PhA 118 - Aëtiana Volume Three - Studies in The Doxograpical Traditions of Ancient Philosophy PDF
PhA 118 - Aëtiana Volume Three - Studies in The Doxograpical Traditions of Ancient Philosophy PDF
PhA 118 - Aëtiana Volume Three - Studies in The Doxograpical Traditions of Ancient Philosophy PDF
Volume Three
Studies in the Doxographical Traditions
of Ancient Philosophy
Philosophia Antiqua
A Series of Studies on Ancient Philosophy
Previous Editors
J.H. Waszink
W.J. Verdenius
J.C.M. Van Winden
Edited by
K.A. Algra
F.A.J. De Haas
J. Mansfeld
C.J. Rowe
D.T. Runia
Ch. Wildberg
VOLUME 118
Atiana
The Method and Intellectual Context
of a Doxographer
volume three
Studies in the Doxographical Traditions
of Ancient Philosophy
By
J. Mansfeld and D.T. Runia
LEIDEN BOSTON
2010
This book is printed on acid-free paper.
LCCN: 96042463
ISSN 0079-1687
ISBN 978 90 04 18041 3
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in
a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical,
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Fees are subject to change.
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii
Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi
i. foundational studies
. Doxographical Studies, Quellenforschung, Tabular Presentation and
Other Varieties of Comparativism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
J. Mansfeld
. Physikai doxai and problmata physika in Philosophy and Rhetoric:
From Aristotle to Atius (and Beyond) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
J. Mansfeld
. Xenophanes on the Moon: a Doxographicum in Atius . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
D.T. Runia
. Chrysippus and the Placita . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
J. Mansfeld
The nineteen articles collected in the present volume were published over
a period of twenty years, from to . They document stages on
our path to understanding, interpreting and reconstructing the remains
of the doxography of ancient philosophy. They may also now function as
a companion collection to the two earlier volumes of Atiana.1
Of course we have not reprinted all our scattered articles on the
doxographical traditions. The study published in Aufstieg and Niedergang
der Rmischen Welt in had to be excluded because of its length,2 but
its absence is to some extent compensated by the inclusion of article
in the present collection. Other papers not included are preliminary
versions of chapters in Atiana Volume II, part I,3 a paper dealing with the
contents of a single lemma only,4 and another which provides a general
introduction to doxography.5 We decided to omit this last paper because
pages briefly introducing the reader to what in our view doxography re-
presents are duplicated in several papers found in the present collection.
These introductory sections have been retained because it is not to be
expected that readers will read the papers in succession, that is to say,
study the book from cover to cover.
In addition, we continue to be convinced that information about the
basics of doxography remains much needed in some quarters. Two exam-
ples can be given. The author of a book on ancient philosophy recently
in W.W. Fortenbaugh, and D. Gutas, eds. (), Theophrastus: his Psychological, Doxo-
graphical and Scientific Writings, New Brunswick, ; D.T. Runia, A Difficult Chap-
ter in Atius Book II on Cosmology, in A. Brancacci, ed. (), Philosophy and Doxo-
graphy in the Imperial Age, Florence, .
4 J. Mansfeld, Illuminating What is Thought. A Platonist Placitum on Voice in
FOUNDATIONAL STUDIES
chapter one
Jaap Mansfeld
the DG and its reverberations as cause to effects, we may say that the
effects have persisted while the cause has largely been discredited, or even
forgotten.
Let me sketch first to what extent the DG is an instance of QF.5 A
variety of this technique is concerned with the identification, and in
as far as possible the reconstruction, of related lost works by means of
the identification and comparison of corresponding passages in extant
works, or even of extant works as a whole. The results may be pictured
by means of a genealogical tree diagram.6
Comparing such corresponding passages in a number of later authors,
and one whole extant work, Diels posited and edited a lost common
source, the Placita of a certain Atius whom he dated to the st cent.
ce. His main sources for Atius are the Placita of Ps.Plutarch (dated by
him to the nd cent. ce), and corresponding passages in the mutilated
Eclogae Physicae of Stobaeus (th cent. ce), the extant chapters of which
as a rule have preserved more Atian material than the corresponding
chapters of the Epitom of Ps.Plutarch. He also identified several passages
* in the Graecarum Affectionum Curatio of the Christian Theodoret (also
th cent. ce) as deriving from Atius; in fact, Theodoret is the only
author who has preserved the name of this otherwise unknown person.7
Diels printed the corresponding passages in Ps.Plutarch (to the left)
and Stobaeus (to the right) in tabular format, that is to say in parallel
columns, crowned with an elegant horizontal brace which symbolizes
the original source.8 At the feet of these columns he printed passages
from later authors who as he believed had excerpted Ps.Plutarch, and
passages from Theodoret and others who as he believed had excerpted
Atius. It should already be noted that this procedure in fact fails to
amount to a reconstruction of the original source; what it resembles most
is an orderly presented collection of fragments which, basing itself on the
extant Ps.Plutarch, attempts to reproduce the layout of the lost work.
Scholars belonging to the generation before Diels, among whom his
Doktorvater Usener but also Zeller previous to , believed that the
corresponding passages in Ps.Plutarch and Stobaeus derived from a lost
work which was already available to Cicero, Varro, and numerous other
5 The genesis and methodology of Diels theory are analyzed at length in the first two
chapters of MansfeldRunia .
6 For Diels cladistic classification see MansfeldRunia , .
7 Thdt. Affect. II., IV., V..
8 More on this still popular technique below.
doxographical studies, quellenforschung
12Meineke , Volkmann .
13See now Runia a, arguing against Gransson . But it is indeed impossible
to be certain that Arius Didymus is the same person as Augustus court-philosopher
Arius, so his exact date is anyones guess.
14 Timpanaro ; Cameron . Though e.g. in early nineteenth century compar-
ative biology this term has some of the connotations of a Platonic Form, in the actual
practice of stemmatics it simply became ancestor, though the feeling that this ancestor
was better than its copies / descendants of course persists.
15 Cf. his use of the term archetype in a letter to Wilamowitz of January
our book had been published, for instance, that I stumbled across the
important but seemingly forgotten work of Bernheim, in which stem-
matics, the study of interrelated texts, and source criticism (QF) are put
on a par as a matter of course, and important examples are cited also
outside the field of classics.18
moreover is very good on how to practice QF and on how to avoid its pitfalls; von
Gutschmid , though informative, is less good. For a critical account of QF on the
ancient historians see Brcker . Also see the excellent remarks of Peter , ,
and Wachsmuth , . [A successfull and conscious recent use of the technique
of stemmatics and trees for the history of the transmission of a treatise of Archimedes is
found at Knorr , ff.].
19 The sources for or related to Atius are now discussed at requisite length in Mans-
feldRunia chs. ; the editions used are Mau and Lachenaud for
Ps.Plutarch (and Mras for Eusebius), Daiber for the Arabic Ps.Plutarch
Diels did not have, Wachsmuth and Hense for Stobaeus, Raeder for
Theodoret, Maass , for Achilles and Morani for Nemesius. A new ed.
of Ps.Galen is a desideratum (one still has to use that in the DG). The recent attempt of
Lebedev, and , to refute Diels is refuted MansfeldRunia , . For
examples of reconstructed Atian chapters see n. below. The second volume of Atiana,
of which a draft version exists, will contain inter alia a reconstruction of At. II, but it
would be premature to describe the principles on which this edition is based [Atiana II
has now been published: Leiden, ].
20 Diels view of Hippolytus has to some extent been revised by Osborne , Mans-
feld b, and Mueller . More research on the Presocratic sections is desirable. For
the Arabic traditions related to Hippolytus see Rudolph , .
21 DG . On two occasions Theophrastean fragments are found straddling
22 Where the doxographies that since Diels are ascribed to Theophrastus are con-
cerned, scholars who are quite severe in other cases, accepting as fragments only pas-
sages where a philosophers name and / or the title of one of his works is found, tend to
be soft-boiled. Fortenbaugh et alii are justified in printing only explicitly attributed
fragments, though they would have done their public a favour by including a section
containing doxographical dubia, even at the price of including (references to) a consid-
erable number of Atian lemmata. Their collection, after all, claims to include sources
for Theophrastus influence.
23 Steinmetz , Wiesner ; Mansfeld b (also for the relation to Cic. Luc.
).
24 Diels , .
25 Zeller . Also cf. McDiarmid on the Presocratic principles.
26 Mansfeld a, , Mansfeld a.
27 On Aristotelian dialectic Baltussen (bibliography ); Algra ,
of the gods. Chs. IV. are concerned with what the soul is, the num-
ber of its parts, the substance and location (category of place) of its regent
part, its motion, and the issue of its immortality, name-labels being added
throughout. The complicated placita on the earth (III.) ultimately
depend on Aristotles discussion at Cael. II., even as to part of their
contents and a remarkable item of the vocabulary used, and so on.31 My
working-hypothesis for Theophrastus Physical Tenets is that it was a sys-
tematic collection of the problematic tenets of the physicists (and of some
doctors) according to genera and species, that he applied the method of
diaeresis, and availed himself of the question-types and the arrangement
according to categories. We have an explicit testimony that he also added
the required objections (enstaseis);32 traces of this procedure are still to
be found in Atius, e.g. I. Diels.
In the extant treatise De Sensu (topic-oriented, of course),33 deal-
ing with theories from Parmenides to Plato, Theophrastus applies the
method of diaeresis throughout. The main and explicitly stated division
(already in Aristotle) is between those who believe cognition is by like
and those who assume it is by unlike. But another division (not in Aris-
totle) also plays a part, viz. between those who be[23]lieve there is a dif-
ference between sense-perception and thought, and those who do not.
Furthermore, within each group the members are arranged according to
the number of senses postulated (category of quantity). The last philoso-
pher to be discussed is Democritus not Plato. This is because, according
to Theophrastus, Democritus has it both ways, arguing both that cogni-
tion is by like and that it is by unlike, and so fails to fit the main diaeresis.
This structure, viz. a division of representatives on either side of an issue
followed by one or more exceptional tenets is not typical of Aristotles
dialectical overviews, but it is entirely similar to that of numerous chap-
ters in Ps.Plutarch, so also in Atius.34 It clearly is Aristotles methodology
as revised by Theophrastus which determines the general layout of large
sections of the Placita. The proem of Atius (at Plu. FA) explic-
of the doxographical treatise, but this is far from certain; see n. below, and Mansfeld
.
34 Mansfeld . Exemplary discussion of the structure of several (newly recon-
itly states that according to Aristotle and Theophrastus and almost all the
Peripatetics the perfect human being has to be concerned with problems
in both physics and ethics; examples are provided.35
That a collection of this nature including tenets of post-Theophrastean
provenance was already available to Chrysippus is proved by a fragment
of the latter concerned with the location of the souls hgemonikon, or
regent part (an important issue in Hellenistic philosophy and medicine)
quoted verbatim by Galen.36 This collection already went beyond Aris-
totle and Theophrastus in that, like Atius, it clearly brought out the
profound disagreement (antilogia, or diaphonia)37 among the experts;
Chrysippus explicitly dwells on this feature, and exploits it for his own
ends. The structure of numerous Atian chapters is that of a diaeresis,
with the emphasis on disagreement, while odd tenets, or tenets which
do not easily fit the general structure, are listed at the end. Accordingly
the tenets are more important than the name-labels affixed to them, and
so these name-labels more often than not are cited in a systematic not a
chronological sequenceas already in Theophrastus De Sensu and, one
must add, as also often in Aristotles dialectical discussions.38
Diels also failed to take the possibility into account, at least not in a
consistent way, that already before Atius more than a single tradition
existed, or mutually diverging witnesses belonging to the same tradition
may have been available (just as, [24] though to a far smaller extent, they
are available today). Furthermore, those who contributed to the tradition
(like the tellers of tales,39 or the performers of epic song in an oral tradi-
tion) were in no way obliged to preserve the material found in their pre-
decessors unchanged. Handbook literature serving a practical purpose
has to be updated and revised, and will mirror the needs and fashions
of the time.40 Though Diels certainly did notice this (he had to explain
the addition of Hellenistic tenets, for instance) his main purpose was to
Diels also neglected the precedents for the Peripatetic dialectical dis-
cussions in Plato and even before Plato.44 Collections of views were
already composed by two Sophists, Hippias and Gorgias, and it may be
argued that Plato and Aristotle among others used them, and were influ-
enced by them. Hippias put together a topic-oriented anthology of related
views in both prose and verse, which were derived from the poets as
well as from what came to be called the philosophers.45 By assembling
related views from the old poets down to just before his own times Hip-
pias emphasized agreement and continuity. Echoes of this approach are
to be found in Plato and Aristotle.46 Gorgias, on the other hand, stressed
the disagreements to be found with the philosophers which were insolu-
ble in his view, thus anticipating the skepticizing Placita literature.47 The
philosophers, so he stated, could not agree whether the things that are
were one or (infinitely) many, whether they were generated or ungener-
ated, and whether motion does exist or not exist. He amusingly went on to
argue that all were wrong. Both Plato and Isocrates provide lists arranged
according to the number and nature of things that were assumed, a fea-
ture that we also find in Aristotle and others. Isocrates list at Antid.
is much more complete than Platos at Sph. ca and db
(so cannot derive from this dialogue), and at the end he adds Gorgias
himself who assumed that there was no principle at all.
What should be noted is that Plato and Aristotle combined the ap-
proaches of Hippias and Gorgias, and added to the material collected by
these predecessors. Indeed, a presentation according to similarity (e.g. a
list of the views concerned with how many and what things there are) may
be combined with one according to disagreement: just show that these
views do not agree among themselves.48 In his later dialogues Plato, who
had begun his career as a sort of Socratic Sophist, turned more and more
to the great masters of the past, discussing and adapting their ideas the
better to go beyond them, and we may well believe that he had studied
the original works of, for instance, Anaxagoras, Parmenides, Heraclitus,
(?) Nat. Hom. , Isocr. Hel. (ca. bce), X. Mem. I.. (t.p.q. ca. bce), Isoc.
Antid. ( / bce), Pl. e.g. Sph. ce and db.
48 E.g. Sph. ca.
jaap mansfeld
Zeno, and Empedocles. Still, his approach to these past masters was
coloured by their reception in the Sophistic works mentioned above,
and also by their interpretation by lesser follo[26]wers.49 Above all note
that what we have in Plato is not doxography but a form of dialectic,
and that the more or less rigid schemes which underly his expositions
are presented in the course of imaginary conversations among civilised
people, not as ingredients of a systematic treatise. Yet I believe that more
research into Platos treatment of the views of his predecessors in the light
of later developments is needed; insight can be provided by hindsight.
Aristotle converted Platos urbane approaches (and Hippias and Gorgias
presentations) into a discipline, viz. dialectic, which follows a set of
specific rules, and it is from this discipline that doxography qua genre
stems.
A few words of warning may be added. The doxographical tradition as
implicitly defined by Diels in the DG is strictly limited to the physical part
of philosophy: Theophrastus at its beginning, with at the other end Atius
who, too, deals with physics only (Plu. Plac. E, our purpose being
to hand down the physical theory,
.). In the course of more than a century of scholarship, however,
its meaning has become quite diffuse. Since then the term has not only
evolved to include general overviews in the fields of ethics, physics and
logic (including epistemology),50 but alsooddly enoughcome to
mean the systematic Darstellung der Lehre, as in the new berweg.51
Overviews in the field of ethics did exist in antiquity; and we have
noticed above ( ) that Aristotle recommended the collecting of doxai
concerned with problems in ethics. Examples thereof are indeed to be
found in his ethical writings.52 But a doxographical tradition dealing
with ethics as a whole in the manner of an Atius never existed, and
the designation as doxography of the remains of the literature belonging
to the genre On Sects (Peri hairesen) dealing with ethics is a sort of
solecism,53 though probably an ineradicable one which, moreover, may
for a systematic doxographical handbook (lost) dealing with ethics, which he attributes to
Arius Didymus. This has been universally rejected. For the On Sects genre see Mansfeld
b, , with references to earlier literature.
doxographical studies, quellenforschung
54 Above at (Top. I.) and n. . On the other hand, one could argue that Diels
use of doxography is too limited in view of Aristotles precepts. But there is no evidence
for special works dealing with ethical, or logical, doxai or areskonta, e.g. no trace of an
thikai Doxai.
55 Algra ; this division was written down by Chrysippus, and its revised form by
others, not so much for the sake of the record as that my own view may become clearer
and more firmly established when these others have been presented first.
57 For Chrysippus dialectical procedures see Tieleman , .
58 The debts of classics to theological scholarship are acknowledged by e.g. von Gut-
schmid , , Wachsmuth , .
59 E.g. the medievalist Scheffer-Boichhorst ; for mathematics see Heiberg ,
. Further cf. e.g. the introduction to Mommsen ; for the so-called minor
ancient chronicles Mommsen , a magnificent rival of the DG.
60 For what follows see MansfeldRunia , .
jaap mansfeld
61 La Bruyre, Les Caractres ch. ., already protested against Casaubon and his
followers: Lon na gure vu jusques prsent un chef-duvre desprit, qui soit louvrage
de plusieurs: Homre a fait lIliade, etc.
62 Evidence of a kind is now available for the succession myth of the Theogony (conve-
nient overview at West , ), but these Oriental parallels are not Hesiods sources
but distant relatives; they show that his epic to some extent belongs with a widespread tra-
dition. On Oriental motifs in Early Greek literature (including Homer) see Burkert ,
.
63 Lachmann , , accepts die Wolfischen Untersuchungen ber die ursprng-
liche Gestalt der Homerischen Gesnge and sets out to prove that the th. cent. epic
aus einer jetzt noch erkennbaren Zusammensetzung einzelner romanzenartiger Lieder
entstanden sei.
64 See above on the Gospels, and , on Atius.
doxographical studies, quellenforschung
believed that a compilation of Posidonius was made by Asclepiodotus who, in his turn,
was compiled by Seneca; but Setaioli , , who argues in favour of the (pre-Ps.-
Plutarchean) vulgata dossografica and ib. for a plurality of sources is almost
certainly right. Besides, Seneca was very much his own man. Also see next n. for Cicero
in one of his letters.
66 Boyanc (= , ), followed by Lvy , wrongly assumes that the origin
Obbink submits that Piet. is Ciceros source; in our present context this is irrelevant.
72 Boyanc .
73 Boyanc (= , ) points out that in some cases the Greeks had read the
Romans, but for Sextus (not among his examples) this is most unlikely.
74 Harder , who of course has Plotinus in mind. I have argued in a similar vein at
passages in Cicero, Philo of Alexandria, Seneca, and Plutarch can only be explained
against the backdrop of a commentary tradition.
doxographical studies, quellenforschung
into account.
79 E.g. his objection that in a paper almost entirely based on the tenets concerning
the soul and first and foremost dealing with the Sitz im Leben of the placita in general I
omitted to discuss the whole of Cic. Luc. .
80 Lvy , .
jaap mansfeld
.
92 Mainly inspired by Friedrich Schlegels Ueber die Sprache und die Weisheit der Indier
of ; see e.g. Timpanaro . For the differences between the Schlegel brothers and
Bopp see Timpanaro .
93 Bopp , .
94 Bopp .
95 Timpanaro , ; for the view that Schleicher was rather influenced by natural
sciences such as comparative zoology see e.g. Koerner , but cf. Hoenigswald ,
. Schleichers final tree is redrawn at Koerner , after p. .
96 Schleicher at Koerner . Reproductions of the trees of Lamarck, Darwin
97 Yet I have read somewhere that Karl Jaspers still believed that the orangutan is a
degenerate human.
98 On the Aristotelian essentialism of Linnaeus and others see Ridley , .
99 On Darwinss predecessors and early followers see esp. the critical accounts of
Bowler , ; also Crombie , . (Of course this does not mean that
catastrophies did not play a role).
100 Bowler , , .
101 Cf. Oehler .
jaap mansfeld
102 A form of adaptation from outside moreover was provided by the commentary
tory chapters in the Cambridge Companion to Presocratic Philosophy and the Cambridge
History of Hellenistic Philosophy (in press [see now below at Bibliography: Mansfeld a
en b]). I have tried to keep the unavoidable overlap to a minimum, and apologize
for the frequency of reference to earlier contributions by D.T. Runia and myself.
doxographical studies, quellenforschung
Bibliography
Jaap Mansfeld
I. Physikai Doxai
che System des Straton, SBBerlin , f., repr. in: H. Diels, Kleine Schriften ed.
W. Burkert, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft , f., he speaks of the
eines Poseidonianers.
jaap mansfeld
Seneca Natural Questions, Book Two, Salem New Hampshire: Ayer Company , 2,
ff. For a preliminary argument in favour of see my paper cited supra
(n. ), n. .
9 Taurus ap. Philop. Adv. Proclum . Rabe = Theophrastus Phys. op. fr.
as he believes derives from Theophrastus, but he does not say when this occurred. Ibid.,
, he derived the lemmata concerned with the physician Asclepiades (late nd to
early st cent. bce), the most recent doctor to be mentioned by name in the Placita,
from the Vetusta Placita; see also the reference in the index nominum s.v. Asclepiades:
ultimus (scil., medicus) in vetustis Placitis. In his later paper Ueber die Excerpte von
Menons Iatrika in dem Londoner Papyrus , Hermes (), ff., he argued
that Anonymus Londinensis is to be dated to the time of Domitian or Trajan and derives
from the 1
of Alexander Philalethes, who for the earlier history of the theories
concerned with the aetiology of diseases used Menons 1& -. J.H. Waszink,
Tertulliani De anima, Amsterdam: J.M. Meulenhoff , * f. n. , correctly points out
that Diels is not clear about the history of the relations between the medical and the more
strictly philosophical historiographical traditions, but fails to notice that Diels actually
does assume that medical doctrines were incorporated in the Vetusta Placita.
A new edition of Anonymus Londinensis is being prepared by D. Manetti, see her paper
Note di lettura dellAnonimo LondineseProlegomena ad una nuova edizione, ZPE
(), ff., and her note on the papyrus and its contents at Corpus dei papiri filosofici
greci e latini (CPF), Parte I: Autori noti, vol. *, Firenze: Leo S. Olschki Editore ,
ff., where she argues that the attribution to Meno is merely an ancient guess, to be
compared to, e.g., the attribution of the Nicomachean Ethics to Nicomachus (Cic., De fin.
V ), and that the workas Galen admitscirculated as one by Aristotle. This sounds
fair enough; however, if the title of the workcomposed by either Aristotle or one of his
early pupilsoriginally was 13 , Meno must have been as real a person
as Nicomachus. See now also D. Manetti, Autografi e incompiuti: il caso dell Anonimo
Londinese P. Lit. Lond. , ZPE (), , where it is argued that the work is
an authors draft.
16 Cf. my paper cited supra, n. .
jaap mansfeld
17 See J. Mansfeld, Aristotle, Plato, and the Preplatonic Doxography and Chronogra-
phy, in: G. Cambiano (ed.), Storiografia e dossografia nella filosofia antica, Torino: Tirre-
nia Stampatori , ff., reprinted in my Studies, op. cit. (supra, n. ).
18 Cf. supra, n. . I refrain from discussing the De sensibus, on which J.N.M. Baltussen
layout of the later Placita moreover conforms to the rules laid down by
Aristotle. One may therefore assume that Theophrastus is important as
an intermediary source between Aristotle and the Placita. The best work-
ing hypothesis available at the moment is that Theophrastus set about col-
lecting the materials in a systematic and complete way20 and made this
collection available to colleagues and pupils, whereas Aristotle compiled
an overview of tenets whenever the need arose in the context of a scien-
tific discussion (he may of course have made such overviews for his pri-
vate use when working on one of his pragmateiai). The lost monographs
and epitomes dealing with individual philosophers listed in the extant
bibliographies of both Aristotle and Theophrastus may have served as
intermediary source material.
It is part of Aristotles method in the school-writings, when engaged
in the dialectical discussion of a topic or a problem, to avail himself from
time to time of the method of dihairesis in order to provide an orderly
overview of the doxai that are relevant, and to stipulate what are the dis-
agreements and what the views which are held in common. This tech-
nique was used by Theophrastus as well; the instance that is problably
most familiar is the diaeresis, in the De sensibus, between those who hold
that perception is of like by like and those who hold that it is of unlike by
unlike. In the Placita literature, too, the doxai are arranged according to a
diaeretic pattern,21 and each separate chapter as a rule is concerned with
a specific problem in natural philosophy. Elsewhere, I argue that a prede-
cessor, or several predecessors, of the Placita was/were compiled by fol-
lowers of the Skeptical Academic Arcesilaus, who plundered Theophras-
tus collection of physical doxai but by no means this collection only, and
who used the method of diaeresis not for training purposes only, let alone
in order to further the solution of a problem in philosophy or science,
but in order to produce a deadlock, viz. an antilogia (), or dia-
phonia ().22 As a matter of fact, the remains of Diels Vetusta
20 Using Aristotles school-writings, other compilations that were available, and the
original works of the natural philosophers (and presumably of some doctors).
21 See D.T. Runia, Xenophanes On the Moon: A doxographicum in Atius, Phronesis
Placita, and the chapters of the Placita of Atius that survive, most of [69]
the time present the doxai in such a way that although the diaeresis is far
from complete the diaphonia is brought out quite effectively.
According to Aristotle, the person who embarks on the discussion of a
problem should proceed in an orderly way. He should establish what the
genus (
) of the matter is, e.g., whether it is a question in one of the
theoretical disciplines, such as physics, or in ethics. Furthermore, various
aspects must be distinguished and treated separately, viz. whether or not
the object of the inquiry has a certain attribute or not, the reason why
it has this attribute, the existence or non-existence of the object of the
inquiry, and its substance or definition. The categories play a crucial part
in this connection, because it is of major importance to establish to what
category (substance, or quality, or quantity, or place, etc.) the object of
inquiry and its attributes belong. Locomotion, for instance, belongs with
the category of quantity or with that of place,23 shape (0) with that
of quality,24 and motion/change in a more general sense may belong with
the categories of doing and being affected.
Discussions of problems in Aristotles school-writings often avail
themselves of varieties of this checklist, for instance in the De caelo.25 We
shall see that clusters of chapters in the Placita are structured according
to this methodology.
In a passage in the Rhetoric Aristotle advises the student of rhetoric
to employ such a checklist as well. This passage clearly was seized upon
by the rhetoricians and so acquired an importance that is quite out of
proportion to the modesty of its original position. Hellenistic and later
theories of stasis (!, type of controversy) are heavily dependent
on this Aristotelian methodology. The rhetoricians moreover accepted
Aristotles distinction between theoretical and practical issues as defined
in the Topics (so this work did not lie unread in the cellar at Skepsis).26
But they refined this by making a further distinction between the general,
or theoretical, practical issue and the particular practical issue which is
the proper domain of the orator; or rather between the general theoret-
ciel, Paris: Les Belles Lettres , cx ff. For Cael. B see infra, VII.
26 One may object that they used Theophrastus Topics rather than Aristotles, but the
original copy of Theophrastus Topics must have been in the cellar too. But even if they
used Theophrastus rather than Aristotle, they must have used a part of Theophrastus that
can no longer be distinguished from the corresponding part of Aristotle.
physikai doxai and problmata physika
The locus classicus concerned with the four main types of inquiry, or
four main questions that should be formulated at the beginning of an
investigation, is at Arist. APo. B .b:27 [71]
27 Note that at Top. A (quoted infra) Aristotle says one has to begin with the what
Israeli: A Neoplatonic Philosopher of the Early Tenth Century. His Works Translated with
Comments and an Outline of his Philosophy, Scripta Judaica I, Oxford: Oxford University
Press , ff. (for Alexander of Aphrodisias cf. infra, n. ). See also C. Hein, Def-
inition und Einteilung der Philosophie. Von der sptantiken Einteilungsliteratur zur ara-
bischen Enzyklopdie, Europ. Hochschulschr. R. XX Bd. , Francfort: Peter Lang ,
ff. (Das Vier-Fragen-Schema), who adds further evidence from Arabic sources to
that collected by Stern. One may cite David and Elias, both deriving from Olympiodorus
lost Prolegomena. See David, Proleg. philos. . ff., following Aristotelian prescriptions
that on each theme the following four main inquiries have to be made: + 7 (exis-
tence), 8 (substance/definition), 9 8 (attribute) 3 8 (cause);
in what follows he discusses all four questions at considerable length. Elias formula is
similar, Proleg. philos. .. Compare Philoponus, who In phys. . ff. refers to the
Analytics passage, and ibid. . ff., where the 3 is subdivided into the four Aris-
totelian causes. Further Simplicius, e.g. In phys. . ff., . ff., and Sophonias, In De
an. . ff., also for a further refinement. (The Simplicius, Philoponus and Sophonias
passages to the best of my knowledge have not been cited in the relevant literature). The
formula concerned with the four types is echoed at Trophonius ap. Rabe, Proleg. syll.
.; cf. also ibid., ., .. A number of further rhetorical parallels are quoted
by H. Rabe, Aus Rhetorenhandschriften, Rhein. Mus. (), . Note that David,
Elias, and others under the influence of later developments (as attested, as I believe, by
the stasis doctrine) list the main types of inquiry in a sequence which differs from Aris-
totles original one and which is indeed easier to understand. For an earlier parallel of the
sequence beginning with existence in a scholastic passage in Clement see infra, text to n.
. Plotinus sticks to Aristotles original order, see infra, n. . On the use of the four
types of inquiry in theological contexts (in Philo, in Plotinus, and in Jewish and Arab
philosophers) see D. Kaufmann, Geschichte der Atttibutenlehre in der jdischen Religions-
philosophie des Mittelalters von Saadja bis Maimuni, Gotha , repr. Amsterdam: Philo
Press , ff., and Stern, op. cit., ff.; cf. also infra, n. , n. , and text thereto.
A somewhat different list according to the categories, important because early, is found
in Stob. II (Ecl. eth.) . W. as I believe that in all decency I ought to investigate
the substance first of all, and then the quality pertaining to it and the quantity, and
following upon these the relative, I think that we should consider including in our
inquiries the views of othersnot of all of them, but of those who disagree about these
things (: 8;
& 8 <
, = & >& , 80
,
@ 3 = 8 , ! >
!, A B !). The author (or excerptor) omits the
inquiries concerned with existence and cause. See further below, n. and text thereto.
28 Note that Philoponus, David and Elias (see previous n.) explain 6 as 9 .
For the way Aristotle deals with these types of inquiry in apodeictic see APo. .a ff.
29 This may coincide with definition cf. APo. .a, in all those cases it is clear
that the what it is is the same as the why it is, and APo. .a ff.
30 This example corresponds with the theme of a chapter in At.: II , on the eclipse
of the sun ( 8 :). Cf. also APo .a ff., which however is about
the eclipse of the moon, for which cf. At. II , 8 -.
physikai doxai and problmata physika
sun) is eclipsed we stop, and if from the start we (already) know that it is
eclipsed we do not seek whether. When we know the that, we seek the why,
e.g. knowing that it is eclipsed, and that the earth moves (?), we seek why
it is eclipsed, and why it moves.31 Now while we seek these things in this
way, we seek some things in another waye.g. if a centaur32 or a god is
(i.e. exists) or not; I mean if one is or not simpliciter and not if one is white
or not. And knowing that it exists, we seek what it is, e.g. what is a god? or
what is a man?33
Aristotle here says that the four types of question are divided into subsets
of two questions each, and that these must be applied to different kinds
of topics.34 [72] We shall see presently that later authors tend to put them
on a par and to assume that in principle they are all equally applicable to
whatever topic you may encounter, although it is not always necessary
to deal with each separate question. Aristotle himself, as we shall see
and as is appropriate for someone who thinks as he writes and comes up
with original ideas, uses the types of inquiry in different ways in different
contexts.
One should moreover note that in the passage from APo. quoted
above the question concerned with the that is put in the whether . . . ,
or not form, that is to say, is formulated as a disjunctive question, and
that the example of such a question provided by Aristotle is an issue in
the domain of physics. The question if it exists may of course be stated
31 Because according to Aristotle the earth does not move (see infra, VII), one should
problably both times insert - before .
32 For the centaur as one of the emblems of the nonexistent see G. Sillitti, Tragelaphos.
(see below); for their presence in a page of Galen see infra, text to nn. and . Cf.
also infra, text to n. , text to n. .
34 Alexander of Aphrodisias attempts to make another division into subsets, In top.
. ff. (including Arist. fr. Rose3, also printed at W.D. Ross, Aristotelis fragmenta
selecta, Oxford: Clarendon Press , f. ~ fr. Gigon, cf. infra, n. ). Alexander,
referring to Aristotles lost !, first points out that physical problems
dealing with the question 3 are not dialectical but adds, .: dialectical
problems occur in relation to physics too, just as in relation to ethics and logic, but
those of one kind are dialectical, and those of another kind physical (3 E 8
7 !, 3 E A !). Dialectical problems are all those which are
reduced to the inquiry regarding the that it is and whether it is, which are two of the four
(reference to APo. .b ff. follows); for the (questions) why it is and what it is are
not dialectical problems. See H. Throm, Die Thesis. Ein Beitrag zu ihrer Entstehung und
Geschichte, Rhetorische Studien H. , Paderborn: Ferd. Schning , ff. I think that
Alexanders problem is that Aristotelian collections of Problmata existed (each of which
as a rule is introduced by the formula 3 ) which are not dialectical in the gymnastic
sense, a solution being quite often provided.
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in the same form: if it exists, or not. But also the other questions may
be formulated more fully. The question what it is allows for a whole
series of alternatives: is it p, or q, or . . . ?, and need notas in the
two instances, man and god, provided by Aristotle as quoted abovebe
restricted to the category of substance. The question why, too, opens
up a larger perspective: is it so because of x, or of y, or . . . ? When
alternatives are possible, the available doxai that are relevant may be
taken into consideration.
Aristotle is quite clear that one need not always put all the questions.
As to the 6 and the , he says in the passage quoted above dealing
with the eclipse that when you already know the that you immediately
ask for the why. A converse instance may be quoted from an ethical
context; here Aristotle says that only the questions concerned with the
that are relevant and those concerned with the why are not (Eth. Nic.
A .b ff.)35
We may now turn to two important passages in the Topics. In the first
of these, Top. .b, Aristotle gives a descriptive definition of the
dialectical problem:
A dialectial problem ( . . . ) is a theorem which
pertains either (genus a) to choice and avoidance, or (genus b) to truth
and knowledge (- ) . . . , on which either people have no
point of view either way, or the many have a point of view that is contrary
to that of the experts, or the experts one that is contrary to that of the
many, or both the experts and the many disagree among themselves.36 For,
the understanding of some problems is useful with a view to choice and
avoidance, e.g. whether pleasure is to be chosen or not, and that of others
with a view to knowledge only, e.g. whether the cosmos is eternal or not
( 9 F G).37 [73]
cosmos did or did not come into being and whether it is imperishable or perishable, first
going over the assumptions of others . . . ( 3 B
F
= F (scil., 9 ), 3
= 5-). Extensive dialectical discussion follows. It is the theme of a chapter
in Atius: II , whether the cosmos is imperishable (+ = 9 ), and
one of the questions in cosmology ( B ) which according to Diog. Lart.
VII are the exclusive domain of the natural philosopher: whether it is generated
or ungenerated (+ F
, scil., the ). Cf. also D.T. Runia, Philos
physikai doxai and problmata physika
De aeternitate mundi: The problem of its interpretation, Vig. Christ. (), ff.,
esp. and n. . Alexander, In top. . ff. mentions the problem that the cosmos
is eternal (6 9 , together with that it is spherical, 6 &)
as an instance of the numerous questions in physics which derive their proofs from
probabilities; for with regard to these questions it is up to the dialectician to bring about
a sort of turn and inclination towards either of the opposites (3 8
- 8 + 3 !I B 3 8 !
8 J- 8 !
).
38 This aspect of the distinction between these genera is of primary importance in
Aristotles ethics. At Eth. Nic. .a he says: the end is not knowledge but action
(
8 > 3 K); ibid. .b ff., he tells us that the present
investigation is not for the sake of knowledge (: B >
L! 8 M ' =)for we do not inquire in order to know what virtue is
( 8 : -) but in order to become virtuous. For Aristotle, ethical problems as a
rule have an immediate relevance to conduct, although he is of course aware that they
also may, and must, be treated in a theoretical way. For the parallel at At. proem see
infra, V; for those in Cicero infra, IV.
39 Cf. the passage from Top. quoted above.
40 For the good cf. Eth. Nic. .a f., let us again go back to the good we are
the dialectical discussion of place () in the Physics. In the first sentence of Phys. ,
.a, Aristotle states that, as regards place, the should know whether
it is or not (+ 7 F -this is because Zeno of Elea denied that place exists), what
kind of existence it has ( 7, a corollary), and what it is ( 8). Its
existence is then proved but its manner of existence and definition remain difficult. See
K.A. Algra in the revised version of his Utrecht dissertation of (where see ff.,
esp. ff.): Concepts of Space in Greek Thought, Philosophia antiqua , Leiden: E.J. Brill
, ff., esp. ff., who provides a detailed analysis of the dialectical argument of
Phys. .
physikai doxai and problmata physika
and infra, n. .
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philosophers (say), some saying that the first principle is air, others that it
is water.48 If more than one, either finitely or infinitely many; and if finitely
many and more than one, either two or three or four or another number,
and if infinitely many, then in the manner of Democritus . . . , or . . . , or
. . . .49
The question-types are also at issue at De an. .a, the aim of
our inquiry is to study and understand its (scil., the souls) nature and
substance, and secondly its accidents. That the soul exists is taken for
granted. Its definition/substance is to be the first subject to be investi-
gated; the inquiry into its accidents according to the other categories is to
follow. The souls substance50 and what [76] may be, or has been, attributed
to it are the subject of the inquiry which in De an. ff. begins with a
dialectical discussion involving the views of other experts. It is clear that
for Aristotle himself the question-types may to a certain extent overlap
with, or include, the categories.
According to the famous opening words of Aristotles Rhetoric, this art
is the counterpart of dialectic. I need not describe in detail here that one
of Aristotles points is that the forms of argument one uses, or should
use, in rhetoric are similar to those one uses in dialectic, the paradigm
corresponding to induction and the enthymeme to the syllogism; at Rhet.
A .b ff. he refers to the Topics, i.e. to Top. A . An important
observation concerning the resemblance between rhetoric and dialectic
is found at Rhet. A .a ff. Aristotle here makes a distinction between
general topoi and those which apply to specific fields of inquiry. Some
51 Note that Aristotles terminology is not always the same; the 6 7translated
an sit by Quintilian, see infrahere does not pertain to the attributes but to existence
(elsewhere indicated by the + 7). The reason may be that the existence of events is
much less a matter of speculative theory than that of the aether, or of a god.
52 For what follows cf. Throm, op. cit. (supra, n. ), passim; B. Riposati, Studi sui
Topica di Cicerone, Ed. dell Universit del Sacro Cuore, Ser. pubblicaz. , Milan: Societ
Editrice Vita e Pensiero , ; S.F. Bonner, Roman Declamation in the Late
Republic and Early Empire, Liverpool: University Press of Liverpool , ff.; R. Mller,
Die Wertung der Bildungsdisziplinen bei Cicero, Klio (), ff.; and Runia,
op. cit. (supra, n. ). Both Riposati and Runia cite further literature. For Hermagoras
see D. Matthes, Hermagoras von Temnos , Lustrum (), ff. (the
fragments have been edited by Matthes as well, Hermagoras Temnitae Fragmenta, Leipzig:
B.G. Teubner ). On the theory of ! see R. Nadeau, Classical systems of stases
in Greek: Hermagoras to Hermogenes, GRBS (), ff., and L. Calboli Montefusco,
La dottrina degli status nella retorica greca e romana, Hildesheim: Olms . On the
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affinity of this division with that of the types of inquiry in science and
dialectic is obvious. One may note, however, that the question pertaining
to the definition is not included in this passage, and that the question of
the that is subdivided into questions concerned with the categories of
quality and quantity (or importance).
Quintilian cites the passage. In his historical report about the views on
! (stasis, type of controversy) of diverse rhetorical authorities at
Instit. orat. III far too long to quote entire53, he cites Aristoteles
in Rhetoricis who, he says, distinguished (a) does it exist (an sit),
(b) what is it like (quale), and (c) how big and how much it is
(quantum et quam multum sit), .. I have pointed out that in the
passage in the Rhetoric the question regarding the definition is lacking.
Quintilian howeverno doubt indebted to his Greek predecessors
finds it attested elsewhere in the Rhetoric, for he continues: but in one
passage he recognizes the notion of definition too, where he speaks
of defenses such as I took it, but I did not steal, I struck, but did
not commit an assault (quodam tamen loco (d) finitionis (definition)
quoque vim intellegit, quo dicit quaedam sic defendi: sustuli, sed non
furtum feci, percussi, sed non iniuriam feci).54 The reason why evidence
for the question concerned with the definition was sought in the Rhetoric
is obvious, viz. the need to have the doctrine of this work agree with
the directions for scientific research given at APo. . It is however
clear that the theory in the Posterior Analytics was the starting-point
for this interpretative move, and not the other way round.55 The appeal
precedents of the stasis doctrine in Aristotle see the various suggestions of O.A.L. Dieter,
Stasis, Speech Monographs (), ff.; R. Nadeau, Hermogenes On Stases: A
Translation with an Introduction and Notes, Speech Monographs (), f.; and
W.N. Thompson, Stasis in Aristotles Rhetoric, Quart. Journ. of Speech (), ff.
For the Peripatetic and Academic background of the distinction between
and
5 see K. Barwick, Das rednerische Bildungsideal Ciceros, Abh.Ak.Leipz. Phil.-hist.
Kl. ., Berlin , ff., and Calboli Montefusco, op. cit., , ff.
53 See the convenient overview of E.B. Holtsmark, Quintilian on status: A progym-
nasma, Hermes (), ff. Passages in which Quintilian provides examples from
natural philosophy for various types of questions are quoted by A.S. Pease, Cicero De
divinatione, repr. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft , .
54 The reference is to another book of the Rhetoric, viz. .a, E
out: First, Aristotle. He drew up a list of ten elements on which every problem seems
to turn: > which Plautus (Sergius Plautus, a first-cent. ce Stoic who translated
Greek philosophical terminology into Latin) calls essentia [. . .]; the question it asks
physikai doxai and problmata physika
is whether something exists; quality [. . .]; quantity, divided by later thinkers into size
and number, etc. ( . . . primum Aristoteles elementa decem constituit, circa quae versari
videtur omnis quaestio: >, quam Plautus essentiam vocat [ . . . ], sed ea quaeritur an
sit; qualitatem [ . . . ], quantitatem, quae dupliciter a posterioribus divisa est: quam magnum
et quam multum sit (III .)). Cf. C. Prantl, Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande,
vol. I, Leipzig , repr. Graz: Akademische Drucku. Verlagsanstalt , f. n. .
Note that Quintilian here follows the sequence of the categories (first quality, then
quantity), which became prominent after Eudorus; cf. P. Moraux, Der Aristotelismus bei
den Griechen, vol. II: Der Aristotelismus im I. und II. Jh. n. Chr., Peripatoi , BerlinNew
York: W. de Gruyter , ff. Quintilians list, too long to quote, is complete, that is to
say includes, e.g., place (the B, or ubi). The analysis according to question-types and
that according to categories to a certain extent overlap; or rather, some of the ! and
! that are usually at issue according to the rhetorical theory in fact coincide
with some of the canonical ten categories.
56 This primary distinction ultimately derives from Aristotle, see supra, III.
57 Cf. infra, n. .
58 This limitation because of the juridical context.
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62 Hermag. fr. M. ap. August. Rhet. . ff.: (on the causa finita) . . . partes cir-
(between and bce) see P. MacKendrick, The Philosophical Books of Cicero, London:
Duckworth , ff.
65 Cf. supra, n. ; infra, text to n. .
66 At. IV , + ' +- ' (whether the perceptions and
If he did, he will have said that they are matters that for the most part
are outside the province of the orator. Cicero, at any rate, suggests at De
inv. I that they are more suitable for philosophers than for orators.67
This suggestion is not original but seems to echo a point of view largely
shared by the members of the Greek rhetorical community, although the
available parallels are later. Quintilian, Inst. orat. III ., gives as one
of the current definitions of thesis the formula quaestiones philosopho
convenientes (problems suitable for philosophers). Theon, Progymn.
ap. Spengel Rhet. gr. II ., argues that theoretical theses are more
suitable for the philosophers (K S) but
that orators may sometimes use them tooas instances he cites whether
the sun is fire (+ 9 T B),68 whether gods exist (+ O),69
and whether the gods exercise providence toward the cosmos (+
B B ).70 One should further compare Hermogenes,
67 The mature Cicero, Orat. , , says that the exceptional orator may on occasion
avail himself of selected general issues; ibid., , , referring to Plat., Phdr. e,
he even wants him to be acquainted with natural philosophy (E. Granatelli,
,
5, in Apollodoro di Pergamo, Philologus (), ff., is not
entirely satisfactory). The little treatise Paradoxa Stoicorum is a rhetorical discussion of
six general theses in the domain of ethics; in his preface (Parad. ), Cicero points out: you
will sample a class of excercises that I have made a practice of employing by transposing
subjects, which are dealt with in philosophical discussions in the manner of a thesis,
into the rhetorical style that is my own (. . . genus exercitationum (i.e., progymnasmata)
earum quibus uti consuevi, cum ea quae dicuntur in scholis ad nostrum hoc
oratorium transfero dicendi genus). In a different context, Cicero argues that questions
such as e.g. sol maiorne terra sit an tantus quantus videatur (whether the sun is larger
than the earth or as large as it is seen to be) are the province of the mathematicians, just
as general ethical questions are the province of the philosophers, not of the diviners (De
div. II ). J.G.F. Powell, Cicero: Cato maior De senectute, Cambridge Classical Texts
and Commentaries , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press , , who says that
Hermagoras has gone so far as to prescribe, as subjects for rhetorical debate, such purely
scientific questions as the shape of the earth seems mistaken.
68 One of the options at At. II , > : (on the substance of the sun).
69 .; cf. supra, n. .
70 .; cf. Quint. III ., whether the cosmos is ruled by providence (an
providentia mundus regatur); also VII ., in general questions: whether the cosmos
was formed by atoms coming together, whether it is ruled by providence, whether it
will some day cease to be (in generalibus (scil., quaestionibus): an atomorum concursu
mundus sit effectus, an providentia regatur, an sit aliquando casurus ), and At. II ,
+ 7 9 V (whether the cosmos is ensouled and
administered by providence) and II , + = 9 (whether the cosmos is
imperishable). Galen believes that these theological questions are not useless, see infra,
text to n. ; the ones here cited are of course familiar from Ciceros De natura deorum,
and from Sextus, M. IX, where they are among the main topics to be treated.
physikai doxai and problmata physika
71 An option at At. II .
72 One of the issues at At. II ; cf. also Quintil. VII ., unus mundus an plures?,
. an unus mundus?, and see infra, n. , n. . Cf. also Ambrosius, Exameron .
Schenkl, although there is among them a not so unimportant issue. For Pythagoras
claims there is one cosmos; others say there are countless cosmoi, as Democritus writes,
who because he lived long ago has lost most of his authority ( . . . quamvis de ipso mundo
non mediocris inter eos quaestio sit. nam Pythagoras unum mundum adserit, alii innu-
merabiles dicunt esse mundos, ut scribit Democritus, cui plurimum de physicis auctoritatis
vetustas detulit). Quotation continued infra, n. ; the whole introductory passage of
the Exameron (cf. also infra, n. , n. ), pace J. Ppin, Thologie cosmique et tholo-
gie chrtienne (Ambroise, Exam. I , ), Paris: P.U.F. , is based on doxographical
materials transposed by means of an interpretatio christiana.
73 We should add that although Aristotle himself defines the
as the paradoxical
view of a celebrity or as an arguable view which goes against received opinion (Top.
.a ff.), he reveals that in his day the word was used to indicate what he himself
calls a dialectical problem (Top. .b f.,
E B ! 3 3
-
B). It was the common appellation that survived, but the
notion was enriched with the results of Aristotles methodological inquiries.
74 Cf. supra, n. , and text to n. .
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an sit, quid sit, quale sit. Hermagoras solus quattuor (scil., status): coniecturam, propri-
etatem, translationem, qualitatem. Translatio (!) is added by Hermagoras
to the three he takes from Aristotle, or from an Aristotelizing tradition. The names of
the others are , 6, . Fr. b M. ap. August. Rhet. . ff.: . . .
rationales seu logicae quaestiones fiunt modis quattuor. haec enim in illis quaeruntur:
an sit, quid sit, quale sit, an induci in iudicium debeat. ubi quaeritur an sit, genus id quaes-
tionis Hermagoras vocat etc.
78 We may recall De inv. I and De orat. II , where Cicero points out that the orator
had better abstain from questions such as what the size of the sun is.
79 Orat. : Aristotle trained young men in this technique (scil., of the quaestio
(quae) appellatur thesis) not for the philosophical manner of subtle discussion, but for
the fluent style of the orators, so that they might be able to argue on either side of
an issue (in utramque partem) in copious and elegant language. He also taught topics,
as he called them, that is to say, a sort of designations of arguments, from which a
whole speech can be formed on either side of an issue (locossic enim appellabat
quasi argumentorum notas tradidit unde omnis in utramque partem traheretur oratio);
tr. Hubbell, modified. Compare the subtler statement at Diog. Lart. V , he also
taught his pupils to argue about a thesis, at the same time training them in rhetoric
(
X !, Y J 8), and see
further Cic. De fin. V (part of an historical survey from an Antiochean point of
view). See I. Dring, Aristotle in the Biographical Tradition, Studia graeca et latina
gothoburgensia = Gteborgs Universitets rsskrift, vol. ., Gteborg , . For
in utramque partem disputare from Aristotle to Cicero see further J. Glucker, Antiochus
and the Late Academy, Hypomnemata , Gttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht ,
n. .
physikai doxai and problmata physika
0), edited by F. Susemihl in the Teubner edition of the Ethica Eudemea, Leipzig:
B.G. Teubner ; translation and commentary by E.A. Schmidt, Aristoteles: ber die
Tugend, Aristoteles Werke in deutscher bersetzung Bd. ., Berlin: Akademie-Verlag
Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft , 3. It has survived not only in
mss. but also ap. Stob. Flor. III .. Hense. Scholars now prefer to date this tract
to the Early Peripatos. It also exists in a revised version with Stoic additions (among which
the whole first part of the treatise): ps.-Andronicus , edited with a substan-
tial commentary by A. Glibert-Thirry, Pseudo-Andronicus de Rhodes ,
Corpus latinum commentariorum in Aristotelem graecorum, Suppl. , Leiden: E.J. Brill
. Twenty-one manuscripts are known, of which only oneCoislin (= C), from
the tenth cent.contains almost the whole work, the others preserving either its first or
its second part only. Grosseteste (whose version is to be dated before , see Glibert-
Thirry, op. cit. ) translates part as Andronici Peripatetici de passionibus and part as
Aristotelis de virtute. Glibert-Thirry prints the Greek text next to Grossetestes and as a
rule brackets the sections, found in part of the manuscript tradition, which have no coun-
terpart in the Latin version and are not attested in the earliest Greek manuscripts (viz., C
and F, the latter from the th cent.). One should however take into account that longer
and shorter versions of this work may have circulated, as is, e.g., the case for the Divisiones
Aristoteleae (for which see below). Grosseteste may have translated such a shorter version,
for he also omits passages reliably attested for part in the Greek tradition. If the parts of
the text bracketed by Glibert-Thirrye.g. the section 3 (..
Gl.-Th. = SVF III ; by no means purely Stoic) not attested in C and F and not
translated by Grossetestewere added after the th or th centuries, one must assume
that the tract was still used at the time and not merely copied.
This is not only a manual that could be used by students of philosophy, but also by
those of rhetoric, for Cic., De inv. II the end, exhibiting the same mix of Peripatetic
and Stoic thought (including a short treatment of affectio), seems to be based on it
which puts a much earlier date to it than that advocated by Glibert-Thirry, op. cit. ff.,
who apparently dates the compilation to the imperial period (she also believes that its
Aristotelian predecessor was composed not much earlier, ibid. ). I note in passing
that in both parts the method of diaeresis is applied rather frequently, and speak of
this work at some length because the various forms in which it survives show in what
ways handbooks were used and modified. What is valid for this tract is also valid for the
Placita and the Divisiones Aristoteleae. One should attempt to account for the pluralities
of traditions that are involved; the attempt to reconstruct a single Urquelle makes little
sense.
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survives in three manuscripts,81 viz. Marc. gr. , Paris. graec. ,82 and
Leid. Voss. gr. Q ,83 and ap. Diog. Lart. III .
Division nr. (in Mutschmanns numeration; not transcribed in
Diog. Lart.) has the title the problems in philosophy (3 8 V
-) in L.84 The division is into five [84] species: political, dialec-
tical, physical, ethical, and rhetorical (, , ,
\, J).85 It clearly is a descendant of Aristotles division of
propositions and problems at Top. A into ethical, physical, and logi-
cal classes;86 the finer subdivisions are not relevant in our present context.
We should note that what the Divisiones Aristoteleae calls the dialectical
problem corresponds to what Aristotle calls the logical proposition, or
problem; the instance provided, . M., is the same as Aristotles,
81 The small number of mss. shows that in later times this handbook was less popular
than ps.-Aristotle and ps.-Andronicus (see previous n.), but the inclusion of a version in
Diogenes Lartiuswhich mutatis mutandis may be compared to the inclusion of ps.-
Arist. De virtutibus in Stobaeusand the reference in the Scholia in Basilii Hexaemeron
(see infra, n. ) prove that in earlier times it was a current text.
82 P seems to be an abstract from an ancestor of M, cf. P. Boudreaux, Un nouveau
frr. (= R3) and (= R3). Edition of the text in Diogenes Lartius and
M by H. Mutschmann, Divisiones quae vulgo dicuntur aristoteleae, Leipzig: B.G. Teub-
ner , who prints the divisions that are common to Diog. Lart. and M in paral-
lel columns. L was discovered by P. Moraux, who publishes its readings (together with
those of P) in those cases where L and/or P differ from Mutschmanns text, Tmoins
inconnus des Divisiones Aristoteleae, Ant. Class. (), ff. The Divisiones Aris-
toteleae are printed as frr. (Diog. Lart.) and (M)substantially in the same form
as by Rose but with some notice being taken of Mutschmanns apparatusin O. Gigon,
Aristotelis Opera, Volumen tertium: Librorum deperditorum fragmenta, BerlinNew York:
W. de Gruyter , who fails to adduce L and oddly believes that what we have here
is a series of excerpts from Aristotelian dialogues assembled for a protreptic (sic) pur-
pose (C. Rossitto in her part of a collective review of Gigon, Elenchos (), ,
accepts the attribution to Aristotle but rejects the protreptic purpose). Commentary by
C. Rossitto, Aristotele ed Altri: Divisioni, Studi aristotelici , Padova: Antenore , who
* takes the various existing versions into account but only provides translations of Diog.
Lart. (viz. that by M. Gigante) and M. A neglected reference to nr. Mutschm. is to be
found at Scholia in Basilii Hexaemeron . (G. Pasquali, Doxographisches aus Basil-
iosscholien, Nachr.Kn.Ges.Gttingen Phil.-hist. Kl. , ff.): 8 1
+ !
A : !.
84 Ms Rossito advises me that there are no titles in P and M (except for nr. in M) and
that those to be found in the Teubner edition of M have been added by Mutschmann.
Cf. also nr. Mutschm.not in Diog. Lart. either + 3
- (L), which however is not immediately relevant to nr. .
85 Mutschmann ad loc. aptly adduces Arist. Top. A (for which see supra, III), and
Diog. Lart. V for the later Peripatetic subdivision of the parts of philosophy.
86 Cf. also Rossitto, op. cit. (supra, n. ), ff.
physikai doxai and problmata physika
viz., whether the knowledge of contraries is the same. The example of the
ethical problem is different from Aristotles; it runs whether one has to
comply with ones friends in all respects, or in some only, and in others
not ( ! F 3 E 3 E G). This
is strikingly similar to the example of a general quaestio pertaining to
conduct provided by Cic. De part. orat. , for instance if it is asked what
are the services by which friendship has to be cultivated (ut si quaer-
itur quibus officiis amicitia colenda sit), and to an ethical maxim cited
by Galen.87 For the physical problem the Divisiones Aristoteleae does not
cite Aristotles instance; instead it has whether there is one cosmos or
more than one, and the other issues of this nature ( E _ -
8 F , ` 3 B, . M.).88 It is notewor-
thy that here (and here only) the Divisiones Aristoteleae notes that more
problems of this nature are available.
We may also adduce the introductory chapters of an entirely differ-
ent work, the little Middle Platonist tract De fato wrongly ascribed to
Plutarch (which it would be interesting to compare in detail with At.
I ). The authors exposition is a bit muddled, but the scholastic
grid is still clearly visible. First, ps.-Plut. ch. , C, says that fate is
to be understood in two senses, viz. as substance (>) and as activ-
ity (8
). The same distinction is made by Nemesius, De natura
hominis , . Morani, and by Calcidius, In Tim. cxliii, .
Waszink, and may therefore be considered to be standard Middle Pla-
tonist.89 Next, ps.-Plutarch briefly describes the activity and (in ch. )
the substance, including, as subsequently appears, questions pertaining
to a number of other categories, F: . . . (this) has been said . . . about
fate according to substance; for its substance, quantity, quality, position,
and relation both to itself and to us have been briefly dealt with (O
87 Cf. supra, text to notes , and for Galen see infra, n. and text thereto. It is
clear that Div. arist. nr. provides a listing of what in rhetorical terminology are called
quaestiones infinitae, or
.
88 Whether there is one cosmos or more than one is one of the issues at At. II ,
cxliii ff. see J. den Boeft, Calcidius on Fate: His Doctrine and Sources, Philosophia antiqua
, Leiden: E.J. Brill , ff.
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. . . 0 > '
I 3 T 8
9 6
6 7 >- H& &
:K a 8 8/0 O). In ch. , the author returns to fate as
activity, a topic to which much of the sequel is devoted, especially to its
quality (F, 9
8). He says that the majority of physical and
ethical and dialectical (i.e. logical) questions are concerned with it (F,
3 3 3 - ! \3 -
3 ! b). A perfect equivalent is found in Calc., In Tim. cxlviii,
W.: we shall now speak of fate in respect of function and activity,
since numerous ethical, physical, and logical disputes are going on about
it (nunc iam de fato, quod in munere atque actu positum est, loquemur,
quippe de hoc plurimae disceptationes habuntur morales naturales logi-
cae). This is the same triad of problem-types as in the Divisiones Aris-
toteleae. A further parallel is found in Philo, Ebr. , i.e. in the last para-
graph of his rendering of Aenesidemus ten tropes, though his wording is
to some extent different: and with regard . . . to numberless other points
of inquiry, which are included in the study of logic, ethics, and physics, an
untold number of topics of inquiry have arisen (6 : & \&
&
), on none of which
up till now the inquirers have been able to agree ().
Quite interesting is also an excerpt from Iamblichus Letter to Sopater
On Dialectic ap. Stob., Ecl. II .. In this letter (two excerpts of which
survive in Stobaeus, viz., loc. cit. and II .) Iamblichus argues that
dialectic is indispensable, and he clearly includes a representative of
the Aristotelian variety, emphasing among other things its usefulness
for neutralizing or refuting the views of others. It is also useful as an
exercise, he adds, in view of forms of philosophical activity such as
arguing against a thesis, or against the teachings of the ancients (F 6
(scil., ) +
8B, F O 8! 3
!, . Wachsmuth). This thesis is the quaestio
infinita, and the teachings of the ancients are their dogmata, or doxai.
Iamblichus doxographical account of the views of the ancients in his On
the Soul, large chunks of which are extant in Stobaeus, is an application
of the dialectical method as described here in the Letter.
The information provided by these passages in the Divisiones Aristote-
leae, Philo, ps.-Plutarch De fato, Iamblichus, and Calcidius is paralleled
in the proem of ps.-Plutarch/Atius (no parallel in either Stobaeus or
Theodoret). Ps.-Plutarch first says that, because he is handing on physi-
cal theory ( . . . ), he wants to begin by providing the
division of philosophy into its parts, so that we may learn what part of
physikai doxai and problmata physika
philosophy physics is, and how large a part. He next (= SVF II ) cites
the standard definition of wisdom and philosophy according to the Sto-
ics, and then their tripartite division into physics ethics logic, adding that
physics is concerned with the investigation of problems about the uni-
verse and what is in the universe ( . . . 6 -
8 ;). Finally (DG aa), he gives the
division according to Aristotle and Theophrastus and almost all the Peri-
patetics, who say that
it is necessary that the perfect man be both a theoretician of the things that
are and someone concerned with conduct as regards the things that [85]
have to be ( . . . b ).
It is possible to learn this also from the following (examples): e.g. the
problem is ( ), whether the sun is an animal (;) or not, because
it is visible [?90]. He who investigates this problem is a theoretician, because
only what is, is the object of (this) theoretical inquiry. In the same way,
the problem may be whether the cosmos is infinite and whether there is
anything outside the cosmos (+ = 9 8 + 7 B
8). For all these (issues) are theoretical.
Again, the problem may be how one ought to direct ones life and how to
guide ones children and how to govern and how to legislate. For all these
problems are investigated for the sake of conduct, and such a person is one
who is concerned with conduct.
It is clear that this section ultimately depends on the passages in Book I of
Aristotles Topics that have been discussed above ( III). We again have the
distinction between theoretical and practical issues, with examples added
(note that ps.-Plutarch omits to speak of the logical part of philosophy
Sonne grsser ist, als er sie sieht; this corresponds to one of the options at At. II
*
but may be pure fantasy. The editors of the Greek text have variously emended 9K;
Mau brackets both words. Perhaps 9K is merely a Verschlimmbesserung which was
interpolated after B had been corrupted to . For + (9 T) B see supra, text to
n. . Whether the sun is an animal or not is an issue connected with At. II ; most
of the tenets cited make it a purely material entity, but according to II . the Stoics
(ps.-Plutarch) and Cleanthes (Stobaeus) say it is an = (intelligent ignited
mass), and what is intelligent is of course alive. I need not remind the reader of the belief
(widespread in antiquity) that the heavenly bodies are gods; for the sun as a god in the
context of a quaestio cf. e.g. Cic., Luc. . At [Plat.], Def. ab the first and third
definitions of T are, respectively: B >! (heavenly fire) and ;
7
(the greatest eternal ensouled living being). Alternatively, one
may assume that there is in At., loc. cit., only one problem, not two, viz. whether the
sun, if fire, is an animal or not.
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begin his exposition of the various ethical doctrines with the problems
(ibid. .,
E -). Stobaeus has preserved an
exposition of such problems concerned with the the end (
,
ibid. . ff.), in which he provides a generous overview of contrasting
views according to the maxim that we should consider including in our
inquiries the views of othersnot of all of them, but of those who dis-
agree about these things.91 Less generous excerpts dealing with the prob-
lems, or theseis, pertaining to the questions about kinds of good and
evil ( ) and whether each good is to be sought
because of itself (+ K 5 ') have also been pre-
served by Stobaeus, ibid., . ff. and . ff. Consequently, the system-
atic approach by means of problems and the discussion of the contrasting
views that are relevant is not a prerogative of the literature dealing with
physical placita which constitutes the main focus of the present inquiry,
but was also employed in relation with issues in ethics.
A passage of considerable importance is found in Clement of Alexan-
dria, Strom. VIII vi .. Ch. vi as a whole deals with ambiguity, diaere-
sis, definition, proof, and the ten (Aristotelian) categories.92 Clement is
91 For the full text see above, n. ad finem. The passage has been misunderstood
by H. Drrie, Der Platonismus in der Antike, Bd. : Die geschichtlichen Wurzeln des
Platonismus (Bausteine ), StuttgartBad Canstatt: Frommann-Holzboog , who
p. (Baust. .) translates ! as die sich hierin ausgezeichnet haben.
92 The chapter-title is ' - 7 B 8
+. On Strom. VIII see W. Ernst, De Clementis Alexandrini Stromaton libro VIII.
qui fertur, diss. Gttingen ; E.F. Osborn, The Philosophy of Clement of Alexandria,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press , ff.; S.R.C. Lilla, Clement of Alexandria:
A Study in Christian Platonism and Gnosticism, Oxford: The Clarendon Press , ff.;
F. Solmsen, Early Christian interest in the theory of demonstration, in: Romanitas et
Christianitas. Studia J.H. Waszink oblata, Amsterdam: North Holland: , ff., repr.
in: Id., Kleine Schriften III, Hildesheim etc.: Olms , ff. P. Nautin, in a neglected
article, La fin des Stromates et les Hypotyposes de Clment dAlexandrie, Vig. Christ.
(), ff., convincingly argues that the so-called Eighth Book of the Stromata is a
selection of abstracts from the otherwise lost final part of the work transcribed by a scribe,
and not a collection of notes made by Clement for his private use and piously published
by his literary executors. Von Arnim in the SVF and K.-H. Hlser in the FDS print
several passages from Strom. VIII as Stoic fragments (or rather testimonia). R.E. Witt,
Albinus and the History of Middle Platonism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
, repr. Amsterdam: Hakkert , ff., speculated that through an intermediate
source Strom. VIII derives from Antiochus. Cf. also the rather unsystematic study of G.
Apostolopoulou, Die Dialektik bei Klemens von Alexandria. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der
philosophischen Methoden, Europ. Hochschulschriften XX., Francfort: Peter Lang .
For the logic in Strom. VIII in relation to Middle Platonism see J. Mansfeld, Heresiography
in Context: Hippolytus Elenchos as a Source for Greek Philosophy, Philosophia Antiqua ,
Leiden etc.: E.J. Brill , ff., also for further references to the learned literature.
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as explicit as one could wish about the questions that have to be put as
a preliminary to each inquiry, vi .: one has to inquire . . . whether it
exists, what it is, what are its attributes; or also in this way: whether it
exists, what it is, why it is (
. . . + 7, 8, >;
-
I F A, + 7, 8, 8). We may note that, just as
the later Aristotelian commentators (e.g., Philoponus, Elias, and David),
Clement begins with the question of existence, but also that, somewhat
oddly, he seems to consider the inquiries into attribute and cause as viable
alternatives. He argues that settling such questions first is indispensable
to diaeresis and definition. At vi . he tells us that induction does not
show what it is, but that it either exists or does not exist, whereas diaere-
sis provides what it is. Definition, just as diaeresis, imparts the substance
and the what it is, but not the whether it exists. Proof clarifies all three,
the whether it exists and the what it is and the why it is.93 For Clements
discussion, according to these rules, of problems that are paralleled in the
Placita see Strom. VIII iv, which I have discussed elsewhere.94
It may be instructive to provide a few examples of the way the discus-
sion of a physical problem, , in literature that may be
called philosophical, is structured according to the types of inquiry per-
taining to the substance and the accidents, or attributes, as first stipulated
by Aristotle. Cic., Ac. pr. II , applies the questions concerned with the
what it is, with place, existence, quantity, and [87] quality to the soul:95
E 6 8 . 6 9 /0
& > 8
!, > E + 7, T 3 , + 7 8
3 8 .
94 See my paper cited supra, n. , ff.
95 A passage entirely parallel to Tusc. I ff., which according to Diels DG f. would
derive from the Vetusta Placita. But Diels is inconsistent; he did not attribute Ac. pr. II
to the Vetusta Placita, but DG derived it from Clitomachus.
At Ac. pr. II (introducing his discussion of problems in theoretical philosophy
which begins with the question of the principles), Cicero says: I do not mean all general
problems; let us merely consider which authority our opponent approves in respect of
the elements of which all things consist, for on this matter there is a great difference
of opinion among great men (Non persequor quaestiones infinitas; tantum de principiis
rerum e quibus constet videamus, . . . est enim inter magnos homines summa dissensio).
As a rule, the translation of quaestiones infinitas here is wrong (e.g., problems of
inifinite vagueness, Rackham in the Loeb ed.). The term must have its usual meaning of
theoretical problems. What Cicero says is that he is not concerned to investigate these
problems in full, but will confine himself to the question of the principles, and from a
Skeptical point of view at that. In actual fact he discusses quite a number of quaestiones
infinitae in physics, ethics, and logic, stopping only just before the conclusion of the
book. The remark in II is therefore best explained as a praeteritio.
physikai doxai and problmata physika
do we grasp what the mind is (quid sit), where it is (ubi sit) and last but
not least whether it exists or, as is the tenet of Dicaearchus, does not exist
at all (sitne an . . . ne sit quidem ullus)? If it does exist, does it have three
parts, as is the tenet of Plato, (viz.) reason anger desire, or is it undivided
and one? If it is undivided, (do we grasp whether) is it fire or air or blood
or, as (is the tenet of) Xenocrates, a number without bodysomething of
which one can hardly understand how it is? And whatever it is, (do we
grasp) whether it is mortal or eternal?96
A very full Greek parallelproving once again that Cicero does not apply
a rhetorical technique to a philosophical issue but that this approach was
common to both disciplinesis at Philo, Somn. I :97
What about the fourth ingredient in ourselves, the regent intellect: is
it capable of being apprehended? Not at all. What do we suppose it to
be as to its substance ( 3 > + 3 & > @)?
Pneuma, or blood, or body in generalno, not a body, we should say it
is incorporeal, or limit, or form, or number, or perpetual motion, or
harmony, or what among all that exists? [ . . . ] Furthermore: when we die,
is it put out and does it perish together with our bodies, or does it live on
for a considerable time, or is it wholly indestructible? Where (B) in man
has the intellect found its hidden abode? Does it really have a home? Some
have dedicated the head, the citadel in us, to it, where the senses have their
station too, because they thought it plausible that these should be posted
like bodyguards around a Great King. Others, convinced that it is carried
in the heart as a divine image, obstinately fight for this (other) view. So in
every case it is the fourth that is inapprehensible . . . .98
In Cicero as well as in Philo, we may notice that the method of diaeresis
is applied not only to the substance but also to the accidents.99
The technique based on a checklist of questions is also used by Cicero
elsewhere, e.g., when, at De nat. deor. I , he first opposes the view of the
majority, viz. that the gods exist (deos esse), to that of those who deny
or [88] doubt their existence.100 This is the question of the type sitne.
Those who say they do exist vehemently disagree among themselves on
the forms of the gods and their dwelling-places and residences and mode
of life (de figuris deorum et de locis atque sedibus et de actione vitae)
I , Sextus M. IX ff.
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and as to whether or not they exercise providence; these are the questions
quid and quale, and even the question ubi, as distinguished in the
Orator and the Topica. See also De nat. deor. I : I admit that the gods
exist; tell me then from where they are, where they are, how they are as
to body, soul, way of life, (concedo esse deos. doce me igitur unde101 sint,
ubi sint, quales sint corpore, animo, vita). The pattern provided by these
questions determines the treatment of the issues in the De natura deorum
as a whole.
A parallel, intriguing though brief, is found in Plotinus, Enn. VI
[]..102 Plotinus knows what the four types of inquiry are and what
they are for; he argues that they cannot be applied to the highest principle.
although
we have to accept that each inquiry is concerned either with the what it is
or with the how or with the why or with existence . . . 103
These questions are irrelevant in relation to the One. Plotinus insists that
though we tend to imagine a place and a location ( ) for
the first principle, we should by all means avoid doing so. Other questions
and attributes which have to be fended off are those concerned with the
whence and how, i.e., with origin and cause ( ), quantity
(the 6), quality (the ) including shape (-), and the relative
( =).
More detailed information is to be found in Galen, who for instance
explicitly speaks of the diaeresis of the problem. At PHP IV ., he
criticizes Chrysippus treatment of the theory of the affections in the
latters because Chrysippus did not take Platos doxa con-
cerned with the soul into account: . . . when he asks whether the affec-
101 Here meaning what they consist of . I note in passing that Ciceros questions
Ammonios: Ein Beitrag zur neuplatonischen berlieferung im Islam, Abh. f. d. Kunde des
Morgenlandes Bd. XLIX, , Stuttgart: Franz Steiner , . But these scholars have
failed to notice that also the categories (and peristaseis) of place, origin, quantity and the
relative are at issue.
103 - Y & F B 8 @ F B _ F B 3 F B
@ (Stern, op. cit. (supra, n. ), , also refers to Enn. V [].). We may note the
correspondence to the sequence as found at Arist., APo B (cf. supra, n. and text
thereto), and suspect that this is the sort of stuff Plotinus was taught by the masters whose
lectures he attended before he found Ammonius Saccas.
physikai doxai and problmata physika
use by Plato and citing passages from the dialogues; at IX . ff., he finds precedent for the
application of the method in Hippocrates, citing a number of passages from the Corpus
Hippocraticum. See further I. von Mller, ber Galens Werk vom wissenschaftlichen
Beweis, Abh.Bay.Ak. , Mnchen: Verlag der k. Akademie , ff., and R.B. Edlow,
Galen on Language and Ambiguity, Philosophia antiqua , Leiden: E.J. Brill , ff.
107 See further my paper quoted supra, n. .
108 For Galen on improfitable issues see also M. Vegetti, Tradizione e verit: Forme
fications.
112 This division is as old as Gorgias, see my paper quoted supra (n. ), f.; the
issue corresponds to At. II . See also Ambros., Exam. . Schenkl, who cites three
positions (quotation continued from that cited supra, n. ): that the cosmos as such has
always existed and will always exist is what Aristotle takes upon himself to pronounce;
against, Plato ventures to demonstrate that it has not always existed but will always exist;
most people however solemnly affirm that it has not always existed and will not always
exist either ipsumque mundum semper fuisse et fore Aristoteles usurpat dicere; contra
autem Plato non semper fuisse et semper fore praesumit adstruere, plurimi vero non fuisse
semper nec semper fore scriptis suis testificantur. Parallels in Galen other than the one
quoted infra, text to n. : Gal., De animi cuiuslibet peccat. ch. ap. I. Marquardt (ed.),
Cl. Galeni scripta minora, vol. I, Leipzig: B.G. Teubner , repr. Amsterdam: Adolf
M. Hakkert , ., and ap. W. de Boer (ed.), Corpus medicorum graecorum
V , . , LeipzigBerlin: B.G. Teubner , .; R. Walzer, Galen On Medical
Experience, London etc.: Oxford University Press , repr. , xix .. Cf. also Lucian,
Icaromenippus .
physikai doxai and problmata physika
(II) just as again some say (c) that there is nothing outside which sur-
rounds (the cosmos), and others (d) that there is,113
and of the latter (d) some say (y)114 that what surrounds it is a void which
has no substance in it,
others115 (z) that it it is surrounded by other cosmoi numerous beyond
calculation, so that their number reaches to infinity.116
The instances of diaphoniae in speculative cosmology which are provided
are given in the form of divisions, as is especially clear for that concerned
with what is beyond the cosmos:117
113 Cf. At. I , on the void ( B), and II , on what is beyond the cosmos,
whether there is a void ( B 8 B + 7
). A variety of this
question is cited as an example of a problem in physics At., proem (see supra, text to n.
). Among the instances provided by Themist. In APo. paraphr. . ff. in his discussion
of the four types of inquiry are questions concerned with the void: ., does a void
exist (` 7 ), ., the cause of the existence of a void (O B
@), ., that a void exists (6 8 ), ., what is the void ( 8
), although the void is not mentioned in the Aristotelian passage he paraphrases;
he uses standard material. The question ` 7 is also used as an example in the
anonymous commentary In APo. lib. sec. ..
114 Cf. At. I ., II ..
115 Cf. At. I . combined with At. II .; same combination, in a most significant
way, at At. proem (ps.-Plutarch only; see supra, text after n. ), at Ach. Isag. ch. , and
at Gal., De animi cuiuslibet peccat. ch. , . Marquardt = . de Boer (partly
printed as SVF II ; cf. infra, n. ), where he discusses this problem at length and
opposes the views of the Peripatetics, the Stoics and the Epicureans to one another
. = . de Boer.
116 Cf. At. I and II , where infinitely many is one of the alternatives.
117 This diaeresis is paralleled at Achilles Isag. ch. , whether there is some void
118 This is the only text I know which explicitly attributes to the Stoics the view that the
void does not contain >; that the Stoics are meant is of course clear in itself, from the
parallel at At. I ., and from what Galen says at De animi cuiuslibet peccat. , .
Marquardt = . de Boer (I follow the latters text): the Stoic affirming that there
is no void inside, but that it subsits outside the cosmos (9 E 3 > 7
@
, 7 E B 5! >). Cf. supra, n. .
119 Cf. (II) in the first passage.
120 Cf. supra, n. and text thereto, and text to n. ; note that Galen not only has the
division one v. infinitely many (as in Atius), but adds many (which is in Hermogenes
who however omits infinitely many). Cf. also Lucian, loc. cit. (supra, n. ), and the
second example of a problem in physics at At. proem .
121 Cf. (I) in the first passage and the parallel text at On Medical Experience cited supra,
n. .
122 Cf. At. II , I . f.; Lucian, loc. cit. (supra, n. ).
123 For this tripartition of practical philosophy into ethics, economics, and politics cf.
Alcin., Didasc. ., ff. and the parallels cited in Whittakers commentary, Alcinoos:
Enseignement des doctrines de Platon, introd., ed. and notes by J. Whittaker, transl. by
physikai doxai and problmata physika
P. Louis, Paris: Les Belles Lettres , f. n. ; cf. also the division of philosophy into
inspectiva and actualis at Cassiodorus, Instit. II . ff., and the tripartition of actualis
philosophia ibid., II . and . Note that Alcinous too, loc. cit., contrasts theoretical
and practical philosophy. In the Galenic passage the ethical section is represented by a
single moral precept, which is parallel to an ethical thesis in Cicero and the Divisiones
Aristoteleae, see supra, n. and text thereto.
124 We have seen above, text to n. and n. , that Theon makes the same exception.
125 For these two questions at Arist. APo. B see supra, text to n. . At At. I
most of the doxai make the gods corporeal; for the view of Epicurus that they are
anthropomorphous see At. I . and e.g. the example at Quint. VII . (= Epic. fr. ,
p. . Us., quoted supra, n. ). One of Quintilians instances of a general problem as
to quality is has god a human shape? (an humana specie deus?, VII .). Ambros.,
Exam. . Schenkl, summarizes the gist of the descriptive section of At. I or
of an account very much resembling that in Atiusas follows: . . . some believe the
world itself is god, others parts of the world, others both ( . . . alii mundum ipsum deum
putant, alii partes eius, alii utrumque; for the introduction of the Exameron see supra,
n. ).
126 In the same way, Galen often says that we may assume and indeed are aware that
the soul exists, but that its > and the question whether or not it is immortal are
beyond our grasp, see the passages cited by P. Moraux, Galien et Aristote, in: Images
of Man in Ancient and Medieval Thought, Festschr. G. Verbeke, Leuven: University Press
, f. n. ; cf. also H. Diller, Empirie und Logos: Galens Stellung zu Platon und
Hippokrates, in: K. DringW. Kullman (eds.), Studia platonica, Festschr. H. Gundert,
Amsterdam: B.R. Grner , ff. Important passage in the De propriis placitis chs.
, IV Khn (for this work see also infra, n. ).
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philosophers talk such nonsense about the size and the position of the
earth (
0)127 as to make one ashamed of the
whole profession. [92]
A number of other passages from Galen demonstrating his use of Placita
material could be quoted and analyzed as well,128 but for our present
purpose these will do.
. Place: At. II . ff., Stobaeus only, where does the cosmos have its
regent part (B 7 : 9 ); III , on the location
of the earth (
0); IV , what is the regent part of the soul
and in what is it ( 0 0 : 8 8);
Similar series are found which deal with the heavenly bodies. The prob-
lems concerned with the sun are dealt with in five chapters: on its sub-
stance, size and shape, At. II : > :, II ,
:, and II , - :. Then a chapter dealing with a
question pertaining to the sun only: II , on the turnings of the sun
( :), and finally II , on the eclipse of the sun (
8 :); these last two chapters are specific applications of the
general topic - in the sense of the categories doing and being
affected. A similar series of six chapters deals with the same set of prob-
lems relative to the moon, At. II and : substance, size, shape,
eclipse. But instead of the item on the turnings ( ) we find
two questions that are relevant to the moon only, viz. II , on the illu-
minations ( , a specific application of the general topic
- again), and II , on its appearance and why it appears
to be earthy ( 8! >0, 3 ).
A comparable series of seven chapters in Book III deals with the prob-
lems relating to the earth. The following questions are listed: substance
and quantity, III on the earth, whether it is unique and limited and of
what size ( 0 +
); qual-
ity, III , on the shape of the earth ( - 0); place, III ,
0, and III , 8 0; movement, III , on
the location of the earth ( - 0); division into parts i.e.
quantity again, III on the division of the earth (
0);
and finally a chapter dealing with a specific problem relevant only for the
earth, III , on earthquakes ( 0).
It is to be noted that the majority of chapter-titles in Atius has been
simplified to the seemingly descriptive and innocuous x type (e.g.
I , on matter, A); but study of their contents shows that they are
concerned with problematic issues. However, the wording of a sizeable
number of chapter-titles still reveals that what we have here are problems
of a specific formal type, for quite a few begin with the word +, or with
or , or with 3 , or with words such as or , or , or
, or have such terms somewhere else in their title. [94]
131 Comparing these with the parallels in Atius must be left to another occasion.
The fact that questions concerned with the fixed stars, the planets, the sun, and the
moon are not treated in the De caelo in the same manner as the questions concerned
with the earth is noteworthy. But elsewhere Aristotle reveals that he is aware that this
may be done, and that the materials were available. See Phys. B .b ff.: it seems
absurd that the philosopher of nature should know what the sun or moon is ( 8)
but should not know any of their attributes ( for this distinction
between substance and attributes see supra, III), particularly because those who (write)
about nature obviously speak of the shape (-) of the sun (cf. At. II ) as well as
of the moon (cf. At. II and e.g. Quint., VII ., is the moon round or flat or pointed,
luna globosa an plana an acuta), and devote special attention (to the question) whether
the earth (cf. At. III , and see further below) and the cosmos (cf. At. II ) are spherical
or not.
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the course of which the views of others are scrutinized at length.132 The
parallels with At. III 133 are noteworthy. [95]
Arist. Cael. B .a begins by listing three questions that have
to be answered, viz. in the categories of place, quantity, and quality: It
remains to speak of the earth, (that is to say) where (<) it is situated,134 of
the question whether it belongs to what is at rest or what is in motion,135
and of its shape ( B -).136 On these three problems and the
dialectical manner in which they are treated compare Simplicius In cael.
: he offers three issues about the earth for consideration: on its
location, where it happens to be situated, and secondly whether it belongs
with what is at rest or with what moves, and thirdly about its shape. He
first lays out the earlier doxai that have been proposed on these issues;
as Arist. in the De caelo, after the heavens and the heavenly bodies, i.e. in Book II of
the Placita? One of the possible answers, I believe, is that on the one hand III , on
earthquakes, involves the position and motion of the earth, and that on the other Arist.
Mete. B discusses winds (with in ch. an excursus on the habitable zones of the
earth, see immediately below) and ibid. earthquakes. In Atius, the chapter on winds
(III ) is separated from the series dealing with the earth by one chapter only, viz. that on
summer and winter (III ). We should also cite III . and III , which as to the issue
treated may be compared with Mete. B .a ff. (see infra, n. ). In other words, in
Atius the meteorology has been interpolated in the cosmology because the chapters on
the substance, position etc. of the earth were put before the chapter on earthquakes.
134 Cf. At. III .
135 Cf. At. III .
136 Cf. At. III .In the last sentence of ch. Aristotle enumerates these three issues
137 See my paper quoted supra, n. , also for references to the learned literature.
138 See supra, text to n. .
139 Cf. b, .
140 Those who do not seem to be Anaximenes, Anaxagoras, and the Atomists (see
b ff.) The first division is between those who say the universe is infinite and those
who say it is finite; the next is between those finitists who put the earth at the centre and
those who do not.
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eclipse of the moon or of the sun.141 Some others (7) posit another
view; although they place the earth at the centre, they (do not say it is
at rest but) have it move about the axis of the universe (O . . .
3
), as is written in the Timaeus
(b).142
In this dialectical overviewin the course of which he also pro-
vides numerous counter-arguments of his own, e.g. at a ff. against
the speculative doxai of the Pythagoreans, Aristotle again and again
emphasizes the disagreement and opposition among the experts. The
141 The tertium comparationis with the Pythagorean view seems to be that these are
8! ;
, B 8 8 B !
3 !.
Cf. Simpl. ad loc., In cael. . ff., who refers to the treatment of the differentiae and
of among other things the finding of propositions (., ! 5 ) in the
Topics.
145 For this use of the term genus see Top. A and Rhet. A , quoted supra, III.
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natural rest and the nature of earth as a whole (and not e.g. that of
objects floating on water), and the diaereses one has to apply must be
exhaustive.
He then (b ff.) goes on with (the infinitists) Anaximenes and
Anaxagoras and Democritus, who say that the flatness ( !
cf. b) of the earth is the cause of its remaining where it isviz.
in a cosmos surrounded by a firmament. For it does not cut through the
air underneath it but covers this like a lid (8!) and compresses
it. The arguments provided, e.g. the analogy with flat bodies which are
hard to move against the wind, are according to Aristotle unsatisfactory
and easily refuted; moreover, it is rather the size (
, b) of
the earth than its flat shape which prevents the supporting air from
escaping. But he has a more general pointwhich resumes the moral
of b ff.:
(b ff.): In general, the point of contention (-) against
those who deal with motion in this way is not concerned with parts, but
with something that is a whole and with all of this whole ( 6
!).146 For first of all one has to settle the question whether bodies
possess a natural motion or none at all, and whether it (scil., motion) does
not exist by nature but does so by constraint. [98]
Aristotle at some length deals with this preliminary issue, which alone
allows one to state correctly and to answer in a satisfactory way the
questions concerned with the that (6) and the why (). He again
says that the others have tried to find the cause (+, a) for the
being at rest of the earth and that for this reason some have referred to
its flat shape and size. But some others, e.g. Empedocles, have adduced
the movement of the heavens and the cosmic whirl (a ff.). Such a
view entails a doctrine concerned with the coming to be of the earth
(a ff.); indeed, all those who state that the universe has come into
being (! 6 > ) say that the earth came
together at the centre.147 Empedocles view is refuted at length by means
of the theory of natural motion and rest, which without doubt is the rea-
son why it is adduced at precisely this place. Finally, Aristotle mentions
some who say, just as Anaximander among the ancients, that it remains
in place because of the equality (9), i.e., because there is no suf-
146 For this whole which is to be treated in full see the passage from Top. A quoted
supra, III, and note the whether . . . or not form of the questions that follow.
147 Aristotle does not deal with the various explanations of the genesis of the earth that
were available.
physikai doxai and problmata physika
148 This is refuted by a special argument involving natural motion, for also fire, if at the
centre of things, will not move for the same reason.
149 As a rule Cicero uses quasi to indicate he translates difficult, technical, or unex-
We may note first that, grosso modo, this section corresponds to Cael.
B .ab, where Aristotle, as we have seen above, first describes
the heterodox cosmology of the Pythagoreans, who have the heavens,
the planets, the sun, the moon, the earth and the counter-earth circle
about a central fire, and concludes with a reference to the passage in the
Timaeus where in his view Plato has the earth move about the axis. There
can be no doubt that what is in Cicero ultimately goes back to this De
caelo passage. This helps to explain the reference to Theophrastus, who
apparently figures as an intermediary source. But some rather odd things
have happened along the lines of transmission in the tradition.
First, the view of Platoaccording to someis put on a par with that
of Hicetas; on the other handand not merely according to some but,
as Cicero says, according to no less an authority than Theophrastus
the Pythagorean Hicetas, just as Plato, put the earth at the centre of the
cosmos. Perhaps Theophrastus attempted to identify at least one of Aris-
totles some (7) at Cael. B .b. We may here add another
reference to Theophrastus (without book-title again, but attributed by
Usener and Diels to the great doxographical treatise) found at Plut., Plat.
Quaest. VIII, C (= Theophr., Phys. op. fr. ~ fr. FHS&G;
paralleled at Plut., Num. c. , D, quoted by Diels in the apparatus).
According to this passage Plato, when he had grown older, repented
(
) of having put the earth in the centre of things, because this
position of honour was not befitting to her. This information is otherwise
without parallel. At first sight, it would seem that what is reported [100]
here is an unwritten doctrine of which no other traces are to be found;
perhaps, however, we may simply assume that Theophrastuswho also
got other facts wrong at timesprovided a wrong interpretation of a
passage in a later Platonic dialogue. If Plutarch is not mistaken and
reports Theophrastus statement more or less correctly, the note about
Platos change of mind may be explained as a further comment on Cael.
151 The passage is printed by Diels as Phys. op. fr. (~ Thphr. fr. FHS&G), but he
152 Cf. J. Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy, London: Adam & Charles Black 4, repr.
The most plausible assumption is that in some way or other the absurd
tenet of Hicetas was spun out of an argument formulated by Aristotle
at Cael. B .b. Here Aristotle says that it is impossible that both
the heaven and the stars (i.e. the planets, the sun, and the moon) are
stationary if the earth is stationary too. The earth, however, must be
assumed to be stationary; accordingly, either the heavens and the set of
heavenly bodies are both in motion, [101] or the one is in motion while the
other is stationary, and conversely. This formula allows for two options,
viz. (a) one according to which the earth and the heaven are stationary
while the heavenly bodies are in motion, and (b) one according to which
the earth and the heavenly bodies are stationary while the heaven is in
motion. But from a purely logicalor rather dialecticalpoint of view
(one not concerned with saving the phenomena) a third option is open.
If one rejects Aristotles premise that the earth must be stationary and
posits that it moves, both the heaven and the heavenly bodies may be
stationary. This is precisely the tenet ascribed to Hicetas and, according
to some, to Plato in Ciceros account.
We should however take into account that the theory that the earth
rotates about (its) axis and that the sky and the heavenly bodies stand
still is three times attributed to Heraclides of Pontus by Simplicius (In
cael. . ff. = fr. Wehrli, . ff. = fr. W., . ff. = fr.
W.).153 Accordingly, the doctrine as such has not been invented by Cicero,
and it is not a mere misunderstanding on his part but derives from a
tradition. Simplicius does not quote chapter and verse, and in the third
passage cited he oddly attributes this impossible theory to Aristarchus
as well! (A better version of Aristarchus doctrine has been preserved
elsewhere in Atius, viz. at II .). We may assume that Simplicius
source of information concerning Heraclides, just as Ciceros, was a
version of the Placita (or an earlier commentatorperhaps Alexander
who is often cited by Simpicius in this commentaryusing a predecessor
of Atius). At In Cael. . ff., at any rate, the reference to Heraclides
has been tacked on to an extensive discussion, beginning at . ff., of
153 F. Wehrli, Die Schule des Aristoteles. H. VII: Herakleides Pontikos, BaselStuttgart:
Aristotles some who, like Plato in the Tim., say the earth moves about
the axis have become some who believe that Plato said such a thing in
the Timaeus.
We may now turn to the parallels in ps.-Plutarch/Atius,157 where
the problems that are interconnected in Aristotle have been neatly and
pedantically separated, [103] although some connections are still visible,
and where other specific questions have been given separate chapters.
In ps.-Plutarch, At. III has the title on the earth, and what is its sub-
stance, and how many (there are), 0 : >
;158 in Stobaeus159 it runs on the earth and whether it is unique and
finite, and of what size, 0 +
. Accordingly, a number of distinct issuescategories of sub-
stance and quantity (number, size)have been coalesced into one chap-
ter. The impression that ps.-Plutarch abridged Atius to a considerable
extent and that Atius problably did the same with his source, or sources,
is hard to avoid. In Cael. B there is no corresponding separate section,
but some of the items found in ps.-Plutarch correspond to points touched
upon in passing by Aristotle.
156 Tr. of Ac. pr. II : the earth, . . . which revolves and twists about its axis with
extreme velocity [. . .]; and this, according to some, is also the view stated by Plato in
the Timaeus, though a shade more obscurely; tr. of Cael. B .b: some say
that although the earth lies at the centre, it winds, i.e. is in motion, round the axis that
stretches right through, as is written in the Timaeus.
157 For the list of chapter-titles relating to the earth see supra, VI ad finem.
158 So the ms. followed by Mau in the Teubner edition; Diels only prints 0.
159 For Stobaeus, only the titles survive; the text (except for III .) is lost. Theodoret
does not adduce At. III. This means that the chapters cannot be adequately recon-
structed.
physikai doxai and problmata physika
The first diaeresis and diaphonia at At. III . is between Thales and
his followers who said there is one earth, and Hicetas the Pythagorean
who said there are two, viz. our earth and the counter-earth. In other
words, the theory attributed by Aristotle to the Pythagoreans in general
is here given to Hicetas only. We may observe that the information
about Hicetas tenet at At. III . flagrantly contradicts that found at
Cic. Ac. pr. II citing Theophrastus as quoted above, which has
Hicetas put our earth at the centre. The next division and diaphonia
(.) opposes the Stoics, who assume that there is one finite earth,
to Xenophanes who said that its nether part is rooted in infinity (+
= 8). Xenophanes doctrine, as we have noted above, is
found both in Aristotle andwithout name-labelin Cicero. We have
also seen that the words 8 = . . . 8 in the text of
Aristotle, lacking in a number of mss, are bracketed by editors. The
parallel in Cicero proves that already before Atius the Placita contained
this expression relating to Xenophanes view; I, for my part, am not
certain that the square brackets in Aristotles text are justified. At the very
least, one must assume that a student of the De caelo adduced the Placita
and jotted down in margine what he found there, which sheds some light
on one of the uses a doxography could be put to. But why, one may well
ask, should he make a note about Xenophanes and not about others on
whom Aristotle provides less information?
In the Xenophanes lemma, we further read that according to Xeno-
phanes the earth has been compacted (0) from air and fire;
obviously, this is a point pertaining to the > of the earth. This infor-
mation is not paralleled elsewhere, but we have seen that Aristotle speaks
in passing of all those who have the earth come together ( ,
a.) at the centre. We may therefore assume that one of the pre-
decessors of Atius payed some attention to the genesis of the earth dur-
ing the cosmogony. In the next lemma (III .), [104] at any rate, we read
that according to Metrodorus the earth is the sediment and dregs of the
water, and the sun of the air (5 B A,
T B
). The tenets of Xenophanes and Metrodorus concerned
with the substance of the earth are in this way opposed to one another.
The clause about the sun according to Metrodorus comes as a surprise.
It looks like a sort of footnote, for the sun is not the subject of this chap-
ter;160 it may have been appended because of the air which according
160 For Metrodorus on the sun see At. II . (ps.-Plutarch: inflamed clump or
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the Arabic version is complete ad finem: . . . und ihre Flchen sind gebogen.
162 At Mete. B .a (see infra, n. ) Aristotle says that each of the habitable
earth.
164 I add a few more doxographical passages devoted to this issue, where the main
diaeresis is again between those who posit that the earth is flat and those who posit that it
is spherical. () Martianus Capella, VI ( = Dicaearchus fr. Wehrli),
opposes three viewssubsequently adding a name-label to the first onlyand opts for
the third: the shape of the entire earth is not flat, as some suppose who compare it with
the position of a wide disk, nor hollow, as others (hold), who said rain descends into the
earths lap (the same explanation as in Cleomedes, see infra), but round, even spherical, as
physikai doxai and problmata physika
Secundus Dicaearchus claims, formam totius terrae non planam, ut aestimant, positioni
qui eam disci diffusioris assimulant, neque concavam, ut alii, qui descendere imbrem dixere
telluris in gremium, sed rotundum, globosum etiam sicut Secundus Dicaearchus asseverat
[ . . . ]. (The next clause I quote is not in either Wehrli or Vorsokr. or Lanza, but the
text as a whole is nr. in D.E. GershensonD.A. Greenberg, Anaxagoras and the
Birth of Physics, New York etc.: Blaisdell Publishing Company , f.:) we may
insist on the first view, supported also by Anaxagoras the physicist (VI , illam
priorem, cui etiam physicus Anaxagoras accessit, praestat exigere.) Wehrli and the most
recent editor of Martianus, J. Willis (Leipzig: B.G. Teubner Verlagsgesellschaft )
follow Dick in bracketing sicut Secundus as a marginal gloss (Pliny, N.H. II =
Dicaearchus fr. W. says that the earth globum efficicf. Martianus globosum
and adds that Dicaearchus supported this view). But in Martianus text one should
bracket Dicaearchus as a marginal gloss. Someone looked up the passage (i.e. N.H.
II ) referred to by Martianus and wrote the name subsequently added by Pliny in
the margin of his copy; by bracketing Dicaearchus we moreover get a better sentence.
Mart. VI is much indebted to Pliny, see Willis upper apparatus. Accordingly,
Martianus overview at the beginning of his Plinian account of the shape of the earth
depends on a version of the doxographical vulgate; this is rendered certain by the
reference to Anaxagoras, a name lacking in Pliny. Dicaearchus fr. W. may be written
off. () Cleomedes I . (. Ziegler) at the beginning of his detailed discussion
of the shape of the earth refers to the viewsno name-labelswhich disagree among
themselves and with that of his school, and to that of the mathematicians and the followers
of Socrates which is the same as his own: among the older philosophers of nature
numerous differences are found about the shape of the earth (we recall that, apart from
the Stoics, ps.-Plutarch lists Thales Anaximander Anaximenes Leucippus Democritus,
and that Martianus mentions Anaxagoras); some of them stated that it has a flat and
level shape ( 8
; ; -, cf. supra, Martianus); others suspect that
water would not stay on it unless it were deep and hollow ( ) as to
shape, and said it has this shape. Others claimed that it is cubical and square (0
!) and some that it is pyramidical (0). Our people (scil., the
Stoics) and the astronomers and most of those from the Socratic school claimed that the
shape of the earth is spherical (). R. Goulet, Clomde: Thorie lmentaire,
Histoire des doctrines de lantiquit classique, Paris: Librairie philosophique J. Vrin ,
n. , argues that this passage is moins doxographique . . . que thorique, because
Cleomedes considers the suitable forms among which the physicist has to choose. Goulet
refers to the parallel procedure at Ptolem., Almagest I ; however, Ptolemywho lists as
shapes (other than the spherical which must be assumed) concave, triangular or square
or any other polygonal shape, and cylindricaldiffers from Cleomedes in that he does
not explicitly refer to the disagreement among the experts. If for a moment one forgets
Cleomedes sentence concerning the cube and the pyramid, the three views listed are
the same as in Martianus. Furthermore, a listing of possible shapes is by no means
foreign to the doxographical literature; cf. At. II . (in the chapter On the shape of
the universe), where not only the view that it is spherical but also the view that it has
the shape of a cone (!) or an egg are listed. Aristotle and many others, among whom
Cleomedes, insist that the universe, the heavenly bodies, and the earth must have the
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them [105] Democritus of Abdera. Aristotle here is explicit about the rel-
ative chronology, [106] so we may assume that the order of the names at
Cael. b implies a chronological sequence too. For the relation
same shape. In this way, the fact that according to some at At. II . the universe has
the shape of a cone explainsfrom a doxographical point of view, of coursewhy at
II . Cleanthes is said to have attributed a conical shape to the stars, and conversely. This
also becomes clear from a garbled passage which was pointed out to me by D.T. Runia.
Here the shape of the cosmos has been mixed up with that of the earth, and here we find a
parallel for the square cube listed by Cleomedes: () Marius Victorinus, Explanationes in
Rhetoricam M. Tullii Ciceronis, ap. C. Halm, Rhetores latini minores, Leipzig: B.G. Teubner
, repr. Francfort: Minerva Verlag , .: What is the shape of the cosmos:
many say the cosmos is concentrated in the way of the sphere, many that it is formed
according to a lengthened roundness, many that it has a flat exterior, many that it has a
square one, many that it is formed in the way of a vault, that is to say in order that the shape
of the cosmos under the earth is not similar to the head above (Quae sit mundi facies:
multi enim dicunt mundum in modum sphaerae esse collectum, multi oblonga rotunditate
esse formatum, multi plana facie, multi quadrata, multi in camerae modum, scilicet ut
sub terra non sit similis ac supra caput est mundi facies.) This is a comment on De inv.
I , quae sit mundi forma (see supra, n. ), i.e. an illustration of a thesis in physics.
On this commentary (alternative title: Commentum, or Commenta) by Victorinus on
Ciceros De inventione (which in antiquity was also known as Ciceros Rhetorica or Libri
rhetorici) see P. Hadot, Marius Victorinus: Recherches sur sa vie et ses uvres, Paris: tudes
Augustiniennes , ff.; for the passage I have cited ibid., f. For Victorinus remarks
on the thesis in general see In Cic. rhet. pp. . ff. and . ff. He seems to know what
doxography is about, see In Cic. rhet. p. . ff. (where he explains what he calls the
probabile argumentum): Thus . . . a probable argument is derived from what is a matter
of opinion, as when you say the nether world exists or does not exist, that gods exists or
do not exist (cf. At. I ), that the cosmos has come to be, that the cosmos has not come to
be (cf. At. II ). These opinions are called dogmata, dok is the Greek word for I believe
and dogma for opinon. It is quite clear that everything that occurs in the world is pleaded
with probable arguments, since even the declarations of the philosophers have been given
the name of dogmata (adeo manifestum est omnia, quae in mundo aguntur, argumentis
probabilibus persuaderi, quando etiam philosophorum professionibus ex opinione nomen
impositum est, ut dicantur). Hadot, op. cit. ff., calls this le scepticisme de
Vitorinus, which is not entirely correct.
As to the geometrical shapes other than the sphere mentioned in some of these
passages, viz. the cube (Cleomedes, Victorinus) and the pyramid (Cleomedes), one may
perhaps think of Plat. Tim. cd (see also supra, n. ), where the baffling suggestion
that there may be five cosmoi is linked to the existence of the five regular solids, among
which the pyramid and the cube (which is also the elemental particle of earth!). In the
doxographies these shapes may have been transferred to the earth per analogiam for the
reason mentioned above. As to the analogy involved, we may also note that the question
whether the earth is unique and finite (
, At. III ) is the same as
that concerned with the number and extension of the universe(s). One may also refer to
Epicurus view Ad Pyth. that a cosmos (for the relation between the shape of the cosmos
and that of the heavenly bodies and the earth see above) may be spherical or triangular,
or any kind of shape ( F F _ - 7 -)
cf. Epist. Herodot. ap. Diog. Lart. X , the cosmoi do not necessarily have one and
physikai doxai and problmata physika
the same shape, with scholium: he says that their shapes differ, some being spherical,
some ovoid, others again of a different shape. These Epicurean views and statements may
have been influenced by a predecessor of At. II . but may also have influenced this
section; they certainly are among the sources of At. II .. Cf. also Cic., De nat. deor.
I : some argue that the world must be spherical (rotundus), but mihi (viz., the
Epicurean speaker) vel cylindri vel quadrati vel coni vel pyramidis (scil., forma) videtur
esse formosior, to me the shape of a cylinder or a square or a cone or a pyramid looks
more beautiful.
165 The cosmic system attributed to Philolaus is described at considerable length at
ited earth are not aware of the counter-earth, but adds that also the counter-earth is inhab-
ited. Presumably, this information caused ., on Parmenides discovery that the earth
has several inhabited (and so several uninhabitable) zones to be appended here, for this
item would have been more appropriately located in the now incomplete chapter III
which I do not discuss because it has no counterpart at Cael. B . Note however that
at Mete. B .a ff. Aristotle argues that there are two habitable sectors of the earths
surface. The parallels at Achilles Isag. ch. have not been noticed.
jaap mansfeld
promise view. Democritus has it both ways. In the beginning, the earth moved around
because it was small and not heavy, but as it got denser and heavier it finally came to a
halt. We may notice that this explanation involves the question of the genesis and >
of the earth (cf. supra, text afer n. , on III .).
172 Note that Diels has modified the sequence transmitted by ps.-Plutarch; I quote the
173 Further discussion of At. III must be postponed until another occasion.
174 Supra, I. One may adduce Alexander of Aphrodisias on the usefulness of dialectic
for the purposes of training, , In top. .: there are books written
by Aristotle and Theophrastus on dialectical reasoning from reputable premises towards
either side of an issue ( 7 E B 1
!
! 7 & + 3 8 8-). Such premises
are what a dialectical discussion according to the Aristotelian Topics is about (already
according the very first sentence, .a). Unfortunately Alexander is not more
specific, but his description also fits what I take to be the contents of the Physikai Doxai.
Also compare Theon, Progymn. ap. Spengel Rhet. graec. II, . ff., on the many works by
Aristotle and Theophrastus with the word theseis in their title.
175 Diels, DG f., discusses some of these passages, but his overview is incomplete
and he has missed the parallel between At. I . and Thphr. Phys. op. fr. (~ fr. AB
FHS&G). He believes the criticisms have been interpolated by Atius and that the critique
of others is contra morem (scil., Placitorum). Quod non.
176 Stobaeus omits < because he inserts Xenocrates + Xenophanes between
fr. A FHS&G, from the Physics),177 this criticism is not found;178 here
Theophrastus merely says that Anaximander did not say his principle
is water or any other element but said it was something else, viz. a
an infinite nature, =. Although the argument contra in
Atius is clearly indebted to this description of the Apeiron as something
different from the standard four elements, it goes further in that it turns
a reportcf. esp. DG .into a criticism which hinges on the
question concerned with substance. One may argue that in Phys. op.
fr. this criticism is implicit and that it may have been formulated
explicitly by Theophrastus in another context. The obvious candidate
for this context is a lost passage in the Physikai Doxai treating the same
issue.
In I , a series of arguments ad hominem against Plato survive: against
Plato one should say, and so on (., & ! J
179
.). The last of these is that the cosmos cannot be imperishable because
it has come into being. Precisely the same objection was formulated by
Theophrastus against Plato in the Physikai Doxai (Phys. op. fr. ~ frr.
AB FHS&G):180 Theophrastus however in his On the Physical Tenets
argues against Plato that the cosmos has come into being and formulates
his objections (8!) accordingly. We have already noted that
mirabile dictuthis is the only text that preserves the title,181 and shall
see in a moment that it is also the only text which is explicit about
Theophrastus method. His critique of course echoes what Aristotle says
at Cael. .
In I , an objection against both Anaxagoras and Plato is formulated:
., they both make the same mistake ( Q S!
, i.e. Anaxagoras and Plato), in that both make the divine
intellect, or the god, responsible for the ordering of things. The objection
at I . states the Epicurean argument (not against Plato and Anaxagoras
but) against the Stoics: what is blessed and immortal does not bother
about men and about creating a world for men. This means that in order
to state contrasting views one could appeal to the-Epicureans-against-
the-Stoics against Plato!
following ( 1
N 8 O).
180 See infra for the Greek text.
181 See supra, I.
jaap mansfeld
8 ' O . 8 E > K K, + 7
H! 3 9,
3 3 + .
* I wish to thank Keimpe Algra, Han Baltussen, Teun Tieleman and especially David
T. Runia for valuable critical comments on earlier versions of this paper. Several parallels
quoted in the footnotes I also owe to David T. Runia.
chapter three
David T. Runia
1 S. Makin, How can we find out what Ancient Philosophers said?, Phronesis
() .
2 J. Barnes, Editors notes, Phronesis () . The call is not falling on deaf
ears. In addition to Italian collections reviewed by Barnes, see also the important study
of C. Osborne, Rethinking Early Greek philosophy: Hippolytus of Rome and the Presocrat-
ics (London ), and the remarkable accumulation of studies by J. Mansfeld, now col-
lected in a volume of Variorum Reprints. On aspects specifically concerning the Xeno-
phanean doxography, see Theophrastus and the Xenophanes doxography, Mnemosyne
david t. runia
henceforth VS.
xenophanes on the moon
AETII PLAC. II
PLUTARCHI EPIT. II. STOBAEI ECL. I
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E XV
... ...
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.
.
EC:
A:
G Lydus B cf. Prol. p. . ||
[SIGLA: E Eusebius Praeparatio Evangelica; G Galen Historia philosopha; A codex Mos-
quensis ; B codex Marcianus ; C codex Parisinus ]
to [248] take the initiative and consult DG that he or she would discover
that there are also readings in which the Xenophanean view is that the
> of the moon was ignited cloud (
).
8 It is a serious defect of Diels work that he tends to conceal his debts to his
predecessors.
9 DG .
10 It has been recently edited and extensively commented on by H. Daiber, Atius
The question that cannot avoided is: does the theory represented in
this diagram hold water? After extensive examination of the various
possibilities, I am convinced that it does.13 Diels theory is, im groen und
ganzen, [250] correct, even ifgiven the present state of our evidencewe
can never be entirely sure that the missing source really was a work by an
author named Atius entitled -. Naturally
there are all manner of complications, such as, for example, a limited
amount of contamination between the two main lines of tradition. But
these do not invalidate the reconstruction as a whole.
A different question is whether the edition of Atius in DG is a reliable
guide to what stood in the lost original. Without doubt it represents a
remarkable achievement. As Diels boasted in his preface, he had reduced
a wild jungle to the ordered neatness of a garden. Nevertheless it is fair
to say that it has two important weaknesses. Firstly, although Diels made
many brilliant observations on the methods of the sources he used for his
reconstruction, he did not pay sufficient attention to the totally opposed
procedures of the main sources, Ps.Plutarch and Stobaeus. Secondly,
it was wrong to fix his results in an edition which was supposed to
represent the ipsissima verba of the lost work (the resemblance of the
above diagram to a Lachmannian stemma is by no means accidental).
In numerous cases it is impossible to be certain of what it was that Atius
originally recorded. And since Diels did not provide a commentary on
his reconstructed text, we often have to guess at his motives for choosing
one particular possibility ahead of another.14 The precise nature of these
criticisms will become clearer, as we now return to the doxographical
lemma which is the subject of this article.
13 It has never been seriously questioned, but the main reason for this universal
acceptance is the fact that it has received virtually no critical scrutiny. A radical dissenting
* voice is the Russian scholar A. Lebedev, who argues that 1
is Theodorets mistake
for 1 , i.e. Arius Didymus; cf. Proceedings of the st International Congress on
Democritus Xanthi October (Xanthi ) . But his case is not proven, and
does not seem promising (I owe the reference to J. Mansfeld).
14 A particular difficulty is the fact that Diels decided to introduce a new numbering
for his edition of Atius, so that whoever quotes it necessarily propagates Diels recon-
struction. Because of this problem I will consistently cite Atian lemmata not according to
Diels numbering (even though this is habitually done by students of ancient philosophy),
but with reference to the source from which they are derived. Perhaps out of deference
to Diels, the most recent editor of Ps.Plutarch, J. Mau, Plutarchus Moralia V , (Leipzig
), does not number the individual lemmata of the chapters. Daibers edition of the
Arabic translation does follow Diels numbering, with predictably odd results.
xenophanes on the moon
by Diels for the many fine readings which he preserves in his extracts.15 It
so happens that here he supports the reading that Diels wishes to reject.
The matter of the correct reading is broached twice in the Prolegom-
ena. At DG Diels is discussing the dating of Ps.Galen. He argues
that the excellence of the text which this author preserves would incline
one to the view that he precedes the Byzantine period. But he does
reveal two Byzan[252]tine interpolations which are absent from the older
sources, one of which is in our lemma. With sublime self-confidence
Diels asserts that, since Stobaeus, Eusebius and the Parisian codices of
Ps.Plutarch agree on the reading
, this must be the original
text (note that no argument is offered taking the content of the lemma
into account).16 Galens reading of
must have been inter-
polated from the lemma on the substance of the sun in Ps.Plutarch ..17
The best codex of Ps.Plutarch preserves both readings as it were, for it
is obviousso Diels brilliantly conjecturesthat the peculiar reading
is a conflation of what must have originally appeared
in archetype as:18
In the second discussion Diels adds nothing new. He gives a few more
examples of interpolation or emendation, and repeats that the person
responsible for the change of the text must have done his work earlier
than the th century, i.e. before Ps.Galen and Lydus.
What are we to make of Diels decision in this particular instance? It
goes without saying that there is much to be said for his choice. Let us
weigh up the pros and cons. In favour of Diels reading is:
. Eusebius is by far the earliest secondary witness to Ps.Plutarch.
. Diels reading has the support of Stobaeus, another relatively early
witness, whoit needs to be addeddid not have access to the
Epitome.
15 DG .
16 DG : convenit hoc inter Stobaeum Eusebium vulgatos codices, ut suspicionis ne
tenuissima quidem umbra relinquatur.
17 For this lemma Stobaeus reads (.., . Wachsmuth): ! 8
whereas Mau, who appears to have collated the manuscripts, reports the slightly less odd
. This is the reading I have reported in my main text. Mau, it is worth
adding, follows Diels in opting for
in his text.
xenophanes on the moon
below.
20 Cf. DG : Theodoretus . . . amplissima servavit ex communi illo fonte excerpta,
quae, si excipias verba quibus ille abundat, tam raro sunt arbitrio adulterate, ut summa
illis fides habenda sit.
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21 A peculiarity resulting from the way Atius used his source; the same occurs in
23 Cf. C. Wachsmuth, Ioannis Stobaei anthologii libri duo priores, vol. (Berlin, )
xi. This edition, which is still unsuperseded, was being prepared while Diels wrote the
DG, and is dedicated to Diels teacher Usener. Reciprocally Diels acknowledges his debt
to Wachsmuth in the preface to DG, cast in the form of a letter to the same Usener.
david t. runia
Patently this text is much more complex than the previous one. In order
to disentangle the evidence Stobaeus offers, we shall have to move sys-
tematically in a number of steps.
The chief difference lies in the placement of Plato and the Stoic doxog-
raphy at the end in Stobaeus, whereas they occur in the middle of the
sequence in Ps.Plutarch. We note, too, that Stobaeus reads Heraclides
instead of Heraclitus (comparison with Theodoret shows that this read-
ing is correct) and adds the Pythagorean Ocellus,24 while Ps.Plutarchs
general reference to the Stoics is made more specific.
(ii) The first complication to be faced is that Stobaeus has brought to-
gether more material than can have been present in Atius. It is apparent
that a number of lemmata deal not only with the substance of the moon,
but also with its size and shape. From Ps.Plutarch we know that the
report on Anaximander in II did contain a reference to size ( times
the earth) and shape (like a cartwheel). But in Ps.Plutarch the rest of
the brief lemmata on the moons size and shape are located in chapters
devoted specifically to these subjects (. and ). What Stobaeus has
done is coalesced these three chapters together. This is in line with his
general procedure through the entire 1 , in which the
chapters of Atius are brought back to his own chapters.25 Let
us observe how this lemmatic coalescence (as I shall proceed to call
this manner of excerpting) works in practice (chapters refer to Atius
as preserved in Ps.Plutarch).
and shape in another lemma in Stobaeus which has so far not yet been
discussed (i ..).30 Cleanthes might have thus had a place in
Atius equivalent of both and .
All the lemmata in which Stobaeus joins up material from other chapters
in Atius have now been dealt with.
in the Stoic school: Ps.Plut. ., Stob. ..a on the shape of fire; Ps.Plut ., Stob.
..d on the shape of the stars.
31 See Diels DG , who introduces criteria of both style and content to distinguish
Arius Didymus from Atius, and presents a collection of the physical fragments at
. I intend to show elsewhere that Diels missed a substantial number of fragments. On
* the genre of Arius Didymus, cf. Mejer op.cit. (n. ) . How little research has advanced
since Diels is shown by C.H. Kahn, Arius as a doxographer, in W.W. Fortenbaugh (ed.),
On Stoic and Peripatetic Ethics: the Work of Arius Didymus (New BrunswickLondon
) .
32 ...
33 Similar lemmata attributed to Chrysippus in .., ... Stobaeus is evidently
34 Because it also discusses the position and the revolution of the moon. Compare
the Aristotelian lemma on the > of the sun: 1
8 B
. We know this stood in Atius because it is preserved by both Ps.Plutarch (.)
and Theodoret (.); Stobaeus replaces the lemma in . with a much longer section
from Arius Didymus.
35 These can only be spelled out apodictically here; I intend to present the detailed
The first lemma has already been mentioned in our survey of the various
readings in the tradition. By the second doxa it is clear, to us at least
who [260] have Ps.Plutarch and Stobaeus, that he is copying out lemmata
referring only to the sun. A few lines later he continues:
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ogy than the anthologist, and so places Thales at the head of the list. The
same reason might be given for his reversal of the order of Heraclides and
Pythagoras, in which our other two witnesses coincide. For the trouble-
some reading in the doxa of Pythagoras he gives a third variant.
All the witnesses have been examined and their evidence duly noted.
The task that remains is to reconstruct the chapter as it originally stood
in Atius. Some highly obscure names preserved by Stobaeus strongly
suggest that the evidence as we have it is pretty well complete.38 I will
contend that, even though one or two trivial matters cannot be resolved
with complete certainty, it is possible to gain an accurate picture of the
original appearance of Atius chapter, and this picture shows that it had
a clear and systematically organized structure.
Starting with the fullest text, i.e. that of Stobaeus, we need to take the
following steps in order to determine the chapters structure.
a: Comparison with Ps.Plutarch suggests that these lemmata stood at the
beginning of the chapter.
b, c: To be combined with the lemma of Anaximenes in a, as Theodoret
shows (as argued above).
d: Placement sound, since Ps.Plutarch and Stobaeus agree.
e: This appears to be a solid block that Stobaeus has simply copied out
of Atius, for the internal order agrees with the lemmata retained by
Ps.Plutarch.
f.: The original position of this lemma is problematic. Diels thought he
should retain Stobaeus order and placed it at the end of the chapter, i.e.
after Pythagoras. But then its position is completely isolated. In terms of
content it is very similar to [261] the Stoic view, recorded in Ps.Plutarch
(both mixture of fire and air, but for Stoics fire comes first, whereas
for Empedocles air has the primacy). If, as we shall see, the Stoics are
postponed through the influence of Arius Didymus and the grouping of
the great schools, then it is likely that originally Empedocles followed the
Stoics.
g: The placement of Plato is plausible, and agrees with Ps.Plutarch.
h: Probably Aristotle followed Plato, as in Stobaeus, but he has substituted
material from Arius Didymus to replace the Atian lemma (as argued
above).
i: Zenonian and Cleanthean material interposed from Arius Didymus (as
argued above), unless Cleanthes is included in Atius as an exception to
Posidonius and most of the Stoics, in which case Stobaeus is following
the chronological or diadochic order (for in the succession Cleanthes was
Zenos first pupil).
38 Note especially Berosus (only here and in Ps.Plut. . = Stob. ..), Ion (only
Stobaeus never cites this text. Compare in the doxographical tradition: Diog. Laert.
. X E 7 X ; Alcinous Did. . H3 9
- 93 8 0 >. Note the subtle distinction
that Atius makes between the moon and the sun (.) which is 8 .
xenophanes on the moon
42 This reading is not found in Diels, but is emphatically indicated in Mras more recent
edition. His suggested reconciliation of the two sides of the the tradition, E
, 3 0
, fails to take the systematics of the chapter into
account, and must be rejected.
43 Ps.Plut. . = Stob. ..d (Philolaus), Stob. .. (some of the Pythagoreans,
including Philolaus). Note that in the last-mentioned lemma the moons face is
,
which corroborates Pythagoras place among the earth group in our chapter.
44 DG . But it was wrong of Diels to emend the virtually unanimous reading in
the Ps.Plutarchean tradition (contrast his procedure in the Platonic lemma, where he did
leave the mss. reading in the text). There is frequent confusion in his left column between
the text of Ps.Plutarch and what Diels thinks the text of Atius must have been. Mau
retains the reading between daggers.
david t. runia
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45 Note that in the above analysis, in order to avoid petitio principii, the question of
It has been a long and circuitous journey, but we have reached where we
need to be in order to determine the text of the Xenophanean lemma on
the substance of the moon. It will be immediately clear that the system-
atic structure has important consequences for the determination of the
text. Given Xenophanes positionwhich can hardly be in disputein
the sequence of , he must belong to the group that uphold the basi-
cally fiery nature of the moon. But if Diels were right in the view that
the text should read
, then that fiery nature is not
indicated. Xenophanes position would have to be unclear, because there
46 The two groups of seven may well not be coincidental. Compare the doxographical
list of views on the soul at Macrobius, In Somn. Scip. .., where there are seven
representatives of the view that the soul is incorporeal, and fourteen for the opposing
position (I owe this reference to J. Mansfeld).
47 The same movement in the chapter on the sun (Ps.Plut. .), while in the chapter
on the stars (.) the reverse appears to apply. But these chapters require more detailed
analysis.
48 Cf. Ps.Plut. ., ., . etc.
david t. runia
49 Texts Mau, Wachsmuth. I pass over textual or interpretative niceties that are not
immediately relevant.
50 Something like this must have stood in Atius. I dissent from the view of P. Stein-
metz that Theophrastus own view is indicated next to that of Xenophanes: cf. Die Physik
des Theophrast (Bad Homburg ) ff., supported by Mansfeld art. cit. (n. ) .
After all the same is attributed to Xenophanes by both Hippolytus Ref. .. (=
ADK) and Ps.Plut. Stromateis (= ADK).
51 As noted above in n. , Zeller suggests -, but the emphasis on movement
in the lemmata on the Dioscuri and lightning argues against the emendation.
xenophanes on the moon
Stobaeus ..
! 3
3 &
.
Since all the celestial and heavenly phenomena are explained in terms of
fiery clouds, presumably because they all give off some form of light, it is
only to be expected that this is also the case for the moon. Consistent with
this view is that the moon has its own light, and does not just reflect it, and
that its monthly phases are caused by quenching, the same explanation
used for the rising and setting of the sun and the stars.52
Furthermore, as is obvious from the texts just cited, the key to Xeno-
phanes cosmology for Atius is that all the heavenly phenomena are to be
explained in terms of clouds. This information must have had some tex-
tual basis, for Xenophanes asserted, as we know from two authentic lines
from his poem, that even the rainbow is a cloud.53 The aim is clearly the-
ological, but in a negative sense, to show that these phenomena are not
supernaturally divine, as in the poems of Homer and Hesiod.54 At the
same time Atius and the other doxographers imply that Xenophanes
did make some attempt to introduce differentiation. Both the stars and
the sun are said to arise 8
. It is possible, however,
that the stars individually are cloud-firelets, whereas in the case of the
sun a whole lot of these come together, which would explain why the
light of the sun is so much brighter.55 The Dioscuri (i.e. St. Elmos fire)
are not clouds but cloudlets, [267] whose gleam is caused by some kind
of motion. Comets too are not just ignited clouds but the result of aggre-
gations or movements thereof.
In this context of differentiation we return to the case of the moon.
Even if it is thought to have its own light, the light it emits is of a different
kind to that of the sun or the stars. It would thus make sense to speak
of an ignited cloud that has undergone a process of condensation or
thickening,56 i.e. the fiery element has cooled off somewhat, with the
result that it gives off a less bright light. We are thus back at Diels
preferred reading,
.
My suggestion, therefore, is that in the case of the disputed reading we
can and should have it both ways. It is certain, in my view, that Atius text
must have read
, but at the same time it is plausible
that the other participle was added by way of a further differentiation.
The text would thus read:
!
@
.
In the view of Xenophanes the moon is an ignited cloud that has under-
gone condensation. Because the two verbally similar participles stood
side by side, it was not long before one or the other was preferred. In at
least one copy, it would seem, the one participle was superscripted above
the other as a variant, leading to the strange combination in the Moscow
manuscript. On riper reflection, however, one might prefer the view that
in this case the words were simply conflated by means of a form of para-
blepsis, i.e.
.
. A double conclusion
56 As has often been noted, the concept of condensation () was probably taken
over by Xenophanes from Anaximenes, who according to at least two reports associated
condensation with thickening (A, DK). In the earlier Presocratics the processes
of rarefaction and condensation are associated with the transitions between fire, wind,
cloud, water, earth, stones. Xenophanes cuts across this with the wide role assigned
to cloud. His clouds must have consisted of more than one element (anachronistically
speaking).
xenophanes on the moon
57 Guthrie op.cit. (n. ) : he did not take these matters very seriously, but was
probably chiefly concerned to ridicule religious notions of the heavenly bodies. Kirk
RavenSchofield op.cit. (n. ) speak of fantasy, irony, humour. Admittedly some of
the doxographical reports are much more fantastic than the one studied in this article.
Steinmetz art. cit. (n. ) concludes that his poem was a sillos, in dem Xenophanes
gegen die mythische Deutung von Wettererscheinungen polemisiert und sie durch ein
physikalische Erklrung ersetzt hat.
58 It is the intention of J. Mansfeld and the author to publish a monograph on Atius
* the collector of placita (note the title of his book), the held by the
philosophers were more important than the philosophers who actually
held those views. This subject-orientated approach, so different to what
we are accustomed in our way of doing history of philosophy, has highly
significant consequences for our understanding of ancient doxography.59
59 The research for this article was carried out with the financial support of the
Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (N.W.O.). Parts of the paper were
delivered to the Dutch Society of Ancient Philosophers in Amsterdam and the Centre
de Recherche Philologique at the Universit de Lille III. My indebtedness to J. Mansfeld,
who read and commented on a draft version, is gratefully acknowledged.
chapter four
Jaap Mansfeld
7 B I + l E [312] !
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.7 [313]
his On the Soul, as he begins to speak of the regent (part) among its (scil., the souls)
parts in the section where he attempts to prove that the souls principle of command is
contained in the heart alone, speaks as follows: () The soul is a pneuma connate with
us, extending as a continuum throughout the whole body as long as lifes healthy breath
is present in the body. () Now of the parts thereof (scil., of the soul) that are located
in each part (of the body), that of them which extends to the windpipe is the voice, that
to the eyes is sight, that to the ears is hearing, that to the nostrils is smell, that to the
tongue is taste, that to the entire flesh is touch, whereas that which extends to the testicles
is spermatic and can be conceived in about the same way (as the others, i.e., as a part of
the soul). The (part) where all these (other parts) come together is located in the heart,
which is the part of the soul that is the regent part. () This being so, there is agreement
about the other parts, but about the regent part of the soul they disagree, some putting
it in one place and others in another. For some say it is located in the chest, others in
the head. () Furthermore, they also disagree as to these locations themselves, viz. as
to where in the head and where in the chest it is, not agreeing among themselves. ()
Plato affirms that the soul has three parts, and said that the rational part is in the head,
the spirited part in the region of the chest, and the appetitive part in the region of the
navel. () The place (of the regent part) therefore seems to be beyond our reach, as we
have neither a clear perception, as was the case with the other (parts), nor indications
from which a solution might be conclusively inferred by means of argument; otherwise
chrysippus and the placita
disagreement among philosophers as well as among doctors would not have gone as far as
it has. () This is the first passage on the regent part written by Chrysippus in the first
book of his treatise in two books On the Soul; one should keep in mind that the earlier
half of this book consists of his inquiry into the substance of the soul. () In the half
which immediately follows upon this first half and which begins with the passage I have
quoted in full, he attempts to prove that the governing part of the soul is contained in the
heart.
8 So also p. ., 8 /0 B 7 3
n, and
p. ., 8 /0 3 .
9 For the Vet.plac. see H. Diels, Doxographi graeci (Berlin , repr. ; hereafter
DG), ff.; cf. also infra, n. . He dates the Vet.plac. to the mid-first cent. bce because
Posidonius and Asclepiades are the most recent authorities mentioned and because, as
he argues, the work was used by Varro in the Tubero de origine humana (DG , ,
ff.). The best short guide to the labyrinthine reasonings of Diels prolegomena is
O. Regenbogen, Theophrastos, RE Supp. VII (Stuttgart ), .
10 It should be noted that the chapter heading found in some mss. of ps.Plutarch (now
printed by Mau in the Teubner edition) is apposite and correct. Diels, DG , has the
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a [314] good summary of the Atius chapter and of the parallel passages
that in some way or other may be connected with the corresponding
section in the Vetusta placita.
With very few exceptions, scholars have neglected the study of the
mode of presentation of the individual doxai listed in Atius and in the
parallel passages for sets of chapters, or individual chapters, that survive
in both Christian and pagan authors. No consistent effort has been made
to study the material that is relevant in a plurality of sources. In Atius
and these other sources, the presentation of the tenets at issue is often
organized according to a definite pattern, which emphasizes the varieties
of opinion that exist (diaeresis and/or diaphonia). Roughly speaking, as
a rule two groups of specific tenets that are opposed to one another can
be distinguished, and a plurality of odd or of compromise views may
be listed as well.11 We take a closer look at the evidence, as much more
material is available than was used by Diels in the Doxographi graeci,
though I shall omit the important passage from Sextus adduced by him.12
First, I shall analyze the structure of the chapter in Atius. This is to be
followed by a study of the material available through Soranus (in various
sources, only some of which were used by Diels). A short account of
the material preserved by Cicero follows. Diels only adduced Tusc. I
, and overlooked the parallel passage in Ac.pr. I . These selected
parallels will afford a better understanding of the Chrysippus fragment
and its relation to the doxographical traditions.
it in the chest (II). Furthermore those who place it in the head may single
out specific places in the head, as those who favour the chest may prefer
a [315] specific position in the chest, or in part of the chest.14 At the end,
we find two compromise views (III).15
The parallel section in Stobaeus, unfortunately, is lost. It is worth our
while to print the texts of ps.Plututarch Placita IV and Theodoret
Graecorum affectionum curatio V in parallel columns, and to pick out
in italics the names that are found both times:
Ps.Plutarch Theodoret
(I), the head
# 8 6/ /0 /0I $! E 3
# 8 8!;16
B 'B +-I
# 8 ;I17 9 E # 8 ;I
G & -18 B G E 9 + &
8!, o 819 [316]
I B 8! -, o 8
I
14 The otherwise useful compilation of C.R.S. Harris, The Heart and the Vascular
System in Ancient Greek Medicine from Alcmaeon to Galen (Oxford ) has been hardly
helpful in sorting out the problems concerned with the section on the heart and the
related organs in At. IV and the parallel texts.
15 Diels has added, as At. IV . , two lemmata from Stobaeus ad finem, but
these are irrelevant to the question of the location of the regent part. They derive from a
different chapter of Stobaeus, that is to say not the 0 in which the other abstracts
from Atius section on the soul are to be found, but the B, Ecl.phys. I .. In the
present paper, I discount these lemmata.
16 For Hippocrates and Plato on the brain as the seat of the regent part cf. the
doxographical note in ps.Galen, Introductio sive medicus, XIV . ff. K. 7 (scil., the
brain) E SB 3 B 8 : I l
: 0 0 >; , a ! $!. On the
Introd. sive med., a general introduction to medicine derived from various sources see
J. Kollesch, Untersuchungen zu den pseudogalenischen Definitiones medicae (Berlin )
ff.; M. Wellmann, Zu den des Soran, Hermes (), ff.,
argues that several passages in this tract derive from Soranus.
17 Cf. Pollux Onom. II p. . Bethe, E j
, l
F - a + , and II , 5 E & B 8! !-
: , 8!; , . . . . ! E +
, ;n : &
. E 8. He derives these
passages from Soranus; this is quite plausible for II , but there is no evidence that
II should reflect what Soranus said. Diels brilliantly but inconclusively argues that the
text excerpted by Atius read B 8! - F (cerebellum)
o 8
. To be sure, according to Poll. II 8 is used for
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L 8 /0 B 8! V, L E 8 /0 B 8!
T 8 !I20 V.
7 9 8
I 8 E , 7 : 0 0 W. Ibid.
.. and .. we are informed that the ! B 8! is the point
from where the nerves take their beginning.
21 Not all the Stoics, however, shared Chrysippus view; cf. Philodemus De pietate
col. IX., printed DG (= SVF II ; for the text see A. Henrichs, Die Kritik
der stoischen Theologie in PHerc. , Cronache Ercolanesi [], ), 3 E
! 6 : 8 /0 /0I 3[] @,
0 I 8 ; C[0] :[] []@
& []K
[] [] Q, ; E [&] & 8 0 0
8
(scil., the poet) 8 0 []0. Cf. Heraclitus, $
ch. ., p. . Buffire, Q , 8 ;k
; W
. 7 : -, s 8 ; &
! + !, and ibid., , on the birth of Athena from the head of Zeus.
Cf. also Cornutus Compendium ch. , p. . Lang,
(scil., Athena) E 8
0 B 0
, ! E 5 :
0 0 : 8B @, ! L 3 B 7I !
8 B E
B : C 8, B E
9 +-, 6 : >B 8 : 0 >. Because
both ps.Plutarch and Theodoret say that all the Stoics place the regent part in the heart
(cf. infra, p. []), it follows (a) that the Stoic views cited by Philodemus and found
in Heraclitus and Cornutus are later than Chrysippus and Diogenes of Babylon (cf. infra,
n. ), and conversely (b), that the Atian lemma gives us the version of the Stoic doctrine
which was standard up to and including Diogenes of Babylon and does not take this later
heterodoxyfor which Philodemus provides the t.a.q.into account. This is important
for the date of the version of the Vetusta placita from which Atius derives, for this lemma
represents the state of the art around the mid-second century bce.
The chapter on the hegemonikon of the cosmos does not survive in ps.Plutarch;
excerpts from Atius ap. Stob. / At. II ., with the title B 7 :
chrysippus and the placita
V F ; & I 022 :
& - ;I
23 8 /0 /0 V 0 Q ! ' E 8 /0
, T 8 -I V 0 ,
G 8 /0 B W24 ' E 8 ; WI25
!I
' 8 ; - 0 26 (deest)
' 8 ; ; 5
I ' E 8 ; ; 5
I
' 8 ; !I ' 8 8 ; !. [318]
First, it should be pointed out that not only the tenets of philosophers
are mentioned, but also those of several famous medical authorities:
9 . For the analogy between the macrocosm and the microcosm which according
to the Stoics is involved compare Diog. Laert. VII . See further F. Buffire, Les mythes
dHomre et la pense grecque (Paris ), f.
22 The mss have 10; Diels, DG n. , suggests the above emendation which
however he did not put in his text. In his Teubner edition of the Graecorum affectionum
curatio Raeder follows those who change 10 to 1
; this is the most
plausible correction. One should at any rate assume that the mistake involved was made
by Theodoret, who at Aff. I and V has Alcman for Alcmeon (the correct form is at
Stob. / At. IV ) and at V Clearchus for Dicaearchus (the correct form is at ps.Plut.-
Stob. / At. IV .). By changing 10 to something else we reconstruct the text of
Atius not Theodoret. The reference to Aristocles would be unique in Atius and almost
impossible to reconcile with Diels date for the latter (ca. ce). However, Aristocles is
after all known as an Aristotelian of sorts, which would perhaps explain the confusion
in Theodoret, and his date is uncertain: either the first or the second century ce. If we
keep 10, Atius will have to be dated somewhat later, which perhaps is rather
unlikely. If we accept a later date for Atius, a palaeographically even more plausible
emendation would be 1
10.
23 The text is printed as an A-fragment of Diogenes of Apollonia at Vorsokr. A,
third text. However, it is clear that the Stoic Diogenes of Babylon is meant; cf. A. Laks,
Diogne dApollonie: La dernire cosmologie prsocratique (Lille ), f. This text
should be added at SVF III p. . Harris, op.cit. (supra, n. ), , following others,
considers the attribution to Diogenes of Apollonia a gross anachronism but does not
provide an alternative.
24 Scil., in the region of the heart; see infra, n. .
25 Empedocles must be included, but we may also think of Critias.
26 The apex of the heart; translated cordis summitatem at Cael. Aurelian. Morb.Acut.
27 See supra, n. .
chrysippus and the placita
28 Cf. supra, n. .
29 Connected with the aorta, which like the other arteries is believed to convey the
pneuma.
30 Cf. supra, n. .
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which matters. Finally, we have a list of further parts of the heart, but
do not learn from either source by whom they were held to be the seat
of the regent part: the apex of the heart (not in Theodoret), and the
cardiac membrane (note that this rhymes with the membrane of the brain
attributed to Erasistratus in [I]).
To the best of my knowledge, it has not been noticed that the main
diaeresis to be found in ps.Plutarch and Theodoret has been preserved in
ps.Galen, Definitiones medicae XIX . K. Here the diaphonia is rep-
resented by two opposed tenets only, viz. the specific view of Herophilus
(whose name is absent) and the general view that the regent part is in the
heart:
: 8 0 = 0 0, B
8!,31
E 8 /0 ! B 8!.32
'33 E AI : 0 8 ! 0 6 B ;
-,34
E 8 /0 V [B 8!].35 [321]
31 This general definition is lacking in our other sources. For 8! cf. Plato Tim.
a, 8!. For B cf., e.g., Alcinous Didasc. ch. , . H., the immor-
tal part of the soul as = B. At Tim. d, Plato speaks of the head as
8 : ! B, ibid. b he calls the face
:. See
also Chrysippus ap. Calc. ch. , . (SVF II. , p. .), who speaks of the regent
part (in the heart this time) as rex, and Theodoret De prov., Migne P.G. , A:
(scil., & ) Q & : B
, ! / ! ! (scil., the Creator).
32 Elsewhere in the same work, the whole brain is involved, XIX . K.: 8
! B 8!, M : 0 0
.
33 According to Kollesch, op.cit. (supra, n. ), n. , this section survives only in
Paris. which contains more material than the other mss. witnesses for the Def.med.
(see J. Kollesch, Ren Chartier, Herausgeber und Flscher der Schriften Galens, Klio
[], ff.). Ibid. , however, she suggests that the two opposed tenets derive from
the doxography used by ps.Galen, basing this inference on what is known in general about
the various ancient doctrines that are concerned, not on the Placita material itself.
34 This general definition is not paralleled in our other sources; it sounds Stoic.
35 Seclusit Kollesch, op.cit. (supra, n. ), n. .
36 To which the evidence from Pollux, Onom. II (see Diels, DG f.) and
from the Anonymus Fuchsii [Anonymus Parisinus] should be added, see H. Diels, ber
das Physikalische System des Straton, SBBerlin , repr. in his Kleine Schriften ed.
W. Burkert, Darmstadt , (= Kl.Schr. ) n. . For these texts see infra, pp.
.
chrysippus and the placita
Onom. II a mistake, for Atius has the singular and Erasistratus would be concerned
with the pia not the dura mater; see however supra, n. , n. .
43 Not the Peripatetic but the homonymous physician who was a follower of Erasi-
stratus.
44 In Cael.Aur., the sequence of tenets (membrana / fundum sive basin) corresponds
Ad finem, both these lists deriving from Soranus (just as the list of
Theodoret) lack the two interesting compromise views preserved by
ps.Plutarch. At the beginning, the first list (Soranus A) is much fuller than
the second (Soranus B). At the end, Soranus B provides important infor-
mation concerned with the cardiac region which is lacking in Soranus A
ap. Tertullian but paralleled in ps.Plutarch and Theodoret; apparently,
Tertullian tired of transcribing the full data that were available in his
source. What is more, at the end Soranus B is also more complete than
ps.Plutarch who, in his turn, is more complete than Theodoret. Soranus B,
45 The Corpus Hermeticum and the commentaries on the Bible according to Waszink,
op.cit. (supra, n. ), , , who submits that this reference has been interpolated by
Tertullian. As to the commentatores, Tertullian may be thinking of Philo, though this
is not very likely. Calcidius, in his account of the substance and the regent part of the
soul, likewise interpolates a treatment of the doctrine of the Hebraei concerned with the
blood (In Tim. ch. ).
46 Translation of Vorsokr. B.. The line may already have been quoted in the
anterior tradition. Soranus, or perhaps Tertullian, was not sure, or pretended to be not
sure, about its author.
47 Also called ; this, by the way, is Galens regular name for the aorta,
see Ph. De Lacy, Galen On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato (CMG ,,, vol. III,
Berlin ), .
chrysippus and the placita
48 Vertex is the translation of - (cf. ps.Galen, Introd. sive med., XIV . ff.
K., E 5E
3
0 0 -, t =
: 7 , a
). Xenocrates doxographical crown is by
no means odder than Stratos doxographical part between the eyebrows.
49 M. Isnardi Parente, Senocrate Ermodoro: Frammenti (Napoli ), f., argues
that Xenocrates, like Plato, had the brain (il cervello) in mind; what is at issue, however,
is not what Xenocrates may really have held but what this doxography attributes to him;
Soranus A ap. Tert. clearly distinguishes between the crown (Xenocrates) and the brain
(Hippocrates).
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ras: ps.Plut. ap. At. IV .; Plato: Tert. De an. ., and Cic. Tusc. I ) and 8 8!;
(Plato: Theodoret ap. At. IV .).
57 For the cerebellum and the membranes cf. supra, n. .
58 The attribution to Aristotle of the view elsewhere universally attributed to Empe-
docles alone (or to Empedocles and Critias) is a sure sign of compression (coalesced
lemmata).
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59 Cf. supra, n. .
60 Other diseases of the mind and the nervous system are described elsewhere in
Caelius Aurelianus voluminous works on diseases, but the only time he refers to the seat
of the regent part in this connection I have found is in one of his explanations of the
name sacred disease for epilepsy, Morb. Chron. I , p. ., . . . sive quod in capite
fiat quod multorum philosophorum iudicio sacrum atque templum [for this metaphor
cf. infra, n. ] est partis animae in corpore natae.
61 A selection of passages is quoted by Waszink, op.cit. (supra n. ), . An.Fuchsii
deals with doctors only, not with philosophers; the case for its dependence on Soranus
has been plausibly argued by M. Wellmann, op.cit. (supra, n. ).
62 Chronic headache; see Cael.Aurel. Morb.Chron. I .
63 Scil., of the brain; see supra, text to n. .
64 For Erasistratus on the membrane as the seat of mental disturbances see further
, Leiden ), , where the present text is printed as fr. (p. ). For Praxagoras
on mental afflictions caused by cardiac disturbances see An.Fuchsii, p. [~ An.Paris.
p. . Garofalo] (& O 0 , <
@ = fr. St.) and p. [~ p. .. G.] (= fr. St.). On
Praxagoras doctrines concerned with the heart see further Harris, op.cit. (supra, n. ),
ff.
chrysippus and the placita
66 [Fr. van der Eijk]; for the tenuous possibility of a parallel ap. Theodoret see supra
n. .
67 Scil., the heart.
68 Kalbfleisch, Wellmann; mss >B.
69 The metaphor of the acropolis is originally Platonic and so derives from the doxo-
graphies that attribute to Hippocrates as well as to Plato the view that the regent part is in
the head or brain; see Plat. Tim. a, where the commands of reason are issued 8 0
. Cf. Cic. Tusc. I (deriving from the Placita literature): Plato . . . principa-
tum, id est rationem, in capite ut in arce posuit; cf. also Philo, Somn. I , ' E 3 &
8 :
>; (scil., the intellect) - (also from the ante-
rior Placita, cf. P. Wendland, Eine doxographische Quelle Philos, SBBerlin , ff.)
and the other passages listed by D.T. Runia, Philo of Alexandria and the Timaeus of Plato
(Philos. ant. , Leiden ), . The standard Middle Platonist formula is found at
Alcinous Didasc. ch. , . ff. H.; the gods place the immortal part of the soul in the
head: ; 8 B 8 0 _ . See further the long list of
passages given by A.S. Pease ad Cic. De nat. deor. II . For the ' = cf. ps.Plu.
I (DG .), & 8 w (scil., 9 ) 7 3
0I 3 B
3 3 ! 8 /0 /u '
B; cf. also the pas-
sage from Cael. Aur. quoted supra, n. , and at Philo, Somn. I .
Harris, op.cit. (supra, n. ), n. , cites Galen XVI K. as a parallel and wonders
whether the figure has been invented by Anonymus Fuchsii himself or derives from a lost
work of Hippocrates, as Wellmann, op.cit. (supra, n. ), believed.
70 Note that the final clause is formulated the same way as the final clause in the
he is said to believe that the regent part is in the heart.71 But in his etiol-
ogy of phrenitis the diaphragm plays an all-important part; the inflam-
mation of the diaphragm involves the heart and so impedes the mind
to function. This etiology, in its turn, helps to explain the lemma in the
Placita (ps.Plutarch and Stobaeus at At. IV .; Soranus ap. Cael.Aurel.)
according to which some people held the diaphragm itself to be the seat
of the regent part. If this tenet is not a purely doxographical fabrication,
there are two alternatives. Either Diocles etiology of phrenitis was mis-
understood and in some way or other is behind the tenet in the Placita
or (perhaps more likely) a physician unknown to us, inspired by this eti-
ology, actually declared the diaphragm to be the regent part, which view
was then duly included in the doxographies. This idea, or this confusion,
may have been helped along by the fact that in early Greek poetry the
(lungs) are the seat of consciousness and that it was known that
the word had had this meaning;72 the Hippocratic writers and Plato later
identified the
as the diaphragm.73 One may compare ps.Galen
on phrenitis, Introductio sive [329] medicus74 XIV . K.:
E 8
,75 F -,76 F M
, l
! .77
71 Waszink, op.cit. (supra, n. ), (on the passage from Cael.Aur.) is mistaken. For
> [scil., between the spirited part in the breast and the appetitive part in the belly]
). One may quote Galen, De loc.aff. V , VII K.: All the ancients
called the lower boundary of the chest phrenes because this term came to their mind, or
because, as some believed, inflammation (of this area) damages the mind of the patients.
After Plato they started to call it diaphragma, although like all the old (authors) he still
called it phrenes. However, Plato believed that it acted as a partition in the living body,
since it seemed to separate the spirited part of the soul, contained in the heart, from
the appetitive part in the liver. From that time the physicians became accustomed to
calling it diaphragm, neglecting the ancient terminology . . . (transl., slightly modified,
by R.E. Siegel, Galen On the Affected Parts [Basel etc. ], f.).
74 Wellmann, op.cit. (supra, n. ), assumes this passage derives from Soranus.
75 Hippocrates according to the An.Fuchsii.
76 Erasistratus according to the An.Fuchsii; for the plural cf. Pollux, supra, text to n. .
77 Cf. Anonymus Londinensis (for this work see infra, n. ), col. IV.. Diels argues
that the term
does not refer to the diaphragm but to the rational part of the soul,
which clearly he does not want to locate in the diaphragm. The argument stands that of
chrysippus and the placita
The topic of Tusculans Book I is death, for the person playing the part
of Ciceros opponent propounds as his
that death is an evil (I ,
malum mihi [331] videtur esse mors). In what follows, this view is
connected with the question of what happens to us (or rather to our
soul) after death. This in its turn enables the teacher (Cicero) to introduce
the placita concerned with the nature and vicissitudes of the soul (Tusc.
78 What comes to mind is the Carneadea divisio (non quot fuissent adhuc . . ., sed
(SVF II , second text), mentioned Praxagoras and opposed him to those who held
that the nerves had their beginning from the brain. But it is clear that Chrysippus could
not simply say Praxagoras was right.
chrysippus and the placita
80 Diels, DG ff.
81 DG f., esp. : academiam redolet exordium II [sic: error for (Tusc.) I]
harum sententiarum quae vera sit deus aliqui viderit: quae veri simillima, magna quaestio
est. sed Ciceronem non ipsum loqui quis probare possit? R. Hirzel, Untersuchungen zu
Ciceros philosophischen Schriften III (Leipzig , repr. Hildesheim ), ff., argued
that Cicero used a Skeptical source for Tusc. I (ibid., ff. he refers to Philo of Larissa),
but did not study its relation to the Placita.
82 At DG , Diels (following Krische) argues that the Academic Skeptic Clito-
machus is the source of Ac.pr. II ff., i.e. also of . But then Clitomachus should be
the source of Tusc. I ff. as well.
83 See A.-J. Festugire, La Rvlation dHerms Trismgiste, II, Le Dieu Cosmique (Paris
and later repr.), , who points out that the tenets of Xenocrates, Plato, and
Diaearchus (Tusc. I ) are also found at Ac.pr. II , where they belong with
the Academic material beginning at Ac.Pr. II , cf. Festugire, ibid., ff. He could
have added that the tenets of Zeno, Empedocles, and the anonymous view that the soul
is anima are also paralleled at Ac.pr. II . Festugire infers: On est donc fond
croire que la doxographie des Tusculanes remonte, comme celle du Lucullus [scil., Ac.pr.
II ff.], un ouvrage de la nouvelle Acadmie, et sans doute au mme ouvrage. But
he does not deal with the problem of the contribution of the Vetusta placita; the date of
such an ouvrage de la nouvelle Acadmie would have to be earlier than Diels date for
the latter work.
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the only issue. As to the location of the soul or rather of its regent part,
the somewhat cavalier overview at Tusc. I ff. clearly is based on the
diaeresis which we know from Atius IV and from Soranus, that is to
say from the Vetusta placita, viz. the heart, or the blood in the heart, as
opposed to part of the brain, or a place in the heart opposed to a place in
the brain:84
Tusc. I Ac.pr. II 85
aliis cor ipsum animus videtur . . . ,86 (deest)
Empedocles animum censet esse cordi suffusum sanguinem, sanguis
alii pars quaedam cerebri visa est animi principatum tenere, (deest)
aliis nec cor ipsum placet nec cerebri quandam partem esse animum, (deest)
sed alii in corde, alii in cerebro dixerunt animi esse sedem et locum.
animum autem alii animam,87 [ . . . ] anima
Zenoni Stoico animus ignis videtur.88 ignis [333]
The only names provided here are those of Empedocles and Zeno. Rather
remarkably, Cicero argues that the views listed so far are those commonly
held (Tusc. I , sed haec quidem, quae dixi, cor cerebrum animam
ignem, vulgo). It is also to be noticed that the diaeresis concerned with
the seat of the hgemonikon is lacking in the Academics passage. Other
names are divulged in the main exposition in the first part of Tusc. I; I
cannot enter into this matter here.
84 Next to the passages from the Tusc. I have printed such parallels as are available at
Ac.Pr. II (italics are mine).
85 For the sake of clarity, I here add the whole passage: Tenemusne quid sit animus,
ubi sit, denique sitne an, ut Diaearcho visum est, ne sit quidem ullus? si est, trisne
partes habet, ut Platoni placuit, rationis irae cupiditatis, an simplex unusque sit? si
simplex, utrum sit ignis an anima an sanguis an, ut Xenocrates, numerus nullo corpore
(quod intellegi quale sit vix potest)? et quidquid est, mortale sit an aeternum? nam
utramque in partem (cf. infra, p. ) multa dicuntur. Note the ordered series of three
overlapping dichotomous diaereses (existence / non-existence, having parts / simplicity,
corporeal / incorporeal) in the form of dialectical questions: I, (a) is it, or (b) is it not? II,
if it is, (b1) does it have parts or (b2) is it simple? III, if it is simple, is it (b2) corporeal or
(b2) incorporeal?
86 Cf. At. IV ..
87 I.e. air, cf. At. IV ., or pneuma (the Stoic doctrine according to At. IV .).
88 SVF I , third text. Cf. At. IV ., where however the doctrine is formulated
in the standard way, which differs from Ciceros. At Ac.po. I (= SVF I , first text),
we also hear that according to Zeno ignem esse ipsam naturam quae quidque gigneret,
etiam mentem atque sensus. This is after Antiochus; accordingly, also the formula at Tusc.
I (= SVF I , third text) represents the way Cicero, following Antiochus, formulated
Zenos doctrine (cf. also De fin. IV = SVF I , second text).
chrysippus and the placita
89 Cf. supra, n. .
90 According to Ciceros abstract from the work in three books referred to at Tusc. I
(cf. also I ), there is according to Dicaearchus no soul in the proper sense of the word,
only the body, which acts and feels temperatione natura (compare the blend of the four
elements attributed to Dinarchus at Nemes. De nat. hom. p. . ff. and to Dicaearchus
at At. IV .).
91 DG . I do not deny that Cicero had read this work by Dicaearchus, but he must
already have found the reference, or laudatio (which he then checked or which made him
recall what he had read), in his source.
jaap mansfeld
passages not only pertains to the alternatives of the heart and the chest,
but in both camps there is also further disagreement as to what part of
the head and what part of the chest is involved.
We may now return to the Chrysippus fragment.
92 Diels, DG, Ch. XVII, De vetustorum placitum fontibus, , argues that the
* doctrines of the more ancient doctors have been incorporated in the Placita (in view of
the context, he must mean the Vetusta placita) from, ultimately, the 1& -,
or , of Aristotles pupil Meno, and that in this way they would have been added
to the material which as he believes derives from Theophrastus, but he does not say
when this occurred. Ibid., , he derives the lemmata concerned with the physician
Asclepiades (early st cent. bce; for further references see my The Pseudo-Hippocratic
Tract $ Ch. and Greek Philosophy, (Assen ), n. ),
who is the most recent doctor to be mentioned by name, from the Vetusta placita; see
also the reference in the index nominum s.v. Asclepiades: ultimus (scil. medicus) in
vetustis Placitis. At Phys.Syst.Strat. (supra, n. ), f., he argues that a most significant
chrysippus and the placita
already taken place. Furthermore, the version from which Diels Vetusta
placita derived must be assumed to have been updated to some extent,
for the tenet of Diogenes of Babylon (At. IV .)93 is post-Chrysippean.
Once it is [336] realized that Vetusta placita may be assumed for the first
century bce and Vetustissima placita for the century of Chrysippus, or
two centuries earlier, and that in between further items were included, it
becomes clear that the collection of placita, as befits a handbook in com-
mon use, acquired new materials in the course of its history. It no longer
comes as a surprise that in the shorter Atius composed by ps.Plutarch a
unique reference to Xenarchus, a first century ce philosopher, has been
preserved which may (but need not) have been added by Atius himself.94
But the vast majority of the items in the doxography remained Preso-
cratic, Classical, and Hellenistic.
I have pointed out above that Chrysippus in On the Soul Book I also
discussed and treated the issues corresponding to Atius IV , viz.
the substance and parts of the soul, and in exactly the same order. The
most economical assumption is that the Vetustissima placita provided
overviews of tenets concerned with these issues too. This assumption can
be shored up somewhat further. After his remarks on the disagreements
concerned with the seat of the regent part, Chrysippus continues with
a section on Platos doctrine of the tripartite soul. This is also found at
Cic. Tusc. I f. and At. IV .,95 where the terminology has been mod-
ernized; that used by Chrysippus conforms to a more correct Platonic
usage which however has not been taken as such from Plato but already
constitutes a fusion of the terminology of the Republic with that of the
Timaeus.96 In Chrysippus exposition, Platos tenet clearly is one of the
views that are in opposition to other views, for he mentions the diapho-
nia both before and after mentioning it. It functions as a sort of compro-
mise view, for it pertains to both the chest and the head. Chrysippus has
it play this part because Platos view contrasts with his own psychologi-
cal monism, according to which reason, the will, and the [337] emotions,
because they are the regent part in a certain condition, must all be located
in one and the same place. There can hardly be any doubt, however, that
in the version of the Placita presupposed by Chrysippus account the Pla-
tonic tripartition was referred to in the section concerned with the parts
of the soul; here, we may be allowed to think, one could also already find
97 I am not prepared to consider the possibility that Chrysippus remark about the
disagreement inspired a doxographer to compose a chapter on the hegemonikon; it is far
too succint to attract this kind of attention, and the information in the parallels that have
been cited above contains numerous details which are not in Chrysippus. On the other
hand Plato, Phaed. b (cf. Diels, DG , who correctly points out that from this passage
posteriorum curiositas multum distat) is insufficient as an immediate precedent for
Chrysippus, because he is not concerned with the hgemonikon, or with the subsidiary
question in which part of the head or which part of the chest this is to be located, and
does not refer to both physicians and philosophers. Nevertheless the Plato parallel shows
that the larger issue was a traditional one.
98 See DG ff.
99 DG ff.
jaap mansfeld
But in the sources adduced by Diels for his Vetusta placita this other
material is not connected with that concerned with the regent part of
the soul.
One also has to think of the other end, viz. the Theophrastean work which
Diels believes to be ultimately behind all this without, however, being
able to provide parallels from Theophrastus relating to the doctrine of the
soul,100 or to the (Varronian) spermatology etc. Neither Diels hypothesis
of the Vetusta placita nor his assumption that, ultimately, Theophrastus is
the main contributor has ever been seriously challenged. Quite the con-
trary: important fields in todays study of the history of Greek philoso-
phy are still largely dominated by the results of Diels Quellenforschung,
although today most scholars, using their up-to-date secondary litera-
ture and their collections of fragments, are, I dare say, hardly aware of
this fact. This does not entail that I argue that Theophrastus contribution
could be discounted. I should argue, however, and have, that at the other
end other Peripatetic contributions are involved as well, not only those
of Theophrastus, and that at any rate ingredients deriving from Aristotle
himself were incorporated at an early date.101 These pertain not only to
contents, but also and perhaps even more importantly to the method of
presentation.
The version of the Placita presupposed by Chrysippus J0 cannot
have been unalloyed Theophrastus, or an unalloyed Peripatetic vulgate.
It clearly emphasized disagreement (). Theophrastus, just as
Aristotle, made a consistent use of diaeresis when inventorying, for the
purposes of a dialectical discussion, the views of others or even such
views as are theoretically possible,102 but in their dialectical overviews
the Peripatetics never emphasized diaphonia in the standard way of the
later doxography. [339]
100 As to Aet. IVV, he can only provide parallels from the De sensu concerned with
* perception, see DG ff.
101 Cf. my paper Gibt es Spuren von Theophrasts Phys. op. bei Cicero?, in W.W. Forten-
* baughP. Steinmetz (eds.), Ciceros Knowledge of the Peripatos, Rutgers Studies V (New
Brunswick/London ), ff.
102 For Theophrastus see my paper cited supra (n. ), where I discuss the diaeresis
* in the fragments Usener and Diels attributed to the Physicorum opiniones (as they called
the work). One should of course add the diaeresis, in the De sensibus, between those who
chrysippus and the placita
assume that perception and knowledge are by the same and those who assume they are
by the opposite; see e.g. A. Weische, Cicero und die neue Akademie. Untersuchungen zur
Entstehung und Geschichte des antiken Skeptizismus (Mnster ), f. For Aristotle
see my paper Aristotle, Plato, and the Preplatonic Doxography and Chronography, in:
G. Cambiano (ed.), Dossografia e storiografia nella filosofia antica (Torino ), ff.
103 This formal aspect, viz. the method of diaeresis underlying both modes of presenta-
tion, and this crucial difference have not been noticed by Weische, op.cit. (supra, n. ),
ff. His use of the word skepticism in relation to passages where Theophrastus cau-
tiously refrains from cutting knots (ibid., ff.) is inappropriate. Eudemus fr. Wehrli
(ap. Alex. In Top. . f., quoted and interpreted by Weische ibid., f.), 9
z E ! ! 8, E X 0
>B
8, does not entail that dialectic is mainly a useless business. On the contrary, the
wrong or mostly wrong opinions of course are the majority, and the grains of truth are
rare and few. The Eudemus fragment is a fair enough assessment of Aristotles procedure
and results in e.g. Met. A.
104 Cf. supra, n. and text thereto.
105 See G. Striker, ber den Unterschied zwischen den Pyrrhoneern und den Akademik-
ern, Phronesis (), ff., and A.M. Ioppolo, Doxa ed Epoche in Arcesilao, Elenchos
(), , .
jaap mansfeld
106 Cf. my paper in the Cambiano vol. cited supra (n. ), passim, where I also show
that these collections were used by Plato as well in the context of dialectical discussions
of other views in the later dialogues.
107 He recommends making collections of at Top. A .b ff.
chrysippus and the placita
108 F. Wehrli, Sotion (Die Schule des Aristoteles, Suppl. II, Basel/Stuttgart ), f.
109 For the fabrication of such stemmata see my paper Diogenes Laertius on Stoic
Philosophy, Elenchos (), ff.
110 Also referred to at Plut. S.R. C. SVF III (Cic. Tusc. .) may derive from
the work Against Common Experience; the examples provided are remarkably similar to
those concerned with customs in Aenesidemus tenth trope in favour of the suspension
of judgement.
111 S.R. A = SVF II , from a treatise that is not identified; ibid., DE = SVF
112 Cf. my paper Philosophy in the Service of Scripture: Philos Exegetical Strategies,
in: J.M. DillonA.A. Long (eds.), The Question of Eclecticism: Studies in Later Greek
Philosophy (Berkeley ), ff., reprinted as Study X in J. Mansfeld, Studies in Later
Greek Philosophy and Gnosticism (CS , London ), , and my paper De Melisso
Xenophane Gorgia: Pyrrhonizing Aristotelianism, Rh.M. (), f.
113 Plut. S.R. A = SVF II b; tr. Cherniss.
114 Cf. my Philo paper cited supra (n. ), .
chrysippus and the placita
DECONSTRUCTING DOXOGRAPHY
Jaap Mansfeld
what his own views are. Perhaps one should allow oneself to be guided
by his apophthegm at p. : Every theory is a lucky combination of
previous ideas. Every theory!
Examples of arguments ad hominem: our emendations of Diels theory
are seen by Z. p. as attacks on his integrity as a scholar. Evidently
one way of arguing ad hominem is to claim that ones opponents argue
ad hominem. And I am admonished by Z. pp. for accepting
the theory of the Doxographi Graeci in my Reclam [278] Vorsokratiker,3
and for changing my mind a number of years later. Changing ones
mind clearly is not done. Z. furthermore believes that Baltussen Runia
Mansfeld form what he calls a school, members of which should toe
the party line. Any putative sin committed by one of these people is
to be attributed to and visited on the others.4 On the other hand, that
Runia and the present writer should disagree is seen by Z. as a serious
weakness fatally undermining what he calls the new doxography. He
fails to appreciate that we are independent scholars who may or may not
agree to disagree among ourselves.
An example of misunderstanding: Z. p. with n. reveals his
lack of a sense of humour or irony by taking a remark of mine about
the Quellenforschung in Diels Doxographi graeci au pied de la lettre.5
Another confusion or false presentation: Z. p. states that the main
thesis of a paper published 6 is that the doxographical tradition
offers not Theophrastus report on Xenophanes but Theophrastus own
view. Quod non: I argued that the doxographical traditions concerning
Xenophanes are complicated and of diverse provenance. Z. adds that
this main thesis was refuted by Runia.7 But Runia merely argued against
the attribution to Theophrastus rather than Xenophanes of one of the
two tenets at Aet. .. Diels. Z. has mistaken the detail about Aet.
.. for the argument of the paper as a whole. Quite amusing is his
contention, p. , that to explain certain important aspects of Atian
doxography through an appeal to the Peripatetic dialectical approach
3 Vol. first published Stuttgart . Naturally I had been working on the little books
8 . . . the new doxography substitutes its own Einquellentheorie with Aristotles Topics
as fons et origo of the entire doxography. Apart from the bizarre use of the term
Einquellentheorie this contention really is as false as can be. Of course Top. . and .
are not the only passages appealed to, and Peripatetic dialectic is not the only approach
mentioned (nor is the Topics the only treatise cited), and the argument is that with regard
to content a plurality of sources is to be taken into account. For this plurality see e.g. also
Mansfeld (a), a paper not mentioned by Z.
9 Note that this title is not attested for Eudemus but for Theophrastus in the catalogue
historical research and the narrowest sense of historical, the modern one.
jaap mansfeld
12 Note that these titles are also found in the catalogue of Theophrastus ap. Diog.Laert.
., $ # # # # (= fr. . FHS&G), . 10
' # # # # # (= fr. . FHS&G) and 1 ' >-
# (= fr. . FHS&G). The usual assumption is that Eudemean titles have strayed
into Theophrastus catalogue. Yet titles such as Analytics Topics Physics
are
attested for both Theophrastus and Eudemus.Cf. also below, n. .
13 To his quotation add &
8 0
T. For the
tenet cf. Aet. .. Diels: Olympiodorus example of a physik doxa is attested in the
Placita literature.
14 A glance at the De elementis ex Hippocrate shows that Galen indeed means prac-
tically all the physical doxai pertaining to the principles or elements: he starts with the
theory that there are smallest parts (Democritus Epicurus Asclepiades) and only later
describes the (various versions of the) theory that there are four elements. He claims that
his overview is complete and that the full diaeresis shows that there are four and only
four main possible theories (.. ff. K.,
E 3 ' K 3 &
5 .).
deconstructing doxography
15 The combination is not more strange than (i.e. the physical part
Sop. de dialectica ap. Stob. .., . W., Procl. in Ti. .., Olympiod. in Meteo.
..
20 As is now definitively proved by the parallels cited in the text (when I first thought
and wrote about these matters the TLG was not available to me). And Phys. op. fr. Diels,
st text = fr. A FHS&Gcf. .b FHS&G and the comment of Sharples () ,
8 ; can only mean in the On the Physical Tenets, not in
the On the Tenets of the Physicists which would require another article before .
21 Or think of the distinction between story and plot attributed to E.M. Forster: The
king died, and then the queen died is a story. The king died, and then the queen died
of grief is a plot.
jaap mansfeld
(b) . For a longer and more detailed argument see Mansfeld () esp.
, (revised and amplified Mansfeld ()). No reference to the relevant argu-
ments of in Z. See also Sharples () , and Sedley () .
23 See e.g. Mansfeld () . The argument about Aristotle and later doxogra-
phy is continued in a forthcoming paper entitled Atius, Aristotle and Others on Coming
to Be and Passing Away [= Ch. in the present volume].
24 DG f.
25 Z.s contention p. that Diels failed to adduce all the possible evidence, viz. the
Eudemean titles, in favour of his (and Useners) intepretation of what they called the
, is mistaken: Diels does quote the titles DG .
26 Of course this evidence is also cited by Steinmetz () , whose arguments
' / 7 !, [ . . . ] / ! .
29 Cf. Part.an. a, 0 6 0 ' 5!
ibid. .
jaap mansfeld
And at fr. Diels Theophrastus says that though Plato concerned himself
mostly with first philosophy he also devoted himself to the phenomena,
taking up the enquiry concerning nature (8
H
S! 0 ', viz. in the Timaeus).
Plato in the Timaeus is not a historian of physics.
Diels moreover argued that Theophrastus sequence is determined by
both (relative) chronology and content.33 To judge from the fragments in
Simplicius attributed by Diels to what he calls the Physicorum opiniones
this is correct.34 Aristotle too in his [283] overview in Metaph. com-
bined content and relative chronology. It is to be regretted that Z. fails
to take this more complex structure seriously into account.35 At p.
he denies that this combination holds for Theophrastus even more com-
plicated De sensibus,36 apparently believing that a relative chronological
sequence is ipso facto person-oriented and historical. But there is also
something like a relative chronology of views, or doctrines, allowing an
author moreover to mention in one breath earlier and later persons sub-
scribing to the same tenet (e.g. Thales plus Hippo: water as the princi-
ple; Anaximenes plus Diogenes of Apollonia: air as the principle). The
theory of causes, or principles, as described in the first book of Aris-
totles Metaphysics develops and grows, and in this sense has a history
the phases of which can be, and are, determined. But as Aristotle shows
this development (or evolution) need not be linear. Some further order is
33 DG ff. I cannot resist quoting, from page : angustae mentis erat neglecta
, A E : '
> 3
, 3 & 0
(This is the summary account of what
has been ascertained about the principles, recorded not in a chronological arrangement,
but according to affinities of doctrine, transl. FHS&G). Not in Sperrdruck in the DG,
but Diels n. admitted that these words non solum Simplicii sed etiam Theophrasti
rationem describere possunt.
35 I note a subdued reference, Z. p. , to a combination of topic- and person-
oriented approach which should characterize Menos (or Aristotles) Iatrik Synagg.
Also cf. Z. p. , a Peripatetic history of philosophy, systematic and critical. But these
incidental remarks do not carry the same weight as Z.s sustained musings concerned with
chronology.
36 The DS was obviously more person-oriented and historical [i.e. in presenting
a chronological sequence JM] than later doxography. True enough as to the relative
chronology. But the a-chronological sequence ParmenidesPlatoEmpedocles for in-
stance is determined by content (escalating number of senses assumed: none two four).
No argument is given for Z.s rejection (p. n. ) of a paper of mine on the De sensibus
as being not convincing.
deconstructing doxography
order.
jaap mansfeld
43 Wehrli () ; ad frr. .
44 A good account of the semantic history of the term ' is to be found in Press
(); on Peripatetic titles see ibid. , (not entirely satisfactory). Huxley ()
translates empirical investigation and ibid. speaks of Aristotles systematic
enquiry into facts and events (3 ) past and present (note that this paper
is not concerned with the historiography of philosophy). For Herodotus Enquiry see
e.g. Calame () and the literature there cited. The meaning enquiry did not
become obsolete, see e.g. the final sentence at Plut. Mor. E, >E + 0 3
! & 5
'. An account of the use of ' in
the late commentators would be rewarding but cannot be provided here.
45 See e.g. Mansfeld (b) .
46 Nipperdey ().
deconstructing doxography
so be very much aware of the fact that this precisely is what one is doing.
I do not claim that Z. applies the h.-word with its modern connotation,
or has really thought out its implications; quite the contrary. But history
is a suggestive word and its use may well mislead the reader.
There is nothing about the above demonstration that is particularly
new, but the publication of Z.s piece obliges one to make a few noises.
For the purposes of the present paper it is not necessary to discuss at
length and to explain the various forms of the titles for or references to
Theophrastean works or passages therein concerned with the treatment
of earlier doctrines. Naturally these matters will be tackled in a forth-
coming volume of Atiana. And I have not dealt with rebukes specifi-
cally addressed to Baltussen or Runia either: amicorum iniuriae amicis
curae!
Bibliography
C. Calame, The Craft of Poetic Speech in Ancient Greece, Ithaca and London
.
DG = H. Diels, Doxographi Graeci, Berlin and later repr.
H. Flashar (Hrsg.), Die Philosophie der Antike : ltere Akademie, Aristoteles
Peripatos, BaselStuttgart .
FHS&G = W.W. FortenbaughP.M. HubyR.W. SharplesD. Gutas (eds.), Theo-
phrastus of Eresus: Sources for his Life, Writings, Thought and Influence
(Philosophia Antiqua .), Leiden etc. , repr. .
D. Frede, Necessity, Chance and What Happens for the Most Part in Aristotles
Poetics, in: A. Oksenberg Rorty (ed.), Essays on Aristotles Poetics, Princeton
, .
K. von Fritz, Die Bedeutung des Aristoteles fr die Geschichtsschreibung, in: F.-
P. Hager (Hrsg.), Ethik und Politik des Aristoteles (Wege der Forschung ),
Darmstadt , .
A. Gotthelf, Historiae I: plantarum et animalium, in: W.W. FortenbaughR.W.
Sharples (eds.), Theophrastean Studies: On Natural Science, Physics and
Metaphysics, Ethics, Religion, and Rhetoric (Rutgers Studies in Classical
Humanities ), New Brunswick , .
G. Huxley, On Aristotles Historical Methods, GRBS , , .
J. Mansfeld, Theophrastus and the Xenophanes Doxography, Mnemosyne ,
, .
J. Mansfeld, Physikai doxai and problmata physika from Aristotle to Atius
(and Beyond), in: W.W. FortenbaughD. Gutas (eds.), Theophrastus: His
Psychological, Doxographical and Scientific Writings (Rutgers Studies in
Classical Humanities ), New Brunswick N.J.-London , . Revised
and amplified version: Physikai doxai e problmata physica da Aristotele ad
Aezio (ed oltre), in: A.M. Battegazzore (ed.), Dimostrazione, argomentazione
jaap mansfeld
David T. Runia
A little over ten years ago Jaap Mansfeld and I published the first of a
number of projected volumes on the doxographer Atius.1 In this volume
we subjected the source-critical Atius-hypothesis to a thorough exami-
nation for the first time since its definitive formulation by Hermann Diels
in his Doxographi Graeci published in .2 The study was given a favo-
rable reception.3 Scholars accepted our demonstration that the hypothe-
sis was in need of a thorough revision, but at the same time were agreea-
bly surprised how well it had stood up.4 The authors were encouraged to
continue with their research. This we intend to do. But before we publish
the next stage of our project, it will be worthwhile briefly to respond to
two review articles of our first volume, in which some salient points were
raised concerning the name and identity of its protagonist.
In an article in this journal, Jan Bremmer responded to our volume
with some interesting observations on the names of Atius, Arius Didy-
mus, and the possible role that Alexandria may have played in the trans-
mission of doxographical material.5 It is particularly the first point that
concerns us now.6 Bremmer argues that our discussion on the name
Atius lacks chronological sharpness (p. ), particularly because we
do not take the latest state of papyrological and epigraphical evidence into
ment of the later doxographical tradition, based on prevalence of names and distribution
of books, is far from compelling. Naturally the metropolis, as a prominent cultural and
educational centre, may well have made an important contribution, but the distribution
of doxographical material was far too wide and its details far too obscure for one place to
be singled out as playing a special role.
david t. runia
account. It appears that as a personal name Atius does not occur in any
documentaryas opposed to literarysource material before the fourth
century ce. The implicationnot made fully explicitis that the un-
known author of the doxographical compendium utilized by Ps.Plutarch,
Stobaeus and Theodoret, whom we have dated to about the second half
of the first century ce, cannot have been named Atius. The person with
this name is of course referred to by [465] Theodoret on three occasions.
Bremmer speculates that he might have been the owner or the copyist of
the copy of the collection of Placita in the bishops possession.
In our study we only devoted a brief paragraph to the name and
identity of the author/compiler of the Placita (pp. ). It was of
course noted that the name of Atius did become more popular in later
antiquity. Bremmers method is to attempt to disqualify all earlier uses
of the name in literary sources, e.g. in Herodian and the Garland of
Philip, leaving him and us with only the documentary material left, in
which apparently there are no cases of the name occurring before the
th century ce. But this is no more than an argument e silentio and it
is more than doubtful that onomastic considerations can carry so much
weight as to justify the conclusion that the name must have been a later
addition to the doxographical tradition (p. ). In this context a further
literary example might be cited. In the Testament of the Forty Holy and
Glorious Martyrs of Christ who completed their life at Sebaste a certain
Atius is one of the writers, as indicated in the first line of the document.7
The authenticity of the document, just as in the case of the poem in the
Garland, has been questioned, but the latest editor Musurillo argues that
its very simplicity speaks in its favour.8 There seems little reason to doubt
the authenticity of the names. The writers may have been soldiers and
were located in a town in Armenia. The execution took place during the
reign of Licinius (). Atius indicates that he is a married man.9
Presuming that he received the name at birth, we must conclude that in
all likelihood his name goes back to the third century, i.e. earlier than
the documentary evidence. One might also mention the name of the
painter 1 whose floruit occurred as early as the second half of the
7 Text in Musurillo , .
8 Musurillo , xlix.
9 See his personal greetings recorded at ... We note that a relative of this
Atius was called Aquilinus, which is evidence for the link with the Latin name Aquila,
which we suggested in Atiana, .
atius, or whats in a name?
Like Bremmer, Frede questions the identity of Atius, but his approach
is source-critical rather than prosopographical. He homes in on the only
three passages in Theodoret in which Atius is mentioned, curiously (as
he points out, p. ) each time in conjunction with Plutarch (i.e. the
author of the doxographical compendium attributed to Plutarch) and
Porphyry. Are these passages sufficient to settle the identity of the mys-
tery doxographer, as Diels thought and we agreed in calling our study
Atiana? Frede thinks not. He makes the valuable point that in put-
ting together the list of three authorities Theodoret cannot have thought
Atius too obscure an author to be out of place in this list, in the com-
pany of senior figures from the first and third centuries (p. ).13 From
the viewpoint of source usage the most interesting of three passages is
., because it introduces the long passage . in which extensive
doxographies are given on the nature [467] of the soul. Frede gives an
overview of the sources used (pp. ).14 No use is made of Plutarch
or Porphyry, but other sources are used, some of which are readily iden-
tifiable because these works are still extant (Clement, Eusebius), while
others are more difficult or impossible to identify. Our doxographer is
one of the latter, as proven by parallel material in Ps.Plutarch and Sto-
baeus. Frede postulates at least one further source from which Theodo-
ret derives interspersed remarks at ., , , . On this basis he
can give the following formal argument. Theodoret says that he is dra-
wing on Plutarch, Porphyry and Atius, but in fact he is using the Placita
and at least one other unidentifiable source, as well as Clement and Euse-
bius. It is not possible to prove on this basis that Atius is the author of
the Placita. He might have been the author of the other source, or indeed
Theodoret might have mentioned his name as an authority, but in fact not
used him at all (as was the case for Plutarch and Porphyry). His conclu-
sion is therefore that it just remains an attractive possibility that the
author of the Placita was Atius (p. ).
The validity of Fredes formal argument cannot be denied. It is indeed
not possible to prove beyond all possible doubt on the basis of Theodo-
rets texts that an author called Atius was the person who compiled the
Placita in the form abridged by Ps.Plutarch and heavily excerpted by Sto-
baeus. It must be emphasized that the argument is formal, as indicated by
13 Theodoret will of course, just like Eusebius, have regarded Plutarch of Chaeronea as
esp. , .
atius, or whats in a name?
nothing to prevent us from going one step further and countenancing the possibility;
and also the passage cited above in the text.
16 Diels , .
17 Mansfeld & Runia , , following LSJ and authorities such as Denniston-Dover
and Smyth-Messing.
18 The analysis given in the monograph devoted to Theodorets use of sources, Canivet
Bibliography
21 But note that the last-named passages were discussed at length by Mansfeld in the
article cited in n. .
22 Frede , mentions seven new Dielsian paragraphs, i.e. .., .. and
, ... It is not clear to me why he does not include .. (Xenocrates), which he does
mention on the following page as likely to be derived from the common source.
23 It is expected that it will be published in the series Philosophia Antiqua (Brill,
Mansfeld J. . Doxography and Dialectic: the Sitz im Leben of the Placita, in:
Haase, W., Temporini, H. (eds.), Aufstieg und Niedergang der rmischen Welt
Band II ., Berlin/New York, .
Mansfeld, J., Runia, D.T. . Atiana: The Method and Intellectual Context of a
Doxographer (Leiden).
Mueller, I. . Review Mansfeld & Runia CPh , .
Musurillo S.J., H. . The Acts of the Christian Martyrs (Oxford).
Robinson, J.M., Hoffmann, P., Kloppenborg, J.S. (eds.) . The Critical Edition
of Q. A Synopsis including the Gospels of Matthew and Luke, Mark and Thomas
with English, German and French Translations of Q and Thomas (Leuven).
part iii
OTHER AUTHORS
chapter seven
Jaap Mansfeld
. Soul as harmony
and it that of the being fitted together of somethings parts so that it forms a whole, see
e.g. Loriaux () . For the musical sense in Plato see Smp. ab (where Heracl. fr.
B DKsee below, n. is partly quoted partly paraphrased), with the comment of
Kirk () ; also see ibid. .
2 Cf. Phd. a, S @ K.
3 Passage discussed by Gottschalk () .
jaap mansfeld
acceptance see below). It is indeed in the Phaedo that this doxa gives an
account of itself, and is judged. The same, presumably, was true of the dis-
cussion in the Eudemus, which at least in this respect seems to have been
to some extent a rehash and further refinement of arguments in Platos
dialogue8 (others were added by Aristotle). In the De anima Simmias
affirmation that the soul as harmony is a common view is taken au pied
de la lettre.9 [3]
Aristotle next argues against.10 Of his arguments, some take up those
of Socrates in the Phaedo; they need not be discussed here. As to the
others I wish to limit the discussion to his criticism of Empedocles.11
He affirms that it is absurd to hold that the soul is the proportion
of the blending (K, scil. of the opposites, or elements). The pro-
portion constituting flesh is different from that of bone etc., so that
on this assumption one would have numerous souls all over the body.
This, he continues, is an objection one may bring against Empedocles.12
We happen to be informed about the doctrine involved. According to
Theophrastus13 Empedocles held that humans think-and-percieve with
the blood, in which the elements are more fully mixed. Theophrastus
moreover tells us that according to Empedocles people are more or less
bright, or slow or impetuous, depending on the nature of the blend. They
are clever orators when a happy blending is found in the tongue, and
artisans when this is the case in the hands. In the De anima Aristotle had
already quoted Empedocles famous fragment dealing with the doctrine
that like knows like, that is to say that with earth we see earth, with water
water and so on, and argued that Empedocles turns each element into a
soul.14 The emphasis is on cognition.
8 For the relation between the Eudemus and the Phaedo see e.g. Guthrie () ;
compare Berti () , who however follows Bernays view that Aristotle only
refers to his own lost work. There are seven references by title to the Phaedo in Aristotle.
9 So also, apparently, at Pol. ..a, where name-labels are again lacking.
10 An. ..ba.
11 In his refutation Aristotle applies his usual distinction between composition (-
) and blending, but this does not affect the point I wish to make.
12 Cf. Emp. fr. B DK on the production of white bones, the first three lines of which
are quoted and commented upon in the next chapter, An. ..a. Aristotle leaves
out line four, which tells us that Harmony glues the elements together. Harmony is
another name for Empedocles principle Love (), which explains why Aristotle
mentions at a. No term for elemental blending is found in B, but cf. B.
.
13 Sens. , with quotation of Emp. fr. B DK and paraphrase of B. See
Mansfeld () .
14 Emp. fr. B DK at An. ..b. See Mansfeld () .
jaap mansfeld
docles $, who joins the elemental portions together to create the bones, is not
musical harmony but one of the personifications of his unifying principle is not to the
point.
20 Fr. Marcovich = DK. For references see Kirk () , Huffman ()
21 Heraclitus doctrine is also one of the ingredients of the thesis concerning the
opposites at Phd. de, see e.g. Hackforth () , Bluck () and ibid.
on the present passage, Gallop () .
22 Phd. d.
23 Thus Rowe () ; Sedly () argues that they were hybrid Pythagore-
ans. Ebert () convincingly argues that the Annahme that Simmias and Cebes
are Pythagoreans is falsch.
24 Philol. fr. Huffman = fr. DK, st part. See Burkert () , Kirk, Raven
The idea that the human soul is a harmony is not attributed to early
thinkers in the doxographical tradition, with the unreliable exceptions
of Macrobius and Claudianus Mamertus who mention Pythagoras and
Philolaus.25 As to later thinkers, according to the flattened-out doxa at
At. .. Diels (both ps.Plutarch and Stobaeus) it is Aristotles follower
Dicaearchus who held that the soul is a harmony of the four elements.26
. Socrates autobiography
25 Above n. , n. .
26 Dicaearch. fr. ab Wehrli, and Theodoret who says Clearchus (Dicaearch. fr.
c). Also Nemes. NH . Morani, who speaks of Dinarchus (Dicaearch. fr. ).
See further Burkert () n. , Gottschalk () , Mansfeld ()
and for Philo Somn.. (anonymous), for the name-label Dicaearchus
and its corruptions in various sources (on which also Gottschalk () n. ,
n. ), on Ciceros attribution, Tusc. ., of soul as harmony to
Aristoxenus (cf. Tusc. ., . ~ Aristox. fr. ab Wehrli; Cicero is our source for this
ascription, since Lactantius and Martianus Capella may be believed to derive from him,
see Gottschalk () ), on Nemesius attribution, NH ., of this
tenet to both Dinarchus and Simmias (!), and , on Lucretius (anonymous). Phlp.
in An. . explains harmony by quoting the Pythagorean definition
8 K L (also at . and .), for which compare
the texts printed at Philol. B DK (not attributed to Philolaus in the sources however,
see Burkert () and Huffman () ). Olymp. in Phaed. .
Westerink attributes the doxa to Simmias [cf. Nemesius] and certain Pythagoreans. Note
that our mutilated text of Olympiodorus Commentary stops at Phd. e, so his detailed
treatment of the issue is lost.
27 Verbatim quotations of important sections at Eus. PE .. (Phd. ac), ..
in Platos works,29 and it is significant that Plato combines them the better
to bring out the opposition. A little later they occur again (c); Plato this
time mentions Anaxagoras name, and turns his cosmology upside down:
if everything were to be combined and nothing separated (+ -
E ! E -), we should soon have the condition
of all things together described by Anaxagoras. This jocular remark,
quite functional in its context, also prepares the reader, or listener, for
the part Anaxagoras is made to play in the story of Socrates early intel-
lectual life.
My purpose in looking at this story is not the identification of the
individual authors of the physical tenets which are listed by Socrates,
or the study of the ' (Phd. a) in general, though
some remarks will be made. What I wish to do is not to repeat what
has been done already but to examine the relevant passages from the
vantage point of hindsight: that is to say from the point of view of
the later doxographical traditions, especially Atius. To say it again:
what I intend to study are sets of tenets and sets of such sets, not the
individual tenets which can be wrenched off from these clusters. True-
blue Platonic ingredients will only be discussed when this happens to
be unavoidable. On the other hand several related dialectical passages in
Aristotles treatises will have to be adduced.
Plato has Socrates begin with an appropriate introductory remark. As
a young man fascinated by the study of nature he had wanted to learn
the causes . . . , [viz.] because of what (3 ) a thing comes into being,
because of what it perishes and because of what it is (Phd. b). This
is because he finds that Cebes problem involves the cause of coming to
be and perishing (e). The issue of being, and of coming to be and
passing [7] away, had become a central one since at least Parmenides. The
3 question30 subsequently became one of the four types of questions
ics; the title is not attested for the Eresian elsewhere, but this does not entail that Apuleius
is mistaken. Nothing further is known about this purportedly Theophrastean treatise.
34 GA ..a, b, ..ab.
35 GA ..b, ..ba. More attention, for instance, is paid to the
(a) argues that the substance of Aet. derives from the Physikai doxai,
but I am not entirely convinced (though I agree it is Theophrastean).
37 Aet. ; see further Sedley (a) .
38 The corresponding section in Stobaeus has been lost (see below n. ).
physical doxai in the phaedo
39 See Runia (), (), (), Mansfeld (), (), (), (), Mansfeld
laus at A DK (Phd. ab). The Atian lemma with the name-label Empedocles
at ps.Plu. .. Diels does not mention putrefacion.
41 For the issue of short v. long headings in Atius see Mansfeld and Runia () ,
The first phrase at its beginning is both about what came to be called
the substance of the soul,43 and about what came to be called its hge-
monikon, or regent part.44 But note that Plato here is neither explicit
about the soul nor about its thinking and sensing part. Aristotle among
other substances which constitute the soul according to his predeces-
sors mentions air and blood,45 but in the De anima fails to speak of
the purported rle of the brain. The doxographies attribute the tenet
about the brain as the location of the hgemonikon to Hippocrates,46 or
to Hippocrates and Plato. From Platos wording it would seem that he has
Alcmeon in mind, whose view about the brain and the senses is analyzed
by Theophrastus.47 Diels attributed the section about perception, mem-
ory and opinion to Alcmeon as well,48 but the details of this cognitive
process are not paralleled in Theophrastus or in other reports about the
Crotoniate. The author of Sacred Disease, to be sure, says that as long
as the brain is stable the human being is in his right mind ( , i.e.
thinks and percieves correctly, and has the appropriate emotions),49 but
there is no precise parallel in Theophrastus account of Alcmeon, and
Hippocrates (or [Hippocrates]) is far from analyzing the process of cog-
ing), perceptions and emotions. I see no reason to doubt that the placita lemmata men-
tioning Hippocrates on the brain pertain to this treatise.
47 Sens. .
48 A DK, st text.
49 Nevertheless this phrase is printed as Alcm. fr. A DK, nd text.
physical doxai in the phaedo
nition the way Socrates does. The closest parallels are to be found in
later Platonic dialogues,50 so it would seem that Platos Socrates hints at
a view that awaited working out.
Although there is a feeble opposition here between the elements and
the brain as the instruments of thought and perception, I believe that
it would be going too far if one were to postulate a diaeresis.51 Blood,
air, fire and the brain are all corporeal. Memory (think of the anamnsis
doctrine) and [10] opinion, presumably, are not, but this is not said in so
many words. Their real nature is left in the dark. Nevertheless there is a
hint here of the explicit contrast, encountered later in Aristotle and the
doxographies, between the view which holds that the soul is a corporeal
entity and the opposite view that it is incorporeal52and Platos own view
elsewhere in the Phaedo of course is that it really is incorporeal, or comes
close to being incorporeal.53 But one needs this context, that is to say an
interpretative combination of various passages in the dialogue dealing
with what we think with to construct such a diaeresis of corporeal v.
incorporeal.
enumerates four stages of which only the first two are also found in Plato, viz. perception,
memory, experience and art/knowledge, e.g. APo. ..a (referred to at Alcm. fr.
A DK ad finem). Platos view is worked out at Alcin. Did. ch. , and used e.g. Plu. An.
in Tim. A.
51 Alcmeon according to Theophrastus report (above n. ) distinguished between
, , .
53 Phd. be, though the term is not used.
jaap mansfeld
sun and of the moon, and with other phenomena connected with stars,
sun and moon.59 Platos rapid overview much resembles Aristotles sum-
mary statement at Phys. ..b, where their relative speed, turn-
ings and whatever else happens to them are called their attributes (my
italics):
It seems absurd that the philosopher of nature should know what the sun
or moon is but should not know any of their attributes per se, particularly
because those who (write) about nature obviously speak of the shape of the
sun as well as of the moon, and devote special attention (to the question)
whether the earth and the cosmos are spherical or not.
59 At. . Diels (too long to quote in detail), in the order stars/sun/moon; the
complicated ch. (on which see Mansfeld ()) is concerned with the distances of
the sun and moon from the earth and from each other, and of that of the earth from the
outer heaven.
60 The mss. reading ; is defended by Loriaux () and kept by Rowe
().
61 Duly pointed out in the commentaries.
physical doxai in the phaedo
ras and Democritus are said to hold that the earth covers the air under-
neath it like a kneading-trough (or lid) and so does not cut through it,
but remains where it is. This is paralleled in a very short Atian lemma
about Anaximenes which (together with parts of other lemmas)62 has
ended up in ps.Plutarchs chapter on earthquakes, .. Diels (corre-
sponding section in Stobaeus lost, with the exception of the Plato lemma
at .): 1
3 ! 8 (scil. & &) ;
.
This lemma is not about earthquakes at all, so perhaps they were epit-
omized away by ps.Plutarch.63 Next, at a, Aristotle mentions
Empedocles and others, who in order to explain why the earth is at rest
appealed to the whirl produced by the motion of the heavens swinging
around the earth.64 To the best of my knowledge this tenet is not paral-
leled in the Placita literature.
. Conclusion
69 See above, n. .
70 See my papers cited above, n. .
jaap mansfeld
other hand, it is entirely likely that Plato not only excerpted the original
works, but also depended on earlier secondary sources. Hippias compiled
lists, or overviews, of similar views, that is to say parallel views dealing
with the same topic, and Gorgias did so too, but emphasized that such
tenets are (or may be) incompatible with each other.71 It does not matter
now whether lists dealing in this manner with the soul, or with the earth
etc., were already current. What is important are the methods of listing,
comparing and opposing tenets concerned with particular topics, and it
is clear, at least in my view, that Plato gratefully availed himself of this
technique. [16]
Biblography
71 See Mansfeld (), where the influence of Hippias and Gorgias on Plato and
Aristotle is studied.
physical doxai in the phaedo
Lloyd, G.E.R. ( and later repr.) Polarity and Analogy: Two Types of Argu-
mentation in Early Greek Thought (Cambridge).
Loriaux, R. () Le Phdon de Platon, Bibl. Univ. de Namur fasc.
bis (Namur).
Mansfeld, J. () Aristotle, Plato, and the Preplatonic doxography and chrono-
graphy, in Cambiano, G., ed., Storiografia e dossografia nella filosofia antica
(Turin) , repr. in Mansfeld, J. Studies in the Historiography of Greek
Philosophy (Assen/Maastricht ).
Mansfeld, J. () Chrysippus and the Placita, Phronesis , [= arti-
cle in this collection].
Mansfeld, J. () Doxography and dialectic: The Sitz im Leben of the Placita,
in ANRW II.., .
Mansfeld, J. () Physikai doxai and problmata physika from Aristotle to
Atius (and beyond), in Fortenbaugh and Gutas, [= article in this
collection].
Mansfeld, J. () Aristote et la structure du De sensibus de Thophraste,
Phronesis , [= article in this collection].
Mansfeld, J. () Doxographical studies, Quellenforschung, tabular presen-
tation and other varieties of comparativism, in Burkert, W., Gemelli Mar-
ciano, L., Matelli, E. and Orelli, L., eds., Fragmentsammlungen philosophischer
TexteLe raccolte di frammenti di filosofi antichi, Aporemata (Gttingen)
[= article in this collection].
Mansfeld, J. () Cosmic distances: Atius . Diels and some related texts,
forthc. Phronesis , [= article in this collection].
Mansfeld, J. and Runia, D.T () Aetiana: The Method and Intellectual Context
of a Doxographer, Vol. : The Sources, Philos. Ant. (LeidenNew York
Cologne).
Rowe, C. () Plato: Phaedo (Cambridge etc.).
Runia, D.T. () Xenophanes on the moon: a doxographicum in Atius,
Phronesis , [= article in this collection].
Runia, D.T. () Xenophanes or Theophrastus? An Atian doxographicum on
the sun, in Fortenbaugh and Gutas () .
Runia, D.T. () Atheists in Atius: text, translation and comments on De
placitis .., Mnemosyne , [= article in this collection].
Sedley, D. () The dramatis personae of Platos Phaedo, Proceedings of the
British Academy (Oxford ) .
Sedley, D. (a) Theophrastus and Epicurean physics, in van Ophuijsen, J.M.
and van Raalte, M., eds., Theophrastus: Reappraising the Sources, RUSCH
(New Brunswick N.J./London) [17].
Sedley, D. (b) Platonic causes, Phronesis , .
Witt, C. (, repr. ) Dialectic, motion and perception: De Anima, book I,
in Nussbaum, M.C. and Oksenberg Rorty, A., eds., Essays on Aristotles De
Anima (Oxford etc.) .
chapter eight
ARISTOTE ET LA STRUCTURE DU
DE SENSIBUS DE THOPHRASTE
Jaap Mansfeld
. Introduction
sensibus , dans Fortenbaugh et Gutas, d., op. cit., p. sqq., plus particulirement
p. , qui parle de lhritage Aristotlicien de faon intressante, mais ne discute pas
les passages-cl que nous nous proposons dtudier (il cite la remarque sur la doctrine
des anciens concernant la nutrition par le semblable, De an. .a sqq., et les
quelques lignes ibid., .a sqq., o Aristote exprime un point de vue qui est le sien
et ne joue aucun rle dans ses discussions dialectiques). De surcrot, il est trop svre
envers les schmes dirtiques de Thophraste, et ne se rend pas compte de leur filiation
aristotlicienne. Chez Baltussen , p. n. , p. , p. f., p. n. , p.
jaap mansfeld
Sensation and Perception., Londres , 3, p. sqq., dans son survol des Prsocra-
tiques, utilise largement le De sensibus sans nommer Aristote. Il faut ajouter que Diels,
acceptant des rsultats obtenus par Zeller, sest exprim brivement sur la dpendance
dAristote du contenu de plusieurs fragments des Phys. op. (op. cit., p. sq.), mais quil
ait omis den parler en ce qui concerne le De sensibus. Mais il a du moins fait la comparai-
son de la mthode dirtique applique par Thophraste dans cet ouvrage avec la grande
division dAristote, Phys. (voir infra, notre note ).
5 Pour la continuit de la pense aristotlicienne en gnral chez Thophraste et les
phraste a voulu suivre lordre chronologique des auteurs, mais quil a aussi
impos une structure systmatique complexe, correspondant une typo-
logie des doctrines, comme il a fait galement dans son traitement des
philosophes, de Xnophane et Thals Platon, dans le premier livre de sa
Physique, dont [160] nous restent dimportants fragments.7 Cette systma-
tisation un peu excessive loblige dvier de lordre chronologique en ce
qui concerne Platon, Alcmon et Dmocrite (voir lappendice la fin du
prsent article). Un rsultat intressant de nos recherches, cest du moins
ce que nous croyons, est quon peut montrer que la structure dirtique
de De sensibus constitue un lien important entre les discussion dirtico-
dialectiques dAristote dune part, et les structures dirtiques et diapho-
niques qui caractrisent la majorit des chapitres dAtius dautre part.
Du point de vue de lordre des doctrines, larrangement thophrastien est
mme plus proche de ceux des doxographies postrieures que de ceux de
son matre. Nous y reviendrons.
tudions, pour commencer, quelques passages importants dAristote.
Nous y trouverons des fragments prsocratiques, petits joyaux quil vaut
la peine dtudier dans la monture qui les a prservs.
7 Voir notre article Gibt es Spuren von Theophrasts Phys. op. bei Cicero ? , dans
et
autant ils devenaient autres en se changeant, autant se prsentait donc
toujours eux le savoir de choses autres.12
Le premier fragment, un seul vers, est cit pour prouver la thse gnrale
selon laquelle lintelligence, ou savoir, est perception, ce qui est prsent
tant interprt comme ce qui se prsente aux sens, et aux sens seuls,13
et ce qui se prsente aux sens tant expliqu comme ce qui dtermine
le dveloppement de lintelligence humaine. Nihil est in intellectu quin
le texte notre note , et J. Barnes, The Presocratic Philosophers, Vol. , Londres etc.
, p. sqq.), et lui a attribu la formule que rien nest vrai, ou que ce qui est vrai
nous est inaccessible . Nous ne pouvons pas entrer dans le problme du bien-fond de
cette attribution, mais il est clair quelle ne saccorde pas bien avec laffirmation qui suit,
selon laquelle lAbdritain croyait que la vrite relve des phnomnes sensibles (cf. aussi
Aristote, De gen. et corr. A .b).
11 Fr. B DK : 3 0 8 . Pour 8
, = + / . Manque le
dernier pied du second vers.
13 Voir aussi les explications du vers dEmpdocle dAlexandre dAphrodise, In Met.
p. . Hayduck, 3 [ explicatif] : -
, et de Jean Philopon, In De an. p. . sq. Hayduck, & 0 &
@ + @, peu convaincantes du fait que selon Empdocle les
paroles (coutes, il est vrai) aussi peuvent augmenter lintelligence, fr. B.,
= B I ! ! [! 3 Stobe, Ecl. II ., citant ce seul vers ;
Wachsmuth na pas chang le texte]
G ( coute mes paroles, car cet
apprentissage augmentera ton intelligence ). Simplicius, In De an. pp. . sqq.
Hayduck, refuse de suivre Alexandre : > & 1
F s 8
0 , N 9 1
;
; 8! 8
/ 3
aristote et la structure du de sensibus
prius fuerit in sensibus.14 Les deux vers qui suivent sont cits pour dmon-
trer que [162] changer notre tat quivaut changer notre savoir. Combi-
nes et interprtes comme elles le sont ici, ces deux citations montrent
donc, dune part, que lintelligence des hommes est le produit des percep-
tions, et, dautre, que les tats variables de notre condition physique dter-
minent le choix des choses dont nous pouvons avoir connaissance. Il reste
remarquer quaucune des deux citations ne parle de la perception de
faon explicite. Aristote, bien sr, savait quEmpdocle avait donn une
explication dune ampleur remarquable des mcanismes de la perception
et quil avait trait sparment les cinq sens canoniques.15 Il nous reste
quelques fragments cits littralement de cette partie de son pome.16 Le
fait quEmpdocle lavait dveloppe a donc encourag Aristote consi-
drer que cette doctrine tait implicitement prsuppose par les vers qui
parlent du processus cognitif en gnral.
La citation suivante est un fragment bien connu et trs difficile de Par-
mnide, qui selon Aristote sexprime de la mme manire quEmp-
docle :
= !. E 3 = + @ I
> & F 5 1
A O, F E n 7. Lesher , p. ,
souligne que le est prsent lhomme individuel.
14 Ladage sappuie vaguement sur Aristote, De sensu .ba, et une interpr-
corr. A .b sqq. ; sur la vue De sensu .b sqq. Pour la canonisation des cinq sens
cf. Aristote, De an. .b sqq., et larticle de R. Sorabji, Aristotle on demarcating
the five senses , dans J. Barnes, M. Schofield et R. Sorabji, d., Articles on Aristotle, .
Psychology & Aesthetics, Londres , p. sqq. remarquer que lauteur du Du rgime
hippocratique, I ch. , qui inclue la bouche pour le langage (!), et la respiration, reconnat
sept formes de perception ( H3 ! : O ;).
16 Le fragment B DK (conserv par Aristote, De sensu .b sqq.), et les
Car, de la faon que, chacque fois, il possde le mlange des membres aux
articulations multiples,
ainsi se prsente lesprit [ou : intelligence, nos] aux hommes ; car la nature
des membres
est la chose mme quil [scil., lesprit] sait,
chez tous et chez chacun, car cest ce plein qui est la pense [ou : ce qui est
compris].17 [163]
Remarquons dabord quAristote interprte ces quatre vers dans le sens
de son exgse un peu force des deux citations dEmpdocle qui les
prcdent. Linversion de lordre chronologique Parmnide-Empdocle
est significative. Pourtant, Parmnide ne nomme pas la perception de
faon explicite, lui non plus ; en fait, nous ne savons rien dune doc-
trine parmnidenne relative aux facteurs qui dterminent lindividualit
des sens, ou relative aux mcanismes sensoriels, ce qui constitue une
diffrence indiscutable avec Empdocle. Dans la seconde partie de son
pome, llate tablit seulement une relation rigoureuse entre la consti-
tution physique des mortels et leur esprit ou entendement, ce qui est com-
pris par eux ntant rien dautre que la nature du mlange des membres.
Strictement parlant, le contenu de cette citation est seulement parallle
celui de la deuxime citation empdoclenne. La manoeuvre dAristote
est claire, mais sa fondation dans le texte du fragment cit par lui lest
beaucoup moins. Il y a une alternative : Aristote a pu prsupposer que le
mlange des membres est codtermin par la perception, tout comme
il a interprt le ce qui est prsent empdoclen comme ce qui se pr-
sente aux sens ; ou bien il a estim que les membres reprsentent les
sens. Le premier terme de cette alternative nous parat plus vraisemblable
que lautre, car il nexiste pas de parallle pour
sans qualification
17 Fr. B DK, a 3 H! 7 K !, / d -
I 3 > / 7 6
-
/ K I 3
8 . La traduction (dfendable)
du texte (en partie discutable) fournie par Aristote est propose exempli gratia. Pour
linterprtation par Thophraste du mot ambigu
cf. infra, notre note . Le mot
!, dont lunique parallle se trouve chez Grgoire de Nazianze, Carm. de
se ipso, PG p. ., peut tre un lapsus memoriae, mais il faut reconnatre que la
variante !, transmise par Thophraste, qui est incontestablement prf-
rable (cf. infra, le texte la note ), nirait pas dans le sens de linterprtation aristo-
tlicienne. Nous prfrons donc penser un lapsus freudien ; voir S. Timpanaro, Il lapsus
freudiano. Psicanalisi e critica testuale, Florence .
aristote et la structure du de sensibus
dit se cache peut-tre Hippias, qui serait la source de la majorit des passages parallles
cits par Aristote. Pour des cas similaires voir notre tude Aristotle, Plato and the prepla-
tonic doxography and chronography , dans G. Cambiano, d., Storiografia e dossografia
nella filosofia antica, Turin , p. sqq., rimpr. (avec la mme pagination) dans nos
Studies . . . , et pour le prsent passage ibid., p. sq., et notre article Cratylus ac :
Plato or Hippias ? , dans L. Rossetti, d., Atti del Symposium Heracliteum, Vol. I, Rome
, p. sqq., rimpr. ibid.
21 Ne se trouve pas dans notre Homre ; Il. , 3
( knock-
cause du coup reu. Or, conclut Aristote, cela signifie que ceux qui com-
prennent de travers ont toujours la comprhension (B . . .
X B). Remarquons que dans ces deux cas la percep-
tion nest pas nomme non plus explicitement dans les passages cits. Il y a
quand-mme une diffrence avec lexplication des citations dEmpdocle
et de Parmenide. Aristote a ajout les deux derniers passages pour appro-
fondir sa critique, citant Anaxagore pour dmontrer labsurdit de la
doctrine des anciens, et citant linterprtation dHomre pour souligner
que notre tat physique dtermine notre tat mental. Il oublie que le fait
quHector est knock-out empche le hros de percevoir.22 [165]
Aristote na donc cit et fourni une exgse de ces philosophes et
de ce pote que pour condamner la doctrine quil leur attribue. Criti-
quant lexpression dHomre, il dit que, si les comprhensions qui sont
fausses restent des comprhensions, les tres seront la fois ainsi et
non ainsi. Porte ouverte au scepticisme . . . La grave erreur de base des
anciens est quils ont restreint le domaine des tres aux tres sensibles
(a sqq.).
Largument de ce chapitre de la Mtaphysique est repris et dvelopp
de faon intressante dans le chapitre trois du livre trois de son trait De
lme, .a sqq.23 Se basant sur ce quil a tabli dans la discussion
dialectique des doctrines de ses prdcesseurs dans le deuxime chapitre
du premier livre, il commence son expos en disant quils avaient dfini
lme laide de deux qualits spcifiques : (a) le mouvement local, et (b)
le penser, le savoir et le percevoir (; +!-
). Mais les anciens ont aussi dclar que le savoir et le percevoir sont
la mme chose (W +! >
@ ). Arrtons-nous ici un instant. Dans le passage de la Mta-
physique tudi plus haut, Aristote avait cru pouvoir prouver que selon
les anciens la perception est un savoir. Cela laisse ouverte la possibilit
que la perception soit une espce du genre savoir, et quil y ait aussi une
autre espce de ce genre. Cette fois, il va plus loin, et prtend que selon
eux la comprhension et la perception sont identiques.
La manoeuvre dAristote dans Mt. , cest--dire lexplication de la
connaissance de Parmnide aprs celle dEmpdocle, lui permet digno-
rer ce quil souligne dans dautres contextes. Ailleurs, il met en vi-
dence que Parmnide a discut ltre, ou le principe, selon le raison-
nement , ou dun point de vue purement formel (3 ,
Mt. A .b). Cette forme de raisonnement se situe en dehors du
domaine de la physique (> 8 ).24 Une fois, il dit
mme que Parmnide et Mlissus (il ne les nomme pas, mais il est clair
quil parle deux), dpassant la perception et la laissant de ct, dans
la conviction quil faut suivre le raisonnement (; ;), prtendent
que le tout est un et immobile .25 [166] Ailleurs, Aristote attribue donc
Parmnide (et Mlissus) une sorte de connaissance a priori (comme
nous dirions) qui ne dpend pas de la perception. Mais il fait une excep-
tion importante pour Parmnide, qui nonobstant sa thse de ltre un
et immobile a aussi suivi lautre route, celle des phnomnes sensibles.
ct de son principe selon le raisonnement il a admis une dualit
de principes selon la perception (Mt. A .b sqq.).26 Cette autre
partie de la doctrine de Parmnide appartient donc la physique. Mais il
reste trange quand-mme qu Mt. il affirme que tous les anciens ont
limit le domaine des tres aux tres sensibles. Il est cependant peut-tre
moins tonnant quil ne pourrait paratre premire vue que dans ce cha-
pitre de la Mtaphysique le Stagirite ait omis de parler du raisonnement
qui a conduit Parmnide ngliger la perception pour arriver ltre
unique. La pointe de son argumentation, nous lavons dj remarqu, est
que la perception est un savoir, et non que percevoir et savoir sont iden-
tiques. La cause de lerreur par omission dAristote est quil se limite lui-
mme aux choses sensibles dans ce passage.
fr. Diels = fr. C FHS&G, ap. Alexandre dAphrodise, In Met. p. . sqq. Hayduck.
jaap mansfeld
B DK (plus bref) +0 + / .
28 De an. A .b sqq., Aristote ne renvoye pas seulement au Time, mais cite
aussi son Sur la philosophie (fr. Ross, me texte) pour une doctrine platonicienne qui
nest pas uniquement physicaliste. Mais Platon nest pas un ancien .
29 Od. , 3 8 8 / _ 8 v =/
& ( tel est lesprit [ou : lentendement etc.] des hommes sur
terre / comme (est) le jour quenvoie ( eux) le pre des hommes et des dieux ). Cf. les
citations tronques des promes de lIliade et de lOdysse, Aristote, Rht. .a.
Aristote aurait pu ajouter Archiloque, fr. b West (Diehl Arch. fr. fait suivre fr.
West comme troisime vers), comme lont fait par exemple [Plutarque], De Hom. [] ,
et Sextus, M. VII .
30 Voir, en gnral, C.-W. Mller, Gleiches zu Gleichem, Wiesbaden .
aristote et la structure du de sensibus
31 Il nest pas exclu non plus que Platon ait utilis une anthologie existante connue aussi
dAristote, qui aurait enrichi les collections de ses prdcesseurs ; cf. supra, notre note .
32 Bas sur De an. A .a sqq. ; cf. infra, le texte avant notre note .
33 Pour une discussion remarquable des arguments principaux de ce chapitre nous
anciens ; voir par exemple dj Cicron, Top. I , sur l obscuritas des Topiques dAris-
tote, et Hortensius fr. Ruch = Grilli ap. Nonius, p. . sq. Lindsay, magna etiam
animi contentio adhibenda est in explicando Aristotele, si legas , o A. Grilli, dans son
dition des fragments de lHortensius, Varese et Milan , p. sq., propose dexclure
in explicando comme une glose et lire est, Aristotelem si leges tort, selon
nous. Cf. aussi Galien, De captionibus ch. , p. . sqq. Edlow = p. . sqq. Ebbesen, et
Compendium Timaei ch. . KrausWalzer.
35 Voir par exemple la note en bas de page A DK, der aus D[emokrit]s Homer
une fois encore, quAristote dispose dun rpertoire de citations utiliser, et que le contexte
dune citation ne fournit pas toujours la clef de son interprtation.
40 Sens. , ' E 3 ; 9; B, ' E ; 8;. Sur cette dirse voir
(and beyond) , dans Fortenbaugh et Gutas, d., op. cit., p. ff., plus particulirement
p. sqq. (version abrge dans A. Laks, d., La doxographie antique, fasc. spcial de la
Revue de mtaphysique et de morale , N , p. sqq.), et cf. infra, le texte nos
notes et . En gnral, cf. A. von Fragstein, Die Dihairesis bei Aristoteles, Amsterdam
.
jaap mansfeld
42 De an. .a sqq.
43 Pour lcho chez Alcinoos, Did. ch. , p. . Hermann, voir J. Whittaker,
Alcinoos. Enseignement des doctrines de Platon, Paris , p. n. , et infra, notre
note . Voir, en outre, J. Whittaker, Platonic philosophy in the early centuries of the
empire , dans W.H. Haase, d., Aufstieg und Niedergang der Rmischen Welt II, Bd. .
Berlin et New York , p. sq., pour linfluence du De sensibus sur le Didascalicos.
Mais on peut galement penser une source intermdiaire entre Alcinoos et Thophraste.
44 La suggestion de Baltussen , pp. , n. , avec renvoi M. Dubuisson,
47 1
E.N. VIII .b sqq., citant (ou paraphrasant) b sqq. Hraclite fr. b
Marcovich [= B DK + B DK ; Marcovich na pas vu que le texte contient aussi une
1 1
paraphrase dune partie de fr. B DK] + B DK = d Marc. + B DK = b Marc.
48 Cette interprtation nous semble rsoudre le problme formul par G.M. Strat-
ton, Theophrastus and the Greek Physiological Psychology before Aristotle, London ,
rimpr. Amsterdam , p. sq.
49 Linterprtation correcte de cette phrase a te donn par A. Laks, The more and
chacun des lments constitutifs est une me.57 Thophraste aurait voulu
trouver une anticipation de cette ide dans le pome de Parmnide. Tout
comme Aristote, il nous donne une interprtation empdoclisante de
Parmnide, mais en stayant sur dautres dtails. Ce qui, aprs tout, est
assez raisonnable. Car si le semblable peroit le semblable, il faut bien
que le chaud sert percevoir le chaud etc., comme le froid percevoir
le froid etc. ; chacque ingrdient du mlange doit avoir une fonction qui
lui est propre.58 Ce traitement plus dtaill de Parmnide en fait donc
le vritable prdcesseur de lEmpdocle dAristote et de Thophraste. Il
reste pourtant remarquable que lrsien ne cite aucun passage o Par-
mnide aurait parl de faon explicite de la perception par le seul lment
chaud qui ne serait plus mlang au froid, et se limite nous informer de
lactivit du chaud comme partie du mlange.59
Nous avons soulign plus haut que Thophraste avait consult le texte
de Parmnide. Il semble quil se soit limit la deuxime partie du pome,
sur les opinions des mortels, pour y trouver des renseignements sur la
doctrine de llate concernant la perception sensorielle. En vue du fait
que plus tard, dans la suite du De sensibus, il indique les penseurs qui ont
tent de diffrencier entre savoir et percevoir, il est assez intressant quici
il ne dise mot des efforts quavait fait llate pour tablir et dcrire un
unique objet de connaissance (il le sait trs bien, voir Phys. op. fr. Diels,
supra, notre note ). Si le De sensibus tait notre source unique pour
la philosophie de Parmnide, nous ne saurions rien sur sa doctrine de
ltre. Une observation analogue peut tre formule pour les paragraphes
du De sensibus dvous Platon. Si rien dautre ntait rest, la doctrine
des Formes et la thorie de la connaissance dveloppe dans le Thtte et
le Sophiste seraient restes inconnues de nous. Dans cette situation hypo-
thtique, Platon, pour nous, serait un penseur la hauteur du Dmocrite
de Thophraste, qui se limite au seul Time, et plus particulirement aux
parties de ce dialogue traitant de la perception sensorielle. Lexplication,
croyons nous, [175] est que Thophraste ne veut pas dpasser les limites
de la physique. Nous avons vu que daprs Aristote le raisonnement de
Parmnide nappartient pas cette partie de la philosophie.
dement cause du chaud est meilleur et plus pur ) est prcd par lentendement change
selon la prpondrance du chaud ou du froid .
aristote et la structure du de sensibus
60 Pour Aristote, cf. supra, nos notes et et le texte ces notes ; pour Thophraste,
Diels. Le savant allemand imprime moins de texte, et omet les critiques de Simplicius et
dAlexandre.
62 Cf. R.W. Sharples, Counting Platos Principles , dans L. Ayres, d., The Passionate
Intellect, RUSCH Vol. VII, New Brunswick et Londres (p. sqq.), p. sqq.
jaap mansfeld
de La maladie sacre, ch. , qui dclare que nous pensons et voyons et coutons avec
le cerveau (;
!
.), plutt qu
Alcmon.
aristote et la structure du de sensibus
Selon Clidme, les oreilles ne peuvent pas juger () par eux-
mmes ; elles transmettent leur information lintellect. Mais il ne fait
pas, comme Anaxagore, de lintellect le principe de toutes choses (&
. . . ! B) .76
Cette comparaison suggre que, pour Thophraste, Anaxagore aussi
aurait suggr une sorte de distinction entre perception sensorielle et
entendement intellectuel, distinction sur laquelle lrsien na pas voulu
insister. Il nous parat probable que nous avons ici une rverbration des
remarques [180] dAristote, selon qui Anaxagore aurait distingu lintellect
de lme (sensorielle et vgtative), mais de faon peu claire et trs incon-
sqente. Clidme est clair, mais seulement en ce qui concerne la percep-
tion auditive, tandis quAnaxagore aurait omis dutiliser son principe de
toutes choses pour expliquer la perceptioncomme il ressort dailleurs
de la discussion de la doctrine anaxagorenne de la perception dans les
paragraphes prcdents du De sensibus. Dautre part, ayant reconnu que
les oreilles servent dinstrument lintellect, Clidme aurait pu appliquer
la mme ide aux autres sens,77 en combinant la doctrine dAnaxagore
avec celle dAlcmon.
La conception qui sert de liaison entre Alcmon et Clidme est quils
ont commenc distinguer, il est vrai de manires diverses, la percep-
tion de lintellection. Mais la position de Clidme dans la dirse des
partisans du semblable et du dissemblable (ou non-semblable) nest pas
entirement claire, Thophraste ne se prononant pas son gard de
faon explicite. Notre impression est quil le range parmi les partisans
du dissemblable (ou non-semblable) cause de son explication du pro-
cessus auditif, le nos tant diffrent et des oreilles et de lair en mou-
vement quelles reoivent. Son explication de la vision comme due la
transparance des yeux est qualifie comme idiosyncratique, ou au moins
personnelle (+ O). Mais il faut remarquer que la formule de
Thophraste caractrisant la perception visuelle suggre que les organes
en question fonctionnent, eux aussi, comme des instruments : la per-
comme une critique et de Clidme et dAnaxagore, et souligne labsence du nos dans les
paragraphes du De sensibus traitant la doctrine de la perception de ce dernier. Mais on ne
peut pas exclure que Thophraste a critiqu Clidme sans trop se soucier des implications
de sa remarque pour son expos sur Anaxagore.
aristote et la structure du de sensibus
ception advient par les yeux pour la seule raison quils sont diaphanes
(+! . . . j 6 ), ce qui implique
que leur information soit transmise ailleurs. En ce qui concerne les autres
sens, ou formes de perception, traits par Clidme, il est difficile de
savoir (du moins daprs la description de Thophraste) si ce sont les
organes eux-mmes, ou ventuellement le corps entier, qui peroivent,
ou sil sagit dinformations qui seraient transmises ailleurs. Cest proba-
blement pour cette raison que lresien souligne que Clidme sexprime
seulement () de faon explicite au sujet de la perception audi-
tive. Le contraste avec Alcmon (Sens. ), pour qui le rle des sens
comme instruments de la perception ne fait pas de doute, est ind-
niable.
Nous navons pas dinformations sur les dates de Clidme, mais il doit
tre antrieur Diogne, du moins daprs Thophraste.78 Sa position
dans [181] le De sensibus peut donc tre explique par des considrations
dordre chronologique, parce quil est trait avant Diogne. Mais elle doit
aussi et surtout tre explique en vue de la systmatique de Thophraste,
car il est le dernier des partisans du dissemblable (ou non-semblable)
tre trait. En outre, sa doctrine un peu confuse, mlange trange
entre la doctrine dAlcmon et celle qui aurait d, ou pu, tre celle
dAnaxagore, entraine, elle aussi, une position la fin dun groupe.79
Les opinions dAlcmon et celles de Clidme, semble-t-il, entourent la
doctrine dAnaxagore comme les deux moitis dun anneau.
Thophraste utilise donc deux dirses diffrentes. La premire divi-
sion, formule explicitement au commencement du trait et rpte assez
souvent, est entre les partisans du semblable et ceux du dissemblable (ou
non-semblable). La deuxime division, jamais formule de faon expli-
cite et formelle, est entre ceux qui font une distinction entre percevoir et
savoir et ceux qui nen font pas.80 Lentrecroisement de ces deux approches
ne facilite pas la comprhension de son expos, parce que la suite des pen-
seurs est dtermine tantt par lune, tantt par lautre manire de les clas-
ser, et parfois aussi par les deux conjointement. Les choses se compliquent
encore plus parce que Thophraste sest efforc de maintenir aussi la
squence chronologique des personnages. Lexception la plus criante
78 Cf. infra, notre note . Voir aussi R. Goulet, Cleidmos (Clidme) , Diction-
atiens sont dtermins par les catgories de la substance, de la qualit, de la quantit, etc. ;
voir notre tude Doxography and dialectic . . . , p. sqq., et notre article Physikai
doxai . . . , p. sqq., p. sqq. Pour le chapitre en question cf. aussi infra, le texte notre
note .
84 Cf. supra, le texte notre note , et infra, notre note , et le texte cette note.
aristote et la structure du de sensibus
Kleine Schriften, Bd. , Leipzig , Osnabrck 2, p. sqq., mais qui, suivi fid-
lement par Diels dans les Doxographi graeci, emploie le titre Physikn doxai.
89 Voir le non liquet prudent auquel arrive Baltussen , p. sq., quoiquil ait omis
pitres dAtius sur les sens sont aussi significatives que les ressemblances voir Baltussen,
op. cit., p. sqq., et par exemple infra, le texte notre note .
*
91 Ailleurs, Thophraste lui-mme, Phys. op. fr. Diels = fr. A FHS&G, ap. Simpli-
cius, In Phys. p. . sq. Diels, estime que Diogne est pratiquement le dernier des phy-
siciens ( d B !). Dans ce fragment
de sa Physique, Thophraste applique une autre dirse comme principe organisateur ;
il construit un groupe de trois monistes dont le principe est infini et mu, comprenant
Anaximandre, Anaximne et Diogne. Voir notre article Gibt es Spuren . . . , p. .
Pour la datation de Diogne voir aussi A. Laks, Diogne dApollonie, Lille , p. xix sqq.
jaap mansfeld
p. , sest tromp en dclarant que la doctrine de Diogne nentre pas dans la division
du semblable / dissemblable.
93 Moniste par son principe, non en ce qui concerne le nombre de sens.
94 Laks, Diogne, p. , a montr que cette formule de Thophraste est un cho
presque textuel dAristote, De gen. et corr. A .b sqq. Cf. aussi supra, le texte notre
note .
95 Thophraste aurait pu citer, comme parallle, Empdocle fr. B.a, +
+
.
96 3 = ; & !.
97 Vu par Regenbogen, op. cit., col. , et dj par Diels , p. .
aristote et la structure du de sensibus
la perception, il ne dfinit pas si elle advient par les contraires [scil., les
dissemblables] ou les semblables (Sens. ). La doctrine de Dmocrite
serait donc un compromis confus entre les deux cornes de la dirse.
La classification systmatique, encore une fois, savre plus importante
que la chronologie. Mais son zle dialectique et rvisionniste rend Tho-
phraste un peu mchant. Pour prouver que selon Dmocrite la percep-
tion advient par le dissemblable, il dit quil considre quelle est une alt-
ration ; or, le semblable nest jamais altr par le semblable. Pour indiquer
quil fait en mme temps un appel au semblable, il lui attribue la concep-
tion selon laquelle seulement le semblable peut tre affect par le sem-
blable.
La position de compromis, entre les doctrines opposes, de la doctrine
de Dmocrite la fin de la dirse dominante, est donc analogue la
position de certaines doctrines dans les chapitres des Placita dAtius.
Pour ce dtail hautement important aussi, dont nous avons dj vu
dautres examples, la structure du De sensibus est la mme que celle des
manuels doxographiques postrieurs.98 [185]
Que la perception soit une altration aussi dans le cas o elle est due
laction du semblable sur le semblable navait pas gn Aristote, comme
nous lavons vu.99 Dautre part, et nous pouvons considrer cet aperu
explicatif comme une correction intentionnelle de ce quavait dit Aristote,
lrsien avait dj remarqu, dans le premier paragraphe de son trait,
que les partisans du dissemblable sappuyaient sur lobservation que le
semblable ne peut pas tre affect par le semblable (la chair chaude ne
sentant pas ce qui a la mme temprature).
Thophraste discute seulement les doctrines de la vision et de loue de
Dmocrite, disant que ses explications des autres sens ne diffrent gure
de celles de la majorit des physiciens. Ils nont donc rien dextraordinaire.
Cela exclut lorigine thophrastienne du lemme curieux du ps.Plutarque,
Plac. IV ., A = Stobe, Ecl. I . (imprim par Diels comme
98 Cf. supra, le texte notre note et notre note ; cf. aussi notre tude Doxo-
100 Nous ne pouvons pas entrer dans les problmes dinterprtation poses par ce
lemme ; cf. aussi Stobe Ecl. I ., texte corrompu, imprim par Diels Atius IV ..
101 Le fr. B DK, cit par Sextus, M. VII .
102 Fr. B DK, cit par Galien, Med. emp. , p. . sqq. Walzer. Il est superflu
. Parmnide (S) I
. Alcmon (NS, ) IV
. Empdocle (S, []) III
. Anaxagore (DS/NS) V
. Clidme (NS, ) VI
. Dmocrite VIII
. Diogne (S, ) VII
. Platon (S) II
* Le prsent essai est bas sur la premire partie dune confrence tenue Paris
le avril , dans le cadre du Sminaire Lon Robin sur Les thories
de la perception dans lantiquit ; lautre partie sera publie ailleurs [= Parmnide et
Hraclite avaient-ils une thorie de la perception ?, Phronesis , , pp. ].
Nous remercions M.G. Romeyer-Dherbey de son invitation et de son accueil, Andr Laks
de ses critiques du contenu et ses remarques sur le texte, Jos Kany-Turpin de la correction
du franais de fabrication batave de lavant-dernier jet, Paul Mercken de nous avoir aid
pour la note , et Keimpe Algra et Han Baltussen dune lecture sans piti de plusieures
versions.
108 Nous omettons Hraclite.
physical doxai in the phaedo
S
I () Parmnide
II () Platon ( sens)
III () Empdocle ( sens)
NS
IV () Alcmon ( sens, )
V () Anaxagore ( sens)
VI () Clidme ()
S
VII () Diogne ()
VIII () Dmocrite
chapter nine
EPICURUS PERIPATETICUS
Jaap Mansfeld
for, see A. Angeli, Filodemo: Agli amici di scuola, La scuola di Epicuro , Napoli, Bib-
liopolis, , ff. Angeli has definitively shown that Philod. Ad contub. col. xi (=
col. viii Sbordone) only shows that the authoritative and cautious Epicurean (presumably
Zeno of Sidon) here cited by Philodemus had initial doubts even about the Ad Pythoclem.
So the letter was, and has to be, accepted as genuine. She translates, ibid., : Accostan-
dosi con esattezza agli scritti dei Maestri per molte cose consider le loro dottrine, con-
cepiva allinizio qualche sospetto, come su alcune epistole, persino sulla Lettera a Pitocle
sui fenomeni celesti . . . . I would add that the mere fact that it belongs with the lauda-
tiones provided by Diog. Lart. in favour of Epicurus (see my paper Diogenes Laertius on
Stoic Philosophy, Elenchos () [ ff.], ff., repr. in my Studies in the Historiog-
raphy of Greek Philosophy, Assen, Van Gorcum, ) proves that it was considered to be
genuine and important. Just as the two other didactic Letters and the Ratae sententiae, it
has been transcribed from an authoritative corpus with scholia citing parallels in Epicu-
rus other works. For what is to be known about Pythocles life see D. Sedley, Epicurus and
the Mathematicians of Cyzicus, Cronache Ercolanesi (), [ ff.], ff. H. Diels in
his epoch-making Doxographi graeci, Berlin, Reimer, , repr. de Gruyter, 4, ,
considered the Ad Pyth. not genuine (iam veteribus suspecta fuit, with reference to the
Philodemus passage); see further below, n. .
jaap mansfeld
the meteorological treatise. E. Reizenstein, Theophrast bei Epikur und Lukrez, Ori-
ent und Antike , Heidelberg, Winter, , ff. believes the to be
the source of the Arabic abstract. Steinmetz in WagnerSteinmetz, cit., argues that an
excerptor omitted the name-labels of the tenets cited by Theophrastus, so has a -
type of treatise in mind as the source of what he believes to be an epit-
om. H. Strohm, Zur Meteorologie des Theophrast, Philologus () ff., ff.,
O. Regenbogen, Theophrastos, Pauly-Wissowa, Realenzyklopdie der classischen Alter-
tumswissenschaft Supp.-Bd. VII, Stuttgart, Metzler, , [ ff.]., ff., D. Lemke,
Die Theologie Epikurs, Versuch einer Rekonstruktion, Zetemata H. , Mnchen, Beck,
, ff. (useful brief Forschungsbericht f. n. ), M. Bollack, La raison de Lucrce.
Constitution dune potique philosophique, avec un essai dinterprtation de la critique
lucrtienne, Paris, d. de Minuit, , ff., and I.G. Kidd, Theophrastus Meteorol-
ogy, Aristotle and Posidonius, in W.W. FortenbaughD. Gutas (eds.), Theophrastus: His
Psychological, Doxographical and Scientific Writings, Rutgers Univ. Studies in Classical
Humanities, vol. V, New BrunswickLondon, Transaction Publ., , ff., accept
Bergstrssers view. J. BollackA. Laks, picure Pythocls: Sur la cosmologie et les
phnomnes mtorologiques, Cahiers de philologie , Lille, Publ. de lUniv. de Lille III,
, ff. (picure devant la doxographie) mention the and even the
Placita literature (they fail to mention the contributions of Strohm, Drossaart Lulofs and
WagnerSteinmetz). See further below, n. .
5 H. Daiber, The Meteorology of Theophrastus in Syriac and Arabic Translation, in
FortenbaughGutas, cit., ff. Daiber provides a new edition of the Syriac and Arabic
texts with introduction and English translation, and a brief but substantial commentary.
The new Arabic version states, ch. [] () Daiber, Theophrastus treatise on meteoro-
logical phenomena is finished.
6 Daiber believes that we now have the whole treatise; I argue contra at A Theophras-
tean Excursus on God and Nature and its Aftermath in Hellenistic Thought, Phronesis
() ff.
7 The relation of Epicurus collections of cosmological and meteorological tenets to
* the Placita literature is the theme of a forthcoming paper by D.T. Runia. I shall not
epicurus peripateticus
therefore adduce this type of evidence. The fact that Diels refrained from comparing the
Ad Pyth. with the other material in the D. G. has caused scholars to pay little attention to
the nature of its relation to the Placita, though Diels himself in his single reference, cit.,
, says that it tamquam ex doxographis nominibus philosophorum omissis raptim
corrasa est. H. Usener suggested that Epicurus for his information on earlier thought
for the most part derives from what he calls the , Epicurea, Leipzig,
Teubner, , repr. Stuttgart, , xl f. In a footnote to his praise of Diels D. G., U.
von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, Antigonos von Karystos, Philologische Untersuchungen
H. IV, Berlin, Weidmann, , repr. BerlinZrich, , n. , suggests that it is
eine des schweisses wrdige aufgabe, (die) von Theophrastos abhngigen oder auch
ihm parallelen zusammenstellungen und forschungen zu ermitteln. dass es wenigstens
fr Epikuros mglich ist, habe ich bei dem studium des vortrefflichen buches von [J.]
Woltjer Lucretii philosophia cum fontibus comparata [Groningen, Noordhoff, , repr.
New YorkLondon, Garland, ] an vielen stellen gelernt.
8 The important passage about this method of inquiry is An. po. B .b ff.
9 See my paper Doxography and Dialectic. The Sitz im Leben of the Placita, ANRW
II Bd. ., BerlinNew York, De Gruyter, [ ff.] ff., and my paper Physikai doxai
and Problmata physika from Aristotle to Atius (and Beyond), in FortenbaughGutas,
cit., [ ff.] ff. and passim [= article in this collection]. For Theophrastus use of
other instruments from Aristotelian dialectic see the preliminary report of H. Baltussen,
Peripatetic Dialectic in the De sensibus, in FortenbaughGutas, cit., ff.
10 E.g. De an. I .a ff.
11 E.g. De caelo II , which in its dialectical section deals with the various views
concerned with the shape and movement of the earth and even with the question how
many earths there are; see my paper in FortenbaughGutas, cit., ff.
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12 See my paper in FortenbaughGutas, cit., ff., where some evidence from the
treatises and fragments in Greek is cited.
13 See further my paper cited supra, n. .
14 A passage dealing with colour from Book II is paraphrased and another quoted at
Plut. Adv. Colot. C (Epic. fr. Usener = [] Arrighetti; Theophr. fr. FHS&G).
15 An early Epicurean (presumably Epicurus himself) mentions these in a letter;
see the quotation at Philod. Ad contub. fr. . Angeli (= fr. 3 Sbordone; Epic.
fr. [] Arrighetti), in Angeli, cit., : 1
[ 3] 13 [3
] . She translates, a bit freely: () gli Analitici ed i libri Sulla natura
di Aristotele, quelli appunto che noi scegliemmo; commentary ibid., f. In fr.
Philodemus according to Angeli quotes passages from Epicurus which are about his study
of a variety of philosophical works. The scepticism of F.H. Sandbach, Aristotle and the
Stoics, Cambridge Philological Society Suppl. vol. no. , Cambridge, The Cambridge
Philological Society, , ff., is not justified. For Epicurus critical reaction to other
Aristotelian doctrines see D.J. Furley, Two Studies in the Greek Atomists, Princeton,
Princeton U.P., . Study of the physical treatises (among which the De caelo) is
also argued by W. Schmid, Epikurs Kritik der Platonischen Elementenlehre, Klassisch-
philologische Studien H. , Leipzig, Harassowitz, .
epicurus peripateticus
the Aristotelian Meteorology is that Theophrastus does not use mathematical arguments.
Epicurus does not use them either.
17 Mete. I .a f., ! 6 8 :
very
much resembles what must have been the Greek for Theophrastus formula we can
observe something similar amongst us which is found throughout the first chapters
of the Metarsiologika. Other experiential analogies at Mete. I .b f., .a ff.,
.a (cf. II .a), .a ff., .a ff. (methodological statement),
.a ff., .b ff., .b ff., .a ff., .a ff.; II .a ff., .b ff.,
.b ff., .b ff., .b ff., .a f., .a ff., .b ff.; III .b ff.,
.a ff., .a ff., .a ff., .b ff., .a ff. See further I. Dring, Aris-
toteles. Darstellung und Interpretation seines Denkens, Heidelberg, Winter, , , and
the excellent remarks of W. Kullmann, Wissenschaft und Methode. Interpretationen zur
aristotelischen Theorie der Naturwissenschaft, BerlinNew York, De Gruyter, , ff.,
esp. .
18 See Mete. I .a ff., where it is argued that torches and shooting stars come about
the All consists of body and void or that elements are indivisible, the-
ses which are uniquely compatible with such experiential data as we are
in a position to be certain about and which are in this respect with-
out rivals. One and only one explanation is possible. But the problems
concerned with cosmological, celestial and meteorological phenomena
must be cleared out according to a plural way (3 -
8
, ibid. ), consistently with the data of sense-
perception (, +- ), or with the phe-
nomena (,
).19 To accept one explanation
and reject another when each is equally commensurate with these data is
unscientific.
The expressions ! and 8
in relation to prob-
lems are peculiar and unparalleled.20 The translations I have [35] seen
render them by various combinations of solution or explanation, and
solved or explained; this lack of clarity is revealing.21 Bailey has a use-
19 Cf. Ad Herod. , R. S. xxiiixxiv. See further e.g. A.A. Long, Hellenistic Philosophy,
London, Duckworth, (BerkelyLos AngelesLondon, California U.P.-Duckworth,
2), ff., esp. f., A.A. LongD.N. Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, vol. , Cam-
solutions, but we shall see that this is not really the case.
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of a set of equivalent ways. But solving is not the same thing as clearing
out; it is the clearing process that produces the (single or multiple)
solution.
The highly technical expression 3 -, which does not
occur before Aristotlefor whom the concept of problems in physics
(and ethics and even logic) is of the utmost importance25must have
been derived from Aristotle and Theophrastus. The formula is attested
in Theophrastean titles.26 The hitherto unnoticed fact that Epicurus took
over the notion of physical problems from the Peripatetics may place the
investigation of the relation between Epicurus on the one hand and Aris-
totle and Theophrastus on the other on a firmer footing. A point that
deserves attention is that Epicurus, just as Aristotle but unlike numer-
ous later philosophers and rhetoricians, speaks of - not
-
. In Epicurus the formula 3 - occurs only here. In
his dialectical overviews Aristotle lists the views, or solutions, concerned
with a problem that had been proposed by others or are theoretically pos-
sible in order to make a choice from among these options, with the aim of
going on from there to construct a definitive and single theory. Problems
in theoretical physics and in cosmology, celestial physics and [37] meteo-
rology are approached in this way. According to Epicurus, such a single
choice is often impossible in the fields of cosmology, celestial physics and
meteorology. Only those proposals that flagrantly contradict experience
have to be excluded. This entails that for a number of cosmological and
meteorological physical problems pluralities of solutions are valid which
are equivalent in respect of the data of experience. As long as we can be
sure that each member of the set is correct from this point of view, it does
not matter which particular member(s) is (are) true and which are false
in our cosmos, because all of them are valid in respect of the infinitely
many cosmoi. The Ad Pythoclem consists almost entirely of listed possi-
ble options that are acceptable whereas others are explicitly or implicitly
rejected, though explicit rejections are rare (we are after all dealing with
an epitom). Numerous similar or even identical instances are to be found
25 The key passages on the various classes of problmata (equivalent to protaseis) are
27 For the earlier history of diaeresis (mostly divisio utens, though the terms
and do occur in Anaximenes) and that outside the Academy and Peripatos see
M. Fuhrmann, Das systematische Lehrbuch, Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Wissenschaften,
Gttingen, Vandenhoeck, , esp. ff., ff. on the Ars rhetorica of Anaximenes. For
diaeresis and its uses in Aristotle and others see my Heresiography in Context: Hippolytus
Elenchos as a Source for Greek Philosophy, Philosophia Antiqua, vol. , Leiden, Brill,
, ff., ff. The divisio docens advocated by Epicurus in connexion with the study
of these problems in physics is indebted to the Peripatetic variety. D. Sedley, Epicurean
Anti-Reductionism, in J. BarnesM. Mignucci (eds.), Matter and Metaphysics, Elenchos
, Napoli, Bibliopolis, , [ ff.], ff. discusses the Epicurean division of existing
things into per se existents and attributes () and the subdivision of the latter
in inseparable and accidental properties () according to Demetrius Lacon
ap. Sext. M. X ff. (cf. also Epic. Ad Herod. ff.) He cautiously argues that though the
diaeretic method of presentation is not characteristic of Epicurus Demetrius analysis is
acceptable, at least in outline (ibid., ). But although the method does not appear to
be prominent, or explicitly stated, in other works of Epicurus, it is applied (as K.A. Algra
points out to me) e.g. at Ad Herod. (images) and (atomic sizes). It certainly is
characteristic of the Ad Pythoclem. Just as Aristotle in the Meteorology, Epicurus in the Ad
Pythoclem most of the time is concerned with accidents of accidents (see Kullmann, loc.
cit., supra n. ); the same holds for Theophrastus in the Metarsiologika. To be sure, Cic.
De fin. I says of Epicurus: tollit definitiones, nihil de dividendo et partiendo docet; cf. also
Varro (Ac. po. I) and . This merely implies that Epicurus had no theory of definition or
of diaeresis, not that he never defined anything or never used the technique of division. A
little bit further down, at De fin. I , Torquatus says that Epicurus partitio of the different
classes of desires is most useful. Cicero criticizes it ibid., II : . . . divisit ineleganter; duo
enim genera quae erant, fecit tria. At Tusc. disp. V (Epic. fr. Usener, first text) too
he tells us how Epicurus genera cupiditatum diviserit. For the division itself see R. S. xxix.
jaap mansfeld
and attempt to [38] find out in what way diaeresis is used here. The
multiple accidental properties concernedor the views stating them
must satisfy the important condition of not being testified against by
the things that occur within our immediate sphere of experience (>
:
).
I suggest that we first look at the section on , which imme-
diately follows (Ad Pyth. ). A noteworthy structure underlies this
compressed account, for Epicurus deals, in unpedantic succession, with
the definition of cosmos, the cosmos outer rim and its relative density
(the dissolution of whichi.e. this outer rimsbrings about that of all
that is inside), its motion or rest, its shape, the number of cosmoi there
are, where they are or come to be, how they come to be and how long
they are able to stay around.
Without difficulty we recognize the originally Aristotelian question-
types. The existential question is not at issue, but the what is it question
is the first to be answered: A cosmos is ( 8) a sort of container
consisting of a heaven, containing heavenly bodies and earth and all
the phenomena, a section cut off from the infinite. Then the questions
dealing with the various sort of attributes or facts (the that) according
to the other categories: the cosmos has a limit (category of quantity:
how large?), this limit has a relative density (category of quality), a [39]
certain shape, viz. spherical or triangular or whatever (quality again), it
moves or is at rest (categories of action and being affected, of place, or
of quantity 3 cf. Cat. b), it comes to be and passes
away (categories of time, of action and being affected), it is somewhere
(category of place). The question concerned with causation (the why)
is certainly at issue in the part concerned with the coming-to-be of a
cosmos in a certain place; the correct explanation excludes the location
in a large very empty place favoured by the early Atomists (Ad Pyth.
).
Some of these issues can be paralleled from Aristotles De caelo;28 some
but not all, because for Aristotle there is only one world and literally
nothing beyond its outermost sphere. The question where a cosmos is
28 An important difference is that Aristotle writes about the heaven (>) and
what is contained thereby, not about the , though he may put > and
on a par, e.g. De caelo I .a, 3 E B 8
N + & = E
K, > & 3 B M @ 1 ! 3 =
B -, 6 ! E !S
, >E
T/ @ E T, & 8 (my emphasis). Cf. also I .a
epicurus peripateticus
located does not make sense for him.29 But he deals with the question
of coming to be vs eternity, arguing that the heaven is eternal, that it is
unchangeable and eternally moves in a circle (De cael. I , also in the
chapters that follow). If the heaven is eternal, the world is too. The heaven
and indeed the whole world is corporeal; against those who posit that
there can be an infinite body Aristotle argues that it must be finite (I
). Accordingly, the world is finite. He mentions the view that there can
be multiplethough not infinitely manyheavens/worlds (I .a
),30 and rejects in at length (I ). Arguments against named and
nameless opponents who generate and destroy the heaven/world are
developed next (I ). The shape of the heaven is dealt with in the next
book: this can only be spherical (II .a, .b ff.). This is because
there is no outside place or void in which the heaven moves. If it were
rectilinear (>, .a), or bean-shaped or egg-shaped
(E [40] F ;p
, a), it would need empty space to turn
around in. We understand how Epicurus came to allow for a multiplicity
of celestial shapes.31 According to him, there is always something outside
a cosmos, viz. either another cosmos or a bit of outer space, in which the
heaven may move; if it is at rest the question is no longer on the agenda.
His position is best explained as an implicit countering of Aristotles
tenet that there is nothing outside the world. We do not hear for what
reason an Epicurean cosmos should for instance be triangular rather
than spherical; the argument against Aristotle seems to be more urgent
than the etiologies of the alternative cosmic shapes themselves. Epicurus
main motive, no doubt, is to argue against the divinity of the heavens
which Plato and Aristotle inter alia based upon their spherical shape and
movement.
who places the unique cosmos either at the centre of the infinite void or at the centre of
an empty spherical chora surrounding it. See K.A. Algra, Concepts of Space in Classical
and Hellenistic Greek Philosophy, diss. Utrecht, , ff.
*
30 Quoted supra, n. .
31 See also Ad Herod. at Diog. Lart. X , X G 8 !
[41] We must observe that in some cases no alternatives are listed. Though
in theory one could perhaps posit a disjunction, a cosmos is not either
finite or infinite but can only be finite. There is not only one and unique
cosmos, as for instance Aristotle and Plato thought, but infinitely many
cosmoi. A cosmos is not either eternal (as for instance Aristotle believed)
or temporary, but exists for a limited period of time only. It is said to
come to be and to pass away, and no reference to the alternative view is
given. For these three physical problems then, there is only one solution;
the options that the cosmos would be infinite or unique or eternal have
already been cleared out, as being inconsistent with the phenomena.
Consequently, the method of the plural way is inapplicable in respect
of these attributes. But as we have seen it is relevant for the attributes
pertaining to shape, movement, and relative density of the rim. It is also
relevant for the places where a cosmos may be formed; this may happen
either inside a cosmos or in a so-called inter-cosmos, i.e. a section of space
between cosmoi, but as we saw not in a large very empty place somewhere
out there beyond cosmoi. Diaeresis again.
More about the diaeresis concerned with the motion vs rest of the
outer rim is found at Ad Pyth. , which deals with the motions of
the heavenly bodies. These can be explained both on the assumption that
the outer rim moves and that it is at rest; we must however note that the
32 The triangular shape comes under what Aristotle calls the rectilinear.
epicurus peripateticus
causes for this motion or rest are not given.33 If the whole heaven moves,
the heavenly bodies are swept along by its revolution. If it does not, they
are propelled by a revolution of their own, deriving from an impulse
dating back to the origin of the cosmos, or caused by their inner heat (?),34
or to be explained by fire attempting to feed itself 35 and moving on [42]
from one place to the next.36 We may set out this diaeresis as follows:
A fuller but still not entirely complete version of this diaeresis survives
at Lucr. DRN V ff., a rather obscure passage.37 Lucretius lists the
same two alternative starting-points: (a) motibus astrorum . . . quae sit
causa / caeli si vertitur orbis () and (b) est etiam quoque uti possit
caelum omne manere / in statione, tamen cum lucida signa ferantur (
). If the heaven moves (a), two equivalent explanations of this move-
ment are feasible: the heaven is gripped by air at the poles, and is moved
either (a1) by a current of air above it which moves in the same direction
33 In view of the parallel in Lucretius to be discussed shortly, one may surmize that if
in motion the heaven is moved by air currents, and if at rest kept in its place by gripping
air.
34 From 8 /0 the text is disturbed, and some scholars have followed Usener in
the modern editions I have seen: Ausbreitung (Apelt), extension (Hicks), spreading
(Bailey), Zuteilung (Boer), diffusione (Gigante), propagazione (Arrighetti), extension
(BollackLaks), and propagazione (Isnardi Parente). This is linguistically possible but a
bit hard; Gassendi, cit., , translates depastio, equally feasible from a linguistic point of
view, which I believe is preferable in view of the parallel in Lucretius for which see below.
36 BollackLaks, cit., f., who stay as close to the transmitted text as they possibly
can, argue for two successive causes, viz. the original impulse followed by fire extending
itself to find new fuel. But this seems awkward in view of the principle of multiple
causation and of the parallel in Lucretius.
37 Transl. by LongSedley, cit., f. (D), who however have obscured the diaeresis.
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as the heavenly bodies, or (a2) by one beneath it. The motions of the stars
are not explained for (a). Presumably Lucretius assumes, just as Epicurus
had done, that in this case the heavenly bodies are moved by the heaven,
that is to say indirectly by the outer current of air. He (or his source) may
also have left open the possibility that they are moved by the same current
of inside air that makes the heaven itself circulate. But one cannot exclude
that he believed that the three equivalent explanations of the motions of
the heavenly bodies that are possible if the heaven does move apply in
case (a) as well. The cause of (b), the heaven remaining at rest, is not for-
mulated; we may perhaps hypothesize a lack of exterior or [43] interior air
currents, or air gripping not only the poles but the whole heaven. Now
if (b), there are three equivalent explanations for the movements of the
heavenly bodies. They circulate either (b1) because their inner fire seeks
to get out and so makes them move on, or (b2) an external current of
air blowing from somewhere drives them on, or (b3) each heavenly body
moves itself along the sky to find its sustenance. As to our cosmos one
cannot choose between (a) and (b), and so on, but for the infinitely many
cosmoi in the infinite universe during infinite time all these possibilites
are realized. The diaeresis may be set out as follows:
spheres) is/are in motion, and (c) one according to which the earth is
stationary while both the heaven and the stars are moving. From a purely
logicalor rather dialecticalpoint of view (one in no way interested
in saving the phenomena) even a fourth option, not dealt with further
by Aristotle, is open. If one rejects his premise that the earth must be
stationary and posits that it moves, both the heavens and the heavenly
bodies may [44] be stationary.38 Now according to Cicero, Ac. pr. II ,39
Theophrastus said that Hicetas of Syracuse held that the heaven and the
heavenly bodies are at rest and that the earth rotates about its axis. It
looks as if he attempted to find an historical instantiation of the fourth
option, either in his De caelo or in the Physikai doxai. Aristotle in what
comes next at De caelo II argues in favour of his own position, viz. that
the heavenly bodies are at rest and are moved around by the spheres in
which they are set.
The four options may be set out as follows, in a different sequence:
38 This fourth option is then worked out in later doxographies; see my paper in
stationary. See J. Barnes, The Size of the Sun in Antiquity, Acta Classica Univ. Scient.
Debrecen , , [ ff.], f.
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moving. One may point out in passing that it is not clear either in the
passage in the Letter or in the more substantial parallel in [45] Lucretius
what were Epicurus ideas about the differences, if any, between the fixed
stars and the other heavenly bodies in our cosmos.
(and references to the literature) at C. Romeo, Demetrio Lacone sulla grandezza del sole
(PHerc. ), Cronache Ercolanesi (), [ f.], f.
45 Not, of course, larger than the earth itself as Aristotle and the mathematical astron-
omers believed (see below). The doxographical tradition has the formula a little larger;
epicurus peripateticus
At. II . (fr. Usener) is paralleled at Cic. De fin. I and Ac. pr. II . But I believe
that the text of the Letter should not be made to conform with it.
46 In the next sentence Aristotle refers to De caelo II .
47 The passage is Heracl. fr. (b) Marcovich, who also prints further references in
Aristotle and other authors; important Diog. Lart. IX = Heracl. fr. (e) Marcovich, 9
T 8
_ .
48 At. II = Vorsokr. B (Heracl. fr. (a) Marcovich). The Atian quotation is
i.e. the school of Eudoxus, but he is of course aware (e.g. ibid., ) of the fact that the
mathematical astronomy of Callippus had exerted a profound influence on Aristotle.
50 For 7 meaning obstacle in a more literal sense see Plut. SR D (SVF
II ), Marc. Aurel. VIII (cf. A.S.L. Farquharson, The Meditations of the Emperor
Marcus Aurelius, Vol. II, Oxford, Clarendon Pr., , 2, ). At Sext. M. VII ,
and (not in SVF; is printed as part of fr. in K.-H. Hlser, Die
Fragmente zur Dialektik der Stoiker, Bd. I, Stuttgart-Bad Canstatt, Frommann-Holzboog,
, who translates by Hindernis, and as K in LongSedley, cit., who translate by
impediment) the rider of the younger Stoics to the cataleptic presentation as the criterion
of truth is at issue (, ' E E 7 7).
Here the obstacle is another presentation, or a memory, or rather an argument based
thereon (see ibid. , 6 3 i 4 6 .my emphasis). In this
same paragraph 7 and 7 are used interchangeably (M. VII , M: E
& - 8 E 7 Q, < E
E v, @ E 4#my emphasis). Cf. also M. VII , where the term occurs
twice and the issue (as in Aristotle and Epicurus) is whether something really is such as it
appears to be (+ B 8 _ , F
8,
E ).
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heavenly bodies based on their vast size is convincingly argued by Barnes, cit., f.
54 Cf. Adorno, cit., , who translates gli elementi sono indivisibili, atomi.
55 See the references at Arrighetti, cit., .
56 According to Theophr. Phys. op. fr. Diels [ FHS&G] ap. Simpl. In Phys. .
and hospitality, and to the Firenze corona as a whole for encouraging observations. I
am indebted to Keimpe Algra, Han Baltussen, David T. Runia and Teun Tieleman for
pertinent criticisms of various drafts.
chapter ten
David T. Runia
1 The theme is prepared in V., where the aspect of wonder is expressed more
explicitly (: mirantur qua ratione), and taken up again in the laus Epicuri at the
beginning of book VI.
2 Tim. ac, a topos by Lucretius day; cf. Runia () .
david t. runia
3 Diels ().
4 See now Mansfeld and Runia (), with copious bibliography; on the term itself
ibid. f. and useful remarks at Mejer () ff.
5 In addition to the work just cited, see also Mansfeld (a), (a); Runia (),
().
6 Esp. in his , but also elsewhere; cf. Mansfeld (b) n. , (a)
n. .
lucretius and doxography
For example, Academics and sceptics not surprisingly stressed the dis-
agreements of the philosophers that the doxai reveal.7
What chiefly remains to us today are the Placita of Atius, an imper-
fectly preserved but extensive collection to be dated to the st cen-
tury ad.8 I mention now three features of this work that are typical for the
genre as a whole. () The work is divided into books and chapters, which
represent a systematically organized whole. () Individual chapters are
almost always structured by means of diaereses, whether as disjunctions
or in the form of lists. () To each opinion a name-label is attached, i.e.
the philosopher who represents the view, but the views take priority over
the names. For this reason historical and chronological aspects play but
a minor role. To put it crudely, doxography is more systematic than his-
torical in orientation. To this extent it remains true to its Aristotelian
heritage.
Mansfeld and Runia (). The main sources are Ps.Plutarch Placita philosophorum,
Stobaeus Eclogae book I, Theodoret of Cyrrhus Curatio affectionum Graecarum. The
double columns of Diels reconstruction, (), should be used with caution. Atius
compendium makes extensive use of anterior traditions, some of which Diels was able to
trace in Cicero and other sources, and which he labelled the Vetusta placita, dating them
to the first half of the st century ad. Even older traditions, i.e. Vetustissima placita, have
been identified in Chrysippus; see Mansfeld (a). Ultimately, however, method and
some material go back to Aristotle and Theophrastus.
9 According to Kleve () about a sixth of the work is devoted to criticism of
rival views. But Kleve does not distinguish between polemics and doxography, e.g. his
statement on p. about Epicurus doxographical method.
david t. runia
or or even .
14 See Smith (b) .
15 Arist. Top. b, a; Pl. Tim. c.
16 Varro ap. Serv. Comm. in Georg. II., Cic. Ac. II. (combined with doxai
connection with the question of providence). Philo devotes an entire treatise to the
question of the eternity of the cosmos, De aeternitate mundi. On the initial doxography
lucretius and doxography
of this in the [96] poets phrase that the poverty of human thought brings
the mind to doubt (V.). Lucretius, however, is convinced that he has
the answer. The world had a beginning and a single day will wipe it out
(V.).
The same theme recurs at the end of book II, but is here placed in
a wider physical context. Lucretius argues the case for the following
doctrines:
The universe is infinite in all directions ().
Worlds different than ours are infinite in number ().
Nature is free and there is no divine providence ().
The cosmos is born, reaches its acme through sustenance by food,
and will reach a terminal age ().
The subjects and their sequence of treatment remind us strongly of the
first chapters of book II of Atius doxographical compendium:18
#
# -
# + 7 9 V
# + = 9
#
9 .
in paragraphs see Ppin () ff.; Runia (). Other Philonic texts referring
to this question are Ebr. ; Opif. ; Abr. . See further Quintilian Inst. VII..;
Gal. De propr. plac. ; Lactantius Div. Inst. II.., VII..; Marius Victorinus in
Cic. Rhet. .; Ambr. Exam. I..; Aug. Acad. III. etc.
18 The chapters of Atius original work are in all likelihood almost perfectly preserved
in Ps.Plutarch Placita philosophorum. See the texts of Mau (); Lachenaud (). I
intend to offer a full reconstruction of Book II of Atius in Aetiana vol. II.
*
19 Mansfeld (a) .
david t. runia
strated beyond all possible doubt that the introductory section raising the
question of the nature of the soul in book I and the full discussion of the
subject in book III reveal influence of the standard schemata of doxogra-
phy, especially as seen in the use of question-types.20 Also the discussion
of the principles in book I is organized by means of a standard proce-
dure, starting with various monists including Heraclitus (), fol-
lowing with dualists () and proponents of four elements (), fore-
most among whom is Empedocles (), and ending with the infini-
tist Anaxagoras (). He concurs with the view of Rsler that the
material on the Presocratics is also not [97] drawn from direct reading,
but is derived from doxographic traditions.21 Mansfeld concludes as fol-
lows:22 just as Cicero and others, Lucretius avails himself of the doxo-
graphic material to discuss problems in philosophy better. I could not
agree more. Doxography is used for the purpose of organizing philo-
sophical material. By outlining various systematic options in the areas
of principles, cosmology and psychology, Lucretius makes the answers
fixed once and for all by Epicurus stand out in higher relief.
At the broader level of macro-organization there are further parallels
between Lucretius poem and the Placita in Atius. In the following table
the sequence of subjects on metarsiology as presented in De rerum natura
VI and Atius book III are placed side-by-side.23
20 I.e. standard questions on essence or nature, size, quality etc., loosely related to the
Aristotelian categories.
21 Ibid. , with reference to Rsler ().
22 Ibid. .
23 See also the tables set out by Reitzenstein ().
lucretius and doxography
almost no name-labels.
27 See for example V..
28 E.g. Bailey () etc.
29 Epicurus at Ep.Pyth. calls it the .
david t. runia
ff.
32 Subsidium interpretationis presented at Usener () . Usener could make
use of the hypothesis on the doxographical tradition put forward by Diels in his Doxo-
graphi Graeci, even though the latter only makes a brief reference to the Ep. Pyth. on p.
(tamquam ex doxographis nominibus philosophorum omissis raptim corrasa), noting that
it is of doubtful authenticity.
33 Bergstrsser (), English translation in Bailey () ff.
34 Daiber (), which in my view puts the Theophrastean origin beyond doubt. Cf.
36 See ibid. with reference to Ep. Pyth. (Useners exclusions are shown to
be quite unnecessary). On p. he notes that the diaeresis on the motions of the heavens
in Ep. Pyth. is paralleled at Lucr. V..
37 As attempted by Reitzenstein ().
david t. runia
38 A nice example is given at Cicero Div. II. in order to illustrate the separation of
On the Vetusta placita see above n. . The passage was wholly overlooked by Diels in his
Doxographi Graeci.
lucretius and doxography
.
44 What about this: does the moon bring forth her own genuine light, or a bastard
light illumined by the rays of the sun, or neither of these in absolute terms on its own, but
rather a mixture of both, as if from a fire that is partly its own and partly from a foreign
source.
david t. runia
; - - F 8
:
8 F 5 E +V >
,
8 a N 8 + K;
45 Carmen ..
46 Fragments are collected by Jacoby in FGH .
47 See Campos Daroca (), esp. . Jacoby separated the astronomical fragments
and attributed them to a Hellenistic Ps. Berosus. This theory, which Campos Daroca
rejects, would only strengthen our hypothesis that Lucretius did not gain his information
about Berosus via Theophrastus or Epicurus.
48 Ibid. .
49 Epicurus wrote book XI of his Physics dealing with the heavenly bodies just before
lucretius and doxography
Stobaeus Eclogae .); Cleomedes Ziegler, cf. Goulet () ff.; Vitr. IX..
.
52 I am thinking of a book similar to that of Cleomedes. Strictly speaking, however, this
cited above at n. , is not introduced. The reason may be that he finds it confusing to
introduce a double explanation: the phases of the moon are explained by the reflection of
the suns rays, while the moons own light explains why it is still visible during an eclipse
and has a face.
david t. runia
Bibliography
Bailey, C. (), Titi Lucreti Cari De Rerum Natura, edited with Prolegomena,
Critical Apparatus, Translation and Commentary, vols. (Oxford).
Bergstrsser, G. (), Neue meteorologische Fragmente des Theophrast, arabisch
und deutsch, SHeidAkadWiss, Phil.-hist. Kl. Abh. (Heidelberg).
Campos Daroca, J. (), Art. Berosus, in: R. Goulet (ed.), Dictionnaire des
Philosophes Antiques, vol. (Paris) .
is part of the recently discovered fuller text of his Metarsiology (see above n. ), para-
graph . ff.: Neither the thunderbolt nor anything that has been mentioned has its
origin in God. For it is not correct to say that God should be the cause of disorder in this
world . . . See further the analysis in Mansfeld (b), who at dwells on the
relations between Theophrastus, Epicurus and Lucretius.
56 Atius I.; II.. The title of chap. II., as given by Ps.Plut.,
David T. Runia
. Introduction*
If we were in a position to ask our protagonist, Philo the learned Jew from
Alexandria, what his views were on the subject of the present chapter, he
might at first be somewhat puzzled. He would want to know more about
what this term hellenistike doxographia might represent. We would have
to explain that both parts of the term are based on neologisms coined
in the th century of our era by German scholarsHellenistic from
J.G. Droysens Hellenismus,1 doxography from H. Diels Doxographi.
But it would surely not take him long to understand what we were talking
about, and there would be much that we could learn from him.
Sadly we have no choice but to base our investigation on his writings,
but at least these are copious and full of interesting information. The aim
of this article will be firstly to investigate what Philo can teach us about
Hellenistic doxography, and secondly to determine how he was able to
use this form of ancient philosophical literature for his own purposes.
It will fall into four parts. First we will have to look more closely at the
work and legacy of Hermann Diels in order to determine more exactly
what doxography is. Next we shall attempt to outline a brief history of
doxographical literature from its first beginnings in the fifth century bce
until the early imperial period in which Philo himself lived. In the longest
part of the article we shall examine the chief texts in which Philo bears
witness to and makes use of doxographical material. In the final part
* I would like to thank Francesca Alesse most warmly for inviting me to write this
from to (Oxford ), .
david t. runia
we shall draw some conclusions on [14] what Philo can tell us about
doxography and why it was important for him in fulfilling the aims he
set himself as a thinker and writer.
5 H. Diels, DG, : Plutarchi quae fertur de Placitis epitomen primus attigisse videtur
Philo Iudaeus, si modo hunc locum libri primi de providentia ab eo scriptum esse
credimus.
6 See below Section (f), (e), & (b) respectively.
7 See the more detailed discussion on terminology in D.T. Runia, What is Doxogra-
phy?, in P.J. van der Eijk (ed.), Ancient Histories of Medicine. Essays in Medical Doxogra-
phy and Historiography in Classical Antiquity (LeidenBoston ), . The differ-
ence between the first and second meaning corresponds to the distinction between broad
and narrow doxography made by J. Mansfeld in the Encyclopedia article cited in the next
note, .
david t. runia
In the present article it is the second meaning that covers our subject
best. As we just saw, Diels does discuss Philo in the context of the Placita,
but much of this literature (though not its sources) post-dates him. On
the other hand if we took the third and fourth of the meanings above,
then the contents of the entire volume on Philo and Hellenistic philos-
ophy could be subsumed under our subject. The scope of ancient dox-
ography in the context of Philos writings will become clearer as we give
a brief outline of its development from the earliest beginnings up to the
time of Philo. This history will not amount to a summary of Diels work.
For the first hundred years after the publication of Doxographi Graeci,
most scholars were happy to accept his reconstruction. However, recent
research, primarily carried out by the Dutch scholar Jaap Mansfeld, with
some contributions from myself and others as well, has yielded greater
insight into the nature or purpose of the doxographical tradition.8 It will
form the basis of the following section.
When philosophers first started to write down their thoughts, it did not
take long before they made reference to the views of their predecessors
and contemporaries. But it took some time before this was done in
any systematic kind of way. In Platos dialogues there are already some
traces of this process, for example when in the Theaetetus he contrasts
the views of Heraclitus and Parmenides, or when in the Sophist he
speaks of a battle of giants in which materialist thinkers are opposed
to friends of the forms, or when in the Phaedo he identifies various
physical topics relating to the cosmos and the soul, on which thinkers
such as Anaxagoras and Socrates are supposed to have views.9 It is [17]
likely that in such passages he is drawing on earlier work done by Sophists
such as Hippias and Gorgias.
8 The best recent overview of the results of this research is given in the article
Doxography of ancient philosophy by J. Mansfeld in the online Stanford Encyclopedia
of Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/doxography-ancient. See also the survey
of J. Mejer, berlieferung der Philosophie im Altertum. Eine Einfhrung (Copenhagen
), esp. . Mansfeld and I are undertaking a large-scale examination of the
tradition of the Placita. The study cited above in n. is the first of a number of projected
volumes. See further the review article on the project by M. Frede, Atiana, Phronesis
(), . Frede praises the basic approach, but encourages its authors to look
more closely at the evidence that Theodoret supplies.
9 Cf. Theaet. e, e, Soph. ac, Phaed. bc, de, a etc. On the latter
philo and hellenistic doxography
texts see J. Mansfeld, Physical Doxai in the Phaedo, in M. KardaunJ. Spruyt (eds.), The
Winged Chariot. Collected Essays on Plato and Platonism in Honour of L.M. de Rijk (Leiden
), [= article in this collection].
10 On the Aristotelian background, which Diels largely overlooked, see the seminal
article of J. Mansfeld, Physikai Doxai and Problmata Physica from Aristotle to Atius
(and Beyond), in W.W. FortenbaughD. Gutas (eds.), Theophrastus: his Psychological,
Doxographical and Scientific Writings (New BrunswickLondon ), , esp.
[= article in this collection].
11 Top. .b. This topic is treated in At. .. The example for ethics is
whether one should obey ones parents or the laws, for logic whether there is the same
knowledge of contraries or not.
12 The three main lists are printed in O. Gigon, Aristotelis Opera, vol. III, Librorum
13 Diels thought the title of the work was Physikon doxai; cf. DG, , .
J. Mansfeld has demonstrated, however, that it was most likely Physikai doxai; see his
article cited in n. , . The crucial difference is that the latter title places the emphasis
on the systematic nature of the collection rather than on the philosophers whose views
are being discussed.
14 See J. Mansfeld, Aristote et la structure du De sensibus de Thophraste, Phronesis
part (hegemonikon) of the soul in his treatise On the Soul. The striking
parallels with later texts have been studied by J. Mansfeld.17 He points
out that Chrysippus emphasizes the disagreement (antilogia) prevalent in
views on the subject. This suggests that by this time the earlier Peripatetic
collections of material have been reworked by the Sceptical Academy
instituted by Arcesilaus in the rd cent. bce in order to support their
view that one should suspend judgment on all philosophical questions
whether theoretical or practical. Difference of opinion, as recorded by
Aristotle and Theophrastus, is converted into disagreement or dissen-
sion (diaphonia). The difference is well brought out by Cicero when he
writes:18
Aristotle the founder [of the Peripatos] instituted the practice of speaking
both for and against on every topic, not in order to speak against every
position as Arcesilaus did, but to set out the possible arguments on either
side on every subject.
in this collection]; Doxography and Dialectic: the Sitz im Leben of the Placita, in ANRW
II . (BerlinNew York ), , esp. .
18 De fin. .; text cited by J. Mansfeld, Doxography and Dialectic, cit., .
19 De inv. ; cf. Mansfeld, Physikai doxai . The chapters in Atius are ., ., ..
david t. runia
..20 Perhaps the most interesting text of all is found in Ciceros Aca-
demica priora ., in which he presents the sceptical view that all
the dogmatic philosophers are in fatal discord with each other.21 Many
of the examples, especially in the area of physics, are closely related to
texts in the Placita literature and led Diels to postulate that there was an
older collection of views (the so-called Vetusta placita) which served as
a source for both Cicero and Atius.22 Situated chronologically between
these two authors, of course, we find Philo of Alexandria.
But before we move to Philos evidence, two further comments need
to be made. The first pertains to the kind of philosophical topics that
are dealt with in doxographical literature. As we saw above, Aristotle
indicates that his dialectical method can handle subjects in the areas of
physics, ethics and logic, and he gives an example for each. However,
it appears that only in the area of physics (including first principles,
psychology and related epistemology) do we have a body of doxai that are
organized on a large scale, i.e. the tradition of the Placita investigated by
Diels. M. Giusta made a valiant attempt to show that there was a parallel
body of ethical doxai, but it has been generally agreed that no such work
ever existed.23 This does not mean that there was not a significant number
of ethical doxographies, as seen for example in Ciceros De finibus,24 but
there was no systematically organized corpus. The same applies for topics
in the area of logic.
The second comment pertains to the way in which doxographical
material was presented. This happened in many different forms.25 In
the Placita the various doxai are mostly presented in an extremely
com[21]pact form, often merely stating the view without any accompa-
nying argument. In other texts views can be set out at greater length with
Theophrasts Phys. Op. bei Cicero?, in W.W. FortenbaughP. Steinmetz (eds.), Ciceros
Knowledge of the Peripatos (New BrunswickLondon ), , repr. in Studies in
the Historiography of Greek Philosophy (Assen ), .
22 Cf. esp. Ac. pr. ., on which see J. Mansfeld, Physikai doxai, cit., ,
the two studies of J. Mejer, Diogenes Lartius and his Hellenistic Background (Wiesbaden
), and berlieferung der Philosophie, cited above (n. ).
philo and hellenistic doxography
26 The physical fragments were collected in Diels, DG ; see further D.T. Runia,
Additional Fragments of Arius Didymus on Physics, in K.A. AlgraP.W. van der Horst
D.T. Runia (eds.), Polyhistor: Studies in the History and Historiography of Philosophy pre-
sented to Jaap Mansfeld (Leiden ), [= article in this collection]. Two
long passages on Stoic and Peripatetic ethics are preserved in Stobaeus; see W.W. Forten-
baugh (ed.), On Stoic and Peripatetic Ethics. The Work of Arius Didymus (New Brunswick
London ); A.J. Pomeroy, Arius Didymus. Epitome of Stoic Ethics (Atlanta ).
27 As argued by T. Gransson, Albinus, Alcinous, Arius Didymus (Gteborg ).
28 See the surviving examples on the Academy and Stoa attributed to Philodemus
30 On these texts and their background see D.T. Runia, Philo of Alexandria and the
evidence shows that originally there must have been a chapter entitled
*
which was deleted by the epitomizer ps.Plutarch.
33 To judge by ps.Plutarchs epitome, the title of this chapter in Atius appears to have
been + = 9 , but its contents clearly also cover the wider question of
whether the cosmos came into being or is ungenerated. The question goes back to Plat.
Tim. c.
34 See the discussions above in the previous section.
35 Fullest text at Stob. Ecl. ..b, cf. Diels, DG, . I have examined the
parallelism between Philo and the Placita in my article, The Beginnings of the End: Philo
of Alexandria and the End of Hellenistic Theology, in A. LaksD. Frede (eds.), Traditions
of Theology. Studies in Hellenistic Theology, its Background and Aftermath (Leiden ),
.
david t. runia
biblical problem
suggested solution
four constituents of the cosmos
three of these, earthwaterair, are knowable
fourth, heaven, is essentially unknowable
four constituents of human beings
three of these, bodyperceptionspeech, are knowable
fourth, intellect, is essentially unknowable.
For this material there are not only parallels in Atius, but also in Cicero,
Tusc. ., Ac. pr. ., Lucretius, Book , and in later texts such
as Tertullian and Macrobius.40 In addition, as Wendland noted, [26]
Ciceronian texts see . Through these parallels Mansfeld can show that Philo
has applied the doxography on the soul in general to the dominant part, i.e. the intellect,
alone.
david t. runia
Philo appears to use the same source material a little further on in his
treatise, when he illustrates the activity of the Chaldean astronomers,
which Abraham leaves behind when he emigrates to Haran (Somn. .
, translation in the Appendix). Here the presentation is much more
compact, with just one or two doxai used as illustrations or only the
topic indicated. The topics are similar to those used in the earlier passage,
but interestingly Philo adds the subject of the size of the sun, whether
just a foot in diameter (the doxa associated with Heraclitus) or much
larger than the earth. This topic was a favourite illustration of a thesis or
quaestio infinita in rhetorical literature,41 but was also compactly treated
in a chapter in At. . On the size of the sun. It is also worth noting that
when Philo indicates what the human being should investigate, namely
his own nature, he outlines a number of topics related primarily to sense-
perception which correspond closely to chapters in Book IV of Atius
compendium.42
Wendland was right to conclude that the parallels between these texts
are such that they cannot be fully independent of each other. But they
can also not be reduced to each other. At least two topics are included
in Philos summary that are not covered in the remains of Atius as we
have them and various individual doxai are not exactly paralleled (see
further the Appendix). Naturally we have to allow for the considerable
freedom that Philo permits himself in using philosophical material. A
good example of such latitude is Philos suggestion that according to some
the substance of the stars consists of hollows and glens and fiery clumps
(of metal). The doxa is paralleled in Atius, but there it is said of the moon
which in the view of Anaxagoras and Democritus is a fiery solid which
has in it plains and mountains and ravines. Two of Atius three nouns are
also found in the doxographical report of Hippolytus on Anaxagoras.43
So it is likely that Philo has [27] altered the language of his source in
41 Cf. Hermagoras at Cic. De inv. .., De orat. ., Quint. Inst. or. .., .., ...
42 E.g. 6 . . . 9K 9VK, cf. Atius ., 9!,
9.
43 Compare Somn. ., '
0 + b -=
order to accentuate the bizarre nature of the views that are held on the
nature of the heaven. At the same time he plainly understands well the
method and purpose of his source. This emerges in at least three respects.
Firstly, as already noted, he strongly emphasizes the role of questions,
which form the backbone of doxography. Secondly, in giving sketchy and
generalized answers to the questions, he frequently uses the method of
diaeresis, which allows the answers to be grouped and opposed to each
other. Thirdly, he gives a considerable number of doxai in abbreviated
form as examples, but leaves out the names of the philosophers holding
the views. This is consistent with the method of the Placita, where the
chief emphasis falls on the view rather than the person holding it.
From where, then, did Philo derive this doxographical material?
Wendland argued that Philos source must have been the Vetusta placita
postulated by Diels as available to Cicero and to be dated to the middle of
the first century bce, i.e. more than a century prior to Atius. Mansfeld
has looked at the epistemology of Philos extracts more thoroughly and
argues that it may well have a Sceptical or an Academic source. The con-
tinual use of the term ! (cf. Somn. ., , ) points more
to the latter. He concludes:44
Two options are open: Philo . . . either used an Academic source which
was based on the Plac. (and such a source would have to be earlier than
the st cent. bce date assigned by Diels to the Vet. Plac.), or he used
among other sourcesa version of the Plac. which was older than the Vet.
Plac. postulated by Diels.
It is, however, difficult to pursue Quellenforschung of this kind with any
degree of precision and perhaps more fruitful to concentrate on how
the material is used.45 Elsewhere in his writings Philo makes extensive
use of both sceptical and academic terminology (we will be discussing
further texts below). I would hesitate to conclude with Mansfeld that [28]
the usage in the De somniis texts has been taken over from a particular
source. Philo goes his own way, adapting material that he has at his
disposal to his exegetical aims.
(! in Mos. . taken from LXX, Deut :). Cf. also the mistaken reference to
Xenophanes at Cic. Ac. pr. . (the moon inhabited and the location of many cities and
mountains).
44 J. Mansfeld, Doxography and Dialectic, cit., .
45 In a personal communication Jaap Mansfeld indicates that he is more and more
reluctant to use terms such as Vetusta or Vetustissima Placita for layers of postulated
sources, at least until more definitive research has been carried out. Moreover it is better
to speak of traditions than sources.
david t. runia
of Gods essence is compared with the search for what each of the stars is with regard to
its substance.
philo and hellenistic doxography
48 These are the final treatises of the Allegorical Commentary. If he wrote the Expo-
sition of the Law directly afterwards (which is by no means certain), then it is worth
noting that its first two works are De opificio and De Abrahamo, from which the texts
studied above under (a) are taken (and cf. also Opif. cited below in (g)).
49 Philos source usage was discovered by H. von Arnim in an early study, Quellenstu-
dien zu Philo von Alexandria (Berlin ). It is very likely that Aenesidemus started as
an Academic philosopher and proceeded to start his own Neopyrrhonist school, but the
details are disputed; see J. Mansfeld, Aenesidemus and the Academics, in L. Ayres (ed.),
The Passionate Intellect. Essays for Ian Kidd (New BrunswickLondon ), ,
in response to F. Decleva Caizzi, Aenesidemus and the Academy, Classical Quarterly
(), . Aenesidemus exact dates are unknown, but there are good grounds for
dating his floruit to the mid st cent. bce.
50 See esp. the discussions in K. Jan cek, Philon von Alexandreia und skeptische
Tropen, Eirene (), ; C. Lvy, Deux problmes doxographiques chez Philon
dAlexandrie: Posidonius et Ensidme, in A. Brancacci (ed.), Philosophy and Doxography
in the Imperial Age (Florence ), .
david t. runia
51 Philo does not number the tropes and only records eight of the ten in Sextus. It is
not wholly certain that they all go back to Aenesidemus, but certainly the tenth must do
so.
52 Note that this procedure is parallel to the greatly expanded example of the disagree-
ment of the dogmatists given by Cicero in propria persona in Ac. pr. . (physics
starts at , ethics at ).
53 On these subjects see further below (h).
54 A compact summary of all the examples is given by J. Mansfeld, Doxography and
Dialectic, cit., .
55 But Mansfeld, loc. cit., concludes that Aenesidemus most likely made creative use
of disagreements listed in the Vet. Plac. For the relation to the doxographical material in
Ciceros Academica see his remarks in Gibt es Spuren, cit., .
philo and hellenistic doxography
goes right back to the beginnings of doxography in Plato and Aristotle; cf. Plat. Theaet.
eb, Arist. De cael. .ba. It is found at At. ., but the two
doxai are not clearly opposed. No doubt this has to do with the vagaries of transmission
and adaptation.
david t. runia
Philos Exegetical Strategies, in J. Dillon and A.A. Long (eds.), The Question of Eclec-
ticism. Studies in Later Greek Philosophy (Berkeley ), .
58 See not only Her. , but also the fascinating fragment preserved in the Flori-
legia QE fr. (text at F. Petit (ed.), Les uvres de Philon dAlexandrie vol. A: Quaestiones
in Genesim et in Exodum, fragmenta graeca (Paris ), ). Both texts use the dis-
tinctive term (pace Mansfeld, Philosophy in the Service of Scripture, cit., ).
59 The earliest example of the key term is in fact in Philo; see the discussion
text uses the same terminology of scepticism to describe the state of philosophical
disagreement which the gifted young Moses is able to surmount.
david t. runia
animalibus makes no direct reference to philosophical schools, though it would not have
been difficult to do so.
64 In this text the question of providence is raised by implication when the problem
is raised concerning the way of life of the Deity, i.e. whether he is concerned with the
cosmos in any way or not.
65 For an overview and solution to the problems see D.T. Runia, Philos De aeterni-
I ungenerated indestructible
II generated destructible
III generated indestructible
The first two positions are directly opposed to each other in a strong
diaeresis. The third is explicitly called a mixed, i.e. a compromise view.
A fourth possible view, that the cosmos is ungenerated and destructible
is not mentioned, presumably because no thinker has ever seriously
entertained it. [36]
Philo then proceeds to illustrate the three doxai and connect them
with the doctrines of individual philosophers and schools, starting not
with position I but with position II. This can be summarized as fol-
lows:
67 For what follows see esp. my article cited in n. : also extensive discussion in Philo
,
, E 8 8 I
+ H
8, E 3 5
3 E
=, &
, = +
> @.
david t. runia
Philo shows the links and contrasts between the various positions. By
connecting them with the thought of individual philosophers he is able
to refine the second and third positions and show how they can be held
in different ways. He also gives some reasons why philosophers choose
a particular position, e.g. Aristotles view that to hold the view that the
cosmos will come to an end shows an impious attitude towards the
cosmos as visible god.69 It is important to observe that the sequence of
doxai and philosophers is systematic rather than chronological. Aristotle
is said to oppose a view held by thinkers who in some cases (Epicurus,
Stoics) lived later than he did. Yet chronology does play a subordinate
role, since in the case of views I and III Philo mentions proponents who
lived earlier than the main philosophers associated with them. And it
is quite plain that Philo is not a neutral doxographer. The doxography
is organized in a sequence of ascending acceptability. The Stoic view is
better than that of the godless atomists. Aristotles view is superior to
that of the Stoics. Platos view improves on that of Aristotle (and should
not be interpreted in an Aristotelianizing way). But, most importantly,
the Platonic view is seen as anticipated by the lawgiver Moses and is
illustrated by two texts from Genesis (:, :). From Philos pen this
is the ultimate imprimatur. The final paragraph is the climax of
the entire doxography and provides the key to the interpretation of the
treatise as a whole. It is impossible that the long sequence of arguments
in , which defend position I, should represent Philos final
word on this question. In order to preserve con[37]sistency with the
doxography in , the arguments in opposition, introduced in
but no longer extant, must have set out position III, not position
I, unless we were to put forward the most unlikely supposition that
the entire treatise at no stage articulates the arguments for the Mosaic
position which Philo regards as his own.
As we have already seen, the question of whether the cosmos came into
being or has always existed was a stock example of a dialectical question70
69 This statement is not found in Aristotles extant writings and has been attributed to
the lost De philosophia (fr. Ross). For his position on the subject see De cael. A .
70 See the text in Aristotle cited above at n. .
philo and hellenistic doxography
71 See Plat. Tim. c, Arist. De cael. A .b, Theophrast. Phys. dox. , Diels,
Stoa ap. D.L. ..
72 This text has also traditionally been attributed to Aristotles lost De philosophia, fr.
Ross, but the attribution is very loose at best. Of course Aristotle could not have attacked
the Stoa, but the passage here is systematic rather than historical.
73 See my analysis at A Difficult Chapter in Atius Book II on Cosmology, in A. Bran-
cacci (ed.), Philosophy and Doxography, cit., . An extensive list of parallels is given at
.
74 C. Acad. .: scio mundum istum nostrum . . . () aut semper fuisse et fore, () aut
coepisse esse minime desiturum; () aut ortum ex tempore non habere, sed habiturum
esse finem; () aut et manere coepisse et non perpetuo esse mansurum; cf. also Civ. Dei
., CCL ...
75 Exam. ..; on this text see J. Ppin, Thologie cosmique et thologie chrtienne
his Life, Writings, Thought and Influence, .. Sources on Physics (texts ). With
contributions on the Arabic material by D. Gutas (Leiden ), .
philo and hellenistic doxography
specifically on De providentia I & II, D.T. Runia Philo of Alexandria and the Timaeus, cit.,
.
83 For this reason the theme is crucial to Philos historical treatises In Flaccum and
Legatio ad Gaium; see P.W. van der Horst, Philos Flaccus. The First Pogrom. Introduction,
translation and commentary (LeidenBoston ), .
84 For example Theon Rhetor in his Progymnasmata gives as an example of a
Although only two of these opinions (nos. and ) are found in the
chapter in Atius on the subject (., eight doxai), all except one can
be [42] found in other sources related to the Placita.91 There can be no
is a garbled version of the same view, as proven by Arist. Meteor. A .a); for ()
cf. Theophrastus at Macrob. In somn. Scip. .., anonymi at Achill. Isag. , . Maass,
cf. Manil. Astron. .; for () At. . (the Pythagoreans), Achill. Isag. , .
(Oenipides of Chios; note that Philo does not include the detail about the sun changing its
course in response to Thyestian banquets); for () no parallels are available, but it seems
related to the next doxa, cf. the mention of Heracles at Achill. Isag. , .; for () cf.
Achill. Isag. , ., Manil. .; for () cf. At. ., Macrob. In somn. Scip.
.. (Posidonius).
david t. runia
doubt that Philo has used a doxographical source, either in the Placita
tradition or closely related to it.92 Alexanders comment at the end of
the passage is important, because he indicates that the reason he puts
forward the various doxai is not because they have any plausibility (they
are fabrications), but for the purposes of debate, i.e. doxography has a
dialectical or disputatious purpose. Given his emphasis on disagreement
in this passage, it may have come to him via an academic or sceptical
route, but this is by no means necessary. Philos own response in is
rather weak. He argues that the Milky Way shares the same substance as
the other stars and that, as in the case of the heavenly bodies, its nature is
difficult to determine (cf. the passages in De somniis discussed in section
b), but nevertheless, as in the case of the sun and moon, there is not the
slightest need to doubt that they exist through providence. Here too Philo
shows himself to be anything but a true sceptic.
The other work De providentia is not a dialogue, but a treatise with
a first brief section presenting arguments based on logic and with a
much longer part based on observation of the sense-perceptible world
( ) which refutes a number of erroneous positions. The first of these
is once again the view that the cosmos is everlasting or created from
all eternity.93 Philo only appeals to doxographical material in
. [43] Using a procedure parallel to what we found in Aet., Philo
cites a number of Platonic texts from the Timaeus and then concludes
( ):94
the technicalities of the philosophical discussion. It has given rise to much dispute; see
D.T. Runia, Philo of Alexandria and the Timaeus, cit., (with further references),
G.E. Sterling, Creatio temporalis, aeterna, vel continua? An Analysis of the Thought of
Philo of Alexandria, The Studia Philonica Annual (), .
94 Translation from Runia, Philo of Alexandria and the Timaeus, cit., , discussion
at .
philo and hellenistic doxography
Plato recognized that these things (i.e. parts of the cosmos) are constructed
by God, and that unadorned matter has been turned into the cosmos with
its adornment. For these were the first causes, from which also the cosmos
came into being. Since also the lawgiver of the Jews, Moses, described
water, darkness and the abyss as being present before the cosmos came
into being (cf. Gen :).
The antiquity of Moses and his prior claim to truth are not spelled out
here, but they are surely implicit.
In the current state of our text a purely doxographical passage now
follows. It begins as follows: Plato, however, matter, Thales of Miletus
water, Anaximander of Miletus the infinite (i.e. apeiron) . . . In all there
are ten doxai, of which all but one are the same as in the chapter on the
archai (.) in the pseudo-Plutarchean Placita. It would seem that the
mention of water in the reference to Mosaic Scripture has triggered a
series of doxai starting with Thales,95 who famously argued that water was
the first principle of all things. As noted earlier,96 Diels argued that the
passage was interpolated into the Philonic text at a later date (the Epitome
of the Placita is to be dated to ce). A detailed examination of
the passage shows that this hypothesis is very likely to be correct.97 The
bald listing of name-labels together with places of origin and patronymics
is entirely foreign to Philos usual style in this work and elsewhere.
The second Empedoclean doxa is taken from a different chapter (.
On whether the universe is unique) and is likely to be a secondary
interpolation. This text, though of historical and philological interest,
should thus be set aside when studying Philos use of doxography. [44]
Texts, cit., .
96 See text above at n. .
97 See the discussion, which includes a translation of the text, at J. MansfeldD.T.
itself has strong roots in dialectic going back at least to Aristotle. The
method of the far more numerous exegetical treatises differs because
their task is to expound the contents of scripture. This can be done in
many different ways, whether by means of narrative exposition, allegor-
ical symbolic interpretation, question and answer, and so on. The role of
doxography in the exegetical process is necessarily limited, but in addi-
tion to the themes that we have already examined above in sections (a)
(d), there are a number of links between exegesis and doxography that
are worth pointing out.
De opificio mundi has a special place in Philos uvre because it is the
opening treatise of a long exegetical series, The Exposition of the Law,
and it explicitly sets out to provide a philosophical foundation for what
follows.99 At the very outset, before expounding the opening creation
account in Genesis, Philo makes a preliminary comment that has the
formal features of doxography ( ):
There are some people who, having more admiration for the cosmos than
for its maker, declared the former both ungenerated and everlasting, while
falsely and impurely attributing to God much idleness. What they should
have done was the opposite, namely be astounded at Gods powers as
Maker and Father, and not show more reverence for the cosmos than is its
due. Moses, however, had not only reached the very summit of philosophy,
but had also been instructed in the many and most essential doctrines of
nature by means of oracles. He recognized that it is absolutely necessary
that among existing things there is an activating cause on the one hand
and a passive object on the other . . .
The opening words of course recall the doxography in De aeternitate
and most scholars have concluded that Philo has Aristotle in mind, or
perhaps also Platonists such as Speusippus and Xenocrates, because they
are associated with this position in Aet. and . There is reason [45] to
believe that he may be thinking of other opponents,100 but for us the main
point is that the method here is doxographical, with Moses representing
the view that Philo supports.
Cosmos, cit.
100 A.P. Bos, Philo of Alexandria: A Platonist in the Image and Likeness of Aristotle,
The Studia Philonica Annual (), , has argued that Philo has a kind of
thinking symbolized by the Chaldeans (on which see further below) in mind; see also
my comments at Philo of Alexandria. On the Creation of the Cosmos, cit., .
philo and hellenistic doxography
Philo claims that the person who learns these lesson and imprints them
on his soul will lead a blessed life. Some commentators have seen here
the beginnings of orthodoxy or credal theology.101
There is a marked tendency in Philos exegesis, which should be inves-
tigated more thoroughly than it is possible to do in this context, to iden-
tify scriptural characters or groups of people with ways or kinds of think-
ing. We note in the passage quoted above that he speaks of the polytheis-
tic opinion (he polutheos doxa). Elsewhere this is the way of thinking that
Abraham leaves behind when he emigrates from his native country (Virt.
), while the representative of the atheistic opinion (he atheos doxa) is
the Pharaoh of Egypt, who states in Ex : that he knows not the Lord
(cf. Leg. .). Another example is his interpretation of the biblical
figures of Cain and Abel. The former represents the doxa that ascribes all
things to the mind or the self, the other to God.102 When Cain challenges
Abel to proceed to the plain, they go out to make investigation concern-
ing opposed and conflicting doxai (Det. ). Another prominent group
are the Chaldeans. They represent a mistaken theological view, namely
that the visible cosmos or its soul is the first god (Migr. ), which in
doxographical shorthand is called the Chaldean doxa (Migr. ).103 A
final quite fascinating example is Philos exegesis of the various groups
of people such as eunuchs and prostitutes who are banished from the
holy assembly in Deut . A number of texts interpret these as opinions
or doctrines with which Philo as a pious but also philosophically orien-
tated Jew strongly dis[47]agrees, such as atheism, polytheism, deniers of
the ideas or forms, champions of the mind (i.e. human autonomy) and
of the senses.104 These opinions are all presented quite anonymously and
it is pointless to identify them too closely with Greek philosophers or
schools. The doxographical method is here adapted to the purposes of
religious doctrine linked to the allegorical method of interpreting Scrip-
ture.
h. Ethical doxography
It will be recalled that in the examples that Philo gives of the dissensio
philosophorum as part of the trope of Aenesidemus, he includes the
domain of ethics.105 An extended example is given on the good, with
some thinkers regarding the good as only what is (morally) fine and
stored up in the soul, while others also include in it bodily and external
goods (Ebr. ). Philo adds that also in relation to ways of life (bioi)
and ends (tele) there are many questions on which no agreement has been
reached ( ).
It is clear that in his writings Philo makes periodic use of the sub-
stantial amount of ethical doxography that was circulating in his day.
An illuminating example is found in Somn. ., where he returns to
the question of the nature of the good and presents the same opposition
between the more austere thinkers who associate the good only with rea-
son, as opposed to those who have a softer, more effeminate way of life
and associate it with bodily and external things as well. The evaluative
adjectives are of course Philos own addition and the reason for them
becomes immediately apparent when the different opinions are associ-
ated with the patriarchs Isaac and Joseph respectively ( ). Joseph
receives a very mixed press in Philos allegories.106 His position is not the
one that Philo himself appears to favour. But in another text which gives
exegesis of Gen : Philo interprets the land from the river of Egypt
to the great river Euphrates as symbolizing the perfection that arises
from the three categories of spiritual, corporeal and external goods, a
doctrine which is attributed to Aristotle and the [48] Peripatetics, but
also to the legislation of Pythagoras: (QG .). In another text in the
Quaestiones Philo interprets the princes of Gen : as those who pre-
side over certain doxai connected with the body and external goods (QG
.).107
It would appear that Philo is well acquainted with a body of ethical
doxography, which he occasionally refers to as such in his work, but
it likely that Philo used the term ; cf. F. Petit, Lancienne version latine des Questions
sur la Gense de Philon dAlexandrie (Berlin ), ..
david t. runia
which he mainly adapts for use in his exegesis, so that the various
allegorized biblical characters represent the contrasted points of view.
Numerous examples can be given. I will give just one, Fug. .
Pharaoh seeks to destroy Moses after he flees his court (Ex :), because
he has heard that Moses has undertaken to destroy the hegemony of the
body in two attacks (cf. Ex :). The first man whom Moses kills
and covers with sand is an Egyptian. He represents the two doctrines
(dogmata) that the first and greatest good is pleasure, and that atoms
are the first principles of the universe, the tertium comparationis in the
latter case being the scattered nature of sand. The connection of course
lies in the fact that both doctrines are Epicurean.108 The second is a
Hebrew, symbolizing the person who splits up the nature of the good
and assigns it to the soul, the body and external things, whereas Moses
wishes to retain the good as a whole and assign it to the understanding
alone. Philo can thus exploit some very common doxographical themes
in order to establish a hierarchy of three doctrines which correlates neatly
with the details of the biblical passage.
The notion of the greatest good referred to in the above passage refers
to the doctrine of chief ends of human life and action, which was the
central question dealt with in Hellenistic ethical doxographies.109 As
Carlos Lvy has noted, Philoperhaps surprisinglydoes not make use
of the celebrated divisiones on this subject associated with the names
of Chrysippus and Carneades which are so prominent in the works of
Cicero.110 For Philo, of course, the question of whether the telos should
be pleasure or virtue is hardly controversial, but as we have seen, he is [49]
able to include it in the interplay of biblical characters in his exegesis.
The relation between doxographical schemata in the area of ethics and
biblical exposition in Philo is a promising subject for research, but we
cannot explore it further in the present context.
siones in Cicero see further K.A. Algra, Chrysippus, Carneades, Cicero: the Ethical divi-
siones in Ciceros Lucullus, in B. InwoodJ. Mansfeld (eds.), Assent and Argument. Studies
in Ciceros Academic Books (Leiden ), .
philo and hellenistic doxography
. Conclusion
The results of our research into the subject of Philo and Hellenistic
doxography can be summarized from a double perspective.
Philos writings provide us with valuable evidence on the prevalence
and function of doxography at the end of the Hellenistic period. Various
passages indicate that he had access to collections of placita which were
very similar to those we find in Atius, but are not the same and probably
go back to common traditions for which we also find evidence in Cicero
and others. In certain cases the context is more or less descriptive, e.g.
setting out the questions that are discussed in philosophy. But more often
it is dialectical or disputative, i.e. referring to disputes between rival views
and the schools that maintained them. It is striking how many of the texts
that make use of doxographical material have a sceptical colouring, both
in terminology and in content. This certainly reflects the developed usage
of the material in the New Academy and Pyrrhonist tradition. Especially
noteworthy was the evidence that Philo presents as earliest witness to
the use of doxographical material by Aenesidemus on his ten tropes. But
there are also texts, primarily in Philos philosophical treatises, where
there is little or no trace of sceptical attitudes, and doxography is used
to organize and evaluate diverse corpora of doctrine and argument.
Philos own usage of doxographical material cannot be divorced from
the philosophical background just sketched, but as always he is very
much his own man. Directly or indirectly, doxography is used in service
of the exposition and defence of Scripture and the author who received
divine inspiration to write it down, the great Moses. On the whole he is
not very interested in recording the names of philosophers and schools.
The majority of his doxographical references are anonymous. Essentially
this coheres with the spirit of doxography, because the doxai are always
more important than the name-labels. Philo goes further in withholding
names than, say, Cicero or Plutarch because he is not very interested in
the subtleties of school successions or traditions. The broad outlines are
mostly sufficient for his purposes. [50]
At the simplest level doxography can supply topoi which allow Philo to
indicate the kind of questions involved in philosophy and the search for
wisdom. It is striking, however, how many of these texts have a sceptical
tinge, with emphasis on the disagreements that preclude an easy path
to knowledge. Philo is acutely aware of the limits of human knowledge,
but he is far from being a true sceptic. The wise man sits in judgment
and delivers his verdict on the really important questions. For Philo this
david t. runia
certainly does not mean any kind of autonomy of thought, but a deference
to Scripture written by the wise man par excellence with the aid of divine
inspiration.
The dialectical and disputatious background of ancient doxography
appears at many points in the Philonic evidence. It is no surprise that
doxography is prominent in the philosophical treatises which discuss
contentious philosophical issues relevant to Jewish thought. But doxo-
graphical material also shines through more than we might expect in the
exegetical works. It occurs prominently when Philo is defending Mosaic
doctrine, for example in the famous passage at the end of De opificio.
Moreover, in his allegorical readings of Scripture he also uses it to expli-
cate many views that he supports or opposes which are located within
the narrative itself, for example in the case of characters such as Cain and
Abel, Abraham, Joseph, and also within the prescriptions of the Mosaic
law, as in the case of the various groups that are banished from the holy
assembly.
Jewish religion for Philo is not just about devotion to God and obe-
dience to the divine law expressed in right action. It is also about right
thinking. In Philos case it is not coincidental that orthodoxy and doxog-
raphy share the common root of the word doxa. In various ways, both
negatively and positively, doxography aids him in elucidating both what
right thinking is and how and where it is to be obtained. Doxography
is pressed into service for the hairesis of Moses, which in matters philo-
sophical commands Philos ultimate allegiance.111 [51]
111 On Philo and the hairesis of Moses see my article, Philo of Alexandria and the
Appendix
Passages in De somniis and De mutatione
nominum referring to doxographical material112
a. Somn. ., , ,
. The following topic would be to inquire for what reason, when four
wells had been dug by Abraham and Isaac and their team, it was the
fourth and final one that was called oath.113 . Perhaps he wishes to set
before us by means of allegory the following doctrine, that while there are
in the universe four constituents out of which the universe is composed,
and there are in us the same number from which we have been moulded
and shaped into human form, three of these have the nature that they one
way or other can be perceived, but the fourth remains incomprehensible
for all agents of cognition. . In the case of the cosmos earth and water
and air and heaven make up the four constituents out of which it is all
composed. Of these three have been allotted a portion that is difficult
but not completely impossible to discover . . .
112 The translations are my own, but are partly indebted to Colsons Loeb Classical
Library version and to the fine translations of David Winston in Philo of Alexandria: The
Contemplative life, The Giants and Selections (New YorkToronto ).
113 That the well of the Oath was the fourth is not specifically stated in the Bible, but is a
deduction made by combining the three wells of Gen : with the well of the Oath
mentioned in Gen :, but the latter had already been mentioned in Gen :.
This explains why Philo mentions both Abraham and Isaac.
david t. runia
b. Somn. .
. It is stated that Terah left the land of Chaldea and migrated to
Haran, taking with him his son Abraham and the relatives of his house-
hold . . . for the purpose that a suitable lesson which of the greatest value
for human life should not be neglected. . What is this lesson? The
Chaldeans practise astronomy, whereas the citizens of Haran are engaged
in studying the topic of the senses. The sacred word thus says to the inves-
tigator of the realities of nature: why do you seek to know about the sun
whether it is the size of a foot, whether it is larger than the entire earth,
whether it is many times larger? Why do you seek to know about the illu-
minations of the moon, whether it has a borrowed gleam or whether it
makes use of a gleam that it entirely its own? Why do you seek to know
about the nature of the other heavenly bodies, whether it be about their
revolution or about the way that they affect each other and things that
happen here on earth? . Why when you are standing on earth do you
leap beyond the clouds? Why do you say that you can engage with the
ethereal beings when you are firmly rooted to the solid ground? Why do
you dare to determine what cannot be determined? Why do you occupy
yourself with what you should leave alone, the heavenly phenomena?
Why do you extend your scientific ingenuity right up to heaven? Why
do you practise astronomy by meddling with the things on high? Do not,
dear friend, investigate what is beyond you and above you, but what is
near to you, or rather discover yourself without any self-flattery.
. How, then, will you discover yourself? Take a journey with your
intellect to Haran, the place that is dug out, the holes and openings of
the body, and examine eyes, ears, nostrils and the other organs of sense-
[54]perception. Practise the philosophy that is most necessary and fitting
for a human being, examining what sight is, what hearing is, what taste
is, what smell is, what touch is, what in general sense-perception is. Then
david t. runia
go on to examine what the act of seeing is and how you see, what the act
of hearing is and how you hear, what the acts of smell and taste and touch
are and how each of them take place. . Is it not an excess of madness
to investigate the universe before you have made a proper examination
of your own home? And there is a greater command that I have not yet
imposed on you, to observe your own soul and intellect of which you
have such a high opinion (I say observe, for you will never be able to
comprehend it) . . .
ADDITIONAL FRAGMENTS OF
ARIUS DIDYMUS ON PHYSICS
David T. Runia
For more than a century a minor but not insignificant figure in the
study of ancient philosophy has been the doxographer Arius Didymus.
Ever since Meineke and Diels presented their hypothesis,1 it has been
customary to attribute the following documents, all located in Eusebius
and Stobaeus, to this obscure personage.2
3The useful labels A, B and C for the three ethical doxographies were introduced
by D.E. Hahm, The Ethical Doxography of Arius Didymus, ANRW .. (BerlinNew
York ) ; it is fast becoming standard.
4 On this intriguing figure see G.W. Bowersock, Augustus and the Greek World
(Oxford ) .
5 See the evaluatory articles by C.H. Kahn, Arius as a Doxographer, in W.W. Forten-
baugh (ed.), On Stoic and Peripatetic Ethics: the Work of Arius Didymus (New Brunswick
) ; Hahm, art. cit. (n. ). Both concentrate primarily on the ethical doxographies.
6 T. Gransson, Albinus, Alcinous, Arius Didymus, Studia Graeca et Latina Gothobur-
the identification of the doxographer with the Stoic court philosopher. It cannot be taken
additional fragments of arius didymus on physics
as a fact that the two are the same person. The problem of the names was already rec-
ognized by Diels and Zeller. But this century scholars simply assumed the identification.
For a spirited defence of the hypothesis see B. Inwoods review of Granssons book, Bryn
Mawr Classical Review .. (electronic document). A further important result of his
research is that he casts serious doubt on the assumption shared by all scholars since Diels
that Ethical doxography A is by the same author as B and C (who, at least in the case of
C, must be Arius Didymus).
8 DG . As far as I know, apart from Wachsmuth, on whom more below, no
attention has been given to the question of the identification of physical fragments of
Arius Didymus in Stobaeus, except incidentally, for example in my own articles cited
below in n. & .
9 P. Moraux, Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen von Andronikos von Rhodos bis
Alexander von Aphrodisias, Band I: Die Renaissance des Aristotelismus im I. Jh. v. Chr.
(BerlinNew York ) .
10 Op. cit. . No doubt he is especially thinking of Diels criterion of a certain
The disputed fragments we are concerned with are all located in Book I
of Stobaeus Eclogae. This book, which unfortunately only survives in a
truncated version,11 contains a vast amount of doxographical material
in the area of physics, but gives no indication whatsoever as to where
it was drawn from. As we all know, Diels, basing his theory on earlier
research but also adding new elements of his own, argued that most of
this material was derived from a compendium entitled
(De placitis) also [366] exploited by Theodoret of Cyrrhus, who appears to
refer to its author as the otherwise totally obscure Atius.12 An important
task that Diels set himself in his Doxographi Graeci was to separate this
Atian material from a second important source of material drawn from
the doxographical work of Arius Didymus. The results of Diels analysis
were incorporated by Wachsmuth in the very structure of his edition,13
which therefore cannot be regarded as an independent piece of work.
But we must give the latter scholar credit for subjecting the details of
the theory to a thorough examination, which led to a number of minor
improvements.
In the light of the sceptical remarks about the MeinekeDiels hypoth-
esis outlined above, it is worth emphasizing that there can be no doubt
whatsoever that Stobaeus did make use of a work of Arius Didymus.14
One of his excerpts shows a strong verbal resemblance to a Didymean
fragment preserved by Eusebius (= fr. in Diels collection). The texts
are best placed side by side:15
reader to volume of the study being prepared by J. Mansfeld and myself entitled
Atiana: the Method and Intellectual Context of a Doxographer. We show that Diels
theory, though deficient in some details, can withstand the attack launched against it by
A. Lebedev.
13 Berlin , and since then never superseded.
14 Cf. Gransson op. cit. ; note, however, the slight inconsistency between the
statements that Stobaeus may have quoted from a parallel doxographical tradition and
that he demonstrably excerpted Didymus at least once.
15 I have included Heerens conjecture in the Stobaean text. Pace Diels, it seems to me
Eusebius cites verbatim, as is his wont, and cites his source (at ..),
whereas Stobaeus leaves his source unnamed and takes the kind of lib-
erties that one might expect from an anthologist. The names of the three
Stoics are brought to the fore in order to make the contrast with the other
doxai clearer. Only the change from >& to might be thought
worrying. It could easily be interpreted as a Verschlimmbesserung, i.e. Sto- *
baeus cannot imagine the Stoics maintaining a cycle of identical worlds.
But we must be wary of hyperinterpretation (and how can we be sure that
is not a textual corruption?).
We know, therefore, that Stobaeus (henceforth S) made use of the com-
pendia of both Atius (henceforth A) and Arius Didymus (henceforth
AD) in his compilation. Most, though not all, of his doxographical infor-
mation on physics can be reduced to these two sources.16 Decisive criteria
here are comparison with other sources (notably Ps.Plutarchs abridge-
ment of A, henceforth P)17 and considerations of style and content. The
macro-structure of the book is loosely based on A, but the anthologist
has seen fit to introduce all manner of structural changes in his mate-
rial, involving the opposed techniques of coalescence and separation,
16 These matters can in the present context not be discussed in detail. The reader is
. The lemmata of AD are often longer than those of A, not only because
they enter into more detail, but also because they often combine more
than one topic. For example some of the longest lemmata in A are found
on the subject ! B (cf. P .), e.g. Parmenides
at S ..a, Philolaus at d. But they are not even half the length of
Chrysippus long expos at S .. (= AD fr. Diels) on the nature
and structure of the cosmos. Because AD treats a number of topics
together in a continuous expos, his fragments often have a more fluent
and discursive style than the compact and sometimes crabbed style of
A. There are, however, two further complicating factors. Some of the
fragments attributed by Diels to AD are so short that the above remarks
can hardly be applied. Moreover we have to take into account that S
in his coalescing of various chapters in A also groups together subjects
that A kept apart. This means that the combinations of AD have to be
distinguished from the coalescences of S. As we shall see, this proves to
be a highly tricky business.
18 DG .
19 I.e. Diels last three criteria. Diels argues that AD uses Stoic terminology in describ-
ing Aristotelian doctrine, but he may well be influenced by his conviction that AD is the
Stoic Arius. The criterion of a direct use of Aristotles Meteorologica can only be verified
as part of a thorough examination of the meteorology of As book III.
additional fragments of arius didymus on physics
that this criterion is vulnerable to the interventions of scribes and editors, and so needs
to be handled with care.
23 Cf. P . B and S ..b. If the doxa was in A, then both sources must have
changed the label from Plato and the Stoics to the Stoics only. This is less likely than that
S added the doxa from his own reading, as he often does in the case of Plato.
david t. runia
. Because the two authors report the views of others, they both make
extensive use of indirect speech. But they reveal opposite [370] tenden-
cies. AD uses indirect speech almost incessantly. His compendium must
surely have been a pain to read. Of the forty fragments in Diels collec-
tion only a handful contain material cast in direct speech.25 A in contrast
often prefers not to linger too long in indirect speech. Exx. of lemmata
in A where he reverts to direct speech are: P . at F and F,
P . at B, P . at C (= S ..), P . (= S ..d), etc. The
entire (exceptionally) long passage in P . at BE is cast in oratio
recta until for the briefer doxai of the Presocratics at the end he returns
to oratio obliqua. This criterion, we note, was not made explicit by Diels.
24 One ex. at ... There are a number of exx. in the first doxography, e.g. at .,
. S tends to begin his chapters with material from A, and group the
excerpts from AD towards the end. This characteristic is hardly surpris-
ing in light of the fact that he (and the Placita in general) rather often
begins with Presocratic philosophers, who of course hardly occur in ADs
physical fragments.27 There are also cases, however, where Diels has pos-
tulated fragments from AD right in the middle of a series of doxai from
A (e.g. ..c, .i). For the brief Chrysippean lemma at ..b this
must be the case, since, as Diels acutely saw, the sentence is repeated at
.. (at .). In other cases, however, one should be suspicious, as we
shall see.
were mixed in and cites six Atian passages.32 This remark is not very
precise, and might be mistakenly taken to mean that material from Arius
Didymus was excerpted by Atius.33 What he wants to say is that in
the case of some texts (all of which we shall examine below), Stobaeus
has coalesced together material from both sources in a single lemma.
Starting off from Diels, therefore, we shall successively examine the two
possibilities open to us: first, that he has failed to include material in his
collection that should be there, and second, that he has included material
that should not be present.34 [372]
The following texts in Stobaeus, which include the six of Diels footnote,
deserve to be considered for inclusion among the physical fragments of
AD.
Xenocrates only in S
Plato short in P, long in S
Aristotle long in P, short in S
Stoics identical in P and S
Epicurus identical in P and S
These five lemmata have a formal feature in common, viz. that in answering
the question 8 9 they list a hierarchy of gods at various levels,
beginning with the highest god (the same feature also occurs in the well-known
doxographies in Cicero ND . and Philodemus De pietate printed in two
columns by Diels in DG ). This common feature suggests that the
lemmata all come from the same document, which must be A rather than AD.
P commonly abbreviates longish lemmata in A. It is unusual for S to abbreviate
texts cannot be presented. The analysis concentrates on aspects relevant to the question
of identification. For example in the case of the first text I ignore the fact that in P the
lemma is attributed to Socrates and Plato. The reader is encouraged to have the relevant
texts at hand.
additional fragments of arius didymus on physics
the Aristotelian lemma; he does this because he will later in the same chapter
cite a long quote from the De mundo, the authenticity of which he does not
doubt.
The final part of the Xenocratean lemma has two features which might suggest
derivation from AD. () The formula
E >; is common in AD
(twice used in the fragment cited in double columns at n. ). It is only found
once in A, at .., where it is used to introduce an additional comment, just as
happens here. () The final remark that Xenocrates handed a Platonic doctrine
down to the Stoics might be thought more in the style of AD than A (cf. again the
fragment cited at n. ). Occasionally, however, A does give information about
the provenance and appropriation of doctrines, e.g. at . DF on Epicurus
and Democritus. Moreover we have no idea whether ADs treatment of Plato
also took developments in the Academy into account.
. .b, .: Aristotle. Diels DG with great confidence declared that
P was wrong in associating Pythagoras and Aristotle on the question of causes
(P ..) and that S, who has separate lemmata for both thinkers, conveys
*
the true picture of the original A. But it is he who is almost certainly wrong.
The opening words 1
7 provide a first clue. The verb in this
formula is indicative of Stobaean intervention. It is never found in A, but does
occur in fragments of AD as collected by Diels: cf. fr. , , , , .
In all cases but the third it stands at the beginning of the excerpt, i.e. where
the anthologist has to cover the traces of his excerpting. In the longer ethical
passages from AD in book of S it is not found at all. The use of the formula
may thus with some confidence be taken to be Ss work (note also the ex. cited
above at n. ), and so supports the hypothesis that S has inserted a fragment
from [373] AD. The formulation as found in S is rather clumsy; both Heeren and
Meineke wanted to emend it. If there were originally two lemmata in A, then
there is an awkward dilemma: either Aristotle preceded Pythagoras, in which
case one would have expected a contrast between Plato and Aristotle
; or Aristotle succeeded Pythagoras, resulting in interference with the
between Pythagoras and the Stoics on the materiality of causes. We
note too that in S the Aristotelian lemma is followed by three others from AD, of
Zeno, Chrysippus, Posidonius; similar sequences are found in ., .
, ., ., .. In short both Ps and Ss arrangements make much
more sense if this fragment is assigned to AD.
. .e, .: Chrysippus. Diels placed this in As equivalent of P .
on account of the subject matter and because it follows fairly soon after the
Aristotelian lemma from the same chapter (certainly from A since in P). But
that lemma is placed there because of coalescence (joined with rd lemma in Ps
.), and it is followed by a lemma from AD. The formula 9 7 is
not found in P. It does occur twice in S, here and at ..a (see next text). Both
the verb and the absence of a connecting particle suggest Stobaean intervention
(see our remarks above on the th criterion). More importantly the lemma seems
otiose in Ps (and As) ., which appears to have a simple systematic structure
A B AB, with the third, Aristotelian, lemma inserted as a compromise between
the other two positions. Note too how the subject treated in the Chrysippean
david t. runia
graphicum on the Sun, in W.W. Fortenbaugh and D. Gutas (edd.), Theophrastus: his Psy-
chological, Doxographical and Scientific Writings (New Brunswick ) , on
pp. .
additional fragments of arius didymus on physics
of the lemma come from A and the third part from AD. On the other hand it
should be recognized that the differences between P and S in the first part cannot
be readily explained on this hypothesis.36
. ., ..: Aristotle. Once again Diels thought there might be
Arian material in this lemma, but nevertheless printed it as part of his recon-
struction of A .. Wachsmuth shows the same vacillation, printing it as A but
adding in the apparatus haec fort. rectius Ario tribuas. There can be no doubt,
however, that, had Diels followed his own criteria, he would have concluded
that the entire lemma was from AD. Not only is it very long, but it replaces a
very short lemma in P and occurs at the end of the sequence. It is most perplex-
ing that Diels should have printed this piece as part of A. Perhaps he was swayed
by the fact that it starts with the name in the nominative, as is usual in A, and
is not preceded by the name in the genitive. But the ms. P does add 1
(sic) in the margin. These genitives, as argued above, are not a reliable criterion.
. ., .: Aristotle. Diels in his reconstruction of A . (DG )
states that he thinks the second part of the lemma in S is Arian since it disagrees
with P and is clearly excerpted from Meteor. . a ff. He did not, however,
include this section in his collection. This passage is the only place in the whole
chapter where P and S disagree. We note the use of oratio obliqua, even though
the second word of the additional section is 3. It is to be concluded that S has
added an excerpt from his reading of AD to A.
. .a, .: Aristotle. Again the text for A . in P and S is identical
except for the additional Aristotelian material. Diels suspected that it came from
AD. Wachsmuth ad loc. disagreed, arguing that, since the [375] material conflicts
with views expressed in the Meteorologica, it is better to assume a lacuna and
attribute the doxa to Posidonius. From the formal viewpoint, however, the clues
clearly point to AD, not only because of the remaining parallelism between P and
S, but also on account of the similarity to S .., where the extract on Aristotle
from AD (= fr. Diels) has a string of subjects introduced with exactly the same
formula E 6 plus subjunctive (admittedly it also occurs occasionally
in A, e.g. in the Democritean lemma in the same chapter). It is possible that
there is a lacuna in the text or that S made a mistake and added a Stoic fragment
from AD to an Aristotelian lemma. It is also possible that AD had an alternative
source for Peripatetic meteorological theory.
. , .: Aristotle. Once again the fact that two explanations of the
origin of winds are given in the same lemma indicates that S has coalesced
two views, the first from A, the second from AD; cf. Diels DG , accepted
by Wachsmuth ad loc. But again the fragment is not found in his collection.
36 K.A. Algra, Posidonius Conception of the Extra-cosmic Void: the Evidence and
The results so far have been quite remunerative: at least seven fragments
should be subtracted from A and added to AD. Six relate to Aristotle,
the seventh to Chrysippus. Diels does his reader a disservice by includ-
ing them in the reconstruction of A, especially because he creates the
impressionmost blatantly in the case of the Aristotelian lemma in his
reconstruction of A .that A contained more long and detailed lem-
mata than in actual fact was the case. It also meant that these texts were
missing in his fragment collection of AD.
At this point we should note that four of the above texts (nos. , )
shed valuable light on the technique of coalescence that S used to weld
his doxographical material together. It appears that he not only merges
lemmata from different chapters of A, but also is prepared to join together
in the same lemma material from both A and AD.37 This means, I believe,
that we should be on our guard in the case of other longish lemmata
which Diels attributes wholly to A. I wish to consider three further texts
which form part of Diels reconstruction of A .. These chapters are
highly complex, and many of Diels solutions, taken over by Wachsmuth
in his edition of S, are rather questionable.
. ., .: Chrysippus. The lemma on '
in its entirety would
appear to be to be on the long side for A. From the beginning to
P
(at . B) and S run fairly parallel (though P has shortened the reference to
Chrysippus works). The text from ! to 8! is probably also
Atian, since it continues the theme of [376] Chrysippean diversity of terminol-
ogy. But the following words
introduce a break in thought. Moreover
the style, with reversion to oratio obliqua and the sequence of single nouns fol-
lowed by explanatory phrases, reflects the more descriptive, cataloguing style of
AD.
. .a, ..: Aristotle. Comparison of the sources and examination of
Diels double columns (DG ) reveal a very complicated situation here:
Ps Aristotelian doxa (at . C) can be divided into two parts (let us say
K & L). S wishes to begin with the distinction between and >
(cf. the title of his chapter), and so places that part of As lemma (= L) first.
He thus reverses the order of these two parts, separates them (by means of a
Platonic lemma slightly longer than what is found in P) and adds sections (let
us say M & N) to both. So Ss lemma can be represented as L MPlatoK N.
The lemma in P makes good sense, as well as Ss continuation & E
. . .
(= M). But the passage with which S ends, 5
. . .
(= N), is more discursive. It introduces various new elements (e.g.
, !, ). It also contains an entire sentence on '
which
seems quite out of place in this chapter. This mixing of themes is characteristic
of AD rather than A. We conclude therefore that this final section (= ..
W.) is more likely to derive from AD than A.
. .c, .: Theophrastus. If we wish to attribute the Aristotelian passage
just dealt with to AD, we must also consider whether the Theophrastean lemma
on the next pagein between S interposes an excerpt from Platos Lawsis also
derived from him, for it appears to continue the theme of causes discussed in the
previous Aristotelian passage, i.e. Theophrastus is reported to add to the causes
related to '
that of missing in Aristotle. A strong argument
in favour of attribution to AD is the verb used, . It recurs in a
doxographical context in AD at Ecl. ..a .W. (i.e. Ethical doxography B),
while elsewhere it occurs only twice in the entire TLG! A lemma referring to
Theophrastus would be unique in the physical fragments of AD that we have. But
we note that he does occur in the Aristotelian-Peripatetic Ethical doxography
C (at .. W. = FGS&H fr. A). A revised attribution to AD would be
consistent with the fact that in the rest of A Theophrastus only occurs as a
reporter of Presocratic views (S ..b, on which see Runia art. cit. (n. ), and
..). The recent editors of Theophrastus fragments have followed the Dielsian
attribution to Atius (= FGS&H fr. ).38 I submit that the clues point to AD.
than he inclines in a way, as done by the editors; see W.W. Fortenbaugh, P.M. Huby,
R.W. Sharples, and D. Gutas, Theophrastus of Eresus: Sources for his Life, Writings, Thought,
and Influence, vols., Philosophia Antiqua (Leiden ) ..
david t. runia
39 In art. cit. (n. ); see also Xenophanes on the Moon: a Doxographicum in Atius,
* Phronesis () [= article in this collection]. I hope to return to this
problem in a full reconstruction of Book II of Atius.
additional fragments of arius didymus on physics
Conclusions
On the basis of our investigation the following results have been reached.
. The criteria that Diels and Wachsmuth used to separate out the
physical fragments of Arius Didymus in Stobaeus Eclogae book I
can be slightly improved. If intelligently and carefully applied, they
are equal to their task.
. Particular attention should be given to the fact that the anthologist
Stobaeus sometimes joins together material from his two sources in
one and the same lemma.
. In the case of very short fragments formal and stylistic criteria are
ineffective. It in fact becomes almost impossible to determine with
any degree of certainty whether the texts should be assigned to the
one doxographical source rather than the other.
. On the basis of the examination carried out above the following ten
fragments should be added to Diels collection. [379]
a. ., . Chrysippus on the
b. .a, .. Aristotle on '
c. .c, . Theophrastus on '
d. .b, . Aristotle on the four causes
e. .e, . Chrysippus on the divisibility of bodies
f. .c, . Aristotle on place
g. ., .. Aristotle on motion
h. ., . Aristotle on the milky way
i. .a, . Aristotle on comets
j. , . Aristotle on winds
40 Ibid. .
david t. runia
>B, and the name-label 1 at .d (but these may have been the work
of Stobaeus). The title of Ethical doxography C at .. is 1
\.
42 There is no need to try to retain Diels sequence of fragments, since his ordering is
by no means always logical (e.g. why place fr. between and ?).
additional fragments of arius didymus on physics
Appendix
The Physical Fragments of Arius Didymus
far from certain, but later in the lemma S uses the label ' .
chapter thirteen
Jaap Mansfeld
. Let us start with the Arabic translation. Anyone who compares ps.Plu-
tarch (hereafter P) as a whole with Daibers German version of Qusta
ibn Luqa (hereafter Q) as a whole will see immediately that the latter is a
translation of a variety of the former. There are a number of minor differ-
ences,5 some attributable to the translator, others to the (lost) translated
manuscript which at some points differed from its extant Greek relatives.
It is absurd to argue from a single paragraphin this case I .where
() .
2 Text in H. Daiber, Aetius Arabus (Wiesbaden ) . Prof. Daiber wrote me
a letter dated .. answering my questions concerning the Arabic text of the present
passage, which I cite here and in what follows with his kind permission.
3 Phronesis () .
4 Phronesis () and n. .
5 A list of selected minutiae of this nature is given by G. Lachenaud, Plutarque: uvres
Q as to the exegesis of the divine names Hera and Aidoneus agrees not
with P A and others but with Stobaeus (hereafter S) and others, that
Q translates a source other than P. Apart from these minor differences,6
Q at I . corresponds virtually word for word [110] with Ps Greek, and
is very much different from the quite extensive S passage (Ecl. I ab)
which according to Kingsley should have been printed in the right-hand
column of Atius next to Ps text on pp. of Diels Doxographi
graeci (hereafter DG), or so it seems.
There is moreover an important and unique Leitfehler in the second
line of the Empedocles fragment (Vors. B) quoted by P, loc. cit., and
translated by Q, viz. X +- instead of the correct X - found
in S and the other authors such as Diogenes Lartius who transmit this
passage (D.L. ., [Heracl.] Alleg. ch. . and Athenag. Leg. ch. .
Marcovich only quoting lines ). The text of P A as found at Eus.
P.E. XIV xiv. has X i, an unmistakable corruption of an original
X -.7 Q has the loan-word atir here, i.e. aether.8
One understands how +- came to replace - in our mss. of
P and the one used by Q: it is a Verschlimmbesserung deriving from the
subsequent exegesis of the first divine name at P, loc. cit.: E 3
&
+
. This is translated by Q as Dabei meint
er mit seinem Wort Zeus die Hitze und das Sieden und die Luft. Daiber
points out that die Hitze und das Sieden is an exaggerating translation
of &
,9 so Hitze cannot be a rendering of +
. Luft in this
formula is Daibers translation of ar. gaww,10 which word at Q III .
corresponds to Ps
, ibid. Accordingly, either the Greek text used
by the translator read
,11 as is argued by Daiber, or the
translator made a (willful?) mistake when rendering +
. The
reads the meaningless garr, but that in Arabic the letters r and w are easily confused with
each other. He points out that the conjecture gr (warmth) instead of hr has to be rejected,
because this would imply (a) that the Arabic translator rendered a single word, viz.
,
with no less than three synonyms, something he never does, and (b) that +
(or
) was lacking in his Greek text. As to Qs version of the meaning of the
divine name Aidoneus, die Luft renders another Arabic word, viz. hawa, which Prof.
Daiber tells me is the more common equivalent of -.
11 For Zeus = air see e.g. Philemon fr. . Kock at Stob. Ecl. I , p. . and I ,
ancestor of his ms. at any rate must have read +- in the fragment. If
it read
instead of +
, this constitutes a varia
lectio comparable to Qs identifications of Hera and Aidoneus.
But in rendering
in Ps exegesis of the Empedoclean formula
by das menschliche Pneuma12 Q certainly did not
make a mistake. The word sperma is replaced by an important part of
its (originally [111] Stoic) definition, see e.g. Arius Didymus fr. Diels
ap. Eus. P.E. XIV xx., E
9 - @ l
= B 5B and the other texts printed at SVF I .
Prof. Daiber suggests that this may derive from a marginal gloss in the
Greek text. Another possibility is that the text itself had been adapted,
for the series of definitions in the Medical Definitions ascribed to Galen
show that this had become the standard view.13 The Placita were a much-
used handbook, and such handbooks were always subject to revisions
and alterations.14 The diverging explanations of the names Hera and
Aidoneus found in P and Q are a case in point. The evidence at our
disposal does not permit us to establish what explanation was provided
by Atius. Either the ancestor of our mss. of P or the ms. used by Q must
have been been modified here. Even the fact that Achilles (who is not
pace Diels in the DGdependent on P but on an earlier version of the
Placita) at p. . Maass agrees with Q (Hera = earth, Aidoneus = air) is
not decisive; Achilles moreover does not quote the Empedocles fragment.
Athenag. Leg. ch. . M. on the other hand, who as to this part of the
exegesis agrees with S, clearly does not derive from a Placita source.
15 For the quasi-poetic line attributed to Heraclitus at Stob. I ., which Diels inserted
in Stob. I . (p. . ff. W.) at At. I .b as the parallel to P.s prose version of the
same idea, see Diels, DG, ad loc., and M. Marcovich, Eraclito. Frammenti (Firenze )
. At Vors. A, nd text, only Ps version is printed. But one cannot prove that Stobaeus
took a phrase from the Atian lemma on Heraclitus and transposed it into quasi-poetry,
though it is clear that he omitted the phrase at . because he had already included its
equivalent in his collection of poetical abstracts.
16 He also interpolates 1
before .a from the margin of his ms. P,
where it was added by a learned hand. In the mss. the lines of Empedocles immediately
follow upon those of Philemon. I do not know what the lost heading looked like.
17 Conversely, the quotation of Il. VII at I . is preceded by a brief prose exegesis.
Oddly, Diels put Stob. Ecl. I . (quotation of Il. XIV , which is also quoted at ps.Plut.
I . as an addendum but there preceded by a brief exegesis) in the b-column of At. I .
at DG p. , though he attibuted the quotation in S to the Homeric allegorists at DG ;
see further my Aristotle and others on Thales, Mnemosyne () = Studies in the
Historiography of Greek Philosophy (Assen ) []. The parallel passage at Theodor.
Aff. II has a different line, viz. Il. XIV .
18 For Ss problematic lemma concerning Xenophanes (with quotation of the line Vors.
B), which is not paralleled in P but to some extent in Theodor. Aff. IV , who likewise
quotes the line, see my Aristotle and others . . . = [] n. . It is printed by Diels
in the DG as At. I . but attributed to the Homeric allegorists at DG and Vors.
A, nd text. The other poetic quotation is the Pythagorean oath at the end of .,
paralleled at P I .. Poetic quotations are occasional ingredients in Pwe have noticed
that of Emp. fr. B at I .; cf. I ..., ...., . (Emp. fr. B, paralleled at S I
.), . (Emp. fr. B, chapter of S lost), II ., III ., IV .., ., V ..
critical note: empedocles and his interpreters
. I shall now look a bit more closely at the differences between these
passages in P and S dealing with Empedocles. P begins () with a brief
summary of the doctrine of the four elements and two principles (not
a word about the relation of these elements to the four divinities), ()
quotes fr. B, and () explains the divine names found in the fragment.
The brief summary () is lacking in S, who begins with (), the fragment;
we have seen above that P and S present different readings of the second
line, P having X +- instead of the correct X - as in S. We
have also noticed that Ss explanation of the divine names in () differs
from Ps in (), and may now add that his exegesis is the same as that at
[Heracl.] Alleg. ch. ., who moreover at ch. . briefly mentions the
four elements (a passage which ad sententiam corresponds to Ps () but
also resembles an interpretative paraphrase of fr. B .) and quotes fr.
B. (with the correct reading X -). Furthermore, S provides
a unique justification for the interpretation of Aidoneus as air: it is called
by this name, he says, because it does not possess a light of its own but
is illuminated by the sun and the moon and the stars. An explanation
which is clearly etymological, for the etymology of Aidoneus is he who
is invisible.
But the main difference between P and S lies elsewhere. S has a quite
substantial fourth section (), elaborating on the natures of the elements
and principles and the cosmic cycle, and adding that Homer already
spoke of Love and Strife in this sense. This entire fourth part, lacking
in P but (at least as to its beginning) corresponding ad sententiam with
Ps (), is paralleled virtually word for word in another allegorist, viz. at
ps.Plut. De Homero , chs. .23 Both S and this other ps.Plutarch
argue that Empedocles doctrine of the two principles Love and Strife was
anticipated by Homer, and both quote Emp. fr. B. and the mini-
cento Il. XIV + in support of this view.
As one ponders the major divergences between the lemmata in S
and P dealing with Empedocles, ones only conclusion can be that these
passages derive from two quite different traditions, and that what is in
S therefore cannot derive from Atius, as Kingsley claims (p. ). S
decided not to transcribe the Atius lemma concerned with Empedocles
among the others at I . ff. because earlier in the same chapter he had
already included an excerpt which provided more information.
. I add a few comments on Kingsleys further claim that Emp. fr. B was
already quoted by Theophrastus, that the interpretation of Hera as earth
and of Aidoneus of air found in S and other authors but not in P goes
back to Theophrastus, and that Ps introductory passage () listing the
four elements and two principles also derives from Theophrastus.24
The hypothesis that Ps () is Theophrastean starts from the parallel at
D.L. VIII . Now Diels arguedand whether or not this argument holds
water is not the issue herethat a number of doxographical passages in
Diogenes Lar[114]tius, viz. short ones followed by more extensive ones,
ultimately derive from Theophrastus,25 and it would seem that Kings-
ley accepts this. But Diels explicitly states that D.L. VIII should be
excluded from these Theophrasti excerpta.26 Nevertheless the parallel at
Theophr. Phys. op. fr. Diels, DG pp. . = FHS&G fr. A.,27
is in favour of the hypothetical derivation of the listing of the elements
and principles both in P () and D.L. VIII from Theophrastus.
28 I note in passing that Kingsleys claim, o.c. n. that +- occurs only once in
Theophrastus (viz. at Sens. ) and that he avoided the term with scrupulous consistency
and, one cannot help concluding, deliberately is misleading. The word is also found
Theophr. C.P. I . = Vors. A, nd text, in a critical remark about . . . Empedocles.
Arist. An. B .ba = Vors. A, nd text, criticising the same doctrine, uses the
word B for the elemental force which drives the shoots upwards. Consequently, +
in the Theophrastus passage reflects Empedocles own wording in the latters otherwise
lost account of the genesis and growth of plants and hence should be added to the B-
fragments. Confirmation is found at the passage in Sens. referred to above (1.
+
), where Theophrastus cites Anaxagoras own terminology. As
to the adjective +
at Theophr. Phys. op. fr. Diels (DG pp. ., .; FHS&G
fr. ., .), ap. Philo, Aet. ( +
A) and (JB +
), one cannot be sure that it represents Theophrastus own wording since there are
occurrences of the word in Philo; what parts of this long passage as a whole derive
from Theophrastus is uncertain anyway. For the idea of fire (here B) moving things
out of the ground cf. Emp. fr. B.., about the first generation of humans; see further
e.g. D. OBrien, Empedocles Cosmic Cycle (Cambridge ) .
29 Xenocrates fr. Heinze ap. Stob. Ecl. I .b, pp. .. W. (At. I .,
B A \ = A
To be sure, the sequence here is different: fire, water, earth, air, but there
are metrical reasons for the order adopted by Empedocles. What is more,
one fails to get the so to speak logical series fire, air, water and earth
on either ancient interpretation of the divine names in Emp. fr. B. The
ordering represented by the allegoresis of P at () is fire, air, earth, water,
while that represented by S is fire, earth, air, water; I see no possibility of
attributing either of these to Theophrastus. We should accept the unde-
niable evidence that Theophrastus quoted and interpreted Empedoclean
passages which were sufficiently clear. I therefore believe that the more
recherch fr. B which came to replace his quotation of fr. B. was
put in by later doxographers who were not averse to this kind of exegesis.
part iv
THEMES IN ATIUS
chapter fourteen
ATHEISTS IN ATIUS
TEXT, TRANSLATION AND COMMENTS ON
DE PLACITIS 1.7.110
David T. Runia
. Introduction*
There was, as we all know, a very long tradition of criticism of religion and
religious traditions by philosophers in the ancient world, beginning with
Xenophanes, and continuing in various shapes and forms until the very
end of antiquity. It can be safely said that this criticism reached its apogee
fairly early on, from about to bce, in the period which Guthrie
has entitled the Greek Enlightenment. This is the period in which most
of the so-called Greek atheists such as Diagoras of Melos, Prodicus and
Critias lived (we may also include Protagoras, although he is clearly an
agnostic rather than an atheist; Theodore of Cyrene and Euhemerus are
later). According to Marek Winiarczyk, the scholar who during the last
twenty years has placed the study of ancient atheism on an entirely new
footing, none of these figures actually were atheists, but other anonymous
thinkers who do deserve this description were active at this time.1 It is no
coincidence that this period also covers the years of Platos youth. Plato
was the philosopher who did more than anyone else to ensure that this
atheistic movement never obtained a secure place in ancient culture.2
My intention in this paper is to focus attention on a small [543] segment
of this tradition of ancient atheism as it is preserved in later reports. I
will concentrate on a text in the doxographer Atius, in which a number
* Thanks to my colleagues A.P. Bos and J. Mansfeld who made helpful comments on
a draft version of this paper, and to Drs. M. van Gool, who alerted me to various errors.
1 Winiarczyk (), . For a list of those thinkers called atheists in antiquity see his
of these atheists are mentioned. Through this text we learn not all that
much about these thinkers themselves, but we do learn a lot about
the intellectual and literary contexts in which reference was made to
them. On the surface this text does not seem particularly problematic.
A closer look, however, reveals numerous difficulties, relating to ()
the philosophical doctrines described, () the argument that the author
wishes to present, and () the sources drawn upon for his material.
The body of scholarly literature on this text is not extensive, and has
been almost exclusively preoccupied with the third question of the texts
sources.3 No attempt has been made to examine what the author himself
is trying to achieve within his own doxographical context.
But first a few words are required about this author. Who was this
totally obscure reporter of philosophical opinions? It is only through
chance that we happen to know his name.4 Under the name of Plutarch a
work in short books has been preserved entitled
! (On the physical doctrines opined by the
philosophers). Our text is derived from this work. This work is certainly
not by Plutarch himself. It is dated to the nd century, and was already
extensively used by Eusebius in the early th century. Various passages
from this work are also found in the huge Anthology of Johannes Stobaeus
(c. ). But there they appear in a different, often much fuller form.
Unfortunately Stobaeus does not tell us where he obtained this material
from. It so happens, however, that a few years later Theodoret, bishop of
Cyrrhus, also excerpted small amounts of material parallel to Stobaeus,
but not derived from Ps.Plutarch. By a stroke of fortune Theodoret hap-
pens to refer to its author by the name of Atius, and also gives us the
* title of the work & (Compendium on the opin-
ions [of the philosophers]).5 Apart from this casual ref[544]erence we have
no evidence about the author whatsoever, except what we can deduce
from his work itself. On the basis of this evidence he is usually dated to
about ce. The first scholar to identify Atius and make a success-
ful attempt to reconstruct his work was Hermann Diels in his celebrated
3 Main discussions of the whole passage (and not just details) in Diels (), ,
Philippson (), (but only for parallels with Cicero), Winiarczyk (), ,
and the notes in the new French translation of Lachenaud (on which see text below to
n. ).
4 The following sketch is very general and somewhat imprecise. For a more exact
6 Diels ().
7 As proven by Diels (), against the criticism of Elter ().
8 See Eusebius Praep. Evang. .., Theodoret, Curatio affect. graec. ., ., Ps.
Ps.Plutarchs method of excerpting at some length, and conclude that on the whole he
abbreviates by leaving out complete doxai, rather than by compressing individual doxai.
This may give us some confidence that we have the text in a reasonably integral state.
But there are exceptions, so we cannot be wholly sure . . . It is interesting to compare
what Ps.Galen (see previous note) does with Ps.Plutarch, for he is making an epitome
of an epitome. He reduces our passage to lines, using the method of (considerable)
compression.
10 Lachenaud (), Mau (); the latter edition replaced that of Diels (),
The commentary that follows the text and translation does not aim
at exhaustiveness, but rather seeks to guide the reader along in his or
her reading of this difficult text (this applies also to the selection of
bibliographical material). Its chief points of focus are the following:
i. what is the literary and philosophical background and provenance
of the material used? are there parallel texts which shed light on this
background?
ii. how does the passage and its contents relate to the doxographical
method used by Atius and other doxographical texts?
iii. what is the argument that Atius is presenting to his reader? can it
be said to amount to a coherent whole?
The formulation of the second point of focus may seem a bit curious. I
say relate to and not exemplify deliberately, because a quick comparison
with the remainder of Atius work shows that our passage is clearly
exceptional. Instead of just presenting views of philosophers (), it
also gives arguments. In order to reach a fuller understanding of our
passage it will be necessary firstly to place it within the two chapters on
theology (. and .), and secondly within Atius work as a whole. It
cannot be the aim of this paper to achieve this task, but I do hope to
* return to the subject in a subsequent study. [546]
. Text
# 9
i , ! 9 -
9 >- 9 !, & @ I
>- 9 + 8 1!-
!I
+ ' S
B,
< ! 9 ! K
d = -,
B 7 3 B & @ .
atheists in atius
> 9 ; E > \
-
, d i !, 8
E B I
3 +- ! 0
>B / /0 /I
v ! , , 6 v =
+ 5
I
7 & 0 +/0I 8 3 9
3 3 ! O 8 \ ,
& 8
, a ; &
- X
a 7 ; ! ;,
l B
=.
!, , 9 0 X !; ;
+ @,
O 6 J
K .
>E 3 9 K I 8 , + 7,
&
E B E - j
8.
3 ! 9 + 9 7
H 5 b - - ! X 0
; !I 3 5; 7; F
0 , b ; [547]
9 1 a '- 3 3 , B
E >3 B 3
6 8.
9 E ! > H 5
3 , !
E I 9 , , 8- a ! 8
, B.
Q S! , 6 8 8-
F ! -
!I 3 ! = ;
K B =, 6 m &
& 0 + > ,
8
!I N O 8!
+ & B -
-.
david t. runia
! 9 l
u 7 + > v, 6
v 3 F ! 8 , F 8K F 8 F
>
. G 7
, 9 3 +-
I G , + 3 8K 8 + 9 , 8-I
+ 3 A 9 ! 8I >E A ,
3 ! B B 8X ! X .
+ v 9 8, u 8
+ > F 8--
8 I G 3 ! 8 9 ,
3 8 + > > !I G 3 ,
E 3 8 7 8 !.
, O 9 7 /0 3 =-
+ , E > !-
; 1
!,
+-,
5 B ! : 8-I 9 E
& $0 3 8
! 5 8-. [548]
. Translation
These books are the ones on the subject that the gods do not exist.
Euripides the tragic poet did not wish to disclose this view for fear of
the Areopagus, but did make his position known in the following way.
He introduced the character of Sisyphus as defender of this opinion, and
so pleaded his cause by means of this mans judgment:
For there was a time, he says, when human life was disordered,
beast-like, and at the mercy of violence.
atheists in atius
The second (ii) too is unacceptable. If God was sleeping from eternity,
he would be dead, since eternal sleep is (tantamount to) death. But God
is also not receptive to sleep, for Gods immortality and a state close to
death are separated by a great distance.
If, however, God was awake (iii), either (#) there was a deficiency in
his felicity or (#) he was wholly fulfilled in his blessedness. But neither
according to the first option is he blessed, because a deficiency in felicity
is incompatible with blessedness, nor according to the second option,
because then, though in no way deficient in happiness, he would embark
on deeds that were to no purpose.
How does it happen then, if God indeed does exist and human
affairs are administered through his forethought, that what is fraudulent
flourishes and what is noble suffers the opposite fate? Agamemnon, for
example, was:
both an excellent king and a mighty warrior,
but he was overpowered and murdered by an adulterer and an [550]
adulteress. And this mans relative Heracles, after he had cleaned up many
of the evils that infest human life, fell prey to the sorcery of Deanira and
was murdered.
. Commentary
Title. The theme of the chapter follows on directly from the subject of the
previous chapter, . From where did men obtain a conception of the gods
(7 )?. The first part of Atius work is distinctly untidy. Important for
our chapter is the fact that he begins by emphasizing that his subject is physics
or natural philosophy (promium). He then discusses what is (.). The
following major theme is the principles of physics (.
+). This sets the stage for the whole of book I which deals with principles
in the broader sense. After a cosmological interlude (.), he commences
to discuss specific principles, i.e. God (., with a chapter on daimones and
heroes appended, .), matter (.) and idea (.). These are of course the
atheists in atius
classic three Middle Platonist principles (already set out under Platos name in
., cf. Alcinous Didaskalikos , and see Lachenaud (), ).
9 ; The chapters title is unusual. The vast majority of Atius chapters
have a title On x. Cf. Ps.Galen Hist. Phil. B (same title at Sextus
Empiricus Pyrrh. Hyp. ., cf. Adv. Phys. . ). But cf. . 8
. In the title of . (cited above) we see a mixture of the two forms. On the
form of the question raised see further the comment on . The use of the article
is surely deliberate, i.e. the god identified as principle, and I have translated
accordingly.
() Mansfeld has shown in two comprehensive articles that the method of the
placita used by Atius can be traced back to the use of dialectical method of
argumentation by Aristotle and his school; see (), esp. , (a).
Aristotle set out this method in his Topics, and put it into practice in his writings.
When dealing with physical and ethical problems one should examine the views
of previous thinkers, the so-called 7. These reputable opinions can be
examined under various head[552]ings. Later these topics become standard
and are usually asked in the order corresponding to the categories (existence,
quantity, quality, location etc.). The two main questions relevant for our text are
in fact posed by Aristotle at Anal. Post. B b: 7 =
B, _ + 7 F & 7
F ( + 7 F & S
, > + F -). E 6 7, 8 B, _
Q 8 F 8 =. Here we see with perfect clarity the questions
whether it exists (+ 7) and what it is ( 8). In both cases Aristotle uses
* the subject of God as an example. First the question must be answered whether
God exists; then the subject of his nature or substance follows. Grosso modo these
two questions correspond to the two main parts of Atius . (the qualification
is required because there seems a shift from what is, i.e. the essence, to who is,
i.e. the identification of the nature, but this aspect is not relevant to our passage).
See further Mansfeld (), , (a), . It is in fact possible to strengthen
this argument with more texts which point in the same direction. Mansfeld
points out that at . Atius begins his chapter on genesis and destruction
with those Eleatic thinkers who deny that such changes exist. It might be added
that Aristotle himself explicitly raises the question of the existence of genesis in
a dialectical discussion at De Caelo ., b. Futhermore there is a source
parallel to Atius, Achilles, which in a chapter on the moon states that some
thinkers affirm that the moon does not exist at all ( , . Maass). This cryptic
remark only makes sense in the light of Aristotles use of the moon at Anal. Post.
B , a as an example of an entity of which it is possible to ask whether
it exists or not. Commentators must have assumed that in that text some doubt
was cast on the moons existence. Another similar text may be noted at Cic. Acad.
., where Dicaearchus is cited as denying the existence of the mind at all.
() The statement that some thinkers deny the existence of gods also implies a
dialectical technique that is virtually omnipresent in Atius work, namely the
diaeresis, or the practice of organizing views into contrasting pairs or related
groups. The former category can be called a diagreement (, dissensio)
or a diaeresis in the form of an exclusive disjunction. The latter category is a non-
exclusive division (, divisio). The technique goes back to Plato and even
earlier (cf. the gigantomachia between the materialists and the idealists in Sophist
, and the celebrated contrast between Parmenidean immobility and
Heraclitean flux at Theaetetus ; Mansfeld () argues that it originates
with the sophist Hippias). It is further developed by Aristotle and his school,
but receives perhaps its most important impulse through the extensive usage by
the New Academy in order to indicate the disagreement () [553] that
should lead us to withhold assent (8-). Mansfeld has collected numerous
parallels in philosophical literature anterior to and contemporary with Atius:
atheists in atius
see his articles (a), (b), (). Most of the chapters in the Com-
pendium de placitis are organized by means of this technique (for detailed exam-
ples see Runia (), Mansfeld (), ff.).
For the basic diaeresis in the area of theology we may cite the beginning of
Ciceros De natura deorum (.): velut in hac quaestione plerique, quod maxime
veri simile est et quo omnes sese duce natura venimus, deos esse dixerunt,
dubitare se Protagoras, nullos esse omnino Diagoras Melius et Theodorus Cyre-
naicus putaverunt. qui vero deos esse dixerunt tanta sunt in varietate et dis-
sensione, ut eorum infinitum sit enumerare sententias . . . quod vero maxime
rem causamque continet, utrum nihil agant nihil moliantur omni curatione et
administratione rerum vacent, an contra ab iis et a principio omnia facta et con-
stituta sint et ad infinitum tempus regantur atque moveantur, in primis magna
dissensio est. The basic diaeresis is clear (note that to the first dichotomy on the
gods existence the position of agnosticism is added):
The basic schema goes back to Platos diatribe against atheists in Laws X b.
Further examples at Aelian Varia Historia ., Epictetus .., Theodoret Cur.
Aff. Graec. . etc. It is clear that Atius opening words imply the basic
dichotomy of the first division. The same dichotomy is found in a sceptical
version at the beginning of Sextus discussion on + + at Adv. Phys. .,
in which, as we saw above, he proceeds to list seven atheists. On this diaeresis
see also further below on .
9 +. The quoted lines are taken from the
Iambi of Callimachus, fr. Pfeiffer. These poems are no longer extant in a
ms. tradition, but numerous papyrus fragments have been found, including one
containing these lines (= P. Oxy. ). The third line describing Euhemerus
is also found in the catalogue of atheists at Sext. Emp. Adv. Phys. .. Since
the line is found nowhere else except in these [554] two texts, this cannot be a
coincidence. A common source must be involved. The word + indicates
that the poet did not mention Euhemerus by name. The discrepancies in the
text between Atius, Sextus and the papyrus do not concern us here; see the
discussion in Preiffer ad loc., and further discussion in Rees ().
+ '. The precise nature of the reference to Euhemerus
here has been the subject of controversy. The temple referred to is the Serapeum
built by Parmeniscus (not the famous temple of the same name in Rhakotis). It
has been attractively suggested that a statue of him in the pose of writing a book
had been erected in front of the temple. But it is also possible that he lived and
worked in the neighbourhood. See further Rees (), Fraser (), .
, ..
david t. runia
. The list of atheist views is complemented by the view of Euripides. His opin-
ion is covertly expressed, but adds an interesting new aspect to the discussion.
>. Although the tragic poet is on a few occasions described as an
atheist in ancient sources (cf. Winiarczyk (), ), he does not occur in
the catalogues of atheists outside the Atian tradition. Moreover in the parallel
text in Sextus (Adv. Phys. .) these views are attributed to Critias of Athens
(one of the notorious thirty tyrants of bce, cousin of Platos mother and one
of the speakers in the Timaeus). Sextus quotes no less than lines of poetry,
among which are found the lines of text which Atius quotes (lines and
cited in this chapter, lines cited in .), but he does not indicate
that the speaker was Sisyphus (also the name of the play). In Dihle argued
that Atius was right and that Euripides was its author. This view has found
some followers, but Winiarczyk () argues persuasively that the traditional
attribution to Critias must be correct. [555]
d i !. This detail is also not found in Sextus. But he
does mention that Protagoras was condemned to death by the Athenians (Adv.
Phys. .), as confirmed by the quote from the Silloi of Timon (.; cf. also
Cic. ND .). So it is likely that this detail was ultimately derived from the
Atheistenkatalog. In Satyrus biography of Euripides it is recounted that he was
accused of impiety by the demagogue Cleon but escaped conviction (Pap. Oxy.
, cited by Winiarczyk (), ).
>B / /0 /. Atius presentation of Euripides view takes over
much more than just the quoted lines from the much longer quotation in his
source, for it also contains a number of additional verbal echoes and allusions,
as the following overview makes clear (line nos. based on DielsKranz):
/: perhaps inspired by l. -. This
would mean that Atius is identifying the view of the inventor of religion
with Sisyphus, and indirectly with Euripides as representative of the atheist
view.
v ! : ll. quoted to indicate the initial situation of total
lawlessness.
& 0 +/0: cf. l. , & -
. In Sextus this line concludes the entire event, including
atheists in atius
the ruse of the sage. Atius refers, however, to the period that the laws
only prevented overt wickedness (ll. ). For !, cf. l. 0,
for O, cf. l. .
&: cf. l. B!
-.
; & -: based on l.
& - ;. The verb replaces for the sake of
variatio.
X : based on the final summary at ll.
X.
a 7 . . . : ll. . Atius modifies the second line so that it can
stand on its own. Diels suggests that = may have been taken from l. ,
but the text there is uncertain.
We may conclude that Atius was acquainted with the entire poetic quote such
as we find it in Sextus. His selectivity is noteworthy: the themes of the fear of
the gods, and their dwelling-place in heaven are ignored, because they are not
relevant to the question of their existence. On the suitability of the last quote for
his argument see the following comment.
. So far Atius has stated the atheistic position, and introduced an example
of it in the form of Euripides covert views. He now goes on to attack certain
theological views. [556]
9 0. What does this refer to? So far we have had three poetic
quotes, and Euripides has been introduced as a ;. In my view the
acerbic term 0 refers primarily to the last quote. It is important to observe
how suitable its two lines are for any kind of anti-theistic argument, for they
assert (i) that God exists (7), (ii) that he is a flourishing immortal being
(implying no doubt or >), and (iii) and that he observes
what takes place in the cosmos, i.e. divine providence. Though placed in the
mouth of an atheist (Sisyphus), they in fact contain all the theses that an atheist
(or a sceptic) would wish to demolish.
The word 0 is a strong pejorative term indicating a polemical stance.
The word is repeated in the case of Plato in (see below). For Diels and
Philippson the sharpness of the tone is an indication of the Epicurean back-
ground. Very similar is the scathing aggressive tone of the Epicurean Velleius
as Cicero presents him in ND . (cf. futtilis sententias (of Platonists),
tarditatem (of Stoics), delirans (of Cleanthes)). We note too that at
Velleius attacks poetic representations of the gods after he has dispensed with
the philosophers views (i.e. the reverse order compared with Atius): exposui
fere non philosophorum iudicia sed delirantium somnia. nec enim multo absur-
diora sunt ea quae poetarum vocibus fusa ipsa suavitate nocuerunt. But the false
account of the gods in the poets attacked by Velleius, i.e. their anthropomor-
phic character and their immorality, is quite different from the object of Atius
polemic.
david t. runia
presents, which are juxtaposed against each other by means of antithesis and
diaereses. The names of the philosophers who represent these views are of
secondary importance (and often mistakes are made in assigning these names,
as here in the case of Euripides). On the relation between doxai and name-labels
see further Runia (), , Mansfeld (), , (a), . The subject of
could, pace Lachenaud, be taken to be Sisyphus, but naturally only in the
doxographic, not the historical sense, i.e. as representative of the atheist opinion
being presented in this section. The word for (!) at the beginning [558] of
thus connects up with the false account of the gods embodied in the quote at the
end of . This is poetic nonsense. The above argument would be strengthened
if we took in the sense of creative, inventive, fictional, but given
the fact that it follows straight on a quote, and is followed by another piece of
poetry, this interpretation is not so likely. On assumption (b), that the argument
is Epicurean, see the comment below.
X !; ;
. These lines have survived only in this text (=
fr. Pfeiffer, in the section Fragmenta incertae sedis), and thus are missing
in Sextus Empiricus. But the fact that Callimachus is twice cited suggests that
the poetic quote came from the same original source (i.e. the Atheistenkata-
log?).
+ @. The Greek can be interpreted in two ways: if you admit that
God exists, or if you know who or what God is. Given the context we should
opt for the former. As Pfeiffer ad loc. notes, in the latter case we should expect
@ (you know too) instead of + (know, be aware) in the next line. The
emendation was proposed by Meineke, but is unnecessary.
. and are interchangeable. The latter here picks up the
last two lines of Sisyphus in .
>E 3 9 . The first step in the argument is to deny divine omnipo-
tence, as affirmed in the Callimachean quote.
It has hitherto not been observed that Atius exempla are taken from Aristo-
tles Categories. Cf. b > 3 8
B @ >E &
(for it is not possible for fire to be cold or snow to be black);
b a ! : ! & , _
!> !, A 5 H! K , 0-
& 0 (example inspired by Plato, Soph. ac). The reference
to sedentary and upright only makes sense in the light of the Aristotelian back-
ground (why should God not be able to make what is sitting upright, since even
for a human being that is hardly a problem, but it is impossible to be both at the
same time). The examples used are taken from the realm of logic and given a
theological application. The question of divine omnipotence was frequently dis-
cussed in the st and nd centuries ce, but the exempla used differ from what
we find in our text. I give some examples:
Alexander of Aphrodisias ap. Simpl. in De Caelo . ff. Heiberg and De
fato . ff. Bruns: God cannot make diagonal commensure with side,
two and two equal five, know the size of the infinite, make what has come
into being indestructible (contra Plato Tim. a);
david t. runia
Galen, De usu partium .: God cannot make man out of a stone, [559] a
bull or a horse out of ashes (contra Moses in Genesis; on this text cf. Walzer
(), );
Pliny NH .: God cannot commit suicide, make mortals eternal, cause a
man who has lived not to have lived, undo the past, cause twice ten not to
be twenty;
Celsus ap. Orig. C. Cels. .: God cannot commit immoral acts or wish
what is contrary to his nature, and so cannot bring about the resurrection
of the flesh.
Alexander and Galen use examples from the realm of mathematics or physics
(the latter is appropriate when arguing against the Platonic or the Mosaic cos-
mogony). The exempla in Pliny are closer to those of Atius, since they involve
contrary concepts (mortaleternal, livednot lived).
Atius exempla do not appear to have any particular focus, except to refute
the poetic quote. Philippson (), points to at least three Epicurean
texts that deal with the question of divine omnipotence. The first is certainly
relevant: Lucretius . argues that those who observe the machinery of the
cosmos and so believe the gods are all-powerful fall into superstition because
they are ignorant of what can be and what cannot be, and of the fact that the
power of everything is limited. The passage at Philodemus 0
Col. . Diels argues (if the reconstructions of Diels and Philippson are accepted)
that Gods lack of omnipotence does not affect his felicity. This differs from what
Atius argues here (but see further below ). The tetralemma at Lactantius De
ira . is attributed to Epicurus (and so = fr. Usener) as an argument
against providence: either (i) God wishes to remove evil but cannot, or (ii) he
can but does not so wish, or (iii) he both can and wishes, or (iv) he cannot
and does not so wish, each alternative being theologically unacceptable. The
same argument is found at Sext. Emp. PH ., on which see further below at
. It is difficult to determine whether this argument was originally Epicurean
or Academic (for two differing opinions see Philippson (), , De Lacy
(), ). Given the wholly negative conclusion, the latter seems more likely.
In Epicurean theology the main question is neither divine omnipotence nor
divine existence, but whether God can act against his own nature, quod non.
After giving a long list of similar arguments, Pease at Cic. ND . rightly
concludes: . . . it will be seen that the elements here appearing were combined
by philosophers of different schools to quite diverse ends.
Finally we should inquire what the chronological implications of the cita-
tion of the Categories are. This work returned to prominence in the edition of
Aristotles works by Andronicus (st half of st century bce). The first com-
mentators are naturally Peripatetic. Wide dissemination outside [560] the Peri-
patetic school seems to have taken longer to achieve. The work is not referred
to by Cicero. The first outsider to criticize them is the Platonist-Pythagorean
Eudorus of Alexandria ( bce), and after him they turn up in Philo (the
dating of the Stoic commentator Athenodorus is unclear). See further Szlezak
(), , Moraux () passim, Gottschalk (), ,
Mansfeld (b), . Although no hard conclusions can be reached, we are
atheists in atius
An interesting parallel for Atius depiction of the model is found in the Plato
doxography at Diog. Laert. . Long: B E 5 B
+. L > > = !, 6
5 } v < > 8I 0 E 3
- B 7 0. 8 E 3
3 = ;,
B E 3 - !. Just as in Atius, Platos God is considered to
be spherical. We noted earlier that both texts use the same rather unusual term
for the model. There is, however, no implicit connection between model, the
shape of God and of the cosmos, as in Atius. Moreover the Plato doxography
does not add the comparison with mans shape, which almost certainly has a
specifically Epicurean background. It cannot be considered certain, therefore,
that the resemblances indicate use of Platonic sources by Atius. The date of the
doxography in Diogenes Laertius is controversial. It could range from the end
of st cent. bce to the nd cent. ce (the hypothesis of Untersteiner connecting
it exclusively with Posidonius has been universally rejected). [563]
It is easy to see how here the doxa is more important than the philosopher
holding the view. In the theological context, however, the distinction seems
rather pedantic.
In Ciceros ND the Epicurean Velleius attacks Plato and the Stoa, but refers
to Anaxagoras only in the long doxography of individual theological views
( ). For Philippson (), this was evidence that both Cicero and Atius
have their ultimate source in Epicurus (but for Cicero an intermediate source
must be postulated). There is no evidence, however, that Epicurus attacked
Anaxagoras view of demiurgic creation (Lucretius . ff. attacks his doctrine
of the archai). Sextus Empiricus too refers to Anaxagoras in his discussion on
archai (PH ., Adv. Phys. .), but not in his account of theology. At Adv.
Phys. . Plato is included in the list of philosophers who infer Gods
existence from the of the universe. The texts cited are Tim. d
a, bc. The second text ends with mention of the gods (i.e. demiurges)
.
david t. runia
> H. By placing these words straight after the name-label, Atius
underlines the diaeresis he is making.
This account of Platos doctrine, based on Tim. a, is fairly accurate, and,
unlike in , does not aim at polemical distortion. It is somewhat imprecise to
say that the were in disorder before creation. Plato statesrather
obscurelythat there were only traces of the [564] elements in the receptacle
(b) and that they then were formed into regular geometric shapes (c
c).
9 . The conjunction implies divine concern with the disorderly
state of the world, which is of course the point under discussion.
involve God in any toil. According to Velleius at Cic. ND . the Stoic god who
exercises providence is laboriosissimus. Both Plato and the Stoa are the object
of the arguments attack. The phrase + & B -
returns, however, to the building metaphor associated with Plato rather than the
Stoa (for the latter the equivalent would be ).
. The final argument sets aside the question of divine creation, and specifi-
cally addresses the theme of divine providence as it concerns human life.
O 9 7. This first condition is otiose if the argument is purely about
whether the gods are or are not provident, i.e. the Stoa versus Epicurus. It recalls,
however, the question of whether the deity does or does not exist, as introduced
in .
E > . The term is perhaps a little surprising
in the context (the opposite of is usually B). Literally the word
means adulterated and is often used of coins. Here it is perhaps chosen because
of the adulterous examples that follow.
The argument is that divine existence and divine providence are rendered
problematic because a provident god would not allow good people to suffer evil.
It must be agreed that this argument does not flow directly from the common
conception of divinity put forward in . To Gods felicity and immortality
the further characteristic of benevolence must be added. In the philosophical
tradition this had been the standard view since Plato and Aristotle (e.g. Tim. e,
Met. a). But the Epicurean would argue that if the gods are not provident,
the problem melts away. The same applies a fortiori for the atheist, because in
his view there are no gods at all. [570]
The argument is thus directed against a form of theodicy such as we find
in the Stoa, and earlier in Plato Laws X. Is it possible to pin down its origin?
atheists in atius
Because these examples deviate from the tradition, as noted above, we may
suggest that they have been deliberately chosen. The emphasis is in fact placed
as much on the treachery of the crimes as on the nobility of the sufferers (hence
the term , as noted above). The crimes were hatched in secret and
carried out through betrayal. The possibility must be considered that Atius
wishes the argument to revert back to the atheistic view outlined through the
persona of Sisyphus in . Gods have been invented in order to prevent crime.
But not everyone is gullible, and certainly not the atheists themselves. The fact
that perpretrators of crime flourish not only shows that there is no providence,
but also throws great doubt on the gods very existence.
Nevertheless it may be that the examples used do give a clue to their prove-
nance. In Cicero ND . and . diverse lines of poetry are cited on the
Atreidae and also the murder of Heracles by Deianira is mentioned in arguments
against the Stoic doctrine of providence. The context of the arguments differs
from our source to some degree. Medea and Atreus are cited as examples where
human rationality is misused, i.e. the gift of providence brings on evil. In
Deianira is cited as an example of someone who wishes to do good and achieves
evil. In Aegisthus, the murderer of Agamemon, is cited as an example where
there is no need to postulate the interference of heaven. It can hardly be denied
that the direction and method of the argument is very similar to what we find in
Atius, except that the theme of theodicy is less explicitly invoked. Moreover it
is almost certain that Ciceros source here is Academic (perhaps Carneades via
Clitomachus; cf. Pease (), ., Kleywegt ()).
As was noted earlier ( ), Sextus does not specifically discuss the question
of providence at any length. His final argument in his section B indi-
cates, however, how he would tackle the question, PH .: 8 [572] E
8, 6 O ! '
@ I ! E 3 >
O
@ -, E F >
u !-
F 0
-, B
8
-. When we consider that in he proceeds from the common concep-
tion of Gods nature, that in he discusses the question of Gods power (cf.
Atius ) and in he combines the questions of providence and existence,
we must conclude there are considerable affinities with our passage, even if Sex-
tus does not link up his doxai and arguments with any specific philosophers and
schools, as Atius does.
!. Diels (), perceptively notes that this word ! (he wrongly
reads ) gives some chronological clues. Before the second cent. ce it is
very rare, except remarkably enough in the Septuagint ( times) and the New
Testament ( times). The only example is in Aeschines Socraticus (th cent.
bce). Then in the nd century it occurs regularly in Aristides, Justin, Clement,
Athenaeus etc. It is thus likely to be the contribution of Atius himself. Diels,
however, uses it to place his (Epicurean) source later than Philodemus (followed
by Philippson (), ). On the examples of murder and adultery found in
Cicero ND III see the previous note.
atheists in atius
. Conclusion
It has not proved an easy task to analyse and furnish a Sitz im Leben
for the passage which we have examined in detail. Partly the difficulty
is caused by the fact that it forms an exception within Atius doxogra-
phy. Instead of merely recounting and organizing views of philosophers,
it also presents arguments. The connections between these arguments
are not very clearly indicated, so that the passage as a whole lacks overt
coherence. Nevertheless our analysis bore out that awareness of two dox-
ographical techniques can help in understanding it. Firstly in doxography
it is the doxai that count in the first instance, rather than the philoso-
phers who maintain them. Secondly doxography has a great fondness for
the diaeresis and the disjunction which allow views to be organized and
opposed to each other.
In the case of our passage the view being maintained is that God or
the gods do not exist, i.e. the atheistic position introduced at its [573]
outset. This view emerges from the basic disjunction between theism and
atheism. A further disjunction results from the theistic view: if the deity
exists, either it relates to the cosmos (through creation and providence)
or it does not.
On the basis of this diaeresis with its two disjunctions, the following
argument can be discerned:
a. some philosophers deny Gods existence ( )
b. Gods existence is a lie invented to ensure righteous behaviour ( )
c. According to the lie there is a blessed eternal being who sees all ( )
d. God is not omnipotent ( )
e. Creation as conceived by Plato & Anaxagoras is against Gods nature
as commonly conceived ( )
f. His blessed nature as commonly conceived precludes creation and
concern with human affairs ( )
g. Gods existence and providence would make the flourishing of evil
and the suffering of the good inexplicable ( )
The greatest difficulty in the analysis is the transition from (c) to (d)
at the beginning of . The final poetic couplet quoted in patently
introduces the remainder of the passage. Does it argue that the first
line about a flourishing eternal deity is correct, but the second about
a provident deity is incorrect, i.e. an Epicurean view? Or does it argue
that both lines are poetic nonsense, i.e. the atheistic view? I have argued
that the he says in continues the atheistic position introduced at the
david t. runia
outset, and that the final argument at is meant to show that any form
of theism is unpersuasive, including even the idea of a fictional theism
introduced in .
In the commentary an attempt has been made to locate the arguments
in their context in diverse ancient philosophical traditions. It has been
long been perceived that there are important affinities with Epicurean
texts in Cicero ND I and Lucretius. These induced Diels, Philippson and
Winiarczyk to argue that the passage as a whole, including the use of
the sceptical-academic Atheistenkatalog, was taken from an Epicurean
source. This hypothesis does not convince. The arguments at and
(and to a lesser extent ) contain features that are not Epicurean. It
is better to look for traditions than to speculate on specific sources. It
is clear that some Epicurean ele[574]ments have been incorporated (esp.
in ). Moreover, reference to atheists was part of the Epicurean tradi-
tion. In our commentary we found numerous affinities with Sceptical
(mainly Academic) arguments on theology as found in the vast collec-
tion of Sextus Empiricus which go far beyond mere use of the Atheis-
tenkatalog. Especially important is the use of the theological diaeresis
with the double disjunction, a standard Sceptical procedure. Even the
use of the common conception of what God is, is as much Sceptical as it
is Epicurean. Various affinities with Academic arguments in Cicero ND
III are also important. For the understanding of the passage as a whole
the Sceptical background is in our view more important than the spe-
cific Epicurean arguments. Finally there are various clues pointing to
the interventions of Atius himself. We noted the use of the antitheti-
cal diaeresis in and the way he introduces his criticism in . Two
hitherto unobserved parallels suggest a date no earlier than the begin-
ning of our era, and may thus be indications of Atius own intervention:
(a) the use of examples from Aristotles Categories in ; (b) similari-
ties to the Plato doxography in Diogenes Laertius ( ). A brilliant lex-
ical observation by Diels ( ) also points to the st cent. ce. Finally
we note the interesting parallels in Atius contemporary Plutarch, in
which the common conception of Gods nature is opposed to atheistic
views.
To sum up: there are three main strands of tradition in this passage,
the Sceptical, the Epicurean, and the doxographical (with some Aris-
totelian views further in the background, and some Middle Platonism
just starting to make its presence felt). What brings these strands together
in our passage is the shared concern with the atheist position. For the Epi-
curean this view is in conflict with our common conception of the deity;
atheists in atius
. Bibliography
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Apparatus, Translation and Commentary, vols. (Oxford ).
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david t. runia
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.
chapter fifteen
Jaap Mansfeld
I. Introduction
1 All references to Atius with the siglum At. will be to Diels edition and number-
ing in the Doxographi Graeci, Berlin and later repr., pp. . For the Placita of
ps.Plutarch I have consulted G. Lachenaud (ed.), Plutarque. uvres morales XII , Opin-
ions des Philosophes, Paris , and H. Daiber (ed.), Aetius Arabus. Die Vorsokratiker in
arabischer berlieferung (Akademie der Wissenschaften und Literatur. Verffentlichun-
gen der orientalischen Kommission, XXXIII), Wiesbaden . Stobaeus is quoted from
C. Wachsmuth (ed.), Ioannis Stobaei Anthologii libri duo priores qui inscribi solent Eclogae
physicae et ethicae Bd. , Berlin , repr. Zrich .
2 A treatise entitled + is attributed to Theophrastus (Diog. Laert. V ).
sources for Atius are available this time.3 Diels reconstruction is ques-
tionable. In the first part of the present paper I shall argue in favour of a
different reconstruction and attempt to explain the rationale behind it.4
In the second part some comments on Atian lemmata in ps.[19]Plutarch
and Stobaeus and in the third and last part some on exclusively Stobaean
Appendix, together with the text of the sources for this chapter (which now include the
Arabic translation of ps.Plutarch by Qusta ibn Luqa).
4 The first example of such a reconstruction is provided by D.T. Runia, Xenophanes
lemmata will be provided, but I shall deal only in passing with the passage
from the Timaeus quoted by Stobaeus, and shall not comment on his
Ocellus quotation.
Commenting on these lemmata is not so easy, and I can here only
reconnoitre the field to some extent. A more serious study should have
to take all the Placita chapters and individual lemmata into account both
as to their interrelations and as to their antecedents, but each time one
has to begin somewhere.5 Most of the time, naturally, the situation one
finds [20] oneself in may be compared to that of noticing a stick of which
one only sees one end, or (more rarely) of which one is able to see both
ends while the long middle section remains invisible.
5 For other attempts in this direction see my papers Doxography and Dialectic cit.,
. The Stoics (held) that all causes are corporeal; for (they are) pneu-
mata. [Lacking in Stobaeus].
. Thales and those who come after him11 stated the first cause to be
immobile. [Lacking in ps.Plutarch].
. The Stoics defined the first cause as mobile. [Lacking in ps.Plu-
tarch].
. The Peripatetics (held) that of the causes some are sensible, others
intelligible. [Lacking in ps.Plutarch].
Diels order mechanically combines the sequences of ps.Plutarch and
Stobaeus. He naturally omits the latters quotation from the Timaeus and
the Didymus fragment he recognized as well as the Ocellus fragment,
but as we have seen inserted the Didymus fragment dealing with the
four Aristotelian causes as his fourth lemma (at At. I , ). His fifth
lemma, in the left column containing the text of ps.Plutarch, occupies
the position held in Stobaeus by the Didymus fragment on the three great
Stoics. His lemmata six to eight are found in Stobaeus only.
We now are in a position to inquire about the rationale of the Atius
chapter. This is threefold. The issues on which the authorities which are
represented by name-labels differ (diaeresis), or disagree (diaphonia), are
(a) the number of causes, (b) the incorporeality versus the corporeality
of causes, and (c) the mobility versus the immobility of the first cause. In
some cases more than one such issue is concerned in a combination of
lemmata.
We may look first at the issue of the number of causes. [23] According
to () Plato there are three kinds of causes, according to () Pythagoras
and Aristotle two kinds, and according to () the Stoics only one kind.
The diaeresis (division) and ordering, then, are according to number:
.12 This is a bit unusual, because in the majority of cases an ordering
according to number starts with the lowest number. Still, there it is (we
shall see shortly why the usual order is inverted in this case), and it
provides supplementary proof for the attribution of the Stobaean lemma
on Aristotles four kinds of cause to Arius Didymus and not, pace Diels,
to Atius, for in the latter it would disturb or even destroy the sequence.
The incorporeality versus the corporeality of causes is next.13 () Py-
thagoras and Aristotle hold that first causes are incorporeal and that
the others participate in or are attributes of the corporeal substructure.
These others therefore are not, in themselves, fully corporeal. Aristotle
and Pythagoras do not differ as to the incorporeal causes, but as to the
semi-corporeal others. I take it that participation has to be linked to
Pythagoras and attribute to Aristotle (see infra, section III at subsection
()). () The Stoics hold that all causes are corporeal, [24] while ()
the Peripatetics, whose tenet is expressed in epistemic terms, said that
some causes are sensible (i.e. are corporeal) and others intelligible (i.e.
are incorporeal). Here a diaphonia is clearly involved, but the order
of the lemmata is not good. My belief is that Stobaeus, who inserted
other material to replace the name-labels Aristotle and Stoics, while
copying out the rest of the Atian chapter overlooked the Peripatetics
lemma and so decided to add it at the end. It does not make Atian
sense after lemmata () on Thales c.s. and () on the Stoics, which are
concerned with a different theme, but belongs with lemmata () and ().
Stobaeus is not concerned with Atius diaeretic and diaphonic rationale,
as the passages he inserted into the Atian framework already prove. To
restore Atius purposive original sequence we therefore have to correct
Stobaeus ordering (or rather lack of it). The diaphonic Atian order
is ()()(): () Pythagoras and Aristotle hold that of the two kinds
of causes some are incorporeal and the others semi-corporeal; () the
Peripatetics hold that of the two kinds of causes some are incorporeal
and the others corporeal, while () the Stoics hold that there is only one
kind, all causes being corporeal.
It follows that lemma (), on the Peripatetics, has to be inserted
between () Pythagoras and Aristotle, and (), the Stoics. The fuller
Atian sequence therefore is () the descriptive general definition; ()
Plato; () Pythagoras and Aristotle; () the Peripatetics; and () the Sto-
ics. From (), Pythagoras and Aristotle. to (), the Stoics, the diaphonia as
to corporeality and incorporeality is neatly bound up with the sequence
13 Cfr. J. MansfeldD.T. Runia, Atiana cit., p. ; for another example of this type
of diaphonia see e.g. At. IV , with my comments at Doxography and Dialectic cit.,
pp. .
plato, pythagoras, aristotle, the peripatetics
14 For another example of this kind of diaphonia cfr. e.g. At. IV , with my comment
for [26] which see infra, section III at subsection (). The tenets have
been flattened out and adapted the better to fit in with the diaphonic and
diaeretic Atian rationale.
I append my argued reconstruction of the original Atian chapter. It
will be noted that it very much resembles Diels mechanical reconstruc-
tion, the only visible differences (apart from minor ones as to the consti-
tutio of individual lemmata) being the elimination of his fourth lemma
(Arius Didymus on Aristotles four types of cause) and its replacement in
a new fourth position by his eighth lemma, on the Peripatetics:
+
. O 8 l
F l .
. ! OI !, 5 < 8 < 6I -
: 5 <I B E v B, 6 8 B.
. 1
3 E O , 3 E
3 & F 3 0 0 5!,
M @ .
. [= () Diels] ' + @ 3 E +!,
3 E !.
. ' ! 3 O !I !.
. 0 ' 80 O -.
. ' O a .
As is the rule in the Placita literature this time too the order of the lem-
mata is determined by content, not by the chronology of the authorities
that serve as name-labels. Pythagoras comes after Plato, and Thales and
his immediate followers, in the sixth position, are wedged in between two
lemmata bearing on the Stoics.
Though these lemmata, as pointed out, provide at best only partial and
pale information when considered from a modern [27] historical point of
view, it is not true to say that there are no links at all between name-labels
and contents. In what follows some observations about these sometimes
quite tortuous connections will be submitted.
plato, pythagoras, aristotle, the peripatetics
the Stoics held that cause is a body which produces an incorporeal effect
in another body;22 this incorporeality is expressed by the use of .23 [29]
The phrase 3 5 has been added by Stobaeus.24
The word 5 is only found here and at Olympiod., in Aristot.
cat. p. ., and Ps.Simplic., in Aristot. de an. pp. . and .. The
adjective 5 too is late and rare. For 5- as the Stoic
term for a simpler or preliminary sort of definition see for instance
Antipater fr. S.V.F. III p. apud Diog. Laert. VII .
pp. ), but cfr. e.g. Sext. Emp. adv. math. XI and = Chrys. fr. S.V.F.
II pp. .
22 E.g. Sext. Emp. adv. math. IX = Chrys. fr. S.V.F. II p. , and the views
of Zeno Chrysippus Posidonius apud Stob. anthol. I , c, printed infra, p. . See for
instance A.A. Long-D.N. Sedley op. cit., I, Cambridge etc. , p. , and cfr. supra,
n. , infra, text to note . Senec. ep. Lucil. , states that decreta (e.g. definitions
of virtues) are the causes of precepts (praecepta) and everything else (et horum causae
sunt et omnium). I assume that the decreta here are not sayables (!) but in order to
function as causes have been interiorized, that is to say have been integrated in the regent
part of the soul.
23 Cfr. Posidon. fr. E.-K. apud Stob. anthol. I , c (printed infra, p. ) O
Plato (to which we shall revert several times) introduced by the phrase
B 8
;. occurs times in ps.Plutarchs Placita and so is Aetian. As so often it does
not introduce a verbatim quotation.
26 H. DrrieM. Baltes, Der Platonismus in der Antike, IV, Die philosophische Lehre
was his source for the original triad he used for this allegorical exegesis
(it may have been a Timaeus commentary, supposing one to have been
available which dealt with Platos principles),28 but we do know that (like
Cicero) he knew and used a predecessor of Atius,29 who possibly (but
see next paragraph) may have been dependent on such a commentary
too. There is a not so insignificant difference: in Atius the formal cause
is rendered, as it usually is, by the Platonizing formula 6, in Varro
by the Latin equivalent of Greek 6, which is more Aristotelian.
It is however far more probable that the triad of causes is of Peri-
patetic30 and doxographical origin. Aristotle, discussing the agrapha dog-
mata and the theory of Forms, had argued that Plato only knew two
causes, viz. the formal and the material cause31 (note that he does not
use the prepositional formulas [31] 8 < and 6). Theophrastus con-
curred as to the number of causes to be attributed to Plato, but disagreed
as to what these are. He pointed out that Plato for the most part had
dealt with first philosophy (Aristotles theme in metaph. ), but that, as
to physics (viz. in the Timaeus, from which Theophrastus quotes signifi-
cant terminology) he had introduced two causes, viz. the material and the
analyse dune prsentation aristotlicienne de Platon, and goes on to argue that this
prsentation must be later than Theophrastus.
31 Arist. metaph. A . a: ! E Q
A -
I 8 +
6 +
, /0 B 8
/0 3 & A . In his De philosophia (Philo de aetern. mund. = Arist.
fr. R3, c Rossprovided the attribution is correct) however he discussed and rejected
Platos Demiurge, probably introduced in the discussion for dialectical reasons; see my
paper Providence and the Destruction of the Universe in Early Stoic Thought, in M.J. Ver-
maseren (ed.), Studies in Hellenistic Religions (tudes Prliminaires aux Religions Ori-
entales dans lEmpire Romain, LXXVIII), LeidenNew YorkKln , pp. ,
esp. p. [repr. with same pagination as Study I in my Studies in Later Greek Philosophy
and Gnosticism (Collected Studies Series, ), London ]. Also cfr. infra, note
and text thereto.
jaap mansfeld
efficient cause (note that he does not use the prepositional formulas 8 <
and 5 <). The latter according to Theophrastus he [32] connected with
the power of the God and the good.32 An interpretation of the nature
and number of the principles, or causes, in the Timaeus accordingly is
not a privilege of the commentary literature, but already to be found in
Theophrastus account of the principles of Aristotles predecessors from
Thales to Plato, an account generally believed, also by the present writer,
to be one of the sources of physical doxography of the Atian type.
If now we combine the accounts of Aristotle and Theophrastus and
notice what they share, viz. the material cause, we get the Platonic triad
of efficient cause (Theophrastus), material cause (both Aristotle and
Theophrastus), and formal cause (Aristotle). To the best of my knowledge
this has not been observed before. What I like to call retrograde contam-
ination of doxographical literature, for instance with material deriving
from Aristotles school writings or from Plato, is a not uncommon phe-
nomenon.33 And Aristotles writings may well have been more accessi-
32 Theophr. phys. opin. fr. Diels = fr. FHS&G apud Simplic. in Arist. phys.
p. .: 3 3 , E 5 a A l -
[Tim. a], a O [Tim. a] B l !
/0 B B [e.g. Tim. a] /0 B [e.g. Tim. e, a] !. The
good more properly is the final cause, but according to Theophrastus this final cause
works as a moving cause (cfr. already Aristotle on Anaxagoras and others at metaph. .
b: ' E Q A 5! V ; & + & @
b 7 & 6 : 5! Q). The doubts
concerning the authenticity of this fragment expressed by D.T. Runia, Philo cit., p.
note , are unjustified. See also Theophr. phys. opin. fr. Diels = fr. FHS&G apud
Procl. in Plat. Tim. I p. . (apparently verbatim): F 3 F ! !
(Plato was the only or the principal person) /0 B B [scil. the Demi-
urge] +V -, 9 . Cfr. also another quotation (verbatim).
Theophr. fr. A FHS&G apud Themist. in Arist. de an. p. .: 8
8
, l - 8 !/ E a A !, E O
.
33 H. Diels, Dox. Graec. cit., pp. , believed that Atius himself is responsible
for contamination with Aristotles esoteric writings. For various examples see J.N.M.
Baltussen, Theophrastus on Theories of Perception: Argument and Purpose in the De
sensibus (Quaestiones Infinitae, VI), diss. Utrecht , pp. (chapter not
found in the revised version, H. Baltussen, Theophrastus against the Presocratics and
Plato: Peripatetic Dialectic in the De sensibus [Philosophia Antiqua, LXXXVI], Leiden
New YorkKln [published separately as H. Baltussen, Plato in the Placita (Aetius
Book IV): A Dielsian blind spot, Philologus , , pp. ]) and my papers
Doxography and Dialectic cit., pp. , Doxographical Studies cit., pp. and ,
and Physical Doxai in the Phaedo, in M. Kardaun-J. Spruyt (eds.), The Winged Chariot.
Collected Essays on Plato and Platonism in Honour of L.M. de Rijk (Brills Studies in
Intellectual History, C), LeidenBostonKln , pp. , esp. p. note [= article
in the present collection].
plato, pythagoras, aristotle, the peripatetics
ble in Hellenistic times than has been believed on the basis of the story
of their being hid in the cellar at Scepsis.34 A Platonic triad of causes as
expressed by prepositional formulas, atttested as we have seen by Varro,
is anyhow earlier than Atius. Whoever was the first to employ these for-
mulas it is impossible to say.35 We shall [33] however find that such evi-
dence as is available indeed points to the Hellenistic period, even later,
presumably, than Strato of Lampsacus.36
This triad is consistently paralleled elsewhere in Atius, viz. in the
chapter On Principles; one should be aware of the impact of the orig-
inally Aristotelian equivalence of principles and causes revealed by
this parallel.37 See Stob. anthol. I , a at At. I , :38 ! 1-
!, & A & +
, W O 4 O 3 +,
9 E B 8 B ,39 : E A 5 [34]
-
VK,40 +
E > 8 -
34 See J. Barnes, Roman Aristotle, in J. Barnes-M. Griffin (eds.), Philosophia Togata II.
text of ps.Plutarch (see also infra). Diels believed that in this text the words !
1 , a second 1 after 1, and ' 3 >
H
(which are confirmed by Qusta ibn Luqa) have been
interpolated, but they may also have been abridged away by Stobaeus (ethnicon and
fathers name are frequently found in the lemmata of this chapter). Baltes, who points
this out at pp. , also reminds us that the three principles doctrine, the definition
of matter, and that of God as the intellect of the cosmos belong with the bliche Lehre
des Mittelplatonismus.
39 Doxa anachronistically attributed to Thales at At. I , (the chapter 8
9 ), presumably because he is the archegete of the Ionian Succession which has
Anaxagoras as a member. Cfr. also ibid. (Plato lemma) B Q 9 .
40 Cfr. the general definition of matter at At. I , .
jaap mansfeld
and , and Id., The Language of Excellence in Platos Timaeus and Later Platonism, in
S. Gersh and C. Kannengiesser (eds.), Platonism in Late Antiquity (Christianity and
Judaism in Antiquity, VIII), Notre Dame , pp. . The formula
+ occurs once in Aristotle (de gen. et corr. . b), where however it
pertains to the formal cause; no parallel in Plato.
plato, pythagoras, aristotle, the peripatetics
his view significant change. After the Atian Plato lemma (in which as
we shall see he made another change too) he appends Tim. ab (see
below), from the proem of Timaeus virtual monologue in the dialogue,
and a is not so far away.
Furthermore, the statement concerning Platos view on causality in
general in Atius is also interesting in that it represents an (interpretative)
effort to modernize Plato by making him fully concur with the primary
importance the efficient cause acquired in the Hellenistic period.46 [36]
The tems 5 <, 8 <, 6 in this sense can hardly be paralleled
in Platos own works, and they never occur in combination. 8 <, for
instance, as a rule has a temporal meaning.47 8 < is however quite
often found in Aristotle as a siglum for matter tout court (also for matter
qua cause, and for proximate matter),48 sometimes combined with 5
< as siglum for the efficient cause.49 There are also a few more or less
coincidental instances of 6 in a teleological sense in Aristotle,50 but
this too is not standard terminology and 6 is not, as far as I have
been able to see, combined anywhere in Aristotle with either 5 < or
8 <. Even so, Aristotles occasional combination 8 < plus 5 < may
well have been one of the points of departure of the prepositional string
as applied to Plato, and should be seen in relation to the attributions of
causes to Plato by Aristotle and Theophrastus analyzed above. We may
further quote the interesting triad of material, efficient, and formal causes
as expressed in part by prepositional formulas (one of which however is
different from its Platonic equivalent, viz. with + instead of ),
to be found at metaph. ba: K 3 !
46 Cfr. M. Frede, The Original Notion of Cause, in his Essays in Ancient Philosophy, New
York , pp. . For Platos not infrequent use of cause in the sense of an efficient
cause or responsible agent see C. Natali, Le Cause del Timeo e la Teora delle Quattro
Cause, in T. Calvo-L. Brisson (eds.), Interpreting the TimaeusCritias (International
Plato Studies, IX), Sankt Augustin , pp. . A useful analysis of Platos causal
doctrine is provided by D. Sedley, Platonic Causes, Phronesis, XLIII () pp. ,
but Platos more important points and arguments are not an issue in the Placita lemma.
Galens view is different from that of the Placita lemma, see infra, note .
47 At Plat. Cratyl. c, and Tim. b and a 8 < does not pertain to the
55 Note that after B the words B , found in the parallel passage quoted
supra, text to note , are absent. So is the God, also found in the parallel passage.
56 Quoted supra, note .
57 Theophrastus here revises Aristotles view, according to which Anaxagoras (and
Hermotimus?) were the first to introduce Intellect as the cause of what is good and of
motion (metaph. . b). The fact that Anaxagoras himself spoke of Nos is
irrelevant insofar as Aristotles and Theophrastus impact on later doxography is con-
cerned.
58 Aristot. metaph. . b: E
9 + 9
6 3 ;, ! 6 : & 0 0 F !, phys. . b:
7 6 : & 0 0 : F 0 \-, _ 9 O,
9 & B
, 6 3 ; B
! B
, de gen. et corr. . b. Cfr. already Plat.(?) Hipp. mai. e:
B
8 > = F O, and the Cratylus passages quoted infra, section
IV at subsection (b), and in note .
59 Cfr. Aristot. de an. . a; for Theophrastus see supra, note ad fin.
jaap mansfeld
see infra at III () on Aristotle, note and text thereto for the Peripatetics and a
string in Sextus Empiricus, and note for a Stoic doctrine. Strings of prepositions
also occur in the New Testament: ep. Roman. :: 6 8 >B >B +
> 3 !, cf. ep. Corinth. :, ep. Coloss. :, ep. Hebr. .. For the relation
to Greek philosophy see the account of G.H. van Kooten, The Pauline Debate on the
plato, pythagoras, aristotle, the peripatetics
() 1
3 E O , 3 E 3
& F 3 0 0 5!, M @
. A complicated lemma.65 For the Atian combination
Pythagoras plus Aristotle compare At. II , (Ps.Plutarch. E only):
! 1
, IV , and V , (Ps.Plutarch.
F and B only) and II , (both sources) !
1
. We have noticed above that Stobaeus omitted the name-
label Aristotle because he inserted a lemma on Aristotle taken from Arius
Didymus.
PythagorasPlatoAristotle, or, more briefly (in the present chapter
Plato has his own lemma) PythagorasAristotle. What I believe is that
what we have in these Atian passages is one of earliest surviving explicit
attestations of the constructed Pythagorean diadoch, or Succession, later
also found in, e.g., Nicomachus of Gerasa and Hippolytus.66 In a way this
construction has its roots in Aristotle himself, who in his critical histori-
cal overview at metaph. links Plato not only with Socrates and Hera-
clitus but also and even especially with the Pythagoreans (not: Pythago-
ras), though he emphasizes the differences.67 The most important of these
differences [42] is that Plato according to Aristotle was the first to intro-
duce the distinction between what is corporeal and what is incorporeal.68
The construction of a diadoch of the kind mentioned above leaves
ample room for the attribution of tenets to a particular member, or mem-
bers, of the Succession (diadoch), or School (hairesis): Platonic doctrine
may with a clear conscience be attributed to the purported archgets
Pythagoras, or even to Platos pupil Aristotle. Conversely, Peripatetic
doctrines may be attributed to an early Pythagorean, as in the pseudo-
Pythagorean tract On the Nature of the All published as if written by
Cosmos. Graeco-Roman Cosmology and Jewish Eschatology in Paul and in the Pseudo-
Pauline Letters to the Colossians and Ephesians, diss. Leiden , pp. .
65 Useful comments at W. Burkert, Lore and Science in Ancient Pythagoreanism, Cam-
bridge MA , pp. .
66 For Nicomachus see my Prolegomena Mathematica from Apollonius of Perga to the
Burkert, Lore cit., pp. , and pp. for its influence on the later traditions. But
pace Burkert the inclusion of Aristotle in several Atian lemmata (cited supra, text after
note ) makes the derivation of these lemmata from Theophrastus most unlikely.
68 See W. Burkert, Lore cit., pp. .
jaap mansfeld
69 See M. Baltes, Timaios Lokros. ber die Natur des Kosmos und der Seele (Philo-
sophia Antiqua, XXI), LeidenNew YorkKln , pp. , and W. Marg (ed.), Ti-
maeus Locrus. De Natura Mundi et Animae (Philosophia Antiqua, XXIV), LeidenNew
YorkKln , pp. .
70 E.g. Tim. ea:
3 Q : B B
8 1!
dumb scriba.
73 Apparently a well-known passage, discussed by Plutarch. de an. procreat. DE,
A; quoted Eus. praep. evang. XI , and XIII , , and Stob. anthol. I , a. Also
cfr. At. I , .
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and polyedra which determine their respective characters. One may add
by the way that the doctrine that the cosmos is a body is also Stoic, see
e.g. Chrys. fr. S.V.F. II p. apud Plutarch. de stoic. repugn. EF,
a verbatim quotation from the second book of Chrysippus On Motion:
E 9 ! 8. And Ps. Plutarch. E at At. II ,
(which actually in this author is a single lemma, not two), summarizing
no less than three Atian lemmata (cf. Stob. anthol. I , c, , a, and ,
f at At. II , , , , and , ), states that according to Pythagoras, Plato,
and the Stoics the cosmos is corporeal, a statement that is consistent with
the M @ in the other lemma.
Aristotle himself once makes a distinction between two types of causes
similar to that found in Platos Timaeus. In chapters nine and ten of the
second book of the De generatione et corruptione he discusses the causes
of coming to be and passing away in general. He naturally argues that
the material as well as the formal cause are involved; note that the latter
is explicitly said to include the final cause (de gen. et corr. . b:
a E < L : & @). But he insists that we also
need a third cause of continuous coming to be and passing away. This
turns out to be the cause of motion and change, or the efficient cause,
specified in chapter ten as the motion along the inclined circle ( .
a).74 Now Aristotle argues that his predecessors only dreamed of
this third type of cause and were never explicit about it.75 He [46] then
gives two examples ( ba), viz. Socrates in the Phaedo, who
argues that the Forms are causes of coming to be and passing away, and
others (viz. the early materialists, whose view is to be preferred to that
of Socrates) who believed that matter itself, e.g. the hot, or fire, is the
cause of motion. Both these options, naturally, are argued against and
rejected. It is not entirely to be precluded that Aristotle has Tim. c
e in mind, since he stands Platos hierarchic order on its head and in
this dialectical context prefers the point of view of those who according
to the Timaeus passage call those causes primary which according to
74 Passage discussed by J. Ppin, Thologie cit., pp. , , but not in relation to the
present Atian lemma.
75 This is somewhat surprising in view of what he says about Anaxagoras Hesiod
Plato are secondary. We notice anyway to what extent the Atian lemma
distorts Aristotles view by attributing to him the exact reverse of what he
believed. And we also see that this lemma attributes to Pythagoras the
Platonic distinction between corporeal and incorporeal entities which
according to Aristotle (metaph. , see above) the Pythagoreans failed
to make.76
() ' + @ 3 E +!, 3 E !.
Several chapters in Atius feature Aristotle as well as the Peripatetic(s),
in separate lemmata,77 so what we have in the present chapter is no
exception. At At. II Aristotle (in both sources) is found in lemma
three, Heracleides and all the Peripatetics in lemma five. Stob. anthol.
I , b at At. IV , has the name-label Xenarchus [47] the Peripatetic
(Aristotle occurs in IV , , both sources again; chapters IV and IV , on
the soul qua incorporeal and qua corporeal, belong together). The other
cases with the name-label Peripatetics derive from Stobaeus.
Stob. anthol. I , at At. IV , (in the chapter On Sense-Perception
and the Senses, where Aristotle is at , ) has an interesting lemma with
prepositional formulas and a blend of Stoic and Peripatetic terminology:
3 X X I 8 < :, <
b +-, l : 8
, < L +-
.78 I had some doubt as to whether this lemma really is Atian rather
than Didymean, for the introductory 3 cannot be paralleled in
ps.Plutarch or, for that matter, in Atian lemmata found in Stobaeus only.
The usual formula is ' (
). There is a single parallel for 3 in
Arius Didymus, viz. in the account of Stoic ethics at Stob. anthol. II , ,
and in Sextus Empiricus, see immediately below; 8 < does not pertain to matter but
apparently to the moving cause, while 6 for the energeia apparently pertains to the
specific effort one has to make. One is reminded of Sextus Empiricus use of prepositional
formulas in a similar context, viz. in his discussion of the criterion at pyrrh. hyp. II
(chapter B 5 <, B <, B 6) and adv. math. VII
, , , , ff. Announced at pyrrh. hyp. II :
-
N , 5 < [efficient cause] < [instrumental cause]
6 [specific effort], _ 5 < E =, < E u O F
! l E : & 0 , o 9 = 8!
!
. The sense of these formulas is in some cases different, but
the agreement as to the use of < and 6 is noteworthy.
jaap mansfeld
had to be listed tooa School which in this context, i.e. on the basis of
the tenet attributed to it, is a branch of the Pythagorean hairesis.
() 0 ' 80 O -. At
first glance this is odd, even if we are prepared to take Thales and his fol-
lowing (' 80) cum grano salis. But we should not do so. A closer
look demonstrates how a doxographical lemma on Thales c.s. can state
that these philosophers believed the First Cause to be immobile. We do
know that the early Ionian monists posited a single principle (Aristotelian
subiectum est certe efficit, on which see P.L. Donini, Fato e volunt umana in Crisippo,
Atti della Accademia delle Scienze di Torino, CIX () pp. , esp. pp. ,
and de fat. on which see Id., Fato cit. pp. , and Frede, Original Notion cit.,
pp. ; also S. Bobzien, Determinism cit., p. note , and at greater length in Id.,
Chrysippus Theory of Causes, in K. Ierodiakonou (ed.), Topics in Stoic Philosophy, Oxford
, pp. .
82 Cfr. supra, notes and .
jaap mansfeld
term) only. Aristotle criticizes them for precisely this reason at metaph.
. b: they posit a single material substance as element and
principle of things, which remains what and as it is because according to
them nothing comes to be or perishes simpliciter (B
- @ b, 3 B G
>E O G , a 0 ;
-
). Even if we force ourselves to disregard the a-historical treatment
of the early monists as a sort of crypto-Eleatics,83 the fact remains that
according to Aristotle their single principle, or cause, in itself remains
unchanged (not affected by coming to be and passing away insofar as
it [51] is water, etc.) The Greek word means unchanged as well
as unmoved. The lemma in the doxography thus is a much compressed
rendering of Aristotles point, which moreover was implicitly accepted
by Theophrastus who pointed out that Anaxagoras was the first to posit
the efficient cause.84 We have also seen above that in Atius chapter
On Principles two of Thales purported followers, Anaximander and
Anaximenes, are criticized for failing to take the moving, or efficient,
cause into account.85
Generalizing statements about the early physicists, as we see, are al-
ready found in Aristotle. In the Atian Placita this tendency is even
stronger. Thales, of whom Aristotle and Theophrastus did not know very
much, becomes a symbolic figure, not unlike his counterpart Pythago-
ras. To both these figure-heads (for Pythagoras see for instance supra,
this section at subsection ()) doctrines associated with their purported
followers may be attributed (name-labels sometimes added, sometimes
not). But the issue of the part, or rather the variety of parts played by Suc-
* cession (diadoch) and School (hairesis) in the Placita literature is too big
to be treated in the present paper.
to Aristotle and Theophrastus (supra, note and text thereto) Anaxagoras was the first
early physicist to posit the moving cause. Note moreover that at Ps.Plutarch. placit. D
(part of text omitted by Stobaeus) at At. I , Thales is criticized because he only spoke
of matter and left out @ l B 8
, :
.
plato, pythagoras, aristotle, the peripatetics
only the B and mover, but also is moved and changes throughout
the cosmological-and-cosmogonic processes.86 [52]
briefness suggests that we are dealing with an abstract from a larger context. For proof
that Stobaeus abridged and modified a Didymean text (Ar. Didym. fr. Diels) compare
Eus. praepar. evang. XV , with Stob. anthol. I , e, on which see the comment of
D.T. Runia, Additional Fragments cit., pp. .
88 anthol. I , b at At. II , . Ibid. I , f at At. II , has no counterpart in
ps.Plutarch, but here 7 will be a Stobaean addition too, see J. MansfeldD.T. Runia,
Atiana cit. p. . Also cfr. anthol. I , d at At. II , ( 7 .), included
between brackets by Diels as a fraus Stobaei and not even mentioned in C.A. Huffman,
Philolaus of Croton. Pythagorean and Presocratic, A Commentary on the Fragments and
Testimonia with Interpretive Essays, Cambridge . 7 on the other hand occurs
five times in ps.Plutarch, with two Stobaean parallels; this form is therefore Atian.
jaap mansfeld
p. , Baust. .) briefly discusses the four types of cause (on the possibly Academic
origin of this doctrine see Baltes at p. , with references). Cfr. also phys. b:
8 E 3 O /- . See further the elaborate discussion of the four
types of cause at phys. B , esp. a, Y E 3 B +
O 9 /
X !. For Eudemus and Strato cfr. infra, note .
94 See supra, text to note .
jaap mansfeld
103 For the chain of causes see e.g. Ps.Plutarch. placit. B at At. I , = Chrys.
and S. Bobzien, Determinism cit., p. (who observes that the ' is not attested
for Chrysippus, but one should acknowledge that the term plays a conspicuous role in
Oenomaus arguments against Chrysippus; see previous note).
105 See also Cic. top. , de fat. , with the comments of R.W. Sharples, Cicero: On Fate
(De Fato) & Boethius: The Consolation of Philosophy IV. (Philosophiae Consolationis),
Warminster , p. .
106 See supra, note .
plato, pythagoras, aristotle, the peripatetics
! is eliminated, as follows: O @
6,
E O m I O E 6, < E O [!] . This
represents the incorporeal effect.
As to the Posidonian formulas O 8 , l 8 , F
B, F - Kidd argues107 that u
u indicate equivalent alternatives, and that - is
another term for the B in the sense of First Cause. For
this meaning of B he refers to Stob. anthol. I , d
O, but this lemma (though in the same Stobaean chapter)
is Atian not Didymaean,108 and Kidd admits that could pertain
to something more immediate. One should add that too may
pertain to something more immediate.109 Even so, Kidds interpretation
of B is attractive. On the other hand, the formula
6 is much wider than First Cause in a theological sense, and may
well embrace [61] for instance what came to be called the antecedent
and containing causes. Accordingly I vote for a distinction between
Posidonius general 6 and his B as referring to the Stoic
God; the latter is a 6, but the former is not identical with the latter,
though it may represent the pneuma, in an acting body, which is a particle
of this God.
The Stoic God, as is well known, is a principle (-), next to matter,
which is the other principle.110 There is some evidence that one of the
many names of this God is cause, for according to Stob. I , , p. .
W. = Chrys. fr. S.V.F. II pp. (printed by Diels as At.
I , in the chapter '
, On Fate, though the crucial
section, from p. . ff. W. is not paralleled in ps.Plutarch)111 Chrysippus
I , .: a + O !, Ar. Didym.
apud Stob. anthol. II , (= Chrys. fr. S.V.F. III p. , on the Stoic path): 3 E
@ !, Gal. de natur. facult. II p. . K. (Script. minor. III p. .
Helmreich = Erasistr. fr. Garofalo): T + ,
> 8
(scil. Erasistratus), de loc. affect. VIII p. . K.: &
+. On the other hand Cleanthes in the second line of his Hymn (fr. S.V.F. I p. )
addresses Zeus as
. Kidd, loc. cit., quotes [Aristot.] de mund. a: &
[-[]? JM] +.
110 E.g. Diog. Lart. VII , laudatio with references to Zenos On Substance, Cleanthes
On Atoms, book one of Chrysippus Physics (near the end), Archedemus On the
Elements, and book two of Posidonius Physical Treatise.
111 Von Arnim in the S.V.F. has failed to notice Diels attribution to Atius and gives
held that one among the many appellations of God attributed from
a variety of perspectives is +.112 This cannot be entirely right in
view of Chrysippus distinction bet[62]ween O, cause, and +,
explanation or account of the cause. But reports about the Stoics
are not always meticulous as to terminology. Plutarch, for instance, in
the De Stoicorum repugnantiis and De communibus notitiis, paraphrasing
Chrysippus and arguing against him, fails to distinguish between O
and + and uses the latter more often than the former. And Latin
authors, whose language only has the word causa, are prevented from
making the distinction at all.
However this may be, it is not at all unlikely that Posidonius, as argued
above, distinguished between the God, or B, as O (still
a 6) on one side, and the O or 6 in a wider sense on the other. It
is even not to be precluded that B and -
are ambiguous, and do not only refer to the very First Cause but may also
pertain to a rather remote cause, for instance to the fateful timber hewn
on Pelion.
V. Conclusion
p. (cf. supra, note ) in this same chapter has a brief lemma defining fate, with the
name-label Stoics, which is not paralleled in Stobaeus though ad sententiam it roughly
corresponds to the second part of the Stobaean lemma cited in the text to the present
note. Therefore it is most likely that Stobaeus in his usual way replaced a brief Atian
lemma with a larger and more informative piece taken from another source, viz. Arius
Didymus again. See D.T. Runia, Additional Fragments cit., pp. , who has the
Didymus fragment begin at p. . W.: .
112 Note that the restoration of Philod. de pietat. col. , Henrichs is hypothetical
113 Thanks are due to Keimpe Algra, Jan van Ophuijsen, and David T. Runia for their
patience in reading earlier drafts, and for their observations and criticisms. Naturally such
errors as remain are my responsibility.
plato, pythagoras, aristotle, the peripatetics
O 8 l
F l .
! OI 3 5 < 8 < 6I
: 5 <I B v B, 6 8 B.
1
3 E O , 3 E 3
& F 3 0 0 5!I M @
.
' ! 3 O !I !. [= S.V.F. II
p. ]
Qusta ibn Luqa Placita I Daiber
ber die Ursachen
8 ! A KI 9 + , ;
, > .
Anthol. c (Ar. Didym. fr. Diels = Zen. fr. S.V.F. I p. plus Chrys.
fr. S.V.F. II p. ; Posidon. fr. E.-K.)
{-.114} O 9 - @ 6I < E O -
I E O , < E O I @
E O , <
8 O & 5!. E
7 I O 8 l , _ 3 &
3 & & 0 3 & -
. 3 @
G & , F 0 & 0, F - & .
{}. O @
6. E O m
, < E O - m - I O E 6, < E O
! . [67] + @ +, F B + a
+.
{}. E AI O 8 , l 8 ,
F B, F -. E O m
, < E O G m G , 3 -
.
9, O . k + 115 , E -
S 3
8 8, 3 E
d O j v; 6 E k 3 -
3 3 , 8
A, 3 >3 + 7 K -
I
3 8
. S 3 -
K A. E
/0, E 0I E VK !,
E AI E 7 7, E
= [ !]. [68]
() O 8 l
() O 8 l
F l .
F l .
3 5.
() ! OI () ! O, 5 <
!, 5 < 8 < 6I 8 < 6I :
: 5 <I 5 <, B v B.
B E v B, 6 8 B.
() 1
3 () 3 E O
E O , 3 E , 3 E 3 & F
3 & F 3 3 0 0
0 0 5!. 5! @.
[[M1 @ .]]
() 1
7 B
L - 0
H , 8 <
& A, 5 <
B, E l @, E
l
() ' ! 3 O
!I !.
() 0 ' 80
O -.
() ' O
a .
() ' + @
3 E +!, 3 E !.
Jaap Mansfeld
1 Note that Plato, Phd. ea, has Socrates put the whole of natural philosophy on a
par with the explanation of genesis and phthora. Galen, De locis affectis VIII ..
Khn mentions the debate in a list of issues all of which recall
Placita chapters and their headings, a passage I cannot deal with here.
2 The division into chapters of our editions has no ancient authority. I shall refer to
3 Diels reference DG (for the chapter-heading only) to Stob. Ecl. ., which has
the chapter-heading 8 >0 +, is mislead-
ing, though it is possible (but unlikely) that the lemmata of At. . Diels were lost in the
course of the transmission of the Stobaeus chapter. In At. .. Diels we have an account
of Aristotles own views on nature, cf. below, text to n. .
4 For another example, pertaining to Cael. II. and At. . Diels, see Mansfeld,
a, pp. . On Aristotles dialectical method see e.g. the excellent pages of Algra,
, pp. (cf. also below, n. ); on its use by Theophrastus, see Baltussen, .
Runia, a, is a good general introduction to the difficult issues of doxography.
5 Lachenaud, , pp. (as elsewhere, in other cases) has noted some par-
ellels and antecedents in Aristotle, but his references are not always precise, and I shall
mostly refrain from discussing them. This remark is not meant to imply that his com-
ments are useless, for they are not. My main objection is that he comments on ps.-Plutarch
as if it were an ordinary philosophical text instead of an epitome which is part of a flexible
doxographical tradition. For a preliminary evaluation of his edition of ps.-Plutarchs text
see Mansfeld and Runia, , pp. .
atius, aristotle and others on coming-to-be
are lacking in DK. It is clear why the fourth (for which see below, section ) could not be
included.
8 Simp. In De cael. . believes that these are probably Orpheus and Musaeus
( E = 0 X 1
+).
Text printed Kern, , p. .
jaap mansfeld
open about the fact that he does not present these contrasting tenets
in chronological order: for dialectical reasons the most radical and
problematic one clearly has to come first.9
. Others, again, submit that all things come to be and are in flux,
and that only one thing persists underneath, of which these other
things are transformations. This is the view of many people, and of
Heraclitus of Ephesus.10 This thesis is not followed by a refutation
either.
. Finally, some people say that all bodies come into being; they put
them together from planes and dissolve them into planes (K
B,
.) This
doctrine, Platos of course in the Timaeus, is refuted at length;
the others, Aristotle says, can wait, that is, they will be refuted
eventually.11 We must note the absence of others who spoke of
the combination and separation of elemental stuffs, viz., the early
philosophers who as we shall shortly see play such an important
rle in the GC.
As has already been pointed out above, the Eleatic view is lacking in the
dialectical overview at GC I.; there is only a single exception to which
I shall revert in due time. The diaeresis is simple, though the dialectical
discussion is quite complicated. Among the ancients, Aristotle says, there
are two (contrasting) positions: some hold that coming to be simpliciter
is alteration (that is, qualitative alteration), others that coming to be and
alteration differ from each other. The monists, that is to say those who say
that the all is some one thing and make everything else come to be from
this one thing can only assume that coming to be is alteration (a
, cf. b). These people, we may point out, are about the same as
those defending position () in the overview in the De caelo.
On the other hand all the pluralists, for example Empedocles, Anaxa-
goras, and Leucippus, have to assume that coming to be and alteration
(b2) Marc., th text. Cf. Viano, , p. . Simp. In De cael. . adds the names and
principles of the early Ionian monists. Aristotle may also have had Plato Tht. e and
d in mind (below, n. and text thereto).
11 At the end of this first chapter, a, by way of a sort of afterthought, ()
certain Pythagoreans are mentioned and refuted, who put the universe together from
numbers i.e. monads (~ DK .). I do not know why Simplicius fails to comment on
this passage.
atius, aristotle and others on coming-to-be
12 More references to the sources for (parts of) this text in Diels, .
13 ! in the Empedocles fragment is translated by Wright, , and Williams,
, as separation; others translate interchange vel sim., for example Barnes, ,
vol. , p. , and already the Arabic translation (Austausch). As to Aristotle in the
present passage Williams is clearly right (for the problem of how to translate in
the fragment see below, n. and text thereto).
14 7 F B 7. For this fundamental type of question or enquiry (--
that being cannot be generated from absolute non-being. This entails a creative inter-
pretation of Parmenides predecessors, see Stokes, , pp. ff. Presumably Aristotle
in the first place has the Parmenidean tradition in mind: Anaxagoras, Empedocles, the
Atomists, discussed in the previous chapters.
atius, aristotle and others on coming-to-be
genesis does not exist at all is of greater importance. It is not a mere repe-
tition of the programmatic declaration at the beginning of the chapter. It
is part of an argument: if combination of shapes is to be rejected, there
either there is no genesis, or only alloisis. In its present form this argu-
ment is Aristotelian, but it may have had an atomist ancestor. The only
correct explanation [277] of unqualified genesis is the coming-together, or
combination, of indivisibles in empty space, and alloisis has to be dis-
tinguished from genesisthis very much looks like the Atomist answer
to the Eleatic ban on genesis and alloisis,17 even if we allow this answer
to have been rephrased by Aristotle.18
is quoted later on in the same chapter, viz., at e (where his name is found
in the Arius Didymus fragment).22 I translate the ps.-Plutarchan column
of At. .. Diels:
Parmenides Melissus Zeno abolished coming to be and passing away
because they held that the all is unmoved.23
This is a remarkable way of presenting the Eleatic argument concern-
ing genesis and phthora. Zenos arguments against motion are many, but
there is no other evidence that he used these to argue against genesis and
phthora too, or indeed that he argued against genesis and phthora at all.
To be sure, for Aristotle and Theophrastus the assumption of absolute
immobility implies that there can be no genesis, and no phthora. So pos-
sibly Zenos name has been added because the assumption that the all
is unmoved is the premise here. But it is perhaps equally likely that Par-
menides is simply accompanied by his two famous followers.24 As to Par-
menides himself, [278] he first argued for the ban on genesis and phthora
on ontological grounds and subsequently based motionlessness on the
defeat of genesis and phthora.25 Melissus derived the ungeneratedness of
being from its having no beginning. Later on in his argument its being
unmoved follows from its fullness: there is no void in which movement
can take place.26
The lemma in the Placita, in other words, modifies the priorities in
the Eleatic arguments as we know these from the verbatim fragments.
This calls for an explanation: as was only to be expected an intermediary
source, or sources, must be at issue.
Sedley, , p. .
26 Mel. DK B , B . See, for example, Barnes, , vol. p. ; Sedley, ,
pp. .
atius, aristotle and others on coming-to-be
27 Text to n. .
28 ~ Leuc. DK A (ba + a ff.), ~ Mel. DK A nd text (a),
and, oddly, because the One is said to be infinite, ~ Parm. DK A nd text (a);
see also below, n. . Aristotle knew Melissus well; the early catalogue at D.L. . lists a
3 # as no. , a title also found in the Vita Hesychii as no. , but absent
from the late catalogue of Ptolemy al-Garib.
29 Identified by Phlp. In De gen. et corr. .. ~ Parm. DK A rd text as
passage motion comes before plurality, while at the beginning one precedes unmoved.
The thesis of the ancients is grounded in a sufficient reason, viz., that there is no void,
which is stood on its head by Leucippus.
31 This view seems to be behind At. .. Diels (nd part, Stobaeus Ecl. .. only.
The lacuna in the DG has been wrongly postulated, see Wachsmuth ad p. .). The
lemma is of course related to the theme of Aet. . Diels, cf. below, section ad finem,
and above, n. and text thereto, below, text to n. . Discussion and reconstruction of
chapter . at Runia, b, pp. .
jaap mansfeld
argued against Leucippus. This does not matter in our context; compare above, section
ad init., the passage where Aristotle makes Hesiod contradict the Eleatics. That Aristotle
is right in taking Leucippus to argue against Melissus is argued by Kirk, Raven and
Schofield, , p. n. .
atius, aristotle and others on coming-to-be
Diels.33 Because in the context of the general theme of this Placita chapter
the idea of cosmogony is virtually superfluous, it would seem that the
first doxographer to contrast the Eleatics and the pluralists as to their
views on genesis and phthora was aware of Ph. VIII., b. We
may compare Theophrastus remark about Anaxagoras at Phys. op. fr.
Diels (~ A FHS&G) ap. Simp. In Ph. .: but as the cause of
motion (kinsis) and coming to be (genesis) he introduced Intellect, for
it is through separation by this that he explains the coming to be of
the cosmoi and of the other natural things. See also ibid. . on
Archelaus, who tried to say something original in his account of the
genesis of the cosmos. We may also adduce the first sentence of Phys. op.
fr. Diels (~ FHS&G) ap. Philo Aet. :34 Theophrastus says that
those who speak of the genesis and phthora of the cosmos were led astray
by four considerations [ . . . ].
On the other hand, a reference to Aristotles fundamental diaeresis
of doctrines concerning the archai at Ph. I. (quite often used in other
treatises too),35 where the Eleatics are said to defend one principle, or
being, that is unmoved (b: [sc. -] . . . , b:
} b) will probably not be sufficient. No argument
is provided here, and the concept of motion is not expanded so as to
include coming to be and passing away in the discussion of Parmenides
and Melissus to be found in the sequel of this chapter either.
What may have happened (this, at any rate, is the best suggestion
I can come up with) is that the argument attributed to the Eleatics at
At. .. Diels, viz., that coming to be and passing away do not exist
because the all is unmoved, ultimately derives from a combination of
ingredients taken from the Aristotelian passages cited above. Met. I.,
ab, as [280] we have seen, is quite clear about the Eleatic denial of
genesis and phthora, and of other kinds of motion; all one has to do when
arguing dialectically, or writing doxographically, is to be silent about
these other kinds of motion, and to omit the remark which attributes
motionlessness in a certain sense to the principle of the materialist
monists. The use of the acceptance, or denial, of motion as the premise of
an argument likely enough derives from Ph. VIII., b, itself as
we have noticed clearly related to the Leucippan argument at GC I.. As
to the latter one may now compare Theophrastus report of Leucippus
, pp. . Some of these passages (cf. next n.) apparently were well known. Tht.
da + da are quoted at length by Eus. PE .. (and de from
Eusebius at Theodoret CAG .), while bb is quoted in Stobaeus anthology at
Ecl. ... For another example of retrograde contamination see Mansfeld, , p.
on Hermias Irrisio ( ) and ps.Justins Cohortatio ( ), which closely correspond to each
other and to some extent to the anterior Placita traditions, but also contain material deriv-
ing from Arist. De an. I. which is not found in the other doxographical, or doxograph-
ically inspired, literature on the soul. Similarly, Cicero (or one of his predecessors) may
have inserted the Platonic reminiscence (Phd. b) into the doxography on the soul at
Tusc. ., just as ibid. he inserted material about Dicaearchus (~ fr. Wehrli) not to
be found in the parallel doxographies. He had written to Atticus, Att. .. ( SB) ~
Dic. fr. Wehrli to send him the two works on the soul as well as others by Dicaearchus.
Cf. Att. .. = SB. Shackleton Baileys doubts, , are unjustified.
40 Esp. Tht. e, ce, e. Plato, like Aristotle in some passages about the Eleatics
on the De sensibus.
44 See above, n. and text thereto.
jaap mansfeld
cannot step into twice.45 Now there are signs of Stobaean intervention
elsewhere at Ecl. ... We have seen above that he presumably left out
the name-label Zeno in the first lemma. Stobaeus third lemma, about
Platos view concerning the perishability of the cosmos, corresponds
verbatim with the greater part of the first lemma of ps.-Plutarch Plac.
., and accordingly was printed by Diels as At. ... It looks as if
Stobaeus inserted a lemma from another chapter into this one.46 The
motive behind this move is not hard to find. In the next lemma of At.
. Diels, that about Empedocles, and so on (see below, section ), the
persons concerned are said to be those who generate the cosmos;47 the
implication, as usual but with special emphasis in the context of this
chapter, is that they also destroy it. This view is nicely counterbalanced
by Platos tenet in Stobaeus according to which the cosmos is generated
but not destroyed (the doctrine of the Timaeus). Stobaeus, who clearly
knows what he is doing, thus creates a sub-diaeresis within a diaeresis.
But one cannot be absolutely certain. It is also possible that this Plato
lemma really belongs in the Atius chapter on genesis and phthora, and
that the tenet was there all along serving as a sort of counter-balance to
that of the others who generate the cosmos. Then we have to assume that
ps.-Plutarch struck it out here, only to insert part of it much later, viz., in
Plac. ... But this may well be less likely.
However this may be, it is a definite possibility that something in his
Atian source prompted Stobaeus to quote Plato Crat. a48 as a second
lemma, and it is not implausible that this something was an Atian lemma
with the name-label Heraclitus. The theoretical position may have been
there, just as in Arist. Cael. III.. And it is a fact that Stobaeus loves to
replace [282] lemmata from the Placita with quotations from one of his
favourite authors, viz., Plato himself,49 though it has to be admitted that
in the other cases these lemmata are about tenets attributed to Plato. Such
quotations are often introduced with an explicit reference to a Platonic
n. ).
49 Mansfeld and Runia, , pp. .
atius, aristotle and others on coming-to-be
50 The ch. -, On motion, where somewhat to our surprise the Eleatics are
not mentioned; there is a lemma (Stobaeus only) with the name-label Diodorus (Cronus):
everything has moved, nothing moves. Excellent analysis, and reconstruction of the
Atian form of this chapter by Runia, b, pp. , who prefers to translate the
title as On change. An interesting discussion of alloosis, genesis, phthora, auxsis, phthisis
and the elemental qualities, including the presence of several name-labels (Anaxagoras
[bracketed by Mller because absent in one ms.; unnecessarily, it seems], Aristotle
[interesting reference to the differences between GC on the one hand and Mete. and
Probl. on the other], Chrysippus, Zeno, Hippocrates) is at Gal., De naturalibus facultatibus
II .. K. = Scr. min. ... Mller, a passage with doxographical undertones
(cf. above, n. ) with which I cannot deal here. Short excerpts at SVF . nd text, .
and ..
51 ~ Heracl. DK A , nd text (= fr. (d1) Marc., nd text): $! \
E ! 8 6 /-I 7 3 B I E
& E .
52 Rather than the fourth as in Wachsmuths constitutio, which (as ususal) follows that
difference.
jaap mansfeld
again, that is what he did), for as a rule he takes care to present the
contradictions and diversities of clusters of doxai as clearly as possib-
ble.
The second lemma of Atius . Diels too derives from both ps.-Plu-
tarch and Stobaeus. The only difference is that Stobaeus has four name-
labels, viz., Empedocles Anaxagoras Democritus Epicurus, while ps.-
Plutarchs epitome has only two, namely the first and the last: Empedocles
and Epicurus.55 The Hellenistic name-label Epicurus may in our present
context be disregarded. [283]
The doctrine about genesis and phthora attributed to this group of
people mirrors Aristotles discussion of Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and
the Atomists in the GC, though not, of course, without the usual sort of
doxographic distortion. This flattening-out leaves out explicit mention of
Empedocles elements and Anaxagoras corpuscles, leaving only bodies
composed of fine particles. Now Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Democritus,
Epicurus, and all those
who generate a cosmos56 through the aggregation of bodies composed of
fine particles introduce combinations and separations, but not comings to
be and perishings (geneseis kai phthoras) in the true sense of these words
(ou kuris). For these [sc. comings to be and perishings according to these
philosophers] do not come about according to quality from alteration
(alloisis), but according to quantity from aggregation.57
We have seen above that Aristotle in the first chapters of the GC argues
that the pluralists to be consistent should claim that genesis and phthora
are different from alloisis, while the early monists were unable to dis-
tinguish them. According to the pluralists the processes of genesis and
phthora are a matter of combination and separation.58 This is what we
find this time as well. But now we must also look at Aristotles argu-
ment that even the pluralists fail to account for unqualified genesis (and
phthora). Aristotle successfully avails himself of his doctrine of the cat-
version).
58 See above, section .
atius, aristotle and others on coming-to-be
59 See GC I..
60 Cf. Plato, Phd. cd.
jaap mansfeld
Also the third and final lemma of At. . Diels is found in both ps.-
Plutarch and Stobaeus, but the Stobaean text is a bit longer, and at
first sight seems confused or at least confusing. It formulates the tenet
opposed to that in the previous lemma, according to which a number of
philosophers failed to allow for comings to be and perishings (geneseis
kai phthoras) in the true sense (kuris). Others, indicated by the complex
name-label Pythagoras and all those (note this formula ! 6,
also found in the previous lemma) who assume
[ps.-Plutarch] [Stobaeus]
that matter is passive (introduce) that matter is passive (introduce)
coming to be and passing away in coming to be and passing away in the
the true sense; for these come about true sense; for through the qualitative
through the qualitative alteration alteration of the elements and
and turning and dissolution of the (their) turning and dissolution [of
elements. coming to be and passing away] do
juxtaposition and mixing, blending
and fusion come about.
atius, aristotle and others on coming-to-be
! 6 ! 6
& & A 5, & & A 5,
3
3
I 8 3 I 8 3
0 0
B . [
K]61
! , K
.
perseveration: no less than four genitives precede these two words in the clause in which
they occur. For the simple emendation I should like to propose see below, n. and
text thereto. The final clause then would run . . . do coming to be and passing away,
juxtaposition and mixing, blending and fusion come about. This makes sense.
62 GC I., b.
63 For - see, for example, SVF . ~ Ar. Did. fr. Diels ap. Stob. Ecl. ..,
says that perhaps the Stoics never spelled out the precise nature of elemental alteration.
Admittedly the evidence is thin, but less hopeless than he believes.
atius, aristotle and others on coming-to-be
69For example, SVF . ~ Ar. Did. fr. Diels ap. Stob. Ecl. ..,
3
0 0 '
!, , K, ., and
SVF . ap. Alex. Mixt. ch. , .. Bruns.
70 Lachenaud, , p. , n. to his p. , refers to D [sc. .] et note ad loc.
and a few more letters are left in Philodemus Index Stoicorum, col. liv. Dorandi, and
according to the Parisian index to Diogenes Lartiuson which see Mansfeld, b,
pp. and Dorandi, he was discussed in the lost part of book VIII (these
texts not in SVF). Todd, , p. believes that Alexander must be speculating [my
italics] that there was Aristotelian influence on the Stoic theory of mixture, but this is
pure speculation. Alexander for instance does not attribute this syncretism to Antipater
himself and says that Sosigenes and others came to know Aristotles views only later,
which presumably means after Antipater had gone. Another pupil of Antipater, Panaetius,
admired Aristotle and the Peripatos as well (Cic. Fin. . ~ Panaet. fr. van Straaten =
fr. Alesse; Philod. Ind. Stoic. col. lxi. Dorandi).
atius, aristotle and others on coming-to-be
The final chapter of the first book of Diels Atius (not in Stobaeus),74
entitled On nature, is remarkable. That is to say, it does not provide what
the title makes one expect and what has in fact already been provided at
At. . Diels, the chapter entitled What is nature? ( 8 , not
in Stobaeus either). Ch. . does not define or explain the concept of
physis (nature) but contains two lemmata pertaining to tenets according
to which there is no such thing as physis:75
Empedocles (holds) that there is no physis, but mixing of the elements and
separation. For in the first book of his Physika he writes as follows:
I shall tell you something more: there is no physis of all that is mortal, or
an end consisting in wretched death, but only mixing, and separation76
of what has been mixed, and physis is what it is called by men.
In the same way Anaxagoras (holds) that physis is combination and sepa-
ration, that is to say coming to be and passing away.
The meaning of physis in this verbatim Empedocles fragment is dis-
puted.77 We have seen above (in section ) that Aristotle for example,
at GC I., b where he quotes parts of the fragment interprets
physis here as genesis in Empedocles sense of a combination of parts
of elements. But at Met. V., ba, where the whole fragment
is quoted, he interprets physis as substance (ousia), which however he
seems to put on a par with something called primary combination. At
first sight it would appear that in the Placita context physis in the Empe-
docles fragment indeed means genesis, just as according to Aristotle (in
the first chapter of the GC), where he also takes ! to mean sep-
aration. But note the fourth line: men call physis what really is only mix-
ing and separation (?). It is idle to speculate about lost lines that would
have followed, lines maybe telling us that the end consisting in wretched
death too is merely a human way of designating what really happens in
the real world, viz., separation.
What physis in the Anaxagoras lemma means is also a bit tricky. Ps.-
Plutarch/Atius begins by stating that Anaxagoras agrees with Empedo-
cles about physis for he, too, said that physis is combination and sepa-
ration, that is: genesis and phthora. So physis here at least seems to be
more than genesis in the sense of coming to be only: it includes phthora.
If according to the compiler of this Placita chapter Anaxagoras tenet
agreed with Empedocles, Empedocles must have agreed with Anaxago-
ras. Empedocles too, then, according to our compiler, would mean both
genesis and phthora when talking about physis. Natural philosophy would
be about genesis and phthora, would be de generatione et corruptione.
Genesis in the sense of birth, or of coming to be, implies death, or passing
away.
What I think should be done in the first place is to recall who first diser-
tis verbis mentioned Empedocles and Anaxagoras together because, after
all, their concept of genesis as combination (and of phthora as separation)
in his view was not good enough or, in Anaxagoras case, inconsistent.
This person, as we have seen ad satietatem, is none other than Aristo-
tle in the first chapter of the GC.78 The most plausible hypothesis there-
fore is that it is this Aristotelian chapter, and this Aristotelian context,
which prompted the Zusammenstellung of Empedocles and Anaxago-
ras in At. . Diels. The intermediary source, viz., the one depending
on Aristotle which in its turn became the ultimate source of the Atius
chapter, remarkably enough filled in the gaps in Aristotles Empedoclean
quotation. For the Anaxagoras lemma it did not, apparently, come up
with a verbatim quotation. But it is clear that what is at At. .. Diels,
the omission of which in Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker is a serious
oversight, is a paraphrazing abstract of the famous Anaxagoras fragment
quoted verbatim by Simplicius:79
The view of coming to be and perishing held by the Greeks is not correct.
For no thing comes into being or perishes; on the contrary, it is from things
that are that it is mixed together and (into which) it separates out. For this
reason they would be correct in calling coming to be being mixed together
and perishing separating out.
78 Plato, Lg. .e, cited by OBrien, , pp. , does not mention names,
, a, Thphr. Phys. op. fr. Diels (~ A FHS&G), cf. below. n. , and At.
.. ad finem. See also Joachim ad GC I., a (whose argument however is not
entirely clear); he rightly translates failed to understand his own utteranceso also the
Revised Oxford Translation. Also cp. Lanza, , .
jaap mansfeld
Parm. DK B at Sens. .
84 Phys. op. fr. (cited above, n. ) where he puts him on a par with Anaximander.
5! @ @ 3
, 6 N
.
atius, aristotle and others on coming-to-be
physicians and astronomers.86 Now the first chapter of the first book
of ps.-Plutarch/Atius, as I have already mentioned above,87 is entitled
What is nature (physis)?, and in its second lemma gives a quite short *
and not entirely accurate version of Aristotles views on the matter.88
According to (this) Aristotle, physis exists and can be talked about.
According to the introduction at .., the Empedocles (and so also the
Anaxagoras) of the final chapter hold that physis does not exist. The first
and the last chapter, spanning the entire length of the first book, provide
a nice (though a bit superficial) diaphonia. To my surprise the key to the
structure of numerous individual chapters also fits the issue of At. ..
plus ..89 Those who believe that these two chapters are too far apart to
have anything to do with each other are invited to look at the next section,
on ps.-Galen. It is, naturally, possible that in the version of ps.-Plutarch
at ps.-Galens disposal the chapters . and . were still together, or had
been recombined. But in the version of ps.-Plutarch known to us (and to
the Arabic translator) they are separate. David Runia suggests (per litt.)
that ps.-Plutarch at first left out the contents of . when summarizing
., but then thought it would be nice to have some poetry at the end of
the first book, where he had a bit of room left. This is possible, but against
it, in my view, is the fact that in ps.-Plutarch each of these chapters has an
innocuous short title which does not give the contents away, viz., What
is nature?, and On nature, and that . could also have been inserted in
some way or other in ..90
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93 Or else his version of ps.-Plutarch had only one chapter, see above, section ad
finem. But this assumption does not agree very well with the order of the lemmata in
ps.-Galen.
94 Text not in SVF.
95 See Mansfeld and Runia, , p. . The closest parallel is at SVF . ap.
D.L. ..
* Thanks are due to Keimpe Algra, Frans de Haas, David Runia, and especially Jan
van Ophuijsen, who criticized earlier versions. I am conscious of the fact that I may have
been wrong in not always following their advice.
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Mansfeld, J. (b), Diogenes Laertius on Stoic philosophy, Elenchos, ,
, repr. in Mansfeld, b.
Mansfeld, J. (a), Doxography and Dialectic: The Sitz im Leben of the
Placita , in Haase, W.H., ed., ANRW II ., Berlin: Walter de Gruyter,
pp. . [292]
Mansfeld, J. (b), Studies in the Historiography of Greek Philosophy, Assen:
Van Gorcum.
jaap mansfeld
Wehrli, F., ed. (), Die Schule des Aristoteles, Heft : Dikaiarchos, nd edn.,
Basel: B. Schwabe.
Williams, C.J.F. (), Aristotles De generatione et corruptione, Oxford: Claren-
don Press.
Wright, M.R. (), Empedocles, The Extant Fragments, New Yale University
Press.
chapter seventeen
COSMIC DISTANCES *
ATIUS 2.31 DIELS AND SOME RELATED TEXTS
Jaap Mansfeld
composed by the poet himself.3 But Diels argument that the account of
the archai in the Armenian Philo originally is a scholium, or set of scholia,
can hardly be contested.
Because Diels purpose in these opening pages is to establish a date
(later than Philo) for ps.Plutarch, he omitted to deal with the interesting
question why the Placita literature was adduced by readers of philosoph-
ical or other treatises, who might even go as far as to copy out whole pas-
sages in the margin of their text. What he could not know at the time is
that parallels for such copying exist. The scholia in the margins of the mss.
of Basils Hexaemeron contain interesting doxographical material deriv-
ing from a cousin, or cousins, of the source abridged by ps.Plutarch, viz.
Atius.4 But this parallel is not good enough. Philos text becomes more
clear when the interpolated material is subtracted, while the scholia on
Basil clarify the latters text which is allusive, and does not mention [177]
the names of the philosophers whose tenets are dealt with. A better paral-
lel is provided by a quite superfluous scholium in the oldest manuscripts
of Ptolemys Megal Syntaxis, or Almagest.
was accepted by Diels; more scholia published by Poljakov () and Cataldi Palau
(). See Mansfeld and Runia () ff.
5 Scholium in Ptol. Alm. . Heiberg (in the apparatus):
. The issue of the original extent of the chapter, or chapters, links up with
the problem of the thematic chapter headings in Stobaeus and ps.Plutarch *
(and ps.Plutarch as excerpted in Eusebius Praeparatio evangelica and
ps.Galens Historia philosopha, and as translated into Arabic by Qusta
ibn Luqa). Ps.Plutarch and his tradition do have both short and long
headings, but the size and contents of these headings may differ in
the different branches.10 In the early papyrus fragments of ps.Plutarch
7 See Lachenaud () f., ; the earliest ms. dates to the thth cent. The tiny
rd-cent. papyrus fragments of ps.Plutarch do not contain traces of Plac. ..
8 See Mansfeld and Runia () ff., ff.
9 Below, .
10 See Mansfeld and Runia () (Eusebius), (ps.Galen), (Qusta ibn
Luqa). For a first orientation on ancient titles and subdivisions of texts see the papers
collected in Fredouille & al. (), where however I have found no systematic treatment
of the issue of shorter versus longer thematic book-titles and chapter-headings, an issue
which deserves further study; but an interesting observation on the titles of a Hippocratic
treatise is found ibid., Jouanna () .
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! in one book, which possibly later but at any rate short title in the catalogue
at D.L. . is followed by #, so the work could have dealt with
cosmic distances. Nothing is known about its contents. Still, Thphr. Met. b reports
that Xenocrates applied ! in a consistent way (fr. Heinze);
see Laks and Most () , van Raalte () .
cosmic distances
so for the introduction of a ch. a.16 The heading of ch. leaves out
the - of the short heading of ps.Plu. ., in this way conform-
ing to the form of the heading at ch. . The headings of chs. are
the same as those of ps.Plu. ., B being no more than an
inferior varia lectio of the original . The heading of ch. is
interesting: it starts with the second clause of the long heading of ps.Plu.
., and adds : - as an afterthought rendering the first clause (we
recall that in ps.Plutarch this first clause has >0 not -). Accord-
ingly the long heading of . was in the text of ps.Plutarch epitomized
by ps.Galen.
I believe that it is safe to conclude that in the Urtext of ps.Plutarch the
headings of chapters . were short, whereas that of . may or may
not have been long. The extra clause 3 (because
of what it appears earth-like) certainly anticipates, and is derived from,
the first sentence of the first lemma of this chapter in ps.Plutarch, ..:
' & - 3
>& . (The Pythagoreans (held) that the moon appears earth-like
because it is inhabited on all sides). At Stob. .., under the short sub-
heading17 E 8! >0, the first part of this lemma is quite
different: E
,18 n 8 , !-
>0 @ 3 & - . (Some of the
Pythagoreans, among whom [181] Philolaus, (held) that its looking/shin-
ing like earth is the case because it is inhabited on all sides).19 We notice
the way ps.Plutarch abridges Atius, as he is wont to do. He deletes a
name label and simplifies what remains; thus some of the Pythagore-
ans among whom Philolaus becomes the Pythagoreans. But it is not
certain that Stobaeus provides the original text of Atius in what fol-
lows: the very common adjective (earth-like) occurs several
times in Atius, i.e. both in ps.Plutarch and in Stobaeus (for instance
in the Anaxagoras lemma in the present chapter, ps.Plu. .., A
16 DG ..
17 For the headings at Stob. . see below, .
18 This must be the originally Atian formula; cf. ps.Plu. .., B = Stob. ..a,
. Let us now take a closer look at the chapter heading and sub-headings
in Stob. .. The heading of the chapter as a whole in Wachsmuths
index, whereas Diels is able to cite four instances of from Thphr. Sens. In Aristotle
is a quite common word (see Bonitz s.v.), whereas - does not occur; it is
found once (in a different sense) at Thphr. Lap. (see further LSJ s.v.). For plus
- also cf. Plu., Fac. C, E, D.L. . (SVF .).
21 Parm. B is put among the dubious fragments in DK; the editors point out: das
Runia () f., and esp. ff. where instances comparable to the present one are
analyzed.
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edition is - >
-
8 8! ! -
(On the moons substance and size and form and illuminations
and on (its) eclipse and outward appearance and on (its) distances and
signs). The part added by Wachsmuth derives from the pinax of the
whole work in Photius, but such a table of contents need not conform
in every detail to the chapter headings in the body of a work.23 In the
pre[183]sent case the mss. only have the chapter heading -
>
- (On the moons substance and size
and form), whereas the items in Photius index which are taken over
by Wachsmuth are represented by sub-headings in Stobaeus text: ..
E >0 (And on its illuminations), . E
8 - (And on the eclipse of the moon), . E
8! >0 (And on its outward appearance), . E
! (And on the distances), and finally . -
(Signs of the moon).
Such sub-headings are quite rare in the Eclogae physicae.24 In the
present case my firm impression is that Stobaeus first composed the quite
long section which as to its contents corresponds with the chapter head-
ing as transmitted. These contents consist of lemmata, often coalesced,
from the chapters of Atius which correspond to ps.Plu. ., plus one
25 The long chapter on the sun (Stob. .) which comes immediately before likewise
sub-headings.
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. The first lemma. If we may believe that Stobaeus deleted the words
0 -, we would have an explanation of an odd varia lectio as
well as of other, at first sight even stranger differences in Stobaeus first
lemma. Ps.Plu. Plac. .. reads 10 !
&
- [185] [accusative confirmed by Eusebius and ps.Galen and, as
we shall see, by the Ptolemy scholium] B : u 0
0 (Empedocles (held) that the distance of the moon from the sun
is twice that from the earth). Stob. Ecl. Phys. .., first lemma, reads
10 !
0 - 0 add. Diels in
DG, followed by Wachsmuth 0 u B : (Empedocles
(held) that the distance of the moon from the earth is twice that from
the sun).28 The genitive 0 - is an obvious mistake. On the above
hypothesis this can be explained. Stobaeus decided to delete 0 -
in his sub-heading, and this decision was still on his mind when he
8 ! B; 8 + FC
C, /, F8 + FC.
28 At Emp. A DK both versions are cited, but that of Stobaeus is subsequently
copied out the first lemma so he wrote a genitive instead of the required
accusative. According to Diels he then compounded his error, muddling
the rest of the sentence by having the bits about sun and earth swap
places.29 We should note that the Ptolemy scholium reads 10
!
& - 0 0 8 (Empedocles
believed that the distance of the moon from the earth is twice that). The
last word of this sentence (believed) has been added by the scholiast,
but !
& - 0 0 at first sight seems
to confirm Stobaeus
0 - 0. There are two
options of which I prefer the first: in the scholium either the words B
: u may have dropped out in the middle because of saut
du mme au mme, or, far less likely, the words u B :
may have fallen out at the end. I suppose that Stobaeus, when copying
out this sentence, made the same mistake (saut du mme au mme) as
the scholiast, and that, when he realized his error, he added at the end a
version of the omitted words. These explanations allow us to believe that
in the present case ps.Plutarchs version of this lemma is the correct one.30
The second lemma is unproblematic; it is virtually identical in all
our sources.31 Ps.Galen abridges ps.Plutarchs '
to [186] ' . Stobaeus reads ' E , which is confirmed
by the Ptolemy scholium; this presumably is a coincidence.
The third lemma is highly interesting. It is incomplete in ps.Plutarch
through saut du mme au mme (which I shall indicate by italicizing the
words at issue): 1
T ***
0 0
! H- j (Eratosthenes (held) that the sun ***
29 Ps.Plutarchs text is confirmed by Eusebius, Qusta ibn Luqa, and ps.Galen. See also
Diels, DG .
30 Whether the tenet is to be attributed to Empedocles via Theophrastus is another
matter altogether.
31 The view reported (inaccurately: he proved in his first proposition that the distance
of the sun from the earth is greater than eighteen times, but less than twenty times, the
distance of the moon (scil., from the earth)) is that of Aristarchus, whose name is not
mentioned. The doxa has been flattened out. Aristarchus little treatise
! : - survived as part of the corpus of astronomical and
related treatises called Little Astronomer (to distinguish it from the Great Astronomer,
i.e. Ptolemys Almagest); it has been edited and translated by Heath () .
Hipparchus treatise in two books with the same title (for information and suggestions
about its contents see Heath ibid. ) did not survive, because the other work was
shorter. For Plutarch who cites Aristarchus first proposition see below, . It is quoted
verbatim by Pappus, Coll. ., ... Hultsch (transl. Heath ibid. ).
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0 0 # j, & E -
0 0 # H- j, i.e. assumes the saut du mme au mme
to have occurred elsewhere and omits the second before the second !;
this makes no difference.
cosmic distances
Needless to say only the distances of the sun and moon could be computed with any
degree of accuracy in antiquity with the means available.
37 The Eratosthenes lemma is dicussed by Heath () , but his reportage con-
cerning the big number is not good (and he did not know the Ptolemy scholium).
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todays mathematical astronomy38 has proved that the size of the sun is
greater than that of the earth and that the distance of the stars [i.e. the
outer heavenly sphere] from the earth is many times greater than that of
the sun, just as the (distance of) the sun is many times greater than (that of)
the moon from the earth.
. We may now look at the Ptolemy scholium a bit more closely, and ask
ourselves how this abstract from ps.Plutarch came to be inserted in the
text of the Almagest after the list of the nineteen kephalaia of book five.
The answer is that something in this list acted as a trigger. The heading
of Alm. ch. . is 1 0 - ! (Proof of
the distances of the moon). This must have recalled to whoever copied
out this abstract the chapter heading at ps.Plu. ., which in the text at
her disposal can only have been ! -.40 What
is more, the heading of ch. . is B :B -
>; (On the distance of the sun and further
consequences of the proof thereof ).
What is interesting is that the chapter headings in our mss. of Ptolemy
may be spurious; some of them cover the contents in a rather inade-
quate way.41 By the time the astute mathematician Pappus of Alexandria
(ca. [189] ce) wrote his commentary on the Almagest 42 chapter divi-
sions and headings had been introduced; but at least for book five these
were sometimes different from those in the Ptolemy mss. The same holds
for the commentary of Theon of Alexandria, composed about thirty years
later.43 Some of the present chapter headings should therefore perhaps be
dated after Theon and before the date of our earliest Ptolemy ms. (ninth
cent.), i.e. presumably to late antiquity, when scholars and commentators
that Ptolemy himself did not use any chapter divisions at all. He brackets all chapter
headings. But the issue is more problematic, see Rome () n. ; it can only be
solved by comparing the chapter-headings in Ptolemys other works. For the Harmonica
see Dring () lxxvi, who argues that the headings are beyond doubt genuine.
42 Extant books edited by Rome ().
43 Extant books partly edited by Rome () and ().
cosmic distances
were even more interested in meticulous chapter division than their pre-
decessors.44 But the heading of Alm. . is already 1 0
- ! in Pappus (according to Romes edition, p. .).
Unless contamination with the later Ptolemy mss. has taken place the
t.p.q. for the scholium is therefore the unknown date of Pappus exem-
plar of Ptolemys text.
This helps explain what triggered the copying of the abstracts from
ps.Plutarch in a ms. (subsequently translated into Armenian) of Philos
De providentia at .: it must have been something in the text. It has
already been pointed out that the abstracts from ps.Plu. . begin with
Thales not Plato.45 The relevant section of Philos text runs as follows:46
Plato knows that these [i.e. the cosmos and its contents] are made by God,
and that matter, which of itself lacks adornment, comes in the cosmos with
its adornment. [ . . . ] For the lawgiver of the Jews Moses said also that water,
darkness and chaos existed before the cosmos; Plato, however, (that it was)
matter,47 Thales the Milesian water [ . . . ].
The word in the text which triggered the insertion is water. Philos Moses
said that water, darkness and chaos were there before the cosmos, and
Philo held that this had been taken up by Plato. Water as the primordial
element of course made someone think of Thales; she looked things up
in her copy of ps.Plutarch and not only abstracted information about
Thales, but wrote out more. Perhaps she even knew this stuff more or
less by heart. We may also think of a scholastic context in which the
Philo text [190] was read with students and the professor provided more
parallels from Greek philosophy than Philo himself had done.
The Ptolemy scholium, on the other hand, is a bit inept in its context,
however precious it may be to those of us who attempt to study and
understand the historiography and use of physical tenets from Aristotle
to Atius, and beyond. It looks like a marginal note by a reader, who on
coming across the headings of book five of the Almagest thought she
could prepare herself for the study of these difficult matters by already
jotting down the information provided by a chapter in ps.Plutarch.
. One issue about this chapter is left, viz. that concerning the fourth and
fifth lemmata at Stob. .., which were incorporated by Diels in his
tabular reconstruction of Atius at . (DG ). I have pointed
out above that the question here is to some extent different from that in
the previous lemmata: not the relative, or absolute, distances of the moon,
sun, and earth from each other, but the real or seeming distance of the
outer heaven from the earth in relation to its shape.48 I do not deny that
the question concerning the distance of the outer heaven from the earth
is related to that of the distances from it of the sun and moon. Aristotle, as
we have seen, mentioned both issues in a single sentence, which is part of
a discussion that is more concerned with the distance of the outer heaven
from the earth than with those of the sun and moon.49 Still, the two issues,
viz. the distances of the sun and moon on the one hand and that of the
outer heaven, however shaped, on the other, may be distinguished from
each other.
Here we receive some help from a perhaps unexpected quarter, viz.
the short collection of abstracts entitled > (On the
things in the heavens) which served as an introduction to Aratus.50 This
piece contains two very small chapters (or rather paragraphs), less than
three lines each, with the shortest possible chapter headings: , s
and , -. For all their slightness these correspond, as to contents
and sequence, to the two series of chapters on the sun and the moon in
ps.Plutarch, or to the two Stobaean chapters on the sun and the moon.
Maass p. in margine refers to Achilles p. for the sun chapter and
to Achilles p. [191] for the moon chapter.51 One item found in these
tiny chapters is not paralleled in Achilles though it can be paralleled from
Atius.52 Another item can be paralleled neither in Achilles nor in Atius,
viz. that the size of the sun is eighteen times that of the earth. So it would
seem that what we have here are the thin remains of another cousin
writing of Atius, or of the same cousin writing that was abstracted in
48 Above, .
49 Above, text to n. .
50 Extant in Paris. suppl. gr. A, the oldest ms. (th. cent.) containing Aratea;
work containing material abstracted from ps.Plutarch, as Diels believed, see Mansfeld
and Runia () .
52 Preliminary remarks at Mansfeld and Runia () .
cosmic distances
a different way by Achilles. But there is more. After these two chapters
there is a third one (ch. ) with a quite substantial heading, which as to
its theme and place corresponds to the last two lemmata at Stob. ...53
This heading at p. . Martin (= p. . Maass) is !-
B >B 0 0 (On the distance of the heaven from the
earth). Though as already said the theme is the same as that of Stobaeus
final two lemmata, the actual contents are entirely different and cannot be
paralleled from the Placita literature (and not from Achilles either): the
excerptor quotes four lines from Hesiods Theogony () to under-
pin his view that the heavenly hemispheres are equidistant from the earth
in both the upward and downward directions.54 Poetic quotations are
found here and there in Diels Atius, and they are not restricted to chs.
and of book one;55 a quotation from Hesiods Theogony (line ) is at
.. Diels. Therefore it is not to be excluded that a pre-Atian version
of the Placita quoted Hesiod at this point, though it is equally possible
that the excerptor substituted his adapted Hesiod quote for other mate-
rial as being more fitting in introductory comments on Aratus, who is
called a follower of Hesiod (& $) in the first version of
his biography.56
However this may be, the chapter heading ! B
>B 0 0 is entirely appropriate for the two final lemmata
in Stobaeus: [192] material which may have been abstracted by Atius
from an earlier and richer Placita source. What is there, or possibly is
left, constitutes a nice diaphonia: according to Empedocles the distance
of the heaven from the earth is really greater in the upward direction than
laterally, whereas according to Boethus this is only so according to the
presentation, and not really the case.57 Boethus, clearly, represents those
53 Also found in Marcianus (th cent.) and later mss., though without head-
ing and without the preceding two chapters; see Martin () , text at Maass ()
p. f., Martin () p. .
54 Good discussion at West () , who shows that the excerptor modified Hesiods
wording to make the quotation fit his point of view. The contents of this ch. are also found
(without heading, and without being preceded by Sun and Moon) at Martin ()
p. . = Maass () p. ...
55 Aratus and Euripides at .., Callimachus and Euripides at .., Homer at
Pfeiffer is quoted as evidence for this quite common view. The Stoic Boethus of Sidon in
the first book of his on him [scil., Aratus] disagreed, Vita II Martin (), p. . ff.
(not in SVF, but noticed by Von Arnim () . ff.)
57 Cf. Gem. . ff., + E 9 , _ E 9 +, L E 9 ;
.
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. As to the contents of the first three lemmata in the Placita chapter (or
chapters), compare Plu. Fac. AD, where three views are compared
which are virtually the same as in the Atius tradition, viz. () that of
Empedocles: moon very close to the earth according to short fragment(s)
cited verbatim; () that of Aristarchus: figures cited more accurately,
i.e. from the original source, than in the second lemma of the Plac.,
and name label lacking in Atius58 given by Plutarch; and () that of
an anonymous other authority: large figures though quite different from
those in the various versions of Atius,59 that is to say distance of moon
to earth ,, stades, of sun to moon ,, stades. More or less
verbatim quotation of physical placita is not found in Plutarch.60
However in the present case his learned discussion may indeed be
indebted to the Placita literature. Plutarch develops the issue point by
point, listing the lemmata in the same sequence and according to the
same pattern as found at At. . Diels, viz. involving ever increas-
ing numbers and a marked difference of opinion (i.e. a diaphonia). We
may therefore hypothesize that he preferred to substitute more detailed
and more accurate data concerning Empedocles and Aristarchus, and
replaced Eratosthenes tenet by an equally spectacular though quite sim-
ilar view. He is quite sarcastic [193] about the large numbers calculated by
one of the mathematical astronomers, and quite in favour of Empedocles
view, which is more down to earth in the literal sense of the expression.
One of the uses scholars, philosophers and others made of the Placita
literature was to check matters concerning the authorities who figured
as name labels. Eventually this prompted them to look elsewhere, or
even to cite from the original sources,61 and presumably this is what
Plutarch did, at any rate for Empedocles and Aristarchus. What is more,
which begins with the sentence It is better to give a brief overview of the (tenets) of the
others, not so much for the sake of the record as that my own view may become clearer
and more firmly established when these others have been presented first.
61 Examples provided at Mansfeld () ff.
cosmic distances
though in what follows he discusses the infinity of the universe and the
difficulty involved in arguing that the earth is in the middle (in the
middle of what? he asks at F), he does not mention the various views
concerned with the distance of the earth from the outer heaven (involving
in particular the shape of the heaven) to be found in lemmata four and
five at Stob. .. (= At. .. Diels), and lacking in ps.Plutarch.
At the beginning of his account (A), on the other hand, Plutarch
had stated that according to the mathematical astronomers the sun is an
immense number of myriadspresumably of stadesdistant from the
upper circumference of the (clearly spherical) cosmos, and that above
the sun Venus and Mercury and the other planets evolve lower than the
fixed stars and at great distances from one another ( - 8
! !
).62 So here the outer heaven is certainly
at issue. But such computations of the distances of the fixed stars and
the planets are dismissed in a sentence placed between his accounts of
Empedocles and Aristarchus, viz. at E: Forget about the rest, viz. the
fixed stars and the planets (X = !),
and consider the demonstration of Aristarchus . . . The distances of these
other heavenly bodies, and of the outer heaven itself, are in fact not
discussed by Plutarch here. He may have known a version of what is
at Stob. .., but whether in his source of reference this was a single
chapter or consisted of two cannot be decided on the basis of the evidence
he provides. If it was a single chapter he must have decided not to use the
second part concerning the outer heaven because, as we have seen, this
is an issue he explicitly wants to leave out. Note moreover that Plutarchs
planets are absent from the final two Stobaean lemmata, and that unlike
Plutarch these do not speak of the fixed stars but of the heaven, viz. at
At. .. Diels, the Empedocles lemma. If there were two chapters he
preferred to ignore the second, for the reason just mentioned. [194]
in general terms of the relative velocities of the circles vis--vis each other.
66 Transl. Cherniss (), slightly modified; my italics.
cosmic distances
of the sizes and of the distances, and the discovery of the arrangement
of their position was attributed to the Pythagoreans.69 Simplicius adds
that up to his own time the sizes and distances of the sun and moon
have been computed on the basis of their eclipses, and speculates that
Anaximander may already have proceeded in this way. To our surprise
he misunderstood Aristotles reference at the beginning of the chapter; 8
is ambiguous, and may be translated from the work [singular]
about astronomy. This is why he believed the reference to be to Eudemus
Astronomical Enquiry, and why, unfortunately, he fails to cite evidence
concerning the mathematical astronomers Aristotle may have had in
mind, let alone evidence relating to later astronomers, and mentions
Anaximander and the Pythagoreans: philosophers, that is, or at any rate
physicists.
We should however return to the tradition concerning Plato and the
astronomers cited by Plutarch in the De facie in orbe lunae and the De
generatione animae. Parallels in other authors, where further information
is to be found, are listed by for instance Cherniss.70 The most important
of these is Hippolytus, Refutatio omnium haeresium ..71 Hippoly-
tus first quotes Plato, in fact the passage from the Timaeus I have quoted
above (and a bit more, viz. all of cd), and explains it at some length.
After the lacuna we have the remains of an account of the diameter and
circumference of the earth, precise numbers (which may be corrupt)
being given. Next is an account of the computation in stades from the sur-
face [197] of the earth to the circle of the moon, in stades, by Aristarchus
and Apollonius of Perga (numbers possibly corrupt). He continues with
Archimedes computation, again in stades, of all these distances, viz. from
the earth to the moon, from the moon to the sun, etc., ending with the
distance of the highest planetary sphere to the outer heaven. He also gives
reans, since at At. .. Diels and Hipp. Ref. .. Anaximander is said to have put the
stars and planets under the moon. See further below, ad finem.
70 Cherniss () n. f.
71 Pp. .. Wendland = .. Marcovich, partly printed at Heiberg
() . Lacuna (probably quite large) in ch. between the end of the account
of Plato and the beginning of that of the astronomers. Parallel passage concerning
Archimedes but without the numbers at Macr. in Somn. .., partly printed at
Heiberg () and as Porph. in Tim. fr. at Sodano () ; on this passage
see below, .
cosmic distances
75 Mansfeld () f., and passim; for the fluctuating nature of the doxo-
graphical traditions see now esp. Mansfeld and Runia () xix f., f.
76 For instances of similar alternatives cf. Mansfeld () , f., n. ,
77 Above, ad finem.
78 See above, .
79 See At. .. Diels (ps.Plutarch only).
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80 Above, n. .
81 Brunschwig () = () .
82 Above, text to n. .
83 At. .. and . Diels, D.L. ., Hipp. Ref. .., conveniently printed together
ps.Plu. . Stob. ..
. ! [0 [[E]] !
-].
() 10 !
() 10 !
& - B : u 0 - 0 0 u
0 0. [A DK] B :.
() ' () ' E
j!. j!.
() 1
T
() 1
T
0 0 ! 0 0 !
j, [!] !
& E -
0 0 j , & E -
! H- j
0 0 !
. H- j .
86 Wehrli () .
87 Above, , and ad finem.
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() 10 B A B
0 0 + >,
T 8 : !,
@ & 3 !
!, 3 B B >B
K
3 ;p;
.
[A DK]
() E &
, > 3
& 5. [SVF III B. ]
References
Dring, I., ed. () Die Harmonielehre des Klaudios Ptolemaios, Gteb. Hgsk.
rsskr. . (Gteborg).
Fredouille, J.-C., Goulet-Caz, M.-O., Hoffmann, Ph. and Petitmengin, P., eds.
() Titres et articulations du texte dans les uvres antiques. Actes Coll.
Chantilly dc. , Coll. t. August., Sr. Antiquit (Paris).
Hahm, D.E. () The ethical doxography of Arius Didymus, ANRW II .,
.
Heath, T.E. () Aristarchus of Samos, the Ancient Copernicus. A History
of Greek Astronomy together with Aristarchuss Treatise On the Sizes and
Distances of the Sun and Moon, A new Greek text with transl. & notes (Oxford,
repr. , ).
Heiberg, I.L., ed. () Claudii Ptolemaei Opera quae extant omnia vol. :
Syntaxis mathematica Bde. (Leipzig).
, ed. () Archimedis Opera omnia cum commentariis Eutocii vol. , nd
ed., Bibl. Teubn. (Leipzig, repr. Stuttgart ).
Huffman, C.A () Philolaus of Croton, Pythagorean and Presocratic. A Com-
mentary on the Fragments and Testimonia with Interpretive Essays (Cam-
bridge).
Hultsch, F., ed. () Pappi Alexandrini Collectionis quae supersunt, with
Latin transl. vols. (Berlin, repr. Amsterdam ).
Jouanna, J. () Remarques sur les titres dans la collection hippocratique, in
Fredouille () .
Kahn, C.H. () Anaximander and the Origins of Greek Cosmology (New York;
repr. , Philadelphia ).
Kirk, G.S., Raven, J.E. and Schofield, M. () The Presocratic Philosophers. A
Critical History with a Selection of Texts, nd. ed. (Cambridge etc.).
Lachenaud, G., ed. () Plutarque uvres morales T. .2, Opinions des Philo-
sophes, with introd., transl. & notes, Coll. Bud (Paris).
Laks, A. and Most, G.W., eds. () Thophraste Mtaphysique, with introd.,
transl. & notes, Coll. Bud (Paris).
Leggatt, S., ed. & transl. () Aristotle on the Heavens I and II, with comm.
(Warminster).
Maass, E., ed. () Commentariorum in Aratum reliquiae (Berlin, repr. ).
Mansfeld, J. (a) Doxography and dialectic: The Sitz im Leben of the Placita,
in ANRW II.., .
, (b) Studies in the Historiography of Greek Philosophy (Assen/Maas-
tricht).
, () Physikai doxai and Problmata physica from Aristotle to Atius
(and beyond), in Fortenbaugh, W.W. and Gutas, D., eds. () Theophrastus:
His Psychological, Doxographical and Scientific Writings, RUSCH (New
Brunswick N.J./London) [= article in this collection] [204].
, () Prolegomena: Questions to be Settled before the Study of an Author,
or a Text, PhAnt (Leiden/New York/Cologne).
, and Runia, D.T. () Aetiana: The Method and Intellectual Context of a
Doxographer Vol. : The Sources, PhAnt (Leiden/New York/Cologne).
Marcovich, M., ed. () Hippolytus: Refutatio omnium haeresium, Patr. Texte
u. Stud. (Berlin/New York).
jaap mansfeld
Jaap Mansfeld
I. Introduction
One of the aims of the present paper is to find out to what extent a group
of meteorological chapters, viz. chs. one to six plus eighteen,1 in Book III
of the Atian Placita depend on and are derived from Books I to III of
Aristotles Meteorologica.2 Comparison will not be pressed beyond the
limits of resemblance. Another aim is to study the macrostructure of this
rather large section of the Book. This entails that we look at individual
chapters, at significant sections of chapters and at specific individual
lemmata in context, rather than at the whole series of chapters in every
detail. And I shall not only look at verbal similarities or similarities [24]
1 Thus leaving to one side chapters dealing with other topics also dealt with in
Meteorologica Books I to III, such as winds (Placit. ) or earthquakes (Placit. ). For
the group of chapters on the position etc. of the earth (largely dependent on a chapter
in another Aristotelian treatise, viz. the De caelo) see next n. The topics of the chapters
discussed in the present paper correspond to those treated at Aristot., Meteorolog. I
plus II III plus III . The numbering of Atian chapters and lemmata will
be that of Diels.It is not possible to include in our discussion the meteorological
sections in Theophrastus Metarsiologica, Epicurus Epistula ad Pythoclem, Lucretius,
Achilles B , Aratus ap. Stobaeum, Arius Didymus, etc., or to deal with the
commentaries on the Meteorologica of Alexander (genuine, see P. Moraux, Alexander von
Aphrodisias, Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen Bd. (Peripatoi, VII/), BerlinNew
York, de Gruyter , pp. ), Olympiodorus, and Philoponus, though occasional
references will prove unavoidable.
2 On Aristotle as a source of Atius as to methodology and contents see J. Mans-
feld, Physikai doxai and problmata physika from Aristotle to Atius (and beyond), in
W.W. FortenbaughD. Gutas (edd.), Theophrastus: His Psychological, Doxographical and
Scientific Writings (Rutgers Studies in Classical Humanities, V), New BrunswickLon-
don, Transaction Publ., , pp. [= article in this collection], at pp. ff., and
at pp. (Aristotle and the Placita on the Earth). See further below, ad finem, com-
plementary note .
jaap mansfeld
of content, but also and especially inquire into the function of cited
positions, or particular lemmata or parts of lemmata, or even chapters,
in the context of the dialectical discussion or doxographical presentation
of a particular topic.3 As to Aristotle as source of, or important parallel
for, the contents of specific lemmata of these chapters I owe much to
others (as will be duly acknowledged in the footnotes), but as far as I
know the influence of Peripatetic dialectic, that is to say the surveying,
characterization and discussion of physical tenets,4 upon the Atian
presentation of such dogmata has not been taken into account by scholars
in this case.
From time to time I shall also adduce parallels, both as to function
and as to content, from Senecas Naturales quaestiones5 and the Scholia in
Aratum. To be sure, the sequence of the topics that are at issue is not the
same in Atius, Seneca and Aristotles treatise.6 Some of the differences
in this respect between Atius and Aristotle will be analyzed in the final
section of this paper.
Aristotle. We have a problem here, for the explanation of vision by
means of optical rays issuing from the eyes found, e.g., in the treatment
of the rainbow in the Meteorologica is very much different from the
explanation of vision as the effect of the transparent medium upon
the eye, found esp. in the De anima ( ). Alexander of Aphrodisias
* already points this out, and argues that in the Meteorologica Aristotle uses
the doctrine of the mathematicians.7 What is more, the complicated
3 See J. Mansfeld, Doxography and dialectic: the Sitz im Leben of the Placita, in ANRW
II ., BerlinNew York , pp. ; D.T. Runia, What is doxography?, in
Ph.J. van der Eijk (ed.), Ancient Histories of Medicine: Essays in Medical Doxography
and Historiography in Classical Antiquity (Studies in Ancient Medicine, XX), Leiden,
Brill, , pp. , and Id., A difficult chapter in Atius Book II on cosmology, in
A. Brancacci (ed.), Philosophy and Doxography in the Imperial Age (Studi, CCXXVIII),
Firenze, Olschki , .
4 This description hopefully satisfies the severe conditions stipulated by J. Brun-
schwig, Dialectique et philosophie chez Aristote, nouveau, in N.L. Cordero (ed.), Ontolo-
gie et dialectique. Mlanges en hommage Pierre Aubenque (Tradition de la pense clas-
sique), Paris, Vrin , pp. , esp. p. .
5 Detailed comparison with Senecas treatise is impossible here. See further ad finem,
complementary note .
6 For the orders of presentation in a considerable number of sources see the overview
cit., pp. .
from milky way to halo
To return to the Placita: Hermann Diels already pointed out that several
chapters of Book III, viz. Placit. (on shafts and mock suns) and
(on the halo), as well as a large part of another chapter, . (on the
rainbow) do not consist of the usual Atian collections of various brief
lemmata with name-labels. They are limited to a single doctrine to which
no name-label has been attached. One may moreover add that the discus-
sion of the rainbow at Placit. . is more extensive than is the rule for
the treatment of such topics in Atius, though there are a few other sim-
ilarly lengthy passages elsewhere in the epitome. Diels believed that for
these passages in Book III Atius did not excerpt Placita literature, but
a meteorological handbook (quoddam de meteoris enchiridion, quod
in opinionibus minus quam in rebus ipsis explicandis versatum est).11
Although [26] chapters and are extant in ps.Plutarch only, they
indeed (as Diels argued) clearly belong with chapter ., extant in
both ps.Plutarch and Stobaeus, so are to be attributed to Atius Placita.
Diels also demonstrated that Placit. (on the halo), the final chapter
of the Book, is out of place.12 It follows upon the chapters dealing with
terrestrial themes, whereas it should have been put among those dealing
with the ! or phenomena situated between the moon and the
earth, which are explicitly said to have already been dealt with in what
in Diels reconstruction is the second lemma of ch. , but in fact is a
transitional phrase analogous to the transitional phrase at Placit. ..13
Note that the ! referred to in this conclusion at Placit. . also
include winds (ch. ) and summer and winter (ch. , title plus first
lemma).14
11 H. Diels, op. cit., pp. , . Diels sees this as fraudulent practice (quis autem
scriptor tanta est pravitate ut illud caput quo introducimur quinto loco collocet?) and
calls Atius a market-salesman (mango); see J. MansfeldD.T. Runia, Atiana: The
Method and Intellectual Context of a Doxographer, vol. : The Sources (Philosophia Anti-
qua, LXXVIII), Leiden, Brill, , pp. .Such an epitome is now available, the
Arabic translation of a Greek original: H. Daiber (ed.), Ein Kompendium der Aristotelis-
chen Meteorologie in der Fassung des Hunain ibn Ishaq (Aristoteles Semitico-Latinus-
Prolegomena et Parerga, I = Verh. KNAW Afd. Letterk., N.R., LXXXIX), Amsterdam,
North Holland Publ., . Note that this deals with Aristotle only (sequence of topics
similar to that of Aristotles original, though those of Meteorolog. are appended at
the endperhaps because the author of the epitome held the Milky Way and comets to
be astronomical phenomena?).
12 Cf. G. Lachenaud, op. cit., p. .
13
, 8- 3 . Cf.
Eusebius paraphrase (found after his abstract from Ps.Plutarch., Placit. ), praepar.
evangel. ., E > B
- I
E 3 0, and note his (standard) emphasis
on the diaphonia among the physicists.
14 I intend to discuss Placit. chs. and . on another occasion, mainly because this
paper is already too long. The reality of winds and of summer of winter, moreover, seems
not to have been questioned, so the distinction between appearance and reality which, as
we shall see, is of crucial importance for the phenomena to be discussed in the present
paper never was an issue in relation to these topics (cf. below, text to n. ).
All the same it is possible to establish a few links between the Placita chapter on
winds and Meteorolog. (a sq.) and , although one of our problems is
that ch. . is extant only in ps.Plutarch, . only in Stobaeus (and is moreover,
as Diels already saw, a combination of a lemma from Atius and a frustulum of Arius
Didymus). The subject of Placit. ., viz. the causes of summer and winter, is not a topic
in the Meteorologica. We only have an obiter dictum at a (their cause is the suns
from milky way to halo
movement in the ecliptic; cf. also e.g. Gen. anim. a)still, this remark is found
in the first substantial chapter on winds in Aristotles treatise, which may to some extent
help to explain why winds are followed by summer and winter in the Placita.
15 See below, n. and text thereto.
16 d 8
8 8/0 > , -
> ,
8 ; ; 3 !I B 8 3
B 0 - -
&
0 0 .
17 3 E 5 _ b !, 3 E
7 + > 7 5I [ . . . ] 7 Q 7 : @.
18 H. Diels, op. cit., pp. (see above, n. ).
19 See further below, notes , and and text thereto.
jaap mansfeld
been disturbed because the chapter on halos ( ) is found long after the
treatment of the ! proper has been concluded. [28]
Placit. .20 lists three tenets. This triad derives from Aristotles Meteo-
rologica,21 and so does the main distinction between the first and second
tenets on the one hand and the third on the other, as will become clear
from the following presentation in parallel columns:
Placit. . Meteor. , a + b
(a) ' (a) E Q
E 7
@
! 8 E 9 @ ' E
0 + L < E 8
,
8
3 &
8
>
8 B !, // (b) ' E T B
3
8BI
I (a +
// (b) ' E : b) _ Q B
/ 3 B u B =
I // () E E ! 5 0 K >. [ . . . ] //
& @ () 7 8 5
B : 3 >3 >BI
! !
> (6 @ ! 0 :
b
8 0 O 8 T, M
).22 -. [29]
the [result of the] burning by a star which moved from its proper place, and the region
through which it came, this it burned in a circular way, at the time of the conflagration of
Phaethon. // (b) Others say that originally the suns orbit followed this route. // () Some
say that it is an appearance, as in a mirror, of the sun, who reflects back its rays against
the heaven, just as what happens with the rainbow on the clouds. For (a) Phaethon and
the Milky Way cf. Diodor. Sicul. .. For (b), the former path of the sun, cf. Achill.
B ch. ( B ), p. . Maass, where this view is
attributed to Oenopides of Chius and others (fr. DK, nd text) and an explanation
derived from myth not found in either Aristotle or Atius is added. Aristotle does not
from milky way to halo
role of the (reflected) light of the sun, which are contrasted with the anonymously cited
view of Aristotle (below, section III) that the rainbow is to be explained by the reflection
of the visual rays towards the sun. Cf. below, text to n. and to n. .
26 Listed in the same chapter (Placit. . = Posidon. fr. E.-K.), and cited at Mac-
rob. In somn. Scipion. . (Posidon. fr. E.-K), cf. above, n. . Posidonius believed
from milky way to halo
Reality versus optical illusion. The main idea or issue, whether explic-
itly stated or implicitly present, is the same in both accounts: existence
(Atius), or substance (Aristotle) on the one hand, versus reflection,
or mere optical phenomenon, on the other. The terms used may vary.
Atius formally opposes 5 to 7, but instead of 7
(appearance) also speaks of ! (reflection), or &
(mirror phenomenon)27 without explicitly opposing these
terms to 5 (existence). He also uses forms of the correspond-
ing verbs. The formal opposi[31]tion 5 versus 7 is also
found in the pseudo-Aristotelian De mundo,28 and elsewhere.29 A com-
promise category, viz. a blend of existence and appearance, isas we have
seenformulated at Placit. , and it is paralleled at Schol. in Arat. .30
But Aristotle uses (meaning compound(ed) substance as well
as compacted substance),31 not 5, and speaks both of 7-
andrather more oftenof ! (or uses forms of the corre-
sponding verbs). Sometimes the wording is very precise, as at Meteorolog.
b, on the rainbow: the process of reflection will give rise to a
sort of appearing (7 3 & ! 7 ).
These polar terms are never formally and explicitly opposed in the
Meteorologica the way their analogues are in the De mundo, or the Placita,
the Milky Way to be substantial, not an optical illlusion; see I.G. Kidd, Theophrastus
Meteorology, cit., p. (also referring to fr. E.-K).
27 Cf. the title of Placit. : 8!.
28 [Aristot.], de mund. a, - E 8
! 3
5 versus 7 is mistaken).
30 At., Placit. (on shafts and mock suns), 0 5! 8!,
32 Cf. H. Strohm, op. cit., p. , followed by G. RealeA. Bos, Il trattato Sul cosmo per
Alessandro attributo ad Aristotele (Temi metafisici e problemi del pensiero antico. Studi
e testi, XLII), Milano, Vita e Pensiero , pp. . The argument of P. Steinmetz,
Die Physik des Theophrastos von Eresos (Palingenesia, I), Bad Homburg etc., Gehlen
, pp. (followed by H. Strohm, op. cit., p. ) that the formal distinction
5 versus 7 derives from Theophrastus is misleading. At Theophrast.
Metarsiologic. ch. .()() Daiber it is not even implicit; I.G. Kidd, Theophrastus
Meteorology, cit., pp. and , expresses doubts.For Clidemus see below, text to
n. , and n. and text thereto.
33 Meteorolog. a, O S! >I ! 3 !-
cited below),34 heterodox views are being discussed, the contrast being an
ingredient of the report, just as in Atius. And to anticipate: the Atian
chapter on the rainbow itself (Placit. , to be discussed in section III
below), the particular stylistic nature of which was already pointed out
by Diels,35 to a large extent reports Aristotles doctrine and emphasizes
that the rainbow is a phenomenon caused by reflection of the visual
raysanother instance of agreement, both functional and as to content,
with the Meteorologica. Moreover, in the famous proem of Aristotles
treatise the halo, rainbow, mock suns and shafts are not listed, and the
all-important distinction between reality and appearance is not found
there either. In this respect, then, there is agreement between Atius and
Aristotle. Seneca too does not set out the opposition between reality
and appearance at the beginning of Book I of the Naturales quaestiones.
Although in the course of his substantial treatment of the rainbow etc. he
now and then states that such phe[33]nomena are deceptive, the explicit
distinction is found much later in the Book, viz. immediately before the
peroration, when all the phenomena at issue have been gone through.36
We should however note that the explanation of the phenomenon
called 7 provided by Atius at Placit. . is not paralleled in
the Meteorologica. The doxographer adapts a commonplace comparison
found in more or less contemporary literature, referring to our impres-
sion, when aboard a ship, that the land is moving.37
All the lemmata of Placit. , the third item of the first lemma
excepted, present tenets which, however varied, agree in representing the
Milky Way as real. The view that it is an appearance is an exceptional and
maverick assumption. That (together with two others) it is mentioned at
the outset of the chapter is also linked to the fact that the presentation
of tenets in this chapter (apart from those not paralleled in Aristotle)38
is much indebted to Aristotles selections in the Meteorologica. A bit
In Atius the two parts of Aristotles sentence have been divided over
Anaxagoras (Placit. . = Anaxag. fr. A DK, nd text) and Democri-
tus [34] (Placit. . = Democr. fr. A DK, nd text; in Stobaeus the
second name-label has dropped out, and the word-order is slightly dif-
ferent).39 Interestingly enough, the cause of the phenomenon assumed by
both physicists according to Aristotle is no longer an issue in the Atian
Democritus lemma, though what remains of the modified or corrected
doxa is not contrary to this explanation, Placit. . (frr. Anaxag. A
DK, nd text + Democr. A DK, nd text):
() 1 & 3 0 0 3 B
W B
>B, 6 5 & 0 9 T & ! /. ()
- 3 & .
() Anaxagoras (holds) that the shadow of the earth rests upon this section
of the heaven [viz. where the Milky Way is visible] when the sun, having
arrived under the earth, no longer illuminates everything. () Democritus
(holds it is) the combined radiation of numerous and small and contiguous
stars giving off light together, because of their density.
39 For Aristotle as the source see G. Lachenaud, op. cit., ad loc. and p. , n. . H. Diels,
op. cit., p. , comparing the Placita lemma and the Aristotelian passage, submits that
Aristoteles Anaxagoram et Democritum minus accurate coniunxit; cf. H. Strohm ad
loc., op. cit., pp. . Further cf. below, text to n. . Because in Atius the wording
has been altered I have not underlined verbal similarities. The view of Democritus is
paralleled at Achill., B ch. (cf. above, n. ): p. . Maass =
Democr. fr. A DK, rd text, cf. already H. Diels, loc. cit.
from milky way to halo
One assumes that Atius, just like Aristotle, presents these tenets as
pertaining to something different from mere optical illusions.40 What is
more, one of the sources that were intermediate between Aristotle and
Atius saw fit to correct Aristotles account to some extent. This may have
been Theophrastus, whom we know to have corrected Aristotle on points
of detail.41 But we do not know in the present case.
The brief lemma with name-label Aristotle (Placit. .) obviously
goes back to the Meteorologica too, viz. to the long exposition at the
end of the chapter, bb;42 Aristotle believed the Milky Way
to have real [35] substance. The definition of the Milky Way in the first
lemma of the Atian chapter (Placit. .)43 too states it to be real,
not illusory. The emphasis of the chapter accordingly is upon the reality
of this phenomenon. To some extent this helps to understand why the
distinction between existence and optical illusion is only explicated at
the beginning of the chapter (Placit. ) which deals with the first
phenomenon which should be explained by reflection, viz. the rainbow.
We may now turn to the following chapter, Placit. , on comets,
shooting stars and beams i.e. a kind of meteor (instead of ps.Plutarchs
beams Stobaeus has the like). It lacks a definition at the beginning,
which is understandable because a plurality of phenomena are collected.
Otherwise the structure of the first part of ch. (Placit. .) is
virtually analogous to that of the first section of ch. : a diaphonia of
Pythagorean (?) views to begin with, then Anaxagoras and Democri-
tus, then Aristotle. These three Dielsian lemmata, all about comets only,
his famous theophrasteorum apud excerptores conspectus, quotes two parallels, viz.
Hippolyt., Refutat. omn. haeres. . (cf. Anaxag. fr. A DK) and Diog. Laert., (cf.
Anaxag. fr. A DK), slightly different from each other, where the Milky Way is said to be
a reflection (!) of the stars which are not illuminated by the sun. But these
references provide only partial parallels, for the Placita lemma on Anaxagoras does not
speak of reflection. There is no overview of excerpta de Empedocle in Diels conspectus,
but this is by the way.
41 See J. Mansfeld, Aristote et la structure du De sensibus de Thophraste, Phronesis,
Stobaeus the second sentence of the Atian lemma has been replaced by an abstract
from Arius Didymus, as Diels already suspected (though he printed it as part of the
Stobaean lemma of his reconstructed Atius!); see D.T. Runia, Additional fragments of
Arius Didymus on physics, in K.A. Algra, P.W. van der Horst and D.T. Runia (edd.),
Polyhistor: Studies in the History and Historiography of Ancient Philosophy (Philosophia
Antiqua, LXXII), Leiden, Brill, , pp. [= article in this collection], at p.
and p. (new fragment ), and J. MansfeldD.T. Runia, op. cit., p. .
43 On this definition see further below, section IV.
jaap mansfeld
are derived from the Meteorologica:44 for Placit. . (not in DK), the
two contrasting Pythagorean views, cf. Meteorolog. b plus
ba; for . (Anaxag. fr. A DK, nd text; not in the Dem-
ocritus ch. of DK), Anaxagoras plus Democritus cf. the first view cited
by Aristotle at b; for ., Aristotle himself, cf. the next chap-
ter of the Meteorologica, aa. Just as in the previous chapter,
so here too the Aristotle lemma in Stobaeus has been conflated with an
abstract from Arius Didymus45 (irrelevant to the inquiry into the sources
of Atius, but of value for the study of Stobaeus).
A noteworthy difference with the previous Atian chapter is that in
Aristotle Anaxagoras plus Democritus are placed before the Pythagore-
ans and Hippocrates of Chius and his pupil Aeschylus, whereas in
Atius the sequence is the other way round. Clearly Atius, or rather the
tradition he [36] depends on,46 wanted to establish a fairly strict corre-
spondence between the opening sections of these two chapters, so Aris-
totles Pythagoreans and Hippocrates plus Aeschylus swapped places with
his Anaxagoras and Democrituswho this time share a lemma, whereas
in the previous chapter they had been separated. The first views cited in
both these Placita chapters are Pythagorean, as we have seen.
The contrast in the first lemma of the Atian chapter (Placit. .)
is again one between reality, or existence, and reflection, or optical illu-
sion: some of the Pythagoreans believe that the comet is a star which
now is visible and now is not, others that it is a reflection of our vision
towards the sun, similar to images which appear in mirrors (Placit. .,
nd tenet: ! 0 :
b T -
8!). Aristotle attributes to Hippocrates
and Aeschylus the view that the comet is a star, but that the tail does
not belong to the comet itself, which acquires it when in its passage
through its space it sometimes draws up moisture which reflects our
vision towards the sun (Meteorolog. ba; Hippocr. + Aeschyl.
fr. DK). This explanation is analogous to that of the anonymous tenet
about the Milky Way cited Meteorolog. b.47 It is surely correct to
argue that Hippocrates of Chius, because he is a mathematician, has been
by H. Daiber, Aetius, op. cit., p. ; for . G. Lachenaud, op. cit., ad loc. and pp.
n. , notes and .
45 Cf. above, n. , and see D.T. Runia, Additional fragments, cit., pp. and
3
& 8 ! a 8 H
. Cf.
Philopon., In meteorolog. ., 8! ,
} 8
!
. Olympiodorus explanation (echoed in LSJ and
the English translations I have seen) is different but I believe not good: Olympiod., In
meterolog. ., . . . B . Compare Senecas rendering of
the tenet, quoted below, n. , and At. Placit. ., the term , said of the
stars that according to the Democritus lemma combine to form the Milky Way (above,
text quoted before n. ). H. Strohm, op. cit., p. translates Gesamtbild.
49 Below, n. . In Seneca this tenet is anonymous (quidam).
50 Of Byzantium; no lemma in vol. of the Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques.
51 Perhaps uncertain whether of Apollonia or of Seleucia, though the tenet has been
52 The word Y has fallen out in Stobaeus. The fact that it is mentioned in this lemma
supports our suggestion that ch. (on the halo) was originally omitted by ps.Plutarch,
see above, text to n. .
53 The chapter divisions in our editions do not have Aristotelian authority, but the
original and intentional division into two sections is clear: see the announcements at
Meteorolog. b sqq., b sqq. and a sqq. (the beginning of the section on
the Milky Way).
54 See below, ad finem, complementary note .
from milky way to halo
proximus est Posidonius (cf. below, ad finem, complementary note ). That an inter-
mediate source (or sources) is/are involved is clear. But if this scholium goes back to
Posidonius, Schol. in Arat. (see below, n. and text thereto) should also go back to
him.
57 Preliminary suggestions: F.P. Waiblinger, Senecas Naturales Quaestiones: Griechische
In this respect the scholium compares well with the dialectical discussions in Senecas
Naturales quaestiones.
61 Cf. above, text to n. . For suggestions about coalesced chapters in Atius see
J. Mansfeld, Cosmic distances: Atius . Diels and some related texts, Phronesis, XLV
(), pp. [= article in this collection], at pp. , , and J. Mansfeld,
Atius, Aristotle and others, cit., pp. .
62 Senec., Nat. Quaest. ., cometas . . . , de quibus dictum est. For the original book
order see H.M. Hine (ed.), L. Annaei Senecae Naturalium quaestionum libri, Stuttgart
and Leipzig, Teubner, , pp. xxiixv, also for references to the literature. For Seneca
on earlier theories concerning comets cf. P. Oltramare, op. cit., p. and p. , n. to
from milky way to halo
with halos, rainbows, shafts and mock suns, which are not at issue
in Placit. but in , and ). Seneca, just like Atius and the
source of the doxographical scholia on Aratus, is aware of the important
distinction between those who believe that comets have real existence
and those who believe that they are optical appearances.63
But in Seneca book on comets neither Hippocrates nor the Pythagore-
ans are mentioned. For the view that comets are illusory phenomena he
cites anonymous authorities at Nat. Quaest. .64 (from Aristotle and
Atius we know these to be Anaxagoras and Democritus), and Zeno (of
Citium), ibid. ..65 These people are said to hold that comets actually
are the combined light of stars in conjunction. Moreover he distinguishes
between two views which presuppose that comets are real: as to contents
these correspond, repectively, to those of the first group of Pythagoreans
and to that of that of Aristotle as reported At. Placit. .a and . ..
As to the distinction between reality and appearance in general, Seneca
states near the end of the next book (our Book I) that no one doubts that
meteors etc. are real, whereas it is a matter of discussion whether or not
the rainbow and the halo are real or not. His own opinion [41] is that rain-
bow and halo are deceptive optical phenomena,66 which (though with
some exaggeration) corresponds to the point of view of Aristotle, one
[ . . . ]. quidam aiunt esse quidem [ . . . ]. Cf. D. Vottero, op. cit., p. ad loc., and P. Parroni,
op. cit., p. ad loc. For species cf. below, notes ad finem, and .
64 cum ex stellis errantibus altera se alteri applicuit, confuso in unum duarum lumine
facies longioris sideris redditur. Cf. above, n. and text thereto, and P. Oltramare, op. cit.,
p. , n. ; C. Codoer Merino, op. cit., vol. , p. , n. , D. Vottero, op. cit., p. ad
loc.
65 Zenon . . . congruere iudicat stellas et radios inter se committere: hac societate luminis
existere imaginem stellae longioris (= Zeno fr. , S.V.F. I p. ). Cf. D. Vottero, op. cit.,
p. ad loc.
66 Senec., Nat. Quaest. ., de his [shooting stars etc.] nemo dubitat quin habeant
flammam quam ostendunt [H. Corcoran, Seneca: Naturales Quaestiones, vol. (LCL,
), Cambridge etc., Harvard Univ. Press, , p. , n. refers to Aristot., Meteorolog.
b]: certa illis substantia est. de prioribus quaeritur (de arcu dico et coronis)
decipiant aciem et mendacio constent, an in illis quoque verum sit quod apparet. nobis
non placet in arcu aut corona subesse aliquid corporis certi, sed illam iudicamus speculi
esse fallaciam alienum corpus nil amplius quam mentientis. non est enim in speculo quod
ostenditur, etc. See I.G. Kidd, Posidonius: II. The Commentary (i), op. cit., p. . Cf. Nat.
Quaest. ., tu dicis illum colorem [of the rainbow] esse, ego videri; ., speciem falsi
coloris. For species cf. above, n. ; below, n. . Also cf. D. Vottero, op. cit., p. ad loc.
jaap mansfeld
also found in the Placita. Note however that he says here that no one (!)
doubts that comets are real (in the sense that they show real fire, i.e.
have their own light),67 while a moment ago we have seen that in the
previous book, at . and ., he quoted the views of Anaxagoras,
Democritus and the Stoic Zeno that they are appearances (to the extent
that they do not have their own light, but are the combination of the lights
of a plurality of stars).68
The long next chapter of Atius (Placit. , fifteen lemmata, on thun-
der, lightning etc.)69 differs from the two previous chapters in that it
fails to report a dissident opinion according to which lightning would be
unreal, viz. a phenomenon of reflection. As we shall see Aristotle reports
such a view, and this view is also cited by Seneca. On the other hand, such
lemmatic echoes of the Meteorologica as it does contain are conspicuously
analogous to those found in the two previous chapters: Placit. . is on
Anaxagoras (fr. A DK, nd text), . on Empedocles (fr. A DK, nd
text; Stobaeus only), . on Aristotle.70
Empedocles and Anaxagoras (frr. Emped. A, st text, + Anaxag.
A , st text) are cited together at Aristot., Meteorolog. b:
E
a 8
8 BI B 1-
0
@ 8 B : ,
1 E [42] B = +
, l & 8 B -
E = !. & E Q ! & @ &
B , E 8
& -.
Nevertheless some people say that fire comes to be in the clouds. Empedo-
cles says this is the part of the suns rays enclosed inside, Anaxagoras that it
is a part of the upper aether (which as we know is his name for fire) that
is enclosed inside, carried down from above to below. Lightning, he says,
is this fire flashing through the clouds, thunder its noise and hissing when
quenched.
see from Stobaeus) and the remainder been coalesced with the Aristotle lemma: a char-
acteristic accident. For the Aristotelian origin of Placit. . and . see G. Lachenaud,
op. cit., ad loc. and pp. n. , n. . For the differences between Aristotles, Posi-
donius and Theophrastus views of thunder and lightning see I.G. Kidd, Theophrastus
Meteorology, cit., pp. .
from milky way to halo
The Atian lemma on Anaxagoras describes not only lightning and thun-
der, but also whirlwinds and firewinds. We may see this as an addition to
the original lemma, and need only compare the first section with what is
in Aristotle. The Empedocles lemma on the other hand has hardly been
expanded: it is about thunder, lightning, and thunderbolt. So here are At.
Placit. . and . (more or less literal verbal similarities with Aristotle
underlined):
1, 6 + 8
/, B 8 +-
+ , ; E ; & & ; E
3 & B & -, ; E -
B .
10 7 +
8
, < & E
71 & B !, &
E ! -I E 0 0 .
Anaxagoras holds that when the hot falls into the cold, i.e. a part of aether
into a part of air, this produces thunder through the noise, and through the
colour set off against the blackness of the cloud the lightning, and through
the mass and size of the light the thunderbolt, etc.
Empedocles speaks of the impact of light in a cloud, light which forces out
the resisting air; the quenching and dissolution of this light bring about
noise, and the shining lightning; thunderbolt, he says, is the intensity of
the lightning.
The tenets of Anaxagoras and Empedocles (frr. Anaxag. A DK, nd text
+ Emped. A DK, nd text) as cited here are a bit more unlike each other
here than in Aristotle,72 but this is a matter of variatio rather than content.
The similarity with the passage from the Meteorologica is clear. [43] The
lemma on Aristotle, naturally, briefly reports Aristotles doctrine as found
in the Meteorologica, viz. in the final chapter of Book II.73
three times cites Anaxagoras first. For the possibility that Theophrastus is to some extent
responsible cf. above, n. and text thereto.
73 H. Diels, op. cit., p. , quoting At., Placit. . and Senec., Nat. Quaest. . (on
Anaxagoras) in parallel columns, refers to the account of Aristotles view which follows in
Seneca, and states: omnia haec [viz., in Seneca] ex Aristotelis meteorolog. II excerpta
sunt, viz. via, as he believes, (a pupil of) Posidonius (cf. below, ad finem, complementary
note ). Also see P. Oltramare, op. cit., p. n. , D. Vottero, op. cit., p. ad loc.,
P. Parroni, op. cit., pp. and p. ad loc.
jaap mansfeld
in Syriac and Arabic translation, in W.W. FortenbaughD. Gutas, op. cit., pp. , at
pp. .
from milky way to halo
explanation of the phenomenon of reflection. For the bent oar cf. above, n. .
82 See above, n. and text thereto.
83 Cf. Meteorolog. b, 6 E Q ! : @ 0 b T
84 For the colours of the rainbow according to Aristotle see e.g. P. Struycken, Colour
mixtures according to Democritus and Plato, Mnemosyne, (), text to notes
and .
85 G. Lachenaud, op. cit., p. , n. , should not have written that the view reported
in the Anaxagoras lemma est dautant plus proche de lexplication aristotlicienne quelle
traite en mme temps dun autre phnomne optique, les parhlies etc. That a variety of
mock suns are included does not entail that the explanation itself is similar to Aristotles.
DielsKranz, ad Metrod. fr. A, st text, hypothesize nach Theophr. For Anaxagoras
cf. fr. B DK, E
8 /0
/ ! ; :; .
Xenophanes said the rainbow is a cloud, fr. B DK.
86 Schol. in Arat. , pp. .. Maass, pp. .. Martin (better text).
replicat, etc. Cf. P. Oltramare, op. cit., p. , n. , p. notes and , and P. Parroni, op.
cit., ad loc., pp. , and p. .
89 But the difference may be minimal, cf. Schol. in Arat. (the fourth scholium on
91 Above, text to n. , and n. and text thereto; below, text to n. . I.G. Kidd,
Theophrastus Meteorology, cit., p. wonders whether this formula arose from a
Theophrastean multiple choice method. I think not.
92 Cf. previous note.
93 Schol. in Arat. = Posidon fr. E.-K. For the interpretation see I.G. Kidd,
Posidonius: II. The Commentary (i), op. cit., pp. . At I.G. Kidd, Theophrastus
Meteorology, cit., p. , he is less clear about the difference between Aristotle and
Posidonius.
94 For mock suns (only) as a blend see Schol. in Arat. as quoted more fully above,
n. .
from milky way to halo
So chapters one to six plus eighteen of Book III of Atius Placita are to
a remarkable extent related to passages and presentations in the Mete-
orologica. The contrast between (mostly atmospherical) meteorological
phenomena which are real and those which are appearances, which is
of great importance in Aristotles treatise, crucially determines the treat-
ment of these phenomena in this section of the doxographical tract as
well. We have moreover seen that the ps.Aristotelian treatise De mundo
and several meteorological scholia on Aratus also belong with the tradi-
tion which relies on this distinction, and that Seneca too is familiar with
it.
Though in individual cases modifications, both as to wording and to
specific contents, have unsurprisingly occurred, both the doctrines and
the wording of lemmata with the name-labels Pythagoreans, Anaxago-
ras, Democritus (or Anaxagoras-cum-Democritus), Empedocles and . . .
Aristotle in chapters , , and of Book III of the Placita are ultimately
derived from the Meteorologica. What is more, the function of the tenets
of these Presocratics in Atius is analogous to the function of their
antecedents in Aristotle, viz. to stress the difference between realities
and appearances. The dependence, to this extent, of the doxographical
tract on the great treatise therefore goes much further, and deeper, than
a listing of (partial) [49] verbal resemblances and similarities of mete-
orological doctrine would suggest. We have noticed that parallel pas-
sages in the scholia on Aratus, and parallel passages (indeed to some
extent whole books) in Senecas Naturales quaestiones exhibit a similar
diaphonic structure, and are in the final analysis equally indebted to the
Meteorologica for their dialectical methodology, and for part of their doc-
trinal contents. One may surmise that both Seneca and these scholia
are inter alia dependent on one or more doxographies, or fontes uberi-
ores, that may be characterized as cousins of the more immediate dox-
ographical sources of Atius (which are not entirely hypothetical: think
for instance of Varro).98
We have seen that Atius slowness,99 too, in so to speak putting the
all-important contrast between reality and appearance explicitly on the
agenda (viz. only at Placit. ., the first lemma of the chapter on the
rainbow)a contrast valid for these meteorological chapters as a whole,
may be explained by an appeal to Aristotelian precedent. Aristotle too
only emphasizes appearance thematically as late as chs. and of
Book III of the Meteorologica, where his account of the rainbow and sim-
ilar phenomena begins. And so, near the conclusion of his compressed
account of meteorology (end of ch. ), does the author of the De mundo.
Before arriving at his explicit formulation of the opposition in ch.
Atius, like Aristotle, in the course of his presentation of the issues quotes
the divergent views of those who believe that the Milky Way ( .) and
comets ( .) are not real but apparent. Aristotle also mentions the
dissident view of the little-known physicist Clidemus that lightning is
an optical illusion (at the end of Book II). This tenet however is not (or
rather no longer) to be found in Atius, but it survives in Seneca, where
it plays exactly the same part as in Aristotle: precious testimony to the
tenacity of the tradition in at least one of its lines.
This temporized unfolding of the distinction between reality and ap-
pearance in both the Placita and the Meteorologica may well be one of the
98 See already H. Diels, op. cit., pp. . Or think of Achilles, see J. Mansfeld
102 H. Diels, op. cit., p. , posited that this chapter, devoted to a subject which according
to him should belong in Book II and so is out of place, is not Atian because the doctrine
is Atomistic: inest enim unius Epicuri ex Democrito conformata doctrina. Not a good
argument for refusing the attribution to Atius.
103 See above, n. , and n. and text thereto.
104 n. and text thereto.
from milky way to halo
(the Milky Way) is a cloud-like circular band () in the air which is visible
over its entire length, and () it is called Milky Way because of its white
colouring.
The substantive (white skin colour) is a hapax: it only
occurs in the sources for Atius and in the abstract from ps.Plutarch in
the His[52]toria philosopha attributed to Galen, each time in the definition
of the Milky Way. This definition is one of the very few definitions to be
found in the Placita beyond Book I, and the only one beyond this book
which is placed right at the beginning of a chapter. In Book I there are
no less than six of them, all at the beginning of chapters.105 Diels has
noticed and commented on the definitions in Book I, but overlooked that
in Book III ch. .106 One can hardly deny that by descriptively defining
the Milky Way without attributing this definition to any authority Atius
states a position which he seems to accept. It is moreover clear that this
definition is not his own invention. To some extent it can be paralleled
from a well-known elementary introduction to astronomy containing
numerous definitions, viz. Geminus, element. .:
8 9 B !. [ . . . ]
E 8 -
B .
The band of the Milky Way is also slanting. [ . . . ] It consists of cloud-like
small particles.
But for Geminus and the astronomical traditions he represents the Milky
Way is not a phenomenon in the atmosphere.
There are also several partial parallels in the Aratea, which seem to be a
bit closer. See the following remark from the chapter On the Milky Way
in Achilles, which really comes quite close to Atius because it makes the
Milky Way a phenomenon in the atmosphere (it is found after the tenet
of Democritus has been cited as being that of others),107 p. .
Maass: [53]
[ . . . ] -
= >
8 F !
E @ 0 7.
[ . . . ] unless it is better to say that it [sc., the Milky Way] is from clouds, or
a transparent compression of air, having the shape of a circular band.
Compare Schol. in Arat. . Martin, & B , 6 8 -
(except the Milky Way, because it is cloud-like); .,
< 3 . . . b 8 >! 3 & 8 >; M-
(for this (circle) alone is easily grasped by sight
because of its cloud-like contraction); ., about cloud-like forma-
tions due to the vicinity of the Milky Way ( . . .
, Y B ).108 The key
terms, in Atius and the Aratea, are cloud(s), and cloud-like.
The inventor of the doctrine reflected in Atius definition cannot be
identified, so no name-label is available. Posidonius theory is different.109
Aristotles doctrine is also different to the extent that he places the Milky
Way in the 5
, the fiery outermost sphere of inflammable mate-
rial (the dry exhalation being the material that bursts into flame), not
just in the air. But insofar as this 5
is the outermost and poten-
tially as well as actually hottest layer of the air, the Milky Way may be
said to be in the air nevertheless. Atius definition looks like a typi-
cal doxographical construct, viz. in the present case the simplified ver-
sion of an Aristotelian doctrine which ad litteram (not always ad senten-
tiam) can be paralleled from contemporary and later astronomical and
quasi-astronomical literature. A similarly simplified version of Aristotles
complicated exposition served as an argument against the authenticity of
Book I of the Meteorologica. It is cited by Olympiodorus; see in Meteo-
rolog. ., ! ,
.).
from milky way to halo
rainbow, lost in Stobaeus only but preserved in ps.Plutarchbut we do not know) the
situation as to this chapter need not be different from the one I have suggested in relation
to Placit. .
112 I.G. Kidd, Theophrastus Meteorology, cit.
jaap mansfeld
reflected!).113 Atius (or his source here), who is later than Posidonius
(a philosopher who, as we know, is often cited in the Placita), apparently
wanted to go back beyond Posidonius to Aristotles theories for the sec-
tions of his meteorological exposition dealing with appearances. Is this
because for him and otherssuch as Posidonius and, to some extent,
SenecaAristotle had again become an important authority in this field?
Seneca regularly, and critically, discusses Aristotelian doctrines that are
derived from the Meteorologica, attributing them to Aristotle, whereas,
as we have seen, Atius does not always do this. It is on the other hand
obvious that Seneca did not consult the original treatise either, but used
derivative literature.
Diels suggestion that the Placita chapters on (Aristotelian) meteoro-
logical appearances came down by a different route, and that the inter-
medi[55]ate source could have been a meteorological handbook, may well
be on the right track. One does not know. The source may for instance
equally well have been a book of a lost meteorological treatise much
resembling a book of Senecas Naturales quaestiones.
An entirely different but equally uncertain alternative is to assume that
the sections, both with name-labels and without, that can be derived
from the Meteorologica are the (naturally revised) descendants of an
original epitome of parts of this treatise, viz. chapters to of Book I,
ch. of Book II (combined with ch. of Book III), plus chapters to
of Book III of the Aristotelian treatise. The rest, viz. the definition in
., the explicit scholastic formulations of the distinction between reality
and appearance, and those contrasting views which were not cited by
Aristotle were added laterpresumably not all at the same time.
However this may be, the last chapter to be discussed in this paper,
viz. Placit. , should not be explained along the lines attempted for
chs. and . Its account of shafts and mock suns without a name-label
is de facto quite close to Aristotles, but (the formula for) the blending
of real existence and appearance constitutes an important difference.
In the Meteorologica shafts and mock suns belong with the genus of
appearances, and do not form a separate species.
The view that shafts and mock suns are blends of real existence and
appearance ( 0 5! 8!)an idea also occur-
ring (and also without name-label) in a scholium on Aratus114
115 See e.g. J. Mansfeld, Doxography and dialectic, cit., pp. and sqq., and
first of which is attributed to the Stoics, the second to Epicurus and Strato, while the
third remains anonymous. It is of this third view that he says that it appears to be a
scholastic construct (or fiction). For the expression cf. Dion Chrysostom., Oration.
., 3 !; also cf. Sextus definition of !, Advers. mathem.
! E (sc. 8 7) ! &
E 9 E
(fiction sets out things which are not real, but are similar to real things in the
telling).
117 The macrostructure of Book III as a whole, as compared with esp. Aristotle and
section was (and is) then rounded off by the note at ch. that the
author will now continue with the because the description of
the ! has been completed.* [57]
Complementary note
Also see the revised Italian version, J. Mansfeld, Physikai doxai e probl-
mata physica da Aristotele ad Aezio (ed oltre), in A.M. Battegazzore (ed.),
Dimostrazione, argomentazione dialettica e argomentazione retorica nel
pensiero antico, Genova, Sagep, , pp. , at pp. ff., and at
pp. , Aristotele e i placita relativi alla terra (here one will also
find references to some of my earlier publications). See also J. Mansfeld,
Atius, Aristotle and others on coming to be and passing away, in V. Cas-
ton and D.W. Graham (eds.), Presocratic Philosophy. Essays in Honour
of Alexander Mourelatos, Aldershot, Ashgate, , pp. [= arti-
cle in this collection]. Useful notes (as well as references in the appa-
ratus superior) concerning Aristotelian antecedents for the contents of
lemmata in Placit. Book III in G. Lachenaud (ed.), Plutarque: uvres
morales t. XII2: Opinions des philosophes, Paris, Les Belles Lettres, ,
pp. , pp. (see also his synopsis, of the exposs de la
mtorologie, ibid., p. ). Several useful references also in the com-
ments of H. Strohm, Aristoteles: Meteorologie. ber die Welt (Aristoteles.
Werke in deutscher bersetzung, XII, ), Darmstadt, Wiss. Buchges.,
3. H. Diels, in his unrivalled masterpiece Doxographi Graeci, Berlin,
* Thanks are due to the members of the Roman corona for observations on the
occasion of the oral presentation of an early version of the present paper in June , and
to Keimpe Algra, Frederik Bakker, Jan van Ophuijsen, David T. Runia and Teun Tieleman
for critical remarks on drafts in December and January . As always the mistakes
which remain are mine.
from milky way to halo
I.G. Kidd, op. cit., Classical Review, XLI (), pp. , at pp.
. I prefer to replace the pseudo-precise siglum Posidonius by the
formula doxographical tradition(s).
Complementary note
Complementary note
David T. Runia
. Introduction
* My warm thanks to the editor [Philip van der Eijk] for his invitation, encouragement
and assistance on various technical aspects in relation to the medical tradition, and also
to my colleague and collaborator J. Mansfeld, who offered comments on an earlier draft.
1 H. Diels, Doxographi Graeci, Berlin, , 4 (henceforth DG).
2 Theodoret, Curatio affectionum Graecarum ., ., .. On the Atius hypothe-
sis before Diels see now J. Mansfeld and D.T. Runia, Atiana: The Method and Intellectual
Context of a Doxographer, Leiden, , pp. . Diels tendentiously gives the impres-
sion that Atius is entirely his own discovery.
3 On the term doxography and doxographer see my other contribution above, ch. .
plete analysis of Atius compendium and its intellectual background is being undertaken
*
by J. Mansfeld and the author. See the monograph cited in n. , which is the first of a pro-
jected series of three volumes.
5 On the title see ibid. pp. .
david t. runia
scientist. But I retain the more conventional doctor. The term physician is a bit out-dated
(on this side of the Atlantic at least), and moreover invites confusion with the ancient 9
* .
the placita ascribed to doctors
10 See esp. the monograph cited above in n. and the important comments on the
the Sitz im Leben of the Placita , in W. Haase and H. Temporini (eds.), Aufstieg und
Niedergang der rmischen Welt, II ., BerlinNew York, , pp. , which
concentrates on only six chapters of Atius on the soul (though also touching on many
other aspects of the doxographical and wider philosophical tradition, including aspects
of the doxai pertaining to medicine).
12 This section will not be documented in detail; the reader is referred to the mono-
graph cited in n. where all necessary details are presented in an accessible form. A more
detailed diagram of Atius transmission is found there at p. .
13 See above nn. & .
david t. runia
can be made of its original contents. For this reason we need to discuss
the witnesses one by one, concentrating of course on the major figures.
Atius
100
ps.Plutarch
200 papyrus ?
Eusebius
300
ps.Galen Nemesius
Lydus
500
now a separate edition of this derivative work with copious useful notes by G. Lachenaud
(ed.), Plutarque, uvres morales Tome XII 2: Opinions des Philosophes, Collection Bud,
Paris, .
the placita ascribed to doctors
tance with Atius; see further Mansfeld o.c. (n. above), pp. and my com-
ments above pp. .
*
the placita ascribed to doctors
(n. above), p. . Note that a few scraps of P . are also found in Stobaeus Book ,
chapters and . It is not a coincidence that the only medical doxa in S that is not
found in P is from Book on Principles, i.e. Asclepiades in the chapter on change which
I will discuss at some length in the following section.
david t. runia
subject is the De natura hominis of Nemesius. But his extracts, which may
or may not go directly back to Atius,24 are all from Book , and contain
no medical placita.
The vagaries of transmission have dictated, therefore, that the first
half of Atius work, up to . in P, is much better preserved than the
second half, excepting some chapters on psychology in Book . This is
most unfortunate for our subject. As we shall soon see, most of the doxai
attributed to doctors are found in the Epitome that goes under the name
of Ps.Plutarch.25 Originally there may have been quite a few more, but we
shall most likely never know this for sure.26
. Atius method
But before we turn to our texts, we will do well first to take a better look
at the method employed by Atius in his book. This introduces us to a
methodological problem. In order to make a sound reconstruction of
what his book looked like, we have to make assumptions about his aims
and methods. But in order to understand these aims and methods we
have no choice but to analyse the source material which we are recon-
structing. There is no way out of this circularity except by developing an
antenna for how his mind works. Fortunately there is some additional
help. Although Atius actual Sitz im Leben is a total mystery, we are able
to relate his work to other sometimes earlier strands of the doxographi-
cal tradition, going back as far as Aristotle at least, and this helps to give
solidity to our hypotheses.27
It would be a mistake to regard the work as unified in approach and
style. The first seven chapters of Book , for example, contain a [197]
number of discursive sections which deviate from the rest of the work,28
24 On the problems of Nemesius evidence see Mansfeld and Runia o.c. (n. above),
pp. .
25 For this reason, in referring to the Placita, I shall usually refer to Atius as found in
P, using the chapter numbers of the epitome, but referring where necessary to additional
information from other witnesses to the text.
26 For a possible clue to lemmata that P may have left out, see our discussion below of
decade; see esp. the long article cited above in n. and also the articles cited below in
nn. .
28 E.g. an atomistic description of the formation of the cosmos (.), a Stoic account
of the sources of mans knowledge of the gods (.) and quite a long refutation of atheism
the placita ascribed to doctors
and there are also some unusually long descriptive passages in Book
and .29 On the whole, however, it may be concluded that the work does
have a dominant method, which has until recently not been adequately
understood.
Apart from the division into five books (as found in P), which was
already noted above in our discussion of the sources for its reconstruc-
tion, the structure of the work is determined at two levels. The first of
these is the organisation into chapters. Each of the chapters deals with
a distinctive physical topic or question. Most often this is expressed by
means of the formula + genetive, e.g. .: 0 (On
respiration). But it is also possible for the topic to be cast in the form
of a question, e.g. .: : > B
; (What is the sub-
stance (or physical nature) of semen), and mixed forms occur as well,
e.g. .: + > : - (On
bodily affections and whether the soul suffers pain along with them).
These questions are, as Jaap Mansfeld has shown, an important clue to
the origin of the doxographical method. In his Topics Aristotle encour-
ages the investigator to organize his subject into problems (-)
or propositions (!), for which he should then collect the opin-
ions () held by the common man or by experts. The examples he
gives (and also those which he supplies in his own scientific works) reap-
pear in the Placita. The method is taken over in rhetorical theory, and is
the origin of the distinction between the general question (
, quaestio
infinita) and the specific question (5, quaestio finita). Among the
examples of theseis in rhetoricians and other writers (including Galen) we
find numerous parallels to chapter headings in Atius.30
The second level at which Atius compendium is organized is [198]
within the individual chapter. Throughout the entire work each chapter
consists of a number of lemmata, ranging from the minimum of two to
about twenty. These represent the doxai on the subject in question, and
(first section of .). On this last passage see now my analysis, Atheists in Atius: text,
translation and comments on De placitis .., Mnemosyne (), pp.
[= article in this collection].
29 E.g. ., . (Peripatetic meteorological material), . & (Stoic pyscholog-
ical material).
30 On this background see esp. J. Mansfeld, Physikai doxai and Problmata physica
from Aristotle to Atius (and beyond), in W.W. Fortenbaugh and D. Gutas (eds.),
Theophrastus: His Psychological, Doxographical and Scientific Writings, New Brunswick
N.J.London , esp. pp. [= article in this collection]. On Galen see my earlier
contribution in this volume above at pp. [see above n. ]. On the thesis see further
below at n. on the lost work of Dionysius of Aegae.
david t. runia
31 For examples of analyses of complex chapters in Atius see the article of J. Mansfeld
cited in n. above and my articles, Xenophanes on the moon: a doxographicum in
Atius, Phronesis (), pp. [= article in this collection], Xenophanes
or Theophrastus? An Atian doxographicum on the sun, in: Fortenbaugh and Gutas, o.c.
(n. above) pp. [not included in this collection]. See also the article by A. Laks,
Du tmoignage comme fragment, in: G. Most (ed.), Collecting Fragments, Gttingen,
, pp. , who concurs with our analysis of Atius method.
32 On diaireseis in Aristotelian and Theophrastean proto-doxographical texts see now
the principles, which was presumably originally given for introductory purposes. It is
moreover true that on many occasions the oldest view is placed first. Obviously it is
often the logical starting-point for discussion. Note, for example, that in the chapter on
respiration (.) the oldest view of Empedocles comes first, but Asclepiades precedes
the earlier Herophilus.
35 Text based on the two modern editions, J. Mau, Plutarchus Moralia V,,, Biblio-
The first two doxai appear to give a description of what change (or
motion) is.36 The third and fourth list views on kinds of changes (the
terms
and @ appear to be synonymous and are not used in
the technical sense of a genus-species relation). The final two introduce
distinctions between types of change; in the case of Herophilus the
perspective is epistemological, in the case of Heraclitus it is physical. It
should be noted how concise the presentation is, almost in the manner of
a telegram. Except for the copulative 8 in the definition at the outset,
there is no verb until the slightly more extensive Heraclitan doxa at the
close of the chapter.
In his anthology Stobaeus (S) also has a chapter on change. We cite the
first section, which is relevant to our example. The underlined words are
precisely paralleled in the text of P.37
.. -
. 8 F H 8 A/, /: 7
A. < ! - 6.
}
- 3 .
1 O -, 3 ! 3
.
+
,
@ +!, >, 6
8 3
.
i E & &
,
3
G.
9 0
, E
.
$! \ E ! 8 6 /-,
E K .
$ - & E ; -, & E +-.
1! K +& -.
1
& 8
@ B ! B /:
. . . .
F, P 7 P post A/, om. F, secl.
Wachsmuth
3 !, 3 - coni. Gassendi Zeller ex Simpl. in Phys.
. [201]
logii libri duo priores qui inscribi solent Eclogae physicae et ethicae, vols., Berlin, ;
repr. Zurich, . The letters in the apparatus criticus represent manuscripts and should
not be confused with our abbreviations for the sources for the reconstruction of Atius.
the placita ascribed to doctors
The verbal resemblances between the two texts are more than sufficient
to allow us to deduce that they utilize a common source (since they
definitely do not depend on each other).38 S offers us a fuller text. There
are now ten doxai instead of six. P has no lemmata that are entirely absent
in S, so it may be assumed (though it cannot be taken as certain) that Ss
list of ten lemmata is complete.39 But before we can offer a reconstruction
of the text such as it must have appeared in Atius (A), we have a
number of problems that have to be resolved (in what follows P refers
to Ps.Plutarch, S to Stobaeus, numbers following to their chapters cited
above).
() From in P it seems that S in drops the name-label Plato. The reason is
apparent: S quotes from the dialogues of Plato later in the chapter, and so does
not need the doxa here.40 In A at P . six chapters begin with definitions. Ss
fuller text probably goes back to A, though it is possible that he added the final
words (from < onwards). As for the difference in reading between !
and , it is true that the latter term has a good Platonic pedigree
( instances), but none are directly related to the subject of physical change. The
use of the term is mostly late, so I would prefer Ps reading.41
() The Aristotelian lemma gives an alternative formulation of what change is. S
has moved it to the end of the section because he wishes to replace the extremely
brief formula in A with a longer extract from Arius Didymus.42
() The next four lemmata in S give a list of kinds of change. The numbering of
the fourth and fifth is rather pedantic, but typical of the genre. Compare lists in
ascending order of number which are given for the archai, for parts of the soul,
etc.43 We note that for the Democritean doxa S indicates the correct reading.
Maus text is too conservative. A often records anonymous doxai in longer lists;
cf. for example in P . on the Great year and in . on the location of the
ruling part of the soul. It allows a greater degree of systematic completeness to
be achieved.
38 P cannot have used S because the latter is plainly later. There is no evidence that S
was aware of P. On the very slight amount of contamination from the tradition of P in the
mss. of S see Mansfeld and Runia, o.c. (n. above), p. .
39 The assumption is of course based on a much more detailed analysis of Ss method;
see above n. .
40 A frequent practice in the Anthology; cf. ibid. pp. .
41 This doxa is not drawn directly from any passage in Plato, but cf. Tim. ea,
which Aristotle may be thinking of at Phys. ., b, when he says that some regard
as H or .
42 Diels erroneously prints this in his double column reconstruction of A; see further
() There is no need to doubt that the doxa of Diodorus Cronus came next.
It presents a view that qualifies the nature of motion, i.e. the paradox that it
has always taken place. This view also has an epistemological aspect. Motion
in progress can in fact not be thought (as in Zeno of Elea). [202]
() We now encounter a major difficulty, namely the difference in the order of
the final lemmata as given by P and S. P first records the epistemological doxa
of Herophilus and then the view of Heraclitus that change is permanent and that
one should distinguish between everlasting change (i.e. circular movement) and
perishable change (i.e. all other kinds). Logically it would seem better to follow
S and have Heraclitus follow Diodorus. He offers a second kind of qualification.
Moreover A often leaves epistemological views to the end (cf. P . on causes
(an excellent parallel), ., . etc.). It must be admitted, however, that it
is rather unusual for P to change the order of the lemmata.
() S adds to the evidence in P the lemma of Asclepiades, which is obviously
formulated in order to highlight the opposition to the view of Herophilus. The
final verb - has probably been added by S, who likes to add some
fluency to the Atian telegrammatic style.
full list of references to him given by J.T. Vallance, The medical system of Asclepiades of
the placita ascribed to doctors
. On change45
Pythagoras and Plato (affirm): change is a kind of difference or alterity
in matter qua matter. This is the common definition of every (form
of) change.
Aristotle (affirms that change is) completion of the changeable.
Democritus (affirms that) there is one kind of change, vibration.
Epicurus (affirms that) there are two kinds of change, in a straight line
and by a swerve.
There are others who introduce a fourth kind, substantial (change),
which is (change) involving generation.
Yet others add mental change as well, for they advanced (the kinds of
change) to the number five.
Diodorus Cronus states that a thing is in a state of having moved, but
nothing is ever moving.
Heraclitus removed rest and standstill from the universe, for this is
what characterizes corpses. For everlasting beings there is everlasting
change, for perishable things there is perishable change.
Herophilus (distinguishes between) change that is observable by
reason and change that is sense-perceptible.
Asclepiades affirmed that all change is sense-perceptible.
Although the chapter does highlight some differing views, the only clear
example of an opposition (i.e. views that are directly opposed to each
other) is between the two doxai attributed to doctors at the end. This
is clearly indicated by the way the doxographer formulates them. In the
Bithynia, Aufstieg und Niedergang der rmischen Welt II . (), pp. . The
reference given here to Stobaeus is rather inexact (add .. Wachsmuth).
45 Or motion; see above n. .
david t. runia
. On the link between Asclepiades and the Methodists see Vallance, o.c. (n. above),
pp. .
50 Adv. logicos . (translation R.G. Bury, modified): =
, 8 +/0 E
> , S E , 8 3 E +- b
- @, ; E E 6 :K !. Further
evidence of his interest in epistemological issues is his interpretation of the Heraclitan
and Platonic river image (Adv. log. .).
51 In Ps.Galen Def. med. (. K.) the same doxa is stated as appendix to
Asclepiades view on digestion, but the link between the two is not made clear.
david t. runia
not be seen, but that does not mean that it was not to be found there:52
Like the atomists and indeed all physicists [206] and physiologists, they
[the medical researchers] were quite prepared to reckon with realities not
accessible to the senses. We even happen to know what term they used for
such realities. They are ; ! [with reference to Atius .].
This is a good example of an isolationistic interpretation of a doxographic
text. It assumes, not necessarily implausibly,53 that the expression ;
! is derived from Herophilus himself. But this cannot be proven,
since the expression is also common in Atius. Moreover it does not take
into account the doxographical context, and in particular the antithesis
with the view of Asclepiades.
From the above discussion on Atius method and the chapter that has
been analysed in some detail an important conclusion may be drawn.
The primary context of the doxai is doxographical. It is methodologically
risky to wrench them out of their context and discuss them in isolation.
The primary task is to interpret them as part of their doxographical
context. After that an attempt may be made to relate the information
to the remainder of what is known about the philosophers and doctors
to whom they are attributed. But, because the formulation of the doxai
is often highly compact or even downright obscure, it may prove very
difficult to tease reliable information from them.
52 F. Solmsen, Greek philosophy and the discovery of the nerves, Museum Helveticum
of the references are attibutable to Herophilus. Von Staden, o.c. (n. above), p. claims
that Herophilus speaks about - in relation to the pulse, but I have not been
able to confirm this in his texts T.
the placita ascribed to doctors
diss. Lige . For the sake of simplicity I have retained the name-label
Hippocrates in the list.
(c) In his reconstruction of Atius, Diels (DG ) suggested on the basis of
the list of names in Photius that S may have contained a doxa of Euryphon the
doctor in this chapter (.). Elter and Wachsmuth pointed out, however, that
Photius undoubtedly found the name at S ..a, which is derived from the
gnomological rather than the doxographical tradition.54
(d) In a paraphrase of A . at CAG . Theodoret reports the name-label
10, which is chronologically impossible. Raeder and others emend to
1
. Diels in a note (DG n. ) suggested the reading might be a
mistake for the original 1 0, adducing Tertullian De anima
., where both names occur (though not together). It is possible that this was
the original reading in A, but the matter is too speculative, so we leave it out of
consideration.55
Four doctors are prominent in this list: the fourth-century doctor Dio-
cles, whose relation to Aristotle and the Peripatos is controversial,56 the
two great Alexandrians Herophilus and Erasistratus, and the prominent
late second century doctor Asclepiades of Bithynia, one of very last fig-
ures to occur in the Atian Placita.57 Between them these four claim more
than two-thirds of the references.
It is remarkable that Hippocrates, famous in other doxographical doc-
uments for having separated medical science from philosophy,58 [209]
is only mentioned twice. The first reference in . is only recorded
in Theodoret. Although it is possible that the name-label was added
by the bishop (the Hippocratic position, aligned with Plato, was well-
known), it is not so likely because a parallel doxography in Tertullian also
includes his name.59 The other reference is in . on the seven-month
totle, and Theophrastus, in: W.M. Calder III (ed.), Werner Jaeger Reconsidered, Atlanta,
, pp. ; P.J. van der Eijk, Diocles and the Hippocratic writings on the method
of dietetics and the limits of causal explanation, in: R. Wittern and P. Pellegrin (eds.), Hip-
pokratische Medizin und antike Philosophie, Hildesheim, , pp. , esp. p. ff.
57 See Mansfeld and Runia o.c. (n. above), pp. f. (where we argue for a later
date against Rawson and Frede). He is the only author to be regularly cited who is
approximately contemporary with Posidonius.
58 Celsus, De medicina Proem. .
59 Tertullian De anima . (derived from Soranus). On this witness to the tradition
tratus is also described as 9 +, but the epithet is not found in P or its tradition (Q
and Eusebius Praeparatio Evangelica .). It could have been present in A, but might
also have been added on the basis of his general knowledge by the bishop himself.
63 See also above n. .
64 On these developments see our discussion with texts above in chapter , pp. .
*
david t. runia
65 See for example the account in Longrigg, o.c. (n. above), pp. . In his tables on
pp. he intriguingly suggests that Alcmaeon may have set the agenda for subsequent
treatments of physiology (e.g. when they find their way into the doxographical tradition),
but does not pursue the matter further.
66 Diog. Laert. .: 3 ! +3
, 6 E 8.
67 Cf. J. Mansfeld, Alcmaeon: Physikos or Physician? with some remarks on Calcid-
ius On Vision compared to Galen, Plac. Hipp. Plat. VII, in: J. Mansfeld and L.M. de Rijk
(eds.), Kephalaion: Studies in Greek Philosophy and its Continuation Offered to Professor
C.J. de Vogel, Assen, , pp. ; G.E.R. Lloyd, Alcmaeon and the early history of
dissection, in id., Methods and Problems in Greek Science, Cambridge, , pp.
(first published in ).
the placita ascribed to doctors
surmise that this was the view of Atius himself, for he gives no indi-
cation that he regards him as any different to other Presocratics such as
Parmenides, Empedocles, Anaxagoras and Democritus, whose names are
all rather prominent in Book . We note that Alcmaeon occurs together
with doctors in four of the above chapters (marked on the list with an
asterisk).68 In the case of Empedocles this happens on no less than nine
occasions.69
68 In the parallel passage to Atius ., On how males and females are produced,
70 The discrepancy in number between this list and the list in is caused by the two
(probably by the epitomator, there is no record of it in the tradition outside P) and should
have been included in book after the chapters on the sea and the tides (). The
source of the Nile was a much discussed question, but the fact that this chapter focuses
on a particular river places it outside the Placita tradition proper.
the placita ascribed to doctors
As this division suggests, the influence of the Stoa in this book is very
strong.74 Four of the doctors placita are found in the general chapters
on the nature of the soul (.) and the location of its ruling part (.).
The doxai of Erasistratus and Herophilus are valuable because they give
locations for the hgemonikon which are distinctive, and so occupy a
special place in the detailed diairesis which the doxographer gives on
this subject.75 The position of the chapter on respiration ( ) in this
book, with its very long doxai ascribed to Asclepiades and Herophilus,
is somewhat anomalous because this chapter discusses physiological
processes only, with no reference to the soul at all. A more logical position
would have been in Book .76 [214]
Book . The majority of the placita ascribed to doctors are found in the
final book of Atius compendium. This book can described in general
terms, as we have done above, as concentrating on the physiology of the
(mainly) human body. A division of its contents, however, can only be
rather rough, for the sequence of topics is in some cases far from logical:
74 See esp. chapters and , and also the prominent role of the Stoics in
and . Note esp. that the chapters on the voice (according to the Stoa the sixth part
of the soul, cf. the Stoic lemma in .) follow straight on from those on the senses. But
the seventh part of the soul, the spermatikon, is not treated in this book, and the chapters
on semen in Book adopt a different, physiological approach.
75 See n. above and the study of Mansfeld cited there, p. .
76 Its presence in Book can be explained through a process of association which is
dent on P, probably gives a skewed impression of the contents of the original compendium
as far as the individual lemmata are concerned.
david t. runia
78 See von Staden o.c. (n. above), pp. , who discusses this doxa in a separate
section at the end of his chapter on Physiology and Pathology (in which all the Atian
lemmata are included).
79 Div. somn. , a. On this text see P.J. van der Eijk, Aristotle on Distin-
guished physicians and on the medical significance of dreams, in: P.J. van der Eijk,
H.F.J. Horstmanshoff and P.H. Schrijvers (eds.), Ancient Medicine in its Socio-Cultural
Context, AmsterdamAtlanta, , pp. .
80 The philosophers Parmenides and the Stoics pronounce on old age only. This
chapter combines more than one subject; see the Appendix below, p. .
the placita ascribed to doctors
81 I owe this specific point to discussion with the editor [Philip van der Eijk].
82 They only appear to surface briefly and obliquely in ., where the text of the
lemmata of Diocles and Herophilus has been imperfectly preserved in the tradition. See
further the Appendix below. On philosophical and medical haireseis in Atius see also
the text at n. above.
83 Daiber o.c. (n. above), whose commentary on the Arabic translation of P gives a
fund of information on the original Greek lemmata; Lachenaud o.c. (n. above), whose
translation is accompanied by copious notes.
david t. runia
are kept rather brief. The briefest are found in chapters in which a title
poses a specific question and the various lemmata give an answer with
telegrammatic concision. The best examples in our selection are found in
. and .. But even here there is a slight difference. In . the question
is the place of the ruling part and the answers do nothing but indicate
various locations, i.e.
. Hippocrates and Plato and Democritus in the head as a whole.
. Strato in the forehead. etc. etc.
The only way that the compiler can introduce any systematics is by means
of an extensive use of the diairesis (see next sub-section). In . the
question is what is first formed in the womb. Here too the answers are
very compact, but at least three of them give a little elucidation.84 [217]
. The Stoics (that) the whole develops together.
. Aristotle first the loins like the keel of a ship.
. Alcmaeon the head, in which the ruling part exists.
. The doctors the heart, in which the veins and arteries (come togeth-
er?).
. But others the big toe of the foot.
. And yet others the navel.
In and there is surely an implicit argument: the part that is
formed first is the most important part of the living being. In the case
of Aristotle, however, the analogy seems less informative. As we shall see
below when we discuss the question of sources, it would seem that the
doxographer makes a mistake here.85 The basic antithesis between the
embryo developing as a whole together versus developing in succession
(so that there must be a first part to develop) is already found in Aristotles
treatment (GA ., a ff.).
The other extreme is the chapter on respiration, ., in which we find
three long doxai amounting to some two pages of text. Only a handful of
lemmata in Atius compendium are longer.86 The comparative wealth of
phers style. Verbs of affirmation and other parts of the sentence have to be supplied, e.g.
from the title.
85 Already pointed out by Diels DG, p. n. . See our further discussion below at
n. .
86 Note that Ps.Plutarch may have abbreviated some of Atius longer lemmata. A
number of the long lemmata, however, that Diels imputed to Atius in his reconstruction
should be attributed to Arius Didymus instead, as I show in my article cited above in n. .
the placita ascribed to doctors
detail not only gives valuable insight into the original theories, but also
allows the doxographer to set up a number of similarities and contrasts
between the three accounts. For example, both Empedocles and Ascle-
piades invoke the mechanical process of circular thrust (note the termi-
nology and
), but in the one case it is
the blood that is the efficient cause, in the other it is the fine-particled
material. Empedocles compares the process with a clepsydra,87 Asclepi-
ades with cupping glasses. By way of contrast Herophilus is reported as
emphasizing the natural capacity of the bodily organs, i.e. dunameis, in
contrast to the mechanical processes mentioned previously.88 There [218]
also seems to be a contrast between his double movement of dilation and
contraction as compared to the single movement of repletion and evac-
uation postulated by Asclepiades.
The remaining lemmata fall between these two extremes, but tend to
the brevity of the former rather than to the expansiveness of the latter.
The chief reason for this is, as we have already noted, that the Placita are
basically thetic.89 They put forward the required view in concise terms.
Sometimes this includes a brief explanation added in a clause introduced
by !.90 The chief aim, however, is to distinguish the one doxa from the
other, not to present a satisfactory account of the philosophers or doctors
doctrine on the matter in question.
87 In the original (fr. B Diels) the image is presented with much more poetic flair.
88 Von Staden, o.c. (n. above), p. interprets the doxa as introducing a distinction
between two kinds of movement, voluntary and involuntary. But this would require
the particle
rather than Q in the second line. The prominent position of the term
! as the first word of the doxa suggests that the doxographer wishes to emphasize
the natural faculty of a bodily organ in contrast to the role of blood and air in the previous
doxai.
89 See our discussion above on the method of the Placita.
90 See further below at n. .
david t. runia
91 The epitomator does have an eye for the method of diairesis, but the reduction of
the earlier source necessarily leads to obfuscation in many cases; see further Mansfeld
and Runia, o.c. (n. above), p. . In the next stage of epitomization carried out by G
the same method continues to be used, but the compression of the texts leads to a further
increase in obscurity.
the placita ascribed to doctors
and that it has a cause, but this cause may be hidden. Herophilus opposes
this view and argues that the fever precedes the swelling and that it can
come up without an apparent cause. There is thus a direct disagreement
between Herophilus and Diocles (and also Erasistratus) on whether
fever causes swelling or the other way around. On the subject of the
cause of fever there is also disagreement, but the positions are less clear-
cut. Erasistratus puts forward a definite cause. Diocles states that the
cause may be [221] concealed, and goes on to suggest three possibilities.
Herophilus says that the cause of the fever may not be clear at all.94 We
thus have to do with a complex schema of partial agreement and partial
disagreement such as is common in the Placita.95 The cause of fever was
a standard topic in a discussion of the art of medicine. Celsus uses it as an
example in his Promium (), referring to the views of Erasistratus
and Asclepiades. Sextus Empiricus uses the same example to illustrate the
disagreement of the doctors Herophilus, Erasistratus and Asclepiades on
the subject of signs.96
94 I do not think that the text should be read as implying that there is no cause at all,
such as might be suggested by the text of G, K +
, which
von Staden fr. a translates as although there is no antecedent [proximate?] cause. G
notoriously tries to improve on his original; see Mansfeld and Runia, o.c. (n. above),
p. . The participle
must be considered suspect when compared with
Q.
95 A very clear example is found at Atius . as found in P on the division of bodies.
96 Adv. logicos . (cf. also .) = fr. von Staden. At pp. von
tioned together, Herophilus usually precedes. See the texts and discussion at von Staden,
o.c. (n. above), pp. .
the placita ascribed to doctors
pupil of Erasistratus.
104 See the comment at the conclusion of the Appendix below, p. .
david t. runia
chapters . and ., which deal with related subjects. The problem can
be spotted if we place a translation of the two chapters side by side. [223]
. Why does a woman who has sex often . How do women become sterile and
not conceive men infertile
Diocles the doctor (states that this The doctors (state that) sterility ensues
happens) either from the fact that from the womb, either when it is denser
some women do not emit any seed at or looser or rougher, or when it has some
all (cf. .) or less than is required, or patches of callus or growths, or from lack
because of seed that is not capable of of spirit or from lack of nourishment
producing life; or through a lack of heat or from poor condition or from its
or coolness or moisture or dryness, or on configuration being twisted or from
account of paralysis of the (genital) parts. distortion (cf. .).
The Stoics on account of the obliqueness Diocles (states that) male infertility
of the male member, which is unable ensues either from the fact that some men
to direct the seed straight; or from the do not emit any seed at all or less than
incompatibility of the (genital) parts required, or from the fact that the seed is
with regard to distance (or depth) of the infertile, or on account of the paralysis of
womb. the (genital) parts or on account of the
obliqueness of the male member, which is
unable to direct the seed straight; or from
the incompatibility of the (genital) parts
with regard to distance (or depth) of the
womb.
Erasistratus from the womb, when it The Stoics blame the incompatibility
contains callus and growths, or when it is of the faculties and qualities of each of
unnaturally loose or small. the partners. Whenever it happens that
they are separated from each other and
have intercourse with others who are
compatible, the natural state prevails and
a child is brought to completion.
Two interesting parallelisms catch our attention. In the first place there
is a patent similarity between the doxa of Erasistratus in . and that of
the doctors in . (and also the doxa of some doctors in .).105 It
may be surmised that the doxai attributed to doctors in . and .
have Erasistratus primarily in mind. Secondly the doxa of the Stoics in
. is word for word identical with the second half of that of Diocles in
.. Moreover there is a strong similarity between the doxa of Diocles
in . and the first half of his doxa in ., except that the female seed
has been changed to the male seed. The Stoics reappear in ., but with
a completely different approach involving male-female incompatibility.
logizing 3 in P.
the placita ascribed to doctors
This peculiar situation led Diels to suspect that something had gone
wrong in . and that both doxai [224] there should be attributed to
Diocles.106 The suggestion appears to have been taken over by Wellmann
in his edition of Diocles fragments.107 Certainly the near identity of the
name-labels in the two chapters is striking. Something may well have
gone wrong in the attribution of name-labels here, either in Atius or
in Ps abridgement. But there is no easy fix. Even if we were to suppose
that in . the doxographer has artificially divided a single lemma in
order to create an antithesis between male and female, we are still left
with the curious fact that Diocles uses almost identical formulations for
female seed in the one text and for male seed in the other. Indeed . is
an excellent illustration of how dominant the diaeretic schemata can be
in the Placita. We know from . that Diocles had views on the female
sterility, but in . only his views on male infertility are required, and so
that is all we get.108
A final aspect relating to name-labels that deserves comment is that the
doctors are scarcely involved in lemmata which contain multiple name-
labels (this only occurs at .,109 where in successive lemmata we have
the group of Polybus, Diocles and the Empiricists followed by Aristotle
and Hippocrates linked together). The chief reason for this may be our
dependence on P, who tends to remove excess name-labels, an easy way
to cut down on his original.110
Thereafter he is not entirely consistent, but generally gives places of origin for exceptional
david t. runia
(i) Direct speech and quotations. Only in three cases is direct speech used.
At . Diocles statement about observation of the wombs of mules with
its striking use of the first person is most likely either a direct quote or
a paraphrase drawn from his writings. We note that the remainder of
Anatomie, RE Suppl. (), cols. ; von Staden o.c. (n. above), pp. .
Aristotle refers to the results of dissection on a number of occasons, e.g. at De respiratione
b, b; HA ., b; GA ., a.
114 Celsus mentions the practice as part of his presentation of dogmatist medicine in
the doxa reverts to indirect speech. The other two [226] cases are found
in ..116 Erasistratus is cited as defining what fever is. The use of direct
speech indicates a closer relation to the original source than is customary
in the Placita, but it would be rash to conclude that it is a direct quote.117
The Dioclean lemma in the same chapter gives the famous slogan b
- 3 .118 The fact that the doxa continues in direct
speech (8
) is an indication that the direct citation continues. Again
it may be a quote or a paraphrase, but not a report. Very rarely does Atius
give a reference to his source, for example in . on the conception of
males and females, where it is indicated that the doxa on Leophanes is
drawn from Aristotle (GA ., a).119 In none of the placita ascribed
to the doctors is such a reference given.
and was approved of by Democritus; see Sext. Emp. Adv. log. . = Ba DK, A.
119 For a full list see my article Xenophanes or Theophrastus? cited above in n. ,
pp. .
120 E.g. in ., ., .. Epicurus in turn had made use of the early doxographical
tradition to formulate his multiple causes; see the study of J. Mansfeld, Epicurus Peri-
pateticus, in: A. Alberti (ed.), Realt e ragione, Florence, , pp. [= article in
this collection].
121 J. Mansfeld has shown that the doxographers make use of such schemata in the
ordering of chapters and lemmata; see his article Doxography and Dialectic cited above
in n. , p. , and the article Physikai doxai cited above in n. , p. .
david t. runia
We now come to two further questions which may and should be asked
of our little collection: () where does the information which it conveys
come from? and () what is its value? These questions must be seen as
belonging to a much larger exercise, the evaluation of the sources for the
psychological and physiological doxographies in Atius Books and in
relation to the entire philosophical and medical tradition. As we noted
at the outset, a limited section of this huge task has been carried out by
J. Mansfeld (for .), the rest remains to be done.124 What now follows
can do no more than give some indications that will hopefully point in
the right direction.
First of all, therefore, we ask where the information we have analysed is
drawn from. How likely is it that our doxographer distilled the doxai we
are studying from the writings of the doctors themselves? Or did he draw
on other intermediate sources which are now lost to us? The answer to
this question may be readily given if we first compare a number of other
documents containing similar material.
a. Censorinus
In his essay On Ones Birthday the third century ce grammarian Censor-
inus discusses various questions concerning the process of conception,
pregnancy and birth. No less than ten of the questions discussed are par-
b. Tertullian
A second significant document for our question is by the late second cen-
tury Christian apologist Tertullian. In the treatise De anima he presents
us with extensive doxographical reports on questions raised by Atius
in Book , chapters .128 The parallelism is striking and closer than
what we found in Censorinus. The source of the information is cer-
tainly the second century Methodist doctor Soranus, who is mentioned
by Tertullian times. If we take the names of the doctors listed in
Tertullians work (except Hicesius they are all found in chapter on
the hgemonikon, but many also elsewhere), we get a striking result:
Andreas (), Apollodorus (), Asclepiades (), Chrysippus (),
125 See the parallel columns of Diels at DG pp. and the copious references in
the apparatus of the edition by N. Sallmann, Censorini De die natali liber, Stuttgart, .
French translation with useful notes by G. Rocca-Serra, Censorinus, Le Jour Natal, Paris,
.
126 E.g. at De die natali . Alcmaeon is recorded as stating that no one can tell what is
first formed in the fetus, whereas Atius at P . attributes to him that the hgemonikon
is formed first. But the doxa of the + in the same chapter is attributed to Empedocles
and Aristotle in De die natali ..
127 The Dioclean doxa at . corresponds to Atius . (though not in company of
Polybus and the Empiricists); the Hippocratic doxa in . deals with the same subject,
but the actual doctrine is quite different. Euryphon the Cnidian physician, named in .,
is absent in Atius (see above at n. ). Herophilus and Asclepiades are cited in . on
topics not directly related to the Placita. Hippocrates is more popular, being cited at .
and . as well.
128 See J.H. Waszink, Quinti Septimi Florentis Tertulliani De anima, Amsterdam, ,
pp. **, Mansfeld, o.c. (n. above), pp. , who in his table also adds the
doxography found in Caelius Aurelianus (cited by Waszink on p. ). The latter passage
has no name-labels, but retains some of the Atian lemmata left out by Tertullian.
david t. runia
c. Philo of Alexandria
A single, hitherto unnoticed text in the Jewish philosopher and exegete
Philo of Alexandria ( bce ce) seems to point in the same direction.
In arguing that the hgemonikon of the soul is prior to the senses and the
passions, Philo draws an analogy with the body (Legum allegoriae .):
According to the best doctors and philosophers the heart is thought to
be formed before the body as a whole, in the manner of a foundation or as
the keel in a ship, on which the rest of the body is constructed. Although
context and formulation differ somewhat, the contents are clearly related
to the question at Atius .: what is first formed in the womb, and the
doxa of Aristotle that the loins are first formed as the keel of the ship (see
above, p. ). The expression keel of a ship is rare. The metaphor is
almost certainly based on Aristotles text Metaphysics ., a, where
it does no more than illustrate a case of arch as meaning beginning.
Philos text indicates that originally it was used to illustrate the properly
Aristotelian view that the heart as dominant part is the first part formed
in the embryo (cf. GA ., ab). In all likelihood, therefore,
our doxographer made a mistake. Philos evidence is valuable because it
suggests that the doxa and the metaphor were brought together in the
tradition of the Placita.129 From evidence elsewhere it is certain that Philo
too had access to the Vetusta Placita.130 We note that his passage starts
with a reference to doctors and philosophers. This is a sure indication
of the names that he encountered in his doxographical reading. [230]
129 It might be argued that no more than the Aristotelian passage is required for Philos
text, because the former illustrates the - of living beings with a diairesis that some
regard it as the heart and others the brain. But Philos text talks about what is first formed,
and moreover uses the word B for ship, rather than , as in Aristotles text and
all others derived from it. See also Mansfeld o.c. (n. above), pp. f. The question
needs to be pursued in more detail than is possible in this context.
130 Missed by Diels but proven by P. Wendland in his brief article, Eine doxographische
Four of the seven name-labels here refer to doctors. Since the correspon-
dences between Atius and this source are so strong, this text may well
give us a clue to what either Atius or his epitomator P has omitted from
our text. It is possible, indeed perhaps likely, that Diocles, Praxagoras
and Asclepiades were originally adduced in the chapter on the nature of
semen. Twice in subsequent chapters Asclepiades is cited, once on the dif-
ference between sperma and gonos (not in Atius) and once on whether
the embryo is a living being or not (cf. .). In the latter case this lemma
too may have been epitomized away by P. [231]
shall note below, at n. , Khns edition of this work has been interpolated. But this
entire passage, including the name-labels, is found in the unexpanded text given in the
Aldine editio princeps of , as I have checked myself on a copy generously supplied to
me by J. Mansfeld.
134 The quaestio of . (What is the nature of the sperma) is not specifically given, but
e. Sextus Empiricus
Finally we point out that the Hellenistic doctors are seldom encountered
in the writings of Sextus Empiricus. By far the most prominent is Asclepi-
ades, whose doxai on first principles and psychology are recorded.135 The
texts of greatest interest for our subject are two brief doxographical texts
on signs in general and signs of fever which were already noted above.136
In both cases Herophilus, Erasistratus and Asclepiades are invoked as a
standard trio. The same three are (together with Diocles) the most promi-
nent doctors in the Placita.
and the role of doxography in the Anonymus Londiniensis (PBrLibr Inv. ), pp.
].
the placita ascribed to doctors
dition that we have been studying. Of the doctors in our list, only [232]
Hippocrates and Polybus could have figured in this source.140 It may be
concluded that this collection was not of prime importance for the dox-
ographical traditions we are studying.141
The situation changes markedly when we come to the first century bce.
The convergence of related material in differing sources led Diels to the
hypothesis of the Vetusta Placita, which he dates to the period from
to bc.142 As we noted above, Diels thought he could accommodate the
parallel evidence found in Censorinus and Tertullian. But he overlooked
a vital passage to which attention was recently drawn by Jaap Mansfeld.143
Galen in his lengthy book On the Placita of Hippocrates and Plato gives
a literal citation from Chrysippus (c. ) of which I quote the
relevant parts for our study:144
() . . . The (part of the soul) where all these (other parts) come together
is located in the heart, which is the part of the soul that is the regent
part. () This being so, there is agreement about the other parts, but about
the regent part of the soul they disagree, some putting it in one place and
others in another. For some say it is located in the chest, others in the
head. () Furthermore, they also disagree as to these locations themselves,
viz. as to where in the head and where in the chest it is, not agreeing among
themselves. () Plato affirms that the soul has three parts, and said that
the rational part is in the head, the spirited part in the region of the chest,
and the appetitive part in the region of the navel. The place (of the regent
part) therefore seems to be beyond our reach, as we have neither a clear
perception, as was the case with the other (parts), nor indications from
which a solution might be conclusively inferred by means of argument;
otherwise disagreement among philosophers as well as among doctors
would not have gone as far as it has.
140 On Euryphon, who occurs in the Anon. Londiniensis, see above at n. . Notoriously
the name of Diocles does not occur.
141 The same conclusion by W.D. Smith, Notes on ancient medical historiography,
Bulletin of the History of Medicine (), p. (who does not doubt the attribution to
Meno).
142 For Diels dating see the argument leading up to the conclusion on DG p. .
Note that much in Diels Vetusta Placita hypothesis remains highly speculative. The entire
question needs re-examination.
143 In Chrysippus and the Placita (cited above n. ) passim, Doxography and
145 Mansfeld notes that the emphasis on the dissensio philosophorum is much stronger
in Censorinus than in Atius and Tertullian-Soranus. This suggests that Varros source
was influenced by Academic philosophy in the third and second century bce. The
chronological advantages of the separation have especially to do with the figures of
Asclepiades and Aenesidemus, of which the dating in both cases remains controversial.
See further the articles cited in n. and on Asclepiades Mansfeld and Runia, o.c. (n.
above), p. (with further references).
the placita ascribed to doctors
the doxai with their own accounts.146 Two strategies might be suggested
to soften the pain and reach some kind of answer. One method is the
use of a control situation. If we can examine cases in which the doxogra-
phers based their reports on works that we do still have, then this might
tell us something about how they worked in other cases which we can-
not check. In Atius Book there are two candidates. Firstly eight doxai
on physiology and animal biology are ascribed to Plato which are almost
exclusively drawn from the Timaeus. For example, the positive answer
to the question whether the embryo is a living being or not is no doubt
inspired by Platos brief account of sex and reproduction at Tim. ad.
At d he speaks of living creatures (;) too small to be seen and still
unformed which are nourished (8
) until they become large
and then are brought into the light of day. But the Atian doxa makes
no further verbal reference to this account. Plato does not use the term
7, never mentions embryonic motion in the womb, and also the
two words for nourishing differ. The interpretation is clearly ad sensum
(as the doxographer perceives it) and not ad litteram.147
But Platos Timaeus is very different from the more empirical outlook
of our doctors. A second, more promising, possibility is to look at the
Aristotelian evidence. The doxographer himself gives us an interesting
clue in ., where he gives a view of the obscure Leophanes whom Aris-
totle has mentioned. The reference can only be to the text of De gen-
eratione animalium ., a. Here too the lemma is formulated ad
sensum, and the compiler rather cleverly avoids the question as to which
testicle produces which sex.148 We [236] have proof, therefore, that Aris-
146 In the case of Hippocrates the corpus Hippocraticum does survive, but the lemmata
in the Placita are too scant to allow us to reach any useful conclusions.
147 Compare the detailed analyses of Theophrastus account of Platos views on the
* senses in his De sensibus by H. Baltussen, Theophrastus on Theories of Perception: Argu-
ment and Purpose in the De sensibus, diss. Utrecht, , pp. , and A.A. Long,
Theophrastus De sensibus on Plato, in: K.A. Algra, P.W. van der Horst and D.T. Runia
(eds.), Polyhistor (n. above), pp. . Long concludes (p. ) that Theophrastus
was simply very uneven in his level of accuracy and clarity.
148 Aristotle appears to suggest that with the right testicle tied up male progeny are
produced, with the left female offspring. This means that the right testicle produces girls
and the left boys, which is most surprising in light of the connection between right and
male, left and female in the Pythagorean sustoichiae (cf. Metaph. ., a). But a
translation with the term respectively, such as given by Peck (LCL) and Platt (Oxford
translation) probably presses the Greek word order too much. See further G.E.R. Lloyd,
Right and left in Greek philosophy, in: id., Methods and Problems in Greek Science:
Selected Papers, Cambridge, , p. n. .
the placita ascribed to doctors
149 What this means for the chronology of the Placita requires further investigation.
The best known of Aristotles biological works in the Hellenistic period was the Historia
*
Animalium, esp. in the Alexandrian epitome of Aristophanes of Byzantium. J. Lennox,
The disappearance of Aristotles biology: a Hellenistic mystery, Apeiron (),
pp. ff. is perhaps too pessimistic about the distribution of other works. See also
J. Barnes, Roman Aristotle, in: J. Barnes and M. Griffin (eds.), Philosophia Togata II,
Oxford, , p. .
150 Such passages can easily be identified in Garofalos edition of Erasistratus fragments
K.),
is given as the single cause of all disease according to both Erasistratus
(fr. ) and Asclepiades. As Garofalo ad loc. notes, this is a doxographical simplification.
Use of the corresponding verb, however, is a more sophisticated procedure.
david t. runia
152 For this reason I shall not refer to secondary literature, but only give a reference to
157 On this text see H. Baltussen, o.c. (n. above), and the article of J. Mansfeld cited
above in n. . It has proved extremely difficult to determine whether this fragment is an
extract from a work such as the Phusikai doxai, or belongs to a work specially devoted
to the question of sense-perception. The diairesis is given at and consists of two basic
views.
158 IV.. We note that the method of formulation using prepositional phrases is
pp. .
david t. runia
161 I. Garofalo (ed.), Anonymi medici De morbis acutis et chroniis, Leiden, . On this
document and the role of doxography in it see further the discussion by P.J. van der Eijk
in ch. of this volume [= The Anonymus Parisinus and the doctrines of the Ancients,
pp. ].
162 For example, what is the reasoning behind the order of the doxai in chapter
164 See further the discussion of the text by A. Debru in ch. of this volume [=
Doctrine et tactique doxographique dans lAnonyme de Bruxelles: Une comparaison avec
lAnonyme de Londres, pp. ] and also the article cited in the following note (which
has a useful structural analysis).
165 E.g. ait, inquit, dicit etc. See further the discussion by A. Debru,
effective teaching device: much can be learned with a few words. Dox-
ography also aims at concision, but tries to highlight differing views on a
particular question. Collections of definitions focus on terms rather than
questions,167 and on the whole are not greatly interested in differences
of opinion. It is true that in many cases multiple definitions are given,
but the compiler is not bent on drawing attention to any disagreement
or conflict between them.168 He seems rather to regard them as com-
plementary. The more definitions, the more the reader can learn. On
the other hand, scattered throughout the work are a number of defini-
tions which do exploit doxographical material, including name-labels.169
Kollesch has noted that these only occur in specific sections of the work,
i.e. in () the section on the nature of medicine as a science, () in the
definitions of physiological concepts, and () the embryological section
noted above.170 In the sections on pathology they are entirely absent (in
contrast, therefore, to the Anon. Parisinus). As for name-labels, a few
philosophers occur in sections on very common terms such as soul,
motions, seed, nature: Plato (), Aristotle (), Zeno (), Stoics ().
The appearance of Empedocles in the chapter on the digestion is, of
course, very interesting in relation to Atius Book . Doctors who are
mentioned are Hippocrates (, by far the most common), Mnesitheus
(), Herophilus () and the Herophileans (, [242] including Bacchius
and Zeno), Erasistratus (), Apollonius of Memphis (), Athenaeus of
Attalia (), and Asclepiades (), who is rather prominent yet again.
Democritus, Praxagoras and Diocles once each occur in the embryolog-
167 There are only two extant examples, this collection and the valuable Academic
collection included in the Platonic corpus. But note that the first part of Ps.Galen
Historia philosopha (i.e. our G) combines definitions, divisions and doxography.
Definitions play an important role in scientific handbook literature, as M. Fuhrmann
has shown: see Das systematische Lehrbuch: ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Wissenschaften
in der Antike, Gttingen, , passim. But he does not discuss writings that consist solely
of definitions.
168 E.g. at and two definitions are given of the heart and liver respectively, the
ical section, but nowhere else. In other words, the names include all the
doctors in Atius (except Polybus), but extend far beyond the Placita in
range. We recall that in all likelihood the two documents are contempo-
raneous.
mundi: The problem of its interpretation, Vigiliae Christianae (), pp. ff.;
J. Mansfeld, Physikai doxai (above n. ), pp. . The monograph by H. Throm,
Die Thesis: ein Beitrag zu ihrer Entstehung und Geschichte, Paderborn, , is still the
standard treatment of the subject.
david t. runia
174 E.g. the view on digestion in no. is exactly that attributed to Erasistratus in Ps.
Galen Def. med. .
175 Von Arnims dating third to first cent. bce at RE V. (), col. is no more than
a guess.
176 J. Ilberg (ed.), Sorani Gynaeciorum Libri IV De signis fracturarum De fasciis Vita Hip-
an 1
(see von Staden in ch. above, pp. ). But this work cannot be
identified with Atius or his source, as rightly observed by Diels DG p. .
the placita ascribed to doctors
. Some conclusions
Appendix
The witnesses to the text of the two chapters are the following:
() Ps.Plutarch (P), as preserved in the Byzantine mss. The text of .
has two lemmata, of which the first is certainly incomplete. The text
of . has five lemmata, three on health and disease, two on old
age.
() Qust.a ibn Luqa (Q). In the Arabic translation the two lemmata of
. found in P are fuller, and a third lemma is added. In . an
extra lemma on disease is found and for one of the lemmata a fuller
name-label is given than we find in P. [246]
() Ps.Galen (G). In the Epitome of P the extra lemma in . given by
Q is confirmed, as is also the fuller name-label in .. Interestingly
. is divided up into two separate chapters. This witness is very
erratic in its dealing with the original text.
() Psellus (Ps). The th century witness does not offer any additional
material in comparison to P.
() Stobaeus (S). The anthologist exceptionally cites the Atian equiva-
lent of . in the second book of the Florilegium, i.e. the part of the
anthology devoted to ethical themes. Sections are cited in the chap-
ters on disease (), health (), and old age (). Diels assignation
of the brief Parmenidean lemma in the last-named chapter to Atius
is speculative, but enables him to explain the word in Ps
text.
david t. runia
Reconstruction
Atius at Ps.Plutarch .
Witnesses: P ., .. Mau, . Lachenaud; G ,
. Diels; Q ., .. Daiber
+ 8
! 8
. 1 9 AI 8 W-
+ 3 B
I
! 3 8 0 !, 6 E >& /0, \ ,
8
, 3 8 6 K, A 8 ;
6 /0 _, 8 E + 3 B , -
E 6 .
>; 8
@
, denn es entsteht aus einer Geschwulst, welche in den Werkzeugen des
Pneumas zusammen mit der Nahrung erscheint, die zu ihnen fliet.
. 0
I b - 3 I 8
, _
9K 8 9 , .
Folglich mu man unbedingt sagen, da das Fieber aus [247] (irgendwelchen)
Dingen entsteht, auch wenn sie verborgen sind, nmlich (aus) einer Geschwulst
oder einer Nahrung oder einem anderen heien Krper.
. Herophilus widerlegte das und glaubte, da die heie Geschwulst nicht dem
Feber vorangeht, sondern das Fieber geht ihr voran. In dieser (Weise) entsteht
das Fieber meistenfalls. Hufig tritt es ein, ohne da in ihm eine Ursache deutlich
ist. Seine Ursache lst die Bewegungen der chronischen (?) Krankheiten und die
Erzeugung der heien Geschwre aus.
8 G
P Mau, G Q Diels et editores alii
codd. et Mau, K Lachenaud, Diels sec. | 3 cum prendo,
Lachenaud sec.
! codd., B Garofalo
9 codd., corr. Diels | denn es . . . supp. Q
8
, _, 8 codd.
textus defuit in codd, supp. Q et cf. G $ (sic) 8 K +
!
. 1! +!
! 8 ! 3
5 3 5 B :
I 8 V
H O 8 K 3 B E X , 8 H
E
I 3 E 3 + ! +
3 K 5 B :, 3 5 = !, 3 B
Q .
, - G
B defuit in S
-, - S
Diels e Psello, cf. S
E 3 , sed
codd. P legunt +, et Q Herophilus (sic) glaubte, die Krankheiten werden
entweder . . . | a E 5 L, 5/0 P, a E 5 L 5 Psellus, a E
5 < 5- S, a E 5 < 5/0 Q ut vid.
a 8 t P, a 8 < S, a E L Psellus | 0 def. in P
7 codd. P, F S
P, 3 S, + G [249]
. . . - P, 7 S, G | - P S Psellus,
-
G Q
1, ! G | P, conj. Bernadakis Mau Lache-
naud e Psello | K mss., ! conj. Usener Diels Garofalo, lectio Q est incerta |
legit S 1 7 0 ! ! O
hoc placitum S solus servat
' P, ' Psellus, ' ' + G Q (G novum
caput incipit cum titulo -)
= conj. Diels, > mss.
. Asclepiades says that Ethiopians become old quickly at the age of thirty years
because their bodies are overheated when they are burnt by the sun; in Britain
people live to the age of one hundred and twenty through the coldness of the
locality and because they protect the fiery element in themselves. The bodies of
Ethiopians are thinner because they are stretched out by the sun; those of the
dwellers in the north are stockier, and for this reason they live longer.
I
J. Mansfeld, Doxographical Studies, Quellenforschung, Tabular Presentation and
Other Varieties of Comparativism, in W. BurkertL. Gemelli MarcianoE.
MatelliL. Orelli, eds., Fragmentsammlungen philosophischer Texte der Antike
Le raccolte dei frammenti di filosofi antichi, Aporemata , Gttingen: Vanden-
hoeck & Ruprecht , .
p. , n. : This is not true. The substantive doxographie is first found in P. Tan-
nery, Pour l'histoire de la science hellne, Paris , n. (= p. , n. of the
nd edition); for these texts Tannery refers to the Doxographi Graeci, adding
that the fragments are translated from Mullach.
p. : On Theodorets contribution see the criticism of M. Frede (), Atiana,
Phronesis , , and the reply by D.T. Runia, article in this collection.
p. : H. Usener, Analecta theophrastea (), repr. in: Kleine Schriften I, Leipzig:
B.G. Teubner , , derived the common source of the little streams
(rivuli; cf. the motto of Diels Doxographi Graeci of , p. iv) of ps.Plutarch,
ps.Galen, and others on the one hand, and of Hippolytus adu. haeres. ..
. () on the other from what he believed to be an Epitome in
two books of Theophrastus so-called Physicorum Opiniones. He also spoke
of Diogenes Lartius use of this Epitome. In his first and second apparatus to
the fragments of the Theophrastean work he refers to and quotes Hippolytus,
ps.Plutarch, Diogenes Lartius, e.g., Analecta p. , on Phys. op. fr. [~ fr.
FHS&G] at Simp. in Phys. .: deest + A ! quod
servavit scr. de plac. philos. I , , the words and everything is resolved
in water, preserved by the author of the Placita Philosophorum, are lacking
[scil., in Simplicius]. These references to a multiplicity of texts as deriving in
one way or another from Theophrastus were of course fundamental for Diels
theory.
p. : On Darwinian and other tree diagrams in a literary context compare
now F. Moretti (), La letteratura vista da lontano, Turin, ch. alberi,
.
II
J. Mansfeld, Physikai doxai and problmata physika in Philosophy and Rhetoric:
From Aristotle to Atius (and Beyond), in W.W. FortenbaughD. Gutas, eds.,
additional remarks
III
D.T. Runia, Xenophanes on the Moon: a Doxographicum in Atius, Phronesis
(), . LeidenBoston: Brill.
The description of the Dielsian hypothesis presented in this article has been
fully developed in Atiana Vol. I. The analysis of At. . which it contains
forms the basis for the more detailed account in Atiana Vol. II, pp. .
On Xenophanes cosmology see now the research of A.P.D. Mourelatos in The
cloud-astrophysics of Xenophanes and Ionian material monism, in P. Curd and
D.W. Graham, eds., The Oxford Handbook of the Presocratics, Oxford ,
, and other articles.
p. , n. : on Lebedevs hypothesis see now the detailed critique in Atiana
Vol. I, pp. .
p. : When writing this I was unaware of a very important early witness, P. Oxy.
fr. recto, which appears to have read
[ ]
.
[ ]. . . . .
[ ].
and so does not support the reading that this article favours; see Atiana Vol. I,
p. and n. . Note, however, this does not mean that the articles conclu-
sion is necessarily invalidated; see the further comment at Atiana Vol. II,
p. .
p. : On the references to Heraclitus in this chapter see now S.N. Mouraviev,
Heraclitea II.A.. Hraclite dphse, La tradition antique et mdivale. T-
moignages et citations; De Snque Diogne Larce, Sankt Augustin ,
T.
p. , n. : This promised piece of research was carried out in article of the
present collection.
p. , n. : This and n. on p. are references to the future publication of
Atiana Vol. I.
p. : On the title of Atius book see above p. . But since our discussion in
Atiana Vol. I, pp. we have changed our mind and now think that the
title of the compendium was more likely to have been
!; see further Atiana Vol. II, p. and
n. .
additional remarks
IV
J. Mansfeld, Chrysippus and the Placita, Phronesis (), . Leiden
Boston: Brill.
Parts of this paper treat the same material as parts of J. Mansfeld, (),
Doxography and Dialectic: the Sitz im Leben of the Placita, in W.H. Haase,
ed., Aufstieg und Niedergang der Rmischen Welt II Vol. ., BerlinNew York,
.
In the late eighties of the last century I still accepted Diels Vetusta placita
hypothesis; today I would, more vaguely, speak of a multiplicity of anterior dox-
ographical traditions. Nor would I place as much emphasis on a purported pass-
ing of the Placita through the Skeptical Academy (though it is useful to keep
this aspect in mind), but prefer to stress the connection with the methodolo-
gies of the Early Peripatos. For this connection see now Atiana Vol. II, Part
.
The complete text of the so-called Anonymus Fuchsii, rebaptized Anonymus
Parisinus, has been published by I. Garofalo, ed. (), with transl. by B. Fuchs,
Anonymi Medici De Morbis Acutis et Chroniis, Studies in Ancient Medicine,
, Leiden; translation and notes to be used with care, see the review by V.
Nutton, Med. Hist. (), . For the sake of convenience Garofalo
page numbers have been inserted in the text between square brackets.
For the fragments of Diocles see now P.J. van der Eijk (), Diocles
of Carystus: A Collection of the Fragments with Translation and Commentary,
Studies in Ancient Medicine, , Leiden etc. For the sake of convenience
Van der Eijk fragment numbers have been inserted in the text between square
brackets.
p. , n. : See now T.L. Tieleman (), Galen and Chrysippus on the Soul:
Argument and Refutation in the De placitis, Books IIIII, Philosophia Antiqua
, Leiden etc.
p. , n. : For other partial editions see Garofalo, op. cit. xxvixvii.
p. , n. : For the medical traditions see now the volume edited by P.J. van
der Eijk (), Ancient Histories of Medicine: Essays in Medical Doxography
and Historiography in Classical Antiquity, Studies in Ancient Medicine ,
Leiden etc. For the Placita in particular see D.T. Runia, The Placita Ascribed
to Doctors in Atius Doxography on Physics, in Van der Eijk, ed., Ancient
Histories of Medicine, [= article in this collection]. For Anonymus
Londinensis see D. Manetti, Aristotle and the Role of Doxography in the
Anonymus Londinensis (Pbrlibr inv. ), ibid., ; for the papyrus
and its contents see D. Manetti (), at Corpus dei papiri filosofici greci e
latini (CPF), Parte I: Autori noti, Vol. *, Florence, . For Anonymus
Parisinus see P.J. van der Eijk (), The Anonymus Parisinus and the
Doctrines of the Ancients, ibid., .
p. : On this issue see now Atiana Vol. II, Part , .
p. , n. : See now H. Baltussen (),Plato in the Placita (Atius Book
IV): a Dielsian Blind Spot, Philologus , .
p. , n. : See e.g. article in this collection, and Atiana Vol. II, Part .
additional remarks
V
J. Mansfeld, Deconstructing Doxography, Philologus (), . Ber-
lin: Akademie Verlag.
This piece was sent to Philologus as a reply to the paper of L. Zhmud listed in the
bibliography ad finem. Philologus wrote that es msse entironisiert werden. I
complied.
p. : The paper announced here is L. Zhmud (), Eudemus History of
Mathematics, in I. BodnrW.W. Fortenbaugh eds., Eudemus of Rhodes, New
BrunswickLondon, . See also L. Zhmud (), The Origin of the
History of Science in Classical Antiquity, BerlinNew York. But I recom-
mend J. Mejer (), Eudemus and the History of Science, in Bodnr
Fortenbaugh, .
VI
D.T. Runia, Atius, or Whats in a Name? Mnemosyne (), .
LeidenBoston: Brill.
The article was written prior to the submission of Atiana Vol. II (see p. n. )
as a response to some critiques of Vol. I, but it did not appear until after Vol. II
had been published.
p. : See Atiana Vol. II, p. xiii for our declaration of intent to publish a
reconstruction of the entire work.
VII
J. Mansfeld, Physical doxai in the Phaedo, in M. KardaunJ. Spruyt, eds., The
Winged Chariot. Collected Essays on Plato and Platonism in Honour of L.M. de
Rijk, Brills Studies in Intellectual History , LeidenBostonKln: Brill ,
.
p. , n. : On chapter headings see now Atiana Vol. II, Part , .
p. , n. : See Atiana Vol. II, Part , .
VIII
J. Mansfeld, Aristote et la structure du De sensibus de Thophraste, Phronesis
(), . LeidenBoston: Brill.
p. , n. and p. , n. : See ad article II, p. , n. .
additional remarks
IX
J. Mansfeld, Epicurus Peripateticus, in A. Alberti, ed., Realt e ragione. Studi di
filosofia antica, Firenze: Olschki , .
p. , n. : This paper has not yet been published. For a preliminary overview
see J. MansfeldD.T. Runia (), Atiana II, Part : Atius Book II: Speci-
men Reconstructionis, , Index of dialectical-doxographical parallels, s.v.
Epicurus.
p. , n. : Revised version: K. Algra (), Concepts of Space in Greek
Thought, Leiden etc., ff.
p. , n. : See now T. KouromenosG.M.T. ParassoglouK. Tsantsanoglou
(), The Derveni Papyrus. Edited with Introduction and Commentary,
Florence, text , col. iv ; commentary .
X
D.T. Runia, Lucretius and Doxography, in K.A. AlgraM.H. Koenen, eds.,
Lucretius and his Intellectual Background, Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie
van Wetenschappen, Verhandelingen Afd. Letterkunde, Nieuwe Reeks , Am-
sterdamOxfordNew YorkTokyo: North-Holland, , .
p. , n. : The reconstruction was published in in Atiana Vol. II.
XI
D.T. Runia, Philo and Hellenistic Doxography, in F. Alesse, ed., Philo of Alexan-
dria and Post-Aristotelian Philosophy, Studies on Philo of Alexandria , Leiden
Boston: Brill , .
The article develops some themes from Atiana Vol. I and Vol. II, but examines in
much more detail the role that doxographical material plays in Philos writings
and thought. Philo with his commitment to Judaism is by no means a typical
ancient author, so the article illustrates well the adaptability of the material
supplied by doxography.
p. , n. : See now Atiana Vol. II, pp. .
XII
D.T. Runia, Additional Fragments of Arius Didymus on Physics, originally
published in K.A. AlgraP.W. van der HorstD.T. Runia, eds., Polyhistor: Studies
in the History and Historiography of Philosophy Presented to Jaap Mansfeld on
his Sixtieth Birthday, Philosophia Antiqua , LeidenNew YorkKln: E.J. Brill
, .
The article, presented as a tribute to my co-author, was a by-product of the
research done for Atiana Vol. I. It is closely linked to pp. in that
volume, with the important addition of the numbered list in the Appendix. The
additional remarks
XIII
J. Mansfeld, Critical Note: Empedocles and his Interpreters, Phronesis (),
. LeidenBoston: Brill.
XIV
D.T. Runia, Atheists in Atius: Text, Translation and Comments on De placitis
.., Mnemosyne (), . LeidenBoston: Brill.
p. : On the title see the note above on Article , p. .
p. : This intention has not yet been carried out. An analysis of . will
form part of the full reconstruction of Atius remains to be undertaken by
J. Mansfeld, O. Primavesi and D.T. Runia.
p. : In a letter written in response to the articles publication Prof. Marek
Winiarczyk pointed out to me that the first text is in fact printed as T in
his Teubner edition of the fragments of Diagoras (Leipzig ), and that the
other text was omitted because it does not include Diagoras name.
p. : On the posing of the existential question in Atius chapters see now
Atiana Vol. II, pp. .
XV
J. Mansfeld, Plato, Pythagoras, Aristotle, the Peripatetics, the Stoics, and Thales
and his Followers On Causes , in A. Brancacci, ed., Antichi e Moderni nella
Filosofia dEt Imperiale, Elenchos , Napoli: Bibliopolis , .
additional remarks
p. , n. : But see now also O. Primavesi (), Ein Blick in den Stollen
von Skepsis: Vier Kapitel zur frhen berlieferung des Corpus Aristotelicum,
Philologus , .
p. : See now Atiana Vol. II, Part , .
XVI
J. Mansfeld, Atius, Aristotle and Others on Coming to Be and Passing Away,
in V. CastonD.W. Graham, eds., Presocratic Philosophy. Essays in honour of
Alexander Mourelatos, Aldershot: Variorum , .
p. : See Atiana Vol. II, Part , .
XVII
J. Mansfeld, Cosmic Distances: Atius . Diels and Some Related Texts,
Phronesis (), . LeidenBoston: Brill. Also printed in M. Canto-
SperberP. Pellegrin, eds., Le Style de la pense: Recueil de textes en hommage
Jacques Brunschwig, Paris: Les Belles Lettres , .
p. : For ch. . see further Atiana Vol. II, Part , pp. .
p. : On chapter headings see now Atiana Vol. II, Part , pp. .
XVIII
J. Mansfeld, From Milky Way to Halo. Aristotles Meteorologica, Atius, and
Passages in Seneca and the Scholia on Aratus, in A. Brancacci, ed., Philosophy
and Doxography in the Imperial Age, Florence: Olschki , .
p. : But note that Aristotle uses to see in the sense of to shine upon (of the
rays of the sun), Mete. a, quoted p. above.
p. , n. : On the definitions at Atius .. Diels see J. Mansfeld (),
Illuminating What is Thought. A Middle Platonist placitum on Voice in
Context, Mnemosyne , .
XIX
D.T. Runia, The Placita ascribed to Doctors in Atius Doxography on Physics,
originally published in P.J. van der Eijk, ed., Ancient Histories of Medicine: Essays
in Medical Doxography and Historiography in Classical Antiquity, Studies in
Ancient Medicine , LeidenBostonKln: Brill , .
On the rich collection of essays in which the article was published see the reviews
of J. Mansfeld, Phronesis () (who calls it a )
and R.J. Hankinson, Apeiron () . The other contribution to the
volume by D.T. Runia, a chapter entitled What is doxography?, pp. , has
not been included in this collection of articles.
additional remarks
P S T Diels Mansfeld-Runia
.. ..
.. ..
.. ..b ..
.. ..b ..
.. ..a ..
.. .. ..
.. ..b ..
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concordance
P S T Diels Mansfeld-Runia
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. ..
. ..
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concordance
P S T Diels Mansfeld-Runia
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concordance
P S T Diels Mansfeld-Runia
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concordance
P S T Diels Mansfeld-Runia
.. ..g ..
.. ..b ..
.. ..b ..
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concordance
P S T Diels Mansfeld-Runia
..c ..*
.. ..a .. ..*
.. ..a .. ..*
.. ..a .. ..*
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.. .b .. ..*
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.. ..c & f .g .. & ..*
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..d .. .a.*
.. ..b .. ..*
.. ..c .. ..*
.. .. ..*
.. ..f .. ..*
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concordance
P S T Diels Mansfeld-Runia
.. ..e .. ..*
.. ..e .. ..*
.. .. ..*
.. ..b .. ..*
..d .. ..*
.. ..d .. ..*
.. ..c .. ..*
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.. ..b .. ..*
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.. ..b .. ..*
.. ..c .. ..*
.. ..d .. ..*
.. ..a .. ..*
.. ..a .. ..*
.. ..b .. ..*
.. ..a .a .. ..*
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.. ..c .b .. ..*
.. ..d .d .. ..*
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.. ..l .g .. ..*
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.. ..n . .. ..*
.. ..o .a .. ..*
.. ..o .. ..*
.. ..d .b .. ..*
.. ..d .c .. ..*
.. ..k .. ..*
.. .. ..*
..
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concordance
P S T Diels Mansfeld-Runia
.. ..e .. ..*
.. ..l .. ..*
.. ..b .. ..*
.. ..g,h .. ..*
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.. ..c .. ..*
.. ..b .., ..*
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..b .c .. ..*
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.. ..c .a, .a .. ..*
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.. .b, .c .. ..*
.. ..g .c, .d .. ..*
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concordance
P S T Diels Mansfeld-Runia
.. ..d,h .., ..*
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.. ..i .b .., ..*
.. .. ..*
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..i Addenda p. ..*
.. ..b .. ..*
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.. ..c .. ..*
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concordance
P S T Diels Mansfeld-Runia
.. ..f .. ..*
.. ..f .. ..*
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..b .. ..*
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.. ..d ..b ..*
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concordance
P S T Diels Mansfeld-Runia
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concordance
P S T Diels Mansfeld-Runia
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concordance
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concordance
P S T Diels Mansfeld-Runia
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concordance
P S T Diels Mansfeld-Runia
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.. .. ..
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.. (Joh. Dam.) ..
.. ..
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concordance
P S T Diels Mansfeld-Runia
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concordance
P S T Diels Mansfeld-Runia
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.. ..
.. ..
.. ..
.. ..
.. ..
.. ..
.. ..
.. ..
.. ..
.. ..
.. ..
.. ..
concordance
P S T Diels Mansfeld-Runia
.. ..
.. ..
.. ..
.. ..
.. ..
.. ..() ..
.. ..
.. ..
(Photius) ..
.. ..
.. ..
.. ..
.. ..
.. ..
.. .. ..
.. ..
.. ..
.. ..
.. ..
.. ..
.. ..
.. ..
.. ..
.. ..
.. ..
.. ..
.. ..
.. ..
.. ..
.. ..
.. ..
.. .. ..
.. .. ..
.. ..
.. ..
.. ..
.. ..
.. ..
.. ..
.. ..
..
.. .. & . ..
.. .. ..
.. .. ..
concordance
P S T Diels Mansfeld-Runia
.. ..
.. ..
.. ..
INDEX NOMINUM ET RERUM
in Soranus, Peripatetic, , , , , ,
in Theophrastus, , , , , , ( Academic; antilo-
n, , , gia; Aristotle; compromise
view; categories; contamina-
method of, , n, , n, tion; definition; diaeresis; dia-
, n, , , phonia; disagreement; disputa-
, , , , , tio in utramque partem; doxai;
endoxa; objection(s); placita;
of genus into species, problem(s); proposition(s))
of lemmata, or as structuring diaphonia, of lemmata or chapters,
chapters, , , , or as structuring chapters, ,
, , , , , , n, , , , ,
, n, , , , , n, , , , , , ,
, , , , , , , ,
, , , , , , , , , , , ,
, , , , , , , , , , ,
( categories; diaphonia; , , , , and passim
question-types) ( dialectic; categories; diaeresis;
of telos (Chrysippus), , question-types)
of the problem (Galen), as structuring (a part of) books,
of problems in philosophy, )
dialectic, dialectical, , , , , Diels, H., , , , , , , , ,
, , , , , , , , , n, ,
, , , , , , and , n, , , , ,
passim , , , , , and
according to Eudemus, n passim
as training, , , n, n, numbering of Atian lemmata,
n, , n, n
before Plato, , n, n, on Arius Didymus, , , ,
, ( Gorgias; Hippias; n, ,
Isocrates) on chapter division, n
image of lawsuit, on definitions,
in Atius, , , on diaeresis, n, n,
in Aristotle, , n, , , , n
, , , , on Epicurean source, ,
, , , , , , , , ,
, , , , n, on (follower/pupil of) Posidonius,
, , , and n, , n, ,
passim on fraud, , , , n,
in Chrysippus, ,
in Epicurus, , , on Hippolytus, , n
in Philo, , on Homeric Allegorists,
in Plato, , , , on Meno/Menoneia, , ,
, n, ,
in Seneca, n, , , on meteorological hand-
in Theophrastus, , , , , book/source, , ,
, on Ps.Galen, , ,
index nominum et rerum
exegesis/exegete(s)/exegetical , , , , , ,
(continued) , , , , n, ,
links with doxography, , , and passim
, , hypograph, 5-,
hypothesis, 5, ( quaestio
fictional/fiction(s), , , , finita)
, , n
Iamblichus,
Galen, , , and passim Iliad, , n
on diaeresis of the problem, Introductio seu Medicus, n
on diaeresis, n Isocrates, , n, n
on diaphonia(e), ', ,
on hgemonikon, ,
on mathematical proof, Jaeger, W.,
on soul,
on theoretical issues, , n, la Bruyre, J. de, n
, Lachmann, K., , n,
study of Aristotle, 0, ,
geneticism, like by like, 9 9;, , ,
gnmai, ( doxai) , ( perception)
Gorgias, , n, n, , linguistics, Indo-European, ,
, n
Gospels, Linnaeus, C.,
Griesbach, J.J., lists, headings of, , , ,
of atheists,
hairesis, W, see Sect(s) of categories, n, n
handbook literature, , , , of ethical views, , n
, , n, , , , of prepositional formulas,
, , , , , , n, n
, , , n, of principles, , , n
( compendium; epitome) of selected passages, ,
meteorological h., , , of tenets, , , n,
Harder, R., , , , , ,
hgemonikon, :, of , n, , ,
cosmos, n, , , , , and
of soul, seat of, , , , n, passim ( dialectic; Hippias;
, , , , , Isocrates; Plato)
, , , , , , Lucretius, , , , , ,
, , ,
Hermagoras, n, , n, diaeresis,
, , n, n doxography,
Hermias, , , n terminology, , n,
Hippias, , , ,
Hippolytus, , , , , , Macrobius, n, , n,
,
Historia Philosopha, macro-organization/macrostructure,
', , , , n, , , , , , ,
index nominum et rerum
Theophrastus, , , , , , , , , , , ,
, , and passim ( Aristotle; ( doxography; Ps.Plutarch)
diaeresis; dialectic) gnomological,
correcting Aristotle, , n, of ancient atheism,
, , , , , of dialectical discussion,
De Sensibus/De Sensu, , , of the Placita, , , , ,
n, , n, , , ,
n, , , , related/shared, , , , , ,
, , , , , , n,
diaeresis, , , , , , n,
Metarsiologika/Metarsiology, , n, , , ,
, n, n, n, ,
n, , n, , , tradition(s) not source(s), ,
n, ,
Physical Problems, n, tree diagram, , , , ( arche-
Physics, , n, n, , , type; cladistics; stemma)
n, n, , n, types of inquiry see question-types
n,
Physikai Doxai, - Usener, H., , , , , , , n,
/Physical Tenets, , , , , n, , ,
, , n, , , , on tradition from Theophrastus,
, , , , n, ,
, , , , , ,
n, Varro, , , n, , , ,
presentation of doxai as in Atius, , , , , ,
, , n, Vetusta Placita, , , , ,
vocabulary, , n n, , n, ,
thesis,
(general issue/question), , n, , ,
, , n, n, , n, , ,
n, n, n, , , , , , , ,
n, , , , , , , ( Diels)
Vetustissima Placita, , ,
domain of the philosophers, , n,
n, n, , n, , Volkmann, R.,
ethical, , n Wachsmuth, C., , n,
physical, , , n, n, , , , ,
rhetorical, n, , , , , n, , n,
( quaestio infinita)
Timaeus Locrus, Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, U. von,
title(s) see book title(s), heading(s) n
topoi/topos, , , , n,
n, , , , Xenophanes,
tradition(s), doxographical, ,
, , , , , n, Zeller, E., , , , n
, , , , n, , ztmata, -, , n, ,
, , , , , ( problem(s))
INDEX LOCORUM POTIORUM
The following index gives all the more important references to ancient writ-
ings in the collection of articles. For general references to authors and works
see also the Index nominum. Because the references have been made in differ-
ing contexts over a period of two decades, we give the most accessible refer-
ence in the expectation that the reader will be able to identify the edition or
fragment collection used. In the case of the Atian Placita the references are
listed as much as possible under the name of Atius (in many cases the refer-
ence will be identical or very similar to that for Ps.Plutarch). See also the Con-
cordance.
Achilles ..
Isagoge .
. , , ,
n,
, .. n
, .
n, n, . n, ,
n, , n
.. n
Aelian ..
Varia Historia . , n,
. n, ,
n, ,
Atius n, ,
Placita
Praef. , , , .. f n
..
Praef. n, n .. n
. .. n
. ..
.. n, ..
. , .. n
.. n .. n
. , , , ..
, , , .. n,
, . n,
.. . n
.. .. n,
.. ..
.. n ..
.. n, .. n
.. , . ,
index locorum potiorum
. , n . , , ,
. , n, , n, ,
n
. , , . ,
n, , . , n,
,
.. ..
. n, , , . n
n, . n, ,
.. n, n,
. n
.. ..
. , . ,
. . n,
.& ,
. n, ,
. , n
.. , .. n
. ,
.. n .
.. n . n, n,
.. n ,
. . , , ,
.. n ,
.. n .. n,
.. ..
. , . , , , ,
.
. , .. n
.. .. n
.. n ..
.. . ,
. n, n, .. &n.
, , .. n
, . , , ,
. n ,
. &n. , , ,
. &n. , , ,
. , , , , , ,
. , n,
n .. n, n
.. , .. n
.. n ..
.. n .. n
. n, n, .
n, , .
..
index locorum potiorum
Aristotle (continued) .
De anima .
. a .
. a n, n . n
. . b ,
. . , ,
. b ff n
. b . , , ,
. b n , n
. b ff . a
. a n . b ff
. a n . b
. a ff n, . a
. a ff . a n
. b ff n, . b
. b n .
. a ff . b
. ab n . ba
. a ff n n,
. a ff . b
. b n . b n
. ba . b n
n . a n
. a n . b f n
. ba . a n
n . b n
. a ff n . b n
. a ff n De generatione animalium
. . a n
. b ff n . b n
. a ff . b ff, . b ff
. a n n
. a ff . b, .
. b ba n
. b ff , n .
. a n . a ff
. a, b . ab
n n
De caelo . a ,
. . a n
. De generatione et corruptione
. a n .
. a, f n . a
. a n . a
. . b n
. b . b , n
. b n, n . b
index locorum potiorum
. b n, . b ff n
. b n . b n
. b ff . b ff n
. . b n
. b n Fragmenta
. b De bono fr. n
. a De philosophia fr.
. b n n
. b De philosophia fr.
. b
. b ff n De philosophia fr. c
. ba , n
De philosophia fr.
. a ff n n
. Eudemus fr. n
. a n Protrepticus fr b
. b ff n n
. b fr. Rose n
. b n Metaphysica
. b n A a ,
. a, ba A ab n
A a n
De iuventute A a
b ff n A b
De partibus animalium A b n
. b ff n A ba
. a n&
. a ff A b
De respiratione A b n, n
b n A ba
De sensu n
ab n A a n
b ff n A a n
n A ab ,
De somno et vigila A b n
a A a n
Ethica Eudemia A b n
. a n A a n
Ethica Nicomachea A b ff n
. a n A b, ff
. a n
. a ff n A b n
. b ff A a n
. a n A a n
. a f n a ff n,
. a n b ff
. b n, n b n
index locorum potiorum
Poetica Athenaeus
a Deipnosophistae
ab &n .c
Politica Athenagoras
. a n Legatio
. a n . ,
Rhetorica
. n Augustine
. a ff Contra Academicos
. a ff . n
. b ff De civitate Dei
. a n . n
.
. b Boethus
Fragmenta
Topica
. a n
. b f n
. a ff n Caelius Aurelius
. b , , , De morbis acutis et chronicis
n . n
. b n . n
. b f n . n
. n, , ..
n, n
. a n Calcidius
. ab Commentarius in Timaeus
, , ff n
n
. b n
. b n n, n
. b n
. b ff n Callimachus
. Fragmenta
,
Arius Didymus ,
ap. Stob. Ecl. .
Cassiodorus
Fragmenta Institutiones
n .. ff n
n,
n, n Catullus
n Carmina
n . n
n, n
n
index locorum potiorum
Celsus De finibus
De medicina . n
Praef. . n
Praef. . n
Praef. . n
Praef. n . n
Praef. . n
. n, n
Censorinus . n
De die natali . n
n De inventione
, , , n .. n
. n, ,
Chrysippus , n,
ap. Gal. PHP .. n
De natura deorum
. , ,
Cicero .
Academica Posteriora . n
., n .
. n, n . ,
Academica Priora .
. n .
. . n,
. n . ,
. .
. .
. n .
. n . ,
. n .
. n .
. n, .
. , , , .
, .
. . n
. , n .
. , .
, , , .
.
De divinatione De oratore
. n . n
. n . n, n,
. n, n n
De fato . n
n .
De partitione oratoria
n
index locorum potiorum
..
n .. n
Epistulae ad Atticum ...,
.. n n
.. n ... n
Hortensius
fr. n
Orator Cleomedes
n Caelestia
, .. n
n
n Clidemus
n Fragmenta
n
Paradoxa Stoicorum
n Cornutus
Timaeus Compendium
n
Topica
. n Corpus Hermeticum
n . n
n
Corpus Hippocraticum
Tusculanae disputationes De morbis popularibus
. , , . n
. , , De morbo sacro
, n, n, n
. , n, n
n De natura hominis (Polybus)
. , n n
. n, n De prisca medicina
. n n
. n
. n Critias
. n Fragmenta
. n B
Cleanthes David
Fragmenta Prolegomena philosophiae
n . ff n
. n B n
. B n
. n, n B n, ,
. n
. n B n
. n B n
. n B n
. n B n
. n, b B n
. B n
. B n
. B n
. B n
. , n B n
. B n, n,
. , n &n
. , n B n, n
. n B n, n
. B n, n
. B n, n,
Diogenes of Oenoanda B
Fragmenta B n
Epicharmus
Dionysius Halicarnassensis Fragmenta
Antiquitates n
.
.. n Epictetus
Diatribae
Divisiones Aristoteleae ..
..
Elias Epicurus
Prolegomena philosophiae Epistulae see Diogenes Laertius
. n Book X
Fragmenta (Arrighetti)
Empedocles .
Fragmenta .
A n n
A .
A n n
A Fragmenta (Usener)
A n n
A n n
B
B
index locorum potiorum
Eudemus Galen
Fragmenta Compendium Timaei
n . n
De animi cuiuslibet peccatorum
, dignotione et curatione
n n
n, n
, De captionibus penes dictionem
n
Euhemerus De causis contentivis
Fragmenta n
T De elementis ex Hippocrate
.. ff n
Euripides De experientia medica
Fragmenta . n, n
De locis affectis
n . n
. n
... n
.. n
index locorum potiorum
Hesiod Isocrates
Theogony Antidosis
&n, n
Helen
n
Hippias n
Fragmenta
B n Johannes Lydus
De mensibus
Hippocrates et Aeschylus . , ,
Fragmenta (DK)
, n .
n
Johannes Philoponus
Hippolytus In De anima
Refutatio omnium haeresium . n
. . n
.. n . ff n
.. n In De generatione et corruptione
.. n . n
.. n, n . ff
. .. n
.. n In Meteorologica
. , .. n
.. n In Physica
... n . ff n
. n Timon
..b
..
. , , Lucretius
De natura rerum
.. , .
.. .
..a .
.. . n
. . n
. n . n
. n . ff
.. n, . n
.. n .
.. n .
.. .
.. . n
.. n . n
.. . n
.. n .
.. n .
..a .
.. n .
.. n .
Florilegium . n
.. . ff
. ff n
Josephus .
Antiquitates Judaicae . n
. . n
. n
Lactantius .
De ira . , n
. .
. .
.
Leucippus .
Fragmenta .
A n .
A n . n
Macrobius, Commentarius in . n
Somnium Scipionis (continued) .
.., n .
.. n
.. Nicomachus Gerasenus
Excerpta
Manilius .
Astronomica Introductio arithmetica
. n .. n
Novum Testamentum
Marcus Aurelius Rom : n
In se ipsum Cor : n
. n Col. : n
. n Tim : n
. n Hebr. : n
. n
Ocellus Lucanus
Marius Victorinus Fragmenta
Explanationes in Rhetoricam
Ciceronis
. ff n Oenipides
. ff n Fragmenta
. ff n n
Nemesius Pappus
De natura hominis Collectio
. ff n . n
. n
. n
index locorum potiorum
Papyri n
Derveni ,
col. i n De animalibus
col. iv n
Oxyrhynchi De cherubim
fr. n
De confusione linguarum
n
Parmenides De ebrietate
Fragmenta
A n
A n
A n
A n
A n
Aa n
B n De fuga et inventione
B. n
B. De gigantibus
B n n
B De migratione
B , n n
B n ,
B n n
De mutatione
Philo of Alexandria
De Abrahamo ,
, n n
, De opificio mundi
De aeternitate mundi
,
n, n
De posteritate
n
,
De Providentia
.
, , .
, n . ,
. n
.
n, , .
.,
.,
n .
n .
index locorum potiorum
Plato ,
Apologia a ,
a n
Cratylus bc
c n b
d n c ,
ab n de
a a
a Philebus
Hippias maior b n
e n Respublica
Leges b
b Sophista
bc n ca &n
e n db n
Lysis b n
ad db &n
Meno
c n ac n
Parmenides ac
c Symposium
Phaedo ab n
d n ab n
de n Theaetetus
b , d
c , ab
ea bb n
be n da
ed de n
d e n
c
ea da
ab eb n
a n ce n
d e n, n
ea n e n
e d n
a e n
bd Timaeus
bc n c n
b n, , c n
, , ab ,
n b
b a
cd n da
db eb
de n, e , ,
index locorum potiorum
. n, n, Psellus
n De omnifaria doctrina
Polybius Epiluseis
Historiae ..
..
Pseudo-Aristotle
Porphyry De mundo
De abstinentia a n
n a
Fragmenta b
F n De Melisso Xenophane Gorgia
F ff n n
In Timaeum Problemata
fr. n b n
Posidonius Pseudo-Galen
Fragmenta (E.K.) Definitiones medicae
n n,
n n
n, n
n ,
n .. n
... n
n, n ..
ab n Historia philosopha
n
n n
Praxagoras
Fragmenta n,
n
n
,
n, n
n,
Proclus
In Timaeum
.. n Introductio seu medicus
Theologica Platonica n
. n . n
.. ff n
Procopius . n
Historia arcana .. f n
. n .. n
index locorum potiorum
Pseudo-Justin n, n
Cohortatio ad Graecos .. n
, n .. n, n,
. n
Oratio ad Graecos
. Scholia
Scholia in Aratum
Pseudo-Longinus ., ., .
De sublimitate
&n
n, n
Pseudo-Lucian
Philopatris n,
Scholia in Basilium (Pasquali)
Pseudo-Plato . n
Definitiones Scholia in Luciani veras historias
ab n . n
Scholia in Ptolemaei Syntaxin
Pseudo-Plutarch mathematicam
De fato . ,
,
Scholia vetera in Pindari pythia
De Homero b n
. n
. Seneca
Placita, see Atius Epistulae
Stromateis . n
n, n . n
Vitae X oratores . n
F n . n
Naturales quaestiones
Ptolemy .
Syntaxis mathematica .
. n .. n
. .. n
.. n
Quintilian .. n,
Institutio oratoria n
.. .. n
.., .. n ..
. .., .
.. n
.. n Sextus Empiricus
.. n Adversus mathematicos
.. n .
.. n, n, . n
index locorum potiorum
. n Simplicius
. n In De anima
. n . ff n
. n In De caelo
. n . ff
., . n n
. n . ff n
. n .. n
. n ., . n
. ff n . n
., In Physica
. n . ff, . ff n
. . n
. . f n
., . n
. ff n . n
. .
., . n
., , . n
. . n
. . ff n
. . ff
. n . n
. n
. n Sophonias
. ff n In De anima
. n . ff n
. n
. n Soranus medicus
. n ap. Cael. Aur. De morbis ..
Pyrrhoniae hypotyposeis
. n ap. Tert. De anima .
.
. n
. n Sotion
. Fragmenta
.
.
. Stobaeus, see Johannes Stobaeus
.
. Stoicorum veterum fragmenta
. n . n
. . n
. . n
.
. n
.
index locorum potiorum
De providentia A n, ,
.A n, n , n,
n
Theodorus n,
Fragmenta n, n,
T n
, n,
Theon Rhetor n, n
Progymnasmata n, n
n AB n,
.. ff n A n, ,
.. n,
n
Theophrastus
De causis plantarum . n
Praef. n
.. n A n
.. n
.. n , n,
.. n n
De sensibus Historiae plantarum
, .., ..
n .. n
n .. n
n Lapides
n
Metaphysica
n b n
De ventis Metarsiologica
fr. ,
Fragmenta (FHS&G) , n,
A n
. n . ff n
. n
n Timon
n, n, Fragmenta
n
, n
, Trophonius Rhetor
, n ap. Rabe Proleg. syll. ., .,
A n, n .
n, n, n
, n
A , Varro
B n ap. Serv. Comm. in Georg. .
C n n
C
index locorum potiorum
Xenocrates Xenophon
Fragmenta Memorabilia
n .. n
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