixations that had been

happening within his thought and knows his relationship to the implicate order.
As he watches what happened with his breath the meditator is also becoming more aware that his thought process is quite fragmented and that it
develops first one theme and then another and another. It creates scenarios with causes and effects and identifies with images of self that are agents of self
in these scenarios. He sees too that, as these thoughts appear, there is a basic identity of the observer and he thinks of himself as this observer and that
observer owns all the thoughts and feelings he observes. But then he wonders; if all of these thoughts come and go, seemingly without his thinking them,
what is this thought that he is the observer? Is that not just another thing that is coming and going? If that thought is also a coming and going thought, who
is he? Just another phenomenon playing across his brain? As he watches, indeed the observer appears to be just that, a thing, a conception, that is
repeated from moment to moment and without that he is nothing. As that insight hits the meditator he sees too that his breathing goes on without his
doing or thinking anything. It is a direct responsiveness in the world. It is.
Dogen-zenji became interested in Buddhism as a boy as he watched the smoke from an incense stick burning by his dead mothers body, and
he felt the evanescence of our life. This feeling grew within him and finally resulted in his attainment of enlightenment and the development of
his deep philosophy. When he saw the smoke from the incense stick and felt the evanescence of life, he felt very lonely. But that lonely
feeling became stronger and stronger, and flowered into enlightenment when he was twenty-eight years old. And at the moment of
enlightenment he exclaimed, There is no body and no mind! When he said no body and no mind, all his being in that moment became a
flashing into the vast phenomenal world, a flashing which included everything, which covered everything, and which had immense quality in it;
all the phenomenal world was included within it, an absolute independent existence. That was his enlightenment. Starting from the lonely
feeling of the evanescence of life, he attained the powerful experience of the quality of his being. He said I have dropped off mind and
body. Because you think you have body or mind, you have lonely feelings, but when you realize that everything is just a flashing into the vast
universe, you become very strong, and your existence becomes very meaningful. This was Dogens enlightenment, and this is our practice.
(Reference 9, page 103.)

When human beings come together they have the opportunity for a group meditation on the way their common consciousness creates restrictions on their
movements in the implicate order. All of them are

in the implicate order and appearing as explicate phenomena inasmuch as they are identified with their individual selves. As they are together they can see
this flow of the unfolding of the forms as it manifests in their individual being. Often, however, when individuals come together in a group they try to justify
their identities and they repeat themselves endlessly; they want the other to know who and what they are. They express and defend the opinions with
which they came into the encounter. They often dont allow for those fixed positions to dissolve and therefore they do not allow for a mutual experiencing
which might occur if they were to share with others what they experience in their presence. The vitality in human relationship is drained of its dramatic
presence and it becomes a dulled encounter in which the talk is meaningless drivel given over to continuing in the vortex of relationships which the fixed
images have created.
In a true dialogue between people, however, a different ambience pertains. A true dialogue promotes trust between people. Where there is trust the
individuals are more willing to see the frozen condition of the relationships imposed by the conditions of thought. The members of a true dialogue pay
attention to this fixation and its vortex and are aware of the limitations it imposes on the group communion. Their dialogue seems to have originated in
some awareness of the limits imposed by these kinds of restriction on the relationship in the implicate order. So the members of the dialogue discover that
their commitment is attentiveness to what consciousness is, rather than an attempt to continue the forms into which they have lapsed. As they are together
they find that the other people in their group dialogue are examples of what it means to be a human being like themselves. All of them have come into the
dialogue because they sensed that they are trapped in a self-orientation and suspect that being with another who is equally caught up will give them a
chance to see into self-deception. This face-off shows each person the fixation in the self that is characteristic of thought and consciousness in all of them.
If they are all thinking of themselves as separate others, they are also not different in that they are all doing that. Then they can all become aware that the
particular opinions of each are focusses of relationship and as focusses they are organizing forces, but if those foci become fixation points they have
blocked the contact between individuals and therefore prevented the group as a whole from knowing its relationship to the larger order in which humanity
participates.
When one person holds that his perspective is the only one, he reflects the way another person thinks that he too holds the special perspective on
reality. In a discussion where people reveal their beliefs that they each have the absolutely correct perspective there is a unique opportunity to discover the
nature of the process in which such conviction takes place. Of course such a group could freeze into the opposition between opinions, but in a dialogue
group, where people

are attending to the movement of thought, it is possible to see how the certainty comes into being and get a glimpse of the rigidity in such frozen points.
With that the group begins to expand its awareness and to look at how consciousness narrows down on particular structures and loses sight of how the
foci emerge.
When the dialogue partners see that thought gets into a frozen state the insight dissolves the state and the oscillation around the vortex stops. Then they
talk more freely in discussion with each other, sharing and connecting in their relationships in a more vivid way; they relate in the freer way that ordering in
the implicate order offers. In one instance one member of the group was expressing how deeply he felt that all relationships were lacking something. He
said that he always felt that any two people are locked into their particular content and perspective. But as he talked about this he noticeably loosened up
and started smiling. He said that he had, as he talked, begun to feel that a connection was established with the group and that there was no lack in that
moment. He said he knew that we all came out of the same perceptive events, the same window, and that made him aware of how he had become stuck
in his ideas about each person only being his particular content. He somehow knew better about the way in which all of our perspectives were generated
and connected to our common generativity. At that moment the dialogue fell into a flowing discussion in which there was a juxtaposition of different views.
Each individual could see that his ideas were but one perspective on the whole of any process. Each person knew that his perceptual activity was the
movement which made a reality at every moment. We shared images, feelings and other not-quite-formed views and, as we tossed around some of the
different ramifications of these images and feelings, new connections and references came forth. The discussion moved from talk about particulars to more
general and even cosmic relationships and then circled back to the particular in an ever-widening circle of connections that linked to our personal past,
present and future, as well as to the past, present and future of humankind.
In that movement of the implicate in the dialogue, each individual discovers his connections to the other people in the group and to other human beings
in general. More accurately put, we should say that the dialogue is an active connecting in which relationships are made and dissolved, and remade again
in new forms each second. Then the person in the dialogue feels that being together with the group is a harmonious process and often begins to think of
how he could also be in other places in his life in a similar manner if he would but pay attention to the blocks that occur in thought. Some-times one person
reminds another of himself in a more exciting way; this time the reminding is a resonance or a knowing that he is part of the movement of the one
consciousness he shares with everyone in the group. He discovers that he shares images and feelings that the

other is having but is not talking about and that shows him that he is registering responses of other people that the other people may not have articulated to
him. Perhaps they dont even realize they are having such feelings until he speaks of them. But from this resonating he senses their connection in an
ambient movement which is finding forms they share in making. They know they are people who make connection to all parts of the explicate order and,
as people who connect, they are part of the implicate order as well. The dialogue is a dramatic example of the way human life expresses the unfolding of
the implicate order into explicate forms. From the perspective of a brain scientist, Mackay writes10:
Perhaps the most characteristic conscious human activity is that reciprocal interaction with others which we call dialogue. I am not now
referring to the non-committal alternating monologue that sometimes passes for dialogue in our sophisticated society, but the deep-going
relationship of mutual vulnerability through which another in a special way becomes Thou to me and I to him. The distinction between the
two seems to have an illuminating parallel at the level of information-flow analysis. As long as someone communicating with another is able to
shield his own evaluative system from the address of the other, he can in principle treat the other as an object, a manipulandum, open in
principle to full scientific specification like another physical object. Once the barriers to fully reciprocal communication are down, however, a
specially interesting configuration becomes possible, in which the information-flow structure that constitutes each supervisory system
interpenetrates the other, and the lines of flow from each return by way of the other, so that the two become one system for purposes of
causal analysis.
In this relationship, each conscious agent becomes indeterminate for the otheras well as for himself. Each is mysterious to the other, not
merely in the weak sense that the other cannot gain the necessary completely determining information, but in the strong sense that no such
information exists, either for him or for his interlocutor, until after the event. There are interaction terms, as a physicist would say, in the
joint state-equation, which prevent it from a uniquely determinate solution for either, even if the physical systems concerned were as
mechanistic as pre-Heisenberg physics pictured them.

One of the central features of dialogue is that it makes apparent that discussion between human beings is an important part of the natural order of life on
earth. Human response and articulation of that response, feedback of reactions to that response and the clarifying of the relationships between different
responses, are the way human beings participate in the flow of the implicate order. The dialogue

unfolds the different forms that are established in the interaction between people and those forms are enfolded back into different meanings of their
relationships to other people. The movement itself is the articulation of the implicate order in the human domain11.
Perhaps what we are also revealing here is that points of order or centers of organization are inherent to the implicate order as it unfolds into the
explicate. These points always create something of a vortex around them as they provide for interactions and further relationships in that flow. Perhaps
some are more restrictive than others. Lower animals do not have as wide a relationship in the implicate order as the human being, with his extensively
connected human brain. The fixed images in consciousness, however, are themselves only a relatively fixed point as there are numerous relationships
intertwining and unfolding from them, even if they do form a vortex. Even in that condition the human brain is more extensively related than a paramecium.
Any form, any organism, is always changing and is in relationships that bring about movements and change. Certainly throughout our universe these
relatively fixed points are in interactions that allow for dissolution and transformation from focus to focus. In meditation and dialogue human beings
become aware of their larger relationship to the implicate order and it enables them to see the limitations of the point of fixation. In that awareness they
outgrow the restrictions in their relationship in the implicate order and extend their participation in that greater order.

Acknowledgment
I want to thank Catherine de Segonzac for her assistance in the preparation of this paper.

References
1 David Bohm, Wholeness and the Implicate Order, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1980.
2 John Briggs and David F.Peat, Looking Glass Universe: The Emerging Science of Wholeness, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1984.
3 David R.Griffen, The Need for a Post Modern Paradigm, unpublished manuscript, 1984.
4 N.Eldredge and I.Tattersall, The Myths of Human Evolution, Columbia University Press, New York, 1982.
5 David Shainberg, Nuclear Arms, National Sovereignty, and Consciousness; Comprehensive Psychotherapy, Vol. 6, Gordon & Breech, New
York, 1984.
6 D.H.Hubel, Effects of distortion of sensory input on the visual systems of kittens, Eleventh Bowditch Lecture, Physiologist, 10, 17 (1967).
7 Jerome Bruner, In search of Mind: Essays in Autobiography, Harper & Row, New York, 1983.
8 Karen Horney, Neurosis and Human Growth, Norton, New York, 1950.

9 S.Suzuki, Zen Mind, Beginners Mind (Trudy Dixon, ed.), John Weatherhill, New York, 1970.
10 D.M.Mackay, Conscious agency with unsplit and split brains, in B.D. Josephson and V.S.Ramachandran (eds), Consciousness and the Physical
World, Pergamon Press, New York, 1980.
11 David Shainberg, The Transforming Self: New Dimensions in Psychoanalytic Process; Intercontinental Medical Book Corp. N.Y., 1973.

29
Reflectaphors: the (implicate) universe as a work of art
John Briggs
New School for Social Research, New York City
A number of years ago I was quite surprised to discover an uncanny resemblance between an approach I was pursuing into the underlying structure of
works of art and David Bohms visions into the underlying construction of matter. The coincidence between these two ideas continues to surprise me, but
Bohm himself added an even stranger twist one afternoon some years later when I had the opportunity of interviewing him for a radio show. The show
focused on the possible relationships between the arts and science and, in the course of the interview, Bohm offered that he didnt see why great works of
art couldnt also have something important to teach us about the laws of nature.
The possibility he raised that day is curious and haunting and in the next pages I will try to catch a glimpse of its ghost by outlining the hypothesis I found
so startlingly mirrored in David Bohms implicate order.
The hypothesis in question is a way of conceptualizing both the structure of works of art and some aspects of the process which goes into creating
them. Specifically, it describes the global interaction of what I call reflectaphors. Reflectaphors are created in the dynamics that takes place among the
elements that comprise a work of art. In the visual arts, reflectaphors emerge in the interactions of elements like shape, line, color and negative space. In
literature they appear in such techniques as irony, pun, motif, symbol and metaphor. Through reflectaphors are displayed an artworks subtlety and its
ability to astonish: they are the intersection between its parts and the whole; seedbeds of its truth; the nexes of the mind apprehending and the thing
apprehended; and they remain both unchanged and in process. They are the artworks hidden order.

To illustrate the interworkings of that order, I propose first to look in detail at its appearance as metaphor.

X/Y: two sides of a mirror

Metaphor is traditionally defined as an unusual or non-logical assertion of identity between two terms. Some aestheticians view metaphor (including simile)
as the backbone of poetry. Aristotle claimed that it is the greatest thing by far to be the master of metaphor.
A sample poetic metaphor will illustrate why. In his well-known Ars Poetica, Archibald MacLeish sets out to tell his readers what a poem is by writing
one. His strategy is to identify the abstract concept a poem with a series of sensuous images, creating a string of stunning metaphors. Through these
metaphors the poet evokes rather than prescribes an understanding of what a poem is. Consider one of MacLeishs figures: A poem should be wordless
as the flight of birds.
The metaphor is conventional in that it is composed of two termsX, a poem, and Y, a flight of birdsasserted to be at least potentially (i.e.
should be) identical. And the mind is given pause.
Behind that pause lurks the secret of poetic metaphora peculiar equation of tension between terms. For in the same mental space X and Y are
convergently compared and contrasted.
On the contrast side, XY because the reader knows very well that a poem is not a movement made out of flesh, blood, feathers and the instinct to
negotiate currents of air. Applying wordless to the equation heightens this contrast almost to the point of paradox.
On the comparison side, the asserted X=Y compels the mind to stretch out to connect the terms. For the metaphor to do that there must be enough felt
similarity between them. For example, we might see in the flight of birds an orderly activity, a free and lyrical quality, a living and ultimately unutterable
meaning that might be appropriate to a poem.
Might bebut, of course, anyone attempting to give an account of all the meanings of this metaphor would immediately run head-on into two
problems. First, the analyzable meanings here are both complex and multiplex because the number of discernible similarities and shades of similarities
between the wordless flight of birds and a poem is limited only by human imagination. Second, to delineate fully even one meaning would require actively
ignoring the contrast side of the metaphorfor to include that would effectively undercut any meaning by making us aware that a flight of birds is basically
not like a poem. Moreover, the fact that it is not like a poem creates still further meanings which are, themselves, not fully analyzable. Not surprisingly,
therefore, the interpreted meanings of metaphors often turn out to be paradoxical or self-contradictory. The movement which produces this effect bears
connection to Bohms implicate order.

According to Bohm, matter and energy continually unfold and enfold, appearing in particular (explicate) forms like photons and mountains and then
disappearing into the (implicate) background. For Bohm this primordial unending movement from implicate to explicate and back again implies the whole.
He calls it holomovement and considers it primary to all natural law. In a metaphor, an analogous sort of thing seems to happen with meaning.
Recently one of the many subtleties of the often paradoxical movement of meaning through metaphor surfaced during a class discussion of the
MacLeish lines. I was explaining that I personally experienced the image as a flight of birds in formation very high up and silent, wordless. Then someone
in the class pointed out that birds in flight often make quite a bit of noise, also not words, but probably communication of some sortand we realized
such an image could also fit MacLeishs metaphor. Obviously, taking that angle on the metaphor alters and broadensin Bohms terms unfolds and
enfoldsones conception of its meaning. In the movement through the mind of the old conception and the new, one gets a taste of the whole.
This suggests the metaphor is meaning as an ongoing process and perception rather than meaning as the conclusions of knowledge. To illustrate,
consider the difference between the MacLeish metaphor and the statement A poem should be made of rhymed couplets. Evidently, the statement is
conclusive and logical. There is no sense of movement from the two terms, no hint of the kind of activity created by the provocative ambiguity of the
metaphor. The statement may be arguable, but it can be quickly assimilated and filed away by the mind. MacLeishs metaphor, however, invites neither
agreement nor disagreement, and despite its stipulative syntax, the sentence leaves the mind in a state more like that of hearing a question than
understanding an assertion.
Perhaps that is the metaphors point. Certainly it was MacLeishs point. A poem, he says at the end of Ars Poetica, should not mean but be. The
metaphor should move the mind beyond the conceptual confines of the X and Y terms, from meaning (which is paraphrasable and analyzable) to an
implicate-explicate-implicate movement of meaning or being (which is not). Amazingly, if the metaphor strikes the right chemistry between X and Y, even
repeated encounters with it will not inhibit this movement.
How can this be? The answer may lie in understanding how consciousness perceives a metaphor.
At present, neuroscience is only beginning to grapple with the immensely intricate questions of how consciousness works. But whatever the specific
mechanisms, it seems plausible to generalize that a great deal of conscious processing (including layers of the unconscious and perception) relies on some
form of comparison and contrast activity1. For example, a sound is heard against a background of

other sounds (the voice of a friend shouting above the crash of the sea) by a process which separates out, abstracts, by contrast, the pitch, volume,
rhythm of one sound (the voice) from that of the background (waves) and compares and contrasts it to patterns (of words, the friends voice) recorded in
memory.
Memory, whether genetically acquired as instinct or experientially acquired as learning, lies at the root of the brain movement in which the complex mix
of reason, emotion, brain states, perceptual regimes and immediate environmental influences unfold in conscious (explicate level) awareness as a stream of
comparing and contrasting. These comparing and contrasting activities then refold into the background (implicate) levels of the brain to set the stage for
further comparisons and contrasts.
In the appendix to his 1965 book The Special Theory of Relativity, Bohm considers theories of perception by Piaget, Gibson, Held, Ditchburn and
others and conveys his sense of them through an elegant hypothetical illustration which I will modify and simplify to make the point here about metaphor.
Suppose you are walking along a road in the obscure light of the moon. You see an unknown shape in the distance (contrast: the figure to its
background). Initially you think you are seeing a person (comparison: of that shape to the complex memories of human shapes in various positions), but as
you draw closer you notice features unlike human ones (your comparison has disclosed elements in contrast) and you then formulate a new image of what
you see as an animal (comparison) until this comparison too reveals a contrast. At this juncture, still retaining elements of your comparisons of human-like
and animal-like features, but confronted by undeniable contrasting elements which make this conclusion unlikely, you may compare your information to
some idea you have of a monster and begin to panic. Finally, trembling on the edge of flight, you press ahead enough to recognize the shape as a bush
(comparison of features of the object with features in the memory-abstraction bush).
Sequences of comparison-then-contrast-then-comparison unfold with neuronal rapidity and flow indistinguishably into one another. Nevertheless, it is
obvious that consciousness does not see the shape simultaneously as background, person, animal, monster and bush. That would be absurd, if not
actually psychotic. Instead, what is perceived in the advance toward the shape is a series of advancing conclusions or abstractions, each held successively
as a theory (and one of the roots of theory is the Greek thesthai, to see). At any moment the comparing and contrasting sequences yield apparent
knowledge of what is being seen.
In poetic metaphor, however, comparisons and contrasts between the X and Y terms dont alternate; they remain in dynamic X/Y tension or balance.
The metaphors dynamic appears to engender the per-

ception that the metaphor means all the possible similarities between its terms and none of the similarities. The categorical or conclusive mind set which is
the staple of our consciousness is momentarily cancelled out. We have the vivid and immediate experience that our meanings may be viable but they are
horribly limited. Indeed, it isnt far-fetched to imagine a poet writing a piece in which he approaches an object and reveals in metaphor that it is a man, an
animal, a monster and a bush. Moreover, he might suggest there are also other possibilities he senses are present in the object but cannot quite discern,
and that all of these, in turn, reflect his own existential condition and the very act of his observing so that, in the end, he is finding himself in the object.
Meanwhile he could be revealing that his experience is more than any of this because it is none of these things. Such coalescences and twists occur in
literature all the time. It is what William Empson meant by his use of the term ambiguity2.
Something like this happens, for example, in Robert Frosts poem The Road Not Taken. The narrator in the poem tells about stopping at the place
where the single road he had been traveling on diverged and how he decided which of the two alternative paths to take. In the course of four stanzas,
each road is described in such a way as to suggest that every feature of the roads is also a feature of the narrators dilemma in living his human life (e.g. I
looked down one [road] as far as I could/To where it bent in the undergrowth). Meanwhile, though he is at pains to tell the reader how similar the roads
were, the narrator also asserts that they were different (e.g. the passing there/ Had worn them really about the same yet I took the one less traveled
by). This comparison/contrast, similarity/difference ambiguity is central to our experience of the roads as a metaphor.
The Road Not Taken might be called a central one-term metaphor because the narrator never says explicitly that the activity of a man choosing roads
X, is metaphorically equated with any Y. But the tone and weight of the narrative suggests that such an unstated Y-term is present. Indeed, the fact that the
reader can never say for sure that a Y such as choosing ones path in life is meant at all adds considerable energy to the X/Y, comparison/contrast
tension. (Actually its more a harmony than a tension, in the musical sense of the word harmony.) When asked to respond to the various meanings that
people had given to this poem, Frost himself insisted rather sharply there was no ulterior meaning at all. It was about a man in the woods choosing roads.
In a sense, his reaction could have been expected. Artists typically become sullen or hostile when asked what their work means. Why? Because its the
wrong question. To want to know the meaning of a metaphor indicates youre bent on missing its meaning. By not falling victim to the lust for a meaning,
Frost kept his metaphor alive.
There are many varieties of poetic metaphor. Some metaphors

appear as images, as in poet Richard Hugos line The sun bruises the oats gold which is formed from three compressed metaphoric juxta-positions
1 (X) sun=(Y) a being or physical object capable of bruising;
2 (X) the act of bruising=(Y) natural processes which engage photosynthesis; and then
3 this strange bruising, as an action (X) implicitly equated in the metaphor with (Y) making the oats valuable (like gold).
Compression of several different metaphoric elements in interlocking X/Y tension is typical of artistic structure.
In other cases, a central X-term may be linked serially in a piece to a number of different Ys to produce a branching-term metaphor, as in the Emily
Dickinson poem where the narrator explicitly compares a certain slant of light on winter afternoons to several images and ideas, including the heft of
cathedral tunes, an imperial affliction and a heavenly hurt.
In poems, the use of metaphor as a technique is extensive and in metaphor resides all of those qualities of vitality, mystery, truth and timeless excitement
we normally associate with poetry itself.
For that reason, it is important to consider why, outside of literary context, in the world at large, metaphors do not have these qualities. Though generaluse metaphors have a structure which also cojoins unlikely or illogical X and Y terms, the structure in this case is superficial.
For example, calling somebody a rat, claiming that a cigarette will taste as fresh as a drop of rain, or giving the name spaceship to a vehicle which
plies the regions beyond earths atmosphere, are all forms of metaphor. General-use metaphors abound, and they can be as strikingly unusual as any
poetic metaphors. But they are unlike them in one crucial respect. In the general-use metaphor the comparison and contrast between the terms can be
resolved. The general-use metaphor stresses the similarity between X and Y. Such metaphors are dressed up forms of conclusion and knowledge and so
they function essentially in the way ordinary communication does. A specific point is intended by the metaphor, a messageand once the point is
apprehended, the metaphor is over. I saw Mrs Bradshaw today; she was high as a kite. A metaphor like this is entirely empty or misleading unless the
listener, who presumably has a context for Mrs Bradshaw, can draw an appropriate conclusion about what is meant (e.g. the lady has been taking drugs).
In contrast, the message of poetic or literary metaphors (a poem should be wordless as the flight of birds) remains essentially complex and ambiguous
though, oddly, literary metaphors are by no means vague (the sun bruises the oats gold). They are lucid despite their rigorous disavowal of message.

Literary metaphors should also be distinguished from the type of metaphor known variously as root metaphor, conceptual archetype or model3.
The Newtonian notion that the universe is a machine is an example of this type of metaphor. It has an envisioning quality because it is more open-ended
than a general-use metaphor. For instance, scientists inspired by the metaphor of celestial mechanics have been able to envision and uncover numerous
mechanical-like aspects of nature. When an envisoning metaphor is created, it has meanings which are unknown at the time and this can make the
metaphor hugely inviting. However, in the end the invitation is to discern what those meanings arequite different from the invitation of a poetic metaphor.
David Bohm, of course, is probably more aware than any scientist in modern times of the traps of envisioning metaphors. Not only has he argued
eloquently against the way science has explicated to distortion the Newtonian metaphor; he has tried to incorporate in his model a clear sense of the
limitations of all scientific models, including his own, to provide ultimate meanings. I remember that during our radio show he said he thought scientific
theories should be presented like poetry because, like poems, theories are insights, acts of perception, rather than hard and fast conclusions. In presenting
his implicate order, Bohm is always careful to spell out the suggestive rather than objective value of his illustrating metaphors like the hologram or the
glycerine ink-drop experiment. He is always pointing beyond, showing where his theory, vast as it is, must shade off into more subtle reaches and regions
of the unknown (the super-implicate order, higher-dimensional realities, chaos as infinite degrees of order, the super-quantum potential and the supersuper-quantum potential), always impressing the listener with the limitations of the mind in the face of this vast order of which the mind itself is a mirror. In
this way, Bohm tries to avoid the common fate of scientific metaphors and accomplish something very like what happens in the X/Y dynamics of
metaphors in poems. But Bohms understanding is rare. The very richness of an envisioning metaphor is usually its downfall. Greedy for certainty, the mind
cant resist and seeks to draw out every last ounce of the treasure until the metaphor collapses. Poetic metaphor avoids this exploitation and eventual
exhaustion (though not for the lack of critics trying) because of its X/Y dynamics and because the metaphor is set in a subtle structure of other metaphorlike devices which engender a pervasive order. This order is, as it were, especially designed to frustrate the drive of consciousness to analyze, paraphrase
or constrict the movement which is that orders meaning.

Reflectaphoric order
There are a number of reasons to propose the neologism reflectaphor. While it might be possible to expand the existing term metaphor to cover the wide
range of similar phenomena which occur in literary artforms, the visual arts, music and performing arts, like most other critical terms in the arts, metaphor
suffers from over-use. Extending it further could inevitably result in confusion arising from the way the critical literature and common usage have conflated
the general-use, envisioning and literary metaphors under the single term and have compounded metaphor indiscriminately with other critical terms like
symbol, emblem and image.
Nevertheless, the X/Y dynamic of literary metaphor, as I have defined it, has so much to offer by way of illuminating what is happening generally in
artistic structure, that I propose to retain an echo of this type of metaphor in a new term.
The word metaphor comes from the Greek meta and Aryan medhi which mean middle, between, among and beyond and from the Greek phore
derived from phoros, to carry or to bear. The word reflect comes from the Greek re and flex which means bending back or bending again. Putting
these together, a reflectaphor can be thought of as having the quality of carrying between and beyond by a constant bending back. One side of the
reflectaphor is carried over to the other, but then is reflected or carried back again and, therefore, once again beyond. The comparison/contrast design of
the reflectaphor propels this movement, bending the mind back again and beyond, giving no rest in conclusion. Between the elements of a reflectaphor
there is no meaning as such; the meaning is the continual revelationwhat Bohm calls unfoldment and enfoldmentof this reflective movement.
Two further important dimensions of the reflect in reflectaphor will also become apparent as we probe deeper into artistic process and structure.
First, a reflectaphor mirrors the apprehender of the reflectaphor so that, as Bohm would say, the observer becomes revealed as the observed. Second, a
reflectaphor in the context of a particular artwork is mirroring other reflectaphors in that context and in fact is a reflection of the whole of that context.
The first step toward contacting that larger order of reflectaphors is to see that the kind of dynamic we observed in the individual poetic metaphor also
appears in other artistic techniques. In literature any technique or aspect of a piece can be reflectaphoric; for instance, irony.
In The Road Not Taken, as we noted, the central axis of the poem is a metaphor (X) roads like (implied Y) life. But this metaphor is itself worked out
ironically. The narrators statement that he decided to take one road because it was grassy and wanted wear;/Though as for that, the passing there/Had
worn them really about the same

combined with his assertion that two roads diverged in a wood, and I/I took the one less traveled by create a context that causes the final statement,
And that has made all the difference to become ironic to a high degree. There is also irony in the fact that, although the narrator appears to emphasize
the road he took, the title of the poem is The Road Not Taken. In irony, the words or situation intend one meaning (X) and yet another meaning (Y) is
perceived. If there is tension or harmony between the twosometimes contradictorymeanings it creates a reflectaphor.
Even puns can be reflectaphors. Would he had been one of my rank! one Shakespeare character says, and his comrade replies, To have smelld like
a fool. Rank as status (X) is juxtaposed to rank as bad smell (Y). The similarity between X and Y (theyre the same word) emphasizes the contrast, and
the reflectaphor is formed.
What happens when these and the many other reflectaphoric techniques are brought together into a whole context? Here lies what is perhaps the most
dramatic similarity between Bohms theory of matter and the structure and process found embedded in works of art.
One of the primary models Bohm uses to illustrate the implicate order is the hologram. He focuses on the fact that in a hologram each region contains
information about the whole picture which is recorded on the holographic plate. If a laser beam is passed through different fragments of the plate, this
whole picture will be revealed to have been encoded in each piece, though seen from different angles. Holographic images are produced by recording on
to the plate the interference patterns of light. Bohm says that since all matter-energy is composed of extremely subtle interference patterns moving
continually throughout space, each particle or wave of matter and energy contains a unique image of the whole.
In artistic creation an analogous holomovement takes place through the medium of reflectaphors.
Joseph Conrads masterwork Typhoon provides a brilliant example of this and shows how the artistic hologram is formed by concatenations of
reflectaphors enfolded in every aspect of the story; characters, setting, plot, conflict and an array of expressive techniques.
Ostensibly Conrads tale is about a rather dull-witted sea captain who navigates his ship through the unimaginable fury of a tropical typhoon. In
actuality, the story is about the nature of a human beings relationship to his fellows, the relationship of mind to matter, fate and will, knowledge and
ignorance, truth and illusion, courage, cowardice, imagination and the creative act. In short, it is a story that implicates the whole.
Conrad depicts the storm which the plot of the tale revolves around as commencing with the surprising oppressive placidity characteristic of typhoons.
A puzzling calm besets the ship and turns out to be the prelude to the tempest that follows. In its context, this storm becomes

a reflectaphor comparing/contrasting (X) its paradoxical placidity with (Y) its amazing energy. The typhoon-as-plot-device, in turn, stands in X/Y
comparison/contrast to Conrads rendering of the strikingly unimaginative captain whose fate it is to ride out the storm. He is one of literatures most
improbable heroes, described to the reader as an (X) absurdly placid character, lacking foresight and drive. Incongruously, however, he possesses fiery
metallic gleams on his cheeks no matter how close he shaved, and these foreshadow (Y) the inner spark and power that allows him, for all his
perplexing dullness, to take on the typhoon. Like the typhoon, the captain possesses tremendous force, at first obscured by a face of apparent placidity.
The captains nameanother reflectaphor of the typhoonis MacWhirr.
MacWhirr is also juxtaposed in reflectaphoric X/Y to his ship. The Nan-Shan has the reputation of an exceptionally steady ship in a seaway.
MacWhirr is described as physically stolid and proves to be psychologically exceptionally steady in the distressing seaway of the typhoon. In this regard,
the fiery gleams on MacWhirrs cheeks (X) are also a reflection of (Y) the fire in the Nan-Shans boilers that keeps the stolid ship with her head to the
wind.
The Nan-Shan carries a cargo of Chinese coolies and they reveal yet another reflectaphor of MacWhirr and the typhoon. Portrayed as a languid
(placid) lot, during the storm the coolies become anything but languid, clawing and thrashing each other in a frenzy because the footlockers they have
brought with them have been battered open by the pitching of the ship, and the silver dollars which they have spent years away from home earning are
flying around the innards of the cabin. At one point, the boatswain opens a hatch and witnesses this scene which Conrad clearly intends to suggest is a
human typhoon. Even rolling circular dollars which the Chinese are chasing are reflectaphoric of the circular storm raging outside.
All these connections are interlocking reflectaphors in which one image, theme or event is equated with another to which it is logically dissimilar. Out of
the basic reflectaphor of the typhoon whirl galaxies of reflectaphoric relationships: captain to storm; Chinese to storm; dollars to storm; ship to captain;
storm to ship; passivity vs activity to all of the above; and so on in manifold, swirling compressions and combinations. Taken together, these relationships
make the work a kind of moving hologram, a holomovement, in which each element (e.g. MacWhirr, the ship, the dollars) reflects by implication the
whole. Moreover, this hologram partakes of something analogous to what Bohm calls a higher dimensional reality.
Bohm notes that in the quantum domain, because each detectable atomic particle must exist in three dimensions, an object with 1024 atomic particles
would have 31024 dimensions of space. For him this multiplicity of dimensions is a powerful way to visualize his implicate-explicate order because it
means that each

object of our perceptions is an expression or display of the enfoldment and unfoldment of higher implicate dimensions into our familiar explicate threedimensional space. One might observe analogously that each reflectaphor contains two dimensions of X/Y dynamics and numerous dimensions of meaning.
With a structure such as Typhoon, where there are many interacting reflectaphors, it seems possible to conjecture, and perhaps to observe, that within the
explicate space of the story a matrix of implicate and higher dimensional realities are enfolded.
The fact that each element and combination in the piece is in a similarity/difference relationship with a multiplicity of other elements could also help
account for the feeling that a great work of literature like Typhoon or The Road Not Taken is always turning away from closure, even at its end. Closure
would be the possibility of resolving the similarity/difference dynamictranslating the reflectaphor into a conclusion such as an allegory or symbol.
Instead, for the reader there is an elusive sense of the similarities in the elements of character, event and setting which emphasize their obviously vast
differences. The X/Y dynamics and permeation of reflectaphors create a distinct impression that there is always something more or other than the literal
elements of the piece. Those elements seem always to stand or move beyond themselves.
I propose to call this special quality of a work of art its this*other-nessa neologism intended to open up a slightly different view on the artistic
process.
In a poetic reflectaphor the X-termthisis asserted to be the same as the Y-termthe other. But because of the comparison/ contrast
dynamicindicated here by the sign *this is also vividly set off from the other. For the reader, the feeling of this*other is a movement, like the
buzzing, uncanny current set up by the shifting poles in an electrical device.
In the context of a literary fiction like Typhoon, the this*other-ness dynamic exists throughout and is an expression of the artworks wholeness.
MacWhirr is a this but he is also a great deal other than this. He is the ship, the typhoon, the Chinese, etc. Each encounter with a this is a discovery at
some subliminal level of how that this exists as an immediate and elusive embodiment of every other in the piece and so the piece as a whole. At the
same time, lest the reader fall into the error of taking MacWhirr as an abstraction, a symbol of something other than what he is, the dynamic * bends him
back. MacWhirr is MacWhirr, a this: the stolid captain in the story.
This*other-ness is also the relationship of the observer to the observed and this is perhaps its major effect. In many artforms the elements of the work
are fixedwords on a page, lines and colors in a paintingyet the perceivers encounter with the reflectaphors sets in motion a profound process of
unfoldment and enfoldment between

the terms of the reflectaphors in the piece and the perceivers own identity. Thus, the reader of Typhoon tacitly perceives the movement of
similarity/difference between himself and MacWhirr, the typhoon, the Chinese, etc. He sees implicitly that in his life, in his mind and in the world there are
all manner of typhoons.
In the preface to one of his stories, Conrad called the effect of discovering ones identity in a story solidarity:
The presented vision of regret or pity, of terror or mirth, shall awaken in the hearts of the beholders that feeling of unavoidable solidarity; of
the solidarity in mysterious origin, in toil, in joy, in hope, in uncertain fate, which binds men to each other and all mankind to the visible world.

Finally, in its largest aspect, the reader may perceive through the story that in the this-ness of the world there is also an overall other-ness, an order which
cannot be contained by our definitionsa super-implicate order.
One more example from Typhoon will illustrate how the unfolding reflectaphoric, holographic, super-implicate and this*other-ly orderConrads
solidaritysubtly informs an artworks entire structure; and it may recall Thomas Manns claim that the only way to write a novel is with mirrors.
The boatswain enters an empty coal bunker just before opening the door to the tween deck cabin and witnessing the mayhem of the Chinese chasing
their dollars. In the pitch black bunker just before reaching the door, the sailor finds himself menaced by a loose metal bar, a coal-trimmers slice, which is
being hurtled around in the blackness by the pitch of the ship. The boatswain has the distinct impression that this piece of metal is trying to catch him and
kill him. Finally, as if by blind luck, his hand falls upon the slice and he is saved. A moment later, he opens the door to the tween deck. Here, rather than
being chased by pieces of metal, the Chinese are trying to catch metal pieces (their rolling dollars) which by a seeming blind luck keep slipping from their
grasp. The ostensible reasons for these cat-and-mouse chases between man and metal are manifestly different (the boatswain wants to save himself from
being battered to death by an unseen force; the Chinese want to secure their possessions). Or are they so different? The scene is like a chemical solution
mixing these reflectaphors with others in the story having to do with blindness, circularity and luck or fate.
This illustration and the others from Typhoon are far from untypical of the piece as a whole and represent only a very small sample of its total
reflectaphoric connections (a higher dimensional total, probably impossible to calculate). One does not need to assume that Conrad was consciously
aware of these connections or that he intended themthough there is good evidence that he was well aware of the prin-

ciple. Creators frequently say that in the act of creating they feel as if they participate in an order that is beyond them.
It should also be noted that not all novels have the direct mirror-type of reflectaphors exhibited by Typhoon. In fact every great artist finds his or her
own approach and techniques for the expression of this*other-ness so that the variety of reflectaphoric structures is an immense and fascinating subject in
itself.

Figure 29.1 Man With Umbrella, after Kao Chi-pei (courtesy of the British Museum, London).

One should also not infer that a work of arts greatness is to be measured by the sheer complexity or quantity of reflectaphoric permutations. Even a
single, simple reflectaphor can be enduring, as Matso Bashs haiku:
Ones life, a single dewdrop.
Its lonely savor.

Umbrella terms
In the art of painting, reflectaphors exist on a number of levels and are articulated through numerous techniques. For example, reflectaphors can be
created when a painting of one thing looks subliminally like anothera building that looks subtly like a face, a range of mountains that is as sensuous as a
reclining body.
Reflectaphors occur most intensively, however, among the shapes, colors and lines of the painting. This can be seen readily in a relatively simple
Chinese portrait, after Kao Chi-pei (AD 1672?1734), called Man With Umbrella (see Figure 29.1).
Let us begin to explore the this*other-ness resonance in this painting with the shape which appears as the top of the mans umbrella, abstracted thus:

This shape is echoed reflectaphorically throughout the painting. Notice that it is in the hat strapped to the mans back; in the notch of his front pant leg; in
the notch between the rear and front pant leg; in the shape of the shadow under the arm; in the top
of the bridge (where the entire figure of the
man himself might be viewed as something like the dot on the umbrella peak).
Each of these variations is slightly different from the
note the comparison/contrast created by the

of the umbrella, different enough probably to pass unnoticed as reflections. For instance,
lines which form the bridge the old man is walking across. These shapes are a kind of X/Y

between the Euclidian triangle composed of straight lines (like the umbrella) and the Riemannian triangle made of curved lines. This
reflectaphoric tension is maintained throughout the piece in numerous variations. In these permutations of permutations of the basic
shape, the
viewer is no longer following actual lines but tracking lines of force created by the overall composition. This suggests another kind of visual reflectaphor at
work. Look at the shape formed by the line

of the mans back and rear pant leg and stomach, then up to the dark spot behind the nape of the necka shape that might be abstracted

Again, there is the

shape, complete with curve/triangle reflectaphor and a solid spot at the buttocks apex. Between the armpit and the nape of
the neck this line is not filled in, but is suggested by the faint upward thrust in the armpit shadow which draws the eye toward the heavy dark spot at the
neck. Here the line which begins at the rear pant leg and ends at the neck is itself a kind of reflectaphor; that is, though it is this (a line) it is also many
other thingsa trouser leg, a shadow, a belly and chest, an armpit and, for a while, between the arm and neck, nothing at all. Each
is
reflectaphorically both there and not there since each figures lines are also lines of other triangles, other parts of the composition. Thus, while the
this*other-ness spreads an implicit recognition of the

everywhere, it keeps its distance so the similarities are never over-stressed or conclusive.

The painting cannot be resolved into a clever collection of

shapes. Each variation blends into the others, appears and vanishes into the overall
picture. Yet the presence of these reflections contribute to the deep sense of coherence in the piece.
These, of course, are formal elements. But there are other quite important aspects to this painting. How do they fit? One might wonder, for example,
about the this*other-ness of an old man crossing a bridge hung in space. And what about the old mans character? Is that reflectaphoric, as well?
Leonardo da Vincis Mona Lisa is perhaps the most popular example of portraiture in the history of painting and can be taken as exemplary of the
reflectaphoric effect of creating character by visual means. Albert Rothenberg notes that over the centuries critics have described the Gioconda smile as
both good and wicked, cruel and compassionate, the smile of the Saints at Rheims and worldly, watchful and self satisfied, a look of both
modesty and a secret sensuous joy.4
Leonardo evidently created in this smile a this*other-ness in which various psychological states were reflectaphorically related. In that particular
remarkable smile, which is Mona Lisas and no others, something universal about the nature of human passion shines through. Something similar is
happening with the old man on the bridgesomething conveyed by his expression and the attitude of his body. Could one say what his character is in the
instant of the painting? determination? resignation? sourness? humor? combativeness? Or should we say that the painting has somehow penetrated and
found the common ground for the structure of all those different emotions (and more)? Yet the man with the umbrella is not an abstraction, a

human generality. He is a particular, unique presence. The painter has expressed through line and simple shape the sense that this man crossing a bridge
stands beyond himself, that his lines extend outward to touch the solidarity of humanity and being. It is as if his individuality were somehow founded upon
his universality; as if the viewers sense of his universality were founded upon the old mans uniqueness.
Like the narrator choosing roads in the Frost poem, the situation of the man with the umbrella is charged so that, even though we arent told this is a
reflectaphor whose terms are (X) the old man crossing the bridge with (Y) our own life, we perceive that it is. And in so far as we are disposed to assign
meaning to the painting, the expression and attitude of the old mans body has something like the effect of the irony in The Road Not Taken. Each time
we think weve got it, we must see we havent. With paintings, however, we generally dont assign meanings, not consciously, anyway.
In fact, in talking about Man With Umbrella I have made explicit aspects which remain implicit for most viewers and were probably so for the artist in
the act of making his creation. However, thats not to say either that the implicit is not real or that by making it explicit we have come any closer to
understanding the actual truth of the piece. That truth must ultimately lie in the mysterious realm of what brought all these reflectaphors together in the
artists mind and in the poignant movement that takes place when they are encountered by a viewing consciousness. Some reflectaphors, like the sun
bruises the oats gold, depend upon being explicit and shocking; others, like the bunker scene in Typhoon and the
of Man With Umbrella,
remain implicit for their effect. The relative degrees of explicitness or implicitness; the types of techniques used to express the reflectaphors and the
reflectaphoric combinations (e.g. irony, metaphor, pun); the types of reflectaphors inherent in each genre and artform (the gestures of dance; contrast and
tonalities in black and white photography; the conceptual quality of words) all have quite different effects on the observing consciousness. Yet they have a
similar effect as well: to create a sense of a this*other-ness order, a moment of uncanniness where, as Heidegger said, one comes into immediate contact
with being.
The whole issue of explicit and implicit can be illuminated by analogy to Bohms assertion that explicate forms like electrons are also implicate and that
the strangenesses of quantum mechanicssuch as the puzzle that the electron can be both particle and waveare really symptoms of the fact that
implicate and explicate are two sides of the same coin. Our minds prefer to see one side or the other. The power of a great work of art is that it gives both
sides simultaneously. Implicit and explicit converge. That is the meaning of the this*other-ness order and a major function of the X/Y dynamics.

In the creative mind

Modern abstract art, photography, dance, musicall artforms and styles find ways to express that order. Composer Igor Stravinsky, in his Poetics of
Music, noted that for him variety is valued only as a means of attaining similarity5. In his Norton Lectures Leonard Bernstein defined compositions of the
Romantic era as having what he called extrinsic metaphor, in that melodies and instruments are used to refer to objects or processes like birds, brooks,
characters. He also noted a more general feature of composition, intrinsic metaphor, where a set of notes becomes varied so that the variations are, in
effect, compared to each other6. In serious music, regardless of stylistic, cultural and historical changes, a reflectaphoric order appears. A composer
once remarked to me that he thought of the notes in a musical composition as forming a little expanding cosmos with its own laws and forms, like our
cosmos.
But in saying this, one very much wants to avoid implying that reflectaphoric order is some subtle principle by which an artist generates, more or less
mechanically, variations of the same thing. Just as Bohm says that for the physical universe it will be impossible to formulate a general law of the whole, in
the reflectaphoric universe a general law for constructing reflectaphors will not be possible. This is because reflectaphoric order unfolds to undercut the
very processes and machinations of thought.
An experiment in perception will help illustrate this point. It is known that if persons are subjected to a single brief tone (or touch) recurring at fixed,
short intervals of, say, a second or so apart, the series of sounds very quickly becomes perceived as rhythm, even though, objectively, no rhythm exists. In
the days before digital clocks people had direct experience of thisthe tick tick tick sound of a clock becoming in the mind a tick-tock pattern. The
brain, it would appear, is a kind of patterning device. Further evidence for this is as near as ones habits.
On the other side, research has shown how quickly a pattern, once established, falls into the background of conscious awareness in the phenomenon of
habituation. In habituation, brainwave responses begin to flatten and arousal diminishes until the pattern is hardly noticed at all7, or until a trance-like
state occurs in which at least some levels of the brain are dulled, as happens with patterns used to induce hypnosis and with narrowly rhythmic music
(rock music, chants).
Taken together, these observations suggest what may be happening with reflectaphors. In a Beethoven symphony, in Man With Umbrella, in
Typhoon and in The Road Not Taken the brains craving for establishing a patterned order is satisfied by the constant display of similar items; at the
same time arousal and alertness are maintained

and habituation suppressed by the fact that these variations unfold in always unpredictable waysthat is, by the law of comparison/contrast which makes
each figure (even after repeated encounters) cognitively dissimilar from the last. The reflectaphoric figures create an alertness in consciousness and, in a
sense, this unfolding alertness is itself the order.
It therefore follows that such an order cannot be produced or comprehended mechanically. For example, as we noted earlier, in a poetic metaphor, to
achieve the proper X/Y tension, the terms have to be close enough together for an observer to perceive their similarities yet far enough apart to create an
enduring, perhaps astonishing, contrast. How could one determine mechanically what the proper distance is to achieve that spark? As Jorge Luis Borges
says, the terms of a metaphor must be precise:
I always remember that wonderful line in a poem by Emily Dickinson, which can exemplify this: This quiet dust was gentlemen and ladies.
The idea is banal. The idea of dust, the dust of death (we will all be dust one day), is a cliche; but what surprises is the phrase gentlemen and
ladies, which gives the line its magic and poetic quality. If she had written men and women it would have failed as poetry, it would have
been trivial.8

There is a further complication to codifying this proper distance between the terms: the effect of context. Many reflectaphors which make little sense or
altogether too much conclusive sense outside their literary context (poem, play, story) have exactly the right similarity/difference harmony within that
context. Example: Shakespeares lines This above all, to thine own self be true/And it must follow as the night the day,/Thou canst not then be false to
any man. Outside the play, this has become the most banal sort of conclusive aphorism. In the plays context, however, it is said by Polonius who is false
to everybodyand so the lines are reflectaphorically ironic. To the extent that we do become habituated to great works of art, its when we take things
out of context or allow our conclusions about the piece to shut off active perception of the reflectaphoric movement.
Thus, it would be an unproductive paradox to assume that reflectaphors could be generated by some scheme or formula. If it were possible to
recognize and predict the pattern, the mind would become habituated to the structure and the structure would fall from this* other-ness into conclusion.
As Frost insisted, No surprise for the writer, no surprise for the reader.
Creators know well that attempting to generate an artistic resonance or reflectaphor by analytically or premeditatively balancing terms unavoidably
collapses into confusion and arbitrariness. Most artists are quick to point out that any choice of words, lines or notes can be justified on some aesthetic,
emotional, rational or other

grounds, but that for each moment and position in the piece it is not the most justifiable choice which counts. It is the one which works. There is about
the discovery of a good reflectaphor a stochastic quality, as unexpected for the artist as if he had just fallen off a ledge (though sometimes a subtle one),
but then in midair seems to remember the ledge was always there. When a creator has tumbled over the edge and finds himself flung along the iron flightpath of his right choiceWordsworth called it the inevitable choicehe feels paradoxically free. Creators have long maintained that creativity is
impossible to teach. Can you teach someone how always to tumble over the rules without yourself making rules which would have to be tumbled over?
As Aristotle said of metaphor, it is the one thing that cannot be learned.
But why do artists make reflectaphors? What is their felicity in the creative act? Many creators have said a piece begins for them in something vague,
amorphous or objectively insignificant; a trivial object, a memory, silly melody, idea or a fusion of these which uncannily floods the artist with the
impression that it contains somehow an immensity, perhaps all the world. Perhaps it is a vision of the whole universe and the artists relation to it. Perhaps
it is a vision of what Conrad called truth. As one sculptor described it to me:
At times there emanated from people almost palpable extensions of themselves, and certain objects possessed a special dimensionality. A
small puddle iridescent with spilt oil and reflecting a patch of midwestern sky would suddenly expand for an endless split-second to
encompass my entire universe.

This glance of this*other-ness becomes for the artist a touchstone or what Henry James called a germ out of which the piece evolves. The germ might
also be thought of as something which serves the artist as a sudden window, opening between the explicate and the implicate. The evolution of the piece
out of that germ (a process which Frost described as like ice riding on its own melting) is a reflectaphoric evolution, each element emerging in X/Y tension
with others. In a peculiar and often quite indirect way, the inspiration for the creation and the thing created began to mirror each other. The initial
perception is that some one elementidea, memory, melodycontained the whole, and, in the end, the creator produces a form in which each unique
element reflects the whole of the piece. Then, since each element in the piece stands or moves beyond itself, the piece as a whole stands beyond
itselfwhich, again, is in keeping with the standing-beyond quality of the pieces inspiration or germ.
The artists biography also enters strongly into this process. As Rothenberg has pointed out4, many elements of creative works arise out of
superimposing remembered or personal experience on to the constraints of the piece. For example, in creating a character, a

novelist may adopt personality traits of someone he has actually known or read about as well as his own personality traits, he then finds these traits
modified, shaped and coordinated by the imagined events and other characters in his story. In the case of a photographer, a tension exists between the
external scene being photographed and what Ansel Adams calls the internal or imagined visualization of that scene. There is, therefore, in the creative
process an ongoing similarity/difference dynamic between (X) the forces of the artists personal experience of the world and (Y) the material of his
invention. The fateful balancing of this unfolding X/Y (which can become exceedingly complex) enters into such important issues as finding the proper
distance on the piece, attaining an authentic persona or style and achieving the appropriate voice or tone for the work.
In the evolution of the artwork, the artist doesnt make choices according to some analyzable logic or pattern, but chooses elements that feel right, in
harmony with the this*other-ness of the germ. In this process the particular, the individualthe puddle iridescent with oil, the two roads in the woods,
Captain MacWhirr, the artists own lifebecomes the universal. The universal, in turn, is revealed as something immediately present to our sensesthe
place where implicate and explicate have coalesced.

(In)conclusion
Those familiar with David Bohms theory of the implicate order may be as surprised as I was to find such correspondence between a scientific theory and
a purely aesthetic one. Bohm has proposed that matter and energy are holographicthat information about the whole is enfolded in the interference
patterns of the matter and energy waves which instantiate space and time. He has also proposed that the universe is multi-dimensional and flowing and that
in it the observer is the observed. A reflectaphor could also be viewed as a kind of interference pattern, created by the reverberations of the colliding X/Y
terms and producing an unfolding and multi-dimensional reality. However, instead of unfolding intoand asspace and time, reflectaphors unfold in
holomovement to instantiate for the observer of the artwork that he is essentially what he observesevery reader is, in some sense, MacWhirr; we are all
the old man on the bridge. And the artists who created them were also those figures. (But perhaps in such discoveries lies the secret meaning for us of
space and time.)
Creative artists who know anything about David Bohms work usually recognize immediately that he has envisioned a physical universe which is
congenial and familiar, one which has been echoed before in aesthetic ideas like Aristotles concept of the dramatist inspiring pity and fear, T.S.Eliots
objective correlative, Keats negative capability, the symbolists correspondences, Nicholas of Cusas

coincidentia oppositorum. It is a universe where, in William Blakes words, one can see the world in a grain of sandor a pair of roads, a typhoon,
an old man crossing the bridge with an umbrella. It is a universe that would have been recognizable to da Vinci who wrote in his journal that every body
placed in the luminous air spreads out in circles and fills the surrounding space with infinite likenesses of itself and appears all in all and all in every part.
Bohm brings new light and considerable force to these ancient artistic visions. But we began by asking if the artistic vision can add anything to our
contemplation of the physical universe.
The question remains open. I can offer here only a few vague intimations.
The holographic and reflectaphoric perspectives are strikingly similar but by no means exactly the same. The difference raises a number of questions.
Could physical reality also be reflectaphoric; that is, based on an X/Y dynamic such as is found in works of art? For example, could such natural
relationships as man/other men, man/ objects, objects/energy derive their vitality, perhaps even their very being, from a similarity/difference dynamic?
Certainly there is ample evidence that similarity/difference is involved in the shape of the physical world: DNA unfolds the similarity/difference dynamic in
all living creatures; the way ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny suggests this vital harmony and tension; matter-energy exchange suggests it. In the
consciousness of human beings appreciation of this dynamic is obscured by our tendency to view things as either similar or different and to introduce
causality to explain away the fact that everything is similar and different simultaneously. Taking a reflectaphoric approach might affect the way in which we
classify natural objects and transform the meanings which we give to our classifications.
The reflectaphor is a hinge between the explicate order of our familiar reality (the grain of sand) and the implicate order (the whole implied by the sand).
If we were to observe objects around us as grains of sand, as this*other-nesses, could this provide a new perspective into what is happening at the
quantum level? In evolution? Should our scientific explanations of natural phenomena have a comparison/ contrast dynamic between implicate and
explicate; between analysis and what lies beyond analysis? Bohm himself has been an advocate of this position. If we were to take such an approach
seriously, how would the universe appear to us and how would we perceive natures laws? Might, for example, the unknown then become a vivid
dimension of our experience of the knownsimilar to what happens in metaphor when the unknown emerges out of the junction between the two known
terms? In a work of art, only when the unknown or ambiguity is present does one implicitly perceive the whole of the pieceand the whole beyond the
piece. What would be the role of the observer and the observed in such an X/Y relationship? For ages artists

have been portraying the physical world as a reflection of the mind, heart and soul of human beingsand vice versa (e.g. the Chinese chasing dollars are
the typhoon). What if the artists are right and the world around us is literally a mirror of our minds? Deep within the similarity/difference of physical things
is there a natural law as broad and rigorous as the law of gravity but governing what Conrad meant by the solidaritywhich binds men to each other and
all mankind to the visible world?
Many people have been surprised by David Bohms thesis for various reasons. Some have been surprised by its elegance; some by its sweeping
grandeur; some by its perfect aptness to their field of interest. There are even some who are surprised at how much they dislike it. In my case, I was
surprised to discover someone in science who saw the world as an artist does; a scientist who had found a creative rather than a random universe; a
scientist who found in nature a continuous mystery allied with a continuous meaning. But perhaps I shouldnt have been surprised because, after all, artists
and scientists do have in common a fascination with our sensual worldand both are driven to discover in its immediate and apparently chaotic
phenomena some glimpses of enduring order.

References
1 David Shainberg, Consciousness and psychoanalysis, Journal of the American Academy of Psychoanalysis, 3, 131 (1975).
2 William Empson, Seven Types of Ambiguity, 1930.
3 Max Black, Models and Metaphors. Studies in Language and Philosophy, 1962.
4 Albert Rothenberg, The Emerging Goddess, 1979.
5 Igor Stravinsky, Poetics of Music: In the Form of Six Lessons (Arthur Knodel and Ingolf Dahl, trans.), 1970.
6 Leonard Bernstein, The Unanswered Question: Six Talks At Harvard, 1976.
7 David Shainberg, The Transforming Self, Intercontinental Medical Book Corp., N.Y. 1973.
8 Jorge Luis Borges, Poetry: a conversation with Roberto Alifano (Nicomedes Suarez Arauz and Willis Barnstone, trans.) The American Poetry
Review, Nov./Dec. (1983).

30
Meaning as being in the implicate order philosophy of David Bohm: a
conversation
Rene Weber
Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey

Weber You are more and more interested in meaning, so can we explore what meaning is; not the definitive essence of it, but why are you interested in it?
Bohm I am interested in meaning because it is the essential feature of consciousness, because meaning is being as far as the mind is concerned.
Weber Is meaning being?
Bohm Yes. A change of meaning is a change of being. If we say consciousness is its content, therefore consciousness is meaning. We could widen this to
a more general kind of meaning that may be the essence of all matter as meaning.
Weber We understand the idea of meaning in the human world, but how can it apply to the non-human world?
Bohm There are several ways of looking at it. Lets take the notion of a cause. Now we know that Aristotle had four notions of causation; of these, the
material and the efficient cause are still recognized by modern science. The other two, the formal and the final cause, are not. But if we could bring in
this notion of the formal and the final cause, we might say that the form that a thing has is its cause and also its aim, its goal, its end. The two go
together. If we think of the dynamics of the establishment of form, it requires some sort of end in view, so the formal and final cause must go together.
This is also the basic essence of Rupert Sheldrakes idea of the formative cause [ed. in Sheldrakes A New Science of Life: The Hypothesis of
Formative Causation]. The formative cause is basically very similar to meaning. Meaning operates in a human being as a formative cause: it provides
an end toward which he is moving; it permeates his attention and gives form to his activities so as to tend to realize that end.

Weber So we could say, using an Aristotelian example; just as the acorn moves toward oakhood and stops growing when it reaches the oak and then
continues to maintain its oakness, in an analogous way when a human purpose is achieved in an action, that action ceases and becomes something
else. You are proposing this analogy?
Bohm Yes, not only to create the thing, but to sustain it. The final cause is not only to become an oak, but to remain an oak, to carry out all the activities
that are required to continue to be the oak.
Weber Is meaning still applicable there?
Bohm Yes, because meaning is to sustain your existence rather than to change it.
Weber The problem is this: in giving that explanation, you are already using a teleological framework. Suppose scientists do not accept that and say that
the development can be explained in terms of the first two causes only, i.e. the material cause and the efficient cause?
Bohm Well, thats a rather limited range, and it wouldnt serve to explain quantum mechanics, which is fundamental.
Weber In what way would it fail to explain it?
Bohm Quantum mechanics has no causal explanation. It is supposed to be one of its virtues that it is entirely random and statistical and therefore there is
no explanation. It has no explanation of time, how one moment becomes another. That is, quantum mechanics is a theory of one moment, of one
measurement, and theres a statistical probability of getting a certain result. Then you drop whatever you have done and start out with the next
measurement, and apply statistics again. It does not explain how you get from one measurement to the other or in fact why or how any measurement
produces the result that it does. It says the formula will give you the probability and thats all there is to it.
Weber But then you dont have efficient causation in quantum mechanics, or even material causation.
Bohm In a way, thats what they say. You have no causation except a statistical one or perhaps, in Heisenberg, who has put in the idea of potentiality. But
that does not make the causation very clear; it just says in some vague sense that the potential is capable of acting in a certain way and gives the
statistics of that action. It doesnt really discuss cause as such.
Weber Isnt that all the more reason for someone not to bring in the formal and final cause? If quantum mechanics says there is no justification for any
kind of causation, why bring it in at all?
Bohm What kind of justification does one want? Simply to say that quantum mechanics has been unable to give a cause of it? I would have an explanation
of the electron in the following terms: it is constantly forming and dissolving in a similar way, and what is behind it is this formative cause; that is, a
formal and a final cause constantly tending to form.

Weber How do you visualize that?

Bohm We might think that the present wave function is the description of a very small part of the formative field of the electron, or the system. This, at any
rate, is my suggestion. Quantum mechanics has narrowed down what it can discuss and says: thats all. Nothing else exists, and thats all that can
possibly be studied. Im proposing that we study something else; for example, the succession of events. Let us interpret the wave function differently
as representing a description of the formative cause, but as having some sort of meaning which would also tie in with things like the non-local
correlation. There would be a meaning connected with the whole system as well as with any one part.
Weber Where would the formative cause and the meaning come from?
Bohm Where does the wave function come from? Its just simply proposed by Schrdinger and a few other people and they say if you work with it it will
give you an answer. Nobody explains it. There is always an assumption, in every theory, from which you derive the rest of the theory.
Weber Youre suggesting that what the formative causation, and the notion of the formal and final causes would add is explanation, meaningfulness,
context and philosophical content.
Bohm And possibly some other content, so you could handle a broader range of questions.
Weber Can you give an example?
Bohm Time, for example. Present quantum mechanics cannot handle time. It can only discuss one moment, compute the probability of that moment, then
take another moment and compute its probability, and so on.
Weber All of it discrete, whereas your proposal would provide a binding whole in one large context. To return to the same question, is there meaning in
the non-human world, the world of nature, and in the universe as a whole?
Bohm Thats what Im proposing; not only that there is a meaning to it, but rather that it is meaning. We began by proposing that human consciousness
is its meaning, not to say that it has a meaning, but it is its meaning. According to what it means, that is what it is.
Weber What it means to whom? To us? Or to some other context?
Bohm Lets think about ourselves for a moment. If we say something has a meaning, who is the person to whom these meanings are being attributed?
Weber To the individual, to the subgroup, to the culture
Bohm What is the culture but a whole set of meanings? If you change the meaning, you have changed the culture. If you change the meaning of the life to
the individual, he is different.
Weber People get around this by saying Meanings are subjective, they have a place in the human world, but not in the subatomic world or in the
cosmological world.

Bohm We have a hidden meaning perhaps and we should explore meaning there too.
Weber Thats what you are saying. Youre extending meaning to the large, to the small and to the in-between, which is the human scale. You say that
meaning is being. One can see that in the psychological world and in the social world quite clearly, but less so in the physical world.
Bohm If the electron were determined by a meaning, that would be its being. If there is a formative cause for the electron, the formative cause is what the
electron is.
Weber But one might question the validity of the analogy. The fact that the meaning of the human being is its being you can document, and youve done it
with many good examples, from psychosomatic medicine, for example. But it is much harder to see in what way the meaning of the electron becomes
its being, because the electron doesnt assign its own meaning the way a human being does.
Bohm I dont think the human being assigns his meaning. I think it happens naturally.
Weber Is its being, youre claiming.
Bohm Yes, it is its being. To propose that we assign meaning presupposes another being who decides what the meanings are going to be for him. I dont
think anybody functions that way. That is, hes got his meanings from the culture, from the society, or else from his perceptions, and so on. He doesnt
choose his meanings; he is his meanings.
Weber It is clear in the inner domain. What is not clear is, is it analogous? Since we attribute meaning to the world of nature and to the electron, does the
electron also attribute it to itself? That would be the analogy carried through.
Bohm I think the word attribute is causing trouble. In a vague sense, of course, sometimes we can consciously attribute meaning. But in general we dont
attribute it; we simply react with meaning, as in the example of someone who perceives a shadow as a threatening figure and whose biochemistry
instantly changes.
Weber So meaning, as you are using it, is not reserved for what is self-reflective and self-conscious in a human sense.
Bohm For example, if a person is conditioned to look at things in a certain way, he doesnt deliberately assign meaning; he immediately sees it that way
and has no choice about it. He doesnt even know hes doing it.
Weber You are proposing that in the subatomic world, something like that also happens.
Bohm Its primarily unconscious in the subatomic world. If we say that 99.99 per cent of our meanings are not conscious, we dont choose them, they
just take place. Thats the analogy. I would say that the degree of consciousness of the atomic world is very low, at least of self-consciousness.

Weber But its not dead or inert. That is what you are saying.
Bohm It has some degree of consciousness in the sense that it responds in some way, but it has almost no self-consciousness.
Weber Is it possible to state what the meaning of that kind of being is? You started to say that time has something to do with it, and coherence and
development.
Bohm Yes, the coherence of large systems. The formal and final cause determine fundamentally what a thing is. They determine how it acts, how it grows,
how it sustains itself, where it will end, what it will become, and what it gives rise to. Therefore, that is what it is, right?
Weber And youre saying that this is really embedded within the subatomic and cosmological world itself?
Bohm Yes. My proposal is that everything is of that nature. The wave-function resembles information with meaning and is much more than a description
of things as hard material objects. Its multi-dimensional character is a sign that it cannot be put into ordinary space but that meanings are specifically
multi-dimensional. Therefore in this view space and time themselves would be some kind of meaning. We attribute meaningour minds attribute
meaningin a certain way, even if not consciously. But that meaning infuses its intention and action towards the world. In so far as theres a
consistency between these two, then that system has some stability.
Weber So one philosophical import of this view is that nothing in the universe, and that includes the domain of nature, is neutral or value free in the
positivistic sense.
Bohm In so far as meaning is value, yes. There may be all kinds of implicit values, in the way things behave.
Weber To simply describe them in the positivistic fashion is not to understand them, according to this view.
Bohm Yes. That would be to see them outwardly.
Weber And mechanically. In that case, the inner impulse that you are describing, the telos, is then overlooked and not understood.
Bohm Yes. There is an interesting pointeven in mechanics and physicsthings can always be looked at in both ways. The laws of Newton, which we
look at as mechanical and causal, when put into Lagrangian form, take a teleological form which is equivalent to saying that the particle now moves to
minimize a certain function called a Lagrangian which is integrated over time. It has to do with long periods of time as if it had an end in view to keep
its Lagrangian as small as possible. The interesting point is that not all of Newtons laws take that form. Its possible to get many equations that cannot
be put in that form; all the laws having to do with the fundamental particles take that form, which suggests that that form has some importance. It has
never been explained why that form should be there. Most physicists always start with the Lagrangian

nowadays; we must find a Lagrangian, its a sort of universal principle. But why there should be a Lagrangian, nobody ever says, or can say.
Weber What is the significance of this?
Bohm It would be part of a view that says that the whole principle of movement is that it contains this end in view, so that it would be quite natural to put
the laws in that form. There are some laws, when put in that form, that are indistinguishable from laws of a mechanical nature.
Weber So that the mechanical laws can mask or cover up these teleological ones.
Bohm They are a special case of the teleological laws. It will not work the other way round.
Weber But to you, the teleological laws are primary and the mechanical laws may in fact be teleological, the universes way of implementing its purpose. Is
that the idea?
Bohm Yes, that is what I am proposing.
Weber So the cosmology youre proposing is meaning, inherently.
Bohm Yes. In that sense, meaning is the essence of reality.
Weber Thats a marvelous thought. If someone were to try to pin you down and say What is the meaning of it: is it development, is it self-awareness
through time and variety, what would you answer?
Bohm We have to discover that. There is no fixed meaning. That is its characteristic, that there is no final meaning. The whole point of meaning is that the
content is in a context, which in turn is in a context, and therefore meaning is not final. We are always discovering it, and that discovery of meaning is
itself a part of the reality.
Weber The discovery of meaning, and the creation of meaning. Of course the question is: Do we discover meaning or do we create meaning?
Bohm We can look at it both ways. We discover meaning in some sense, but whatever we discover we also create some idea as to how we are going to
put itthe way it is going to be abstracted from the context.
Weber In your earlier implicate order philosophy you proposed terms like intelligence, order and compassion when applied to the universe as a whole.
Would those be a part of the meaning of the universe as it unfolds itself?
Bohm Yes, intelligence is part of this process of the perception of meaning. In fact when you say I understand you really say T see the whole meaning of
this.
Weber You say that if meaning changes, being changes. Does this mean that as we understand, as this holomovement understands itself more deeply and
more in detail through history, its being becomes clearer or fuller?

Bohm Yes. A change of order. Any change of understanding is a change of being, at least of the creatures who are doing it and of all that they affect.
Weber Isnt this analogous to Hegel?
Bohm Yes, I think the point Hegel made was that analysis doesnt necessarily mean breaking things into bits, but rather unfolding the meaning. He made
the interesting point that analysis is at the same time synthesis, because when you have unfolded the meaning, the being has changed and something has
been added to it. It unfolds a meaning which is another order of being.
Weber Thats the synthesis.
Bohm Yes, the analysis is at the same time a synthesis.
Weber It also unifies things.
Bohm There is a larger being which includes the analysis and the material analyzed. Instead of saying that the analysis is just about the thing analyzed, the
analysis is a change in the thing analyzed.
Weber So this links change, permanence, development and significance, all in one?
Bohm Yes.
Weber You are after all a quantum physicist. Is meaning in some way analogous to energy, or could it be like the charge on matter?
Bohm No, information is a very condensed form of meaning that has to be unfolded. Information by itself may be irrelevant or just wrong, but information
is the form within, virtually. But obviously that form as the meaning is not complete without the whole meaning and all the contexts spreading
indefinitely. So the concept of information is very limited without adding and bringing in the meaning.
Weber Concepts in particle physics, like spin or charm, would be limited and you are saying they are true, but there is more meaning than that. What
would be appropriate words besides development or time that one could apply to those?
Bohm I dont know. The point is that we think of these meanings as signasomatic, in the sense that the significance affects the soma. The spin, the
significance of spin, implies some somatic consequences. The result of observation is to change the meaning and therefore change the being. There is a
great analogy between how analysis, which adds further meaning, is a change of being, and the observation adds some meaning and therefore theres
a change of being. It gives a good image of how the observer and the observed are one.
Weber Thats an example of the claim that the observer and the observed are one?
Bohm Yes. The point about meaning is that once you bring in the signasomatic side of meaning you can see that meaning is the observer. Thought
producing meaning is the observer, but the observer is the observed, because that meaning is inseparable from the somatic and it

unfolds immediately into consequences which are observed, hence physical.

Weber It illustrates in what way the observer is the observed, but it also leaves open what being is because you are saying that being is knowing about
being.
Bohm Being and knowing are inseparable.
Weber Exactly.
Bohm Meaning is something like the form which informs the energy, so it will actively direct the energy and shape it.
Weber This view assigns a highly active role to human beings. Isnt that the implication of what you are saying?
Bohm Yes.
Weber Every time meaning changes for us, weve changed what being is for us.
Bohm Yes, and also what it is in itself; the whole being of whatever being is, has changed. The question is: How important is the change, and we dont
know that. But at first you might say because it is so small it is not a very significant change. But the size of the change is not always significant.
Weber A so-called small effect can have far-reaching consequences?
Bohm Yes.
Weber You used an example yesterday of size as a poor indicator of importance; people said, if we just split one or two atoms, thats nothing.
Bohm Yes, they might have said This can have very little effect.
Weber And they were wrong!
Bohm I dont know if they said it, but if they had said it, that would have been an analogy.
Weber I was going to ask you at what level of organization meaning comes in, but thats obviously the wrong question, from what weve been saying.
Bohm Meaning organizes everything.
Weber If somebody would use meaning as a synonym for cosmic intelligence or cosmic mind or something like that, how would you respond?
Bohm Mind and matter are inseparable, in the sense that everything is permeated with meaning. The whole idea of the somasignificant or signasomatic is
that at no stage are mind and matter ever separated. There are different levels of mind. Even the electron is informed with a certain level of mind.
Weber Its a beautiful and poetic metaphor, but specifically in what way can one say that the electron is somehow infused with mind?
Bohm In so far as any meaning determines what it is, how it acts and so on, it is behaving in a way similar to how a mind acts.
Weber As a philosopher I can see that this part of your work, your implicate order philosophy, relates to historical philosophy in

several ways. I think the developmental side is reminiscent of Hegel, but the new concepts of somasignificance and the signasomatic really evoke Spinoza.
Like him, you conceive matter and consciousness as two aspects of one being.
Bohm Yes. We havent penetrated that ultimatelythe mystery of it may go furtherbut as far as I can see consciousness contains a self-awareness.
This sort of process without self-awarenessits hard to know if you would call it consciousnessbut you can call it a kind of mind in the sense that
the computer is almost a kind of mind. This would be far more subtle than a computer, but it would still not be self-aware.
Weber It would be aware, but not aware of being aware.
Bohm Yes.
Weber That comes in at higher levels of organization. One can see how this works by applying it to a human organism; there its more clear-cut. For every
state of mind theres a state of body and vice versa, like in Spinoza.
Bohm Its also very subtle levels of being, within the implicate order, which may not even be located in the body, in the sense that it may be affected,
rather as Sheldrake is suggesting, by fields which are not local.
Weber These fields affect us and we affect them; its a mutual interpenetration and exchange.
Bohm Yes.
Weber Are you proposing something like a meaning field?
Bohm Yes, thats exactly it. You could say (and Sheldrake seems to agree with this) that the morphogenetic field is a field of active meaningmeaning in
the signasomatic and somasignificant sense.
Weber It may sound naive, yet somebody might ask How did it get there?
Bohm One theory is that it accumulates gradually. In discussions with Sheldrake, for example, one idea that has come up is that meaning is constantly
operative at different levels. It works from the implicate to the explicate, but there is also a projection out of the implicate to the explicate and an
introjection back into the implicate order. If we keep on introjecting similar content, it will build up a certain meaning.
Weber So the meaning field is the consequence both of an inner impulse which somehow it is, and of what it has undergone in history, and in human
consciousness.
Bohm One can see that in human beings clearly; if nature is similar to us, then it should be happening there too.
Weber That is one of the beautiful aspects of this world view. It envisions a universal coherence and points to an all-encompassing principle that runs
throughout the system; it doesnt just start at the human or organic level. You are saying that it exists on all levels.

Applied to the very large scale, what would a cosmologist say, for example, of the constant making and unmaking of galaxies and stars?
Bohm We havent gone into it sufficiently to see how it would work there. The universe is supposed to have started from this big bang. We might say that
that is the formation of a certain meaning and a certain structure of meaning which unfolds. There could be other universes, within this sea of infinite
energy. Lets look at basicsmeaning, energy, matter and, ultimately, self-awareness. Meaning infuses and informs energy, giving it shape and form.
Now a certain from is matter, which is energy which has stabilized into a regular form, more or less stable, with some independence. But there must
be a meaning that is behind it. In terms of quantum mechanics I would say there will have to be some development of the wave function beyond the
present theory which is just what that is, i.e. it would be a formative cause, a field of meaning.
Weber The field of meaning would be displayed, to use your terminology, by the explicate or the material.
Bohm Yes, that is the display.
Weber This is the point on which people are going to have to shift in their thinking: it doesnt only have meaning when it comes out of the enfolded order;
meaning runs through the implicate order as well as the explicate order, at all levels.
Bohm Yes. In fact you could think of the whole series in seeing one level of the implicate as the signasomatic consequence of the next level, which is less
subtle, right?
Weber Yes.
Bohm There could be many levels, an indefinite set of levels of implication.
Weber Would the signasomatic principle function all the way through?
Bohm Yes, because something is somatic relative to something which is more subtle.
Weber So this would function in the non-human world, the subatomic world, too, and would apply at all the levels of implication, inner and outer.
Bohm Yes.
Weber Its dazzling and one cant help but draw the conclusion that you are saying: This is a universe that is alive (in its appropriate way) and somehow
conscious at all the levels.
Bohm Yes, in a way.
Weber Thats what I take this to mean.
Bohm We dont know how far the self-awareness would go, but if you were religious, you would believe it in the sense of God, or as something that
would be totally self-aware.
Weber You mean, as a whole. The question is: Is there a significance to the holomovement as a whole?

Bohm Yes, that is a question of what proposal we want to explore. People have, in effect, been exploring notions of that kind in religions. One view is to
say that the significance is similar to that of ourselves in a sense that Christians would say that God is a person.
Weber Or, anyhow, a being.
Bohm Well, they say three persons, the Trinity, which are one. Anyway, its something like a human being, or rather the other way around; that man is the
image of God. That implies that there is a total significance. If you say Atman, in Hinduism, something similar is implied.
Weber Atman and Brahman, seen as identical; the micro- and the macrocosm.
Bohm Yes, and Atman is from the side of meaning. You would say Atman is more like the meaning. But then what is meant would be Brahman, I
suppose; the identity of consciousness and cosmos.
Weber Looked at from the so-called subjective side it would be Atman; that would be the meaning. And what is meant is the objective.
Bohm Meaning in this sense that the somasignificant and signasomatic unite the two sides. This claims that the meaning and what is meant are ultimately
one, which is the phrase Atman equals Brahman of classical Hindu philosophy.
Weber Its an identity-thesis claim. To relate this again to what some of the great philosophers of the past have said: somasignificant and
signasomaticarent they your way of working out your own creative concepts for what Spinoza meant by mind and body, and what Hegel meant by
subject and substance?
Bohm Yes, this is a way of understanding how these are related, extending the understanding, or extending the meaning.
Weber It has plagued philosophers through the ages that there are these two ways of apprehending reality. You are proposing that signa and somatic are
somehow the very fabric of everything in the universe and that this gets expressed in appropriate ways at different levels of organization.
Bohm Yes, and that the bridge is the energy which creates the soma and regulates it and so on.
Weber Lets pursue this idea of a bridge of energy.
Bohm The energy which is informed with meaning.
Weber Would it be right to call that the efficient cause?
Bohm Yes, I think that is the nearest to Aristotles efficient cause. The soma is the material cause.
Weber And the signa is the formal-final cause?
Bohm Yes. The somasignificance would be the formal-final cause. The significance is both the form and the end.
Weber So psychosomatic implications, of which you gave examples earlier, hold true even on the cosmological scale?

Bohm Yes.
Weber Could one put into words the idea of a meaning or a purpose for all this? You once suggested greater clarity of the universe about itself.
Bohm That could be part of its end. Maybe an end of greater order, greater clarity, an end to create something.
Weber So that meaning and being become transparently clear to the organism at all the levels of itself?
Bohm That would be part of the end. I dont know how to put the end yet. The end could be said to be love, it could be said to be order, harmony, but
the end could also be said to be the process itself.
Weber Spinoza would have liked that. He said that the universe doesnt have to have a reason, it is, and thats enough. Although you start out from
physics, your view seems to be similar to that.
Bohm Yes, because its not to say that it has a meaning, but it is its meaning. We are trying to be more clear as to what this meaning is, because then it
will have changed our being.
Weber You are a physicist, yet so much of this sounds like what a mystic would say: that in the mystical experience there simply is profound and selfevident meaning, without utilitarian overtones. Isnt that what you are saying?
Bohm Yes, utility is only a small part of meaning. Utility is a meaning, but its a rather restricted meaning. The question is: Useful for what? It always
occurs in some contextwithout the context we cannot discuss utility.
Weber Archibald MacLeish defines poetry in that way. He says: A poem should not mean but be. So the meaning is its being. To shift to another
question: are time, history and development necessary for the evolution of form and consciousness?
Bohm That needs exploration. Somebody like Krishnamurti and some other people like the mystics would say that it has nothing to do with it. That is one
approach. On the other hand, we have to understand the meaning of time more deeply. We have hardly touched it so far.
Weber As a human species, you mean?
Bohm Yes. We have to see more deeply the meaning of timethe relation between time and the timeless. What is called eternity does not mean all time,
but what is beyond time. Is there meaning beyond time? That is one of the questions. Perhaps the mystic would say that there is.
Weber In fact, the mystic would say that the profoundest sense of meaning arises beyond time.
Bohm And that meaning is being beyond time.
Weber That is the classical mystical position.
Bohm But time is also meaning and the question is How are the two related? I think that we have hardly begun to touch that.

Weber Would you care to make some tentative statement about how time is related to meaning and being?
Bohm In so far as meaning is telos, which we will now put in terms of time, it may be something deeper than that, beyond time.
Weber Of which this is just the outcome.
Bohm Yes. We havent fully understood what time isto see how it emerges from what is beyond timethat is one of the questions that needs
exploration.
Weber How would one even begin such an exploration?
Bohm For example, we could consider orders that are beyond time, from which the time order might emerge; an implicate order that is beyond time that
would be possible to have a sub-order of time emerging from it.
Weber It would be beyond time, yet be the source of it in some way?
Bohm Yes.
Weber Would this be the super-implicate order or beyond that?
Bohm It might be beyond that. There would have to be an implicate order from which time itself emerges. The distinction between the significance and its
somatic consequences is one which we make in thought only. They merge and flow into each other. But time itself arises out of that sort of distinction
because we say theres meaning and the endin so far as the end is not yet realizedis time. If the end were immediately realized, we would not
have time.
Weber Time is like the expression of the gap between this being and its becoming, that being.
Bohm Yes. If we say that there are enfolded in being potential ends which are not yet realized, that begins to provide the ground for time.
Weber If we look at it cosmologically and philosophically, it brings up the question, Is there something incomplete or unrealized in this whole cosmos that
would bring about this gap between what being is and what its becoming will bea necessary enfoldment of it?
Bohm In so far as meaning is incomplete it inevitably implies time. The mystic might say that perhaps the total is complete and does not involve time, but
that there is another set of meanings which is not complete which does involve time. Here it becomes a question of value. The mystic might place the
highest and supreme value on the one that does not involve time and may tend to give much smaller value to the one that does. On the other hand, we
must explore that to see if the mystic is always right.
Weber All the more so because your whole philosophy seems to grant genuine status to the world of history and changing development as part of the
meaning of the whole thing.
Bohm Yes. See, there is a kind of meaning that is incomplete, and the question is what is its value? Thats our first question. The mystic may be
undervaluing that.

Weber Filtering it out as if it were an accident of the universe.

Bohm At least, a great many mystics may do that. On the other hand, in the Christian tradition, and the Jewish one probably, time and history have a very
great significance.
Weber Your implicate order philosophy says that genuine understanding of the holomovement requires one to look at both the temporal and what is
beyond time, together. You are suggesting a synthesis, a holist approach to this question.
Bohm Yes. If we were to take this view of Hegels about analysis, that analysis is the enfoldment of what is to be analyzed, and that at the same time is a
synthesis. It enriches the thing, it adds to the thing that is being analyzed. It adds meaning and therefore adds being.
Weber So concerning the question raised earlier, Do we discover or do we create meaning? it is as if in discovering it we create it or create it in us.
Bohm Not only that, but we enrich it; we create something which has not been there.
Weber We add to it.
Bohm Yes. We are a part of it and it is part of us.
Weber Since any meaning that we grasp in it changes its being, this makes us partners in the evolution of the universe?
Bohm Yes, thats the proposal. Therefore if we take that complete universe of the mystics and let it unfold in time, then that unfoldment is similar to
analysis. It unfolds what is implicit. As Nicholas of Cusa said, eternity both enfolds and unfolds time. We may add that unfoldment enriches what was
enfolded. It adds meaning to it and therefore being.
Weber Since the point of departure of your whole philosophy is not crude materialism to begin with, being transcends the visible, the tactile and all that.
Bohm Yes, and space and time. In fact the visible and the tactile are the outcome of meaning, in this generalized sense.
Weber They are derivative, and the generative orders are these invisible realities.
Bohm Yes, at least in some sense; if we see the meaning of something, that thing has in some way been changed. But the question is: How significant is the
change? That is something that needs to be explored. You say that is a small change, probably, but it may not be so small in its full implications.
Weber You are proposing that its magnitude is overlooked.
Bohm Magnitude may not be the significance.
Weber I dont mean quantity-wise, but its significance.
Bohm Its significance is overlooked. Teilhard de Chardin has proposed something like this; when you study science it gives an account and explains
everything except the human being in his essence. One view of it is to say thats not a very important oversight. Or else

one may say, gradually well take care of it. But the other view is to say that though it looks small, it may be that it reveals what is much more significant.
Weber Is there an analogy in the world of physics?
Bohm Just what I said earlier, i.e. those small atoms disintegrating, revealing something much more significant.
Weber What does all this imply for the human world? Looking at the universe in this way changes our lives in what way?
Bohm Its hard to say at first, but it will clearly imply something very different, a different attitude in the sense that we wont give that much primary weight
to the external and the mechanistic sidethe side of fragmentation and partiality. Also, it encourages us much more toward a creative attitude, and
fundamentally it opens the way to the transformation of the human being because a change of meaning is a change of being. At present we say
because of the confused fragmentary meanings we have a confused fragmentary being, both individually and socially. Therefore this opens the way to
a whole being, in society and in the individual.
Weber It also seems to bring in ethical responsibility, because if we are, or can be partners in, helping to transform being through our meanings, wouldnt
that imply that what we think and feel counts?
Bohm It counts. When you say responsibility, the key word is response. Nobody can be responsible who is unable to respond. If you ask somebody who
is unable to respond to be responsible, you have not responsibility, but probably guilt. As long as the meaning is confused, nobody can respond to all
this. His response is going to be very limited and therefore that responsibility is very limited.
Weber To relate it to human psychology and transformation, the key seems to be the Socratic maxim Know yourself, go inward, and also Observe.
Bohm And also outward. The outward and the inward are one part of one total meaning.
Weber You are really saying our being is meaning. The whole world is meaning.
Bohm Yes. The being of matter is its meaning; the being of ourselves is meaning; the being of society is its meaning. The mechanistic view has created a
rather crude and gross meaning which has created a crude and gross and confused society.
Weber This view, your view, would make human beings feel rooted and have their dynamic place in the whole scheme of things.
Bohm At least they would have a chance to find it there. Its a view within which it makes sense to observe to find out where your place is.
Weber Beautiful!